GW Final Report for OAS

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES & COLOMBIAN SOCIETY:

MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS TOWARDS REINTEGRATING EX-COMBATANTS

© Copyr ight 2016 by Chloe Bacon, David Okun, Paige Scholes, and Br i t tney War r i ck

Al l r i ghts r eser ved

from their past and present; and the victims of the confl ict who opened their hear ts and shared their stor ies.

We would be r emiss to not r ecognize the many Washington, D.C.-based subject-matter exper ts we consulted over the course of our r esearch: Dr. Virginia Bouvier , Ms. Mar ia Antonia Montes, Dr. Cynthia Arnson, Mr. Jason Marczak, Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brow n, Ms. Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli , Mr. Nicolás Bedoya, and off icials from the U.S. Depar tment of State.

Final ly, we are grateful for the suppor t of George Washington Univer si ty?s Latin Amer ican & Hemispher ic Studies Program Director , Dr. Rober t E. Maguir e; our Capstone Instr uctor and the OAS Inter im Director of the Depar tment for Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, Mr. Steven Gr iner ; and last, but cer tainly not least, to our many family and fr iends who suppor ted and encouraged us ever y day over the past year of this exper ience, and who never complained about our many late-night phone cal ls and overal l obsession w ith the Colombian peace process. Thank you.

This r esearch was par tial ly suppor ted by the George Washington Univer si ty?Ell iott School of International Affair s? Capstone Travel Award and the in-kind suppor t of the Organization of Amer ican States.

The authors would l ike to speci f ical ly acknow ledge the fol low ing individuals who contr ibuted or other w ise made our capstone research, and this r epor t, possible:Our cl ient, Rodr igo Zubieta, who believed in us and in what our project could accomplish; the gracious and accommodating MAPP-OEA suppor t staff in Bogotá and Medell ín, including, but not l imited to, Piedad Moreno, Juan Car los Roncal, Gina Guauque, Janna Greve, Sabina Carmona, Weslley Almeida, Luz Betty Cor tes Romero, Alejandro, Fernando, Daniel Mi l lares, Car los Garzón, Ángela Aguir r e, Si lvana España, and Laura G.; the r epresentatives and professional r eintegrator s from the ACR; the government and civi l society r epresentatives from Bogotá, Soacha, Medell ín, and Itagüí; the demobi l ized ex-combatants from the FARC, AUC, ELN, M-19, and ERG who recounted often painful moments

Acknowledgements

I t seems that after more than 50 years of confl ict, we are star ting to see the l ight at the end of the tunnel. I t is probable that in less than six months we w i l l celebrate the end of an internal war that has created more than 7 mi l l ion victims and over 200 thousand ki l l ings.

Obviously, this w i l l be a huge step for ward for Colombia, but i t w i l l also be a touchstone for the r egion: the end of the Colombian confl ict w i l l mean that the Western Hemisphere has closed the ?Cold War? chapter to star t a new one? we hope.

But we have to be clear. The signing of the agreement between FARC and the Government of Colombia w i l l not automatical ly lead to peace. Even though we recognize the effor t of both sides to achieve an agreement to end violence, this does not mean the goal of ever lasting peace has been completed. Rather , Colombia w i l l have just star ted the long and hard road of f inding sustainable peace.

As Frank Pear l, one of the government negotiator s in Havana explained, ?Signing does not mean that we Colombians w i l l stop being violent.? It means that the door of new oppor tuni ties for mi l l ions of abandoned Colombians w i l l be opened. I t means that Colombians can set their minds on bui lding a more prosperous and equal society. I t means that Colombia has the chance to be more just, more inclusive, more cohesive, and in one word, more democratic.

We think the OAS can contr ibute to bui lding this big goal cal led democracy. Actually, we have been doing i t since 2004 when the Government of Colombia and the OAS signed an agreement to establish the MAPP/OAS (The Mission to Suppor t the Peace Process in Colombia). Since i ts inception, MAPP has been working in the far thest r eaches of Colombia to monitor and ver i fy the government?s peace policies. With more than 11 years of exper ience in Colombia, MAPP has made outstanding effor ts to maintain i ts ini tial phi losophy: ?We do not teach Colombians how to bui ld peace; we suppor t and accompany victims, demobi l ized and former combatants, communities and government to help them f igure out the peace they yearn for.?

Through a national engagement of over 11 years, MAPP/OAS has bui l t tr ust r elationships across the countr y w ith victims, author i ties, and social organizations. These relationships provide the Mission w ith pr ivi leged information faci l i tating i ts analysis of confl ict dynamics and peace-bui lding processes, which are then tr anslated into r ecommendations to the Colombian government. They also permit MAPP/OAS to create and suppor t spaces for inter -insti tutional coordination and rapprochement between victims and insti tutions. With or w ithout the singing of the Havana accords, the OAS is doing r elevant activi ties in favor of sustainable peace.

We are cer tain that there are many things to be done before we can celebrate. Many issues are sti l l in the air , and i t w i l l take many years in order to implement the Accords. One of the biggest concerns of the MAPP/OAS regards the r eintegration process of the FARC?s demobi l ized members. There is no such a thing as a per fect r eintegration process. The OAS has w itnessed the str engths and f laws of the past and present r eintegration process policies. But we think that many good practices can be shared w ith Colombian actor s in order to make the future DDR process w ith the FARC much better. We also think that new and fr esh perspectives are urgently needed; that is the main r eason we gladly accepted the proposal of Chloe, David, Paige, and Br i ttney.

I thank them for taking this project w i th r esponsibi l i ty and enthusiasm. From our view , their work w i l l str engthen our capaci ty to be more effective in a crucial issue such as the r eintegration of guer r i l la members. Bui lding peace has to be an open process, and thanks to your col laboration, the OAS is helping Colombia to be more just, cohesive and in one word: more democratic.

Again, thank you for choosing the OAS. Thanks to the wonder ful Colombian LAHSP team, your professors, and the enti r e George Washington Univer si ty academic community. Rodr igo ZubietaChief, Special Missions SectionThe Organization of Amer ican States

Foreword4

Execut ive Summary

With the Western Hemisphere's longest r unning insurgency coming to an end in Colombia, what happens "the day after " to the thousands of FARC guer r i l las who have col lectively spent decades f ighting the Colombian state?

Colombia has histor ical ly str uggled to r eintegrate ex-combatants. The countr y off icial ly ini tiated this process in earnest in 2006 w ith the demobi l ization and reintegration of ex-paramil i tar y actor s from the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia1 (AUC). Since then, thousands of paramil i tar ies and guer r i l las al ike have begun this di f f icult process, often w ith middling r esults.

Through f ieldwork in Bogotá and Medell ín, the GW consultants assessed government and civi l society?s capaci ties to faci l i tate the expected r eintegration of demobi l ized FARC combatants into Colombian society. With the peace process in Havana coming to an end, the countr y must take an introspective look at this process to ensure posi tive r esults.

This study focuses on how the Organization of Amer ican States (OAS), through the Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz2 (MAPP) in Colombia, can par tner more effectively w ith the Colombian government and local organizations to establish lasting peace. More speci f ical ly, i t provides r ecommendations for how the MAPP can dir ectly improve i ts approach regarding the r eintegration process, and how the MAPP could indir ectly suggest more effective str ategies for the Colombian insti tutions w ith whom i t par tner s.

This focus dir ectly suppor ts the MAPP?s renewed mandate, signed by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and former OAS Secretar y General José Miguel Insulza in 2014. This broadening permits the MAPP to diagnose and formulate r ecommendations r egarding secur i ty, r isk mitigation, affected communities, and the identi f ication of new macro-cr iminal phenomena.

The study methodology included prel iminar y r esearch and f ieldwork in Bogotá, Soacha, Medell ín, and Itagüí. Whi le in Colombia, the GW consultants met w ith a cross-section of r elevant stakeholders, including MAPP representatives, Colombian government off icials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These discussions, formatted as inter views and focus groups, focused on the role and capaci ty of the r elevant insti tutions to suppor t the r eintegration of demobi l ized ex-combatants.

The research f indings are organized into six broad themes. The GW consultants offer r ecommendations for each theme, broken into two categor ies: (1) for dir ect action by the MAPP, and (2) for indir ect action, e.g., for the MAPP to r ecommend to i ts government and civi l society par tner s.

1. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

2. Mission to Suppor t the Peace Process

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WITH THE PEACE PROCESS IN HAVANA COMING TO AN END, [COLOMBIA] MUST TAKE AN INTROSPECTIVE LOOK AT THIS PROCESS TO ENSURE POSITIVE RESULTS.

Recom m endat ions for the MAPP to di r ect l y im plem ent are focused around the organization?s core competencies of monitor ing, r esearch and analysis, and accompaniment. The recommendations take into consideration the l imited human resources of MAPP off ices outside of the national off ice in Bogotá. Many of the r ecommendations involve the continuation of ongoing effor ts, identi f ied by other stakeholders as extr emely valuable.

Recom m endat ions for the Colom bian gover nm ent and civ i l society are intended to draw on their mandates and respective str engths. Many recommendations are dir ected at the Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración,4 the Colombian government?s pr incipal insti tution focused on reintegration effor ts. Recommendations to civi l society are more general, taking into account the diver si ty of mandate and str engths that these organizations offer. Several oppor tuni ties were highl ighted in which public-pr ivate par tner ships between the ACR and NGOs can improve the effectiveness of, and expand access to, r eintegration ser vices.

Them es:

Em ployabi l i t y, which discusses challenges the demobi l ized ex-combatants face whi le tr ying to f ind gainful employment in the formal sector.

Insecur i t y, which highl ights the personal safety concerns of former combatants, and the threat posed by bandas criminales3 (bacr im).

Di f fer ent i al Appr oach, which explores the impor tance of tai lor ing the r eintegration process to meet the unique needs of special populations, such as women, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous peoples, among others.

Heal th , Psychosocial Aspects, and Suppor t Networ ks, which measures the impact of r eintegration on the physical and psychosocial health of demobi l ized ex-combatants and str esses the impor tance of bui lding suppor t networks. Ur banizat i on and the Role of Place, which discusses the migration of demobi l ized ex-combatants to Colombia?s major ci ties and the role that the concept of place plays in r eintegration.

St igm at i zat i on and Reconci l i at i on, which shines a l ight on the challenge of social stigmatization of demobi l ized ex-combatants and existing or missing effor ts to encourage reconci l iation.

IF THIS MULTIDIMENSIONAL "DILEMMA BETWEEN PEACE

AND JUSTICE" IS TO BE SOLVED... COLOMBIA'S

REINTEGRATION EFFORTS MUST BE STRENGTHENED.

Recom m endat ion Categor ies:

3. Cr iminal bands

4. Colombian Agency for Reintegration

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Colombia is gradually r esolving an internal armed confl ict that has lasted for more than 50 years. At the hear t of the confl ict are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia5 (FARC). Founded in 1964, the FARC emerged from communist self-defense groups that f i r st appeared dur ing poli tical violence of the 1940s. Other guer r i l la groups, such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional6 (ELN), have histor ical ly joined the FARC in an armed insur rection against the Colombian state.

The confl ict was tr ansformed in the 1970s and 1980s w ith the addition of another armed actor in the confl ict: paramil i tar ies. Purpor ting to act on behalf of a state exhausted from confl icts both mi l i tar y and poli tical, paramil i tar y groups emerged and unleashed violence on guer r i l las and whomever they suspected of suppor ting them. Their presence had a profound effect on the nature of the confl ict. With the increase of paramil i tar y activi ty throughout the countr y, the level of pol i tical violence, par ticular ly against civi l ians also rose. The r ise of the drug tr ade also provided fuel in the form of cr iminali ty and narco-dollar s to al l sides of the confl ict.

Colombia exper t Marc Chernick explains that the ?violence was spaw ned by a confluence of str uctural, insti tutional, and social conditions that

inf lamed existing social hosti l i t ies, accentuated inequali ties, and fostered bloodletting over compromise or r eform.?7 Javier Gir aldo descr ibed the 1990s as a per iod of unchecked brutal i ty towards peasants and civi l ians.8 In fact, ?grassroots organizations in one southern depar tment r epor ted a ?campaign of total annihi lation and scorched ear th, Vietnam-style conducted by armed for ces in the most cr iminal manner , w i th assassinations of men, women, elder ly, and chi ldren.?9 I t is w i thin this bloody context that the Colombian state made targeted moves to demobi l ize paramil i tar y actor s and guer r i l la groups.

In 2003 the Colombian government, led by former president Álvaro Ur ibe, negotiated the col lective demobi l ization of the AUC, an umbrella organization that incorporated var ious paramil i tar y groups. The legal fr amework of the demobi l ization agreement, however , was plagued by several issues. The law or iginal ly proposed did not meet international humanitar ian standards and was rejected by the Colombian Supreme Cour t. After signi f icant debate, a new Ley de Justicia y Paz10 was passed in 2005 and would ultimately be the fr amework that guided the paramil i tar y demobi l ization and reintegration process.

Background: Conf l ict , Peace, & Reintegrat ion as Recurrent Themes in Colombia

5. The Revolutionar y Armed Forces of Colombia

6. National Liberation Army

7. Marc W. Chernick, Acuerdo Posible: Solución Negociada al Confl icto Armado Colombiano (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Aurora, 2008), 62.

8. Javier Gir aldo, S.J., Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1996),

9. Chernick, Acuerdo Posible, 19.

10. Justice and Peace Law

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11. Stephanie Hanson, "Colombia's Right-Wing Paramil i tar ies and Splinter Groups," Counci l on Foreign Relations, last modif ied Januar y 11, 2008, accessed Apr i l 25, 2016, http://w w w.cfr.org/colombia/ colombias-r ight- w ing-paramil i tar ies -spl inter -groups/p15239.

12."Confusion and Discord around Colombia?s Peace Tr ibunal," Voces: The Off icial Blog of the Inter -Amer ican Dialogue, entr y posted October 14, 2015, accessed Apr i l 25, 2016, http://w w w.thedialogue.org/ blogs/2015/10/confusion-and-discord-around -colombias-new -peace-tr ibunal/.

While over thir ty-one thousand paramil i tar ies have laid dow n their weapons since 2003, Colombia has str uggled to ful ly r eintegrate these ex-combatants.11 Many former paramil i tar ies have returned to cr iminali ty. As a r esult, in the last decade the confl ict in Colombia has evolved to include cr iminal actor s dominated by the descendants of the paramil i tar ies, or so-cal led neo-paramil i tar ies. Thousands of neo-paramil i tar ies continue to operate under new names and have forged al l iances w ith drug tr aff icker s to form new cr iminal bands (bandas criminales, or ?bacr im?) across the countr y. These bacr im pose a threat to lasting stabi l i ty and peace in Colombia. Poli tical kidnappings, murder , sexual violence, and internal displacement r emain a bl ight on Colombia?s human r ights r ecord.

Concur rently, w i th peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC rapidly coming to a close, the countr y now faces a simi lar si tuation w ith thousands of FARC combatants on the cusp of demobi l ization. Colombia has begun prepar ing for the col lective demobi l ization and reintegration of the FARC, as i t did w ith the AUC a decade ear l ier. The FARC, however , have been individually demobi l izing for a number of years? including through deser tions. Only now , w ith formal negotiations in Havana, Cuba close to concluding, are concer ted conversations and planning occur r ing r egarding the col lective demobi l ization of thousands of FARC combatants.

Colombia must ensure that any accord w ith the FARC can be realistical ly implemented and

prevent ex-combatants? r eturn to cr iminal activi ty, draw ing on lessons learned from previous effor ts w ith the AUC. This w i l l r equir e prudent and thoughtful effor ts to successful ly r eintegrate FARC members into Colombian society in a timely manner. I f this multidimensional ?di lemma between peace and justice?12 is to be solved, and lasting peace sustained, Colombia?s r eintegration effor ts must be str engthened and involve al l stakeholders of society? especial ly civi l society.

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THESE BACRIM CONTINUE TO POSE A THREAT TO LASTING STABILITY AND PEACE IN COLOMBIA.

Study Object ives & Methodology

The objectives of the study were to provide targeted r ecommendations to the MAPP in Colombia, through consultant-dr iven in-countr y f ieldwork, stakeholder inter views, and w ith the input of subject-matter exper ts. Acting independently, the GW consultants speci f ical ly developed:

- Recommendations for Di r ect Act i on: Str ategies for the MAPP to Suppor t Reintegration

- Recommendations for Indi r ect Act i on: Robust Reintegration Strategies for Colombian Insti tutions

The GW team tr aveled to Bogotá and Medell ín, meeting w ith a cross-section of Colombian government off icials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The meetings fol lowed an inter view and focus group format, fol lowed by questions and unstr uctured discussion. The consultants asked each group of inter viewees to share their var ying perspectives on the r eintegration process in order to complete a well rounded analysis.

This analysis included meeting w ith the MAPP in both Bogotá and Medell ín; off icials from the Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (ACR), in Bogotá, Soacha, and Medell ín; the Secretar iat for Social Development and Community Par ticipation in Soacha; local government off icials from the Programa de Paz y Reconciliación in Medell ín; demobi l ized ex-combatants from var ious i l legally armed groups; civi l society NGOs; victims of the confl ict; and other key informants, including a r epresentative of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and off icials from the maximum secur i ty pr ison in Itagüí.

Findings and ThemesConversations w ith key actor s tended to coalesce around a r epeated ser ies of topics: socioeconomic str uggles, ci tizen insecur i ty fear s, and the need to address the inter sectionali ty of victim-victimizer identi ties, among others. In this analysis, the data are classi f ied into six overar ching themes. Themes are fur ther broken dow n by ci ty: ei ther metropoli tan Bogotá or Medell ín, when the data col lected was location-speci f ic. The six themes include:

- Em ployabi l i t y- Insecur i t y- Di f fer ent i al Appr oach- Heal th , Psychosocial Aspects, and Suppor t Networ ks- Ur banizat i on and the Role of Place- St igm at i zat i on and Reconci l i at i on

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The challenges faced by persons in the process of r eintegration (PPR) to f ind gainful employment stood out as a cross-cutting theme in the r esearch f indings. Representatives from the MAPP, Colombian government, and civi l society, and the demobi l ized ex-combatants themselves, al l acknow ledged ser ious obstacles that hinder PPR from f inding sustainable employment in the formal sector. These obstacles include a lack of exper ience and education, entr enched discr imination, the changing legal fr amework, and the durabi l i ty of the informal economy. Whi le many programs have been put in place to overcome these challenges, they are often not effective in the shor t term. According to r epresentatives from Proyecto 840, i t can sometimes take 10?12 years for PPR to complete the formal r eintegration process due to a lack of economic oppor tuni ty. As a r esult, many demobi l ized ex-combatants turn to the informal sector or even organized cr ime in order to sur vive. The study f indings r elated to employabi l i ty are deconstructed into four sub-themes: job ski l ls and tr aining, discr imination, legal fr amework, and informal economy. Each sub-theme is descr ibed pursuant to the unique data obtained from Bogotá and Medell ín, r espectively.

Met r opol i tan Bogotá

Bogotá presents a unique challenge for PPR seeking employment because the job market is ver y competi tive. Representatives from Proyecto 840 explained that Bogotá?s industr ial sector has been shr inking dramatical ly as companies move to less expensive factor ies overseas. This change means that the number of low -ski l led jobs is also decl ining. Many demobi l ized ex-combatants r elocate to major ci ties, including Bogotá, in an effor t to f ind employment. The avai lable jobs in Bogota, however , often do not al ign w ith the education and exper ience of PPR, many of whom have l i ttle formal education or job exper ience. As a r esult, i t is often ver y di f f icult for demobi l ized ex-combatants to f ind and retain a job in Bogota?s formal economy.

Job Skills & Training

Many demobi l ized persons in Bogotá r efer to themselves as ?urban campesinos? who l ive on the outskir ts of the ci ty and face di f f iculty commuting into work. Those l iving in Soacha often leave home before the sun comes up and uti l ize unrel iable public tr anspor tation to ar r ive in Bogotá for work or class. The ACR provides a stipend which usually only covers the cost to take courses at a community school. The ACR provides PPR w ith 480,000.00 Colombian pesos over the

Theme: Employabil i ty

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course of their r eintegration process. Without an additional source of income the ex-combatants str uggle to take care of themselves and their fami l ies. In Soacha, one individual noted that the stipend was not enough to eat suff iciently.

Though they may be unski l led, the demobi l ized population often f ind that they cannot move back to their homeland due to fear of safety. Fupiagro expressed the concern of demobi l ized campesinos who have moved to Bogotá and have l i ttle education and ski l ls to compete competi tively in the labor market. Often, these campesinos only desir e to r eturn to their lands, to go back to what they know , but a fear for per sonal safety l imits them. Discrimination

The demobi l ized ex-combatants are stigmatized whi le looking for work in the formal sector , as many employers do not want to hir e ex-combatants; they are often viewed as violent cr iminals by prospective employers. In Bogotá, many former combatants noted the constant fear of being ?marked.? They expressed concern that many businesses w i l l not hir e them once they know they have a r ecord. However , the laws affect the individual armed groups di f ferently. Those who have demobi l ized from the AUC under Law 1424 (Ley de Justicia y Paz) w i l l have a cr iminal offense permanently on their r ecord, whi le those that have demobi l ized from the FARC do not (yet), depending on their r ank in the armed group. This di f ference is a source of tension between the demobi l ized groups and contr ibutes signi f icantly to their secur i ty si tuation, post demobi l ization, noted below.

Former combatants who demobi l ized under the Ley de Justicia y Paz, pr imar i ly the AUC, ended up w ith cr iminal r ecords, which discouraged many employers from hir ing them. This r ecord means that i t is di f f icult to hide their past as an armed actor. Proyecto 840 noted that employers fear that ex-combatants w i l l not r espond well to author i ty, may have mental health problems, are violent, w i l l not have adequate tr aining, and that may actually have to invest in them. Proyecto 840 noted that often times, the best economic oppor tuni ties are the ones that the demobi l ized ex-combatants can create themselves.

Legal Framework

Inter views w ith stakeholders r evealed that government agencies, including the ACR, are prohibi ted from employing individuals w ith a cr iminal r ecord. This means that once the judicial system catches up w ith ex-combatants, and they are off icial ly charged w ith an offense, they w i l l no longer keep their job, and may only function as a ?contractor? employee w ith the ACR.

Legally, under the Ley de Justicia y Paz, the demobi l ized AUC must complete 80 hours of community ser vice. Though they often complete their r equir ed hours in community center s and by working w ith victims? organizations, PPR may also complete these hours w ith area businesses. Whi le the completion of a ser vice component provides a social benefi t, these oppor tuni ties may replace low -ski l l jobs that would other w ise be avai lable as paid employment to PPR.

Informal Economy

The major i ty of the demobi l ized and those in the process of completing the r eintegration route are working in the informal economic sector , and repor ted di f f iculties tr ansi tioning to the formal economic sector. Professional r eintegrator s in the ACR and Proyecto 840 noted that there have been instances where demobi l ized women must r esor t to prosti tution in order to earn a sustainable income. One demobi l ized combatant in Soacha told the r esearch team, ?The only job is sel l ing mar i juana on the str eet corner.? Fupiagro noted that the demobi l ized combatants alr eady have a speci f ic ski l lset that makes them valuable to other organized cr iminal groups. A demobi l ized combatant from the FARC told us that he has r eceived voicemai l messages from other cr iminal gangs w ith job offer s. These oppor tuni ties are di f f icult for the demobi l ized to turn dow n, because they need an income to sur vive, and other factor s at play hinder them from f inding economic success.

Met r opol i tan Medel l ín

Medellín faces many of the same issues as Bogotá, though Medell ín has a more ethnical ly diver se population. The ci ty government has a r eintegration off ice that functions in paral lel fashion to the ACR off ices in Medell ín. The ACR off ice has jur isdiction over al l of the depar tment of Antioquia, and i t is able to share information w ith Medell ín?s Programa de Paz y Reconciliación.

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Job Skills & Training

The demobi l ized population in Medell ín faces simi lar obstacles to those in Bogotá. They have few special ized ski l ls and minimal formal education. In meetings w ith the Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista13 (ERG) in the Itagüí pr ison, many inmates confi rmed they lacked a ?bachillerato,? or a high school diploma. The penitentiar y system does l i ttle to provide ski l ls and job tr aining, mostly due to a severe lack of capaci ty.

The Programa de Paz y Reconciliación of Medell ín has created a community center cal led Centro de Formación Para la Paz y Reconciliación14 (CEPAR), which offer s classes to demobi l ized individuals and provides daycare ser vices for their chi ldren. This enables parents to work and provides a meeting place for demobi l ized and victims (l ike Madres de la Candelaria) to gather in a safe space.

However , some demobi l ized combatants r epor ted that CEPAR quickly became a target because i t is a well-know n locale for demobi l ized and their fami l ies. Due to these concerns, CEPAR is not as well-r eceived as i t was in years past. Despite these obvious challenges, the stipend that the demobi l ized are offered does have i ts r ewards. One former combatant told us that he was ver y proud of himself and that previously ?[he] didn?t know how to r ead or w r i te,? but now he has f inished his high school degree.

Economic Stigma

Economic stigma remains the same in Medell ín. Many demobi l ized r epor t di f f iculty f inding a job due to fear and misunderstandings w ith businesses. The ACR off ice of Medell ín highl ighted that the ?productiva?15 section of the route to r eintegration is the most di f f icult to overcome. One individual told the group, ?I can have al l of the quali f ications, but I w i l l never get hir ed because they think I am violent.? Legal Framework & the Informal Economy

Similar legal issues affect the population in Medell ín. Once they are convicted of a cr ime and have i t on their r ecord, they are no long el igible for a government job. One demobi l ized told us that he worked for Medell ín?s metro system, but once his cr iminal r ecord was f inal ized, he lost his job. Because they fr equently lose formal sector jobs once their sentence is handed dow n, they tend to work in the informal sector. Cur rently, 70 percent of the demobi l ized in Medell ín work in the informal sector. The government attr ibutes this to the cr iminal r ecord that many demobi l ized obtain whi le going through the demobi l ization process. The tension

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13. Guevar ista Revolutionar y Army

14. Peace and Reconci l iation Training Center

15. Term ACR uses to define employabi l i ty

Photo Cour tesy of Nicolás Bedoya, Vela Colectivo

WHETHER THREATS COME FROM RIVAL ARMED GROUPS, ORDINARY CRIMINALS, OR EVEN FORMER COMRADES FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, MANY DEMOBILIZED COMBATANTS NOTE PERSONAL SECURITY AS ONE OF THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES THEY FACE EVERY DAY.

over employabi l i ty among demobi l ized groups, due to the var ying legal fr ameworks governing the process sur rounding convictions, is arguably higher in Medell ín due to a heightened sense of insecur i ty, discussed below.

Theme: Insecurity

Colombia?s r eintegrated population faces r isks on al l sides. Whether threats come from r ival armed groups, ordinar y cr iminals, or even former comrades from their r espective guer r i l la movements, many demobi l ized combatants note personal secur i ty as one of the biggest obstacles they face ever y day. Worsening the secur i ty si tuation in the countr y, a lack of per sonal secur i ty for ex-combatants can lead individuals to r e-engage in the cycle of violence.

All inter viewed groups highl ighted this? ex-ELN members, demobi l ized AUC actor s, and former FARC guer r i l las. Assassinations, kidnapping, for ced disappearances, and harassment loom no matter from which group the individual or iginated. Each is a target for violence anywhere in the countr y, but par ticular ly w ithin the largest ci ties. Insecur i ty is an issue relevant to Bogotá, Medell ín, and in the smaller municipal i ties. I t is l ikely to hamper the peace process throughout the foreseeable future.

Colombia continues to grapple w ith the bacrim, who operate in var ious depar tments throughout the countr y. These groups, and the cr iminal networks suppor ting them, are know n to r ecrui t former combatants. With the ski l ls learned dur ing confl ict, former paramil i tar ies and guer r i l las are ideal agents for a w ide var iety of cr iminal activi ties, including the sti l l -lucrative drug tr ade. Whether acting as hi t men, kidnappers, or drug r unners, there is a plethora of posi tions for former combatants. Dur ing the GW consultant team?s f ieldwork, a number of ex-combatants communicated that the employment offer s coming from the bacrim can be more tempting than those negotiated through the Colombian government?s r eintegration process.

Those who refuse to provide their ser vices to the bacrim put themselves at r isk. Intimidation is a well-documented and practical tactic in Colombia for r eaching cr iminal goals. In the case of the demobi l ized population, cr iminal gangs w i l l ter ror ize individuals, or threaten their fami l ies, in order to coerce them to (r e)join an armed group.16 The choice is not easy? and i t is one often made for them: r eturn to violence and a cr iminal way of l i fe w ith the gangs when no other alternatives are viable? and when the threat is str ikingly r eal. According to Alejandro Elder , of the 35,00 people that demobi l ized from the AUC, 3,800 were ki l led by 2015.17 The major i ty were assassinated between 2006 and 2009 when the bacrim f i r st emerged.18

Yet armed groups are not the only threat to those on the path to r eintegration. Homicides and assassinations, perhaps by those not

13

16. Adr iaan Alsema, "Demobi l ized Paramil i tar ies Rearm or Are Murdered," Colombia Repor ts (Colombia), September 25, 2009, http://colombiarepor ts.com/demobi l ized-paramil i tar ies-rearm-or -are-murdered/.

17. Alejandro Elder , United States Insti tute of Peace Forum, 2015.

18. Ibid.

associated w ith the bacrim, are an issue that increasingly affects former combatants. Proyecto 840 leaders noted a r ise in murders of demobi l ized individuals, in r andom attacks throughout Bogotá. These murders often go unsolved.

Regardless of motivation, i t is increasingly clear to demobi l ized individuals throughout the countr y that the Colombian state cannot guarantee their per sonal secur i ty. They can become victims of threats and assassinations, not only by organized and sophisticated cr iminal networks, but also by common cr iminals. These disincentives to r eintegration, combined w ith a lack of viable economic oppor tuni ty, do not bode well for lasting peace.

Theme: Dif ferent ial Approach

Reintegration stakeholders in both Bogotá and Medell ín highl ighted the need for a di f ferential approach, which was largely absent in previous r eintegration processes. A di f ferential approach refer s to the unique needs and dynamics of special populations such as women, Afro-Colombians, indigenous populations, and youth, among others; their needs must be addressed in order for these vulnerable groups to be successful ly r eintegrated into society. According to data from the Obser vator y of Peace and Confl ict, between 1990?2015, 23 percent of the par ticipants in the r eintegration program were women.19 Women also make up a signi f icant por tion of active FARC combatants. In addition, Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations are also over r epresented in the FARC compared to their per centage of the general population. The speci f ic needs of these populations must be addressed in future r eintegration programs. Past processes have show n that, w i th r egards to r eintegration programs, one size does not f i t al l , and that new programs must include a special focus on special populations.

Bui lding on lessons learned from previous processes, r eintegration special ists have begun incorporating a di f ferential approach into their programs. Medell in?s Programa de Paz y Reconciliación r ecently developed a multidimensional approach to r eintegration that attempts to incorporate the var ying needs and reali ties of di f ferent populations. They recognize, however , that i t is a learning process that they are continually tr ying to improve. In addition, the off ice launched a women?s group that br ings together female victims, demobi l ized ex-combatants and reintegrator s from across the countr y to discuss gender , the role of women in the peace process and leadership. Ini tiatives such as these offer oppor tuni ties for special populations to create suppor t networks, begin a process of r econci l iation and

14

19. Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración and Observatorio de Paz y Conflicto, "Mujeres Excombatientes en Colombia 1990-2015," infographic, digi tal f i le.

identi fy best practices for r eintegrating minor i ty groups.

Despite this progress, signi f icant challenges remain. Female demobi l ized ex-combatants face obstacles largely unknow n to their male counterpar ts, including the r esponsibi l i ty of chi ld care and the hazards of prosti tution, among others. One woman recounted how , when she demobi l ized, she was mistaken for a man because she had joined the paramil i tar ies when she was ver y young and never learned ?how to be a woman.? Her r eintegration process did not include a di f ferentiated plan for women, thus she str uggled to r eintegrate into a society that highly values tr adi tional expressions of feminini ty.

In addition, two governmental r epresentatives explained that many Afro-Colombians and indigenous people do not self-identi fy as such. The unique dynamics and customs of indigenous groups can make successful r eintegration of former community members especial ly di f f icult.For example, a MAPP representative explained that some indigenous communities view war as a sickness and refuse to accept former members who joined armed groups back into the community. These obstacles affect speci f ic groups in di f ferent ways and must be taken into account for successful r eintegration.

Theme: Heal th, Psychosocial Aspects, and Support Networks

When the AUC demobi l ized en masse in 2005?2006, commanders ordered ground-level uni ts to lay dow n their arms and begin the r eintegration route; i t was not necessar i ly a per sonal choice. As Judith Cingolani w rote in a study of the effect of social ser vices on involuntar y cl ients, these suddenly-demobi l ized guer r i l las may display signs of ?distr ust, fr ustr ation, and w ithdrawal.?20 The data r einfor ce Cingolani?s r esearch: both the ACR professional r eintegrator s, as well as the persons in the process of r eintegration, spoke to the di f f iculty of bui lding durable cl ient?reintegrator r elationships.

Many demobi l ized individuals r efer r ed to their process of leaving their armed group as a ?ruptura con la organización [r upture w ith the organization].? By this, many individuals suggest that they are essential ly breaking the family l ine, a decision they deem incredibly di f f icult. A number noted that the one thing that kept them going throughout ?la ruta? was the presence of other demobi l ized as well , going through the same process, and exper iencing the same di f f iculties. One ex-FARC member explained that he would not be here today i f i t was not for his comrade encouraging him. Social networks in the ci ties are extr emely impor tant in this r egard, providing much needed suppor t dur ing the di f f icult time of r eintegration. I t was in this ear ly meeting that the consultants noted the impor tance of not only physical health, but psychosocial health as well .

15

20. Judi th Cingolani , "Social Confl ict Perspective on Work w ith Involuntar y Clients," Social Work 29, no. 5 (September /October 1984): 444, accessed Apr i l 17, 2016, https://w w w.jstor.org/stable/23713055. Photo Cour tesy of The Guardian

Structural ly, these new ly-demobi l ized populations exper ience major l i fe changes. Moving out of the jungle and into the ci ty br ings w ith i t a host of societal pressures, the least of which could be considered adjusting to creature comfor ts and ci ty schedules. Inter viewees commented on the need to set schedules, r ising ear ly in order to ar r ive in time class or work. Simi lar ly, after years in the r elative w i lderness for some, they are now l iving in a house and sleeping on a bed; these may be basic things, but they are comparative luxur ies for many demobi l ized combatants. The informants in Bogotá expressed that change on this front has been di f f icult but r ewarding. Met r opol i tan Medel l ín

The data from both ci ties demonstrate a robust concern among al l key actor s involved, r egarding the health of demobi l ized populations, the psychosocial aspects that affect their r eintegration, and the social suppor t networks that undergir d successful r eintegration. The Medell ín branch of the ACR br ings a multidimensional focus to this theme, concentrating f i r st on shor t-term, immediate r einser tion into society for postulants, fol lowed by a long-term ongoing holistic r eintegration. At the same time, a major weakness w ith ACR?s approach is that there is cur rently no dedicated pre-professional tr aining program for r eintegrator s. As Cingolani and others claim, psychosocial suppor t is a complex cal l ing; on-the-job tr aining may be an insuff icient mean to fulf i l l ing the needs of this vulnerable population.

Diving deeper into the issue of vulnerabi l i ty, the Itagüí Penitentiar y visi t r aised concerns for long-term prospects of r eintegrating incarcerated ex-combatants. Field notes indicate troublesome inmate conditions? one inter locutor termed them ?un acto de tortura [an act of tor ture]? given the dear th of beds and the necessi ty of sleeping on the f loor , of sleeping whi le standing up, and of taking shi f ts sleeping dur ing the day due to overcrowding. I tagüí?s poor infr astr ucture and previously outsourced healthcare also may be impacting the physical well being of i ts inmates; pr ison off icials noted the state r ecently took over r esponsibi l i ty for health care from a pr ivate company.

Unfettered access al lowed the consultants to conduct inter views w ith two pr ison populations: former members of the AUC in Patio 1, and former members of the ERG in Annex 2. Through these conversations, both groups of inmates expressed fr ustr ation w ith the r eintegration process. The AUC members claimed a loss of voice before the government, a r eduction of impor tance to the state fol low ing demobi l ization, and an increase in what they termed ?bad fai th.? This was a common theme among demobi l ized groups displeased w ith ei ther the pace or scope of their overal l r eintegration. The perceived fai lures of the r eintegration laws have generated much anger , and appear to undermine resocial ization effor ts w ith these populations.

The ex-ERG expressed simi lar sentiments. They noted that they are legally helpless and lack r esources to contest their long convictions. Beyond that, they claim their health and well being

THE PERCEIVED FAILURES OF THE REINTEGRATION LAWS

HAVE GENERATED MUCH ANGER, AND APPEAR TO

UNDERMINE RESOCIALIZATION.

16

have changed dramatical ly. As guer r i l las, the ERG l ived r elatively healthy and physical ly active l i festyles. In jai l , an area for purpor ted ?resocial ization,? they are exposed to drugs, f ights, and other factor s leading to negative health outcomes. From the psychological suppor t per spective, ex-ERG inmates noted many of their fami l ies are located outside of the Antioquia depar tment, and they do not visi t. According to some inter viewees, only the MAPP checks in on them regular ly. Despite these negative sentiments, the ERG in par ticular seemed to have a genuine desir e to help end the confl ict and a ver y posi tive outlook towards ending this ?chapter of violence? in Colombia.

Working pr imar i ly w ith non- incar cerated populations, Medell ín?s Programa de Paz y Reconci l iación inter weaves psychosocial suppor t into their r eintegration effor ts. Special ized care provider s are w ith PPR ever y step of the way and are a fundamental par t of the process of mixing w ith the general population, and ongoing psychosocial suppor t meetings help postulants continue to r eintegrate

w ith society. Off ice staff consider themselves competent in car r ying out their work on this front.Field data suppor t the notion that civi l society organizations are also concerned w ith psychosocial and social network suppor t r egimes. ConCiudadanía sponsored the constr uction of a Memor y Park in Santa Fe de Antioquia, and the victims group Madres de la Candelaria work to create spaces for victimizer s to tel l the tr uth and to be heard by victims. The women of the Madres de la Candelar ia bel ieve the best r eparation is the tr uth, although they for ceful ly maintain that al l who have committed cr imes should spend time in jai l in order to r ef lect on their actions and be ready to r eceive forgiveness. To that end, the group claims i t is the only victims? organization that works in jai l settings; despite the progress made across Colombia, their work is sti l l dangerous and demands a constant process of sensi tization.

The ACR approaches the r eintegration route from the fol low ing eight dimensions:

- Personal- Productive- Family- Habitabi l i ty ?- Health- Educational- Citizen- Secur i ty

17

SPECIALIZED CARE PROVIDERS ARE WITH PPR EVERY STEP OF THE WAY AND ARE A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF THE PROCESS.

Fieldwork r evealed that r apid urbanization poses a problem for major ci ties w ithin Colombia. Many demobi l ized individuals choose to r elocate the major ci ties, seeking government suppor t (in the form of ACR programming off ices), schools, and mental health faci l i t ies. The ci ties are also the location of the cr i tical judicial cour ts, where most of the demobi l ized are r equir ed to present themselves dur ing the demobi l ization process. As many former combatants move into the ci ties to join these reintegration programs, this becomes a signi f icant burden on alr eady-str ained municipal r esources.

Professional r eintegrator s in Soacha, for example, noted that f inding adequate housing is a consistent challenge for their cl ients. ACR representatives in Soacha noted that victims and internally-displaced populations have access to a number of government housing programs. However , the r epresentatives highl ighted that simi lar programs to suppor t r eintegrated combatants are lacking. This theme was rei terated across meetings in both metropoli tan Bogotá and Medell ín.

Because demobi l ized persons are moving into Bogotá w ith lower education and work exper iences that do not meet the needs of the ci ty?s labor market, Proyecto 840 r ecommended that former combatants consider r elocating to

smaller ci ties at the onset of the r eintegration process. They hypothesized more economic oppor tuni ties may be avai lable to them in areas outside the ci ties. Proyecto 840 notes that 10?12 percent of the demobi l ized population has r elocated to the capital area, often moving to the outskir ts of the ci ty.

Consider ing these reali ties, the civi l society group proposed a ter r i tor ial-based str ategy, since Bogotá is ver y large and diver se. The demobi l ized combatants came and received personal attention at one of Proyecto 840?s four off ices in the ci ty. These off ices were str ategical ly placed in the neighborhoods that many former combatants r eside in. This way, Proyecto 840 invested in i ts cl ients, not just economically, but also by bui lding r elationships. They began to learn the local, unique context of each location, which Proyecto 840, along w ith other civi l society organizations inter viewed, fear is missing from national pol icies.

The unique neighborhoods of the major ci ties are di f ferent wor lds, each a microcosm of the larger ci ty. These suburban environments do not al low suff icient space for dialogue w ithin the ci ty as a whole. The data suppor t the notion that peace begins in each barrio [neighborhood]. ConCiudadanía of Medell ín r ecognizes that the urban landscape offer s few oppor tuni ties for

Theme: Urbanizat ion and the Role of Place18

Photo Cour tesy of The Guardian

Theme: Social St igmat izat ion and Possibi l i t ies for Reconcil iat ion

discussion. They concentrate their work in the sur rounding smaller municipal i ties of Antioquia, as when demobi l ized combatants ar r ive in these communities, there is ample oppor tuni ty for dialogue and reconci l iation.

Many demobi l ized persons ci ted secur i ty as a r eason for not r eturning to their home tow ns, but they also expressed concern that peace w i l l not be constr ucted in a power ful way i f they cannot go home and be a par t of i t. The ERG also noted that they legally cannot r eturn to their homelands in Chocó, though this is disputed by the MAPP. For most former combatants, l i fe in these new ci ties is the chance for a fr esh star t, though a lack of a strong social network often poses psychological r isks, as noted in the previous section.

The major i ty of PPR inter viewed highl ighted the issue of social stigmatization. Many feel a r esolute discr imination against them as ex-combatants, at ever y level of Colombian society. One group seeks to combat this. Mesa Nacional, a national network of demobi l ized actor s, speaks w ith school groups about the dangers of armed violence. They do not want other youth to throw their l ives away. They also share their exper iences and give advice to each other to help w ith coping. This is impor tant, because i t is perhaps a lack of understanding and forgiveness which leads many Colombians to r eject former f ighter s in their communities.

The GW team obser ved resignation among ex-combatants: ?They think we are sick, that we w recked this countr y.? As actor s in the confl ict, they have come to accept this r eal i ty. At the same time, many remarked that they are eager to break this cycle of r esentment and hur t through sensible r econci l iation processes. Acknow ledging discr imination as a ser ious issue, and making targeted moves towards r econci l iation, may result in the most signi f icant effor t towards social integration for al l former f ighter s.21 Indeed, r econci l iation is key to the success of r eintegration programs. Met r opol i tan Bogotá

Proyecto 840 provided an interesting analysis r egarding the stigma towards ex-combatants. The organization?s r epresentatives noted language i tself can be stigmatizing. Many ci tizens r efer to the former combatants as ?victimizer s,? which both subjectively labels the individuals and ignores the fact that some ex-combatants were also victims themselves. Whether in state legislation or ever yday conversation, there is a prevalent assumption among Colombians ?that ever ything about the FARC is seen as an er ror or tr auma.? When former FARC members are told they are w rong simply for thinking di f ferently, Colombia leaves ver y l i ttle room for discussion or discourse. Proyecto 840 views this r eal i ty as the root of confl ict and discr imination in the countr y. There are no off icial avenues for exchange, and this breeds stigma against al l armed actor s in the confl ict.

21. Maivel Rodr íguez López, Eleni Andreouli , and Carol ine Howar th, "From Ex-combatants to Citizens: Connecting Ever yday Citizenship and Social Reintegration in Colombia," Journal of Social and Political Psychology 3, no. 2 (2015): accessed Apr i l 25, 2016, http://epr ints.lse.ac.uk/63291/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondar y_libf i le_shared_reposi tor y_Content_Howar th,%20C_From%20ex-combatants%20to%20citizens_Howar th_From%20ex-combatants%20to%20citizens_2015.pdf.

19

?TO RECONCILE, YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER NOT ONLY WHAT HAPPENED, BUT WHY IT HAPPENED.""

Bogotá in par ticular is a ci ty noted for the presence of al l groups associated w ith the Colombian confl ict. Displaced populations, victims, and former combatants have al l settled in the countr y?s capital? many on the outskir ts and in the poorest areas of the ci ty. In such close proximity to one another , encounter s based on deep-rooted tensions are not only expected, but a r eal i ty. Tensions in the community between the ?victim? and the ?victimizer? are not cur rently being addressed ? a reali ty that is a ser ious blow to social r eintegration and convivencia [coexistence]. Demobi l ized actor s cer tainly r ecognize this fact: one member of Mesa Nacional noted, ?[Colombian] society is not prepared,? ? suggesting qui te plainly that the countr y as a whole may not be r eady to begin this process.

If the countr y is looking for lasting peace, i t must begin to create spaces for dialogue. Neither the ACR, nor any of the civi l society organizations that were inter viewed in Bogotá, have active programs or ini tiatives to begin this process of r econci l iation. A number of demobi l ized actor s seemed ready to ini tiate this process and expected others in their posi tion feel the same. Members of Fupiagro suggested that the lack of government action to proceed along these l ines is a ser ious mistake, an outcome of indi f ference towards community needs. One leader in par ticular commented, ?They [the government] do not know what post-confl ict is, but they want to talk about post-confl ict.?

Within the municipal i ty of Soacha, there are cur rently no special ized r econci l iation programs. ?This [topic] is r elatively new to Soacha,? one

local government off icial r emarked. Victims groups and ex-combatants have no off icial contact w i th one another , despite l iving in same neighborhoods. However , as noted by civi l society leaders w ithin the ci ty of Bogotá, many victims of the confl ict are open and ready to begin the process of r econci l iation. Civi l society actor s in Bogotá r ecognize the need for tangible spaces for r econci l iation, but they are perhaps unable to enable this process on their ow n. Met r opol i tan Medel l ín

In contrast to the obser vations in Bogotá, Medell ín?s Programa de Paz y Reconciliación has distinct programs dedicated to overcoming social stigmatization and bui lding r econci l iation. Of note, CEPAR functions as a community-based tr aining and education center that br ings victims and victimizer s face to face. As previously documented, civi l society groups such as the Madres de la Candelaria make use of CEPAR to effect their mission of r econci l iation through tr uth tel l ing. ?Las mujeres son las constructores de la paz y la vida [Women are the bui lder s of peace and l i fe],? expressed a r epresentative of the organization. Therefore, women must be r eady to forgive and to pardon.

Yet the Madres? forgiveness contains a kernel of tough love: they suppor t jai l sentences for the ex-combatants. In their view , ever yone should go to jai l in order to r ef lect and emerge ready to ask for? and receive? forgiveness. Another civi l society organization, ConCiudadanía, bel ieves r econci l iation is a social matter and can be achieved as a function of working w ith three

20

Infographic Cour tesy of the ACR

groups: society as a whole, victims, and ex-combatants.

Such programs, however , do not always yield success. Some PPR explained that those who speak up are often discr iminated against. They shared anecdotes of l inger ing non acceptance and rei terated the need for sensi tivi ty tr aining. Self-esteem in par ticular appears to suffer : ?I w i l l always be labeled ?demobi l ized.? It is a process I chose, and I am happy w ith i t. But I w i l l always be marked.? Other actor s in Medell ín were simi lar ly pessimistic. The incarcerated former AUC members in I tagüí claimed there is no r eal plan for r esocial ization. They opined, ?Without education on the confl ict, there w i l l never be peace or r econci l iation.?

These data r aise questions of how Medell ín-based reintegration actor s can better sensi tize the general population. With r egards to the mandator y community ser vice projects which form an integral par t of the r eintegration route, beneficiar ies are general ly not informed that those per forming the community ser vice are demobi l ized combatants. Whi le i t is understandable that project coordinator s w ithhold that information? perhaps due to secur i ty concerns? disclosure may help sensi tize the public by show ing them that not only are the PPR giving back to the community, but that they, too, are ci tizens of Medell ín concerned w ith i ts overal l well being.

At the same time, some of the burden does l ie w ith the former mi l i tants themselves. The demobi l ized ex-combatants cannot show society they are human? not just victimizer s? i f so few are w i l l ing to self-identi fy. Fieldwork r evealed that Mesa Nacional is one of the few groups w i l l ing to have a visible presence. Most demobi l ized populations often hide their identi ty, again for understandable r easons, r esulting in the maintenance of an invisible population w ith visible, l inger ing, stereotypes.

21

THE DEMOBILIZED EX-COMBATANTS CANNOT SHOW SOCIETY THEY ARE HUMAN ? NOT JUST VICTIMIZERS ? IF SO FEW ARE WILLING TO SELF-IDENTIFY.

Photo Cour tesy of Nicolás Bedoya, Vela Colectivo

Based on the study?s objectives and f indings, the GW consultants suggest that the Organization of Amer ican States? Mission to Suppor t the Peace Process in Colombia implement the fol low ing r ecommendations:

Recommendat ions

Recom m endat ions for Di r ect Act i on: St r ategies for the MAPP to Suppor t Reintegr at i on

- Continue to leverage insti tutional connections w ith the Colombian government and civi l society organizations in an effor t to:

- Suppor t access of PPR to the formal economy;- Expand economic oppor tuni ty in order to speed up completion of the route;- Develop r esi l iency str ategies for demobi l ized combatants to r eject employment offer s by

organized cr iminal groups.

- Continue to promote entr epreneur ial ventures

- Highlight the need for basic education leading to r ecognized cer ti f ication.

Recom m endat ions for Indi r ect Act i on:St r ategies for Colom bian Inst i t u t i ons

- Recommend that the ACR and civi l society organizations continue to consult w i th the business community on potential employment programs and corporate social r esponsibi l i ty ini tiatives for PPR.

- Recommend that the ACR and civi l society organizations continue to explore incentive programs for mid-size companies and businesses to encourage hir ing of former combatants.

- Recommend that the ACR explore possible mechanisms by which demobi l ized ex-combatants can be hir ed as consultants by secondar y organizations to advise ACR on the r eintegration process.

- Recommend that the ACR ini tiate f inancial management tr aining at the outset of the r eintegration process. This could include the development and implementation of computer tr aining modules.

- Recommend that ACR par tner w ith other governmental insti tutions to develop economic prof i les for Colombia?s major ci ties. These repor ts should focus on economic sector s that offer low - to medium-ski l led jobs in an effor t to:

- Identi fy and publicize economic sector s w ith increased job oppor tuni ties in each ci ty- Tai lor local tr aining programs for PPR to ensure that they are appropr iate for the local

economy- Identi fy sector s and businesses whose needs would most closely al ign w ith the ski l ls and

exper ience of PPR

- Recommend that the Colombian government more effectively enfor ce the employment non-discr imination component of the Substantive Labor Code to r educe unlaw ful termination due to previous par ticipation in an i l legal armed group.

Recommendat ions: Employabil i ty

22

23


- Continue to r esearch ways to incorporate a di f ferential approach, including an inter sectional model, into r eintegration and recommend relevant pol icies changes.

- Par tner w ith indigenous communities to develop and promote cultural ly r elevant and comprehensive r eintegration processes for their members.

Recom m endat ions for Indi r ect Act i on: St r ategies for Colom bian Inst i t u t i ons

- Recommend that ACR and civi l society organizations create suppor t groups for special populations, intended to provide an oppor tuni ty for these groups to share their exper iences and provide intr a-group suppor t. These groups should be at a local level to ensure a more r elevant and sustainable model.

Recommendat ions: Dif ferent ial Approach


- Collaborate w ith Colombian governmental and secur i ty insti tutions to ensure that assaults and assassinations of demobi l ized ex-combatants are monitored and recorded in an effor t to understand the dynamics of the secur i ty si tuation.

- Continue to accompany civi l society groups to at-r isk communities and municipal i ties.

- Conduct focus groups w ith ex-combatants, leveraging the MAPP?s status as an international organization, to faci l i tate an understanding of the secur i ty si tuation in local communities.

- Collaborate w ith national and local media outlets to publicize insecur i ty issues for demobi l ized populations, br inging attention to unrepor ted acts of violence.

- Explore public opinion via informational inter views and data sur veys on the perceived l inks between the bacrim and perceived paramil i tar y ties.


- Recommend that civi l society organizations expand existing programs in which demobi l ized ex-combatants speak to school groups about their exper iences and the r isks associated w ith joining i l legal armed groups.

Recommendat ions: Insecurity

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Photo Courtesy of Moon.com


- Par tner w ith Colombian insti tutions, psychologists, and social workers to develop mechanisms to monitor the mental health of PPR and inter vene in cases of extr eme distr ess, such as depression or suicidal behavior.

- Par tner w ith Colombian insti tutions to study the psychosocial aspects of involuntar y individual or col lective r eintegration and incorporate f indings into the str ucture of the r eintegration program. This w i l l help prepare for the l ikely col lective demobi l ization of the FARC.

- Par tner w ith the ACR to develop tr aining courses for demobi l ized ex-combatants that have completed the r eintegration process and are w i l l ing to mentor future par ticipants.


- Recommend that the ACR per iodical ly monitor and consult w i th individuals that have completed the r eintegration process. This could include tow n hall-style meetings to provide an oppor tuni ty for discussion of topics of concern and to identi fy mechanisms to overcome existing obstacles.

- Recommend that civi l society organizations sponsor pr ison visi ts by local community groups to meet w ith demobi l ized ex-combatants to encourage the development of social ties and a more successful r eintegration into Colombian society.

- Recommend that the ACR provide emergency assistance, such as a 24-hour telephone hot l ine, for PPR under immediate distr ess.

- Recommend that the ACR par tner w ith Colombian univer si ties to develop professional and pre-professional cer ti f ication programs. These could include:

- Advanced tr aining for cur rent ACR employees;- Development of dedicated univer si ty coursework for

students interested in confl ict r esolution and/or working on psychosocial r eintegration of ex-combatants.

- Recommend that the ACR expand their ter r i tor ial r each by having professional r eintegrator s use digi tal video conferencing (e.g., Skype) to meet w ith PPR in r ural areas.

Recommendat ions: Heal th, Psychosocial Aspects, and Support Networks

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- Continue to conduct fr equent f ield missions into r ural communities to explore r egional dynamics and create spaces for dialogue.

- Ensure that l ines of communication r emain open between regional MAPP, ACR and civi l society organizations to guarantee that r elevant information and lessons learned are being shared.


- Recommend that the ACR par tner w ith r egional civi l society organizations to expand access to r eintegration ser vices outside of metropoli tan areas.

- Recommend that the ACR incorporate a ter r i tor ial approach to ensure that programming is tai lored to speci f ic community dynamics.

- Recommend that the ACR and civi l society organizations conduct an awareness-raising campaign in r ural areas to ensure that the communities have a thorough and accurate understanding of the r eintegration process.

Recommendat ions: Urbanizat ion and the Role of Place

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Photo Courtesy of ACR


- Faci l i tate meetings between victims? groups and PPR in order to create spaces for r econci l iation and the development of suppor t networks.

- Continue to study past and present r econci l iation processes in other countr ies in order to identi fy lessons learned and recommend the incorporation of best practices into the Colombian process.

- Suppor t government and civi l society organizations in their effor ts to educate the general population on the demobi l ization and reintegration process. This could include effor ts to:

- Increase their capaci ty for information shar ing and tr ansparency;- Distr ibute informational mater ials, including documents that explain the impact of var ious

laws and regulations on di f ferent demobi l ized populations.


- Recommend that ACR incorporate more r econci l iation-related programming to complement their cur rent focus on social ser vices. This could include convening dialogues, continuing to develop r esources for CEPAR, and increasing awareness among the general population to the posi tive social externali ties of r econci l iation.

- Recommend that the ACR and civi l society organizations suppor t increased visibi l i ty of demobi l ized former combatants through the creation of ini tiatives l ike the Mesa Nacional.

- Recommend that civi l society organizations continue effor ts to educate the general population on the demobi l ization and reintegration process, and the need to ensure that i t succeeds. Such effor ts could include school visi ts, television and radio ads, and awareness campaigns and f lyer s.

- Recommend that the Colombian government and civi l society organizations jointly develop a school cur r iculum that explores the r ecent histor y of the confl ict and the need for r econci l iation.

- Recommend that the ACR and civi l society organizations develop mechanisms to incentivize victims and demobi l ized ex-combatants to par ticipate in r econci l iation dialogues.

Recommendat ions: Social St igmat izat ion and Possibi l i t ies for Reconcil iat ion

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SWOT Analysis

STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES

OPPORTUNITIES THREATS

- Relat i onships: Deep ties w ith insti tutional par tner s

- Mandate: Renewed; targeted in scope, yet evolves

- Diver se Per spect ives: International per spectives from diver se staff

- Subject-Mat ter Ex per ts: Conduct fr equent f ieldwork

- Reputat i on: Posi tive among in-countr y and international actor s

- Mandate: Reduced f lexibi l i ty to adapt to changing cir cumstances

- Hum an Resour ces: Small staff in some off ices can l imit f ieldwork in smaller municipal i ties

- Access: Limited presence across the countr y, especial ly in more r emote depar tments

- Par tner sh ips: Civi l society organizations are open, w i l l ing, and would appreciate suppor t

- Possibi l i t i es: Strengthen par tner ships w ith a var iety of actor s

- Educate: Oppor tuni ty to educate the general population on the need for , and social benefi ts of, r eintegration

- Mul t i l ater al Actor s: Presence of outside actor s may displace the role of the OAS and the MAPP-OEA

- Loss of Inter nat i onal At tent i on: Whether from marginal successes in the peace process or diver ted focus to the cr isis du jour

- Uncer tainty of Funding: Fiscal r esources may be hard to confi rm, making long-term projects di f f icult to plan

This matr ix outl ines key str engths, weaknesses, oppor tuni ties, and threats for the MAPP. It is a diagnostic which provides consideration for broader implementation of the r ecommendations presented.

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""SOMOS CAPAZ DE CAMBIAR.""

""WE ARE CAPABLE OF CHANGE.""

Photo Courtesy of Dracamandaca.com

EX-COMBATANTS NEED THE SUPPORT AND SECURITY OF THE WHOLE OF SOCIETY TO PROPERLY REBUILD THEIR LIVES AND BEGIN ANEW.

ConclusionColombia is on the verge of r eceiving a new wave of demobi l ized ex-combatants? the FARC? who must be effectively r eintegrated into society i f long term peace is to be r eal ized. This study sought to understand how the MAPP and i ts par tner s, including Colombian government agencies and civi l society, can more effectively suppor t r eintegration effor ts. Inter views w ith stakeholders in Bogotá and Medell ín identi f ied both str engths and weaknesses from previous effor ts to r eintegrate the paramil i tar ies, as well as from the cur rent piecemeal process sur rounding individually demobi l ized guer r i l las. Both avenues offer pronounced lessons learned, to guide the l ikely future col lective r eintegration of the FARC.

The study identi f ied six overar ching themes which have par ticular impact on r eintegration effor ts: (1) Employabi l i ty; (2) Insecur i ty; (3) Dif ferential Approaches; (4) Health, Psychosocial Aspects, and Suppor t Networks; (5) Urbanization and the Role of Place; and (6) Social Stigmatization and Possibi l i t ies for Reintegration. Each theme draws on the insights and exper iences of the stakeholders whom the consultants inter viewed. Most themes are fur ther broken dow n into sub-sections that focus on location-speci f ic data. This r epor t proposed two categor ies of r ecommendations: those which the MAPP can dir ectly implement, and those which the MAPP may choose to r ecommend to par tner insti tutions in order for the latter to operate more effectively in the r ealm of demobi l ization and reintegration. The recommendations draw upon the MAPP?s core competencies, both as par t of a r egional intergovernmental organization and as a tr usted

insti tution that has played an active role in Colombia for over ten years. The second categor y of r ecommendations bui lds upon the MAPP?s relationships w ith the Colombian government and civi l society. These recommendations are intended to promote fur ther public-pr ivate col laboration in an effor t to improve and expand reintegration ser vices across the enti r ety of Colombia.

The SWOT Analysis provided a useful matr ix for fr aming the MAPP?s unique place in the r eintegration process. Str engths include deep and posi tive r elationships w ith par tner s, the success of a r enewed mandate, and diver se perspectives as a r esult of r el iance on both international and locally-employed subject-matter exper ts. At the same time, the MAPP?s targeted mandate can at times constr ict action and reduce the mission?s f lexibi l i ty. This weakness, along w ith l imited staff and presence across the countr y, can reduce the effectiveness of f ieldwork. Oppor tuni ties, however , abound: from civi l society organizations extending their hand in par tner ship to the potential for developing comprehensive education on the social benefi ts of r eintegration. Threats to the MAPP include the potential role of OAS counterpar ts, the r isk of diver ted international attention once peace seems inevi table, and the cycl ical str esses of uncer tain funding.

Over the course of this r esearch, stakeholders r epeatedly expressed that effective r eintegration is necessar y to ensure sustainable peace. The alternative is dir e: a l ikely r eturn to confl ict. Ex-combatants need the suppor t and secur i ty of the whole of society to proper ly r ebui ld their l ives and begin anew..

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GW Consul tant BiosChloe Bacon holds an M.A. in Latin Amer ica and Hemispher ic Studies from The George Washington Univer si ty, w i th concentrations in International Education and Poli tical Science. Ms. Bacon is cur rently an Assistant Program Off icer at Mer idian International Center , where she implements a State Depar tment-funded professional exchange program for emerging leaders from around the wor ld. Her pr ior professional exper ience includes the UNESCO Regional Bureau of Education for Latin Amer ica and the Car ibbean in Santiago, Chi le, and the International Research Exchanges Board (IREX). Ms. Bacon has extensive exper ience in Latin Amer ica and has l ived and worked in both Argentina and Chi le. In the spr ing of 2015, she tr aveled to Cuba where she conducted research on the countr y?s education system and i ts academic diplomacy ini tiatives. Ms. Bacon earned her B.A. in International Studies from the Univer si ty of Nor th Carol ina at Chapel Hi l l in 2009.

David Okun holds an M.A. in Latin Amer ican and Hemispher ic Studies from The George Washington Univer si ty, w i th concentrations in Secur i ty and Economic Development. Mr. Okun cur rently works as a Countr y Off icer in the Off ice of Chi ldren?s Issues at the U.S. Depar tment of State, where he handles a bi lateral por tfol io of international parental chi ld abduction cases. Past professional exper iences at Freedom House, the Organization of Amer ican States, and the State Depar tment?s Off ice of Brazi l ian & Southern Cone Affair s crossed sector s and al lowed him to work on functional and regional pol icy issues. In addition to conducting graduate r esearch in Colombia, he has l ived and studied in r ural Costa Rica and in Spain. He received his B.A. in Spanish and B.A. in International Affair s from the Univer si ty of Georgia in 2012.

[email protected]

[email protected]

Paige Scholes is cur rently pur suing an M.A in Latin Amer ican and Hemispher ic Studies at The George Washington Univer si ty, w i th concentrations in Migration and Economic Development. She cur rently works as a contractor employee for the Depar tment of State?s Under Secretar y for Economic Grow th, Energy and the Environment. There, Ms. Scholes ser ves as an Administr ative Assistant. Pr ior to her work w ith the Under Secretar y, Ms. Scholes worked in the Off ice of the Chief Economist and in the Off ice of Chinese and Mongolian Affair s. She graduated w ith a B.A. in International Relations and minors in Economics and Spanish from the Univer si ty of Delaware in 2012 and has studied abroad in Mexico and Spain.

Br i t tney War r i ck holds an M.A. in Latin Amer ican and Hemispher ic Studies from The George Washington Univer si ty, w i th concentrations in Secur i ty and Economic Development. Pr ior to commencing graduate school, Ms. War r ick spent four months in Colombia teaching English to minors and adults at an education-technical school in dow ntow n Medell ín. Past professional exper iences include posi tions held at the U.S. Insti tute of Peace, Refugees International, and the Hudson Insti tute. Ms. War r ick cur rently works as a Development Assistant at Development Alternatives Incorporated. There, she suppor ts government projects in Central and South Amer ica. She is a former graduate of The George Washington Univer si ty, earning a B.A. in International Affair s, w i th a Secur i ty Policy concentration, in 2013.

[email protected]

BWar r i [email protected]

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GW Final Report for OAS

Documents

Transcript of GW Final Report for OAS