Qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuipasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklz xcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqw ertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm

DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE-.

SUBJECT-PUBLIC INTERNTIONAL LAW

SUBMITTED TO- Ms PRATUSHA SAMVEDAM

NAME- SONAM

ROLLNO:-2013114

SEMESTER-V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

I have taken efforts in this project. However it wouldn't have been possible

without the kind support and help of many individuals. I would like to extend

my sincere thanks to all of them.

I am highly indebted to Ms Pratusha Samvedam for her guidance and constant

supervision as well as for providing necessary information regarding the

project.

I would like to express my special gratitude and thanks to my friends for giving

me such attention and time and helping me in developing the project and people

who have willingly helped me out with their abilities.

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Table of contentsTable of contents........................................................................................................................1

Abstract......................................................................................................................................2

Scope and Structure of the Project.............................................................................................3

Research Methodology...............................................................................................................3

Introduction................................................................................................................................3

United Nations’ Interference......................................................................................................4

Need for the International Regulation on Gun Control..............................................................5

Government Preferences on International Regulation...............................................................6

Critique on the Protocol and UN’s PoA.....................................................................................7

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................8

Bibliography.............................................................................................................................10

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AbstractThe project “Gun Control and International Issues” deals with the International regulations that are present for the gun control. It aims at discussing the details about the need for the International regulation on gun trade and also the Government’s attitude about the same. The motivation for the regulations and also the need for them are explained in the project under three heads which are:

1. Why national regulation is insufficient and why International regulation is necessary for curbing the negative externalities of small arms.

2. Theoretical framework for explaining Government preferences on International regulation.

3. Regulation of the trade in small arms.

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Scope and Structure of the ProjectThe project aims at providing an insight into the gun control mechanism existent on International level and also the State’s interest in the gun control system. The project also gives a description about United Nations interference in the gun control regulations and a critical view about the same. It gives details as to why there is a need for an International regulation to be made, which must be legally binding and also the details about how the Government’s interest in International regulation changes.

Research MethodologyThe project is based on a non-empirical study and the research includes gathering the data from the existing information like referring the articles, journals and the documents relating to the topic available online.

IntroductionIn an era when it has become fashionable to advocate that social policy be guided by

evidence, social scientists should be riding high. But there is a problem: The available

evidence on what works in the social-policy arena is typically something less than definitive.

Experts disagree. Sometimes the only consensus that can be mustered among researchers is

that “more research is required,” often a dubious assertion when there has been voluminous

research already. Meanwhile, policymakers are left free to either ignore the research

evidence, or to search out an expert who supports their position. A case in point is the recent

report on gun violence of an expert panel of the National Research Council. In one topic after

another, the NRC’s blue-ribbon panel concludes that the existing evidence is inconclusive

(Wellford, Pepper, & Petrie, 2005).1 It calls for an investment in better data, the invention of

better methods for extracting sound conclusions from non experimental evidence, and more

research funding. There is essentially no guidance offered for policy development. At one

level, the NRC report’s nihilistic conclusion about this body of research is not surprising.

Gun policy is a contentious issue, among social scientists as much as laymen. In this heated

context, the NRC panel made a reasonable decision to assess the evidence according to the

usual scientific standard that insists on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Their work provided a

public service in pointing out that a number of claims bruited by researchers rested on thin

evidentiary ice. But the panel missed an opportunity to provide guidance on how

policymakers could best take advantage of available research in this area. The evidence may

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not be definitive, but it is far from irrelevant to making good policy. In this review essay, we

offer several conclusions that we believe are defensible and relevant to policy choice

“The illegal trade in small arms, light weapons and ammunition inflicts havoc everywhere. Mobs petrifying a neighbourhood. Rebels attacking civilians or peacekeepers. Drug lords aimlessly killing law enforcers or anyone else interfering with their- illegal businesses. Bandits hijacking humanitarian aid convoys. In all continents, uncontrolled small arms form a persisting problem,” says UNODA.1“Small arms,” it says, “are cheap, light, and easy to handle, transport and conceal. They are the weapons of choice in civil wars and for terrorism, organised crime and gang warfare.”

There are no accurate figures for the number of small arms and light weapons currently in circulation globally.2

The UN resists that small arms and light weapons cause the deaths of over 500,000 people annually. Gun trafficking is big International business which affects every country. An inquiry by the Toronto Star stated that guns are purchased in the United States and trafficked into Canada. The report specified that a gun would first be procured in the United States for $150. The gun would then be trafficked across the border and sold in the City of Windsor for $800 to $1,000 to a trafficker. The trafficker would then move the gun further north into the City of Toronto, where that gun is sold for at least $2,000. Pistols in Toronto are also obtainable for rent for $600 per night, according to the Toronto Star. Up to 70 per cent of all crimes involving guns in Canada involve firearms purchased in the United States and smuggled into the country.3

In order to fight the illicit arms trade, The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a multilateral treaty to legalise the International trade in conventional arms was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on April 2, 2013 and opened for signature on June 3, 2013. As of July 31, 2013, more than 80 States have signed the Treaty.4

United Nations’ InterferenceIn 1995 the United Nations launched a political process intended to combat the negative effects of small arms proliferation5 and misuse. The UN small arms process has included a series of resolutions, meetings, and reports. The primary agreement resulting from this process is the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small

1 http://www.newsday.co.tt/sunday_special_report/print,0,183330.html last viewed on 10th November 2013.2ibid 3Ibid 4 Ibid 5According to estimates, there are at least 875 million small arms in circulation worldwide. Civilians own roughly 75% of this total (approximately 650 million small arms). Small Arms Survey 2007.Referred from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2007.html.

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Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Program of Action or PoA), adopted at a UN conference in 2001.6

As Stated in its preamble, the Program of Action addresses the uncontrolled spread of small arms which has “a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and poses a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development.”7 The PoA intends to “reduce the human suffering” and “devastating consequences” caused by small arms proliferation and misuse, and therefore establishes a set of International guidelines for controlling small arms. Given the enormous death toll of small arms and the destruction they inflict it is expected that there is a tight International control of small arms, based on a strict agreement, clear and specific norms and a mechanism to ensure compliance. The Nuclear and chemical weapons are controlled internationally through legally binding agreements which include monitoring and verification mechanisms;8International control of small arms should have taken a similar form. Yet the control of small arms as established by the PoA is far from being compared to it. The PoA has a very loose framework which is hard to reconcile with the plethora of the problem.

Firstly, the PoA has no legally binding force. Whereas arms control agreements typically take the shape of treaties, the PoA is merely a political declaration and does not establish legally binding commitments.9

Secondly, arms control agreements usually lay out clear and unequivocal obligations. Non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT commit “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons”; State Parties to the CWC “undertake never under any circumstances” to develop, produce, otherwise acquire or use chemical weapons.

By contrast, the PoA’s language is vague and not precise, allowing Governments to interpret the document as they see fit. There is no specification, however, of what constitutes “adequate laws” or “effective control”.10

Third, verification arrangements – a keystone of arms control agreements like the NPT and CWC – are absent from the PoA. The PoA neither grants States the authority to monitor compliance, nor does it delegate verification power to a third party. It merely asks States – on a voluntary basis – to provide information concerning implementation.

The contrast between the enormous magnitude of the harm inflicted by small arms worldwide and the weakness of International small arms control is striking and puzzling. As the PoA itself acknowledges, small arms proliferation “sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, and

6 http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptsarms.pdf last viewed on 10th November 2013.7 http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060626Slo-eng.pdf last viewed on 10th october 2015.8Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).Referred from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_Weapons_Convention last viewed on 9th october 2015.9 http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/schools/Government/Research/Documents/Efrat.IO.pdf last viewed on 10th october 2013.10 Ibid

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contributes to the displacement of civilians and fuels crime and terrorism.”11 But the reasons for not answering these issues in the PoA are unknown.

Need for the International Regulation on Gun ControlPropagation and misuse of small arms result in a variety of negative results, from fatalities in civil wars and terrorism to trouble of trade and health care. The primary means to curb it is a national regulation of the import, sale and possession of small arms. In fact, most countries have gun control laws which strictly regulate civilian possession of arms. Then the question that arises is why there is any need for International regulation of small arms? And also what is the need to have an International regulation of small arms. The limitations of law enforcement agencies and justice systems are a key reason. Restrictions on the import of guns may exist on the books, but customs and border control often fail to detect and seize guns; the increasing volume of trade in recent decades has diminished even further the intensity and effectiveness of customs inspections.12

Gun control legislation is meaningful only if the police can catch the violators and courts’ sentences are carried out; in many countries, this is not to be seen. Effective law enforcement requires significant resources and even developed countries often struggle to fully enforce gun regulation, let alone developing countries where trained and equipped law enforcement personnel are a scarce resource.13

The limited effectiveness of domestic gun regulation has another cause. Typically, Governments respond to the problem of negative deeds by imposing regulation on the source of the deed, such as an air-polluting factory. This solution, however, is inapplicable for curbing the negative effects of small arms, because these effects are transnational, in that the source may sometimes be outside the boundaries of those countries that bear the misgivings. The source may sometimes be across the border. For example, guns are regularly smuggled from the United States to Mexico; most weapons used in the separatist conflicts in Georgia in the 1990s came from Russian stockpiles in the Caucasus. In many other cases, the countries generating the problems i.e. the arms-exporting countries – are far remote from the countries that are bearing the negative consequences.14

Given that controls on import and circulation of guns are not entirely effective, curbing the problems created by the small arms requires control at the source which requires having a restriction on small arms exports. Yet the problem-bearing countries cannot themselves address the source of the problems, which is outside their boundaries. For that, they turn to International regulation. International regulation supplements the national controls of the problem-bearing countries by inducing the problem-generating countries to establish

11Program of Action, Preamble, Article 5. Referred from, http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptsarms.pdf last viewed on 10th October2015.12 http://www.debate.org/opinions/does-there-need-to-be-stricter-laws-for-gun-control last viewed on 17th October2015.13 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/983724fc-b589-11dd-ab71-0000779fd18c.html last viewed on 9th october 2015.14 Ibid

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adequate controls. Through International regulation, countries suffering rampant gun violence seek to restrain the arms-exporting countries and restrict exports of small arms.15

This concept can be observed in the other related International aspects as well. One of which is the control over drugs, which has been effectively restricted with the help of the International regulations.

Government Preferences on International RegulationFor the Government to be interested in the International regulation of the laws there must be some implications which either affects it positively or negatively. In the case of gun laws these implications can be put under 3 heads.

Primarily the Government focuses on International regulation to curb the trade’s negative effect on its country. For example, the gun homicide victims, archaeological destruction caused by antiquities looting, or crime associated with widespread drug abuse etc., will put a pressure on the Government to make sure there are regulations to have a check on it. The trade models typically equate the public with consumers, and therefore assume that the public favours trade liberalization. The public, in case of small arms, has distinct preferences from the actual consumers of the goods. The consumers of the goods, the gun users, indeed favour uncontrolled trade. The public, however, bears the negative consequences of the trade and so is interested in curbing them through regulations. There can also be cases where the Government may be the ultimate bearer of the consequences and so might be interested in the control of the gun trade, for instance, in case there is uncontrolled gun violence then the Government may feel it as a threat to its control over the society.16

Governments with humanitarian foreign policy agenda, such as those of Japan, Canada, and many European countries, are therefore likely to treat small arms as a pressing humanitarian concern. These countries have a compulsion to accept the regulations on the gun control because of the humanitarian policies and so look up to the International regulation for the same.17

Another strong reason for the Governments to look up to International regulations is the weak laws or the problems in enforcing the domestic laws. This makes it next to impossible to curb the trade and its outcome so the strong need for International regulation in order to establish controls at the other end arises. International regulation allows those Governments to make up for their own regulatory incapacity.18

The secondary reason can be the related innovation which includes the value-based concerns about the trade’s negative effects on foreign countries, this can be considered as a contrary to the focus of usual trade models on material incentives. The emphasis of the Government in

15 Ibid 16 http://ivn.us/2012/07/25/gun-control-an-International-comparison/?utm_source=ivn&utm_medium=featured&utm_content=title&utm_campaign=opt-beta-v-1-017 Ibid 18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Traffic_in_Arms_Regulations last referred on18th October 2015.

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this regard is to the negative effects that the foreign country is facing because of the trade. For instance, the situation in China where there was a restriction on opium caused American missionaries to put pressure on United States to initiate the International drug control. The customary trade rules fail to establish any benefit to the US in doing this but the Governments concentrate on the value-based concerns to promote welfare and address humanitarian problems.

The third reason could be the Government’s role: not only as a policy maker, but possibly a market actor – exporter or consumer. In case of small arms manufacture, if there is are State owned manufacturers, their export will be considered as the income for the State and hence the more the export is, the more will be the income. This will result in the State trying to export more for the income and causes harm to the foreign nationals and then the need for a International regulation to control the export.19

The situation where the Government is a consumer should also be considered to understand its preferences in the International regulations. The consumption of guns for internal and external security is but one prominent example. By opposing International regulation, Governments-as-consumers wish to maintain their ability to obtain the goods and use them.20

Critique on the Protocol and UN’s PoAThe UN’s non-functional programme of action can be the main reason for the need in the development of a legally binding, enforceable mechanism for restricting arms and ammunitions on an International standard.

In the absence of legally binding force and a meaningful enforcement mechanism and with critical gaps such as ammunition, the PoA could hardly be considered an appropriate International response for the devastating consequences of small arms proliferation and misuse; it also lacks typical attributes of arms control agreements. The reason for this mechanism to be so is the different structure of Government preferences. Arms control agreements build on mutual gains and partial convergence of interests. In the case of small arms, however, Governments hold clearly different preferences with no common ground. African and Latin American Governments facing rampant gun violence favour stringent International regulation. They do, however, meet with resistance from Governments that find International regulation of small arms harmful. Resistance comes, first and foremost, from decidedly anti-regulation Governments like China and Syria. International regulation yields no benefits to those Governments, which face very low levels of gun violence. Moreover, regulation could impose significant costs on both, threatening China’s commercial interest as a major arms exporter and possibly establishing a means of pressure on nondemocratic Syria. With nothing to gain and much to lose from International regulation, those Governments wish to maintain the small arms trade uncontrolled. Resistance to regulation also comes from the

19 Supra note 1620 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_agency last referred on 18th October 2015.

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cross-pressured United States. Torn between its interest in curbing gun violence abroad and the powerful gun lobby, the American preference, is for weak International regulation.21

This sharp disagreement of preferences and absence of similar kind of interests has yielded a very weak International regulatory framework for small arms in 2001 and a deadlock at the 2006 Review Conference. Countries favouring weak regulation were interested in creating the appearance of concern about the grave problem of small arms without establishing commitments that would have teeth. The African and Latin American countries wished for a much more stringent regulation but could not overcome the resistance of such powerful countries as the United States and China. While some Governments are concerned about the daily loss of life of innocent victims, the others guard the interests of arms exporters. Many Governments would like to address the issues of civilian possession of small arms and so do the non-State actors, which are a taboo for others, first and foremost of this group being the United States.22

The main obstacle to International regulation of small arms is not difficulties with monitoring and enforcement, a collective action problem, or uncertainty. The primary difficulty is that certain Governments benefit considerably from International regulation, whereas others benefit very little and, in fact, have much to lose. This major hurdle – absence of mutual gains and the resulting large variation of preferences – is masked if the assumption of mutual gains is put into work, and so the Governments create hindrances in the creation, maintenance and application of the International regulations.23

ConclusionInternational law is the collective system of rules and doctrines concerned with the associations between sovereign States, and relations amid States and Global organisations such as the United Nations. Domestic law, the law within a State, is concerned with the rights and duties of legal persons within the State. Even though International law does not have the coercive enforcement processes available to domestic law, it is in the interests of most States to ensure stability and predictability in their relations with other States. By complying with their obligations, they help to ensure that other States comply with theirs. It is in this same interest that the States are expected to develop an internationally accepted gun regulation, so that the trade, manufacture and other aspects relating to guns can be controlled.

In the light of need for the International regulations, the project gives an insight about how the municipal laws are not being properly implemented and so how exactly the need for an International regulation arises.

21 Wade Boese, General Assembly and Illicit Firearms Protocol, can be referred from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07-08/armsjul_aug0122 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/review-of-the-implementation-of-the-convention.html last viewed on 19th October 2015.23 Ibid

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The final part of the project deals with the critical view on the UN’s programme of action which has been brought into existence for control of the gun manufacture and supply. This PoA has also not been implemented properly because of the different preferences of the Government. So though there is a need for International regulation, the same Government is responsible for the non-implementation of the PoA. Also the fact that the PoA has evident flaws in it is noteworthy.

So it can safely be said that the Government is need for a legally acceptable International control and at the same time is not in a position to accept and implement the regulation. Which proves that the States will be in the same conditions when it comes to gun control for the coming few years due to the adamant behaviour of few States and compulsion on the rest.

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Bibliography http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/review-of-the-implementation-of-the-

convention.html

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07-08/armsjul_aug01

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Office_on_Drugs_and_Crime#Criticism

http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2163&context=ilj

http://www.debate.org/opinions/does-there-need-to-be-stricter-laws-for-gun-control

http://ivn.us/2012/07/25/gun-control-an-International-comparison/?utm_source=ivn&utm_medium=featured&utm_content=title&utm_campaign=opt-beta-v-1-0

http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/schools/Government/Research/Documents/Efrat.IO.pdf

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/

http://www.snopes.com/politics/guns/untreaty.asp

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/

http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/index.html

http://controlarms.org/en/media/2006/7-july-2006-control-arms-un-world-conference-on

http://www.poa-iss.org/DocsUpcomingEvents/ENN0846796.pdf

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/

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