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GULF WAR 1991
Gen
1. On 2nd Aug 90 Iraqi tps along with armr, hel and ac sp, invaded the tiny
kingdom of Kuwait. To fight against the invaders the world body united andmade the Coalition Force. Air power of 11 countries, Naval ships of 17
countries and Grd forces of 18 countries of the world participated in the war.
Allied force led by US conducted one of the most op successful wars in the
history, in which air power played a pre-eminent role.
2. In gulf war log sup was excellent which ultimately made huge
difference. With in six weeks the Iraqi war machine was crumbled by the
spectacular success of the most modern arsenal of the world.
3. Initially the Coalition Forces carr out massive air strikes (Op Desert
Storm) on the Iraqi tps to reduce their fighting capability and then launched
final grd offn (Op Desert Sabre) to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The war
ended with the unilateral cease-fire by the Coalition Forces on 28 Feb 91.
Backgrd of War
4. The relations between Iraq and Kuwait have remained uneasy onterritorial as well as ideological grounds. Both these countries were a part of
the Ottoman Empire. The World War I led to the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire and the creation of Iraq and a number of countries. Iraq got only a 20
miles stretch of coastline, on the other hand Kuwait possessed about 120
miles long shoreline on the Gulf. The arrangement was never accepted and
when Kuwait received its independence on 19 June 1961, Baghdad almost
immediately resented that Kuwait had been a part of Ottoman Empire and it
was an artificial British creation.
5. During the eighties Iraq raised the long standing question of ownership
of the Islands of War bah and Bunyan, the waterway leading to the Persian
Gulf. This waterway became the only alternative to the closed Sate-el-Arab
cluttered with debris from the Iran-Iraq war.
Causes of War
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6. Loss due to Oil Price. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the prices oil
fell as countries like Kuwait and UAE had exceeded the laid down quota of oil
production. Saddam claimed that this resulted in a loss of 14 billion dollars in
oil revenue for Iraq.
7. Oil Drilling from Rumaila. Iraq accused Kuwait of drilling slantingholes from Rumaila to tap oil from Iraqi territory. In this they claimed that
Kuwait had drained off 2.4 billion dollars worth of oil.
8. Membership of GCC. Despite the economic and mil clout that Iraq
enjoyed amongst the Arab nations, it could not gain Arab ldrship role. Its
attempt to become a member of the Gulf Coop Council (GCC) was upset by
Kuwait and Saudi Arab.
9. Border Demarcation. Although Kuwait was estb as a Seikh
Kingdom in 1756, its borders were not delineated till 1932. Kuwait achieved
independence in 1961 and Iraq has always claimed that Kuwait should form a
part of Iraq as it used to be a part of the old Ottoman province of Basra.
10. Inability to Repay Loans. Iraq could not repay about $80
billion loan that had been borrowed to finance the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq wanted
this loan to be waved off. But Kuwait decided not to forgive the debt.
11. Wealth of Kuwaitis.The Kuwaitis were incredibly rich and had huge
investments abroad. Access to this wealth could give resolved Iraq's financial
problems.
12. Ambition of Saddam. Saddam wanted to create a psychological
impact on her neighbors by posing Iraq a regional bully. By flexing its muscle
it aimed at sending message across the Arab world about its future role of
leadership in the Middle East.
ORBAT
13. Iraq. By 23 Feb 1991, the day before the coalition ground offensive
commenced, Iraq had about 35-36 divs in the Kuwait Theatre of Ops (KTO).
Details are:
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a. Tps : 6,00,000
b. Corps : 5
c. Divs : 35-36 (3 Armd, 8 mech, 22-23 Inf, 1 Marine, 1 Spl
Forces)
d. Tks : 4280
e. APC : 2880
f. Arty : 2950 Guns
150 Multiple Rocket Launchers.
g. AD : 2000 Guns
300 SAMs
h. Air Force:
(1) Pers : 5000
(2) Cbt ac : 600
(3) Bomb : 2 Sqns
(4) Fighter Ground Attk : 22 Sqns(5) Fighter Interceptors : 17 Sqns
14. Coalition. The total strength of coalition forces were:
a. Pers : 6,00,000
b. Tks : 3450
c. APC/ICVs : 2200 plus
d. Guns : 2000
e. Cobt Hel : 650
f. Cbt ac : 2070
g. Ac carriers : 06
h. Warships : 76
Iraqi Def Plan
15. Iraq's Perception of Mil Threat. As event unfolded themselves it
appears that Iraq had the following threat perception:
a. Counter air ops by the Coalition Forces to degrade Iraq's Air
Force's potential to support ground ops.
b. A massive air offensive to degrade the efficacy of the forward
defensive positions followed immediately by a multi prolonged ground
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offensive by mechanized formations, from the south driving straight for
the heart of Kuwait.
c. On reducing the initial defences in the south, the coalition could be
expected to make an amphibious landing from the Persian Gulf to
retake Kuwait city.
16. Iraqi Defence Plan. Salient features of the Iraqi defence plan were as
follows:
a. An obstacle belt filled with wire, oil filled trenches and mines were
constructed all along Saudi-Kuwait border. It had five layers.
b. Behind this formidable obstacle belt, nine inf divs were placed in
rows to cover the obstacle by fire and attrite Coalition.
c. The second defensive belt consisted of mobile armoured reserve.
Their task was to block enemy units that succeeded in penetrating the
first defensive belt and reinforce the front line units when needed.
d. The elite Republican Guards with their top-of-the line T-72 tanks
were kept as reserve. They were tasked to counter attk coalition units.
e. Iraq built a huge network of hardened ammunition storage and
command and control bunkers throughout KTO.
f. Iraq Army stockpiled huge quantities of chemical and biological
weapons with the front line units, placed at the disposal of the field
commanders to be used at own discretion.
Coalition Offn Plan
17. Phases of the Campaign. The campaign was planned to execute infour phases:
a. Phase-1. Strategic Air Campaign.
b. Phase-2. Air supremacy in KTO.
c. Phase-3. Battlefield Preparation.
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d. Phase-4. Offensive Ground Campaign.
18. Coalition Attk Plan. The coalition Army had two obvious choices; to
punch though the fixed Iraqi defence or to outflank them to the west. Gen
Schwarzkop opted the later. He planned to launch a swift outflanking move
around Iraq's exposed western flank to cut him before he had chance to
withdraw and then with the help of air and artillery destroy him in a major
tank battle south of River Euphrates. To this purpose, he assigned tasks to his
various formations as under:
a. VII Corps. It was tasked to jump off form Harf Al Batin, sweep
across the Iraqi western flank and then engage and destroy the
Republican Guards.
b. XVIII Airborne Corps. Its mission was to jump off from Rafah,sweep northeast to the Euphrates, then turn directly east, between
Kuwait-Iraq border and Basra to block the escape of the Iraqis and put
them in a killing zone.
c. MARCENT. It was tasked to launch a secondary attk from Saudi
frontiers across Kuwait to tie up as many Iraqi troops as was possible.
Then encircle Kuwait city from north and west and liberate Kuwait
International Airport.
d. Joint Forces Comd (JFC) - N. It was assigned the coastal
sector. Its mission was to encircle Kuwait city from the south and
capture it in conjunction with other Coalition Forces.
e. Special Forces. Well before the ground battle began, they were
to penetrate deep inside Iraq, rescue downed allied pilots and hunt for
SCUD launchers. Their main task was strategic reconnaissance.
f. Res. 1st Cav Div was initially designated as Theatre res by Comd in
Chief Cen Comd (CINCENT), ready to Cattk Iraqi forces.
g. Deception Plan. The deception plan was named Jail Mary
Play, was intended to convince Iraq that the main attack would be dir
into Kuwait, sp by an amphibious assault.
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Depl of Iraqi Forces
19. Depl of Iraqi Forces.
a. Intelligence sources estimated Iraqi forces in KTO in mid-October
most of the country's combat power.
b. 27 Iraqi divisions were deployed, including all eight Republican
Guard Forces Command (RGFC) divisions.
c. Of these 27 divs, nine were armoured or mechanised, 17 were
Infantry and one was special forces.
d. These elements were organized into the II Corps, III Corps, IVCorps and VII Corps, as well as the RGFC, which operated as a corps.
e. Iraqi manpower in the KTO numbered more than 435,000
supported by more than 3,600 tanks, almost 2,400 armoured personnel
carriers and more than 2,400 artillery pieces.
Depl of Coalition Forces
20. Depl of Coalition Forces. Initial Deployment of US Military Forces
and Other Coalition Forces are as fol:
a. The initial order to deploy combat forces to the Gulf was issued on
6 Aug 90.
b. CENTCOM began to deploy its combat forces on 7 Aug 90.
c. In three weeks, CINCCENT had seven brigades, three carrier battle
groups, 14 tactical fighter squadrons, four tactical airlift C-130
squadrons, a strategic bomber squadron and a Patriot air defense
missile umbrella 8,000 miles from the United States.
d. Arab League member nations also started deploying their forces to
Saudi Arabia. Egyptian and Syrian Special Forces were among the first
Arab forces to arrive.
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e. Primary defence was organized relying on air power and a thin line
of Saudi units along the Kuwait border and French and Egyptian forces
staging in King Khalid Military City (KKMC).
f. To the south of these forces, dug into defensive positions north
and west of Al-Jubayl and in the desert outside Dhahran was org.
21. Window of Vulnerability.
a. The ability of Coalition forces to defeat a determined Iraqi attack
into Saudi Arabia remained questionable, due to lack of heavy armoured
and mechanized forces. The weeks that passed until adequate heavy
forces arrived in theatre became known as the "Window of
Vulnerability".
b. However with the arrival of 1st Cav Div and Substantial air
reinforcements, by the early October, this "Window of Vulnerability"
had been narrowed.
The Btl
22. The mil conflict in the Gulf can be divided three stages:
a. Initial Stage pertained to mob of forces and resources req to wage
the war. Code named Desert Shield this op stands out as an
outstanding achievement in management and logs.
b. Sec stage of the conflict, the air campaign code named Desert
Storm will be studied for a long time as a classic in air warfare.
c. The culminating stage Desert Sabre though lasting a hundred
hrs emp of large mech forces in the desert terrain.
Desert Storm(Air Campaign)
23. Mil Objs. The mil obj of air campaign were:
a. Destroy Iraqi mil capabilities to wage war by attk Iraqi political/mil
ldrship and C2.
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b. Gain and Maint air superiority.
c. Cut Iraqi sup lines.
d. Destroy Iraqs NBC capability.
e. Destroy Republican Gd Forces.
24. Strat Objs.
a. To make the Iraqs population realise the folly of their ldrs action.
b. To condition the depl tps for a lightning gr offensive.
c. To pulverise the Iraqs civ govt with a view to quicken its down fall.
d. To ensure economic backwardness of Iraq for a long time to come.
e. To gain air supremacy.
25. Phases. Air campaign was launched by coalition forces in 4 phases.
The tgts that were planned to be destroyed in each ph are as fol:
a. Ph 1. NBC wpn instls, msl launching and storage sites, key
industrial units, C3I factories, power generation and transmission
facilities.
b. Ph 2. AD grd environment an airforce.
c. Ph 3. Battle posns and L of C.
d. Ph 4. Close Sp of own grd ops.
26. Coalition Air Caps. The allied air cap in fact encompassed the
total spectrum of air warfare. Starting form a highly sophisticated surv and int
system based on sensors in the space and at various altitudes lower down, it
could dir and del highly lethal fire power through a comb of ac and a wide
range of stand off wpns. High technology AD environments and other recce
and con means acted as force multipliers.
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27. Iraqi Air Caps. Iraqs air cap was essentially built around only the ac
and SSM. It was characterised by a near absence of eff electronic means req
for surv and creation of conducive AD environments. Most of the Iraqs fleet
comprised relatively older and obsolete eqpt.
28. Comparative Capability.
Allied Iraq Ratio
a. AD Environments.
(1) Satellites 22(Approx) - 22:0
(2) AWACS 5 1 5:1
(3)JSTARS 2-4 - 2:0
(4) Air Tankers 20-30(Approx) - 30:0
b. EW & AD Suppression24 1 24:1
c. Recce ac 40 8 5:1
d. Air Superiority Fs 271 463 1:2
e. Multirole ac 669 248 2.5:1
f. Tpt(C-141)etc 200 19 10:1
g. Sea Borne ac 90 - 9:0
h. Hels 700 249 2.5:1
29. Other Fire Del Means.
a. Coalition.
(1) Cruise Msl - Tomahawk. Which can be launched either
from ships, submarines or B-52 bombers. Range up to 1100 km.
(2) Lance SSM. Range up to 43 kms.
(3) Tac Msl System(TACMS). Range up to 60 km.
b. Iraq. Iraq was in possession of approx 200 SCUD launchers and
400-1000 SCUD msls before the commencement of war.
(1) SCUD.
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(a) Al-Hussain. Range up to 600 km.
(b) Al- Abbas. Range up to 900 km.
30. Conduct of Air Btl.
a. Coalition Air.
(1) In the 43 days of Gulf War, the Allied Air Force was able to
cont maint the surge rate and managed an astonishing 1,10000
sorties, at an average of over 2700 sorties per day.
(2) Before the air campaign began, deception ops were waged
by flying routine E-34 AWACS flts near the border which
conditioned Iraqs pers to consider such activity as normal.
(3) On the ni of 17 Jan 1991, coalition strike ac were aerially
refuelled just beyond Iraqs radar range and when the air
campaign began at 0130 hrs, the AWACS vectored the strike ac to
their tgts and surprise was achieved.
(4) The air campaign began with STEALTH F-117A and
TOMAHAWK cruise msl strikes virtually undetected.
(5) At dawn on the 17 Jan 91, French JAGUARS bombed Al Jaber
air base and SCUD msl silos. French MIRAGE 2000s flew def msns
over Saudi Arabia and strikes on munitions deps, naval bases and
other tgts.
(6) Eighty percent of sorties were eff meaning that 80% of the ac
reached their tgts. The others did not because of mech or weather
problems.
(7) By the end of the first 24 hrs, the coalition had flown 2107
cbt sorties, fired 196 TOMAHAWK msls.
(8) Allied lost 23x US, 8x UK, 1x France, 1x Italy, 4x Saudi Arabia
and 1xKuwait ac in the air campaign.
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b. Iraqi Air.
(1) Iraq also had an impressive AD system incl as many as
17000 SAM and between 9000 and 10000 AA Arty pieces. But,
resistance from Iraqs Air Force was almost non-existent. Only a
few Iraqs ac rose to challenge the allied air but they turned tail
before any air cbt could take place.
(2) On the first day it flew 96 sorties incl 53 cbt sorties. On the
2nd day, its sorties surged to 118 although cbt sorties dropped
sharply to 23. The no of cbt sorties remained the same on the third
day, cbt sorties acct for 58 out of 60 sorties flown. Thenceforth,
the no of sorties fluctuated but remained low until the sixteenth
day when the flying ceased.
(3) Due to extensive EW, long range SAMs were neutralised but
short range SAMs and AA guns did pose a challenge to the low
flying acs. The allied pilots therefore, resorted to bombing from
15000 ft.
(4) As a result of the relentless air war, almost 75% of fighting
capacity of Iraqs front line tps in Kuwait had been destroyed. Out
of 54 maj comm brs, 10 were completely destroyed, 40 were made
inoperative by partial destruction. Whereas, only 4 brs remained
op.
(5) A moderate est of the damage before start of gr campaign
caused to maj eqpt is shown on the slide:
(a) Tks. Approx 1772 destroyed out of a total of 2870.
(b) APCs. 948 knocked out from a total of 2870.
(c) Arty. More than 1474 pieces destroyed out of 3110
held before the war.
(d) ACs. Atleast 352 ac out of 708 were put out of action.
99 out of them were counted as cbt losses. 15 were captured
intact in Kuwait. Whereas, approx 112 fled away to Iran.
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(e) Ships/Crafts. Approx 60 sea vessels were destroyed
by air/naval actions.
(f) Iraqs aerial recce cap completely destroyed/put out of
action.
31. Salient Aspects of the Air Battle.
a. The air offensive started at 0130 hrs on 17 January 1991.
b. The Coalition Forces mounted 2500 to 3000 missions in a 24 hours
period.
c. More than 2700 aircraft representing 14 separate national or
service components took part.
d. The air campaign continued for 43 days until the cease fire.
e. The coalition losses of aircraft were US 23, Uk 8, France 1, Italy 1,
Saudi Arabia 4 and Kuwait 1.
Desert Sabre (Grd Campaign)
32. Coalition Forces.
a. US 3rd Army (Including British and French Forces).
(1) XVIII Airborne Corps.
(2) VII Corps.
b. 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
c. Joint Forces Command - North (JFC - N). Consisting of
Egyptian, Saudi and Syrian forces
d. Joint Forces Command-East (JFC-E). Consisting of Saudi
and GCC forces
33. Iraqi Forces.
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a. VII Corps (West). 7x inf div and 1x armd div.
b. IV Corps (Cen). 6x inf div, 1x armr and 1x mech div.
c. III Corps (East). 9x inf div, 1x armr div and 1x mech div.
d. II Corps (North). 3x inf div and 1x mech div.
e. Res. 8x Republican Gds div, 3x armr div and 3x inf div.
34. Btl.
G-Day (24 Feb 91).
a. The 1st MEF and JFC-E.
(1) At 0400 hr the first blow of the ground campaign was struck
by 1st MEF (1st and 2nd Marine Divs) and JFC-E as they began the
breach of Iraqi barrier system in south western Kuwait.
(2) The Marines found the first defensive belt abandoned but the
Iraqi 2nd line put up some resistance.
b. XVIII Airborne Corps. The XVIII Airborne corps had the mostcomplex mission and the farthest to travel of any ground forces. Its
objectives were:
(1) The French 6th Light Armoured Div would Seize As Salman
and protect corps flank (Euphrates valley).
(2) The 101st Airborne Div would fly northward to seize blocking
positions at Nasiriyah on Highway 8, the MSR of Iraq.
(3) The 24th Inf Div would strike in the direction of Talil Airbase
and then eastward toward Bashra to envelope the Iraqis.
(4) The paratroopers of 82nd Airborne Div were to secure
forward operating bases. Over three hundred helicopter ferried the
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troops and equipment in to the objective area is the largest
heliborne op in mil history.
(5) Before the attk six Special Forces teams were sent deep into
Iraqi rear, north of the Euphrates to keep a watch on Iraqi
reinforcement.
(6) By the mid night of 24/25 February, all elements of XVIII
Corps achieved their objectives without much difficulty. They were
about 93 miles into Iraq poised to continue the attk.
c. VII Corps. The VII Corps mission was to strike a killing blow at the
Iraqi Army's center of gravity - the heavy divs of the Republican Guards,
the two tanks and one mechanized divs.
35. G+1 (25 Feb 91).
a. XVIII Airborne Corps. XVIII Airborne Corps continued to drive in
to Iraq to interdict line of communication and Iraqi forces. By the
morning the French had surrounded As Salman and by evening, had
destroyed the 45th Iraqi Div.
b. VII Corps.
(1) On the VII Corps' right flank the UK 1st Armoured Div and 1st
Inf Div expanded the breach by defeating enemy brigades in the
front. The British Div turned right to hit the Iraqi 32nd Armoured
Div.
(2) On the VII Corps' left flank, the 1st Armoured Div resumed its
attk shortly after daybreak and made contact with the Iraqi 20th
Inf Div. In early afternoon it reached Al Busayah. Later in the night
of 25 February it contacted 12th Iraqi Armoured Div, and prepared
to continue attk at first light 26th February.
c. JFC-N. JFC-N in the centre continued to advance. At about 0400
hours the Egyptians continued their breaching ops and had secured a
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16 square kilometres bridgehead. By the end of the day they had seized
their objective and consolidated positions. The 9th Syrian Armoured Div
followed and supported.
36. G+2 (26 Feb 91).
a. XVIII Airborne Corps. The 24th Mechanized Div led the corpsattk into the Euphrates valley. The Div encountered its heaviest
resistance of the war. The Iraqi 47th and 49th Divs, the Republican
Guards Inf Div and 26th Commando Brigade stood and fought. The XVIII
Airborne force achieved all its objectives.
b. VII Crops. The 1st Armoured Div struck the Iraqi Medina Tank Div
while the 3rd Armoured div was destroying the Tawakalna Republican
Guards Div.
c. JFC-N. The JFC-N continued to attk seizing its objectives before
evening of 26 February. The plan was to pass through the US Marine
forces and liberate Kuwait city. TF Khalid secured its objectives and also
turned east towards Kuwait city.
37. G+3/4 (27/28 Feb 91).
a. XVIII Airborne Corps. At 0400 hrs the brigades of 24thMechanized Divs started moving east in three directions. The 1st
brigade roared towards Bashra running over retreating Iraqi columns.
The 2nd brigade raced across the runways at Jalibah Airbase. The 197th
Brigade headed west and demolished the airbase at Talil. By 0800 hrs,
the Corps took up a hasty defence just 30 miles west of Bashrah.
b. VII Corps. The Corps conducted a coordinated main attk against
the three tank Republican Guard Div- the Twakalna, the Al Medina and
the Hummurabi. By 0800 hours 28 Feb the Corps secured their
objectives and cleared the MSR between Al Jahra and Bashra.
c. JFC-E. Egyptian forces closed on Ali As Salim air field; The Kuwaiti
and Saudi forces secured objective hotel. Syrian forces continued to
handle PWs and secure JFC-N's line of communication. A brigade sized
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force entered Kuwait's western part. By 0800 hours on 28 February
Kuwait city was liberated.
d. Before dawn of 28 Feb, 40 out of 42 divs originally depl in Kuwait
and southern Iraq, including the Presidential Guard had been destroyed.
Almost 400 tanks were destroyed, 80% of artillery assets were
smashed. Coalition forces suffered some 138 KIA and about 350wounded. Iraqi deaths are estimated to be between 25,000 to 50,000
while estimate of Iraqi casualties range between 85,000 to 150,000.
Desert Shield (Log Campaign)
38. Gen. Gulf War was in fact a war of logistics, where a superior force in
material was put against a force superior in numbers, and in the end logistics
won. It was the foresight of logisticians that they catered for every aspect of
logistic support to the military, ingenuity that removed the hurdles of
shortage of military logistics by making optimal use of all possible sources
including commercial resources, and superb planning that empowered
placement of a technologically superior force with all its advantages in the
War Theatre. There are four general categories of supplies required by any
military organization to wage war; ammunition, petroleum, spare parts, and
food and medical supplies. These all supplies and other war machinery that
includes both men and material must be available at the desired place in
desired time frame.
Conduct of Logistics Operations Prior to Gulf War
39. Coalition Administration Chain of Comd. CENTCOM coord admin
and logistical plans, procedures and actions. Coalition used pull system.
Units requisitioned required supplies from higher HQ and each HQ maintained
a standing list of requests from its subordinate units, so as and when
demanded, requirements could be met immediately. Coordination and controlof various resources was as under:
a. Military Traffic Management Command.
b. U.S. Transportation Command.
c. Military Airlift Command..
d. Corps Support Command.
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40. The Coalitions Logistical Capabilities. Coalition had unlimited
supplies of almost all the items.
a. Ammunition.
b. Petroleum.
c. Food and Medical Supplies.
d. Transportation.
e. Saudi Arabia Infrastructure.
41. The Log Build Up. When US forces were ordered to deploy in the Gulf,
the challenges presented to logisticians was like nothing experienced since
word war II. The length of the logistics pipeline was more than 8500 miles i.e.
a 17-hour flight.
42. US Mob Plan. When on Aug 7, Saddam Hussains one million many
army was either in Kuwait or within a couple hundred miles of it. Theimmediate task confronting Schwarzkopf and his component (Army, Navy,
and Airforce) commanders was to get some troops and fire power
immediately. By August 14 the Air Force began landing the 82 Airborne
Division in Saudi Arabia.Both the Marines and Airborne Division were light
formations without much armor or heavy weapons. Within first thirty days,
more than 38,000 men and two Divisions were in Saudi Desert, most of them
brought by air. Over 150,000 tons of weapons, vehicles, equipment and
supplies had arrived. At the end of sixty days the number had grown to more
then 100,000 troops and a half million tons of cargo.
43. Strategic Perspective. The Gulf Operation started on 8 August 90, as
Operation Desert Shield. Initially, the emphasis was on a speedy build up to
deter the Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. The magnitude of the tonnage
lifted to Saudi Arabia is as under:
a. Military Airlift Command. Military Airlift Command had to
requisition 117 aircraft from Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment theirown strategic airlift capability, thus developing the capability of flying
5,000 passengers per day. They flew over 484,000 passengers and
524,000 tons of cargo.
b. Sea Lift. More than 8 division equivalent of equipment was
shipped to the Persian Gulf region, principally to sea ports and airfields.
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c. Industry Support. DLA (Defense Logistic Agency) and AMC (Army
Medical Command) took major contracting efforts. DLA dealt with the
accelerated production and delivery of desert uniforms, chemicals
defense clothes, desert boots, rations, repair parts, equipment,
weapons, fuel and ammunition.
d. Reserve Component. Over 1300 Army Reserve Corps units were
mobilized to perform various duties in US and abroad. RC personnel
were involved in combat support duties of various kinds i.e.
maintenance, quartermaster, petroleum, supply units, port operations,
ordinance, transportation, medical and depot support function.
44. Theatre Perspective. The principal theatre level logistics mission
involved the reception, onward movement and sustenance of operations.
Most Forward Support Bases were located north along the two highways,
designated MSR DODGE and the north south roadway adjacent to King Khalid
Military City MSR NASH. These bases were designated in series as ALPHA,
BRAVO, CHARLIE DELTA and ECHO. These bases were stocked with all classes
of supplies to support the two corps:
Class I - Food and water.
Class II - Clothing.
Class III - Fuel.
Class IV - Barrier material (barbed wire etc).
Class V - Ammunition.
Class VI - Major items e.g. M1A1 Tanks to replace losses.
Class VII - Medical.
Class VIII - Repair parts.
45. Log Sp US Tps. Logistic support of operations, Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, was done professionally and successfully despite extremeadverse conditions. Logistics challenges were magnified by the very complex
structure of the force. Due to commercial agreements Saudis provided a large
amount of logistic support.
a. Pers Items. The logistics system deployed support packs,
providing a variety of sundry and personal items in the field.
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b. Spl Eqpt. The theatre presented a unique opportunity to test
weapons and equipment in war environments. i.e. MI tanks, Bradley
fighting vehicles, satellite communications gear, aircraft carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, frigates and battle ship etc.
c. Med Sup. In addition to ultra modern hospitals operating onland, a number of the new hospital ships had been deployed, the
important ones being Mercy and Comfort.
d. Spare Parts. The great bulk of the requirement for
transportation in the operation was in keeping the logistics pipeline
open for heavy equipment, particularly the replacement of parts.
e. Mail. Postal authorities reported that over 30 millions pounds of
mail was shipped or air lifted to the desert till Christmas only. Express
mail was used to ship thousand of parcels per day.
Conduct of Logistic1stic Operations During Gulf War
46. Logistic Support In Operation Desert Shield & Desert Storm.
The war had nearly been won by air power alone; the army went in just
for mopping up operations. After receiving 38 days of extensive tactical and
strategic bombing Iraq was already on its knees. The 100 hours land offensiveappear short breezy but behind it, the invisible effort of build up logistic
support were the key pillars ensuring the text book victory.
47. During Operations.
a. The two corps commenced their operations to get into their attack
positions. During this movement, Theatre level support involved move
and control of 2,750 miles of MSR, which carried thousands of vehicles.
b. During the peak time 18 vehicles per minutes passed a single
point on the northern route. The movement of units, which covered
distances from 300 to 500 miles, continued 24 hours a day for 21 days.
7 Convoy Support Centres were established to provide food and rest for
drivers, fuel and maintenance services.
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c. On Jan 17, 1991, VII Corps along with its logistic base, began
moving from Harf Al Batin 150 miles westward to get into position for its
24 February assault. Each US combat division had a division support
command which consisted of:
(1) Main support battalion.
(2) Forward support battalion (for each combat brigade).
d. 7 US Army Divisions deployed in Saudi Arabia each of these seven
combat divisions had its own support command to meet short-term
supply, maintenance and medical needs. Each Corps Support Group was
composed of a Maintenance Battalion, Supply and Service Battalion, and
Transport Battalion.
e. Each armored brigade used 290-300 trucks to carry its
ammunition, fuel, water and supplies. A total of 3,500-4,000 trucks were
used to support the operations from logistic bases to forward.
Approximately the same number of trucks was required to keep
supplies going from ports to logistic bases.
f. Daily consummations by combat units were:
Fuel 5,000,000 gallons.
Water 1,300,000 gallons.
Food 708 tons.
Ammunition 34,000 tons.
Medical/misc 804 tons.
Analysis of Allied Logistic System
48. Allied Logistic Policy. As in the NATO context, the logistic policy
hinged around provision of logistic support by the participating nation in it
self. Integrating multinational logistic system created following problems:
a. Different nations were required to support a wider variety of
weapon system and support equipment.
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b. Planning for logistic support while reconciling different national
policies on :
(1) Reserve stock level
(2) Emergency repairs
(3) Casualty care
c. Excess logistic resources could not be appropriately distributed to
other participating nations.
d. Co-operating in logistic system was not evolved as a policy.
49. The Host Nation Integration. Commander-in-Chief Central Command
(CINCCENT) determined that his primary need was combat forces. This
assessment resulted in slipping the priority for deployment of support units
and thus the support units available to support early arriving combat units.
The Saudis provided a large amount of logistics support but the initial
negotiation process proved to be a difficult one.
50. Dev of Infrastructure. Developing of a theatre infrastructure was also
constrained. Law to $ 200,000 per project limited funding for minor
construction.
51. Organic Production. Deploying forces was dependent onextensive lateral support and depot re-supply prior to deployment. Post
deployment support was significantly enhanced by the surge of organic depot
production the availability of airlift to bring high priority items into the theatre
quickly.
52. Industrial Base. Support for the forces deployed to the theatre
depended in several areas on the ability of the industrial base to respond to
new and increased demands. Not all requirements were met in the quantitiesand within the time period desired. As an example, the US Army field-feeding
plan relied on ample supplies of T-rations but they were not currently in War-
Reserve stocks. Industry was unable to gear up production quickly enough to
meet the Armys increased requirements. Similarly, the industrial base was
unable to meet the theatre requirements for the newest and most preferred
tank-killing round. From weapon systems to individual items of supplies, a
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tremendous demand was placed on the nations Industrial base. Despite
some shortcomings, the industrial base was reasonably responsive to the
need of the forces.
53. The Deployment. The most stressful aspect of the operation has
been the air and sea-lift effort. On August 4, US forces were alerted for
deployment and on August 7, the first U.S forces began to arrive in SaudiArabia.
54. Military Air Lift. The coalition air forces transported more than half
a million tons of military material to the Gulf. Most of it was conveyed by US
Force, Military Airlift Command (MAC) which flew over 11,800 missions. The
time between a request made in Saudi Arabia, and delivery from continental
United States would total just 31 hours.
55. Sea Lift. When all available air assets were committed or using air was
non-practical, sea-lift was the only answer. The number of US ships went
down from 5000 in 1945, to 424 in 1990. For this, 8 fast sea lift ships and 36
maritime administrative reserve vessels were activated. Retired crewmen
manned some of these. In total 120 merchant and supply ships were
committed to the deployment of heavier ground forces and their supplies. By
New Year eve, over two million tons of equipment had been shipped to Saudi
Arabia by sea.
56. Transport. Each service deployed a greater percentage of truck
transportation units than combat units, yet still had transportation
requirements that had to be met with host nation support because the area
where US forces were operating had few roads and no railroads. Trucks-both
heavy Equipment Transporter (HETs) and vehicles with good off-road mobility
capability were a consideration during Operations. The most efficient way to
move armd vehicles over long distances in non-combat conditions is to move
them on trucks or by rail. Over 1,200 HETS, were required to support USforces during Operation Desert Storm. The Department had only about 500
HETs available. Obtaining 182 HETs (134 leased and 48 purchased) form US
trucking companies and acquiring 715 HETs form other nations satisfied the
requirement. Without these assets, it would have been very difficult to move
forces over the vast distances.
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57. Supplies viz. Transport. Throughout Operation Desert Shield there
was a long haul requirement to move supplies from ports to theatre storage
areas to consuming units. Division-sized units consume hundreds of tons of
supplies each day. When VII crops and XVIII Airborne Corps began shifting to
the west prior to their end run sweep, the transportation system was taxed
to the limited. The newly introduced Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactics Truck
(HEMITT) and the Marine Logistic Vehicle System (LVS), performed well in this
mission, but there were not enough of them. Once the ground offensive
began, many types of trucks struggled to keep up with the manoeuvre forces.
58. Logistic Command & Control. At the outset of the operation there
was a brief period when an adequate structure for Army command and
control of logistics unit was not available in the theatre. CENTCOM elected to
establish an ad hoc Logistic Headquarters to oversee this portion of force.
This was a satisfactory solution during the first phases of the deployment,and when the size of force increased in November, CENTCOM did not request
mobilization of a theatre level logistics command and control element
because it would have disrupted an already functioning system.
59. Medical Supply. Deployment of medical units began on 8 August,
and units from all services were involved. As the mission of the deployed
force evolved from deterrence to offensive operations, the medical support
requirements expanded. In addition, beds were provided by host nationsupport agreements with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. When the decision was
made to augment the forces in theatre to provide an offensive capability,
medical requirements were adjusted accordingly. In theatre bed
requirements increased, based on doctrinal rules, 18,100 were to be provided
by the host nation and staffed by US military persons. When the air war
began 7680 fully staffed beds were in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
60. Maintenance. Fine abrasive blowing sand creates special problems for
tacticians and maintenance alike. If equipment is protected from sand
Infiltration and accumulation, removal problems are less important.
Maintenance and lubrication techniques changed to prevent dust
accumulation, which pre-maturely wears and seals bearings and weapons
mechanisms. Helicopter rotor blades and canopies developed sand erosion
and required solar loading protection to achieve normal service life and
reduce maintenance requirements. Sand caused clogged airlines,
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overheating, and even vehicle fires. The environment demanded high
maintenance standards which was provided by the log elms.
61. Water. The assessed requirements of water for one Armed Division
were up to 2 million liters per day: that allowed for 40 liters per man per day
plus provision for hospital, NBC decontamination. By the end of Feb 1991,
nineteen reserve Osmosis Plants and twenty NBC water purification unitswere functional in the theatre. The nearly million coalition forces never ran
short of water, a commendable logistic achievement.
Lessons Learnt (Log)
62. Disrupting the logistics system played a vital role in destroying the Iraqi
Army, but that role was somewhat indirect. Had the war lasted longer than
100 hours, the Army would have had to curtail its activities due to shortages.
Disrupting Iraqs strategic highway and rail network enabled the Coalition to
destroy huge amounts of Iraqs military hardware. As the army tried to
withdraw, it was trapped and Coalition ground and air power destroyed the
remaining equipment at will. The massive destruction on the highway of
death between Kuwait and Iraq was the most notable example of the Iraqi
predicament. Following are few lessons which can be drawn from the war:-
63. Transportation. Heavy Equipment Transport (HETs) so that tanks
and other heavy equipment can move quickly, without damaging the road or
causing excessive wear and tear to tracked vehicles. The American found
themselves short of transportation and had to desperately requisition ships,
aircraft and trucks from commercial sources/friendly countries. An army,
which wants to have a capability for quick build up in critical areas, should
have adequate means of transportation to do so.
64. Materiel Handling. Another critical shortage was in the area of
material handling equipment, i.e fork-lifts, and mobile cranes. So not onlytransportation means are important but also means of handling them.
65. Trained Manpower. Along-with the equipment a need was felt to have
trained manpower to operate the equipment.
66. Logistics Wins Wars. This war demonstrated most conclusively that
logistics can win war. Lack of adequate logistic support other than any
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professional ability on the part of opponents contributes to the defeat of an
army.
67. Integrated Logistics. Three services combined their resources with
those of the other countries to organize such and efficient logistic system.
Therefore pooling of entire logistic resources of a nation for an efficient
logistic network is reqr.
68. Propositioning of Stores. The war highlighted that in future logistic
planner must preposition stores and supplies in the vicinity of potential
conflict areas to enable a rapid build up.
69. Reorganization of Units. Certain units may need to be reorganized to
make them more mobile and transportable, in order to avoid straining the
already stretched transportation resources.
70. Defense Industrial Base. Having a strong and well-developed
industrial infrastructure is absolutely vital for any nation to wage war.
71. Rapid Mobilization of Reserve. This war has once again
demonstrated the critical role played by the reserves in the success of any
war. Pakistan needs to urgently overhaul its outmoded system of reserves.
72. Revision of Wastage Rates. Towards the end of the war, even the US
had run short of ammunition of a few weapon systems and had the war
prolonged, the situation would have become critical.
73. Logistical Interdiction. The month long aerial interdiction of Iraq was
in fact largely instrumental in the destruction of Iraqi will to fight.
74. Keep the Logistic Plan Simple. The Logistic plan should be made
as simple as possible. This requires:
a. Emphasis on Training.
b. Flexibility in Planning and execution.
c. Centralized planning and decentralized execution.
d. Communication.
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75. Joint Planning. The administrative and operational chain of command
given the Diversity of nationalities in its composition created a lot of
operational friction.
76. Technological Developments.Tactics and technology should serve
side by side. This high-low mix is likely to present enormous challenges tologisticians.
77. Quantum of Support. Logistics systems should be made more
flexible to sustain the superfluity of supplies and maintenance.
78. Centralization. To balance between centralization and
decentralization. Logistics system should be able to provide continuing and
effective support on the modern battlefield.
Causes of Coalition Victory
79. The major factors, especially from mil point of view that contributed to
the coalition victory were:
a. Identification of the Correct Mil Objective and Maintenance
of Aim.The Allied could ident and destroy the correct mil objectives at
the first stage i.e. NBC wpn instl, msl launching site, C3I factories etcand maint their aim to liberate Kuwait.
b. Best Suited Doc. Allied plan to soften up the tgt by massive
air attk first and then by a coord grd-air action was proved to be the
best suited doc in Gulf war.
c. High Tech Wpn System. Allied used highly sophisticated
weapon system, stealth technology, cruise missiles and electronic
warfare to defeat tech inferior Iraqi tps.
d. C3I. Total integration of resources including C3I and the creation
of a viable unified command structure. On the other hand Allied could
destroy Iraqi C3I factories at the beginning of the btl.
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e. Air Supremacy. Absolute air supremacy over the theatre of
ops. Allied had supremacy over Iraq from Ad environments to ac.
f. Log Bal. Iraq could built up some res stocks in their def posn but
they failed to maint a secured L of C. On the other hand Coalition forces
took seven months to built up the stocks and ensured their secured L of
C.
g. Surprise and Deception. The exec of Coalition deception plan
caught Iraq by total surprise. This led to the rapid collapse of Iraqi
resistance.
h. Concentration of forces.
j. Training.
k. Maintenance of momentum.
l. Very effective psychological warfare.
Causes of Iraqi Defeat
80. Factors that led to the Iraqi defeat were:
a. Geo Political. Iraq was isolated internationally and depended
solely on his own resources, which were extremely limited.
b. Static Warfare. In an era of widely practiced mobile warfare Iraq
depended on positional warfare.
c. Training. Lack of training led to crisis in confidence in their
equipment and was further aggravated with their inability to fight at
night.
d. Integration of Forces. Because of lack of interaction between
svcs/arms the air force bowed out of the conflict in the early stages. The
integration between the Republican Guards and the Army was non-
existent.
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e. Air Defence. Even though Iraq had invested heavily in air
defence assets, these resources did not cover the entire country. Except
few isolated vulnerable areas.
f. Personnel Management. The Republican Guard was given
preferential treatment compared with the rest of the army. Added to
this, army personnel were kept to their post under threat of execution.These seriously eroded morale of the Iraqi forces.
g. Inferior C3I. Inferior command, control, communications and
intelligence system of Iraq when compared with the same of the
coalition forces.
Lessons Learnt
81. The Gulf conflict exhibited some unique dimensions of warfare
unprecedented in mil history. Many lessons can be drawn from this conflict
separately relating to politics and diplomacy, economy, international
relations, post cold war balance of power, coalition dynamics and mil. In
conformity with the scope of today's presentation, major mil lessons are:
a. Fixed Defence. The weakness of fixed def is that a determined
enemy, given sufficient time and study, can always overcome them.
b. Air Support. Due to lack of proper air support a formidable Iraqi
defence was not capable of dealing with the coalition attackers as
expected. On the other hand, the war was literally won by the Coalition
air campaign before the ground battle commenced.
c. Surprise and Deception. The superb execution of coalition
deception plan caught Iraq by total surprise. This led to the rapid
collapse of Iraqi resistance and quick allied victory.
d. Electronic Warfare. The Coalition's ability to degrade the
enemy's C&I system with a significant ECM capability was a major battle
winning factor. Therefore, one must retain its capability to fight under
ECM environment.
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e. Morale. The Gulf war proved once again that well trained, well
motivated and well led forces will prevail over poorly trained, poorly
motivated and poorly led troops. No matter what scientific and
technological advances are made on the battle field.
f. Logistics. Though Iraq could build up some reserve stocks in
their defensive positions but they could not maintain a secured line ofcommunication. On the other hand the coalitions forces took seven
months to build up their stocks and ensured their secured line of
communication.
g. All Arms Coop. Coop among the arms and services contribute to
the victory to a great extent. This has been amply demonstrated in the
Gulf war.
Concl
82. Invasion of Iraq in Kuwait has provided a huge shock to the world, it has
created a sense of insecurity among the states adjacent to such regional
super powers. It is not logical to think that the west would respond in the
similar way as that of the Gulf situation in case of any third world conflict,
since there are no obvious western interests other than the protection of the
nationals. However, the Gulf experience should help to deter those
contemplating blatant aggression. The deterrent effect of the Gulf war may
no doubt create a fear against such adventure.