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Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG)

Gulf Countries as Catalysts: Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative

Tuesday, March 4, 2009

Speakers:

Marina Ottaway

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Marcel Pott

Publicist and Independent Journalist

Guido Steinberg

Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

Otto Wiesheu

Chairman, German Arab Friendship Society (DAFG)

Chairs:

Sawsan Chebli

Policy Advisor, German Bundestag

Fabrice Pothier

Director, Carnegie Europe

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) OTTO WIESHEU: I want to thank Carnegie Europe and the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace as well as Sawsan Chebli for arranging this meeting and

making it possible to discuss this cooperation. I think we will have a very fruitful discussion.

The German-Arab Friendship Society suggests four fields for cooperation: the first is

political information about the politics in the Arab countries including information about the

politics from Germany to Arab countries, the historical development, the situation now and

the politics between different Arab countries. The second field is cooperation in cultural

matters, in scientific matters and in religious matters. Primarily, we inform people in

Germany and we provide better information. In Germany, the people often combine Islam

and terrorism to “Islamic terror”, but we have to make a big difference, we have to inform

people about the Islamic religion, about tradition, to have much more understanding of the

situation.

The third field is the cooperation in economic affairs and economic questions. I think

economic cooperation is an important aspect as it can act as a stable bridge for political

cooperation and the solution of political questions. Therefore, cooperation is necessary. The

fourth and final field is communication, communication and communication. We have to

inform and to discuss; we have to build a stable basis to understand each other, to

understand the problems and to develop understanding for both sides.

In the course of the past months, we have lived through very hard times, through terrible

times. There was the war in the Middle East. On a daily basis, we witnessed the destructions,

the deaths of so many people. There have also been events taking place before that in

Palestine, namely between Palestinians themselves and there had already been many dead

The West Bank has been occupied for over forty years. I think we should do everything we

can possibly do, in order to work towards a peaceful solution, towards a situation, which

allows for peace to be established and for people to live together peacefully – as neighbors

not as enemies. I am very skeptical, however, whether that can be brought about so easily,

especially seeing the announcement of the continuing settlement policy in the West Bank.

However, things just have to be solved. There must be a solution.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) It is with mixed feeling – and I hope you understand me well – that I have followed the

Donor Conference. To donate money for reconstruction is a good thing, it is a very good

thing. However, it is only a good thing if at the same time one takes care that things will not

be destroyed again. Europe must continuously support efforts to create the preconditions

for lasting reconstruction. Europe must continuously be striving for peace. Peace must come

to last. I am personally convinced that this cannot be brought about; peace cannot be

brought about just by talking, by trying to convince people. It is the Quartet, the United

States and Europe in particular, that should feel called upon to work towards a peaceful

situation or else it cannot come about.

The Middle East needs peace, not only for humanitarian reasons. War has never been a

solution to a conflict. A war is the establishment of a conflict. The Middle East needs a

solution - a solution for the wider area, in a wider sense and for the various problems

existing there. Europe has to use the current situation to draw closer attention to peace and

to make the region come closer to peace.

I hope that the discussion of tonight will help us see a little clearer in the situation. As you

may be aware, tonight is one event in a series of evenings we are organizing under the lead

question ‘Is Peace in the Middle East Possible?’ On my part, I hope that peace is possible

and that the outcome of the recent Israeli elections does not put a hold to it all again,

because the work for peace must go on.

This is what I wanted to say tonight here, because the situation is dramatic. Let me just add

on a personal note that over Christmas, I had an opportunity of visiting Israel and Palestine

together with Mr. and Mrs. Maarouf. We went to Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem. When

you are there, on the spot, you get the true impressions of the situation. Therefore I realize

how great an effort has to be made for peace.

Against this background, I wish you all a very good evening and I thank the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace once again for its help.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) FABRICE POTHIER: Good evening, Ladies and Gentlemen, my name is

Fabrice Poithier. I am the Director of Carnegie Europe. On behalf of the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, it is a real pleasure to welcome you tonight. I will be

very brief. I will start by thanking the German-Arab Friendship Group, especially its

President, for hosting this debate tonight. My special thanks also to Sawsan. It is a real

pleasure for the Carnegie Endowment to co-host this evening. As some of you may know,

Carnegie Europe is the new pan-European foreign policy forum of the Carnegie

Endowment. Carnegie Europe is working to bring to Europe the best of Carnegie

worldwide. Especially our center in Washington D.C., but also our regional centers in

Moscow, Beirut and Beijing provide non-European perspectives to the European debate on

foreign policy.

I think tonight’s debate is particularly interesting and very much in line with what Carnegie is

trying to do. That is not necessarily to bring a typical American or Western perspective to

the big questions. It would have been an easy choice to talk about Europe’s policy towards

the Middle East or the U.S. policy towards the Middle East tonight. Instead, during this

debate we are seeking to highlight the Gulf States’ approach towards the Middle East peace

initiative. The fact that Hillary Clinton is in the region right now indicates that the world has

changed over the last eight years and the Middle East has not necessarily waited for the U.S.

to change.I think, today we are going to hear many very interesting insights about this new

world and those new perspectives and actors that are emerging. Thank you very much again.

SWASON CHEBLI: Excellencies, Members of Parliament, Ladies and

Gentlemen, thank you all for accepting our invitation to this meeting. I especially want to

thank our guests for speaking to us tonight and for giving us insight into their expertise. The

questions we want to ask today are: What role do the Gulf States play in the Middle East

peace process? What is their strategy? Does a strategy exist? – and finally, what challenges do

they face?

The past weeks have shown a flood of diplomatic activity in the Middle East. Everyone who

is following the news sees it clearly. The United States has a new administration that is

willing to solve the conflict in the Middle East. There are signs of warming relations between

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) the United States and Syria. Hamas and Fatah seem to be on the right track to reconciliation

and to the formation of a government of national unity. Europe and the United States, for

their part, have actually promised to support the outcome brokered by Egypt – whatever the

outcome might be.

Last but not least, we are currently hearing strong words of the Arab leaders – to use

[Secretary General of the Arab League] Amr Moussa’s words – ‘to end the chaos in the

region’ and to end Arab differences, to overcome the Arab division that has become obvious

during the Gaza War. The Gaza War did not create the division, but the Gaza War showed

how deep the division is and how much it affects the whole Middle East arena. The Gaza

War exacerbated how difficult it is to overcome the divide. The call for unity is not just

benevolent, but rather it is linked to the Iranian issue.

Yesterday, during the Foreign Ministers meeting between Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt,

[Saudi Foreign Minister] Prince Saud Al-Faisal said that the Arabs needed – I quote – ‘a

unified and joint vision in dealing with the Iranian challenge’. Those of you who have

watched the news today and probably heard about the conference in Teheran on Gaza and

on Palestine have heard very hard words of the Iranian Supreme Leader [Ali Khamenei]

saying that – I quote – ‘support and help to Palestinians is a mandatory duty of all Muslims’.

‘I now tell all Muslim brothers and sisters to join forces and break the immunity of Zionist

criminals’. The Secretary General of the Conference [Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour] said that

‘Those who participated at the Donor Conference in Egypt… approved the Zionist regime’s

atrocities in Gaza’. This message, actually, seems to be addressed to the Arab leaders, to the

Arab states who participated in the conference in Egypt.

Before giving the floor to the speakers, allow me to introduce them. To my immediate left is

Marina Ottaway. Marina is the Director of the Middle East Program at Carnegie

Endowment and a Senior Associate in the ‘Democracy and Rule of Law Project’. Her main

fields of interest are democracy and post-conflict reconstruction with a special focus on

political transformation in the Middle East. In January 2008, Marina published her latest


book entitled Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World.1 I have read it and I can

highly recommend it. Marina, it is great to have you with us.

MARINA OTTAWAY: Thank you very much.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: To Marina’s left is Guido Steinberg. Guido is Senior

Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, to us the institute is

known as the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP. His expertise lies in political

developments in the Arab East and in the Gulf region, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Before joining the SWP, Guido was adviser on international terrorism at the Federal

Chancellery. He has published extensively on the Middle East, Saudi Arabian and Iraqi

history and politics, the Wahhabya, Islamism and terrorism. Thank you for speaking to us.

Finally, to my right is Marcel Pott. Marcel is publicist and independent journalist. He is a

former Middle East correspondent for the ARD. He covered the 1982 Lebanon war. From

’83 to ’92, Marcel was head of the ARD radio station in Beirut and Amman. In 2004, his

book Schuld und Sühne im Gelobten Land2 took account of the impact of the Iraq war on the

Middle East peace process.

Now we will have three statements and after that open the floor for a questions and answers

round from the audience. We will start with Marina who will talk to us about the role of the

Gulf States, will give us an overview about challenges, and missed chances. Marina, in your

latest policy brief Sharing the Burden in the Middle East you say that the United States should

not monopolize the Middle East peace process. You say that they should get the Arab States

engaged and this actually leads us to the point of assessing and discussing the role of the

Gulf States. Please, Marina, the floor is yours.

1 Marina Ottaway, Julia Choucair-Vizoso (Eds.), Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008. 2 Marcel Pott, Der Nahost-Konflikt: Schuld und Sühne im Gelobten Land – Israels Sonderrolle im Schutz der westlichen Welt. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2004. First published as: Schuld und Sühne im Gelobten Land: Israels Sonderrolle im Schutz der westlichen Welt. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2002.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) MARINA OTTAWAY: Thank you very much for this invitation. I like to join

my colleague Fabrice Pothier in thanking the Association for this opportunity. As you said, it

is the first time we have done something together. I hope it is not going to be the last.

Let me point out that it is not my intention to be here to tell Arab countries what they ought

to be doing. I have realized that the United States on its own is not going to be able to

achieve peace in the Middle East. Unless everybody pushes in the same direction, unless

there is even greater effort than Arab countries have already made, and I’ll explain in a

moment what I mean, there is not going to be a successful conclusion of this conflict which

has gone on far too long already.

This is both a very good time and a very bad time to talk about what can be done about the

peace process. It is a very good time because there is a new administration in Washington

that is clearly taking a very different position from its predecessor There is an administration

in Washington that clearly believes that diplomacy represents a window of opportunity. The

new administration believes in engagement. It has pledged to engage with the Middle East

from the very beginning and I think it is showing that it intends to maintain its pledge. It

does not repeat the mistakes of both the Bush administration and the Clinton

administration. It is not planning to wait until the end of the second term in office before

finally turning attention to the Palestinian issue.

In some ways, the Gaza crisis made the decision for the Obama administration, because

there was the temptation in Washington to postpone addressing the issue again. No

president wants to take on a foreign policy issue where there is little guarantee of success –

especially not at the beginning of his mandate. Let us face it: there is no guarantee of success

for the peace process, but the Gaza situation has imposed itself and it is quite clear that the

administration is and will remain to be engaged.

At the same time, one has to be very realistic about the fact that the Obama administration is

an American administration that, when trying to address the peace process, is subject to all

the constraints that exist in the United States. Those constraints are manifold. There are very

strong ties between the United States and Israel and that it is not going to change. Nor do I

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) think that it should change. There is an extremely well organized lobby that is watching very

carefully what the administration is doing. This lobby can clearly articulate criticism and is

ready to publicly criticize any step the administration takes that is considered to be not in

favor of Israel.

Essentially, there is a new climate in Washington, but there is only partially a new climate.

The Obama administration’s appointments of positions in the Middle East reflect this. If I

can put it this way, the administration seems to be somewhat schizophrenic at this point,

because its different appointments are sending out different signals. There is the

appointment of George Mitchell as Special Envoy to the Middle East, which – I understand

from my talks and my travel in the region – has been quite well received in the Arab world

by and large.

Then, there has been the appointment of Dennis Ross as Special Advisor for the Gulf and

Southeast Asia to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, which has not been particularly well

received. Probably that is somewhat of an understatement. I think there has been a lot of

concern in the Arab world about that particular appointment and I think correctly so. There

are two issues of concern about Dennis Ross: One is the positions he has taken in the past

and the fact that he is the co-founder and counselor of the Washington Institute for Near

East Policy, which is the think tank of AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

Secondly, he was involved in the peace process before and he is likely to start where he left

eight years ago. Given the fact that the situation on the ground has changed very

dramatically, this is not a good place to start all over again. Even though the Obama

administration had a much more encouraging start than previous administrations, it is still

sending out mixed messages.

I do not want to spend a lot of time telling you that the situation on the ground is bad,

especially in the aftermath of the Gaza crisis and the Israeli elections. Therefore, it is going

to be very difficult for Arab countries to do even more than they have so far. Yet, there is

more that Arab countries could and should do in the interest of peace and in trying to make

the Arab Peace Initiative become a reality.


The Arab Peace Initiative has been proposed for a long time. First, it was the Saudi peace

initiative and then the entire Arab League and all Arab countries embraced it. Considering

that the document was first drafted in 2002, it is safe to say it is not a new idea. The Arab

countries continue to refloat it and correctly so. However, merely floating it will not be

enough. Arab countries have counted too much on the United States to take this idea and

make it a reality. I would argue that it is time that Arab countries engage more directly and

try to make their idea a success.

This would not entail the Arab countries taking all the burden. Both, the United States and

Europe should be taken to responsibility. The peace process is going to require a lot of very

heavy lifting on the part of everybody. In recent years, Arab countries, and particularly the

Gulf countries, have shown an unprecedented degree of activism in their foreign policies.

This has been brought about partly by the crisis that was created by the absence of policies

of the Bush administration. This left the countries of the region, and particularly the Gulf

countries, with very little choice than to become much more active themselves on a lot of

issues.

The Gulf countries have been extremely worried about the new balance of power that has

been created in the Gulf region as a result of the war in Iraq. Concerns about the possibility

of conflict between the United States and Iran have discomforted the Gulf countries. In

such a conflict, the Gulf countries are likely to become victims.

What has been the result? A new, very active diplomacy that tries to create a position for the

Gulf countries, which is close to the United States but also taking its distance from the

policies of the Bush administration. Last fall, a colleague of mine and I published a paper for

the Carnegie Endowment which we called The New Arab Diplomacy: Not with the U.S. and Not

against the U.S. 3 I think that has been the approach of the Gulf countries.

They did not welcome the attempt by the Bush administration to build an anti-Iranian

alliance, the ‘Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plus two’ initiative that was an attempt to

3 Marina Ottaway, Mohammed Herzallah, The New Arab Diplomacy: Not with the U.S. and Not Against the U.S. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004 (=Carnegie Papers No. 94).

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) build an alliance of the GCC countries plus Egypt and Jordan to essentially create a common

front against Iran. The Gulf countries considered that a rather dangerous approach to the

problem of how to deal with Iran. They reacted by participating in meetings without

officially admitting it. In theory the ‘GCC plus two’ initiative was launched, but it was never

officially mentioned. I would argue that it was ‘dead on arrival’. Instead, the Gulf countries

tried to establish more links to Iran, without embracing its political position. The fear of Iran

is still very strong in the region and arguably for understandable reasons. This diplomacy was

based on the assumption that there are different ways of dealing with problems, and

confrontation is not necessarily the ideal way to deal with a country that could be quite

dangerous to the region.

Since the Obama administration came to power, the Gulf countries have a new concern - the

fear that the Obama administration will become too close to Iran. In other words, there is a

fear expressed all the time, of a ‘grand bargain’ between the United States and Iran in which

the United States would obtain from Iran the cessation of the nuclear program in exchange

for, essentially, letting Iran pretty much be in charge of security in the Gulf. That is a fear

that probably nobody needs to have because given the position of the Iranian government

and given the statements that were made today by the Kahmenei, I don’t think there can be

that kind of ‘grand bargain’ with the United States.

My reason for elaborating on the history of the relationship between the GCC countries and

Iran is to show that there was a willingness of the GCC countries to become much more

active and involved. They have displayed a much more proactive foreign policy than in the

past. There has not been as much activism concerning the Palestinian issue yet, with the

Arab initiative still pending because it was not really backed up by diplomacy. So far, the

Gulf countries have tried to push the American administration to help realize the initiative.

In the point which I am about to make, I realize that I am probably sticking my neck out.

The following argument may not be particularly welcome. For the Arab initiative to become

a reality, I think it is time to start some sort of second-track diplomacy with indirect contacts

between the Arab countries and Israel. There has to be a process of negotiations that cannot

depend wholly on the United States.


I am not saying that Arab countries should start negotiating directly with Israel at this point.

I am quite aware that this would imply recognition. There are other ways to carry out

contacts or to push certain initiatives without having direct contacts. The most recent

example is the case of Syria and Israel. However, I am not sure at this point that Turkey

would be a good interlocutor. The Turkish-Israeli relationship has suffered badly from the

position that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took during the Gaza crisis.

Two statements particularly strained the relationship. First, there was the statement that

Israel should be expelled from the United Nations and second, the statement of walking out

from the meeting in Davos when sitting on the same podium with the Israeli President

Shimon Peres. Thus, even if Turkey is evidently not the right choice at the moment, there

are certainly other channels through which to conduct indirect talks.

I am not arguing that Arab countries should be the only one to push for this initiative, but

only the Arab countries can convince Israel that they are serious diplomatic actors. They can

convince Israel that peace with all Arab countries can be the ultimate goal. Marcel Pott will

talk more about the details of the Arab initiative, so I am not going to elaborate further, but

I would like to stress that only the Arab countries can really realize peace.

What can United States and what can Europe do that would be helpful? An immediate step

for the United States would be to openly declare support for the reconciliation process that

is taking place in Egypt at the present time – and I hope that the Obama administration is

able to do this. Although the Obama administration has not opposed the reconcillaition

process, it has not made a clear statement in favor of it either. An unequivocal statement that

the United States supports the reconciliation process is necessary, but would be a big step

for the United States. If the process were to succeed, the United States would have to deal

with the Palestinian Authority including Hamas. The Bush administration refused to do that

in the past.

Just as there are ways to open indirect talks with a country one does not recognize, it is

possible to find ways of dealing with the Palestinian Authority without recognizing the

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) legitimacy of Hamas. After all, that is what diplomacy is all about, to find ways to move the

process forward.

Let me just conclude with one statement. I think all sides have to give in to arrive at a

compromise. ‘The Sharing of the Burden’ is what really applies here. The United States is

not going to succeed by itself, neither can Arab countries succeed by themselves. Quite

frankly, I think there is a role here also for European countries. What European countries

can do most successfully is to exert pressure on the Obama administration so that it starts

supporting the reconciliation talks.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you very much for this open and very frank

statement. I think it was a realistic overview on the role of the Gulf States. You mentioned

the Arab Peace Initiative, Marina, and I’m glad that you didn’t elaborate more on it because

Marcel is going to give us an insight on his views about the Arab Peace Initiative.

Marcel, I would like to ask you a few questions: Why do you think the international

community just ignorde the – what I would label – historic momentum of the plan? Do you

think the Arabs failed to launch it properly? Or do you think the international community

did not take the plan seriously? What was the problem with this peace initiative and the

reception thereof in the Western world?

MARCEL POTT: I believe they did take it seriously and this is why they

did not react to it. This would have meant to changing policy altogether. The Arab Peace

Initiative has been, by the time it came into being in 2002, a completely new approach by the

Arab League, made up of 22 member states, vis-à-vis Israel and vis-à-vis a so-called ‘collective

peace approach’.

Before I elaborate on the peace initiative in itself, I have the humble task, given to me by the

honorable presenter of this program here, to give a brief account on history, because it has

been a very long way from Khartoum in 1967 to the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002. We all

remember, maybe not all, but a good number of the audience remembers the year of 1967.

Israel’s decisive victory over the Arab states in the Six-Day War of 1967 initially raised hopes

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) that at last it would be possible to reach a definitive settlement of the then-19-year-old Arab-

Israeli conflict. Instead, it soon became apparent that the conflict had merely been

complicated by the occupation of further Arab territory, the displacement of still more

refugees and the aggravation of the sense of grievance felt by the Palestinians and now

shared more widely than ever in the rest of the Arab world.

After the U.N. Security Council had passed Resolution Number 237, on June 14, 1967,

calling on Israel to facilitate the return of the new refugees who had fled and were still

fleeing from the areas occupied by Israel during the Six-Day War, the U.N. assembly then

failed to produce an agreed resolution on the basis for a settlement. The deadlock became

total when an Arab summit conference held in Khartoum between August 29 and

September 3, 1967, confirmed earlier decisions: first, not to negotiate directly with Israel;

second, not to accord her recognition; and third, not to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The

Israeli government, for its part, announced its refusal to undertake any but direct

negotiations. If no such negotiations developed, Israeli force would maintain their

occupation of the Arab territories conquered during the war.

During the fall, the U.N. Security Council considered a number of draft resolutions, which

failed to gain approval. Finally, on November 22, 1967, the Council unanimously adopted

Resolution 242, which was to be the basis of all subsequent peace initiatives during the next

five years and which remains an important element in attempts to resolve the Palestinian

question. It emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, which

satisfied the demand of the Arabs and their then-supporter, the Soviet Union, for an Israeli

withdrawal. At the same time, by being less than categorical about the extent of that

withdrawal, it became acceptable to the Israelis and its supporter, the United States of

America. To this day, all the subsequent arguments that developed centered around this

question. Do the Israelis, in return for a definitive peace treaty, have the right to retain parts

of the Arab territories occupied during the war?

In September 1982, the Arab summit conference took place in Fes. It adopted a peace plan

similar to the Fahd Plan, a 1981 plan to resolve the Arab-Israel and give the Palestinians an

independent state. That means that already in 1981/1982, Saudi Arabia was taking the

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) initiative of pushing the Arab collective towards a new position vis-à-vis the conflict and the

resolution thereof. This Fes Plan was similar to the Fahd Plan and the Fahd Plan included

not only the Arab demands on behalf of the Palestinians as approved by the U.N. General

Assembly, but also an implied de facto recognition of Israel. That was historic, that was new.

Concerning the Arab Peace Initiative, it was proposed at the Arab League summit in Beirut

in 2002. The initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and unanimously adopted by all 22

member states of the Arab League. It offered a formula for ending not only the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict, but also the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. It offered to achieve collective peace

and security for all signatories and normal relations with Israel. According to Marwan

Muasher, Jordan’s former Foreign Minister and Jordan’s first Ambassador to Israel, the

initiative was ‘the embodiment of the moderate camp in the Arab world and of its leap of

faith in addressing both Arab and Israeli needs. Unfortunately, the Arab Peace Initiative was

not related to seriously by the two players whose support and endorsement were crucial for

its implementation. Neither Israel nor the United States responded with more than lip

service. Arab states are also to be blamed for failing to explain the initiative to the Israeli

public – our principal audience.’

The Arab Peace Initiative calls for Israel’s full withdrawal from the Arab territories it has

occupied since June 1967, and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as

its capital. It offers collective peace and security guarantees for all states in the region

including Israel and an agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem. In other words, the

Arab proposal should serve as a basis for comprehensive negotiations over territory,

refugees and mutual acceptance between Israel and the Arabs.

Today, seven years after its adoption, the Arab Peace Initiative still holds, even though King

Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has recently hinted it may not remain on the table eternally. Critics

state that the Arab countries have not undertaken – and now I quote Marina in her paper

“Sharing the Burden” – have not undertaken “the necessary effort to transform a general

idea into a detailed, workable agreement.” Thank you, Marina. Thank you very much.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you very much, Marcel, for giving us a historic

overview over the Arab Peace Initiative. Actually, one can tend to read only daily news and

then we forget about history.

MARCEL POTT: When I first came to the Middle East, late Seventies –

I was still young and this is why it has been such an important breakthrough to put forward

such a plan, including – which is of paramount importance in my opinion – the offer to

negotiate the refugee question which is very important to the Arab mind, to the Palestinians

but also to the wider Arab public. This is why it is so important. I agree with Marina that this

peace initiative should be translated and transformed into a peace plan.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Maybe we will discuss that later. Guido Steinberg, we

want to switch from the history to the present and we will talk about Germany, because we

are a German-Arab Friendship Association and those of us who deal with Arab Middle East

policy may sometimes be frustrated with Germany’s position. One can get frustrated by

Germany’s inactivity, by Germany’s passiveness, by Germany’s immobility to form a clear

strategy. I would like to hear your opinion and your impression of Germany’s Gulf policy.

GUIDO STEINBERG: Thank you. I would formulate the whole issue a little

bit differently. German-Saudi Arabian relations are not extremely deep. They are okay, but

there is hardly any cooperation between the two countries in Middle Eastern affairs. That is

astonishing, first, because of what we heard right now, but secondly, also because both

countries’ interests are very similar in many fields of Middle East policies – especially with

regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It has become clear through the Saudi peace

initiative. It is frustrating indeed, to see the amount of inactivity on the German side, but

also on the Saudi side with regard to Europe.

First, I would like to expand on Saudi interests; secondly, I want to compare them to

German interests in the Middle East; and thirdly, I will come up with several suggestions for

changes in German-Middle East, or in German-Saudi Arabia policies and some suggestions

for the Arab and Saudi Arabian policy approach as well.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) Looking at Saudi Arabian policies, it is quite clear that the country has two main interests in

the region: first, contributing to a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, secondly, a

containment of Iran. If you listen to Saudi Arabian politicians and representatives, they will

always tell you that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the number one priority for their

regional policies. I am a little bit skeptical, but it might be true, because many people,

politicians and officials repeat it to you.

What is convincing in this regard is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does have an internal

dimension for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is very closely allied with the U.S. The U.S. in turn

is Israel’s main ally. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is often perceived as Israel’s main ally in the

Arab world. This leads to a constant pressure to legitimize governmental policies vis-à-vis its

own population, which is partly anti-American, anti-Israel and anti-Semite. As a result, Saudi

Arabia’s quest for a Middle East peace has to be taken very seriously, if only for this internal

dimension, because any peaceful solution would definitely benefit the stability of the

Kingdom. This interest is reflected in the Saudi peace initiative and, more recently, other

Saudi efforts to bring about a Palestinian government of national unity.

When looking at the second interest, ‘containing Iran’, it is probably the more important

current Saudi interest – obviously because of the nuclear issue. Since 2006, Iran has

broadened its influence in the Middle East. By supporting Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran has

particularly influenced the Israeli-Palestinian theatre. Thereby, the two previously mentioned

Saudi-Arabian foreign policy interests converged and have made the Saudi desire to

contribute to a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem more urgent.

When one compares Saudi-Arabian foreign policy interests with German foreign policy

interests, it becomes evident that they are broadly similar. First, a solution to the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict is a priority for German policymakers – probably even the single most

important priority in the Middle East – although that might change with the development of

the nuclear issue in Iran. In this case, this is a lot more than pure rhetoric and when asking

German policymakers, analysts, or officials for details, the responses are very similar to the

ones laid out in the Saudi peace initiative as presented by Marcel Pott.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) First, the two-state solution combined with a more comprehensive approach and peace

between Israel and all its neighbors; secondly, the foundation of a Palestinian state, at least

roughly within the borders of 1967; and third, a solution to the refugee problem. Arguably,

the refugee question is not a fundamental concern in Germany, but probably it has not been

as prominent for the Saudis in the beginning either. This is also reflected in the fact that the

Syrians insisted on introducing the refugee problem into the Saudi peace initiative.

Differences in the past two to three years have mainly arisen over the role of Hamas and the

government of national unity. Many policymakers in Germany and Europe have now

realized or are realizing in recent months that there is no way to ignore Hamas.

Second, Saudi Arabia is perhaps more concerned about the Iranian quest for hegemony in

the Middle East than Germany, but Iran is definitely the second major question for German

foreign policy in the Middle East. German politicians would not label it containment of Iran

as an interest of Germany, but this is probably where the whole issue will end up one day -

Iran will have its bomb. In this situation, Germany, just like Saudi Arabia, will cooperate in

any containment strategy decided upon by the U.S. or the international community.

Simultaneously, Germany will seek to keep channels of communication open to

communicate with either the government or civil society, along the lines of the Helsinki

process. This is exactly what the Saudis have been doing in recent years already. They have

always made clear that they are on the American’s side. At the same time, they have always

tried to ease tensions with Iran trying to avoid the hard decision in case of a military strike

against Iran.

Third point: What does this mean for German and European foreign policy? First, if you

agree to this analysis of German and Saudi interests – and you might add a lot of other,

similar interests, like the interest in the stability of a unified Iraq, or the stability of Lebanon

– then it is quite hard to explain why these two countries do not cooperate more effectively

and try to cooperate in regional matters. If interests are that similar and if these issues are

really that important for Saudi and German foreign policies why should there be no

cooperation. The same holds true for the whole of Europe as well as other Arab states. In

fact, beyond rhetoric and different visits by policymakers on both sides, there is hardly any

evidence for a deepening of relations in recent years.


That was especially disappointing in late 2008, when the Bush administration was not acting

on the Middle East any more and when the Obama administration was not acting yet. There

was a gap that could have been filled. I would have expected the Europeans and some Arab

states at least to try to fill the gap. Even if there are some shortcomings and if their capacities

might not be up to that task, they should have tried.

One can of course argue that there are differences of opinion between Germany and Saudi

Arabia. These differences are for example the internal situation in Saudi Arabia, human

rights, religious policy, and perhaps most importantly, religious foreign policy, especially in

the Balkans. These tensions are relevant, but to have a foreign policy impact in the Middle

East, one has to adopt a pragmatic attitude and be prepared to isolate Middle East affairs

from all other issues. By doing this, common interests and views dominate.

As a result, European politicians should seek to engage Arab states. President Sarkozy’s state

visits in January 2009 were an example of how such a pragmatic approach can work. By first,

visiting Egypt and then visiting Syria, he managed to engage Hamas as well thereby

increasing chances of success. Despite minor flaws in the state visit, this is the example

Europe has to follow. With previous experience in the region, the French have realized a

degree of pragmatism that German policymakers have yet to realize.

From a Saudi or from an Arab perspective, I would expect an attempt to build something

like an Arab Quartet. By laying the foundations of an Arab Quartet there might have

emerged a partner cooperating with the Middle East Quartet. One can argue that the Middle

East Quartet has disappeared, but it will most certainly reappear in the coming months. This

Arab Quartet could have had a constructive role, perhaps with a slight reconfiguration of

member states of the original composition in 2007. Syria, for example should be a part of

such an Arab institution if any tangible solution is to be found. In fact, if the Europeans are

to engage the Arabs on a multilateral level, the Arab states need to develop a multilateral

Arab forum. Unfortunately, this has not been realized yet.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you, Guido, for your insights on German-

Saudi Arabian relations. Thank you all for your diplomatic contributions and your very

stimulating presentations. I think we have a lot of food for thought. If I may open the floor

for questions from the audience. Do we have a first question from the audience? Mr.

Omran, Your Excellency?

H.E. HUSSEIN OMRAN (Ambassador of Syria to Germany): First of all I

would like to thank the audience and I thank my association, German-Arab Society for this

unique opportunity to host such an important meeting. It was a very fruitful and informative

background discussion about the Middle East, what is going on. Thank you very much. In

addition, I would like to thank Marina Ottaway and the Carnegie Endowment, and Dr.

Wiesheu for organizing such an event.

My country has been mentioned many times in this discussion. I do not see any sort of

conflict or misunderstanding between the positions, which have been outlined by Mr.

Steinberg and my own country. Syria is exactly corresponding with this position. Syria

supports the Arab initiative, which was launched by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and has been

renewed last year. The initiative is not a Saudi Arabian initiative any more, it is an Arab

initiative, since it has been taken up by the Arab League and by all Arab countries. Secondly,

with this new approach of the European Union, the Syrian position is taken into

consideration.

Sure, one cannot do anything without taking into account the de facto actors the Middle

East. One cannot talk about, for example, the Hamas without saying that they are partly

living in Syria. One has to mention about 700.000 refugees that still live in Syria today. When

talking about the settlement of peace in the Middle East one has to take into consideration

occupied territories in the Golan Heights. Syria cannot accept any peace with Israel without

having this land back from Israel, because it is our land and we do insist on getting it back.

Secondly, there is the very disputed and very controversial issue of the Iran-Syria

relationship. Many people are blaming us: ‘Why do you maintain such a close relationship

with Iran?’ I see it from another angle. I see it very positive. I look back into the history, in

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) 1980, Syria had the very same good relations with Iran. All Arab countries were against Syria

during the first Gulf War. Later on, it has been depicted that Syria was right, because Syria

cannot refrain to help an Arab country that was attacked by another Arab country, as it

happened when Iraq launched an aggression against Iran. Later on, Syria has been told:

‘Your position is right.’ Secondly, without the position of Syria in 1990, there was no alliance

against the interference of Saddam during the occupation of Kuwait. Syria’s position was

always insisting on bringing about a real and de facto consideration and configuration of

peace in the Middle East.

After four years of immense pressure on Syria, and four years after the assassination of Mr.

[Rafik] Hariri, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, there were plans that Syria should be invaded

just like Iraq. Syria has withstood this immense pressure, and last year, the Arab world told

us: ‘You were right, we have to start negotiating again, because Syria’s position was right.’

Believe me, ladies and gentlemen, Syria wants peace. Syria would like to have peace with

Israel, provided only – and this is our condition – the Golan Heights will be returned to

Syria. Without the Golan Heights, there is no peace in the Middle East. Land for peace is a

very important concept. In Lebanon, Syria did everything possible to guarantee stability in

Lebanon after the events Iraq and the Lebanon War. The same is true for Iraq. Syria has a

very positive perspective towards many disputed places in the region. I do not understand

why they are blaming Syria nowadays. Every diplomatic action step vis-à-vis Syria ought to be

considered thoroughly. Mr. Sarkozy did very well. I was hoping that Germany would take

the same position, since Franco-German relations are very good, but there was no obvious

amelioration of relations between Syria and Germany. Therefore, I would like to thank Mr.

Sarkozy. I would like to thank the European Union as well and I would like to encourage

more countries to normalize political relations with my country. I thank you very much.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you, Excellency. Since that was not a

real question but rather very good remarks, I would like to give His Excellency the floor for

asking a question. Your Excellency, please.

H.E. ABDULHAMID ABDULLA AL AWADHI (Ambassador of Kuwait to Germany):

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) Thank you. I am the Ambassador of Kuwait. First, I would like to thank all the organizers

for this meeting which is very interesting and very open-minded. Therefore, I am going to be

a little bit – maybe –undiplomatic.

Mrs. Ottaway said at the beginning of her presentation that no American administration

tackles the issue of the Middle East conflict when they come into power, because there is

not guarantee of success. Therefore, they always keep it to the end, and the same thing can

be said more or less in about European governments. I think that there is no guarantee of

success, because they are no serious efforts to solve the conflict.

I do not think that American administrations or European governments are serious about

solving this problem. The reason for not being serious is simple. They are not affected, and

their interests in the region are not really affected either. If their interests were to be affected,

there would be more serious efforts to solve the conflict. A good example is the 1973 Yom

Kippur war. After the war in October 1973 American and European governments were

engaged, because their interests were affected. After the liberation of Kuwait, there was the

Madrid meeting, because European interests were affected and they realized that this is the

core problem of the region. Hence, a serious European and American effort to resolve the

conflict is what is needed today. I hope that the new American administration is taking the

initiative and is prepared to stick to its electoral promises beyond sending an envoy to the

region which is an important step. Please let us hope so.

Secondly, I would like to mention Germany. When discussing the problem with German

officials one always encounters a single answer: there is always a special relationship between

Israel and Germany. This is always the answer and it makes any kind of even discussion

impossible. To be very frank, the special relationship has been abused by Israel for almost

sixty years now. How can Germany overcome this special relationship? It is important and

when Mr. Schröder was the Chancellor, he opposed the United States war in Iraq. It was like

a taboo in Germany, but it was very successful. I hope they will be able to overcome the

special relationship in the future too. Thank you.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) MARINA OTTAWAY: I will address only the first part of your statement, as I

cannot and should not speak about German politics. You are right; the United States does

not feel the same sort of urgency. They are not directly affected. Then there is always this

sense of ‘well, it can wait’, this is absolutely true. That is why I was putting pressure on Arab

countries to do something. The question is how to create more urgency for the United

States? How can we make it more important for the U.S. to address U.S.-Arab relations?

There are two ways and I am certainly not advocating the first one. There are two ways,

theoretically, in which the U.S. can be made to look at the problem with a greater sense of

urgency. The first option is something drastic that Arab countries can do to affect American

interests: namely another oil embargo. Please do not do it. As I said, I am not advocating

this approach. However, that is something that would put pressure on and hurt the United

States. The second option, which is the one I would like to advocate, is to make the U.S. an

offer that it cannot refuse. In other words, if there is any new offer, it should be indirect and

covert diplomacy. If there should be an indirect process of negotiation on the Arab initiative

between the Arab countries and Israel, the U.S. would have to get involved immediately.

There would be no question of the U.S. not getting involved in it. There would be no

possibility for the U.S. to say ‘well, it can wait in the background.’ Essentially, it seems to me

that the question is: can Arab countries do something to add a sense of urgency to U.S.

policy vis-à-vis the Middle East?

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you. Guido, would you like to comment on the

German part of the question?

GUIDO STEINBERG: Yes, a short remark. I think you are right in most of

the points you have presented. Definitely, nothing will change in this Israeli-German

relationship. However, there is one thing that you can do as Arab ambassadors: start to

explain to what extent Europe has interests in the Middle East. Highlight why Europe is

affected. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a major issue in the radicalization of young

jihadists. Maybe not the single most important issue, but it is certainly important.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) The second point is again terrorism-related. In the last years, there has been a major

radicalization of young boys in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan. This

is a point that is not really understood in Germany. As Arab ambassadors you can explain

this relationship and you can explain why Europe has interests in the region. Perhaps, this

will result in slight changes.

When looking at German foreign policy in recent years one realizes a changing pattern. The

previous focus in the Middle East was on Israel, Turkey and Iran. This has changed and the

focus is not as exclusive any more. There are German governments, which at least try to find

out whether there is a basis for a common Gulf policy. Even if it is a commercialized policy,

the German government has developed a policy from 2003 until 2005. There are other hints

as to a changing perception among policymakers in Germany. The public perception is also

changing and it is showing a heightened awareness for the Middle East. Arab ambassadors

can try to explain to the German public why political affairs between Pakistan and Morocco

might affect our personal life here in Germany.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you. Mr. Marcel Pott, wold you like to add a

few remarks?

MARCEL POTT: Concerning the German position vis-à-vis Israel and

the Arab-Israeli conflict, the least one can expect from any German government is to end

the policy of double standards. That does not include a change of the ‘special relationship’

between Israel and Germany due to the past. However, the double standards have to end.

When looking at the war in Gaza, one cannot blame Hamas without blaming the Israeli

forces at the same time.

Concerning the sense of urgency in relation to the resolution of the Palestinian question,

there is a new situation. I would like to elaborate on that, because what has changed for both

America and Saudi Arabia ever since the disposure of Saddam Hussein, is the rising

influence of Iran from the Persian Gulf area down to the Eastern Mediterranean. No

resolution of any of these issues, whether in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, can be done

against Iran. This is it. And this is why the sense of urgency has changed in Riyadh and in

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) Washington. As soon as there is real progress in Palestine, the instruments Teheran can

dispose of in all these different conflict theatre are getting much more limited. The public

perception in the area will change once the Arab and Muslim people see that the U.S. is

serious about finding a solution to the Palestinian issue. The psychological mindset is going

to change in the area. One cannot expect a quick, fast change in the immediate future, but

one has to ask the very question: is the U.S. serious about peace? All Saudi Arabian policy

proposals concentrated on this very issue. The initiative of the Saudi government to form a

government of national unity was in the first place meant to limit the rising influence of Iran

in this conflict.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: I’m sure we’ll talk more about it when we’re

discussing. I have another question or remark from His Excellency, the Ambassador of

Saudi Arabia.

H.E. OSSAMA ABDULMAJED ALI SHOBOKSHI (Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to

Germany):

Thank you very much. I would like to make the following comments and I will have to be

frank and undiplomatic.

First of all, the so called oil embargo would harm the oil producers more than it will harm

the West. The Arab world has been penalized in the 80s because of an embargo in 1973. The

price of oil went so far down that we did not even get 6 dollars for a barrel. Any policy in

this direction can be compared to a suicide attempt and we are not making the same mistake

again.

Second point. American presidents normally seek a second term in office. That is the reason

why they do not address the Arab-Israeli issue until the end of their second term. George W.

Bush Senior is a good example. He allowed ten billion dollars to be given to the Israeli

settlements. He was still not re-elected, because the Jewish population lobbying in America,

especially the AIPAC, is so powerful that they can bring down any candidate. There is no

point in discussing this particular issue, because obviously their interest in remaining in

office is always more important for them than seeking a solution in the Middle East.


I would also like to respond to Mr. Marcel Pott. I was personally involved in the 2002 .

There was a telephone call between George W. Bush Junior and His Majesty, the Custodian

of the Holy Mosques [King Fahd of Saudi Arabia]. George W. Bush Junior was given a copy

of the initiative and he agreed to it on the phone, but he was not brave enough to accept it

until American election. Mr. Steinberg, why do you think that the relationship between Saudi

Arabia and Germany is not as good as it should be? The relationship is very good

relationship. The problem is only that the Germans are usually slower than other European

countries. Any time Germany and Saudi Arabia discuss the issue of cooperation, Germany

reminds the interlocutors about the Holocaust and the history of Germany on a daily basis.

They remind their partners that Germany has external constraints and that the partners have

to understand their position.

Thirdly, you have two different politicians who are dealing with foreign policies, your

Chancellor and your Minister of Foreign Affairs. Whom should Saudi Arabia follow?

SAWSAN CHEBLI: That was definitely a good remark. Maybe Guido

Steinberg can start reacting and then the others can address the remarks.

GUIDO STEINBERG: The first point about Germany is definitely right, but

that would be exactly the thing that German officials would tell you about Saudi Arabia. ‘The

Saudis are slow.’ They would add a second thing: ‘Well, they always talk about cooperation,

but they are not serious about it.’ I know that the Saudi side says the same thing about

Germany. At the end of the day, one can it a ‘good relationship’, but there is no substance to

it.

H.E. OSSAMA ABDULMAJED ALI SHOBOKSHI: With all due respect,

the Israelis do not follow the interests of Germany. They are not even affected by German

influence. On the contrary, and one has to be very frank with each other, the Israelis do not

trust the Germans.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) SAWSAN CHEBLI: What is your recommendation to German foreign

policy makers?

H.E. OSSAMA ABDULMAJED ALI SHOBOKSHI: There should be more

flexibility and they should be courageous enough to forget their past and they should look to

the future. We cannot penalize people after sixty years. It was their grandfathers’ actions and

not the generation of today. The Arab world respects and has good faith in the German

population. The Arabs expect German influence to be more positive. After all, the Germans

have never occupied an Arab country. The Arabs believe in German possibilities and seek

cooperation. This is one of the reasons why Arab ambassadors are in Germany. The only

problem is that Germany is always a little bit too slow.

GUIDO STEINBERG: I already gave you the answer on the pace of German

or Saudi Arabian actions. Thinking about it, it is a little bit sad. I would like to see more

cooperation. However, I do not blame you, I normally tend to blame my own government,

but I have the impression that both sides are responsible in this case. To reiterate my

previous comment, I do not see enough substance. I hope that proper cooperation is

developing.

The second point is about Israel. It is not necessary to convince the Arab States that

partnership with Israel does not entail distance toward Arab States.

The third point about two foreign policy actors of the German government is normally my

remark. I totally agree. In the German political system, there is a certain lack of leadership. I

am not talking about Ms. Merkel but about the Chancellery in general. It does have problems

asserting itself with regard to the ministries, especially if these are lead by strong ministers.

This is particularly devastating in times of a grand coalition. There are really two different

foreign policies. That has been true with regards to the debate about Syria, as well as with

regard to Russia. That is absolutely unfortunate and I totally agree with that point.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: I am afraid this pattern will continue as long as the

grand coalition is in power. Marina, do you want to address His Excellency’s remarks?


MARINA OTTAWAY: Yes, I would like to reiterate that I was by no means

suggesting a new oil embargo. I do not think it is about oil. The world economy is already in

a tailspin. Agreeing to the issue of the impact of the Israel lobby and AIPAC in particular,

would make it impossible for an administration to address the peace process before the

second term. I would disagree slightly with you because Bush Senior was defeated by the

state of the economy and not by the Israel lobby. It was really the economy that decided the

elections. There is no doubt that the Israel lobby did not like the pressure that the

administration had put on Israel, but, frankly speaking, that was not the decisive factor in the

electios.

H.E. OSSAMA ABDULMAJED ALI SHOBOKSHI: That’s what they want

you to believe.

MARINA OTTAWAY: The slogan of the Clinton administration… of the

people who were campaigning was ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’ That is really the issue the

elections were fought on.

H.E. OSSAMA ABDULMAJED ALI SHOBOKSHI: What was the role of

Monica Lewinsky? Why do you think was she brought into the picture? Why was she on the

first page? Why was she introduced into the White House?

MARINA OTTAWAY: I do not accept those statements. I think it is a bit too

conspiratorial. However, please let me make the point, which I was getting at. There is a

greater sense of urgency in the United States of today. Perhaps that gives Arab states a bit

more leverage. There are many people in Washington D.C. who are beginning to worry,

including in the Israel lobby, the chances for the ‘two state’-solution are running out unless

something is done relatively soon. That might change the game somewhat.

H.E. OSSAMA ABDULMAJED ALI SHOBOKSHI: There is no point in

having a ‘two state’-solution, because the Israelis took over all the land. The West Bank is

sometimes referred to as ‘cheese land’ Jordan. There are too many settlements for having

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) consistent Palestinian state. The Israelis have to withdraw from the settlements they have

created.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: There is another comment you made and Marcel Pott

would like to react.

MARCEL POTT: I would like to come back briefly to the distinction

between German public opinion on and German governmental policy vis-à-vis the Middle

East conflict, especially in relation to the past. What you mentioned, Your Excellency, about

the German public is true. The majority of the German public takes a very different stance

on the Middle East conflict than the government does officially. This is due to the fact that

these people are tired of making statements that are not reflecting reality. If there is to be a

solution of the conflict, either side has to be taken into consideration under the same

umbrella. That means: end the double standards and apply international law everywhere and

to everyone. This is the point put forward by the majority of the German public. It does not

mean that they do not take responsibility for the past, but rather to judge Israel on what is

allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do according to international law. Nobody asks

the German government to come up with very critical statements in public, but in private,

they can give the Israelis a clear idea of what has to change. Eventually, governmental policy

will change – I am quite sure that it is only a matter of time.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Government policy definitely has to change. The lady

over there has a question.

ABDULGHAFFAR ABDULKARIM ISSA AL-BULUSHI (Chargé d’affaires, Embassy

of Oman):

My name is Al-Bulushi from the Embassy of Oman, I’m the Chargé d’affaires. Since this

event addresses the Gulf countries, I was tempted to say something, especially with regard to

what Marina Ottaway said. It seems that the initiative has to always come from the Arab

countries. One has to understand that the Arabs have given in a lot towards Israel and

towards peace. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was a bold step from Saudi Arabia and the

Arab world. For the Saudis to publicly put on the table their willingness, even though

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) implicit, to recognize Israel was a very bold step. Especially as Saudi Arabia has a very special

status in the Gulf, as it is the largest country in the Gulf, and hosts the holy sites. What did

the Arabs get in return from the Israelis? Right after making that proposal, Yasser Arafat was

surrounded in his barracks and there was total dismissal of the initiative by the Americans

and the Israelis.

The issue in the region is whether the peace process – as it has been called in the Arab world

– is ‘a strategic option’ or resistance. The public opinion in the area is not towards making

new initiatives or taking further steps towards Israel. The people in the region are not

expecting something of that sort. They want the Americans, the Israelis and the Europeans

to make proposals. It seems to me as if Israel is sitting on the top of a hill, expecting the

Arabs to come and offer their various proposals to get their approval. I think the region is

not ready for that. If we want to address the issue comprehensively, there has to be

something the Americans are willing to offer – especially after September 11. As Mr. Marcel

Pott mentioned, the radicalization that has taken place in the Arab world is tremendous. The

Americans, the Europeans and the Israelis have to see their interest and have to give in.

What can the Israelis do? Please excuse me if it is not really a question but rather a long

remark. Thank you.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you very much. We have Sabine Taufmann

from the Federal Foreign Office to defend the German position. Yes, please.

SABINE TAUFMANN (Deputy Head, Division Middle East Countries, Federal Foreign

Office):

No, not to defend. I’m very happy that the discussion is so critical with German politics. I

have a question to Marina Ottaway. She mentioned the ‘GCC plus two’ structures. We had

different meetings, as for example Condoleezza Rice with ‘GCC plus two’, and we had also a

meeting ‘GCC plus two plus one’, that is plus Iraq. Do you think that this structure could be

a platform for future security arrangements in the region or – in the long-run – for a future

security architecture. Can it become a structure, which includes all countries in the region

plus perhaps important regional actors. We think such an initiative could perhaps also help

assist to solve the Middle East conflict. Or do you think that the solution of the Middle East

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) conflict is a precondition to have such arrangements. Then, I think, one will wait for years.

The German government is a little bit optimistic, since for the first time this kind of

initiative came from the region, through Bahrain and Turkey, they made proposals in the

U.N. General Assembly to create an organization in the region including all countries, that is

including Iran, including Israel, to sit together to solve conflicts.

MARINA OTTAWAY: I do not think that by adding Iraq to the ‘GCC plus

two plus one’ is in itself enough to make the architecture work. I think, a security

architecture for the Gulf has to include Iran – unless we want to go back to a Cold War-kind

of situation that the Arab countries have not been looking for. Neither the Bush

administration nor the present administration wanted that. It has to be a comprehensive

gathering of states. The question is why ‘GCC plus two’, why not ‘GCC plus x’, why

stopping at two. There are various countries that have an interest in the security of the area. I

don’t know whether at this point there is realistically a possibility of a security organization

for the Gulf that also includes Israel. That is tied to a success in the peace process. At this

moment it seems to be inconceivable that Arab countries should agree to a security

arrangement that includes Israel, unless there has been progress on the peace process.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you. I’ll take two more questions and then we

will end the session. Please, could you identify yourself.

MEMBER OF THE FLOOR: I am a colleague of Sabine Taufmann from the

Federal Foreign Office. I will attempt a modest defense of German diplomacy with respect

to Your Excellencies who have spoken already. I would begin by pointing out that Germany

is not alone in having failed to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is a lot of

company. Germany is a middle power and German means are modest. The United States

has failed to resolve the conflict, the Arab countries, despite their efforts over the past

decade, have failed to do so and, certainly, Germany will not resolve this conflict alone or

even through the European Union. What is required – as has been pointed out by the

panelists – is a joint effort. Certainly, the German position can be developed but Germany

cannot do it on it own.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) On the issue of slowness, I would point out that Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier

was not slow when it came to visiting Syria several years ago. He was actually quite fast,

compared to most Western foreign ministers, in visiting Syria. I have no doubt that one day

he will visit Syria again – when he feels that the time is right. This was one element of

German foreign policy which was slightly different from foreign policy proposed by others

in the European Union and the West. It was helpful and I think it was understood to be

helpful in the region.

The ‘special relationship’ with Israel is a reality. It will remain a reality of German foreign

policy, not because this is what diplomats come up with when they sit at their desks, but

because it is a reflection of our history and it is founded on a consensus in parliament and in

a very strong public opinion. There would be very little understanding if we decided to

discard the ‘special relationship’, which is not only founded on the Holocaust; but is also

founded on a very broad range of relations across society.

I would also point out that there is a ‘special relationship’ with the Palestinian Authority. If

you ask President Mahmoud Abbas, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and many others, you will

hear that Germany is one of the most reliable supporters of the Palestinian Authority. In a

number of regions, the assistance Germany promised to the Palestinians is assistance that is

delivered, and in that sense, Germany is highly reliable. Furthermore, Germany has also

initiated efforts in the European Union to develop new policies to assist the Palestinians to

move the peace process forward.

It is tough work, however. At the end of the day, countries in the region and the Arab

League as the forum for the Arab countries, the United States and others must work

together to take this forward. Germany will make its contribution. I accept that some of you

feel that this contribution is not sufficient. Germany will continue to develop its

contribution. I feel that it is slightly better than some of you might be willing to admit, but I

will be very pleased to make my case over a glass of mineral water once this discussion has

ended.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you very much. Before going to the mineral

water, I have one last question. Please be short, direct and clear and address it to one of our

panelists, please.

MANFRED BAUMANN: I am not a diplomat, so I can speak very frankly. I

wanted to support His Excellency, the Ambassador of Saudi Arabi to Germany. He spoke

about the so-called German-Israeli ‘special relationship’ that is always mentioned. However,

Germany had also a ‘special relationship’ with Arab countries, for many years. Since thirty

years, I travelled to Arab countries for one of Germany’s major banks. I was always well

treated, especially as Germany was never a colonial power.

Second, recently, His Excellency talked about one-sided treatment of Arab matters in our

media, in the German press. That is quite true. What the Arab ambassadors need, is

somebody who openly represents Arab interests in Germany – maybe someone like Michel

Friedman, who used to host talk shows. My question is what is your forecast? You

mentioned the Donor Conference several times. Is it reasonable that the German

government together with all Western governments donate 150 million Euros for all the

damages done by Israel? Palestine has to be build up again, but what will be the future?

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Maybe, the panel wants to react not only to this last

point, but just to give the audience the last few words. You have one minute each to sum up

your argument.

GUIDO STEINBERG: One point to the German government: Take regional

actors more seriously! Now you have one and a half minute.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you for this very short conclusion, Guido.

Marina.

MARINA OTTAWAY The Middle East conflict is not just the responsibility

of the Arab countries. I totally agree that they have proposed a lot and have made many

concessions with the Arab initiative. However, the problem is that it is still not enough.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts – Prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative Tuesday, March 4, 2009, Berlin Carnegie Europe & the German-Arab Friendship Society (DAFG) Everybody has to give in even further. More concessions are needed or nothing is going to

move. There is a lot of work to be done by everybody. Certainly the Americans and the

Europeans have a lot of work to do themselves.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: There is a last reaction from the floor.

H.E. OSSAMA ABDULMAJED ALI SHOBOKSHI: One of the problems you have

in your country is the double standards. Al-Bashir shall be taken to the International

Criminal Court. Mr. Saddam Hussein was sanctioned for weapons of mass destructions.

Against Israel however, against Israel nobody dares to say anything although they are killing

children, women and people every day. Nobody says anything and nobody dares to say

anything. There is a taboo in the German press when it comes to Israel. We only see the

murderous effects of Hamas fired rockets and that is sad.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Marcel, I am sure you can find some concluding

remarks.

MARCEL POTT: Yes, the German media was mentioned so I have to

reply. Your Excellency, this is very kind of you. I would like to remind you, Your

Excellencies and also the audience, that Israel is blaming the same German media to be

biased in favor of the Arab cause. It is true, in the past there was a lot of reluctance to name

the facts frankly and bluntly. However, nowadays, it really depends on the media you look at.

There is a lot of criticism when it comes to Israel’s performance vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but,

of course, I agree, when it comes to the behavior of the occupation force in the occupied

territories in the West Bank, we do not get the details we should get, about the settlers’

behavior for instance.

I would like to refer, one last time to the gentleman of the Federal Foreign Office. It is true,

Germany has been one of the major financial supporters of the Palestinians. When it came

to the boiling points, however, when it came to the settlement policy, which has been and

still is the main stumbling point of a peace process, the Germans, the Europeans, and, of

course, the United States of America – they all looked the other way when it really was


necessary to tell the Israelis: ‘There is the limit.’ They said: ‘It is not all right. We disagree

with expansion of the settlements.’ Nevertheless, they did not do anything against it. In the

U.S., it has always been mentioned: ‘No settlements, the expansion of the settlements in the

occupied territories is undermines a peaceful settlement of the conflict.’ Yet, nothing was

done on the ground. On January 12, there was a very blunt article in Newsweek, by Aaron

David Miller. Mr. Miller has been serving in the administration for six foreign ministers. He

wrote, and I quote: ‘Never ever have I attended a meeting where America really told the

Israeli governments… the successive Israeli governments to stop expending the

settlements.’4 The Europeans did the same. This is a historic responsibility, because a “two

state”-solution is running out of time. There is, very soon, no land left. This is why the

position has to change.

SAWSAN CHEBLI: Thank you, very much Marcel. It is all said. I am really

sorry that I did not take all questions. On behalf of the German-Arab Friendship

Association and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I want to thank the

panelists for their presentations, I want to thank you for your intelligent questions and I

want to thank the audience for speaking to us. You are all invited to an informal discussion

and drinks outside. Thank you very much.

4 Original quote: “In 25 years of working on this issue for six secretaries of state, I can't recall one meeting where we had a serious discussion with an Israeli prime minister about the damage that settlement activity – including land confiscation, bypass roads and housing demolitions – does to the peacemaking process.” See: Aaron David Miller, “If Obama Is Serious He Should Get Tough With Israel”, Newsweek, January 12, 2009. Online available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/177716.

Gulf Countries as Catalysts: Prospects for the Arab Peace ... Transcript - 20… · Gulf Countries...

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Transcript of Gulf Countries as Catalysts: Prospects for the Arab Peace ... Transcript - 20… · Gulf Countries...