Kadir Ustun4/18/23

Guarding the Republic

The latest parliamentary elections in Turkey and the events before and after the elections exposed once again the political fault lines of the Turkish political scene. The military’s open opposition to the election of R. Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul as the next president and the political turmoil that followed led to the Erdogan government’s decision hold new elections to be able to move forward with the presidential election.

One needs to look at the history of the relationship between the military and the “civilian” politics in Turkey to understand the recent events. A majority of the founders of the modern Turkish Republic was educated in the Ottoman schools which had been established both to keep up and compete with what the Ottoman bureaucrats perceived as the European military superiority. While holding the traditional subject matters in place, these schools had a curriculum that was heavily influenced by the 19th century European positivist ideas. Prior to the establishment of the new republic, the Ottoman system had already produced a class of educated civilian and military bureaucrats. The Committee of Union and Progress was composed of these western educated civilian and military men. The Committee, which managed to come to power succeeding the sultan Abdulhamid, would lead the Ottoman government into the WWI alongside the Germans hoping to retrieve the lost Ottoman territories. When the Germans lost the war, the Ottoman territories were divided among the French, the British, the Italians, and the Greeks. The local resistances to this arrangement brought about what the Turkish modern historiography calls the Turkish War of Independence. The political leverage this war provided Ataturk with allowed the foundation of the new Turkish Republic in the 1920s.

What followed was a full-fledged process of nation-building. The main trauma for the participants in this process was the transition from a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural empire to a nation-state. The new nation-building project was heavily influenced by the 19th century positivist ideals. Ataturk and his friends saw it their mission to forge a new “Turkish” nation based on the European secular (in the sense of French laicism) nation-state model.

The transition from an empire to a nation-state was everything but smooth. The majority of the participants of the War of Independence was common people and if one was to ask them what they were fighting for, establishing a western style secular republic would not be their answer. Their major concern was fighting against the invasion of their land. The political fruits of this struggle, though, would be reaped by the founders of the new republic. 1920s and 1930s witnessed both ethnic and religious challenges against the new Kemalist ideology only to be suppressed severely.

The Kemalist ideology claimed among many other things that Ataturk had saved the Turks from the invasion forces and tried to bring the Turkish people, who had been under the yoke of the Ottoman rulers, par with the “contemporary civilization.” The Kemalist principles were deemed the absolute guiding principles for the new nation. The former Ottoman civilian and military bureaucrats participating in the new project had to either adapt to the new situation or to risk being sidelined. Notwithstanding the differences of

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opinion about how to implement the new measures, there was composed a new core group of military turned civilian Kemalist elite which saw as its mission “protecting the republic” from the domestic and foreign threats.

Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the Turkish military should intervene “whenever the republic was under threat.” Hence, the three coup d’etats throughout the second half of the 20th century were justified in the name of protection of the republic and its Kemalist ideals. The two main domestic threats for the republic was ethnic and religious threats. The strong emphasis put on the Turkish-ness of all citizens living within the borders of Turkey as well as the staunch secularism insisted upon were bound to create its opposition in a society which had had many ethnicities and a “religious” outlook for a long time.

There were many small and large scale rebellions against the Kemalist project from the 1920s through 1950s. One of the most important one of these, the Sheikh Said Rebellion, had profound ethnic and religious implications. While Sheikh Said was a Kurdish leader, his main concern seems to have revolved around the diminished role of and increased pressure on religion in general. These early resistance movements aided the Kemalist elite in developing a vocabulary about “backward-looking foreign-aided forces” that aimed at the destruction of the republic. This was projected onto the society as an anxiety over the religious movements in general. Hence, the Turkish state has been able to repress and control the religious movements in Turkey with backwardness and anti-secularism charge.

The ethnic resistance to the Kemalist ideology made itself felt the strongest in the 1990s as a result of the armed resistance by the Kurdish guerillas. The ‘low-intensity’ war as one general called it resulted in the deaths of more than 30,000 people both civilian and military with devastating effects both on the economy and the psyche of the society as a whole. This time the charge was that the ‘foreign-aided terrorist forces’ were aiming to divide up the country. Once again, the official state ideology had a chance to crystallize its Turkish-ness emphasis.

At the end of the last century, the civilian discussion of the Kemalist principles and questioning of the power of the Turkish military over Turkish politics were only possible if one was ready to face charges of either religious fundamentalism or ethnic separatism. Hence, defending the “state” against these threats were the job of the civilian and military bureaucracy who saw themselves as the true protectors of the state and the country. Democratic demands of the society were undermined by such fear for the future of the Turkish state. Continuation of the unitary and staunchly secular structure of the state had to be held above all else. This kind of politics, however, could not offer much to the society other than its protection against enemies. The enormous human potential of the society (about half the population in Turkey is still under the age of 25) was being barred from realizing their economic and social aspirations as a result of having to remain committed to concepts of nationalism, secularism, loyalty to state etc. as was defined by a military mentality.

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The civilian politics in Turkey throughout the 1980s and especially the 1990s suffered from the weaknesses of coalition governments headed by the political leaders of the 1960s and 1970s. There was a large generational discrepancy between the society and the political leaders. At the end of the 1990s, people in Turkey were frustrated by a dysfunctional civilian political scene that could not offer new solutions for the economic and political problems. The push for change brought the former mayor of Istanbul, Receb Tayyib Erdogan, and his party (AK Party) to power in 2000.

The bureaucratic and military establishment was quite vary of the new government because of many of its members’ “religious” background although the AK Party set out to be a center-right party committed to the secular principles of the republic. Aware of this distrust, Erdogan government made the most serious attempt in getting the EU to launch accession talks with Turkey. They hoped to consolidate their power with the help of the Europeans and show everyone that they did not have a “secret religious agenda” as was charged by the establishment. Economic and political stability secured by this process was no small prize despite the fact that the accession to the EU was to take no less than a decade and the road was full of major obstacles (namely opposition by some European countries including the current French government). Nevertheless, Turkey could look ahead and busy itself with changing the economic and political structure to adapt to the EU norms. Stability combined with a booming economy helped Erdogan government to consolidate its power.

The EU demands were not always welcome by all. Demands such as the lessening the influence of the military in politics and writing of a new civilian constitution stripped of its Kemalist principles angered the military establishment. Although the military had always portrayed itself as the most progressive force in society, they were no liberals. They saw it as their mission to protect the republic and this they would do at any cost “despite the people and for the people.” Knowing that the democratic changes, which would benefit the common people in Turkey as well as their conservative constituents, could not come about with the government’s own doing. Alliance with the EU and presenting the democratic reforms needed as requirements of “advancement to the level of modern civilization”, the major aim of the republic itself, was a clever way of avoiding confrontation with the military one-on-one.

On the eve of the election of the president for the republic in 2007, Turkey had a stable political situation with a prospering economy. The office of the president in Turkey has always been seen as closer to the establishment rather than to the government although many of the presidents were elected from among the former prime ministers. The real power has always been at the hands of the state (composed of the high judiciary, civilian and military bureaucracies) while the government could only enjoy a limited rule thanks to the wide veto powers of the president afforded by the 1980 coup d’etat. As the saying goes in Turkey, “you can be a government but you cannot rule!” Given that the president had been traditionally elected from among the former prime ministers and/or former generals, Receb T. Erdogan could theoretically be a candidate for presidency. The fact that Erdogan even considered candidacy caused an uproar among the military who could not imagine Erdogan as the next president because of his religious past and his wife’s

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headscarf. It was inconceivable that the president of the Turkish Republic, who would represent the state, should be someone like Erdogan. Erdogan government decided to nominate Abdullah Gul, then the foreign minister, who would not have the same baggage as Erdogan, yet, whose wife wore headscarf as well. Gul’s candidacy was perceived along the same lines as Erdogan’s possible candidacy by the military, which openly opposed Gul’s candidacy with an internet posting stressing the core values of the republic on the military’s website. What followed looked like the old days of political dysfunction since the parliament could not wield its civilian power and elect a president despite the pressure by the military. The early elections brought Erdogan government a huge victory with %48 of the popular vote. The new parliament elected Abdullah Gul as the president whose wife has not, until now, appeared in the meetings and receptions Gul has held as president.

As should be clear by now, the military’s influence in politics in Turkey is essential in understanding the political events in the country. The solutions to the political problems in Turkey (accommodation of ethnic and religious identities) have been dictated by an establishment, who has seen itself as the guardians of the Turkish republic. The ethnic and religious variety in Turkey is immense although people may not necessarily recognize it. The many overlapping ethnic as well as religious identities are at work. Being Turkish, Muslim, Kurdish, or secular may imply very different things for different people. The very same person does not see a contradiction in calling himself a Turk, Muslim, secular, patriot, conservative or all at the same time. Such multitude is reduced to religious vs. secular or Kurdish vs. Turkish dichotomies, which misses the reality on the ground. Hence, it becomes harder to understand the intricacies of politics. The Kemalist project of creating a nation by straight jacketing various identities has been successful to some degree. However, one can see how these identities have a way of surviving and adapting.

Demands of the ethnic and the religious groups in Turkey are, for the most part, democratic rights enjoyed by the citizens of many democratic states. Attributing a hidden agenda to these demands and associating them with internal and external enemies seem to serve the interests of the establishment in Turkey. On the other hand, one cannot neglect the anxiety over whether these seemingly democratic demands would eventually transform into ones that could destroy the democratic institutions themselves. There is always the danger that some groups in any given society might try to make up the rules of the game as they like. But are we supposed to block the legitimate demands of the people because of such a danger? Should we not prioritize the establishment of real democracy over protecting a republic with pseudo-democratic institutions against the people for the people?

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