Yvan Guichaoua

MICROCON workshop June-July 2011

Group formation, identities and mobilisation – Findings and policy implications

Project’s organisation

Project leader Prof. Frances Stewart – Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

Research team Ingunn Bjørkhaug (FAFO), Morten Bøås (FAFO), Carlos Bozzoli (DIW), Tilman Brück (DIW), Yvan Guichaoua (University of Oxford), Anne Hatløy (FAFO), Frances Stewart (University of Oxford), Mark Taylor (FAFO)

Countries Colombia, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Ukraine

Objectives • This Work Package aims to further current understanding of collective violence grounded in individual perception of identities and interactions • The Work Package focuses on key questions about who the actors of conflict are and why they choose to join in violent activities Focus on activists and perpetrators of violence

Methods Mostly qualitative (interviews with low-level combatants, leaders, NGO representatives etc.; archival search…). Exception: Ukraine survey

A fast-growing research field

Dominant analytical framework when the project started: greed models, flawed in many respects Role of natural resources dependence has been reconsidered A-historical (no interaction with the state) Absence micro-foundations (‘loose molecules’ assumption) Need to know what armed groups are empirically made of

Weinstein’s more sophisticated account Micro-level approach Opportunists vs activists The central role of finance Still a very top-down, static approach, not fully valid empirically

Present research trends (inc. MICROCON) In depth case studies, individual surveys, refinement of the

Horizontal Inequalities’ approach more complex yet more empirically accurate approaches

Articulating MICROCON’s findings

A major caveat: violence is a special kind of conflict Users of force become prominent (veterans and sportsmen) Rules of the game and dynamics are different

Armed groups consolidate through a matching process First movers: entrepreneurs of violence Rank-and-file: multiple logics of participation

Emerging research topic: armed groups’ behaviours

What do Entrepreneurs of violence do?

Collective action puzzle: attracting (the right) followers

Identity production: the cognitive dimension of violent enlistment Top-down or bottom-up? Which identities work? Religion v ethnicity Performative repertoires? (Does Radio Mille

Collines produce killers?)

Brokerage between violent actors Horizontal networks (loyalty trading) and peer

effects Vertical (clientelistic) networks: Côte d’Ivoire

Young Patriots, electoral violence in Nigeria

Mapping out (non rival) logics of individual participation

Irregular armed groups stem from the percolation of heterogeneous logics

Armed groups’ behaviours

Armed groups are places where behavioural norms are produced through explicit training, collective learning and violent socialisation. Reasons why people stay in groups differ from the ones which made them join

A great variety of outcomes Entrenchment in no war / no peace types of governance Violent radicalisation / sectarian drifts Political normalisation (e.g. today’s RENAMO) Annihilation through repressive means Factionalisation Criminalisation ‘Zombification’ / hijacking...

What shapes armed groups’ trajectories? Internal match or mismatch Interactions with civilians: civilians are not bystanders Interactions with state actors

Some conclusions

Huge heterogeneity of causes, trajectories and outcomes

Collective violence is fundamentally an interactive process. States actions shape trajectories of irregular armed groups before, during and after violent conflicts. Groups’ evolution depend on outside influences There is room for intervention

Tailored to address local demands (e.g. Liberia) Timely (e.g. Niger)

Remaining challenges

Improving our understanding of heterogeneity

From a policy perspective. Integrating the micro and the macro. How can micro-level initiatives succeed in absence of macro-level will to make things change?

Nigeria’s dirty electoral politics A Swiss initiative in Northern Mali