1

GALLIPOLI A place of meeting

Commemorating theThe 1915 Allied Gallipoli Campaign

a century afterward

5LA

4

The Allied Gallipoli Campaign, 1915

The Lead Up to Gallipoli

The Allied invasion of the then Ottoman Empire's Gallipoli Peninsular was the result of a complex political and tactical situation a the beginning of World War One, involving the "Central Powers" (including the Otto-man Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany ) and the "Allied" nations in-cluding France, Russia and the British Empire

Germany, despite having only unified in 1871 had emerged as an aggressive new power under the leadership and imperialist ambitions of Kaiser Wilhelm II, after his suc-cession in 1888. It's new bold and expan-sionist foreign policy, in particular the navies rapid development was seen by Britain as a challenge and threat to her naval and commercial supremacy, especially to her vulnerable trade routes to India and the colonies. Britain had worked hard to estab-lish and keep these trade routes in part by becoming a dominant force in the Mediter-ranean Sea. Like it's rivals over the years it had forged a complex relationship with the major power in the east of the Mediterra-nean, the 600 year old Ottoman Empire.

By the Early 20th Century the Ottoman Empire was referred to as "the sick man of Europe", an empire that was shrinking as it's provinces and minorities rejected the rule of the Sultan creating a power vacuum in the region and forming what was know as the "Eastern Question" in rival countries minds "who would get to the sick mans booty first" (Broadbent, 2005). The "Booty" most desired was control of the Dardanelles and the straights of Bosporus and the trade and transport routes from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Russia had already tried to gain control of Constantinople and the Dar-danelles in the Crimean War, but had been repulsed by a combination Ottoman, British and French forces. Britain was especially

interested in the security of the the straights against Russia, sending a Naval mission in 1912.

Germany had also been fostering ties with the Ottoman Empire, with visits and political appointments as early as 1883. By the early 20th century the Ottoman Empire was most valued by Germany for it's supplies of oil (in what is now Iraq), now having supplanted coal in the fuelling of Battleships. This was the beginning of the struggle surrounding oil in the region as British, German and other interests began to carve out territories, leading to more rivalry, tension and alli-ances. In 1904 Britain and France, under the Entente Cordiale agreed to work together in foreign affairs, being joined by Russia in 1907. This lead to an Arms race between these countries to be the most prepared to come to one-another's aid.

With the Assassination of the Archduke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz Ferdi-

5

The Dominions of the Empire were quick to support Britain, mustering their reserve forces and beginning recruitment drives as soon as war was declared. New Zea-land’s Battalions of soldiers joined with those of Australia, leaving in a convoy for Britain and the Western Front from Albany in Western Australia on the 1st of Novem-ber 1914. However En route they were diverted to Egypt after the Ottoman Em-pire entered the War on the side of the Central Powers.

In August 1914 the then neutral Otto-man government began to mobilise and expand it’s army, conscripting mainly rural citizens from all over it’s empire in response to facing potential enemies on all sides. Although the Ottoman Govern-ment (controlled by the recent Party of Union and Progress and puppet sultan) was divided on what position to take in the conflict, the War Minister Enver Pasha had signed a secret treaty with Germany promising to tie up significant Russian forces, protecting her Eastern front. Ger-many had been involved in the years prior to the War with reorganising the Ot-toman army into a modern army, effec-tively infiltrating it and winning influence with the then war minister.

However it was the British that swayed the Ottoman Empire to side with the Germans. Upon the declaration of war in Europe Britain seized two Dreadnoughts being built for the Ottoman Navy in British shipyards, refusing to return the capital which had been raised through public subscription. Germany then offered two ships in return, allowing the infiltration of the navy by German interests and lead-ing to the Ottoman Empires eventual entry into the war following a German advocated attack on Russian warships in the Black Sea.

6

With the Ottomans now in the war the other Allies felt obliged to support Russia, especially after the demonstration of the Ottoman armies brav-ery and dedication in defending the Caucuses. Having failed diplomati-cally the Allies now felt they would have to remove the Ottoman Empire from the War through Military Means. The British immediately focused upon the capture of the Dardanelles. Should these be taken, they would allow a swift passage to the Capital Constantinople and the Bosporus Straight and allow the Russian Navy into the war.

Many in Britain’s Navy were opposed to any attempt to force the Dar-danelles. Although it had been done previously by the Royal Navy in 1807, they believed modern weaponry and mines would make such a thing too risky in the current situation. Winston Churchill himself rejected the idea in 1911, saying in a memorandum to the Cabinet “it should be remembered that it is no longer possible to force the Dardanelles, and nobody would expose a modern fleet to such peril” (Broadbent, 2005). However by 1914 his opinion had changed, ordering the Bombardment of the outer forts in the Dardanelles and leading to the spectacular de-struction of one as it’s ammunition bunker exploded.

By January 1915 the need for action against the Ottomans had become a political as well as military priority, with the security of an oil supply be-ing a primary motivation for the British Navy. Taking the Ottomans out of the war would secure allied oil supplies, while denying the Germans theirs. Despite other high ranking naval Sea Lords recommending a joint naval and land attack on the Dardanelles, by the 13th of January Churchill had pressed and convinced the War Council agree to a pure Naval Assault.

7

8

1914 June

Ass

ass

ina

tion

of A

rchd

uke

Ferd

ina

nd a

t Sa

raje

vo

28 July 28 30

Aus

tria

dec

lare

d w

ar o

n Se

rbia

.

Prel

imin

ary

arra

ngem

ents

ma

de

in N

ew Z

eala

nd fo

r

the

Exp

editi

ona

ry F

orce

.

Aug 2 3

Ger

man

y de

clar

ed w

ar o

n Ru

ssia

.

Ger

ma

ns e

nter

ed F

ranc

e. R

ussia

ns e

nter

ed G

erm

any

.

Ger

ma

ny d

ecla

red

wa

r on

Fra

nce.

Brita

in d

ecla

red

war

on

Ger

man

y.

4

The

New

Zea

land

gov

ernm

ent c

ab

led

to th

e Im

per

ial g

over

nmen

t

offe

ring

the

serv

ices

of a

n Ex

ped

ition

ary

For

ce.

7 12

Serv

ices

of N

ZEF

acc

epte

d b

y Im

per

ial a

utho

ritie

s.

9

Ger

ma

ns e

nter

ed F

ranc

e. R

ussia

ns e

nter

ed G

erm

any

.

Ger

ma

ny d

ecla

red

wa

r on

Fra

nce.

The

New

Zea

land

gov

ernm

ent c

ab

led

to th

e Im

per

ial g

over

nmen

t

offe

ring

the

serv

ices

of a

n Ex

ped

ition

ary

For

ce.

Serv

ices

of N

ZEF

acc

epte

d b

y Im

per

ial a

utho

ritie

s.

Sep 28

Turk

ey c

lose

s th

e D

ard

ane

lles

to a

ll sh

ipp

ing

follo

win

g th

e

inte

rcep

tion

of a

Turk

ish to

rped

o b

oat b

y th

e Ro

yal N

avy

.

Nov 2/3

Initi

al n

aval

bom

bard

men

t of G

allip

oli.

Roya

l Nav

y sq

uadr

on, i

n-

clud

ing

the

battl

ecru

iser

s H

MS

Indo

mita

ble

and

HM

S In

defa

tigab

le,

bom

bard

the

Turk

ish

forts

at t

he e

ntra

nce

to th

e D

arda

nelle

s.

5

Brita

in a

nd F

ranc

e of

ficia

lly d

ecla

red

war

on

Otto

man

Em

pire

(Tur

key)

. Rus

sia

decl

ares

war

on

Otto

man

Em

pire

(Tur

key)

. Otto

-

man

s en

ter W

W1

on th

e si

de o

f Ger

man

y.

Dec 14

2nd

Rei

nfor

cem

ents

left

New

Zea

land

.

25C

hrist

ma

s d

ay

spen

t on

the

des

ert.

10

1915 Jan 18

Div

ision

na

med

the

‘New

Zea

land

and

Aus

tralia

n D

ivisi

on’.

25

NZ

Infa

ntry

Brig

ad

e or

der

ed to

Sue

z C

ana

l.

NZ

Infa

ntry

Brig

ad

e le

ft Ze

itoun

for I

sma

ilia a

nd K

ubri.

1Feb

Ad

vanc

e p

arti

es 4

th A

ust.

Inf.

Bde

arri

ved

at Z

eito

un.

Mus

tafa

Kem

al (

Ata

turk

) is

ap

poi

nted

to re

org

ani

ze a

nd c

omm

and

Nin

etee

nth

Div

ision

in T

hra

ce.

2 3

Turk

s a

tta

cked

Sue

z C

ana

l. N

ew Z

eala

nder

s en

ga

ged

; one

ma

n

die

d o

f wou

nds

and

one

wou

nded

.

14

3rd

Rei

nfor

cem

ents

left

New

Zea

land

.

19Fi

rst A

llied

nav

al a

ttack

on

the

Dar

dane

lles

begi

ns. N

ava

l att

ack

on th

e fo

rts a

t the

ent

ranc

e of

the

Da

rda

nelle

s. U

nsuc

cess

ful n

ava

l

att

ack

.

Seco

nd n

aval

atta

ck o

n th

e D

arda

nelle

s. U

nsuc

cess

ful n

aval

at-

tack

. Mus

tafa

Kem

al e

stab

lishe

s H

eadq

uarte

rs o

f 19t

h D

ivis

ion

at

Mai

dos,

on

Gal

lipol

i Pen

insu

la.

25

11

Mar 18

Turk

ish

nava

l vic

tory

at t

he D

arda

nelle

s. V

ice-

Ad

mira

l de

Rob

eck

laun

ches

fina

l Allie

d n

ava

l att

ack

. Allie

d fl

eet f

ails

to fo

rce

the

Da

rda

nelle

s. O

cea

n, Ir

resis

tible

, and

Bou

vet s

unk.

Mus

tafa

Kem

al

dist

ing

uish

es h

imse

lf in

ba

ttle

s.

Apr 17

4th

Rein

forc

emen

ts le

ft N

ew Z

eala

nd.

25

Land

ing

at A

nza

c C

ove

ma

de

by

the

Aus

tralia

n a

nd N

ew

Zea

land

Arm

y C

orp

s (A

NZA

C).

Alli

ed m

ilita

ry la

ndin

gs a

t Arib

urnu

(Anz

ac),

Hel

les,

and

Kum

Kal

e.

A &

NZ

Arm

y C

orp

s la

nded

at A

nza

c C

ove;

3rd

Aus

tralia

n In

fant

ry

Brig

ad

e fo

rced

a la

ndin

g a

t da

wn.

NZ

Div

ision

al H

Q a

nd d

eta

ils

ash

ore

at 1

0.00

am

; Auc

kla

nd B

att

alio

n a

ll a

shor

e b

y 12

noo

n w

ith

two

com

pa

nies

of t

he C

ant

erb

ury

Batt

alio

n; N

o.1

Fiel

d C

omp

any

NZ

Eng

inee

rs a

nd C

ant

erb

ury

and

Ota

go

Infa

ntry

ca

me

ash

ore

dur

ing

the

afte

rnoo

n.

May 5/6 6

NZ

Infa

ntry

Brig

ad

e a

nd 2

nd A

ustra

lian

Brig

ad

e le

ft fo

r Ca

pe

Hel

les.

3rd

Rei

nfor

cem

ents

arri

ved

Anz

ac

(839

) – s

ent d

own

to H

elle

s.

25

Firs

t Alli

ed n

aval

atta

ck o

n th

e D

arda

nelle

s be

gins

. Na

val a

tta

ck

on th

e fo

rts a

t the

ent

ranc

e of

the

Da

rda

nelle

s. U

nsuc

cess

ful n

ava

l

att

ack

.

Seco

nd n

aval

atta

ck o

n th

e D

arda

nelle

s. U

nsuc

cess

ful n

aval

at-

tack

. Mus

tafa

Kem

al e

stab

lishe

s H

eadq

uarte

rs o

f 19t

h D

ivis

ion

at

Mai

dos,

on

Gal

lipol

i Pen

insu

la.

12

NZ

Hos

pita

l shi

p M

ahe

no le

ft W

ellin

gto

n

8 19 24

NZ

Infa

ntry

and

2nd

Aus

tralia

n Br

igad

e at

tack

s on

Krit

hia

defe

ated

.

Turk

ish

forc

es m

ount

a m

assi

ve a

ttack

at A

nzac

. Tur

kish

atta

ck a

t

Anz

ac d

efea

ted

(hea

vy T

urki

sh lo

sses

). N

Z In

fant

ry B

rigad

e re

-

turn

ed fr

om H

elle

s.

Arm

istic

e da

y to

bur

y th

e de

ad.

Turk

ish b

lock

hous

e b

low

n up

in fr

ont o

f Qui

nn’s

by

two

sap

per

s.

NZR

M fo

rced

to a

ba

ndon

Old

No.

3 Po

st.

31 1915 Jun 1 3 7

Mus

tafa

Kem

al p

rom

oted

Col

onel

.

2nd

Fie

ld C

omp

any

NZE

arri

ved

(239

).

4th

Rein

forc

emen

ts a

rrive

d a

t Anz

ac

Cov

e (1

761)

. Sor

tie fr

om

Qui

nn’s

Pos

t nig

ht o

f 7/8

th.

28

Battl

e of

Gul

ly R

avin

e be

gins

. AN

ZAC

div

ersi

onar

y at

tack

.

Turk

ish

atta

ck o

n Q

uinn

’s P

ost -

Pop

e’s

Hill

sec

tor o

f Anz

ac.

Succ

essf

ul B

ritis

h at

tack

at H

elle

s.

Jul 11 Aug

13

NZ

Hos

pita

l shi

p M

ahe

no le

ft W

ellin

gto

n

3 6/7

13th

(New

Arm

y) c

omm

ence

d la

ndin

g a

t Anz

ac.

Bat

tle

of S

ari B

air

com

men

ces.

Ma

in A

nza

c of

fens

ive

tow

ard

Sa

ri

Bair

rang

e co

mm

ence

s. B

ritish

att

ack

at C

ap

e H

elle

s. A

ustra

lians

att

ack

at L

one

Pine

, Qui

nn’s

Pos

t and

Rus

sell’

s To

p a

t The

Nek

.

7

Battl

e of

the

Nek

. Aus

tralia

n a

tta

ck a

t the

Nek

take

s p

lace

.

Rhod

oden

dro

n Ri

dg

e in

the

hand

s of

New

Zea

land

ers.

8

Battl

e of

Chu

nuk

Bair.

Wel

ling

ton

Batt

alio

n ca

ptu

res

Chu

nuk

Bair.

Briti

sh s

ubm

arin

e E1

1 to

rped

oes

the

Turk

ish b

att

lesh

ip H

ayr

edd

in

Barb

aro

ssa

. Mus

tafa

Kem

al i

s a

pp

oint

ed o

vera

ll co

mm

and

er o

f

north

ern

are

a.

10 12 13

Battl

e of

Chu

nuk

Bair

ends

whe

n Tu

rkish

forc

es le

d b

y M

usta

fa

Kem

al r

eca

ptu

re C

hunu

k Ba

ir a

nd d

rive

the

Allie

s of

f the

hei

ght

s.

Battl

e of

Lon

e Pi

ne e

nds.

Att

ack

of

I / 5

Nor

folk

Ba

tta

lion

at S

uvla

.

Da

wna

y a

t GH

Q fi

rst p

uts

forw

ard

idea

of p

arti

al e

vacu

atio

n.14 21 26 28

Battl

e of

Krit

hia

ends

.

6th

Rein

forc

emen

ts le

ft N

ew Z

eala

nd.

Italy

dec

lare

d w

ar o

n Tu

rkey

.

Ma

heno

arri

ved

off

Anz

ac.

New

Zea

land

er’s

hol

d o

n a

nd c

onso

lida

te th

eir p

ositi

on o

n H

ill 60

.

Aug

14

3

Gen

era

l Mon

ro o

rder

ed G

ener

al B

irdw

ood

to p

roce

ed w

ith

eva

cua

tion

of A

nza

c a

nd S

uvla

Sep 2 15 17

Bulg

aria

ns a

gre

e to

inva

de

Serb

ia in

con

junc

tion

with

Ger

ma

ns

and

Aus

tria

ns.

Oct

Brita

in d

ecla

red

wa

r on

Bulg

aria

.

Sir I

an

Ha

milt

on d

epa

rts.

6

Da

wna

y d

epa

rts fo

r Lon

don

.

Troo

ps

with

dra

wn

to re

st c

am

p a

t Sa

rpi o

n Le

mno

s.

1915 Nov 10N

Z M

ount

ed R

ifles

retu

rn to

Anz

ac.

Win

ston

Chu

rchi

ll re

sign

ed

from

Brit

ish

Cab

inet

.

Dec28

Com

men

cem

ent o

f the

Gre

at B

lizza

rd.

15

3 10

Gen

era

l Mon

ro o

rder

ed G

ener

al B

irdw

ood

to p

roce

ed w

ith

eva

cua

tion

of A

nza

c a

nd S

uvla

19 20 9

All

sick,

wou

nded

, sur

plu

s tro

ops,

veh

icle

s a

nd v

alu

ab

le s

tore

s

rem

oved

.Th

e la

st n

ight

of e

vacu

atio

n of

Anz

ac

and

Suv

la.

Evac

uatio

n of

Anz

ac b

y 4a

m a

nd S

uvla

com

plet

ed b

y da

ylig

ht.

Jan1916

Evac

uatio

n fro

m C

ape

Hel

les

com

plet

ed. E

nd o

f Dar

dane

lles

31Oct1918Tu

rkey

sur

rend

ers.

NZ

Mou

nted

Rifl

es re

turn

to A

nza

c. W

inst

on C

hurc

hill

resi

gned

from

Brit

ish

Cab

inet

.

Com

men

cem

ent o

f the

Gre

at B

lizza

rd.

16

The Allied Naval Assault

The Allied Naval assault on the Dardanelles opened on the 19th of February, after a rushed and confused preparation. The fleet, consisting largely of obsolete battleships supported by two modern dreadnoughts bombarded the outer de-fences of the straights from their maximum range for the entire morning. Forces were unequal as German support had not yet reached the Ottoman army and there was little the de-fenders could do to retaliate, as their guns lacked the range to strike back. However the accuracy of the Allied bombard-ment was low, due to the extreme range they were operat-ing at, and when Admiral Carden pulled his forces out that evening very little significant damage had been done to the fortifications of the Dardanelles, with most of the recently rein-forced inner forts having been out of range and untouched.

Rough weather followed, lasting for five days, until the 25th of February, when Carden tried again to force the straights with the power of the Navy alone. On this day the long range guns of the outer forts of Seddülbahir and Kumkale were silenced. Over the following days land around the entrance to the straight seemed deserted, Allied warships bombarded the intermediate forts near Kilitbahir and Canakkale and mine-sweepers penetrated six miles into the straights without finding mines. Landing parties roamed the outer straights, destroying defences and managing to put a few big guns out of com-mission, however this as at the cost of 22 marines, and many parties had to be hastily evacuated after Ottoman and Ger-man forces returned in strength.

Allied bombardment of the intermediate and Narrows forts was hindered by the need to fight a six knot current and more to avoid shelling, which itself hampered accurate targeting of the fortifications. Ships also had to fire from a distance to avoid minefields, while minesweepers with poorly trained civil-ian crews and poor sailing speeds made easy targets for the Ottoman Defences, preventing them from doing the crucial job of clearing the mines and allowing battleships through. The Ottomans also made good use of mobile howitzers, a major threat for the small unarmed minesweepers, and a hin-drance to the larger ships. Nighttime minesweeping attempts were tried with little success, the minesweepers being spotted by searchlights, then targeted by light artillery shells. Weather worsened and by March 8th a deadlock had been reached.

Lord Kitchener had stated previously that if a naval attack proved to difficult the navy could withdraw, writing the assault of as a demonstration and losing no prestige. However on the 5th of March a secret treaty had been signed between Rus-sia and Britain, allowing Russia to annex Constantinople and the Dardanelles. This was an effort by Britain to keep Russia

17

Fig 3. The Naval assault.

18

in the war and placed a new pressure on the Naval Campaign, they could no longer withdraw with prestige. Kitchener decided to deploy the Armies 29th Division to a Aegean, (something he had been delay-ing) making up a force of 75,056 men in the region, also made up of the Anzacs, Royal Naval Division and a French Division (Broad-bent, 2005). These forces were placed un-der the command of General Sir Ian Hamil-ton in the new Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), indication Kitchener had more in mind than restricted military action.The next Naval assault was planned for March 18th, however Admiral Carden had cracked under the pressure of the planning and control was passed to the hastily pro-moted Admiral John de Robeck. The plan was to arrange the ships into three squad-rons or attacking lines, A, B and C, with sup-port ships flanking the leading outer edges of the formation. With the modern Battle-ships leading in line A they were to smash the inner forts from long range, soon to be joined by the flanking ships. Line B would then move through this line and engage the forts at a closer range, followed soon after by the ships of line C. As much mine sweeping as possible took place in the days

before the offensive, however they had failed to spot a line of 28 mines laid by the small Ottoman Ship, Nusret earlier in march, a failure that was to prove costly.

On the morning of the 18th of March 18 Battleships and the supporting flotilla of Cruisers, Destroyers and Minesweepers steamed into the straights, the Battleships then taking the lead. Opening shots were fired at 11:30 am towards the Intermediate Forts and those in the Narrows and by noon, firing from the shore had dropped in rate, the defenders perhaps waiting for a more accurate shot, or running out of Ammuni-tion. It was at this point Admiral de Robeck ordered line B to advance, his fleet had taken few causalities and only some hits, the damage from which was under control. By 2 pm the forts were barely firing and de Robeck ordered the minesweepers forward and line B to turn starboard in a large arc. This point was crucial as it was where previ-ous operations had failed, largely due to the inexperience of the inadequate mine-sweepers.

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Suddenly things began to go awry, the French ship Bouvet hitting a mine at speed as she move through Erenköy Bay and causing a great explosion to rock the ship. Within two minutes the Bouvet had found-ered, capsized and sank, killing 600 of her crew (Broadbent, 2005). It is possible a Turkish shell had also hit her just after run-ning into the mine. The Nusrets mines had proved deadly, the Allies minesweepers and spotter planes completely failing to spot them. Simultaneously the Minesweep-ers were fired upon by an array of Howit-zers and Field Guns as they neared the first minefield, causing them to flee. The Bat-tlecruiser Inflexible was then rocked by an explosion while manoeuvring near where the Bouvet had sunk, killing 33 crewmen and officers and causing the ship to list noticeably. The minefield had claimed its second victim, and soon took a third, the Irresistible which sank with the lives of 168 men. The French ship Suffren took a direct hit from a shell putting her out of action. For Admiral De Robeck and his staff the battle had changed from an assault to a matter of saving ships.

The Inflexible was escorted by destroyers from the straights to the Aegean Island of Tenedos. Ocean was dispatched to aid the sinking Irresistible, but struck a mine herself and began to list, threatening to capsize. Theirs crews were transferred to other ships as they foundered and sank. The com-manders ship, the Queen Elizabeth had been hit several times herself. The decision was made to retreat.

In all six ships were out of action, including three capital ships. Three ships had been sunk outright. The Turkish Batteries had fired 1600 rounds and scored 139 direct hits (Broadbent, 2005), despite running low on ammunition and extensive damage in some places. Particularly effective was a system of mobile howitzers and field guns, which after each shot were transferred to a new location to avoid destruction. Sev-eral fake guns were that made from scrap metal managed to divert allied fire form the real thing through the use of smoke (Mor-

genthau, 1918). The defending forces de-termination to defend the Dardanelles at all costs is symbolised by the feat of Corporal Seyit, who lifted three 275kg artillery shells up to the gun after its shell crane was dam-aged. Germans had manned the defences too, guns and gun crews from the ex-Ger-man ships of the Ottoman Navy forming the entire crew of the successful Dardanos (Canakkale) fort (Morgenthau, 1918).

The exhausted Turks and Germans manning the defences fully expected the Allied fleet to return the following day and orders were given to the gun crews to man their posts until they had expended their ammunition (Morgenthau, 1918), which at the at stage was running perilously low. The most power-ful fort on the asiatic side, Fort Hamidié only had 17 armour piercing shells remaining, while Kilid-ul-bahir on the European side had only 10. Had the Allied Fleet attacked again immediately, the remaining defences could not have stopped them reaching Constantinople. Bad gales and the Admi-ral De Robeck’s misgivings over a second attack meant that it did not eventuate, despite pressure from Churchill. As the fleet retreated the victory gave the Ottomans something to be proud of after years of setbacks. They had now gained the skills and confidence in their ability to match the enemy.

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The Land Campaign

The Allies (lead by the British) decided to overcome their Naval defeat by mount-ing an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula by land and sea, as had originally been fa-voured by some in the War Council. Lead by 62-year-old General Sir Ian Hamilton, the 75,000 strong MEF (Mediterranean Expeditionary Force) was composed of troops from Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Gurkhas and Sheiks from India, Greeks and Eastern Jews. Gathered on the island of Lemnos they were the half the number some believed would be needed, their force approximately equal to that of the defenders, when generally a 2:1 ratio was favoured when attacking. The plan-ning of the invasions was also hurried and ill informed, the staff appointed for the role hurriedly recruited and crucial information on the Peninsulas defences and topogra-phy were withheld or not supplied.

The plan was to land the Anzacs first at Ariburnu, just north of Kabatepe. This would distract the Ottoman’s attention from the south and enable the taking of the strate-gic Hill 971 after climbing the shallow hills behind the beach. On the next day the An-zac would move down to the hill Maltepe, from which the Narrows Defences could be neutralized. Meanwhile in the south the British would land at 5 locations around Cape Helles/Ílyasbaba Burnu, with the aim of moving north along the Asiatic coast to reach the forts after taking the high ground. A bluff landing would be staged at the isthmus of Bolayir to the North, while on the southern shore of the Dardanelles the French would land at Kumkale to occupy the forces there while the beach heads to the north were established.

Meanwhile the Defences of the Gallipoli Peninsula were being strengthened. The departure of the Allied forces from the Is-land of Lemnos to Egypt after the March 18 Battle had taken the pressure off of the de-fenders and allowed their commanders, a mixture of Turkish and Germans, to organise the improvements to defences. The leader

of the Ottoman forces on the Peninsula, Marshall Von Sanders had the difficult job of protecting the peninsula with only 80,000 men, the length of coastline to be pro-tected was simply too large. Von Sanders knew the size of the Allied force gathered on Lemnos through Aerial reconnaissance, it was simply a matter of predicting where they would land. He started by positioning two divisions each at the Bolayir Isthmus to the North and the Asian side of the straights in the south to cover other invasion possibili-ties. This left him with only two divisions to cover the lower peninsula and this dilemma was what General Hamilton was banking on to succeed.

To cover for this, these divisions were de-ployed in a manner that left detachments of 100-200 men guarding each likely inva-sion spot. At the widest and most accessi-ble beaches, such as Kaba Tepe, defences were reinforced with machine guns and artillery, the remaining men were stationed inland in positions that allowed quick move-ment to any landing point. This technique was particularly risky at the peninsulas south, where the force was understrength, with only four machine guns between them. By mid April a threefold trench system had developed, with deep trenches for units overlooking the beach, a main front-line trench network on higher ground and a third line further back in the reserve posi-tions. An allied surprise attack was now an impossibility.

The Allied landings began before dawn on 25th of April.

The events of 25th April 1915 would see the name ANZAC passed into legend. New Zealand had entered the war ‘ignorant of its causes and innocent of its meaning’. War was something remote, fought far away from these shores always in the Em-pire’s cause. New Zealand had never been threatened nor had experienced war’s presence. ‘the public would sing men off and cheer them home with no understand-ing of what they had been through.’ The First World War was never of New Zealand’s

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making; the causes of the conflict were not entirely clear but that did not matter. Britain had declared war on our behalf and that was enough.

Of the young men clamouring to join up, few consciously enlisted for King and Coun-try. Patriotism was a comfortable cloak worn unthinkingly, an accepted tenet of New Zealand faith. Men joined for more im-mediate and personal reasons. Now there was the chance to go away and see the world, to escape the isolated spot on the globe and do something.

Indeed, we did not even go to war as New Zealander’s. Nothing in our experience had forced us to consider our relation-ship to the land in which we lived. This war was to change that; but when 8574 men sailed from these shores in October 1914, they sailed not as New Zealander’s but as a number of highly competitive provincial teams: Otago, Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland. Jealous of their reputations, more conscious of their differences than of any national identity, they were sailing over-seas to play a series of games whose results, in their minds, was preordained. The British Empire would win. The destination? No one was sure where. It did not matter, off to find adventure and the rest of the world.

ANZAC did not, as the term suggests, indi-cate a close and indistinguishable union of the two forces (Pugsley, 2008). Rather, it emphasized the uniqueness of each of the nationalities, Australia and New Zealand, working together, but highly individual and increasingly proud to be so.

When they sailed from Wellington, many saw it as a chance to be ‘home’ for Christ-mas. Home was Britain, but Egypt changed that; the reality became the towns and farms they left behind. They travelled across the seas only to find that what they wanted most was back in New Zealand. ‘It seems great to be such a long way from home but we are all New Zealander’s and now that we are away from our own country we all stick together like glue.’

In April the ANZAC sailed to Mudros Har-bour on the Greek island of Lemnos as part of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force commanded by Sir Ian Hamilton. This hotch-potch force of French, British, Indian and ANZAC troops was to be committed to an ‘adventure unprecedented in modern war’, an opposed landing on the Turkish mainland to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula and open the straits of Dardenelles to the battleships of the Royal Navy.

It was an ambitious project. Today it seems obvious that Sir Ian Hamilton saw this as another colonial war (Pugsley, 2008). The Turks were just another hill tribe to be over-awed with the guns of the Royal Navy. A show of force by the Empire on land, and any Turk opposition would be swept aside. The difficulty would be getting ashore. The Australians landed before dawn but instead of doing so on the beaches near the open expanse of the Maidos Plain that crossed the Peninsula from west to east, the Navy blundered and set them down two kilom-eters north. Instead of a low coastal ridge and an open plain, the Australians faced a lunatic landscape of clay slopes and ra-vines all cloaked in an impenetrable prickly scrub. They landed around a headland on the northern point of an unnamed beach some 600 meters long and a cricket pitch

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wide. This part of the coast was all but de-serted, as the Turkish command considered this the least likely area for a landing.

It was a fatal mistake on the Navy’s part. Even though the isolated pockets of Turks guarding the coast were soon driven inland, from the beginning the fight was as much with the landscape as it was with the Turk. It was the landscape that broke and scattered the Australian battalions as they waded ashore, across the narrow beach, and start-ed up the heights above them. A yet unknown Turkish divisional commander, Mustafa Kemal, had heard of the ANZAC landing. Recognising the threat, he commit-ted his leading regiment to a counter-attack about the time the Auckland Battalion was lining up in four ranks on the beach. As they stood gaping at the sights and breaking ranks, Kemal’s battalions were advancing on the Australian line. Though heavily outnum-bered, the Turks new the ground and were in organized units. The Australians, by contrast, were widely separate in small groups, often out of touch with the men on their flanks.

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focus of the space, but rather a means by which users can further experience the site and derive meaning from it.

locations had piers in 1915- historical significance

focus of the space, but rather a means by which users can further experience the site and derive meaning from it.

locations had piers in 1915- historical significance

focus of the space, but rather a means by which users can further experience the site and derive meaning from it.

locations had piers in 1915- historical significance

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Remembrance and Commemoration can be instilled in practical and functional spaces like Piers. An example of this is the Veterans Memorial Pier in New York City. Al-though dedicated in name to War Vetrans, previously the Pier contained no memorial other than the American Flag. This changed with the 2001 9/11 attack, the Piers view of Manhattan Island offering clear views of the destruction. Because of this connec-tion with the disaster, it was recently chosen as the location for a monument that com-memorates the 283 people from the area who died in the disaster (Freudenheim, 2010). Despite this sombre purpose the pier is alive with leisure activities, a place of dual purpose, remembrance and recreation (especially fishing (Freudenheim, 2010)). The memorial is not the focus of the place, rather a means by which its users can expe-rience the landscape around it and derive their own meaning from it

We believe the Piers will also offer a chance for interaction between cultures. Since ancient times the Gallipoli Peninsula, due to it’s location on a trade route, has been a meeting places for many cultures, often through war. To continue and encourage the National Parks mandate of peace, we must stimulate dialogue between cul-tures and people, hopefully encouraging understanding and tolerance, preventing violence. We hope the Piers could be used by local residents and domestic tourists as places of leisure, a place to swim or fish from as well as a place for reflection and rest. When tourists arrive, offered the oppor-tunity they may take the time to talk to a lo-cal Turk or to a fellow tourist, enriching both persons understanding of each other.

The Piers would be designed to compliment the landscape in which they are situated, acting almost as a natural extension of the

land rather than being designed to stick out and draw attention. The design may also reflect the piers used by Allied forces in their 1915 invasion. Their design would also try to avoid any negative impact on the fragile ecosystems and archaeology of the Pen-insula, perhaps through the use of modern construction techniques or through floating upon the water. In all we hope to design something that will become integral to the Gallipoli experience, a memorial that goes beyond the remembrance of past events and becomes something in itself.

Veterans Memorial Pier, New York City

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References

Harvey, A.D. (1985). War Memorials. History Workshop Journal, 20 (1), 214-a-214.

Bennet, James R. (1998). From Patriotism to Peace. Humanist, 58 (5), 5-9.

Ziino, Bart. (2003). Claiming the dead: great war memorials and their communities. Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 89.2 (145).

Connelly, Mark, Donaldson, Peter. (2010). South African (1899–1902) Memorials in Britain: A Case Study of Memorialization in London and Kent. War & Society, 29 (1), 20-46.

Vronsky, Peter. (2012). South African War Memorial. Retrieved fromhttp://www.toronto.ca/culture/public_art/locations/south_african_war_memorial.htm

Veterans Affairs Canada (2011). Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Retrieved from http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/Memorials/tomb/cwgc/other_tomb

Westminster Abbey. (2011). Unknown Warrior. Retrieved from http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/people/unknown-warrior

Unknown Soldier, by Getty Images, Retrieved March 6, 2012, from http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/49884000/jpg/_49884700_106665787.jpg

South African War Memorial, by City of Toronto, Retrieved March 4, 2012 from http://www.toronto.ca/culture/public_art/locations/south_african_war_memorial.htm

Thiepval Memorial to the Missing, by greatwar.co.uk, Retrieved March 6, 2012 fromhttp://www.greatwar.co.uk/somme/memorial-thiepval.htm

Thiepval Memorial by greatwar.co.uk, Retrieved March 6, 2012 fromhttp://www.greatwar.co.uk/somme/memorial-thiepval.htm

The Sunken Road by greatwar.co.uk, Retrieved March 6, 2012 fromhttp://www.greatwar.co.uk/somme/memorial-thiepval.htm

VVM, (2004) Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Retrieved from http://www.tourofdc.org/monuments/VVM/

The Wall, (2012) Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Retrieved fromhttp://thewall-usa.com/information.asp

Vietnam War Memorial, (2012), Google Earth, Retrived 5th March from http://maps.google.co.nz/maps?hl=en&tab=wl

Vietnam Veterans Memorial, (2012), 10ga, Retrieved 11th March from http://www.10ga.com/pics113/IMG_3241.JPG

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National WW2 Memorial, (2012). WWII Memorial Retrieved March 8th from http://www.wwiimemorial.com/default.asp?page=design.asp&subpage=memorialdesign

Michael Killian, (2001), Chicago Tribute, Retrieved March 8th from http://www.savethemall.org/media/senateok.htm

The DCTraveller, (2008), National WW2 Memorial, Retrieved March 5th from http://www.thedctraveler.com/2008/01/monument-monday-the-national-world-war-ii-memorial/

Freedom Wall, (2012), Freedom Wall, Retrieved March 5th from http://images.travelpod.com/users/drfumblefinger/1.1269627251.washington----freedom-wall.jpg

Gallipoli Peace Park International Office & Middle East Technical University. (1997). Gal-lipoli Peninsula Peace Park International Design Competition, The Book. Ankara, Turkey: Publisher is the Author.

(GPPIO & METU, 1997)

Broadbent, H. 2005. Gallipoli, the fatal shore. Penguin Books Ltd, London

Images

Places

Anzac Boat Skeleton: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/1480016

Anzac Boat Skeleton, North Beach: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/13039100

Anzac Cemetery Location: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/16729131

Anzac Cove (Boat offshore): http://www.panoramio.com/photo/32295079

Anzac Cove, North Beach: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/36089983

Beach Y: http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/4273402.jpg

Suvla Bay North: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/1547834

Suvla Bay South Headland: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/13487784

Boat, Suvla Bay North Headland: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/21844907

Suvla Bay: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/12251809

Seddulbahir, V Beach: http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/18307899.jpg

W Beach: http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/15031629.jpg

Remains of Pier, W beach: http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/15031242.jpg