GRENFELL TOWER PUBLIC INQUIRY PHASE 1 CLOSING … · 1.2 The Inquiry has heard significant amounts...

GRENFELL TOWER PUBLIC INQUIRY

PHASE 1 CLOSING SUBMISSIONS OF KINGSPAN INSULATION LIMITED

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Kingspan Insulation Limited ("Kingspan") wishes to repeat its deepest

sympathies to the bereaved families, survivors and everyone affected by the

tragic events which occurred at Grenfell Tower. Kingspan is committed to

assisting the Inquiry in its objectives of understanding what happened and

preventing similar tragedies occurring in the future.

1.2 The Inquiry has heard significant amounts of factual and expert evidence

during Phase 1, much of which has been traumatic and distressing. The

Chairman is now tasked with reaching conclusions in respect of the Phase 1

issues which relate largely to the events of 14 June 2017 itself. These closing

submissions are intended to assist with that task.

1.3 As explained in its position statement, Kingspan was not involved in the

design, specification or implementation of the 2015-2016 refurbishment of

Grenfell Tower (the "Refurbishment"). Prior to the fire, Kingspan was not

aware that any of its products had been installed on Grenfell Tower during the

Refurbishment. Kingspan was not asked by those involved in the

Refurbishment to provide, and did not provide, any advice or guidance as to

the suitability of its products for the applications for which they were used in

the Refurbishment.

1.4 As set out in further detail in Kingspan's position statement, post-fire

investigations show that three Kingspan products were installed on Grenfell

Tower:

(a) It appears that Kingspan Kooltherm K15 ("Kooltherm K15") was

delivered to the Grenfell Tower site on one occasion when Celotex

RS5080 was unavailable for delivery. Accordingly, a relatively small

1 Kingspan Insulation Limited is incorporated in England & Wales, company number 1882722, with its registered

office at Torville Industrial Estate, Pembridge, Leominster HR6 9LA, and is wholly owned by Kingspan Group plc.

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quantity of Kooltherm K15 appears to have been installed, amounting

to approximately 6.5% of the rainscreen insulation boards installed on

the spandrel beams of Grenfell Tower;

(b) Kingspan's PIR insulation, sold as both Thermapitch TP10 and

Thermawall TVV55, was installed around at least some windows linings

behind the uPVC surrounds; and

(c) Kingspan's Kooltherm FM Pipe Insulation was installed in Grenfell

Tower during the Refurbishment.

1.5 In these closing submissions, Kingspan focuses on the expert evidence heard

in Phase 1 of the Inquiry to the extent it relates to the spread of fire to the

rainscreen cladding, the subsequent spread of fire across that cladding, and

the production and spread of smoke during the fire. In doing so, Kingspan

acknowledges the preliminary nature of the Phase 1 expert evidence and the

further testing and analysis being conducted by the Inquiry's experts in

preparation of their Phase 2 reports.

1.6 By way of overview, Kingpsan makes the following five observations in

respect of the expert evidence heard to date:

(a) First, it appears to be clear from the expert evidence heard by the

Inquiry to date that the rainscreen cladding system installed during the

Refurbishment did not comply with the Building Regulations 2010 (the

"Building Regulations") and should never have been installed on

Grenfell Tower;

(b) Second, in respect of fire egress from flat 16, the expert evidence to

date suggests that it is currently not possible to determine by which of

several possible mechanisms the fire initially escaped from the flat and

ignited the ACM cladding nor, if relevant, which material in the window

and window surround ignited first;

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(C) Third, expert evidence to date indicates that the presence of PE-cored

ACM panels was the most important factor contributing to the

propagation and spread of the fire;

(d) Fourth, at this stage it is not clear from the expert evidence to what

extent the presence of PIR insulation installed behind those panels may

have contributed to the nature and extent of the fire spread, save that

any such contribution was of secondary importance. Similarly, it

appears that the nature and extent of the fire spread may not have

been significantly (or measurably) different had an alternative type of

insulation, such as "non-combustible" mineral wool, been used instead

of PIR; and

(e) Fifth, it appears based on current expert evidence that a significant

source of any smoke, including any hydrogen cyanide present in

Grenfell Tower was the burning of flat contents.

1.7 Sections 2 to 5 below look at these conclusions and the expert evidence

supporting them in more detail. Section 6 of these closing submissions details

the steps which Kingspan has taken following the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower.

Kingspan does not consider that it would assist the Inquiry for it to make

closing submissions in respect of the other areas of Phase 1 expert and

factual evidence which are not connected to the Kingspan products used on

Grenfell Tower.

1.8 For the avoidance of doubt, these closing submissions relate only to Phase 1

of the Inquiry and make no comment in respect of any of the issues to be

considered during Phase 2 of the Inquiry.

2 COMPLIANCE OF GRENFELL TOWER WITH BUILDING REGULATIONS

2.1 It is clear that following the Refurbishment, multiple aspects of Grenfell Tower,

both internally and externally, did not comply with the relevant parts of the

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Building Regulations.2 In this regard, Kingspan's closing submissions are

limited to certain aspects of the external failings.

2.2 As regards the compliance of the rainscreen cladding system installed on

Grenfell Tower during the Refurbishment, the evidence indicates that it failed

to satisfy any of the available routes to compliance:

(a) The linear route to compliance was not capable of being achieved

because the system incorporated products that were not non-

combustible or of limited combustibility;

(b) Dr Lane has confirmed that she is not aware of any BS-8414 test

having been conducted to test the performance of the cladding system,

nor is she aware of any desktop study of the system's performance

having been conducted3; and

(c) There appears to be no evidence to suggest that the holistic fire

engineer route to compliance provided in the Building Control Alliance

Guidance Note 18 "Use of Combustible Cladding Materials on

Buildings Exceeding 18m in height' was followed.

2.3 Furthermore, Kingspan agrees with Dr Lane that the rainscreen cladding

system on Grenfell Tower did not comply with the Building Regulations and

Kingspan considers that if it had been tested to BS-8414 it would have failed

as a result of the PE-cored ACM panels, regardless of the backing insulation.

This view is supported by the BS 8414 testing carried out in the aftermath of

the tragedy by the Department for Communities and Local Government and

Professor Bisby's opinion in respect of those tests, that "what those tests

show is that if you have an ACM PE rainscreen, the test, regardless of the

backing insulation, escalates fire spread very, very quickly'.4 This is consistent

with Kingspan's understanding of the position.

2 Paragraph 2.9.9 of Dr Barbara Lane's Amended Phase 1 Report, as confirmed in her oral evidence on 22

November 2018 (transcript p. 25, line 11)3 Dr Barbara Lane oral evidence, 22 November 2018, transcript p. 108, lines 3-12

4 Professor Bisby oral evidence, 21 November 2018, transcript p. 178, lines 1-4

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2.4 For the avoidance of doubt, Kingspan confirms that it is not aware of K15

having been tested to BS 8414 as part of a cladding system using PE-cored

ACM panels as at the date of the Refurbishment.

3 EGRESS OF FIRE FROM FLAT 16

3.1 Turning to the specifics of the egress of fire from flat 16 into the cladding

system, the experts have provided two main hypotheses as to the egress of

the fire from the flat: (i) escape via the window (either the window being open

or through the hole where the extractor fan had been located); or (ii) escape

through the failing of the window and the uPVC window surrounds, and the

ignition of materials installed behind the window.5

3.2 Although these hypotheses will be the subject of further testing and analysis in

preparation of the experts' Phase 2 reports, both Professors Torero and Bisby

have expressed uncertainty as to the value of such analysis.6

3.3 Kingspan agrees with the above expert evidence: it may or may not prove to

be possible to determine the precise route of egress of the fire from flat 16,

but this is of secondary significance to understanding how and why the fire

could spread so quickly once it had breached the window in flat 16 to engulf

the whole of Grenfell Tower.

3.4 Notwithstanding such evidence and agreement, in respect of the second of

these hypotheses and any analysis of which material in and behind the

window surround was likely to ignite first, Kingspan supports Professor

Torero's preliminary conclusions. When asked whether the thermal inertia

values of each material assists an analysis of the likely route to ignition,

Professor Torero explained that "they just give you an estimate of what

could've gone first. ... these numbers are only valid in the sense that they had

to be under exactly the same conditions I mean, what we're talking about

5 These hypotheses are identified by Professor Bisby as "B1" and "BT in paragraphs 688-714 of his revised

Phase 1 report6 Professor Bisby oral evidence, 21 November 2018, transcript p. 134, lines 16-25; Professor Torero oral

evidence, 20 November 2018, transcript p. 78, lines 9-13

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here is a very small fire being capable of igniting any of these things. ... What

the sequence is and all the details is extremely difficult, because while they

are related to all these material properties, they're much more related to

where the flame was in relationship to the materials.'

4 VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD

4.1 Looking at the specific mechanisms of flame spread across the cladding on

Grenfell Tower, Professors Torero and Bisby agree that the PE-cored ACM

was the most important factor. This conclusion was summarised succinctly by

Professor Bisby's evidence that "I consider the presence of PE filled ACM

rainscreen cladding cassettes to be, by a considerable margin, the most

important factor contributing to upward vertical fire spread (and indeed to

external fire spread generally) during the Gren fell Tower fire".8

4.2 The experts have also opined on the role of the PIR insulation installed behind

the PE-cored ACM panels and its contribution to fire spread. Kooltherm K15 is

phenolic insulation, rather than PIR insulation, but as Professor Bisby stated

(a view with which Kingspan would generally agree), its (limited) ability to

support flame spread is similar to that of PIR.9 Significant to any conclusion as

to PIR's ability to support flame spread is an understanding of how PIR reacts

when exposed to flames: when exposed to a heat flux sufficient to reach the

pyrolysis temperature, PIR will release combustible pyrolysis products and

form a char.19 However, in the absence of any heat flux being received by it

from an external source, PIR will self-extinguish.11 When questioned as to the

impact of such pyrolysing qualities on the fire spread, Professor Torero

explained his finding that "it is likely that the PIR will have a minor effect on

the rate of burning, because the polyethylene, being thermally thin, once it

ignites and starts spreading, it will spread at a much faster rate than the

7 Professor Torero oral evidence, 20 November 2018, transcript p. 79, lines 13-25

8 Professor Bisby oral evidence, 21 November 2018, transcript p. 168, lines 12-16 (confirming paragraph 859 of

his amended Phase 1 report)

9 Professor Bisby oral evidence, 21 November 2018, transcript p. 55, line 210 Professor Bisby oral evidence, 21 November 2018, transcript p. 173, lines 21-24


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P/R".12 Professor Bisby further confirmed that "the timescales of vertical fire

spread are too short for the burning of the PIR to be that important."13

4.3 As regards the role of PIR more generally in the vertical fire spread, Professor

Torero explained that there is evidence that the burning PIR contributed to the

energy being released during the fire although he was unable to determine

whether it was "very significant or mildly significanr.14 It will be of importance

to the Inquiry to understand whether the spread of fire on Grenfell Tower

would have been different had a non-combustible insulation been used

instead of PIR. Whilst this will be considered in more detail in Phase 2,

Professor Bisby provided his clear preliminary view on this point during his

oral evidence: although different insulation which was less thermally efficient

(eg non-combustible insulation) would give rise to greater heat loss which

might slow vertical progression of the fire, "in the context of the presence of

the polyethylene, that would be hugely overshadowed by the fact that you

have polyethylene in the system which is freely buming".15

5 HORIZONTAL FIRE SPREAD

5.1 Understanding the route of horizontal fire spread on Grenfell Tower will be of

importance to the Inquiry in order to establish how the fire spread to all four

sides of the building. Kingspan notes that the Inquiry's experts intend to do

further testing and modelling of this issue.

12 Professor Torero oral evidence, 20 November 2018, transcript p. 125, line 4


14 Professor Torero, oral evidence, 20 November 2018, transcript p. 127, lines 16-22

15 This evidence was given in response to a series of questions from Kate Grange QC regarding the role of

insulation in the speed of the initial fire spread on the cladding. In particular Kate Grange QC asked: "would it

follow from that that if there were no such insulation, or no such combustible insulation, the vertical fire spread of

fire would've been slower in its initial stages? ... Or if it were insulated by something that was wholly non-

combustible, if there were such a thing?' In response to such question, Professor Bisby responded "... if the

backing insulation has a higher thermal inertia, it's less thermally efficient as an insulator ... there would be

additional heat losses to that system and the vertical profession of the fire would be slowed, My personal view is

that in the context of the presence of the polyethylene, that would be hugely overshadowed by the fact that you

have polyethylene in the system which is freely burning'. Professor Bisby oral evidence, 21 November 2018,

transcript pp. 175 to 176

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5.2 In this regard, the experts agree that at least the initial horizontal fire spread

occurred around the crown where there was no insulation.16 Professor Bisby

considers that horizontal fire spread across the rest of Grenfell Tower

occurred in a downwards diagonal line from the crown, originating from the

burning polyethylene dripping from the crown causing pool fires on horizontal

surfaces lower down the cladding. Professor Bisby concludes that these pool

fires caused the ignition of the localised PE-cored ACM panels which then

spread fire vertically either upwards and/or downwards from that point.17

5.3 Professor Bisby confirmed his view that he considered the above to be a

stronger hypothesis than fire having spread laterally by way of opposed-flow

spread across the cladding.18 In particular, Professor Bisby concluded that

even where there were exposed edges of PIR insulation, a significant external

heat flux would be required to cause a continuing progression of the fire. In

effect, this means that for PIR to contribute to horizontal fire spread, a fire

involving other materials already needed to be present.19

6 SMOKE SPREAD

6.1 The Inquiry has heard preliminary evidence from Professor Purser in relation

to the spread of smoke and toxic gasses through the tower as the fire

progressed. Professor Purser made clear, in common with the other experts

to the Inquiry, that he needs to carry out a significant amount of further work in

relation to these issues, in particular a detailed analysis of the evidence from

those people, firefighters and survivors, who were in the tower.

6.2 Kingspan agrees with Professor Purser that the factors which influenced the

development of the fire and the production of smoke and toxic fumes were

very complex, with significant variation over time and in different parts of the

building. It is evident from the evidence that this is an area requiring significant

further expert investigation.

16 Dr Lane oral evidence, 22 November 2018, transcript p. 89, lines 14-21

17 Professor Bisby oral evidence, 21 November 2018, transcript pp. 189-192



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6.3 In respect of hydrogen cyanide, Professor Purser's preliminary view was that

the only situation in which the existence of cyanide may have affected the

outcome of an individual in Grenfell Tower was where an individual exited

their flat before 3am, having been exposed to some cyanide in their flat before

then being exposed to further cyanide in the lobbies or stairwell, causing that

individual to collapse. Professor Purser confirmed that in that situation "the

source of that cyanide that you're breathing in the lobby and stair is going to

be mainly from the burning contents that's getting into the lobbies".20

7 STEPS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE FIRE AT GRENFELL TOWER

7.1 The Inquiry asked a number of core participants, particularly governmental

bodies and the London Fire Brigade, to submit position statements explaining

in detail the steps they have taken following the Grenfell Tower fire. In case it

should be of assistance to the Inquiry, Kingspan sets out below a summary of

the steps it has taken since the fire at Grenfell Tower.

7.2 Kingspan has taken a number of steps in response to the fire at Grenfell

Tower, including the following:

(a) Kingspan has fully engaged with the Inquiry from the outset, including

providing it with a substantial volume of documents to date as well as

providing disclosure of further relevant documents such as further BS

8414 test reports as they become available;

(b) Kingspan has fully engaged with the Metropolitan Police investigation,

including providing a witness statement and supporting documents to

the Police;

(c) Kingspan engaged fully with Dame Judith Hackitt's Independent

Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety and answered all

questions asked of it. Such engagement included various

communications, written submissions and a meeting in person with the

review team;

20 Professor Purser oral evidence, 29 November 2018, transcript p. 189, lines 4-18

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(d) Kingspan, in conjunction with Efectis UK, has carried out further fire

tests at the University of Ulster in accordance with the ISO 13785-1

standard on various facade systems using a combination of different

AGMs and insulants. These tests were conducted to ascertain whether

this method of testing might be a good intermediate scale proxy for

BS8414 testing and also to study whether toxic combustion products

are released by these systems. Copies of these reports were provided

to the Inquiry on 16 February 2018;

(e) Kingspan, in partnership with others, has stepped up its existing

programme of BS8414 testing of systems using Kooltherm K15, with a

particular focus following the Grenfell tragedy on systems using

Kooltherm K15 in conjunction with ACMs;

(g)

Kingspan has published on its website copies of all BS-8414 test

reports and BR 135 classification reports it has received for tests it has

conducted using Kooltherm K15;

Kingspan has commissioned Tenos and Efectis to conduct reviews of

the BS8414 test methodology, which have confirmed it to be a reliable

and robust test, copies of which have been disclosed to the Inquiry;

(h) Kingspan has met with Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local

Government ("MHCLG") Building Safety Expert panel members and

shared with MHCLG its test data and technical assessments. Kingspan

Insulation also responded to the MHCLG consultation on desktop

studies, and on the proposed ban on the use of combustible materials

in the eternal walls of high-rise residential buildings;

(i) The Managing Director of Kingspan provided evidence to the Housing,

Communities and Local Government Committee as part of its

Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety; and

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U) Kingspan is introducing systems to allow greater traceability of

Kooltherm K15 through the supply chain to allow Kingspan to track its

intended use.

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Gowling WLG (UK) LLP

6 December 2018

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GRENFELL TOWER PUBLIC INQUIRY PHASE 1 CLOSING … · 1.2 The Inquiry has heard significant amounts...

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