Great Historic Disaster

8/3/2019 Great Historic Disaster

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The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshimaand Nagasaki

The Black Death

The Dust Bowl

The Great Chicago Fire of 1871

The Hindenburg Disaster of 1937Hurricane Katrina

The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004

The Influenza Pandemic of 19181919

The Johnstown Flood of 1889

The San Francisco Earthquake and Fireof 1906

The Sinking of the Titanic

The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire


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J. Poolos


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The ATomic BomBings of hiroshimA And nAgAsAki

Copyright 2008 by Inobase Publishing

All rights reserved. No part o this book may be reproduced or utilized inany orm or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,recording, or by any inormation storage or retrieval systems, withoutpermission in writing rom the publisher. For inormation contact:

Chelsea HouseAn imprint o Inobase Publishing132 West 31st StreetNew York NY 10001

Lbay c catal--Publat dataPoolos, J. (Jamie)The Atomic bombings o Hiroshima and Nagasaki / J. Poolos.

p. cm.(Great historic disasters)Includes bibliographical reerences and index.ISBN 978-0-7910-9738-0 (hbk.)1. Hiroshima-shi (Japan)HistoryBombardment, 1945Juvenileliterature. 2. Nagasaki-shi (Japan)HistoryBombardment, 1945

Juvenile literature. 3. World War, 19391945Juvenile literature. 4. AtomicbombHistory. I. Title. II. Series.

D767.25.H6P66 2008940.54'2521954dc22 2008004953

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Cs

Introduction: The Site of Destruction 7

1 Prelude to the Bomb 9

2 The Origins of War in Europe 22

3 The Conflict Takes Shape 36

4 The War in Europe 47

5 The Pacific Theater 65

6 The Manhattan Project 81

7 Dropping the Bombs 94

8 The Legacy of World War II 104

Chronology and Timeline 114

Glossary 117 Bibliography 120

Further Reading 122

Picture Credits 123

Index 124

About the Author 128


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Eve ea o Auu 6, people ahe Hohma Peae

Memoal Pa (above) o leave lowe ad emembe he vm

o he aom bomb o he . Oe o he ew buld o

ema ad wa eamed he A-bomb Dome ad peeved a

a emde o he damae ad deuo aued b he aa.


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7

I ou wal dow he ma ee Hohma,

Japan, today, it is almost impossible to tell that it wasever anything but a peaceul, tranquil city. Automobiles

and scooters move over tree-lined streets. Lush gardens line

the gently lowing river. Despite a population o more thanone million people, residents and visitors create a relaxedbut active environment. Modern oice buildings are a signo Japans thriving economy, as are the many restaurants andshops that dot the downtown area.

Only a ew signs o what some historians call the most sig-niicant event in modern world history remain. The HiroshimaPeace Park is a place that draws many visitors rom all nations.

The centerpiece o the park is the remains o a concrete building,one o the ew buildings in the city let standing ater the mostpowerul bomb attack ever seen. The blown-out windows andramework o the dome remain as a reminder o what the citylooked like in 1945. The building stands as a memorial to thetens o thousands o victims. Each year on August 6, HiroshimaDay, ceremonies are held here to remember these people.

It is hard to believe that ewer than 70 years ago the citylay leveled in its own smoldering waste, with up to 140,000

ic:t S f

dsc


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AtOMic BOMBings O HirOsHiMA AnD nAgAsAki

reported dead by the end o the year. Thankully, scenes osuch horriic destruction have not been seen since. The Hiro-shima Peace Park remains as a symbol o the vast lengths to

which humankind will go to stop dictators determined to rulethe world.


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9

p Bmb

The o o he aom bomb be a e-

ting as unlikely as any: a man standing at the cor-ner o an intersection, waiting or the traic light

to change. The man was Hungarian-born physicist Dr. Leo

Szilard. The place was Southampton Row, in London, Eng-land. The time was September 1933. It was while on one ohis requent, ambling walks that Szilard envisioned an atomicchain reaction much like a series o traic lights all chang-ing to green in rapid sequence, allowing traic to low again.Szilard had a playul mind, and thoughts such as these servedas both stimuli and entertainment.

Szilard was reminded o a novel he had read shortlybeore he led Germany at the time Adol Hitler was rising topower. The book was The World Set Free, written in 1913 byH.G. Wells. In the novel, Wells describes a global nuclear warthat lays waste to 200 cities by atomic bombs. Szilard tried toimagine the intense energy created by a nuclear bomb. He hadsome experience in the theories o superweapons, gained theprevious year when he was a researcher at the Kaiser Wilhelm

Institute in Berlin, Germany. It was there he studied and worked with the great Albert Einstein, with whom Szilard


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Atomic BomBings of HirosHimA And nAgAsAki10

had collaborated on the invention of a new kind of refrigera-

tor. Szilard admired Einstein for his ability to focus on theory

and to avoid the distractions of achievement, unlike another

accomplished physicist named Ernest Rutherford. Szilard hadlearned that, during a recent meeting of scientists, Rutherford

had described atomic energy as an insignificant idea with no

base in the possible. Rutherford had established his reputa-

tion by conducting early experiments that gave physicists new

insights into the nature of the atom, and he would later be

called the father of the nuclear age. Yet his claim sparked the

playful, competitive fires in Szilard.

Ernest Rutherford

Born in 1871 in New Zealand, Ernest Rutherford is knownas the father of the nuclear age. His early work on the orbitaltheory of the atom was instrumental in physicists ability to

understand the nature of the atom. After completing his stud-

ies in his home country, Rutherford was named to the chair of

physics at McGill University in Canada, where he completed

work that would earn him the 1908 Nobel Prize in Chemistry.

Later, with physicist Niels Bohr, he theorized on the exis-

tence of neutrons and their role in holding nuclei together. The

pair developed a model of the atom, showing its structure as

a nucleus surrounded by orbiting electrons.

His research was instrumental in the advancement of

nuclear physics, and his work was both a resource and an

inspiration to the physicists who would follow him. In 1914, he

was knighted, and in 1931, he was named Baron Rutherford

of Nelson, a title he held until his death in 1937.


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11

The young scientist set up a meeting with Lord Rutherord,during which he attempted to prove energy was a easible prod-uct o atoms split by neutron bombardment. Peter Wyden wrote

in his book Day One: Before Hiroshima and After that Szilardtold a riend he was thrown out o Rutherords oice. But he

was not easily deeated, and he loved a challenge. So, he set outto prove Lord Rutherord wrong. He knew it would not be easyand that success would mean a dramatic change to the currentviews o the universe. Ater all, the word atom comes rom theGreek wordatomos, meaning a thing that cannot be divided.The very idea o splitting something that by conventional wis-dom was unable to be split was ar-etched, to say the least. ButSzilard, being a bit eccentric himsel, embraced the ar-etched.

With enough money to last him the year, he began to devotehis energies to the identiication o the element that would bebest suited or the task. Szilard disliked routine work, and hetried to hire a scientist to research the 92 elements that at thetime were known. No one seemed interested, and the project

began to lose momentum. It was not until Szilard moved tothe United States in 1939, some six years later, that he resumedserious work on atomic chain reactions.

SCientiStS Flee europeDuring the 1930s, the center o theoretical physics was inEurope. Much o the major work in the ield was being doneat universities in England, Italy, and Germany. The physicists

working in Europe requently visited one another to shareideas, work on theoretical problems, and assist with experi-ments. But dramatic political changes in Europe brought anabrupt end to all that. With the rapid spread o Nazism inGermany and Fascism in Italy and Hungary, scientists andreethinkers were under attack.

Nazism is the word that describes the political policies

practiced by Germany rom 1933 to 1945 under Adol Hitler.These policies persecuted the Jewish peoples o Europe, who

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AtOMic BOMBings O HirOsHiMA AnD nAgAsAki12

Nazis believed were orming a conspiracy against Germanyand, or that matter, all o the Western world. Fascism is apolitical ideology that popularizes the practices that suppos-

edly serve an entire population rather than individuals. Fas-cism was championed by Benito Mussolini in Italy rom 1922to 1943. It was also the central issue ueling the Spanish CivilWar (19361939), which at the time was being won by the Fas-cists. Both Nazism and Fascism denied an individuals impor-tance and instead sought to make all individuals subservient tothe state. Nazism took the concept a step urther, placing theindividual and state at the eet o the White race.

Many European academics, including physicists, wereJewish. As Hitlers German army began to make advances inEurope, there was no sae place or Jews, and many physicistsled their homes or the saety o neutral European countriesin the north or or America. Fearing what many saw as theinevitable union o German Nazism and Italian Fascism,many Italian scientists ollowed suit. The nucleus o European

scientists who or so long had enjoyed the comort and secu-rity o a privileged community where they were ree to ocuson their work was orced to split, its parts scattered across theWestern world. Many o these scientists ound reuge in theUnited States, including the worlds most amous physicist,Albert Einstein. At irst, this seemed like a blow to the pursuito science. But in the end it provided some o Europes topphysicists with a new home and thereore made them availableto contribute to the invention o the atomic bomb.

An exCiting BreAkthroughOne day during the irst week o January 1939, the noted Dan-ish physicist Niels Bohr was about to board theDrottningholm,a ship that would take him and his amily rom Copenhagen,Denmarkwhere he had ounded the Institute or Theoretical

Physicsto saety in New Jersey, where he would take a tem-porary post at the Institute or Advanced Study at Princeton.


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As Bohr was making last-minute preparations, a physiciston his sta named Otto Frisch barged into his oice with

wondrous news. He had recently visited his aunt, the noted

Jewish physicist Lise Meitner, who had led Germany and herpost at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin or the saetyo Sweden. When Frisch arrived or the holiday visit, his auntshowed him a letter rom her collaborator, Otto Hahn, a chem-ist who like Niels Bohr had been a student o Rutherords.Hahns letter spoke o the recent experiments he and his new

Pelude o he Bomb

D. Leo szlad (above) wa he e o oeve a ulea

ha eao, a poe ha wa he ba o develop

ulea weapo. Awae o he poeal o aweome deuo

uh weapo poed, szlad aemped o eouae he U.s.

oveme o ea om u aom bomb o vla.


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partner had conducted in Germany, in which they bombardedthe element uranium with neutrons. To their surprise, someo the uranium had changed into another element, named

barium. These results indicated that he and his associates hadquite possibly split the nucleus o an atom. But he could not becertain. In a report he sent to a science journal describing theexperiment, he wrote, We cannot yet bring ourselves to thisconclusion which is at variance with all previous experience innuclear physics. But Frisch and Meitner had a strong eelingabout the signiicance o the experiment. And as Frisch, hav-ing rushed back to Copenhagen, recounted the story to Bohras Bohr was preparing to depart or America, he could notcontain his excitement.

Bohr shared in Frisch and Meitners amazement. Overthe course o his voyage at sea, he reworked the calculationso the experiment. According to his indings, there was littledoubt that the Germans had split the atom. He recalled thatFrisch had called the splitting o the nucleusfission, a term he

borrowed orm the biological term or the splitting o a cell.Perect, he thought.

einSteinS letterShortly ater the news o the splitting o the uranium nucleusleaked out over Americas shores, scientists began in secretto conduct experiments to veriy the work o Hahn and Meit-ner. Some o the worlds brightest and most lauded physi-cists, such as Eugene Wigner, Edward Teller, and J. RobertOppenheimeralong with Bohr and Szilardwere caughtup in the ervor around this unprecedented breakthrough.At once, they began to spread the word within the greaterscientiic community. Szilard, Wigner, and Teller ormedthe Hungarian conspiracy and took time out rom theireorts to build support within the inancial community

in order to und urther research. They joined Niels Bohras he delivered a surprise lecture to a meeting o 50 senior


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scientists at a conerence originally scheduled to presentindings on an altogether dierent topic, low-temperaturephysics. There, in a lecture hall at George Washington Uni-

versity, Bohr related Hahns indings to the stunned audi-ence. While Teller proposed the possibility o creating andcontrolling a chain reaction catalyzed by the splitting o theatom, most o the attendees were ocused on the questiono conirming that nuclear ission actually released energy.And they wasted no time.

That aternoon, delegates rom Johns Hopkins Universityrepeated Hahns experiment. Later that night, a ormer stu-dent o Bohrs, named Merle Tuve, sent a colleague to his labo-ratory at the Carnegie Institutes Department o TerrestrialMagnetism to perorm an experiment to validate Hahns ind-ings. Upon hearing the news in his oice at the University oCaliornia at Berkeley, J. Robert Oppenheimer wrote in a letterto a riend, The uranium business is unbelievable.

But as momentum developed within the cloistered com-

munity o physicists across the country, so did the concern thatNazi Germany would use Hahns indings to build a nuclearbomb. In act, many scientists in the United States predictedthat the Germans were already urther along then they were,and this terrible possibility ueled the urgency with which they

worked. Their concern was justiied. In April 1939, one o LordRutherords trainees, a physical chemist located in Hamburg,Germany, wrote to Hitlers War Oice in Berlin to warn thechancellor o the grave possibilities associated with Hahns

work. The letter stated that it was highly likely that the split-ting o the atom would lead to the development o a bomb manytimes more powerul than conventional bombs and that the irstcountry to make use o this technology would have an unsur-passable advantage over other nations. This letter was shown toHans Geiger, coinventor o the Geiger counter (a device used to

measure radioactivity), whose support or the cause led to high-level meetings with physicists and government oicials.

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Meanwhile, the physicists in the United States worked ever-ishly to convince the U.S. government o the immediacy o theissue. Szilard asked that all papers on the progress o nuclear

study be withheld rom publication, or ear the Germans wouldlearn rom them. Szilards colleague Enrico Fermi was granteda brie audience with a military committee, which thought ura-nium could be best used as a new source o power or subma-rines. They sent Fermi away, telling him they would be in touch,yet they distrusted the reugee with the Italian name.

That summer, Szilard was told that the United StatesNavy was at the time unable to support his research on chainreactions because o restrictions on government contracts.Conceding to the reality that the military would not be asource o research unding, Szilard scratched his head. He wasdistressed by the Nazi embargo on uranium. The worlds other

l Sa

Leo Szilard was a Hungarian-born physicist who is creditedwith conceiving the nuclear chain reaction. Szilard was born

in Budapest, Hungary, on February 11, 1898. He studied with

Europes most notable physicists, including Albert Einstein.

In 1933, he fled to London to escape Nazi persecution. In

1938, he moved to New York, where he was hired to conduct

research at Columbia University.

In 1939, he and fellow physicist Enrico Fermi conducted

a successful experiment using the element uranium to trigger

a reaction, that showed significant neutron multiplication and

demonstrated that theoretically a nuclear chain reaction was

possible. Szilard later wrote, We turned the switch, saw the


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signiicant source o the element was in the Belgian Congo. Hedetermined that it was important to warn the Belgian govern-ment not to sell uranium to the Germans. He would have to

do this through the president o the United States, FranklinDelano Roosevelt. But how would a little-known scientist suchas he get the attention o the president? Roosevelt was certainlytoo busy or him. But there was one man he knew could getthe presidents ear: his ormer teacher and collaborator, AlbertEinstein. He also recalled that Einstein was an acquaintance othe queen o Belgium, who was known as Princess Elisabeth oBavaria years beore when she and Einstein had played violintogether in a chamber music ensemble. Szilard was sure Ein-stein would at least listen to his plea.

At the time, Einstein was relaxing at a riends cottagein Peconic, Long Island. Szilard arranged a meeting, and on

Pelude o he Bomb

flashes, watched for ten minutes, then switched everything

off and went home. That night I knew the world was headed

for sorrow.

Prior to the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

Szilard wrote the Szilard petition, which promoted the cause

of demonstrating the atomic bomb to an audience of Japa-

nese military before actually using it. He believed that would

be enough to discourage the Japanese from further fighting.

In the end, President Truman took the advice of his military

advisers and attacked Japan.

After the war, Szilard was so horrified by the atomic bomb

that he gave up being a physicist and turned his attention to

molecular biology.


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the morning o Sunday, July 16, 1939, he and Wigner drove toLong Island in Wigners Dodge coupe. Unable to locate theproperty, they asked several locals where the cottage was, but

no one had heard o it. Then they happened upon a young boy,whom they asked where they might ind Einstein. It seemed

Oe o ma e who led Euope beoe Wold

Wa ii, D. Eo em (above) wa a olleaue o Leo

szlad a columba Uve. Wo oehe, he

veed he wold ulea eao. Lae, em

would be a mpoa ue ea ad e

he aom bomb.


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everyone knew about the great Einstein, even the boy, whopointed them to Old Grove Road.

On vacation, Einstein greeted the men wearing an under-

shirt and a pair o rolled-up trousers. When Szilard explainedhis theory o how a chain reaction could be created, Einsteinexclaimed, I never thought o that! Immediately, he under-stood the great signiicance o such a discovery and agreed todo anything he could to convince the U.S. government o thedangers o allowing the Germans to lead the way in develop-ing the technology rom which an atomic bomb could be built.In his book The Manhattan Project, Daniel Cohen noted thatSzilard wrote, Einstein was willing to assume responsibilityor sounding the alarm even though it was quite possible thatthe alarm might prove to be a alse alarm. The one thing mostscientists are really araid o is to make ools o themselves.Einstein was ree rom such a ear and this above all is whatmade his position unique on this occasion.

Though Einstein recognized the importance o sounding

the alarm, he was reluctant to trouble the queen o Belgium. Atthe same time, Wigner questioned the wisdom o sending sucha letter to a oreign government. At last, the three conspiredto write a letter to Roosevelt. Einstein dictated the letter inGerman, which Wigner took down in longhand. In the letter,he explained that he understood the brutality o the Nazis andthat the United States should take any measures necessary toprohibit them rom gathering the worlds supply o uraniumand developing an atomic bomb.

Still, there was the problem o bringing the message to thepresidents attention. Even though the United States was notyet directly involved in the war in Europe, the president hadhis hands ull with all that was going on there. Szilard calledon an old riend rom Berlin, who called an acquaintancenamed Alexander Sachs, an economist who was a riend o the

president and who in the past had advised him on economicpolicy. Szilard met Sachs, who immediately agreed to lend hisassistance. Szilard drated the inal letter, reining Wigners

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dictation o Einsteins letter, and on October 11, ater Sachs hadinally convinced Roosevelts aides that his news was worth anhour o the presidents time, he was led into the Oval Oice.

During the weeks leading up to the meeting, Sachs hadspent considerable time strategizing his pitch. He knew themeeting was the one chance he would have to convince the

president to take action. So when Roosevelt greeted him, hewas well prepared. He began by telling the president a story

Whe Leo szlad waed hm o he pobl o he naz

oba uaum ad ea a upebomb, Ee mmedael

eozed he dae o he uao. He ad aohe e,

D. Euee We, ued Ee eaoal ame ad

epuao o ale Pede rooevel o he mplao o

u uh a weapo.


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about a young American inventor who had written NapoleonBonaparte, the great French emperor rom 1804 to 1814, witha resh idea. The inventor knew Napoleon had been unable to

invade England because his navy could not solve the trickytides and currents o the English Channel, which lies betweenFrance and England. He proposed a leet o boats without sailsthat could attack England in any weather. Napoleon was unim-pressed with the idea and dismissed the man. The inventor

was Robert Fulton, inventor o the steamboat, which became acommercial success. The story served to warn President Roos-evelt that he would be wise to approach the inormation Sachshad come to bear with an open mind.

In true presidential ashion, Roosevelt handed a note toan aide, who returned a short time later with a rare bottle oNapoleon brandy and two glasses. As the two men sipped theexpensive brandy, Sachs presented his own version o the issue,describing the potential uses o nuclear energy and expressing astrong belie that a bomb o untold potential would one day use

nuclear ission. In The Manhattan Project, Daniel Cohen wrotethat Sachs told the president there was no question that one dayman would control almost unlimited power. He quoted Sachs assaying, We cannot prevent [man] rom doing so and can onlyhope that he will not use it exclusively in blowing up his nextdoor neighbor. According to Cohen, Roosevelt grasped theurgency o the issue and responded, Alex, what you are ater isto see that the Nazis dont blow us up. This requires action.

This was the chain o events that led to a government-authorized plan to develop the atomic bomb. Ater the UnitedStates was attacked at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the plan wasdubbed the Manhattan Project, named ater the New York Cityborough where early research on the atomic theory had beencarried out. The project would cost an estimated $2 billion andcontribute not only to the end o World War II (19391945)

but also to the United States prominence as a world power ordecades to come.

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Wold Wa ii wa a ue wold wa. h

took place all over the globe, on land and on sea.Bloodshed occurred in Asia, Arica, Europe, and

in the Middle East. More than 30 million lives were lost. Cities

were destroyed, and empires crumbled. As a war, it changed thecourse o history. As a historical event, it changed the way wethink about humankinds capacity to destroy one another.

Rarely are wars caused by a single event. Instead, theyare typically the result o a series o events or conditions thatcollectively lead leaders to perceive their nations are underthreat. This was certainly the case with World War II, andto understand the origins o the war, it is helpul to reviewthe events that preceded it during the early part o the twen-tieth century. In particular, it is important to consider howmeasures to prevent another major war rom happening aterWorld War I actually created conditions ideal or a large-scale, worldwide conlict.

politiCAl leFtoverS

It is easy to see how the war in Europe grew directly romWorld War I (19141918). In what was called The Great

t os fWa e


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23the O o Wa Euope

War, the Allied powers o Great Britain, France, ImperialRussia, and the United States deeated the Central powers,led by Austro-Hungarian, Germany, the Ottoman Empire,

and Bulgaria. World War I was a global war that wroughtdevastation, even among the victors. More than 9 millionsoldiers and civilians lost their lives during the conlict. The

war caused the destruction o our world empires: Ottoman,Austria-Hungary, Imperial Russia, and Germany. Followingthe war, the victors drew up an agreement that disbanded theold world order and, through the Treaty o Versailles, threwGermany into economic ruin.

The treaty, signed on June 28, 1919, marked the oicial endto the war. But it was not until six months later, at the conclu-sion o the Paris Peace Conerence, that the inal details o theagreement between both sides were worked out. The Treatyo Versailles included provisions that required Germany topay reparations, or damages, to countries it had ought. Theseprovisions were controversial insoar as they served France,

who wanted to punish Germany, while ignoring the wishes oBritain, who wanted Germany to remain a strong economicorce in order to balance the strong position o the French. TheUnited States simply wanted long-term peace and compensa-tion or its wartime expenditures. President Woodrow Wilsonthought Germany should be punished, but he believed tooharsh a punishment would push the Germans into rebellionand a possible second world war. Wilsons point o view wouldprove insightul over the years to come.

The Germans were outraged at the agreement. They eltthey had neither started the war nor lost it. They understoodthe Paris Peace Conerence as a peace conerence, not as anact o surrender. They were so angry with the pressure romother world powers to sign the treaty that they sank their ownships in protest. Top government oicials resigned, and the

new government, named the Weimar Republic by historians,assumed leadership. Under this governance, Germany was to


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operate as a liberal democracy. Ultimately, the endeavor ailedwith the ascent o Adol Hitler and the Nazi Party.

A WAr oF ideologieSWorld War II was ought or several reasons, including eco-nomic and territorial. But rom the perspective o all inter-ested parties, the single most important issue at stake or theUnited States and its Allied partners was the preservationo democratic ideology rom the threat o Fascism, an ideol-ogy embraced by the Germans, Italians, and Spanish. Witha democracy, the power o a nation is spread among electedrepresentatives o the common people. With Fascism, a strong,centralized government controls power. In essence, Fascistsbelieve the good o the state is more important than the goodo the individual. They also believe war is a natural character-istic o a prospering nation. Fascists in Germany even went soar as to believe that people with Aryan eatures, such as theEnglish, Germans, and Scandinavians, are superior to other

races, such as Aricans and Jews.Fascism rose rom the chaos that enguled Europe ollowing

World War I, particularly among nations whose economies andgeneral way o lie had been severely disrupted due to the sanc-tions imposed by the victors. Many common citizens in Ger-many, Italy, and Spain craved order and stability, and thus theyembraced the organization and security Fascism promised.

MuSSolini And the QuiCkriSe oF FASCiSM in itAlyWhile the Nazis were establishing a irm oothold in Germany,a similar dictatorial political movement was gaining momen-tum in Italy. Italys economy took a turn or the worse ol-lowing World War I, and power-hungry politicians seized theopportunity to convince the population that better times lay

ahead. As with Germany, political powers in Italy attemptedto establish a liberal democracy, but members o the rapidly


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growing Fascist and Socialist parties resisted their eorts.King Victor Emmanuel III was pressured to choose a politi-cal leader rom one o these two competing parties. He gave

Benito Mussolini, who had risen rapidly through the ranks othe Fascist Party, permission to orm a government.

The Fascists used propaganda and intimidation to pro-mote their agenda, which valued nationalism, socialism, andstrict adherence to rules. Mussolinis Blackshirts, a privatearmy o ormer soldiers, rounded up the dictators enemiesand political opponents, many o whom were murdered. The

the O o Wa Euope

thouh oe ad popaada, Beo Muol ew popula

wh he iala mae. gve he powe o om a ew iala

oveme wh h a pa, Muol (center) ued a

oup o ome olde o o-am dde ad e h

h o domao.


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country saw progress, as there were noticeable improvementsin industry and civil services, such as the transportation sys-tem. But the political corruption that grew out o Fascist Italy

was problematic, and rather than solve internal problems,Mussolini looked outside o Italy or new conquests that wouldcement his popularity.

hitler And the riSe oF nAziSMOver the next 15 years, while the Weimar Republic attemptedto cultivate a air, democratic government, other German lead-ers stewed as their country suered through what they elt

were undeserved hardships. In addition to the economic hard-ships mandated by the Treaty o Versailles, these leaders wereangry at the ormer government or surrendering. They wereespecially angry with the men who proited rom the war byselling weapons and who controlled the availability o weaponsto the German army. They believed that the war was theirsto win until the arms dealers cut o their supply o weapons.

Many o these weapons dealers were Jewish, and soalongwith a history o anti-Semitisma strong resentment towardall Jewish people began to grow among a action o these lead-ers. This was the basis or the rapid rise o the Nazi Party ando the man who would become their leader: Adol Hitler.

Hitler rose to prominence in the 1920s and was namedchancellor in January 1933. He built support among Germanleaders by playing to their sense o nationalism. He made thembelieve that i Germany was ever to regain power it would haveto do so on its own terms, by the sheer will o its people, who

were undoubtedly the most capable in the world. He convincedthem that the stronger the national identity, the stronger thenation. Anyone who expressed even the slightest doubt in thesuperiority o Germany would be pushed aside or eliminated.

He wasted no time exerting his new authority. He began at

once to cancel civil and political liberties. By March 1933, hepassed the Enabling Act, transerring all legislative powers to


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27the O o Wa Euope

t Ba f h

Hitlers vision for Germany was centered on a master raceliving in wealth and comfort. At the outset of World War II, he

had two goals that would contribute to the realization of this

vision: one, to create a racially pure German population, and

two, to establish a new home for Germany, expanding its

borders into Europe and Russia. As the German army began

its campaign to expand its borders, the Nazi Party began itscampaign of genocide.

Hitlers quest to cleanse the German race of unsound

elements began with a program designed to eliminate Ger-

manys disabled population. As a result, between 75,000 and

250,000 physically and mentally disabled people were killed.

Hitler was especially intent on exterminating Jews because he

believed they were the root of all evil in the world. Under his

direction, the Nazis developed The Final Solution to the Jew-

ish Question, a plan to systematically exterminate the Jewish

population in Europe. By early 1942, the first extermination

camps had been built, and Operation Reinhard began. Jew-

ish citizensmen, women, and childrenwere taken from

their homes and shipped by train to concentration camps,

where they were shot in groups or led into large rooms filled

with poison gas.Hitlers strongest supporters in this plan and the two

men who were credited for managing the Nazi concentra-

tion camps met their ends after Germany surrendered. Adolf

Eichmann, found hiding in Argentina, was brought to Israel,

where he was tried for war crimes and executed. Heinrich

Himmler committed suicide when he was captured by the

British army near the end of the war.


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Hitlers cabinet. He then began to eliminate opposition withinthe Nazi Party. Anyone who questioned his authority or who sup-ported socialism (in this case, meaning a government that served

the people) more than they supported German nationalism (agovernment that served the interests o German leaders) waskilled. In August 1934, when the president o Germany, Paul vonHindenburg, died, Hitler eliminated the oice o the presidentas well as his own post o chancellor. He replaced these oices

with a single oice, a dictatorship, and declared himsel Fhrer,or leader, o a new order, which he called the Third Reich. Withull command o Germanys government and military, Hitler wasin prime position to carry out his master plan.

JApAn BeCoMeS MilitAriStiCWhile Fascism took a oothold in Europe, unrest was brewingon the other side o the world. Traditionally, the Asian powerso China and Japan had resisted Western expansionism. Bothcountries had long been centers or European trade, oering

spices, silk, rice, tea, and other goods or European-madegoods such as cloth and machines. Japan saw the threat oEuropean expansion into Asia and adopted a national policythat would ensure its place as a world power.

By the time World War I began, Japan had already begun aprogram o expansion into a world colonial power. Because thesmall country had ew natural resources, its military leadersbelieved expansion was necessary even to deend Japan againstits longtime enemy, China, as well as the European powers.During World War I, Japan ought on the side o the Allies,

which included France, Great Britain, Russia, and the UnitedStates. Following the war, Japans leaders elt that Allied del-egations treated them as an inerior country and did not givethem the rewards they deserved. They were equally oendedin 1922, when the Washington Naval Conerence proposed the

size o Japans leet be smaller than the leets o Great Brit-ain and the United States. The perceived arrogance o these


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29

nations would become an important actor in turning Japanrom riend to oe.

Although Japan prospered economically immediately ol-

lowing World War I, the 1923 Tokyo earthquake signaled anabrupt change. The earthquake leveled the capital city, killingsome 140,000 people and disrupting services and industriesthat aected the entire island nation. This natural disas-ter, coupled with the worldwide economic depression o the1920s and 1930s, triggered a shit in Japanese politics. While

Japan had been working toward establishing a democracy, itsmilitary leaders began to gain power within the government.These individuals were too impatient or democracy and eltthere should be a government ocused on expanding Japaneseinluence and controlling the raw materials o its neighbors.

In 1931, Japanese troops invaded Manchuria, in northernChina. They easily conquered the region and were met withno resistance rom the United States, European powers, or theSoviet Union. In 1934, the Japanese government set orth the

Amau doctrine, which declared that Japan controlled Chinaand its resources. Japanese military leaders grew bolder andbolder, until in 1937 Japan invaded China itsel in an attemptat all-out war. The Japanese Imperial Army quickly built areputation as barbaric and violent, as it looted and burnedthe city o Nanjing and raped and murdered its inhabitants inan attempt to intimidate the countries that neighbored Japanrom resisting uture attacks.

The United States and the United Kingdom turned theirattention to supporting China via loans and covert militaryassistance. They instituted embargoes on raw materials, includ-ing oil, hoping to starve Japan o resources. Japan reacted withaggression. It declared war on territories rich in resources, suchas the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and the Philippines. The

Japanese elt the Dutch and British governments were too busy

with the war in Europe, that the Soviets were stressed by theirconrontations with Germany, and that the United States would

the O o Wa Euope


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Hle (left, with German president Paul von Hindenburg) wa

able o ue h oaoal ll o whp he gema publ o

a ez o aoal ad aal pde. Whe he aumed ulmae

powe a Fhrer, he bea o expad gema bode whle

mpleme pla o ehall leae he populao o

gema ad he e o Euope.


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31

not be ready or war or some time. Thus, the Japanese begantheir great expansionist endeavor, the Greater East Asia War inthe Paciic, more commonly known as the Paciic War.

hitler And MuSSolini in SpAinIn 1936, at about the time that physicist Leo Szilard took thatateul London walk during which he envisioned an atomicreaction, Spain saw a shit in power when a group o let-wingpolitical parties took over. This progressive group was sup-ported largely by radicals, Communists, and anarchists. Therelatively conservative army then rebelled against the coun-trys new leaders. These army rebels were under the commando General Francisco Franco and were supported by SpainsFascist Party, the Catholic Church, and a large part o themiddle class. The result was a civil war between the adherentso two political ideologies o Communism and Fascism.

Hitler and Mussolini, being anti-Communists themselves,saw an opportunity to get involved with the Fascist cause and

came to the aid o Francos Nationalist Party. Hitler sent tanks,aircrat, and 10,000 troops. Mussolini sent 50,000 troops.While Hitler and Mussolini hoped to gain an ally in Franco,they also saw an opportunity to give their armies real-worldexperience with war as well as to demonstrate the capabilitieso the German air orce. O particular note was the bomb-ing o the Basque village o Guernica, which suered vastcivilian casualties and near total destruction. This bombingdemonstrated the power o the German air attack as well asHitlers blatant disregard or civilian lie. According to somehistorians, the air attack on Guernica intimidated Europespolitical leaders, who ound even more reason to avoid war

with Germany and Italy.

gerMAn expAnSioniSM

Once the Nazis had established a strong oothold among theirown people, they turned to the rest o the world. On March16, 1935, Hitler ordered Germany to rearm. Government arms

the O o Wa Euope


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spending increased by 70 percent, and much o Germanysworkorce was put to work producing battleships, submarines,tanks, and warplanes. These acts were in direct violation o

the Treaty o Versailles, which mandated that an active Ger-man army was orbidden by international law. Hitlers boldmove was met with almost no resistance. In act, the British,sympathetic to Germanys struggle under what they believed

were the Treaty o Versailles too-harsh restrictions, signedthe Anglo-German Naval Agreement, authorizing Germanyto construct a leet no larger than one-third the size o theBritish Royal Navy. The agreement included a provision in

which the Royal Navy would cease its operations in the BalticSea, eectively handing the territory to Hitler.

Germany immediately moved into the Rhineland and inNovember 1936 signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan,in which the countries ormed an alliance against the SovietUnion and Communism in general. Italy joined the alliance in1937. Bolstered by the support o Japan and Italy, Hitler ound

himsel in position to expand German inluence in Europe.While both Japan and Italy allied with Germany simply toexpand their colonial possessions, Hitler had a much grandervision. He wanted Germany to rule the world. In his book TheCauses of World War II, author Paul Dowswell stated that Hitlerbelieved the execution o a two-stage plan would accomplishGerman rule. In the irst stage, Germany would regain theterritories it lost as a result o the Treaty o Versailles as wellas expand into Europe. Once Germany controlled eastern andcentral Europe, it would have plenty o coal, iron ore, oil, andmanpower to build a war machine that would allow him toachieve his stage-two goals. In stage two, he would build anempire to the east o Germany or his master race.

In March 1938, German troops marched into Hitlershomeland, Austria. Hitler immediately annexed Austria, mak-

ing it a province o Germany. Hitler viewed the annexationas a test o Europes reaction to his violations o postWorld


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33

War II treaties. Sensing the British and the French wouldnot interere with his aggressive moves, he set his sights onCzechoslovakia, a small country that had alliances to both

nations. While France and Great Britain eyed the dictatorwith reservation ater he took Austria, neither country elt the

the O o Wa Euope

Eve houh Hle deed he Vealle tea b emlaz

gema ad aex Aua ad czeholovaa, Ba

ad ae wee elua o he pobl o o o wa

b ad up o Hle. th map how he exe o Hle

expao houh 1939.

to Hungary,

1938

to Hungary,March 23,

1939

Knigsberg

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

OF POLAND


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need to intervene. They believed he was marching in his ownbackyard and did not represent a threat to their own planso colonization. But when Hitler began his plans to invade

Czechoslovakia, Europes two main powers grew concerned.

An AgreeMent For peACeBritains prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, and Francesprime minister, douard Daladier, suddenly recognized thatNazi Germany was once again a threat. They wanted to main-tain the prestige they had gained as European powers and holdGermany rom eating into their share o Europe, but they wereill-prepared to back their policies with orce. While Hitler wasbuilding a massive army in Germany, their countries werenot prepared or war. The awul memories o the slaughter oWorld War I were still resh in the minds o their publics, who

wanted to avoid another war at all costs. As well, both countriessaw Nazi Germany as a potential ally against the CommunistSoviet Union. They believed the best course o action was a

plan o appeasement, which meant they would allow Germany,which they believed may have been unairly sanctioned underthe Treaty o Versailles, to reclaim the territories it had lost, solong as Germany agreed to expand no arther into Europe.

Chamberlain and Daladier called a meeting with Hitlerin Munich, Germany, in September 1938. During this meet-ing, the parties agreed that Germany was entitled to theSudetenland, which was the portion o Czechoslovakia that

was home to many German-speaking supporters o Hitler. Inreturn, Hitler agreed that Germany would make no additionalterritorial claims in Europe. This agreement was satisactoryto Chamberlain and Daladier because they could do nothingto stop Hitler rom taking the Sudetenland. The agreement

was popular among both the British and the French. WhenDaladier returned rom the meeting, he was greeted by a hal-

million supporters; and Chamberlain in turn was hailed as ahero, claiming triumphantly that he had achieved peace in


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35

our time. But all too soon, events would take a dramatic turn.In March 1939, just a ew months ater the Munich agreement,Germany marched into Prague, the capital o Czechoslovakia,

breaking Hitlers pact with France and Great Britain and set-ting the world on edge.

Meanwhile, in the United States, Leo Szilard continued toreine his theories. When he was not scribbling igures intonotebooks, he was writing letters to colleagues in an attemptto recruit them to join his team. He also kept pressure on theadministration to come through with unds to support theresearch. The act that he was an ocean away rom the conlictdid nothing to diminish the urgency o his work.

the O o Wa Euope


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36

Du he 1930, he mood he Ued sae

was staunchly antiwar. The ailure o World War Ito create democracy in Europe was in the ront o

peoples minds. In addition, some public opinion held that

America had been dragged into World War I by arms manu-acturers and business opportunists seeking proits, and noone wanted to repeat that scenario. Consequently, Congresspassed a series o acts that prohibited American governmentand American businesses rom selling arms to oreign nationsor rom lending them money to buy arms. By creating suchacts, Congress eectively prevented the United States romgetting involved in the Spanish Civil War or rom deendingEthiopia rom Mussolinis invasion in 1935.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt understood the antiwar sentiment among Americans. Oceans separated Americarom Europe, the Soviet Union, and Asia. Natural resourcesand the means to manuacture them into inished goods wereplentiul in the vast country. There was a eeling o isolation-ism within the country, o wanting to leave the ugly conlicts

to other countries while America went about its own business.Respecting this eeling, Roosevelts public strategy was to isolate

t Cflctas Sa


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37the co tae shape

ga ifma

A pws:

Soviet Union

United States

United Kingdom

China

France

As pws:

Germany

Japan

Italy

ima las

Joseph Stalin: Soviet Union

Franklin Roosevelt: United States

Harry S. Truman: United States

Winston Churchill: Great Britain

Chiang Kai-shek: China

Charles de Gaulle: France

Adolf Hitler: Germany

Hirohito: Japan

Benito Mussolini: Italy

A Casas

Military dead: More than 14 millionCivilian dead: More than 36 million

Total dead: More than 50 million

As Casas

Military dead: More than 8 million

Civilian dead: More than 4 million

Total dead: More than 12 million


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Europes Fascist dictators rom the beneit o American trade.Yet even this mild intererence with European aairs ruledthe eathers o Americans. All along, Roosevelt knew that at

some point the United States would have to rise to the occasionand oer help to the European nations ighting Hitler, but orthe time being, he kept the American troops at home and madeno public measures to prepare or war.

into polAndFollowing Hitlers blatant disregard or the Munich agree-ment, both Great Britain and France reluctantly begandiscussions with the Soviet Union about entering into anagreement. Prior to Hitlers invasion o Prague, the Englishand the French eared the Communist Soviet Union evenmore than they eared Germany. Both nations mistrustedthe Soviets and elt they had little to gain with an alliance.Nonetheless, they began talks with the Soviets in the sum-mer o 1939, only to have the negotiations end when little

progress was made. At the same time, Nazi oreign ministerJoachim von Ribbentrop initiated discussions with his Sovietcounterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov. Molotov knew the Germansplanned to invade Poland and was eager to orm a productivealliance, despite the dierence in the two countries politicalideologies. On August 24, 1939, the nations signed a treatythat stipulated neither would attack the other. As part othe agreement, the Soviets would supply Germany with rawmaterials in exchange or weapons. Germany would also havecontrol o west Poland, and the Soviets would gain controlo Finland, the Baltic States, and east Poland. When Hitlerlearned the agreement had been reached, he was certain thatneither France nor Great Britain would intervene with hisplanned invasion o Poland. He immediately sent tanks andtroops to the border to await his command.

By invading Prague and western Czechoslovakia and ly-ing in the ace o the Munich agreement, Hitler humiliatedboth Britain and France. Yet Hitler had not recognized his


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39the co tae shape

i sepembe 1939, he sove Uo ad naz gema pu ade

he deee o eae a ea ha uaaeed wa upple ad

eoe. Pa o h ea luded a aeeme ha allowed

boh oue o vade Polad.Above, gema ad rua

oe ae pa a eemo eleba he ew bode ha

a houh Polad ad made gema ad he Ussr ehbo.


41/129


political error in slighting these European powers. They weredetermined to crush the Nazi dictator at any cost. At the time,the three powers were o about equal military strength. France

and Great Britain realized that i Germany were allowed to takePoland, it would be much stronger than them. Both nationshad also made agreements with Poland that they would attackGermany i Poland was invaded. Having built up their armiesover the year, France and Great Britain were prepared to takemeasures to stop Germany rom additional aggression.

Nonetheless, Hitler read things dierently. He believedthat the lack o intervention rom Europes great powers whenhe invaded Prague was an indication o their unwillingnessto deend the rest o eastern Europe He was made even moreconident by Germanys pact with the Soviet Union. Hitlerbelieved that the power and orce o the German army intimi-dated Europe and France and that neither country wouldinterere with his plans. On September 1, 1939, German troopspoured over the border and into Poland. The news came as

no surprise to world leaders, who had long been expectingthe volatile Hitler to cross the line with yet another act ounwarranted aggression. On September 3, France and GreatBritain declared war on Germany. I Hitler was worried abouthis young German army butting heads with the worlds twogreatest empires, he did not show it. The German army rolledthrough Poland, using its blitzkrieg tactics (precise, swit, andviolent military oensives supported by intense aerial attacks).Within a month, Poland was Hitlers.

FrAnCe And greAt BritAin reSpondThough neither France nor Great Britain had wanted to engagein war, Hitlers blatant aggression let them little choice. Theyknew the German dictator would not stop at Poland, and

within their respective countries, they intensiied preparations

or the ight. While some historians argue that even at thetime their armies were strong enough to deeat the Germans,


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41

Hitler had so thoroughly convinced the world that his orceswere stronger than they were that neither country positionedits armies or battle.

By this time, British prime minister Neville Chamberlainhad been pushed out o government in disgrace. The Britishparliament elt he had greatly mistaken his inluence over Hit-ler and that he was too sot a leader to make the hard decisionsthat were part o a wartime government. In his place, WinstonChurchill stood as the new prime minister. Churchill had longbeen outspoken about the treatment o Hitler. He elt the Ger-man dictators deiant behavior should have been dealt with ear-lier. He was a brash, outspoken leader who would become one othe greatest heroes o British history. Churchill was described asa leader whose time had come. Indeed, he realized the time wasnear when British soldiers would ind themselves in battle.

In April 1940, the German army suddenly attacked Norwayand Denmark, which were quickly conquered. Then, in whathas been described as a military masterpiece, Hitler attacked

France. The French had expected Hitler to attack through Bel-gium. But Hitler outwitted the French military leaders and senthis troops through the Ardennes Forest, which lay arther tothe south and was thought to be impassable. French and Britisharmies ought the Germans in Belgium, while larger numberso Germans poured through the Ardennes and straight into theFrench capital o Paris. Though the German army was stretchedthin at this point, their rapid attack overwhelmed the French.The French government agreed to let Hitler occupy hal oFrance, while they governed the remainder o the country. This

was known as the Vichy government, named ater the smallcity o Vichy, which became the new French capital. When theItalian dictator Benito Mussolini joined Hitler, sensing a Ger-man victory and eager to share the spoils, French morale sank.Within weeks, France surrendered.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the nuclear project waso to a slow start. But soon ater France ell to Germany,

the co tae shape


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the U.S. government inally approved unds or Leo Szilardsresearch on chain reactions. The experiment Szilard suggested

was actually designed by Enrico Fermi. A team o scientists

would test Szilards theories by creating a sel-sustaining reac-tion at the atomic level. Szilards team began work at once todesign and create materials or the experiment.

rooSevelt WorrieSAmerica viewed the events in Europe with alarm. Still, Roos-evelt heeded to public opinion and kept the United States outo the war. He was worried about Japan, which he knew wantedto become the most powerul country in Asia and eared wouldtake advantage o the instability in Europe to meet its goals.At this time, Japans government was being gradually replaced

with more aggressive, militaristic leaders. Roosevelt con-vinced Congress to authorize a large sum o money to doublethe navy and to pass the Selective Training and Service Act,

which would allow men to be drated into the military. He also

oered Great Britain the Lend-Lease program, whereby theUnited States loaned the British 50 retired navy destroyers inexchange or a lease on naval bases in the Caribbean Sea. Inshort, he prepared America or war and lent assistance to GreatBritain without actually entering the war. Meanwhile, in Sep-tember 1940, Japan signed an alliance with Germany and Italy,creating the Axis powers that would come to be the collectiveenemy o the Allies. This worried Roosevelt even more. Hitlerhad proven to be much more than a mere nuisance in Europe,but Japan was the greater immediate threat to America. Inact, by the spring o 1941, U.S. intelligence had learned that

Japan was planning an attack in the Paciic sometime atermid-November. Exactly where and when they did not know.

the u.S. under AttACk

On the morning o December 7, 1941, minutes beore 8:00,hundreds o Japanese planes, launched rom aircrat carriers at


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a devastating loss or the American navy, and the attack sentshock waves through the public that are still elt to this day.

The United States immediately declared war on the Axis

powersGermany, Italy, and Japan. Pearl Harbor broughtthe horrors o the war home, and the American people wereorced to recognize the reality o the situation: They wouldhave to ight back. Considering the U.S. military was unpre-pared to enter the war, there was a lot o work to do. Once

Js hw SsWas pa hab?

Ever since the 1930s, when the United States imposed tradeembargoes on Japan to discourage the Asian nation from con-

tinuing its aggressive expansion into Manchuria and French

Indochina, tensions began to build between the two countries.Wary of a possible attack, the U.S. Navy had in place a plan

to defend its westernmost bases, including Pearl Harbor. Why,

then, were the Americans unprepared for Japans attack?

U.S. military intelligence indicated a growing hostility in

Japan toward America. Even the American newspapers car-

ried stories about the escalation of tensions between the two

countries. In late November, Pacific commands were warned

explicitly that Japan was expected to attack any day. Why did

the navy not try harder to protect Pearl Harbor?

At about 7:00 A.M. on the morning of December 7, 1941,

two radar operators noticed an unusually large blip on their

radar screen. When they called headquarters to report

their findings, they were told not to worry. Why did military


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In the midst o all this chaos, Szilard and his team o scien-tists worked in secrecy. On December 2, 1942, they carried outthe experiment that demonstrated the basic principle o a sel-

sustaining chain reaction. (This event is described in detail inChapter 6.) The physicists were well on their way to the nextstep in the development o the atomic bomb.


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47

A a eul o he devaa aa o Peal

Harbor, the United States began manuacturingast ships that were eective in combating subma-

rines. Strategies or transporting goods were also modiied

so that ships traveled in large groups, or convoys, escortedby destroyers that could deend the reighters against attackrom the sea and air. These measures proved successul atprotecting ships and also at sinking German submarines. Asthe German navy suered submarine losses, it pulled back inorder to protect its leet.

Meanwhile, the Alliesthe United States, Great Britain,France, and Russiaknew that an all-out assault on the Ger-mans to recover France was necessary. Roosevelt and Churchillagreed that France took priority over Japan. First, the Allies

would need to suppress German threats in other areas o theWestern world. At this point, the British were ighting theItalians in the North Arican deserts, and the Russians werebusy deending their border against the Germans. Stalin, too,

wanted the Allied troops to attack France in order to relieve

the pressure rom the Russian ront, but Allied commanders

t Wa e


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decided that the irst priority was to run the Germans out oNorth Arica. I the Allies controlled North Arica, the Ger-mans would not be able to retreat in that direction once the

Allies began pressuring them rom western Europe, and theGermans would not be able to access oil and other suppliesrom Arica and the Middle East. Most important, the British

would retain control o southern Europe, the MediterraneanSea, and the Suez Canal, which was immensely important totransportation lines between Britain, India, and Australia.Allied commanders devised a plan that called or Americantroops to assist the British in taking back North Arica. OnceNorth Arica was secure, the Allied troops would move northinto Europe.

the deSert WArThe North Arican Campaign o World War II, more com-monly known as the Desert War, took place in the desert oNorth Arica. It began in June 1940 and ended in May 1943.

On September 13, 1940, 200,000 Italian troops invaded Egypt,which at the time was held by the British. As the Italians setup a deense beore moving inland to capture more territory,the Allies launched a counterattack, designated OperationCompass. The British Western Desert Force marched acrossLibya, ighting the Italians along the way. Although they wereoutnumbered 200,000 to 35,000, they surprised the Italianarmy, which surrendered in its entirety. It was the irst oicialbattle in the North Arica campaign and a stunning victory orthe British Western Desert Force.

The military action created a ront at Al-Agheila, a coastalcity at the bottom o the Gul o Sidra. As the British WesternDesert Force sent most o its soldiers to retake Greece rom theGermans and Italians, word o its phenomenal victory over theItalians reached Germany. Hitler immediately sent reinorce-

ments to aid the Italians. Field marshal Erwin Rommel andthe Deutsches Arikakorps (German Arica Corps) arrived


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49the Wa Euope

to rescue to the Italians. Nicknamed the Desert Fox or hiscunning strategies in tank warare, Rommel was a shrewdcommander. Ordered to hold his position at Al-Agheila, he

saw the opportunity to exploit the British position, and herecaptured the ground the Italians had lost during OperationCompass. As a result o the arrival o the Deutsches Arika-korps, the Allies sent the British Eighth Army, a multinationalcollection o troops rom Australia, New Zealand, India, andSouth Arica, to ight the German orces. These orces wereled by General Bernard Montgomery. Over the next two years,Montgomery and Rommel engaged in a battle o wits in theNorth Arican desert.

the MAnhAttAn proJeCtFindS A neW hoMeThe year 1942 saw dramatic changes or the atomic bombprogram, which in 1941 had been given the name the Man-hattan Project. Up until that point, the physicists had orga-

nized the work. But the U.S. Army thought it was time to stepin to run things and make sure the work got done eicientlyand with a minimal risk o espionage. The army appointedGeneral Leslie Groves as the director o the operation.Knowing nothing about physics or, or that matter, scientists,Groves immediately began a search or a go-between, some-one who could manage the physicists while he took care ologistics. Groves hired Robert Oppenheimer, a wiry, youngphysicist with a reputation or unusual brilliance. Grovesknew Oppenheimer was knowledgeable about all scientiicaspects o the project and that he would be the glue to hold itall together. More important, Oppenheimer had the respecto the other scientists.

During the autumn o 1942, Groves and Oppenheimerled a team o army personnel in search o a suitable spot

or the Manhattan Project. They needed a wide-open space,preerably on a hilltop so the area could be easily protected


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rom intruders or attacks. It had to be ar enough away romtowns, just in case something went wrong and to maintainsecrecy. Ater weeks o searching remote areas o New Mex-

ico, Oppenheimer suggested they visit a place he had knownas a boy.

The Los Alamos Ranch Boys School was a school whosemission was to toughen up city boys. Oppenheimer, who hadsuered various ailments as a child, was sent to the school asa youngster to build up his strength. Groves ound the site armore suitable than the others they had looked at. The school

geeal Lele gove (right), a Am eee who had

ju hed upev ouo o he Peao, wa

appoed a head o he Mahaa Poje. He hed D. J.

robe Oppeheme (left) a he e deo o he eam,

ad he wo made a ulel pa ha boe uul eul.


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51the Wa Euope

J. rb om

Robert Oppenheimer was a U.S.-born physicist who is bestknown for his role as director of the Manhattan Project. As a

student at Harvard, he majored in chemistry but, unlike most

scientists, immersed himself in a number of widely varying

disciplines, including architecture, art, classic literature, and

Greek. After graduating summa cum laude in three years,

he traveled to Europe to study physics, earning a Ph.D. at22 years of age. During the course of his academic work, he

published more than a dozen important articles that contrib-

uted to the emerging field of quantum theory.

General Leslie Groves took a gamble when he hired

Oppenheimer to direct the Manhattan Project, for Oppen-

heimer had past links to the Communist Party. His mastery of

the various scientific aspects of the project made him, really,

the only man for the job. In fact, the entire period Oppen-

heimer was in Los Alamos, he was under investigation by

the FBI. When questioned about his directors value, Groves

called him absolutely essential to the project.

After the war, Oppenheimer was named chairman of the

General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Com-

mission. Like many scientists at the time, he lobbied for

international arms control. In 1953, the FBI accused himof being a security risk, and he was subjected to a lengthy

hearing on his political views. As a result of the hearing,

his security clearance was revoked. Many members of the

scientific community saw him as a martyr who was unfairly

attacked by paranoid conservatives with political power.

Stripped of his political influence, Oppenheimer traveled the

world as a lecturer.


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had allen on hard times in recent years and was eager toexplore a buyout. In November, the U.S. government began tobuy up pieces o the property. All in all, they paid $440,000 or

the land and buildings, as well as 60 horses and assorted class-room materials. The home o the Manhattan Project oiciallyopened on April 15, 1943.

u.S. troopS hit the groundMeanwhile, the irst American troops to engage in combatin the Western Theater landed in North Arica in November1942 to join British orces. Unortunately or the Allies, there

was little organization among their ranks, and the Americantroops were not yet battle-experienced. On January 23, 1943,Montgomerys Eighth Army captured Tripoli and cut oRommel rom his main supply base. When the 5th PanzerArmy encountered the Allies on January 30, the Allies wereoverrun and suered many losses. Tunisia ell into Germanhands. With nowhere else to go, the U.S. 1st Armor Division

retreated to the Kasserine Pass, which would be easier todeend. Because o poor tactics, they soon ound themselvestrapped. British and French troops came to their rescue, andthe Allies were able to prevent the Germans rom advancing.While the Panzer divisions easily deeated the Americans,they also spread themselves thin along a longer and longerbattleront. Fearing the battle line would be broken, Rommelretreated to orm a strong deense. A U.S. air attack drovehim out o the pass, which once again ell into the hands othe Americans.

By March 1943, the 8th Army had reached the Tunisianborder, using the U.S. II Corps as a pincer to trap Rommel andhis army. They squeezed the Axis orces, which surrenderedon May 13, handing the Allies more than 275,000 prisoners o

war. The loss o so many experienced soldiers was a big blow

to the Axis powers.


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north to itAlyAter driving the Germans and Italians out o Arica, the Alliesset their sights on Italy. In July 1943, the Italian Campaign was

launched with the Allied invasion o Sicily, an Italian-heldisland o the coast o mainland Italy. Allied orces provedto be too strong or the Italian soldiers. A string o deeatsled the Italians to grow distrustul o Hitler. Italian leadersturned away rom their loyalties to Mussolini and began tosupport the king, who eventually ordered Mussolini to resign.Pietro Badoglio succeeded Mussolini and immediately began

negotiating surrender with the Allies in Italy. An armistice,or temporary suspension o hostilities, between the Allies andItaly was signed September 3, 1943. The Germans, however,knew the Italians would surrender and sent in orces to occupythe northern part o the country.

Mussolini, who had been arrested by the new government,was rescued by German special orces and was placed as heado a new German state in northern Italy called the Italian

Social Republic. As the Allies continued to ight their waynorthward, Italians overthrew the Italian Social Republic onApril 25, 1944. Mussolini was captured by these Italians and,along with his mistress, executed by machine gun and hungupside down rom a street lamp. The Germans retained con-trol o northern Italy until the end o the war, but by mid-1944,Italy was no longer a actor in deciding the outcome.

MerChAnt Shipping in the AtlAntiCDuring the course o World War II, one o the most hotlycontested areas was the Atlantic Ocean. From early on, theAllies knew the key to holding Britain was shipping. The Brit-ish war machine required guns, planes, tanks, ships, and oil.The British people needed ood and other raw materials tosustain industry. Britain produced only one-third o the ood

it required and relied on imports or the rest. Germany did its

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best to cut o the shipping lanes through which vessels carry-ing goods to Britain traveled. The Allies quickly realized thati they were going to win the war, they would have to control

the Atlantic.The Allies planned to support merchant ships with naval

escorts and air support. There were two problems with thisstrategy. Battleships were in short supply, and planes did nothave enough range to cover the Atlantic without having toturn back to their bases to reuel. Thus, a vast portion o the

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Atlantic was unprotected by airpower. In addition, the Ger-mans had lethal submarines, called U-boats, that lay in waitor British ships. They could ire torpedoes and retreat into

the depths, undetected.During the early part o the war, the German U-boats

were nearly unstoppable. British convoys, typically totaling4050 merchant ships and escorted by a ew naval ships, werevulnerable. Large numbers o merchant ships were sunk by U-boats at a great cost o ships and the lives o those who sailedthem. However, several technological developments duringthe course o the war made it diicult or the U-boats. One othose developments was sonar. The Allies used sonar to detectthe noise made by the U-boats when they ired torpedoes.Sonar allowed them to estimate the location o a U-boat, at

which point warships would drop underwater bombs, calleddepth charges, with the hopes o disabling the enemy subma-rines. Another development was the small aircrat carrier, aship with a built-in airstrip rom which planes could take o

and on which they could land. Armed with their own small airorces, British ships could attack both U-boats and Germanships rom any location in the Atlantic.

As the war progressed, Britain and the United States sup-plied more naval ships to escort merchant shipping. Planes

were built to hold more uel, extending their range andenabling them to protect shipping convoys deeper into theAtlantic. By 1944, when the Allies planned an invasion omainland Europe, the Allies had sunk most o the GermanU-boats and battleships, making the journey rom America toBritain a relatively sae trip.

prepArAtionS For theBAttle oF norMAndyBy May 1944, the Allies had driven the Italians and Germans

out o North Arica. Italy had no strategic importance. Thebeaches o England were secure. The vast majority o German

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troops were positioned on the eastern ront, where they engagedthe Russians in a long, brutal campaign. For the Allies, thenext logical step was to send troops into mainland Europe to

take back France. Because most o the German troops wereighting the Russians, only 400,000 Germans guarded FrancesAtlantic coast. In contrast, the Allies oered 120 divisions thattotaled more than 2 million soldiers. Most were American,

with about 600,000 British soldiers and a smaller number oCanadian, French, and Polish troops. Until this point in the

war, most o the ighting in Europe had taken place betweenthe Russians and the Germans on the eastern ront. By sendingmasses o troops and equipment to western France, the Allies

would create a second ront. The hope was that the second rontwould draw German troops away rom the battles with the Rus-sians, spreading them thin and making them more vulnerable.It would also enable the Allies to squeeze the Germans romboth the east and west.

Prior to the invasion, the Allies had heavily bombed Ger-

man industry, crippling their enemys capacity to replenishaircrat, ships, tanks, and small arms. In essence, the Ger-mans would have to ight the remainder o the war with whatthey had. Still, Allied commanders realized the diicultyin overrunning a German army that had established eec-tive deensive positions along the coast o France. So in themonths preceding the invasion, the Allies began a campaigno deception to trick the Germans. They created a ake opera-tion they hoped would convince the Germans they would irstattack the Balkan Islands or the Pas de Calais. They also ledthe Germans to believe they would attack Norway so that theGermans would send troops there to deend their holdings.The Allies positioned double agents within the German ranksto eed alse inormation. They also placed dummy tanks andlanding crat along the ports o eastern Britain, which they did

not protect with planes, enabling German pilots to photographthem. In addition, they sent radio broadcasts o static noise so


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that the Germans would spend their resources trying to decodewhite noise and distracting them rom the actual invasion site.The night beore the invasion, Allied planes dropped dummy

paratroopers over Le Havre and Isigny, drawing the Germansto ocus on those areas. That night, they also dropped a largenumber o tinoil strips in the ocean 15 miles rom Le Havre.The oil would show up on enemy radar and lead the Germansto believe a small convoy o ships was heading there.

U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower would command theoperation. The troops would be supported by 6,900 ships andlanding crat and 12,000 aircrat, mostly bombers. In the initialphase o Operation Overlord, the Allies would land at severalbeaches along the Normandy coastline and establish deensivepositions. It was hoped they would secure the beaches andthen bring in two artiicial harbors, called Mulberry harbors,that would make it easier or supply ships to dock close to thebeach, where they could quickly unload supplies or the invad-ing orces. They also planned to install a series o underwater

pipes to carry uel rom Britain to the invading orces.Eisenhower had chosen the night o June 5 or the assault.

Typically, the weather on the Normandy coast turned or the worse in June. It was oten cloudy and oggy, and the seasgrew rough. Because the brie window o avorable weatherhad closed, the Germans did not expect the Allies to attack.When June 5 arrived, the weather prohibited an attack. Alliedcommanders eared the weather would hold and urther delaythe operation, but the next day, the skies had cleared justenough to make an air attack easible. On the morning o June6, 1944, Operation Overlord began.

d-dAyThe day began with heavy airborne landings by the U.S. 82ndand 101st Airborne Divisions and the British 6th Airborne

Division. Paratroopers jumped rom planes to landing sitesinland rom the coast and attempted to secure areas toward

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which troops landing on the beaches would drive the Ger-mans. The night beore, battleships and troop carriers sailedrom Britain across the English Channel over rough seas. Most

o the soldiers suered seasickness as they sailed through thenight. As they neared the coast o France, the ships unleashedtheir big guns on the German artillery.

The ships anned out over ive beaches: Sword, Juno, Gold,Omaha, and Utah. Most Allied troops were quick to establisha solid deense and keep the Germans at bay. But the Ameri-can orces landing on Omaha Beach hit a wall o Germanury. Omaha Beach was the most heavily ortiied o the ivebeaches, and German gun placements were well protectedrom Allied air strikes. The initial landings suered heavycasualties. Almost every soldier was gunned down as soon ashe disembarked the landing crat and ran onto the beach. Oth-ers were shot in the water or drowned under the weight o theirheavy loads. More than 3,000 American troops were killed onOmaha Beach in the span o the irst day o the invasion. Still,

the carriers unloaded troops.Finally, a small group o survivors, hiding behind the

barbed wire and wooden obstacles placed by the Germans,established a small, secure area where tanks and armoredvehicles were able to land. These vehicles helped in providingcover ire, and eventually the Allies were able to saely land anumber o troops. These were able to assault the German gunplacements and, ater a long, bloody battle that saw many casu-alties on both sides, take control o the beach. Many o thesegun placements were perched atop steep clis, and the only

way to reach them was by climbing ropes.By the days end, more than 150,000 Allied troops had

landed on the beaches. The initial stage o the operation wasa success. From there, the Allies ought their way east towardcentral France. By August 6, they had reached the Seine River

and were in a avorable position to retake France.


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The invasion o Normandy is considered the best-plannedmilitary operation o World War II. Despite the large numbero Allied casualties, the deeat was more costly to the Germans,

who relinquished vital ground as they retreated toward Ger-many. The Soviets beneited rom the landings as well, as largenumbers o German troops were withdrawn rom the easternront in an eort to contain the invaders. German morale wasvirtually destroyed, as Axis commanders watched their armiesconronted on two sides by strong Allied orces. To many, thesuccess marked the end o the war or Germany. From thatpoint on, it would be only a matter o time beore the Alliesoverran Germany.

the WeStern FrontBy August 1944, the Allied orces in Europe had spread outacross France in attempt to establish a western battle line. TheFrench Resistance, a group o armed French citizens who sab-otaged Nazi occupation orces in Paris and in the surrounding

countryside, rose up against German troops and aided in gain-ing the liberation o Paris on August 25, 1944. As Allied orcesmoved toward Germany, they encountered logistical problemsthat slowed their advance. They were still being supplied viaNormandy, which meant that uel and other necessities otenarrived in a trickle. Aid came when the Canadian 1st Armycleared the entrance to the port o Antwerp, Netherlands, inNovember 1944 to help speed up the supply o Allied troops.Things were going well or the Allies. In October, Americanscaptured the city o Aachen. The Allies elt the war would beover beore winter.

Hitler was not ready to give up his quest to rule Europe.He had been planning a major counteroensive against theAllies. His sights were set on Antwerp, the Belgian port recentlysecured by the Allies. His intention was to disrupt the supply

line to the Allies and thereby demoralize them to the point that

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Allied leaders would be orced to negotiate. He sent his bestorces through the Ardennes in southern Belgium, a heavily or-ested region where the Germans had been victorious in 1940.

the BAttle oF the BulgeOnce the Allies had retaken France and crossed the Germanborder, they were preoccupied with planning and preparingor oensive strikes. Hitler took advantage o this weaknessas well as o the Allies overconidence. He knew they believedthey would end the war beore winter, and he thought thattheir oensive-minded tactics would put them at a disadvan-tage should he attack. Plus, his armies were no longer deend-ing Europe. They were more concentrated and closer to theGerman border, making resupply easier than it had been inthe past. Now it was the Allied orces that were spread romFrance to the Netherlands. In total secrecy, he and the Germancommand planned an attack on Antwerp.

His goal was to cut o the Allied supply lines and to divide

the enemy army in hal, attacking and encircling the Ameri-can armies and orcing the Allies to negotiate a peace treaty inavor o the Axis powers. During the resulting lull in ighting,he believed the Germans would produce more advanced weap-ons such as jet planes and heavier tanks. In hindsight, Hitlersview could not have been less realistic. Although he believedAmerican troops were poorly trained and had little resolve, inactuality they were the strongest and the most readily rein-orced or replaced troops on the battleield.

The surprise attack ell upon the U.S. 1st Army, whichguarded the weakest section o the Allies line. In act, Alliedintelligence considered the Ardennes a quiet spot and evenused the area or the training o new troops. Thus, many o thesoldiers in the immediate area were inexperienced in combator battle-weary troops who were sent there to recover. I Hitler

had been wrong about the overall strength o the Americanorces, he was right about this weak link.


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On December 16, 1944, the 6th SS Panzer Army let loosetheir artillery on Allied troops. By 8:30 a.m., all three Germanarmies had attacked. The 5th Panzer Army, which attackedin the middle, killed at least 7,000 Americans. These orces

advanced, pushing the middle o the battle line orward, creat-ing a bulge. It was not until the next day that Eisenhower

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realized the Ardennes was a major oensive. Within a week,250,000 troops had been sent as reinorcements. Once the

weather cleared, the Americans were aided by air strikes. While

they were holding their newly won territory, the German orces were depleted. They turned to tactics o disruption, such asdressing soldiers in American uniorms and iniltrating thembehind Allied lines. Many o these were captured and spreaddisinormation about German tactics. It was clear the Germans

were desperate, yet they continued to ight strongly at the centero attack.

With the air assault, the Allies were able to stall the Ger-man advance and eventually drive the Germans to retreat.On January 7, 1945, Hitler ordered the withdrawal o Germantroops rom the Ardennes.

The U.S. orces saw more troops killed in the Battle o theBulge than in any other battle in World War II. They usedmore troops and ought against more Germans than in anyother conlict. In the end, there were 19,000 American dead,

with an estimated 80,000 total casualties. As or the Germans,they had exhausted the last o their reserve troops, and theynever realized their objectives o cutting the Allied orces inhal and negotiating a avorable peace treaty. Their depletedunits retreated.

the WAr in europe endSThe Battle o the Bulge marked the end or Germany. Hitlerstroops had suered more than 100,000 casualties, and theyhad lost at least 600 tanks and 1,600 planes. The actoriesthat produced this equipment had been bombed out o pro-duction, so they had no way o building more. As the Ger-man army retreated rom the west, they destroyed bridgesto hamper the Allied advance. It took the Allies six weeks toreach Germany.

Meanwhile,

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