Granting Human Rights: U.S. Philanthropic Foundations and the Patronage of Rights

Heidi Nichols Haddad Pomona College

June 2016

Prepared for the ISA/IPSA/ECPR/APSA Human Rights Conference, New York

DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION (PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT)

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I. Introduction Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) represent critical and dynamic actors in the

articulation, enforcement, and actualization of international human rights. Their impact ranges

from agenda-setting, developing new norms, crafting international law, raising awareness,

naming and shaming, monitoring, to building the institutional capacity of judicial enforcement

mechanisms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Neier 2012; Teitel 2011; Haddad 2012; Risse, Ropp, and

Sikkink 1999). As such, much of the scholarly attention related to human rights NGOs focuses

on their global influence. This often occurs at the expense of examining the organizational

structure, processes, and material underpinnings underlying the human rights work of NGOs.

Further examination into the relationships between donors and NGOs is particularly

important because research has shown that donor preferences influence NGO agendas, tactics,

and institutional structure and processes. Donor influence affects all types of NGOs including

humanitarian, development, and advocacy NGOs (Cooley and Ron 2002; Berkovitch and

Gordon 2008; Edwards and Hulme 1996). At the most direct level, donors give preferential

treatment to organizations and projects that mirror their agendas and preferred tactics or

approaches. This occurs not only during single grant cycles but changes the future incentives of

organizations to tailor or generate new grant projects that correspond with donor preferences

(Edwards and Hulme 1996; Smith 2014; Bob 2002). Donors can also shape NGOs through

establishing accountability measures on which the grants are conditional. While accountability

metrics allow donors to account for their grant money and evaluate outcomes, they can distort

the organizational structure and processes of NGOs in two ways. First, accountability measures

often require expertise in accounting and results-based evaluation approaches, which can further

professionalize NGO staff or preclude non-professionalized NGOs from receiving grants

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(Markowitz and Tice 2002). Second, accountability measures incentive NGOs to be beholden to

donors, not the communities or partner organizations with which they work (Hwang and Powell

2009; Choudhury and Ahmed 2002). Lastly, the cumulative and simultaneous process of grant

seeking and giving can create negative market outcomes, such as duplication of services, limited

collaboration or institutional sharing, and willingness to compromise organizational principles

(Cooley and Ron 2002).

This paper builds upon the premise that donor preferences can shape the priorities,

projects, and tactics of human rights NGOs by seeking to understand the preferences of one

prominent and understudied source of human rights funding: U.S. philanthropic foundations.

U.S. based philanthropic foundations provide the greatest absolute quantity of private

contributions to human rights organizations.1 Many NGOs that operate transnationally also

consider foundation dollars superior to government foreign aid as the money is less likely to

infer shared governmental preferences or policies, which could adversely affect work abroad

(Gourevitch, Lake, and Stein 2012, 104). This paper examines the human rights preferences of

the MacArthur and Ford Foundations through their historical grant allocations from the 1980s

through the present. Preliminary analysis suggests that the MacArthur Foundation largely

conceptualizes human rights within a U.S. context, where rights are exported and promoted

abroad and global partnerships mirror U.S. foreign policy goals and interests. These findings

have implications for the availability of philanthropic funding for domestic human rights NGOs

from developing countries. Gaining access to crucial philanthropic funding will likely depend

1 Of the top 15 foundations by human rights grant dollars, 13 of the foundations were based in the United States. The total human rights grant allocated by these 13 foundations in 2010 total $597.7 million (The Foundation Center 2013, viii).

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less on the merits of the project, innovation, or severity of the human rights issue, but on

proximity to overseas funding offices.

II. Philanthropic Foundations

Foundations, the State, and Policy Preferences Philanthropic foundations are a product of the excesses of the U.S. industrial age. John D.

Rockefeller established the first foundation in 1919 through a gift of seventy thousand shares of

Standard Oil. The impetus behind constructing such an organization was to distribute the profits

of Standard Oil as charity in order to avoid paying substantial tax payments. At the time,

Rockefeller’s proposal was considered scandalous and the U.S. Congress refused to approve a

federal charter because of concerns over Standard Oil’s monopolistic and anti-union practices

and the undemocratic nature of such a foundation. In response, Rockefeller chartered his

foundation in New York State, which did not include oversight, monetary caps, or any of the

other regulatory measures proposed in the Congress (Reich Undated).

The origins of philanthropic foundations as charitable and government sponsored tax

shields both establishes autonomy from the state and complicates the state in foundation

preferences of what constitutes the public good. On one hand, foundations privatize the public

good by giving a private actor discretion to fund projects that enhance the public good with what

would-be tax revenue (LaMarche 2014). When viewed in this way, foundations have

considerable autonomy from the state and the state conceptions of the public good. On the other

hand, foundations operate at the discretion of the state and must follow rules demarcated in the

tax code, such as not being involved in overtly political activity like campaigns. This is not to

say that foundations constantly fear being shut down by the government but the fact that they can

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be policed by the state may contribute to self-censorship or a level of risk aversion (Heydemann

et al. 2010). Due to the backlash against foundations during the early years of the Rockefeller

and Carnegie foundations, early grants consisted of provincial and largely non-controversial

projects such as eradicating disease, war relief, and establishment of academic initiatives

(Roelofs 2003, 9). U.S. foundations only began working on more controversial issues in the

1960s, which reflected the increasingly activist nature of the state. During this time, the Ford

Foundation expanded spending for “rights for minorities,” which included significant support for

black power projects (Ferguson 2013, 6).

Foundations electing to engage in international work further complicate the dynamic

between foundations and national governments.2 To operate abroad, foundations generally need

permission or special invitation from foreign governments. This is done to mitigate sentiments

that foundations—or their NGO grantees—constitute foreign interferences in domestic affairs

(MacFarquhar 2016). When U.S. foundations first began international grantmaking, significant

deference was given foreign governments. In 1952, Prime Minster Nehru of India invited the

Ford Foundation to set up an office in India. Subsequently, the Ford Foundation mostly financed

projects of the Indian government (MacFarquhar 2016). Apart from government projects, U.S.

foundations also established international studies institutes, which would encourage cultural

diplomacy and facilitate international exchanges of scholars, intellectuals, and prominent

government officials (Bell 1971; Sutton 1968). As the Cold War progressed, this deference to

foreign governments eroded and U.S. foundations were more likely to fund anti-communist

activist groups, organizations, and political parties in opposition to their governments (Berman

1983).

2 Not all foundations choose to operate or fund international grants—usually it is those with the greatest financial endowments (The Foundation Center 2013).

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In addition to relations with foreign governments, foundations have obligations to their

home governments. Foundations must operate with the normative constraints demarcated by the

government, most importantly not to embarrass the government or negatively interfere with

foreign relations (Bell 1971; Heydemann et al. 2010). Thus even without governments dictating

foundation preferences, foundation preferences may converge with those of the government

(Berkovitch and Gordon 2008, 889). Foundations may adopt or mirror government preferences

because of shared geopolitical or ideational outlooks, prior cooperative engagements, or

revolving personnel. For example, John McCloy, a prominent trustee of Ford Foundation in the

early 1960s would “drop by the National Security Council in Washington every couple of

months and casually ask whether there were any overseas projects the NSC would like to see

funded” (Bird 1992, 519). In this way, foundations can amplify foreign policy and soft power,

without serving as direct instruments of foreign policy (Sutton 1968; Nye 2009). Preference

convergence between U.S. foundations and the U.S. government was especially strong during the

Cold War. The Ford Foundation grants mirrored U.S. foreign aid programs that targeted

geostrategic “Third World” countries (Horowitz and Horowitz 1970, 168; Bell 1971, 469). Often

the Ford Foundation would directly collaborate with USAID on projects (Bell 1971). The

blurring of foundation and government preferences reached an apex when U.S. foundations—

including the Ford Foundation—complicity funneled CIA money to global anti-communist

causes (Saunders 2013).

Foundations and Human Rights

In 2010, the grants to human rights projects by the ten foundations with the largest grant dollars

totaled $581.1 million (The Foundation Center 2013, 8). With these large grant figures and the

human rights focus of many large foundations such as the MacArthur and Ford Foundations, it

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would be easy to assume that foundations have always provided financial support to human

rights NGOs. In fact, the consistent material support of human rights NGOs by philanthropic

foundations—and particularly U.S. based foundations—only occurred in the mid-1970s.

Prior to 1975, there were only a few major foundations and these foundations rarely

funded international human rights projects (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 98). During the 1960s and

1970s, foundations financed projects that strengthened the capacity of government

administrations in developing countries. Human rights projects—which targeted states for the

maltreatment of its citizens—were antithetical to the dominant ethos of building state capabilities

among major foundations (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 98). This aversion to human rights projects

by foundations is also reflected in the financing structure of the vanguard NGO of the time,

Amnesty International. Amnesty International did not rely on financial support by foundations or

governments, but received almost all of its operating expenses from dues and donations from its

worldwide membership and donor base (Neier 2012, 189).

Beginning in the mid-1970s, several factors converged that altered the status quo from

membership-based human rights NGOs that did not receive funding from foundations to human

rights NGOs dependent on funding from major international foundations. First, foundations

changed their stance on providing funding for organizations that conducted human rights work

that challenged the state. The major change in policy came from the Ford Foundation and was

prompted by state repression of academic freedom for social science research in Latin America.

In the 1960s and 1970s, several key individuals within the Ford Foundation began to support

social science research in response to state repression in Brazil—and later Chile, Uruguay, and

Argentina. As repressive governments fired academic researchers from university and public

sector positions, the Ford Foundation helped relocate these individuals abroad or set-up new,

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independent academic research centers. The premise behind this support was not human rights

protection, but was rooted in support for academic freedom. Nevertheless, the promotion of

academic freedom and academic institution building can be viewed as the beginning of the Ford

Foundation’s human rights program. The academics supported by the Ford Foundation later

linked human rights activists and organizations from the region in need of financial support, such

as the Vicaría de Solidaridad in Chile, to the Ford Foundation (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 99–101).

In 1979, the Ford Foundation financed several human rights organizations, including Lawyers

Committee for Human Rights, the International Human Rights Law Group and Physicians for

Human Rights (Ford Foundation 2013). In 1981, “human rights and governance” was added as

one of foundation’s main program areas (Ford Foundation 1982).

Second, the establishment of Helsinki Watch and the other “Watch” groups—now known

as Human Rights Watch—represented a fundamental shift in the funding structure of NGOs. The

fact that the Ford Foundation helped establish Helsinki Watch (Neier 2012, 205) created an

alternative funding model than the Amnesty model of depending on membership dues.

Beginning with Helsinki Watch, human rights NGOs could and would seek funding for their

activities from foundations, governments, and private individuals.

Third, the late 1970s and early 1980s not only saw a shift in the funding criteria of the

Ford Foundation to include human rights, but new foundations were established, many of which

mirrored the Ford Foundation and adopted a human rights focus. In 1978, the MacArthur

Foundation was established with a “focus on international justice” and its first grant was to a

human rights organization (MacArthur Foundation 2013a). The following year, George Soros

founded the Open Society Institute (later retitled as the Open Society Foundations) to support

individuals and civil society efforts to open authoritarian governments. At first, the Open Society

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Institute exclusively funded educational programs such as scholarships and exchanges, but soon

expanded its scope to promote rule of law, civil liberties, and protection of minorities. This

expanded scope encompassed funding projects that promoted the human rights of the Roma

populations in Europe and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Open Society

Foundations 2013).

III. Methods This paper explores the historical conceptualization of human rights by two major U.S.

philanthropic foundations: The MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation. These two

foundations are examined for three reasons: (1) they are they are the two foundations with the

longest standing articulated commitment to funding projects related to human rights (2) they are

sustained and substantial funders of human rights grants in terms of absolute dollars and (3) they

are “social justice” foundations that also fund advocacy work as opposed to more development-

focused foundations like Rockefeller and Gates.3 A minor difference between the two

foundations—which has the potential to affect their grant allocation relating to human rights—is

their willingness to allocate large grants to established organizations for general operating

support. The MacArthur Foundation will provide general operating grants, while the Ford

Foundation will not and elects to give smaller grants for specific projects (MacFarquhar 2016).

The primary source used to ascertain how the Ford and MacArthur foundations

conceptualize human rights over time is historical data on grant allocations relating to human

3 The Ford Foundation was the first foundation to give grants to human rights organizations in Latin American in the late 1970s. During the same period, the MacArthur Foundation was founded with a focus on “international justice.” In 2010, the Ford Foundation provided the greatest amount of human rights grants of all worldwide foundations at nearly $160 million. In 2010, the MacArthur Foundation ranked twelfth in amount of human rights grants with nearly $24 million (The Foundation Center 2013, viii)

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rights. The paper uses an original dataset of all grants relating to human rights—either identified

categorically as human rights or having human rights in the name of the organization—compiled

from Ford and MacArthur annual reports.4 For the MacArthur Foundation, there are

approximately 800 grants relating to human rights between 1983 and 2012. (The exact data for

the Ford Foundation is not yet available). Analysis of this data can uncover the imbued

preferences and priorities of the foundations such as location of the grant projects, types of

organizations receiving grants, and kinds of activities supported.

The grant data is also supplemented with the narrative accounts from annual reports,

public statements by foundation officials, and special issue foundation reports.

IV. The MacArthur Foundation The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation was established in 1978 following the

death of John D. MacArthur. At that time, the Foundation assumed his assets, which

approximated $1 billion—generated from MacArthur’s Bankers Life and Casualty insurance

company and his significant real estate holdings. The purpose of the foundation was to “shape a

forward looking organization that could change with society’s evolving challenges.” The mission

has since narrowed to: “The MacArthur Foundation supports creative people, effective

institutions, and influential networks building a more just, verdant, and peaceful world.” During

the leadership of the five presidents, the foundation has emphasized various issues from peace

4 This coding strategy diverges from the criteria established in the groundbreaking report by the Foundation Center and the International Human Rights Funders Group on the trends of global foundation grantmaking entitled “Advancing Human Rights.” The Advancing Human Rights report included all grants that relate to the advancement of human rights broadly defined, even if the grant was not categorized as relating to human rights. This paper only examines those grants which are explicitly categorized as human rights or have human rights in the name of the organization or project description. This allows for the examination of how foundations conceptualize human rights as related to grantmaking.

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and security, global population, ingenuity, to international justice. The foundation is

headquartered in Chicago, with regional offices in India, Mexico, and Nigeria. Currently,

MacArthur holds over $6 million in assets and gives annual grants totally over $200 million

(MacArthur Foundation 2016b).

(Preliminary) Trends Philanthropic foundations are often touted for their autonomy from governments or any other

financial or political pressures (Cain 2016). With this autonomy, foundations should be able to

innovate, veer from established practice, and support projects overlooked by governments or

those that seek to change government policy. In the area of human rights, such innovation and

breaking from standard practice could take many forms such as establishing new enforcement

mechanisms, articulating protections for previously marginalized groups, or promoting second or

third “generation rights.” Data from the MacArthur Foundation show that the foundation has

supported innovation, particularly around the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

Nonetheless, preliminary analysis of the historical human rights grant giving of the MacArthur

Foundation demonstrates that the foundation is not nearly as autonomous or innovative as

theorized. Specifically, the MacArthur foundation has conceptualized human rights within a U.S.

context, where rights are exported and promoted abroad and global partnerships mirror U.S.

foreign policy goals and interests.

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Exporting Human Rights

Between 1983 and 2013, 57% of human rights grant money given by the MacArthur Foundation

went to organizations headquartered in the United States.5 A portion of this money is anchored in

million or multi-million dollar allocations to prominent U.S. human rights organizations,

including Human Rights Watch,6 the World Federalist Movement (which funds the Coalition for

the International Criminal Court), and the Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights. It is not

altogether surprising that a U.S. headquartered foundation would attempt to build a network of

prominent and robust human rights organizations in the United States. What is more puzzling is

the fact that almost none of the human rights grants made by the MacArthur Foundation to U.S.

based organizations are specifically designated to projects related to human rights in the United

States. The majority of money (61%) went to general operations or was unspecified; however,

many of the organizations receiving these operations or unspecified grants do not have robust

U.S. programs (See Figure 1).7 16% of monies went to organizations working to develop

international human rights or criminal law. 13% of the monies went to U.S. based organizations

engaging in human rights projects in Africa. Only 2% of the monies went to programs designated

in the U.S. The U.S. programs are quite diverse: from funding the National Academy of

5 This finding matches that of the Foundation Center’s Advancing Human Rights report. In 2010, 69% or $830 of all human rights grants were awarded to U.S.-based organizations (The Foundation Center 2013, ix) 6 The MacArthur Foundation was a critical to the launching of Helsinki Watch (Neier 2012, 205). 7 Human Rights Watch received the greatest percentage of grants from the MacArthur Foundation that were for general operations or unspecified (nearly all grants exceeded $1 million and were made at least every few years). Since the 1990s, Human Rights Watch has had a United States Program that examines domestic human rights issues. This program is not a dominant aspect of the organization. More broadly, Human Rights Watch views the U.S. government as a potential ally to leverage change on other countries rather than a target of human rights naming and shaming (Neier 2012, 231–32).

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Science’s Committee on Human Rights, studying U.S. military perspectives on the International

Criminal Court, to developing women’s rights programs.

This data suggests that the MacArthur Foundation has historically viewed human rights

as something that happens outside of the United States. U.S. based human rights organizations

can seek to build and advance human rights but their work either occurs in the international legal

sphere or is exported to other countries. Historically, the MacArthur Foundation has allocated

substantial grants to the domestic issues of criminal justice and civil rights. Nevertheless, these

funds have generally not been categorized as human rights work. The only exceptions to this

trend are two grants made in the early 2000’s—one to the Lawyer’s Committee for Human

Rights and the other to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)—to fund programs

supporting domestic civil liberties in the face of terrorism.

This categorization by MacArthur mirrors American exceptionalism arguments that do

not see human rights as applicable to the United States (Ignatieff 2009). Civil and constitutional

rights are within the purview of American domestic politics but human rights are values and laws

to be fostered and exported outside of the U.S. The MacArthur Foundation is not unique in its

reticence to conceptualize its domestic civil rights grantmaking as human rights work. Other U.S.

based foundations are also unwilling to classify their domestic grants as human rights and instead

categorize work as “social justice” or “progressive social change” (The Foundation Center 2013,

7).

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Figure 1: Grant Focus Area for MacArthur Foundation Grants to U.S.-Based Organizations (1983-2013, by dollar amount)

Geopolitics and the Internationalization of Grant Giving

Before the 1990s, all of the human rights grants given by the MacArthur Foundation went to

U.S. based organizations. Following the end of the Cold War, there was an effort by many large

U.S. philanthropic foundations to globalize and increase their grantmaking outside of the United

States (Heydemann et al. 2010). During this time, there was an exponential increase in the

number of NGOs and civil society groups worldwide and many of them were technologically

networked together in ways previously unavailable (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the 1990s, the

13%

40%16%

2%2%2%

21%

Africa Asia “Developing countries”Europe General Operations International Law/OrgsLatin America & Caribbean Middle East RussiaU.S. Unspecified

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MacArthur Foundation reduced its percentage of funding to U.S. organizations to approximately

75% and the 2000’s further reduced it to approximately 50% (See Figure 2).

Figure 2: Percentage of MacArthur Foundation Grants given to Organizations with U.S. Headquarters (1983-2012)

Given the mission of foundations to enhance the public welfare, it is not unreasonable to

assume that foundations seeking to globalize their human rights grant giving would fund

domestic organizations seeking change in areas with the most severe human rights abuses.

During the 1990s and 2000s, this might include the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Myanmar,

Sierra Leone, and others. Instead, human rights grants given to non-U.S. organizations by the

MacArthur Foundation largely cluster around three countries/regions: Russia and the Former

Soviet States, Nigeria, and Mexico (see Figure 3). Together, these three countries/regions

account for 69% of all human rights grant given to non-U.S. based organizations. The remaining

31% is distributed between African countries (excluding Nigeria), Asia, Canada, Australia, the

Middle East, and Latin America (excluding Mexico), with the largest allotment going to

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

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European-based organizations. Put another way, 79% of the funding given to African-based

organizations went to those based in Nigeria. 89% of all funding given to Latin American

organizations was given to organizations headquartered in Mexico.

Why Russia and the Former Soviet States, Nigeria, and Mexico? Disproportionate human

rights grants are allocated to these countries because the MacArthur Foundation has or had

offices in these locations—offices that were set up for different programs but which human

rights initiatives were subsequently added. MacArthur set up an office in Russia in 1992 in

response to the end of the Cold War because of the “emerging opportunities in the former Soviet

Union” (The MacArthur Foundation 1991, 11).8 MacArthur’s initial work in the former Soviet

Union was largely an extension of the anti-communist and pro-democracy work supported

during the Cold War. The Russia Initiative supported Russian pro-democracy organizations as

well as organizations seeking to shape U.S. foreign policy to Russia with regard to political and

economic development and arms reduction (The MacArthur Foundation 1991, 11).9 The Russia

Initiative later expanded to include energy and the environment, law and society, human rights,

and development of independent mass media (The MacArthur Foundation 2016).

The MacArthur Foundation established offices in Mexico and Nigeria in 1992 and 1994

respectively. These countries were selected because they were the focus of the Population and

Reproductive Health initiative. In 1999, MacArthur issued its first grant regarding human rights

to Centro de Derechos Humanos Bartolome Carrazco to provide human rights education to

indigenous communities. In 2009, MacArthur began supporting penal reform in Mexico in

cooperation with USAID (Frey 2015, 136). Because there are limited sources of funding

8 The MacArthur Foundation’s office in Russia shut down in 2015 following the enactment of legal restrictions to limit foreign organizations (Tavernise 2015). 9 Such organizations include the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Alliance later renamed the American Committee on East-West Accord.

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available to Mexican NGOs, both Ford and MacArthur are prominent agenda setters for the

Mexican human rights movements (Frey 2015, 132). Although MacArthur’s Nigeria office was

established in 1994, the first human rights grant was not made until 1999 after the end of the

bloody Babangida regime and the restoration to democracy.10 MacArthur was not the only

prominent donor to Nigerian civil society following its transition to democracy. At this time and

subsequently, Nigeria was viewed as a beacon and role model of democracy for sub-Saharan

Africa (U.S. Agency for International Development 2016; Okeke 2015). USAID also resumed

funding for Nigeria in 1999 and since then, Nigeria has consistently been in the top ten in terms

of absolute dollars of USAID funds received.11

10 The grant was made to the Community Action for Popular Participation to engage in human rights education. 11 See aid distribution map at www.foreignassistance.gov.

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Figure 3: Headquarters Location for MacArthur Foundation Grants Made to Non-U.S. Based Organizations (1983-2013, by dollar amount)

V. Next Steps

The next stage of this project is to complete the analysis of the historical grant data of the Ford

Foundation. The data from the Ford Foundation is categorized in a much less hierarchical

manner, and includes less description of the grants than that of the MacArthur Foundation. It

therefore requires more extensive investigation and coding. Based on the results of the

comparison between the Ford and MacArthur Foundations on their historic articulation of human

rights, the paper would likely take two different paths. If the comparison demonstrates sharp

contrast between the Ford and MacArthur Foundations then the paper would investigate why this

6% 2%

20%

2%

16%22%

31%

Africa (excluding Nigeria) AsiaAustralia CanadaEurope Latin America (excluding Mexico)Mexico Middle EastNigeria Russia and Former Soviet States

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is case. Possible explanations could include organizational structure, values, and leadership. If

the Ford and MacArthur Foundations look mostly similar in how they conceptualize human

rights, then the paper could add non-U.S. headquartered countercase(s). Possible foundations to

include are Sigrid Rausing Trust of the United Kingdom or the Oak Foundation of Switzerland,

assuming access to grant data. Either option would include interviews with past and current

foundation personnel.

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