Some IVotes OR Gramsci's Theory o f the InteZZeetuaZs 29

A change i n the organisa t ion of knowledge was a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r an expansion of democracy. P o l i t i c s i n t h i s view of a s o c i a l i s t soc i e ty does not disappear but is transformed. Cruc ia l t o understanding e x i s t i n g forms of p o l i t i c s is a concrete study of the i n t e l l e c t u a l s and fundamental t o the c r e a t i o n of a f u l l y developed democracy, of a s o c i a l i s t soc i e ty , was a transformation of t h e i r r o l e .

Re ferenees Gramsci, A (1965),

Gramsci, A (1971), Wishart.

Gramsci, A (1975),

Gramsci, A (1978), and Wishart.

Marramao, G (1977)

Letters de l carcere . Turin, Einaudi.

Se lec t ions from t h e Pr i son Notebooks. London, Lawrence and

Quaderni del carcere , Vol I - I V . Turin, Einaudi.

Se l ec t ions from P o l i t i c a l Writings, 1921-1926. London, Lawrence

, In t roduct ion t o Austromarxismo e social ismo d i s i n i s t r a f r a l e due guerre . Milan, La P i e t r a .

Paggi, L (1974), In t roduct ion t o Max Adler. 11 social ismo e gli i n t e l l e t t u a l i . B a r i , D e Donato.

Razeto Migliaro, L and Misurance, P (19811, "Theory of Modern Bureaucracy" i n Showstack Sassoon (1981).

Showstack Sassoon, A (1980), Gramsci's P o l i t i c s . London, Croom H e l m .

Showstack Sasson, A ed (1981), Approaches t o Gramsci. London, Writers and Readers Publ ishing Cooperative.

Showstack Sassoon, A (198la) , 'Pass ive Revolution and the P o l i t i c s of Reform' i n Showstack Sassoon (1981).

Vacca, G (1976), 'L'occasione "Pol i t iecn ico" (Note s u a lcuni elementi d e l l a p o l i t i c a c u l t u r a l e d i T o g 1 i a t t i ) ' i n Lavoro c r i t i c o , V o l 5 , Yan-March.

Vacca, G (1977) 'La "quis t ione po1i t ica"degl i i n t e l l e t t u a l i e l a t e o r i a d e l l o S t a t o n e l pensiero d i Gramsci', i n P o l i t i c a e s t o r i a i n G r a m s c i , Vol I , ed by Franco Ferru. Rome, E d i t o r i R i u n i t i . (A shortened vers ion i n Showstack Sassoon, 1981).

Vacca, G (1979), 'La teoria de l socialismo i n G r a m s c i ' . Unpublished paper.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GRANT CONSOLIDATIO~ AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF I ~ ~ T E ~ ~ O V E ~ N ~ E ~ T A L RELATIONS I N THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOPI' €D~ARD PAGE

The d i f fe rence between the intergovernmental f i n a n c i a l systems of t h e United Kingdom and the United S t a t e s l ies less i n t h e amount of money sub-national governments rece ive from n a t i o n a l o r state l e v e l s than i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of gran ts . In both coun t r i e s , l o c a l governments receive around 48 per cent of t o t a l revenue from intergovernmental g r a n t s , w h i l e i n the United S t a t e s , S t a t e governments rece ive 28 per cent of t h e i r tdal revenue from g ran t s . The way i n which grants are d i s t r i b u t e d has important implicat ions f o r r e c i p i e n t s which do not need rehearsing here; they include effects upon the f i n a n c i a l behaviour of l o c a l and s t a t e governments; on how funct ions a re c a r r i e d out and how sub-national governments conduct themselves with r e spec t t o wider proceduies such a s race r e l a t i o n s and c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n .

One common assumption i n both t h e United S t a t e s and the United Kingdom is t h a t gran ts which a r e less s p e c i f i c i n the types of a c t i v i t y they f inance o f f e r sub-national governments more 'autonomyt or d i s c r e t i o n than grants which are

20 EciSard Page

highly ta rge ted on s p e c i f i c programs o r narrower aspec ts of a p a r t i c u l a r se rv ice ; f o r example, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relat ions (ACIR) t a l k s of t he 'devolution of au tho r i ty ' which r e s u l t s from General Revenue Sharing o r block grants (1979, p 61). Ashford i n B r i t a i n , argues t h a t : 'were the c e n t r a l government i n t e n t on manipulating l o c a l expendi ture , it would have ample f inanc ia l inf luence. However, .,. it does not appear t h a t c e n t r a l support is used t o forec lose choice and pa r t i c ipa t ion wi th in the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . A s a general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of na t iona l pol icy towards l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , such an e f f o r t would probably be coupled with increased use of s p e i c i f i c g r a n t s ' . (1974, p 309)

While i t i s not t o be doubted t h a t , o the r things being equal the more s p e c i f i c t he g ran t , the g r e a t e r t h e inf luence grant donors may e x e r t over r e c i p i e n t s , a l l o the r th ings can never be held equal , This paper argues that gran t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s cannot be seen a s an independent in f luence on the na ture of intergovernmental r e l a t i o n s . Ins tead , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of g ran t s are embedded i n a wider system of the organisat ion of na t iona l government and i t s r e l a t ionsh ip with sub-national u n i t s i n which the independent r o l e of gran t is empir ica l ly weak. While much of t h e debate about gran t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s takes the form of an examination of t he e f f e c t of gran ts on intergovernmental r e l a t i o n s , i t i s more accurate t o argue t h a t a c e r t a i n t y p e d grant characterist ic emerges from a c e r t a i n p a t t e r n of r e l a t ionsh ips between na t iona l and sub-national governments.

I f one looks a t the development of t he gran t s y s t e m s , one f inds t h a t g ran t s , f a r from causing change, a r e themselves consequences, a t least i n p a r t , of changes i n intergovernmental r e l a t ionsh ips . The change examined i n t h i s paper looks a t t h e consol idat ion of gran ts . According t o the terminology employed i n t h i s paper, a ca t egor i ca l g ran t is one which is given f o r a narrow range of funct ions o r programmes; t h i s would include t h e Rent Rebate Subsidy i n B r i t a i n and the Venereal Disease Prevention g ran t s i n the United S t a t e s , A bleck grant covers a r e l a t i v e l y broader range of s e r v i c e s , such as the Transport Supplementary Grant i n B r i t a i n , o r the Safe S t r e e t s grant i n the United S t a t e s ( f o r a discussion of block grants i n the United S t a t e s , see ACIR: 1977). A general g ran t is one which is provided t o cover a broad range of s e rv i ces such as the Rate Support Grant i n B r i t a i n , o r t h e General Revenue Sharing grant i n t h e United S t a t e s . In t h i s paper consol idat ion is used t o descr ibe the broadening of the scope of a c t i v i t i e s t o which the gran t r e f e r s ; i , e . t he changeover from ca tegor i ca l t o block and general g ran ts .

Taking f ede ra l g ran ts t o states and locali t ies, David McKay sees t h e development of consol idat ion i n the 1960s and 1970s as being of profound s igni f icance t o the intergovernmental f i n a n c i a l sys t em of t he United S t a t e s (1980, p 58). Beginning with t h e Par tnersh ip f o r Health gran t i n 1966, a number of major block g ran t s were introduced i n the period t o 1977; Safe S t r e e t s , T i t l e XX Soc ia l Services , Antirecession F i s c a l Assis tance, Comprehensive Emp~oyment and Training and Housing and Community Development. I n addi t ion t o t h i s , i n f i s c a l 1973, s t a t e and l o c a l governments received a t o t a l of s i x b i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n General Revenue Sharing grants . While i n 1966 99.5 p e r cent of g ran t s t o states and l o c a l i t i e s were i n the form of ca t egor i ca l g ran t s , by 1978 only 76 per cent came from ca tegor i ca l s , while 15 per cent came from block and 9 per cent from General Revenue Sharing g ran t s .

However, desp i te these f i g u r e s , consol idat ion i s showing few s igns of endurance; ca tegor ica ls a r e es t imated t o account f o r 82 per cent of t o t a l gran ts again i n f i s c a l 1981. Two th ings are happening t o consol idated g ran t s i n the United S t a t e s . F i r s t , block grants and General Revenue Sharing a r e being squeezed by i n f l a t i o n . For example, i n 1981, General Revenue Sharing w i l l amount t o 6.9 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s a s aga ins t 6.1 b i l l i o n i n 1974; the Par tnersh ip f o r Health Program has &veloped from 'g i an t t o pygmy' (Sternberg and Walker, 1977). with i t s d o l l a r value ac tua l ly being reduced by more than ha l f i n 1981 over its h ighes t d o l l a r value i n 1976. In s h o r t , although only one consol idated grant (ARFA) has ac tua l ly been discont inued, and the constant doubts raised 8 b O U t many of t he o t h e r s have stopped s h o r t of d i scont inua t ion , where gran ts have grown s ince 1978 i t has come through the expansion of ca t egor i ca l s , w h i l e block grants have not been expanded once they have been introduced.

Grant Conso Zidation and the Deve Zopment of Intergovernmental Relations i n the United S ta tes and the United Kingdom

21

Second, t he re has been a ' r eca t egor i sa t ion ' of block g ran t s ; i .e . ' s t r i n g s ' , t h e absence of which is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of block g ran t s , have been introduced t o l i m i t the type of spending the gran t should cover. T h i s development has been more marked i n Safe S t r e e t s , Comprehensive Employment and Tra in ing and Par tnersh ip f o r Health than i n o t h e r programmes; 'The earmarking of a s s i s t ance ca tegor ies within the gran t o r t h e establ ishment of ca t egor i ca l s around i t have been a f a c t of l i f e w i t h which m o s t block grant adminis t ra tors have had t o reckon' (Sternberg and Walker, 1977, p 57; see a l s o A C I R , 1977).

In England and Wales (and s i m i l a r developments a r e t o be found i n Scotland) grant consol idat ion represents a more gradual progression. There may be some doubt a s to whether the 1888 Goschen 'ass igned revenues' cons t i t u t ed a general g ran t (see Schul tz , 1948; Webb, 1911), however, these formed a small and decreasing por t ion of l o c a l government g ran t s &round the tu rn of t h e century. 13 per cent of g ran t s t o governments were i n the form of general g ran ts ( f igu res taken from Rhodes, 1976). The 1929 reforms consol idated a number of g ran t s i n t o a general g ran t , so t h a t i n 1931 35 per cent of g ran t s received by l o c a l governments w e r e not ass igned t o s p e c i f i c s e rv i ces . T h i s percentage decreased i n t h e next 25 years due t o the addi t ion of ca t egor i ca l g ran ts f o r newly expanding se rv ices such as l o c a l government midwifery provis ion . Most important ly , t h e 1929 grant consol ida t ion excluded education g ran t s . The 1958 Act c r e a t i n g t h e General Grant brought education i n t o a consol idated g ran t , and i n 1960, 68 p e r cent of l o c a l government g ran t s were general g ran t s . In 1978 86 p e r cent of gran ts were general g ran t s (RSG).

The i n t e r e s t i n g p a r a l l e l between t h e move t o consol idat ion i n both England and Wales and the United S t a t e s i s t h a t i n both count r ies it is associated w i t h attempts t o reduce the amount of money t h a t t he f ede ra l o r c e n t r a l government pays out t o sub-national governments i n g ran t s . In the United S t a t e s , revenue shar ing , o r i g i n a l l y proposed a s ' add i t iona l money' f o r s t a t e and l o c a l governments, soon became assoc ia tdd w i t h , a t l e a s t under Nixon, s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r e x i s t i n g grants (Dommel, 1974). Mushkin a l s o notes t h a t ' a t t i m e s t h e block grant f o r a broad program has been urged pr imar i ly a s an economy measure, t h a t i s , a s a way t o reduce t h e f ede ra l share of t h e costs of a s p e c i f i c program' (1960, p 206). One reason f o r t h i s may be put forward. I t is p o l i t i c a l l y easier f o r c e n t r a l government t o cut a general g ran t s ince the c l i e n t groups a f f ec t ed are not clearly defined i n the g ran t , i n s t ead i t passes the task of s p e c i f i c a t i o n of c u t s t o another l e v e l of government.

In the United Kingdom the Treasury has been a prime mover i n the reform of the g ran t s system f o r s imilar reasons of reducing demands upon the Exchequer. In the 1929 reform debate the Treasury had unsuccessful ly attempted t o abol i sh the whole system of percentage grants f o r s p e c i f i c s e rv i ces s ince i t ' t akes away from the S t a t e t h e power very l a r g e l y t o reduce expenditure ' (nhodes, 1976, p 111). Where a percentage of a s e rv i ce i s funded, t h e Treasury cannot be Sure of the f i n a n c i a l commitments i n terms of gran t u n t i l t he end of t he f i n a n c i a l year . Undm,aprcentage grant sys tem t h e t o t a l g ran t given t o l o c a l governments depended upon l o c a l government expendi ture . Webb's study (1911, pp 20-21) argues t h a t i t i s a ' n a t u r a l desire' of t h e Treasury t o have grants paid a s a f ixed sum d i s t r i b u t e d on the basis of 'mechanical' formulae. This quest ion w a s not resolved u n t i l 1958. Although t h e Treasury r o l e i n t h e 1958 reforms were not as g rea t as i n 1929, i t was i n f l u e n t i a l i n the f i n a l proposals drawn up by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government; t h e Treasury supported any at tempts t o consol ida te t h e g ran t i n 1958, as it had proposed i n 1929, since t h i s made the g ran t more comtrol lable (Rhodes, 1976, pp 132-134).

The p rec i se reasons f o r the lack of enthusiasm for gran t consol idat ion i n the United S t a t e s and t h e a t t r a c t i o n of consol idat ion i n the United Kingdom depend upon the p a r t i c u l a r gran t programme examined. Spec i f i c f e a t u r e s of the proposed grant programme, the na ture and s t r eng th of ideologica l commitment as w e l l as organised i n t e r e s t s , t h e c l i e n t e l e a f f ec t ed by the g ran t s , the process of l e g i s l a t i o n , the pos i t i on of t he na t iona l economy, f o r example, a l l have had e f f e c t s on the f a i l u r e o r success of a t tempts t o provide money f o r consol idated

In 1914,

22 Echard Page

grants . i n the United S t a t e s , and one which has some p a r a l l e l s i n the barriers t o consol idat ion i n B r i t a i n u n t i l 1958, is the ex is tence of powerful func t iona l 'fiefdoms' i n Washington focused upon Congressional committees and sub-committees.

The c lose network that e x i s t s among congressional committees, branches of t h e f ede ra l bureaucracy and i n t e r e s t groups defined along more o r less s p e c i f i c func t iona l l i n e s has been discussed elsewhere (Heclo, 1977; Seidman, 1975). The r e l a t ionsh ip between these powerful po l icy communities and the f a i l u r e of ca tegor i sa t ion i n the United S t a t e s is simply t h a t the ca t egor i ca l g ran t allows the s p e c i f i c func t iona l po l icy communities i n Washington t o spec i fy more p rec i se ly the range of a c t i v i t i e s which its money should be financing. (1960) argues t h a t it is imperative for the success of bargaining f o r a gran t tha t t h e ca t egor i ca l shou=.not be too s p e c i f i c and a l i e n a t e p o t e n t i a l supporters , too l i t t l e s p e c i f i c i t y would f a i l t o a t t r a c t advocates. involves reducing the p robab i l i t y t h a t t h e grant w i l l go towards f inancing the type of a c t i v i t i e s i n which members of the pol icy sub-communities have an i n t e r e s t . I t a l s o reduces the accountabi l i ty of s t a t e and l o c a l governments t o the pol icy sub-system i n Washington, Sharing ' . . . t h i s is money that does not requi re accountabi l i ty ... I n the revenue shar ing area, nobody can say t h a t the money goes t o t h e needy, nobody can say t h a t it goes to a s p e c i f i c usefu l purpose, because nobody knows where it goes. Nobody can t e l l us ' .

In B r i t a i n , both major consol ida t ion reforms were achieved only a f t e r departmental oppos$,&n t o the p r inc ip l e of re lax ing t h e d iscr imina t ing inf luence of fe red by ca tegor ica l g ran ts was overcome. In 1929, the proposal t o include education and po l i ce gran ts i n t o the block grant were abandoned due t o s t rong departmental opposi t ion (see Rhodes, 1966, pp 113-114). The 1958 A c t , which brought education i n t o a general g ran t came after a change i n the a t t i t u d e of the Ministry of Education to having ca t egor i ca l s merged i n t o a consol idated grant . fundamental quest ion about the development of intergovernmental f inance i n the United S t a t e s and the United Kingdom. What had changed by 1958 i n B r i t a i n t h a t had not changed from t h e poin t of view of the Washington pol icy sub-system? Even i f one argues t h a t t he American pol icy sub-systems are more powerful than Whitehall departments, departmental opposi t ion managed t o delay t h e process of grant consol idat ion f o r more than ha l f a century; i n 1899 the ' h a b i t of piecemeal l e g i s l a t i o n engrained i n our l e g i s l a t i v e and adminis t ra t ive bodies ' (Barnstaple, 1899, p 542) seemed l i k e l y t o prevent any grant consol idat ion. Why d id departmental opposit ion t o consol idated g ran t s wane i n B r i t a i n , while i n the United S t a t e s it has so f a r been powerful enough not only t o block conscitldation proposals (see Dommel, 19741, bu t also t o s t o p the growth of e x i s t i n g consol idated grants by squeezing them and reca tegor i s ing them?

The answer t o t h i s is p a r t l y suggested by G Rhodes commenting on the acceptance of the block grant p r i n c i p l e by t he Ministry of Education i n 1958; 'it had evolved a system of adminis t ra t ive con t ro l s which enabled it t o inf luence l o c a l au thor i ty programs q u i t e apar t from the s p e c i f i c form of the education g ran t ' (1976, p 134). T h i s suggests t h a t i n order f o r pol icy sub-systems to r e l inqu i sh t h e discr iminat ing inf luence over where c e n t r a l government money is spent a t t k e sub-national l e v e l through changing grant f m s , there must be a high degree of c e r t a i n t y t h a t the general or block grant w i l l be used t o promote the type of se rv i ce t h a t t he pol icy sub-systems seek t o promote. T h i s should not be taken a s arguing t h a t there is 'no f e d e r a l inf luence ' i n t h e United S t a t e s or ' t o t a l c o n t r o l ' i n the United Kingdom. Rather, i t i s t o say t h a t o the r cons t r a in t s on l o c a l governments emerged i n B r i t a i n alongside t h e growth i n t h e gran t sys tem, so t h a t s p e c i f i c g ran t s became less necessary i n t h e inf luenc ing of l o c a l s e rv i ce de l ivery - indeed, their ex is tence w a s a burden t o the Treasury. In the United States, federal inf luence , where it i s exerted, is still pr imar i ly , although not exc lus ive ly , l inked t o the s p e c i f i c i t y of g ran t s ; according to Key ' f ede ra l con t ro l of state ac t ion is. then, i n essence, the con t ro l which comes from earmarking appropr ia t ions ' (1937, p 378).

Perhaps the most p e r s i s t e n t reason f o r t h e f a i l u r e t o achieve consol idat ion

While Moneypenny

To conso l ida t e ' a gran t

A s Senator Proxmire commented on General Revenue

This raises one

Grant Consolidation and the Development of I n t e ~ g o v e ~ ~ ~ n t a ~ ReZations i n the United States and the United Kingdom 23

The types of changes in the intergovernmental system in the United Kingdom can be given only in the briefest of outline here. First, the development of legislation. It does not require a blind acceptance of 'excessive legalism' to suggest that laws and regulations can impose real constraints and obligations upon local governments. One might argue that there are more areas in which central government takes an interest and places more obligations on local government through legislation. One could also argue that the sheer volume of legislation makes local government more dependent upon central government for interpretation of legislation as offered by administrative circulars. Second, one could argue that increasing professional- isation has produced 'vertical coalitions' between specialists in central and local government; professionals with broad similarities who share similar responses to certain specific questions which leads to a degree of predictability in terms of local government decision making, In the United Kingdom this may be associated with what Davies terms 'national policy paradigms'. In the United States the analyses of Beer (1973) and Derthick (1970) suggest that professionalisation reinforces harmonies of interest between central and state and local actors.

Third, one could argue that grants have helped create expectations of the type of service that should be provided. Chester (1951, p 174) argues that specific grants are especially important in the early stages of the development of a service since it creates two groups interestedh its maintenance; producers and consumers. Thereafter the grant form becomes of less importance precisely because these expectations have developed into real constraints upon local authority decision making. Finally, one could argue that central government has been able to create limitations on local government discretion over time, and this gives central government some form of influence akin to the authority of the 'ewig Gestrigen' a traditional legitimacy. Finer uses this argument; 'as local councillors and officials enter office, they are confronted by the fact that departments in London ... have been consolidating their authority for decades, generations and even centuries' (1946, p 302).

It is misleading to regard any grant type as causing a fundamental change in the relationship between different levels of government. While block grants may appear to offer 'greater autonomy' for local governments, it is only likely to be introduced where there is relative certainty that it will make little difference to the overall pattern of service provision. None of this should be taken to imply that the development of constraints in Britain is 'bad' and the absence in the United States is 'good'. Macdonald argued, on the question of 'autonomy', that 'men seldom go forth to do political battles for the sake of abstract political theories' (1928, p 239); implying that 'autonomy' is to some extent a convenient term to be employed in striving for more concrete political goals. If you are poor and black in a locality in America which uses federal money to benefit transportation in white and prosperous areas then 'autonomy' might be 'bad', but if you are seeking to expand social services in Lothian Region despite threats from central government then it might be 'good'.

Much attention has been devoted to the study of grants as an influence on the system of central-local relationships when, in fact, these are often more accurately regarded as consequences of the relationship. The new block grant, for example, which is to be introduced under the Planning and Land Act (1980) is often regarded as the 'end of local government'. In fact the grant itself will only do in more systematic way what has already been practised for a long time; the channelling of grants into certain types of local authority on the basis of previously identified and desired resul'ts. Were central government to impose limits on levels of rates that may be raised, then this would indeed constitute a change in the central-2ocal relationship, but it would not be achieved as a result of the new grant, but as the result of something quite separate.

Notes 1: A lengthier version of this paper was presented to the Political Studies

Association Workgroup on United Kingdom Politics, Cardiff, September 1980. It is based upon research undertaken at the Urban Institute, Washington, DC, in Summer 1980, facilitated by a Ford Foundation Grant for the Study of Intergovern- mental Relations made to the Centre for the Study of Public Policy. I am grateful

24 E&ard Page

to Professor Richard Rose, Hal Wolman, Brian Hogwood and Ian McAllister for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Re ferencas ACIR (1977), Block Grants: A Comparative Analysis (Washington,DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).

ACIR (1978), The Intergovernmental Grant System. Summary and Concluding Observations (Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).

Ashford, D (1974), 'The Effects of Central Finance on the British Local Government System', British Journal of Political Science, 4 (4).

Barnstaple, C (1899), 'The Distribution of Revenue Between the Central Government and Local Authorities', Economics Journal, IX.

Beer, S H (19731, 'The Modernisation of American Federalism', Publius, Fall. Chester, D N (19511, Central and Local Government (London: Macmillan). Derthick, M (1970), The Influence of Federal Grants: Public Assistance in Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press) ,

Dommel, P (1974), The Politics of General Revenue Sharing (Ontario: Indiana University Press).

Finer, H (1946),English Local Government (London: Methuen).

Heclo, H (19771, A Government of Strangers (Washington, DC: Brookings). Key, V 0 (1937), The Administration of Federal Grants to States (Chicago: Public Administration Service).

Macdonald, A F (1928), Federal Aid (New York: Cromwell). McKay, D (1980), 'The Rise of the Topocratic State', in D Ashford (ed), Financing Urban Government in the Welfare State (London: Croom Helm).

Moneypenny, P (19601, 'Federal Grant in Aid to State Governments: A Political Analgois', National Tax Journal XI11 (1).

Mushkin, S (1960), 'Barriers to a System of Federal Grants in Aid', National Tax Journal XI11 (1).

Rhodes, G (1976), 'Local Government Finance 1918-1966', in the Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance Appendix 6 (London: HMSO).

Schulz, N (1948), 'The Development of the Grant System', in C H Wilson (ed), Essays on Local Government (Oxford: Blackwell).

Seidman, H (1975), Politics, Position and Power (New York: Oxford University Press).

Stenberg, C and Walker, D (1977), 'The Block Grant: Lessons from Two Early Experiences', Publius, Spring.

Webbm S (1911), Grants in Aid: A Criticism and a Proposal (London: Longmans Green).

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OTHER NEO-FASCIST STRATEGIES: SOME CONJECTURES I A N R BARNES

Recent acts of extreme right-wing violence ha& drawn attention to an apparent revival of fascism in Europe. The dramatic bombing of the Bologna railway station, and similar atrocities in Munich and Paris have led to allegations of an internat- ionaffy co-ordinated neo-Nazi terrorist campaign. Undoubtedly, ad hoc networks do exist if only in the form of the annual Nazi festival at the Flanders village of Diksmuide. Column 88, the British Movement, the National Front, the Belgian Flemish Militant Order (VMO) and sundry groups from Ireland, France, Germany and fifteen other states, were present. Reports also exist of support from Libya, Lebanese Falangists, and,

This year representatives of the British League of St George,