GRACEFUL DEGRADATION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A CRITICALEXAMINATION OF ICT4PEACE

A dissertation submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Master of Arts in theFaculty of Humanities

2007

ALIA NOELLE LAMAADAR

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contents

-Abstract-A more pacific global community, engendered through the use of Information andCommunication Technology (ICT) is the hopeful and indeed lofty goal championed by thepractice and theory of ICT4Peace. A recent addition to the field of international development,there has been little effort to strenuously challenge the propositions and assumptions put forth byICT4Peace. What is noticeably absent from the ICT4Peace agenda is an attempt at critical self-reflection, an endeavour to understand if its tools of the trade—the ‘new’ ICTs—having emergedfrom unique Western experiences, are apposite to areas of conflict in the developing world. Thefollowing research is intended to explore how the dominant discourse surrounding ICT4Peacepossibly obscures alternative understandings of the effects of ICT in conflict-affectedenvironments. Using discourse analysis this paper isolates the central themes and assumptions ofICT4Peace by examining its Operational, Programmatic, and Peace-building applications. Thisanalysis highlights three dominant discursive themes—Neutrality, Liberalism andPositivity—each respectively perpetuating the assumptions that: (i) ICTs encourage equality; (ii)ICTs are democratizing; and (iii) ICTs promote grassroots involvement. A critique of thesethemes and assumptions indicates substantial dissonance between the social changes that ICTsare expected to engender and the actual demands of ‘failed states’. By neglecting to address theseshortcomings, ICT4Peace offers an incomplete understanding of the potential effects of thesetools, possibly to the detriment of already vulnerable societies.

-Declaration-

No portion of the work referred to in the dissertation has been submitted in support of anapplication for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute oflearning.

-Copyright Statement-

i. Copyright in text of this dissertation rests with the author. Copies (by any process) either infull, or of extracts, may be made only in accordance with instructions given by the author.Details may be obtained from the appropriate Graduate Office. This page must form part of anysuch copies made. Further copies (by any process) of copies made in accordance with suchinstructions may not be made without the permission (in writing) of the author.

ii. The ownership of any intellectual property rights which may be described in this dissertationis vested in the University of Manchester, subject to any prior agreement to the contrary, andmay not be made available for use by third parties without the written permission of theUniversity, which will prescribe the terms and conditions of any such agreement.

iii. Further information on the conditions under which disclosures and exploitation may takeplace is available from the Head of the School of Social Science.

-Dedication-

Academically, I am indebted to Dr. Rorden Wilkinson for inspiring the critical approach that Ibelieve differentiates this research from most other examinations of ICT4Peace.

Financially, I am indebted to Nancy Lamaadar, Courtney Abrahams, Richard Smallfield andRetta Peel for their 25 years of generosity and love.

I am also forever indebted to Eoin Hennessy for igniting my interest in technology and for hisconstant pokes in the right direction.

*And most of all I am indebted to my mother for everything, always.*

- List of Abbreviations –ADR – Alternative Dispute ResolutionAEKW – African Education Knowledge WarehouseBaBe – Be active, Be emancipatedCMC – Computer Mediated CommunicationCMI – Crisis Management InitiativeCSIS – Centre for Strategic and International StudiesGIS – Geographical Information SystemsGooB – Government out of the Box programICANN – Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and NumbersICRC – International Committee of the Red CrossICT – Information and Communication TechnologyICT4D – Information and Communication Technology for DevelopmentICT4Peace – Information and Communication Technology for PeaceIDP – Internally Displaced PeoplesISP – Internet Service ProviderITU – International Telecommunications UnionMENA – Middle Eastern and North AfricanMtF – Mandate the FutureNDI – National Democratic Institute for International AffairsNGO – Nongovernmental OrganisationODR – Online Dispute ResolutionOECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOLPC – One Laptop Per ChildPDA – Personal Digital AssistantPFN – People First NetworkPSO – Peace Support OperationsRAWA – Revolutionary Women’s Association of AfghanistanSMS – Short Message ServiceTFP – Technology For PeaceUN – United NationsUNICTTF – United Nations Information and Communication Technology Task ForceUNDP – United Nations Development ProgrammeUNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationUNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesVoIP – Voice Over Internet ProtocolWAP – Wireless Application ProtocolWiFi – Wireless FidelityWSIS – World Summit on the Information Society

- List of Cited Websites -

African Education Knowledge Warehouse. http://www.schoolnetafrica.net/278.0.html.Burundinet. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/burundinet/.Cybersettle. http://www.cybersettle.com/info/main.aspx

Ericsson Response Program. http://www.ericsson.com/ericsson/corporate_responsibility/ericssonresponse/

Eyesondarfur. http://www.eyesondarfur.org.Facebook. http://www.facebook.comGlobal Voices Online. http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/.Gurtong Peace Trust Project. http://www.gurtong.org.Humanlink. http://www.hlink.org/mission.asp.ICT4Peace. http://www.ICT4Peace.org.Info-Share. http://www.info-share.org.Interlocals. http://www.interlocals.net.Internal Displacement. http://www.internal-displacement.org.IRIN. http://www.irinnews.org/.

Mandate the Future. http://orgs.takingitglobal.org/547.Microsoft Office Groove. http://www.groove.net/home/index.cfm.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. http://www.ndi.org/about/about.asp.People First Network. http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/.ReliefWeb. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc100?OpenForm.Reuters AlertNet. http://www.alertnet.org/.SmartSettle. http://www.smartsettle.com.Square Trade. http://www.squaretrade.comSwisspeace. http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/research/index.html.Tech4Peace. http://tech4peace.orgVideoletters. http://www.videoletters.net/set-1030.1005-en.html.Voxiva. http://www.voxiva.netWikipedia. http://www.wikipedia.orgWSIS. http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html

CHAPTER ONE- Preface -

‘[We, the representatives of the peoples of the world], value the potential of ICTs to promotepeace and to prevent conflict.’

(WSIS 2005: Para. 36)

1.1 IntroductionWith this passage from the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the foundations

of what has come to be known as ICT for Peace (ICT4Peace) were laid. A more pacific globalcommunity, engendered through the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)is the hopeful and indeed lofty goal embodied in both ICT4Peace and the notion of an‘Information Society’. In the legacy of the Information Systems approach to development,ICT4Peace has become a growing field of academic and political interest. ICT4Peace and theWSIS celebrate the availability of technological services that were unthinkable even 10 yearsago: satellites provide precise spatial awareness, cell phones encourage constant communication,and laptops with wireless connections to the internet allow for uninterrupted access to the‘Information Society’. Conversely, satellite technology allows state militaries to gather intrusiveand incriminating information, while terrorists can use cell phones as explosive detonators.

These experiences – positive and negative – have bred a unique view of technology in thedeveloped world. Avgerou (2002) refers to this as ‘techno-economic rationality’ and suggeststhat it is instrumental to how Western developed societies define problems and determinesolutions (2). Of interest to this particular research is the problem of ‘failed states’ and the twinchallenges of peacekeeping and peace-building. In their attempts to ‘promote the use […] ofICTs in humanitarian and peace operations’ (ICT4Peace 2007) and ‘establish the foundations foran Information Society for all,’ (WSIS 2007) what the WSIS and ICT4Peace have neglected toadequately address is if this unique rationality is appropriate for the 50 percent of the world’spopulation who have never used a phone (Kuster, Lin, Balzano 1997: 4), or the 80 percent wholive in developing countries (Castells 2001), 23 million of whom have been killed as a result ofwar in the last sixty years (Dress 2005: 7). Western experiences and ‘techno-economicrationality’ embrace the ‘Information Society’ as a strategy, but like any strategy, it is alsorepresentative of a discourse, a particular way of imagining (Fairclough 2005) a new Globalpolitical-economic order. What is noticeably absent from the ICT4Peace agenda is an attempt atcritical self-reflection, an effort to understand if the social assumptions and practices of the‘Information Society,’ having emerged from ‘another context and other needs,’ (Dagron 2001:31), are apposite to areas of conflict in the developing world. Danowitz et al. (1995) have aptlydescribed this concern, suggesting that when ICT ‘is injected into cultures […] it comes loadedwith an embedded virtual value system’ (28). Certainly, the foundations of ICT4Peace areheavily rooted in the West’s unique experiences with technological modernity. The followingresearch is intended to address this concern and explore in what ways the dominant discoursesurrounding ICT4Peace possibly obscures alternative understandings of the effects of ICT inconflict zones.

The literature review in Chapter Two utilises discourse analysis to identify the ‘neutral,liberal and positive’ themes (Rohozinski 2003: 8) that dominate the ICT4Peace discourse,respectively perpetuating three assumptions: (i) ICTs encourage equality; (ii) ICTs and

transparency are democratizing; and (iii) ICTs promote grassroots involvement. The critiquepresented in Chapter Three is drawn from diverse research on social theories of technology,which as Kling (2000) has noted are ‘scattered in […] several different fields’ includingcommunications, computer science, and some social sciences (217). Such a critique ultimatelydemonstrates that ICT4Peace initiatives, premised largely upon the assumptions isolated inChapter Two, ignore many of the practical realities of conflict zones. By neglecting to considerthe shortcomings of a discourse premised on Neutral, Liberal and Positive

1discursive themes,

ICT4Peace initiatives are naively designed and possibly harmful. Let it be clear that this researchis not meant to discredit ICT4Peace as a valid endeavour. Instead it is intended to place attentionwhere it has previously been absent, identifying the features of technology that the ICT4Peacediscourse largely ignores.1.2 Explanation of Terms

ICTs are generally understood to encompass ‘the full range of the production, distribution andconsumption of messages, across all media from radio and television, to satellite to Internet’(Wilson 1998: 6). This research has attempted whenever possible to focus on what are oftenreferred to as the ‘new’ ICTs, the digital, often wireless technologies, most relevant to themodern conflict community (Hattotuwa 2007). For the purposes of this paper, Hattotuwa’s(2004) broad understanding of ICT4Peace is adopted. As such ICT4Peace ‘is the use of enablingtechnologies to augment existing stakeholder interventions, enable hitherto marginalised actorsto participate more fully in peace-building processes, empower grassroots communities and bringcohesion to […] peace-building and conflict transformation’ (12). ICT4Peace applications cangenerally be grouped into Operational, Programmatic, and Peace-building categories(Rohozinski 2003), although there may inevitably be some overlap between the three.Recognizing a distinction made by Laouris (2004: 69), this research only addresses thoseapplications of ICTs used directly in the service peace; it is beyond the scope of this paper toconsider the military uses of technology.1.3 A Note on Discourse AnalysisDiscourse has been found a useful category of study among social analysts and linguists alike.Herein, the more conventional linguistic definition is embraced, referring primarily to spoken orwritten language as opposed to semiotics or other non-verbal forms of communication(Fairclough 1993:134). In adopting discourse analysis, the following research subscribes toFairclough’s (1993) interpretation as:

analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaquerelationships of causality […] between(a) discursive practices, events, and texts and (b) widersocial and cultural [processes…] suggesting that suchlinkages between discourse, ideology and power may wellbe unclear to those involved […]’ (135).

Like all critiques that involve the identification and synthesis of a dominant discourse, subjectivejudgements on the part of the researcher are inevitable; subsequently, ‘there can be no“definitive” analysis of a piece of discourse’ (Thompson 2004: 6). However, whenever possiblethis essay has included exemplars and extensive citations to put the reader in a position to judgethe validity of the author’s conclusions based on their own interpretation of the text, thus suitably

allowing for ‘the development of independent judgements concerning the analysis’ (ibid). AsICT4Peace is premised on the notion of an increasingly mediated global environment,–‘anenvironment that by definition cannot exist without its technologies of communication’(Fairclough et al. 2004)– the need for analytical emphasis on the process of discourseconveyance is particularly relevant. Therefore as Fairclough has contended, discourse analysismust be understood not simply as the researcher’s subjective insights into spoken words butrather as ‘social analysis with a focus on the moment of discourse’ (Fairclough et al. 2004).

CHAPTER TWO- Review -

2.1 Introduction to the ReviewAny examination of ICT4Peace is incomplete without a preliminary discussion of the

historical theories addressing the relationship between man and technology. Although rigorousacademic critiques of ICT4Peace are sparse, there is nonetheless a great tradition situated withinthe realm of critical development theory and social theories of technology that endeavour toproblematise ‘the grand narratives that have defined development thinking’ (Wilson 2001: 2; seeEscobar 1988 as an example). Escobar urges critical dissection of the technological discoursesthat are the products of modernity, believing that ‘[technology] emerges out of particular culturalconditions and in turn helps to create new ones’ (Escobar et al. 1994: 211). The predecessors tothis critique were the critical theorists of modernity including Mumford and Marcuse whorespectively warned of ‘authoritarian technics’ (Mumford 1964) and Western ‘scientific-technical rationality’ as political systems of domination (Marcuse 1964). Marcuse, adopting aMarxist perspective, suggested that the Western regard for science and technology served aparticular hierarchical structure of power and class and reinforced ‘unequal relations fostered bycapital accumulation’ (Avgerou 2000: 5). Thus, the historical critique of technological modernitysuggests that the fundamental principal that has come to distinguish ‘modern’ Western societyfrom ‘traditional’ societies is the belief that man can be improved by reason alone (Touraine1995). This position also helps to form the theoretical critique of ICT4Peace and its convictionthat science and technology are beneficial to the creation of an ‘Information Society.’ Ribeiro(1997) has posited that ‘children of both globalism and the computer age see themselves ascreating a new world mediated by hi-tech, where access to the network is both a sort of post-modern liberation and the experience of a new democratic means’ (Ribeiro 1997: 3). Therefore,in addition to its theoretical foundations, the genesis of ICT4Peace is very much a product of thehistorical climate within which it evolved.

The end of the 20th Century witnessed unprecedented international interventions in conflictzones across the developing world, driven largely by the magnitude of human suffering in theseareas and ‘hope for the “peace dividend” that was to accrue with the end of the cold war’(Rohozinski 2003:2). Mark Duffield (2005) suggests that this period experienced a‘securitisation’ of international development, as the Cold War Era’s geopolitics (the security ofthe state) were replaced with the Humanitarian Era’s biopolitics (the security of populations).Thus, this period shifted away from more traditional and limited interventions, intended to curbviolence and provide humanitarian aid, towards a more comprehensive social transformation ofthese areas, applying the liberal signposts of development, and modernist notions of progress.The stated goals of these ventures were to ‘transform conflict zones from nests of Hobbesianatavism and poverty into modern, liberal, market-oriented democracies’ (Rohozinski 2003:3).Amid this historical backdrop the notion of an ‘Information Society’ emerged. The discoursesurrounding the ‘Information Society’, reminiscent of the modernisation theses that Marcuse andMumford criticised half a century before, hints that through the immutable progress of ICTs ‘allsocieties will move inexorably over the next twenty years to the condition of late twentieth-century southern California’ (Golding 2000: 170). Based on the West’s own experiences withtechnological modernity, development and relief practitioners have come to consider ICTs asneutral devices of communication and information transmission, while simultaneously‘harboring strong expectations for the positive development and peace-building potential that

they may enable’ (ibid: 4). The following literature review endeavours to contribute to thistradition of critical theory by identifying the themes and assumptions that are composite to theICT4Peace discourse.

2.2 Current ResearchUntil the WSIS set an explicit research agenda for ICT4Peace, few formal investigations

addressed the subject. The most relevant research has been limited to the military’s reliance onICTs and claims of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Much has been written about thisRMA including extensive research on ‘Netwar’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001), and‘Cyberterrorism,’ (Denning 2001), often performed under the auspices of military publications.What follows is a discussion of ‘the first serious and high-level report’ (Hattotuwa 2006)published on the subject of ICT4Peace. ICT for Peace: The Role of ICT in Preventing,Responding to and Recovering from Conflict (Stauffacher et al. 2005) was commissioned by theUnited Nations ICT Task Force (UNICTTF) in conjunction with the WSIS. The UNICTTFreport is essentially descriptive research intended to broadly delineate ICT4Peace as a uniquearea of study and identify current activities which fall under its arrangement.

The first obvious theme presented in the report is the emphasis on the neutral qualities of ICT.The report highlights the neutrality of ICT at several points by suggesting ‘that every technologycan be used for good or evil’ (iv), and that ‘the internet itself is neutral’ (11). The report looksprimarily at the operational applications of ICT—those applications devoted to the organization,and networking of peace practitioners—consequently it suggests that the technologiesthemselves have no social or political bias, that ‘in all cases, technology is a means to an end’(55). From the theme of neutrality the report often assumes that equality exists among users. Inhighlighting the universal benefits of ICTs the report suggests that, ‘ICTs give us the potential toimprove standards of living throughout the world,’ (iii; emphasis added) and ‘the web gives apotentially limitless number of individuals and organizations the ability to broadcast news (11;emphasis added). On a few occasions the report does indeed warn of the potential for inequitabledistribution of ICTs ‘subject to social and economic constraints’ (10), since ‘political will isrequired to respond to information, to share it widely and equitably, and to ensure globaldissemination’ (iii). However, these caveats are in reference to the notion of technology ‘haves’and ‘have-nots’; they are not largely critical of the possibility of existing social inequalities thatICTs might help perpetuate. The report acknowledges that, ‘for those who know how to use it,however, the internet offers ways of raising the profile of forgotten emergencies, [and]countering the misuse of the internet for promoting conflict’ (11; emphasis added). Yet the reportnever explicitly addresses the vast disparities that exist between segments of the globalpopulation in terms of technological experience and savvy.

The report also emphasises the fundamentally liberal qualities of ICTs, particularly withregard to free speech and information flows. The Liberal discursive theme extends throughoutthe report suggesting that, ‘[ICTs] have given a new meaning to human rights, in particular thefreedom of expression and information’ (iv), ‘communication is also essential for ending conflictand building lasting peace, and ICT has a key role to play in improving communication,facilitating negotiations, increasing transparency, and building trust’ (7). The report does notelaborate on the specific causal pathway between peace and the liberal values of transparency,communication and liberty, instead assuming that the most likely implication of greatercommunication flows is more peaceful relations. Limited evidence is given for this claim,although one example cited indicates that ‘in Chiapas, Mexico, the Zapatista’s use of the Internetcalled international attention to the plight of the indigenous; this attention may have affordedthem some protection and prevented a full scale violent conflict from developing by enablingtheir participation in a political process’ (23). Thus, ICTs are expected ‘to some extent enable the

democratization of information’ (6) and democracy in turn acts as a harbinger of peace. Such aposition echoes democratic peace theory and the liberal expectation that communicationpreserves the central freedoms of democratic society (Kedzie 2002: 107).

In addition to the themes of Neutrality and Liberalism, the UNICTTF report demonstrates anexpectation favouring the Positive implications of ICT, particularly at the grassroots level.Despite being focused on primarily Western web-based initiatives, the word ‘local’ is found 72times throughout the report. Frequently claims are made that ICT ‘[fosters] people-to-peoplelinks’ (62), ‘[makes] people-to-people connections’ (ibid) and can supplement local exchanges‘by linking people to people, both in country and in Diaspora populations’ (48). The reportreflects often on the grassroots benefits derived from the large scale use of ICT in conflict zonesgiven that, ‘rather than seeking to promote a solution from outside, the goal is simply to createspace for collective problem solving between the protagonists’ (48). This Positive discursivetheme is reflected in the assumption that localised social interactions subsequently encouragepeace by addressing the local roots of violence. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annanindicates in the preface, ‘ICTs can help address the root causes of violent conflict. By promotingaccess to knowledge, they can promote mutual understanding, an essential factor in conflictprevention and post-conflict reconciliation’ (iii). Most of the ICT4Peace initiatives detailed inthe report have originated in Europe and the United States, and the report does not detail howthese initiatives overcome the possibility of socioeconomic bias.

As the first serious academic attempt to identify ICT4Peace as a unique area of research anddevelopment, the UNICTTF report is indicative of the broader discourse on the subject. Thereport is legitimised by its high-ranking affiliations with the United Nations, and theInternational Telecommunications Union (ITU). More importantly, this report is intended totarget an audience previously unfamiliar with the concept, specifically large internationalorganisations and corporations in a position to allocate resources to ICT4Peace (Currion 2006).So while the report is largely intended to be descriptive, we might also expect the discourse toperpetuate these particular themes and assumptions, due to its stature and primacy. Theremaining portion of this review examines a variety of articles, websites and initiatives that fallunder the purveyance of ICT4Peace. Organised according to their application (Operational,Programatic and Peace-Building), the discourse analysis confirms the dominance of the Neutral,Liberal, and Positive discursive themes and assumptions identified in the UNICTTF report.

2.3 Operational Applications and NeutralityICTs applied operationally are by far the most common example of ICT4Peace. In this

capacity ICTs are a tool and support mechanism for diplomatic and civil peace practitioners.These tools ease the complex coordination of relief operations, helping to control the rapid flowof information, supplies and people in conflict zones. Operational applications of ICTs tend toinclude technology that disseminates information and allows for networking betweenstakeholders, as well as field-based support systems and early-warning systems.

Networking and field-based supportThe operational applications of ICT4Peace include the use of cellular and satellitecommunications technology, VoIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol), and GIS (GeographicInformation Systems) to form networks of contact between geographically disconnectedstakeholders within and outside of conflicts. Lt. Col. Boltz’s research into the emergingrelationship between ICT and Peace Support Operations (PSO) indicates that ‘[one] of thegreatest Information Age boons to PSOs is an increased capability to share information quickly,universally, and objectively’ (2002). This claim to objectivity is common when discussing theoperational aspects of ICT4Peace and stems from a prevailing treatment of ICTs as utilitariantools. Much of ICT4Peace demonstrates a clear predisposition favouring this view of rationalneutrality. This view is supported by the many and varied uses of technology; it is no longer thecase that the military is the sole proprietor of advanced ICT in areas of conflict. Increasinglyvarious international organisations devoted to peace-building, like the UN and the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employ vast amounts of advanced technology. Theseorganisations have become so dependent on ICT that many ICT4Peace initiatives are devotedsimply to providing these groups with rapid, field-based deployment of technology and support(See Humanlink 2007 and Ericsson Response Program 2007). Other ICT4Peace initiatives aredevoted to using ICTs to collect, organise and distribute information relevant to the peace-building community. Frequently these initiatives make use of the Internet and are organised into‘Portals’ of searchable information (See ReliefWeb 2007, IRIN 2007, and Reuters AlertNet2007). Internaldisplacement.org is a large searchable database specifically designed to distributeinformation on internally displaced people (IDP) around the world. The goal of this site is to‘directly contribute to raising awareness of the plight of internally displaced people’(Internaldisplacement.org 2007). These portals are ideally ‘standing [bodies] that will fuse anddisseminate information for the good of all,’ acting as a ‘neutral clearinghouse for accurate,current, and useful information’ (Roth 1997).Although many of these ICT4Peace initiatives are web-based several are actually softwareapplications designed to connect large, distributed networks outside the limitations of internetaccess (See Voxiva 2007 and Groove 2007). Voxiva is a collaborative software package that hasbeen used in states recovering from conflict, including Rwanda. The software is ‘designed tobring technology to the ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’. By leveraging phones, PDAs, as well as theInternet, these applications ‘allow organizations to collect information from and communicatewith distributed networks of people in a timely and systematic way’ (Voxiva 2007). SimilarlyMicrosoft Office Groove (formerly Groove Software) is a peer-to-peer collaborative desktoppackage that has been adopted by hundreds of government and non-governmental organizationsas well as the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. In particular, the Force Protection RapidSolution application is designed to be used by military, NGO, and civilian peace practitioners toshare threat data, and alerts in hostile areas, while the Route Assessment application can

coordinate the movement of convoys through potentially hostile areas. Another operationalsoftware package is The Government out of a Box project (GooB), ‘which aims to develop abetter civilian tool set for the international community to deal more professionally andeffectively with failed states and post-conflict societies’ (CMI 2004). The main objective of theGooB project is to assist in the rapid reconstruction of the civil service, enhancing ‘localownership in the new administration’ (CMI 2004). Described as a ‘Lego box with ready-madecomponents’ (ibid), the project suggests that peace-building operations around the world aresimilar enough that readymade, neutral ICT tools could be developed to quickly restore a localsense of belonging and regularity to the lives of people affected by conflict.

Early-warning SystemsThose involved in peace-building efforts are acutely aware that it ‘is much better to preventconflict than to have to resolve it’ (Stirrup 2007: 24). Thus, an ever more important operationalapplication of ICT4Peace is the development of early-warning systems used to prevent andalleviate tensions before they escalate. Traditional early-warning systems consisted mostly ofqualitative analysis, however this methodology has been criticised as being subjective andpredisposed to bias (Lundin 2004). Additionally, Wolf (2005) has lamented that, ‘for warnings towork, it's not enough for them to be delivered. They must also overcome that human tendency topause; they must trigger a series of effective actions, mobilizing the informal networks that wedepend on in a crisis.’ In this sense, there is a demand that early-warning systems must employmodels that make use of the alleged objectivity of technology (ibid). Hence, quantitative systemsare considered more appropriate for early-warning (Lundin 2004). These computer predictionmodels are expected to be ‘less dependant on subjective judgement’ since ‘with a quantitativeapproach, it is also possible to validate and improve the model by “teaching” the system […] inother words a self-learning system’ (Lundin 2004). Ultimately most ICT4Peace early-warningsystems combine both human coding (qualitative) and machine parsing (quantitative) methods.One such example is Swisspeace's Early-warning Program, FAST International (swisspeace.ch2007). FAST International's quantitative methodology is based on event data analysis whichSwisspeace claims offers ‘consistency, transparency, speed, and interactivity’ (ibid) andautomated coding which enables a large amount of information to be digested reliably in a briefperiod of time. By using ICT to objectively synthesis vast sums of event data FAST Internationalis expected to act as a neutral watchdog, balancing the de-sensitization and subjective hype oftraditional media (ibid).

As this review demonstrates, ICT4Peace operational initiatives exalt the impartial qualities oftechnology. This treatment emerges from a primarily Neutral discursive theme; ICTs in thiscapacity are value free. This sentiment is variously described as, ‘information technologies areneutral […] whether the consequences of information technologies are beneficial or deleteriousdepends on the uses to which they are put’ (Rosenau and Johnson 2002: 55-56; See also UNDP2001 and Layton 1992). As a result of this faith in the neutrality of technology, ICT4Peaceinitiatives fail to consider the alternative implications of technology and assume that ICTs are‘tools creating open channels rather than contested spaces’ (Rohozinski 2003: 218). Thediscursive theme of Neutrality limits the ways that ICTs can be conceived of and their socialimplications understood. As technology is increasingly portrayed as a neutral and unbiased toolin support of peace, the assertion that these tools have the potential to better the lives of all andbanish global inequalities has increased. In a 2001 UN report, revealingly titled ‘DigitalOpportunities for All’ the authors justified the goal of universal access to ICTs by concluding

that these tools are critical to ‘increased social inclusion and the creation of a better life for all’(Gurumurthy & Singh 2005: 7). Similarly Alty (2006) has described the InternationalTelecommunications Union (ITU) as ‘built on the principles of equal opportunity anddevelopment.’ Practitioners who use ICTs operationally are likely to view technology as anobjective tool, and are particularly susceptible to the assumption that technology benefits allpeople equally; a belief that resonates with Bill Gates’ claim that the ‘Information Society’ mayultimately reduce the global inequalities between rich and poor nations (Norris 2000a: 1). In areport by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) entitled Wikis, webs, andnetworks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings, Linder’s (2006) recommendationsare indicative of the assumption underlying much of ICT4Peace that ICTs allow for a hithertounheard of degree of global equality and a forum for communication that strongly resembles theHabermasian ideal speech situation (Murphy 1994: 114-115). She suggests that ‘user-drivencontent, in which all individuals contribute information, share concepts, and evaluate resources,is the practical choice for fast-paced environments with conflicting and unreliable data’ (17). Shefurther suggests users who best utilize the resource shall drive the market regardless of theirposition in a hierarchy (18). Linder uses the phrase ‘architecture of participation’ to underscorethe inclusive properties of ICTs, particularly the internet, highlighting their potential as ‘systemswith low barriers to entry that are designed for openness and user contribution [… elevating]valuable contributors […] on merit, rather than position and title’ (19). The assumption that ICTsencourage equality is also appealing to those initiatives designed to bridge the infamous ‘digitaldivide’ and to encourage social and economic development in areas impacted by conflict,otherwise known as the Programmatic applications of ICT4Peace.

2.4 Programmatic Applications and LiberalismThe programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are linked to the Information Systems approach

to international development, and are often indistinguishable from ICT for Development(ICT4D). In this capacity ICTs are conceived of as tools that can help failed, recovering, orvulnerable states to ‘leapfrog’ the traditional stages of development by ‘enhancing governance,empowering citizens, facilitating regional development […] and offering new opportunities tocombat poverty’ (Rohozinski 2003: 4). These initiatives are in accordance with a recent UnitedNations report indicating that ‘the world is undergoing a revolution in [ICT] that has momentousimplications for the current and future social and economic situation of all countries of theworld’ (Rice 2003: 73). The programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are heavily dominated bya Liberal discursive motif clearly demonstrated in both theory and practice. While there may beno universally agreed upon definition of liberalism, insofar as ‘what we tend to call liberal,resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions’ (Doyle 1986:1152), it is possible toidentify the influence of this theme in ICT4Peace as well the assumptions it perpetuates. Broadlyspeaking, the ‘recognizable characteristics’ of liberalism include an emphasis on individualrights such as equality, free speech, (Doyle 1986: 1151) the rule of law, the free exchange ofideas, a market economy and a transparent system of government, notably liberal democracy(Liberal International 1997). Reflective of liberalism, ICT4Peace expects ‘that governmentsfounded on a respect for individual liberty exercise “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” in theirforeign policy’ (Doyle 1986: 1151). Consequently, this Liberal discursive motif has propagatedthe assumption that ICTs used programmatically to increase information flows and transparencywill also facilitate economic development, and social development, specifically promotingdemocracy.

Economic DevelopmentThe programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are only the most recent line of an ancientscholarly tradition linking development, democracy and peace. This liberal tendency to viewdevelopment as a linear progression that eventually, and necessarily, concludes in Westernliberal democracy is found throughout the ICT4Peace discourse. ICTs are often expressed interms of their capacity to ‘leapfrog’ failed states into more advanced and progressive societies.The World Development Report (1998/99) has described the ability of developing countries to‘leapfrog the industrial countries by going straight from underdeveloped networks to fullydigitized networks’ (in Rosenau & Singh 2002: 279). It is by merit of increased transparency andthe free flow of information that ICTs are expected to promote both economic and socialdevelopment. In designing the National Strategy for an Information Society in Serbia, the UNDPreports that those countries who take the lead in implementing national ICT strategies have themost ‘outstanding economic performance’ (UNDP 2005: 12), further suggesting that thesestrategies ‘address the opportunities to use ICT to expand employment and earning opportunities[…] for the poor, women, [and] marginalized communities’ (ibid: 38). Other countries in theprocess of rebuilding after violent conflict have also adopted the view that there is a causal linkbetween ICTs and economic development. The Rwandan ICT strategy, described as ‘more“mobile in every pocket” than “chicken in every pot”’ (‘Once war-torn’ 2006) is aimed at therapid transformation of a depressed agricultural economy into an information economy,decreasing the percentage of the workforce involved in farming from 90 to 50 percent in only 15years (ibid). Working with Microsoft to develop a comprehensive ICT strategy, the government‘believes that ICT is offering Rwanda a window of opportunity to leap frog the key stages of

industrialisation and transform [Rwanda] into a service-driven, knowledge-based economy’(Microsoft 2006).

In addition to broad national strategies, many initiatives are favouring individual technologiesto promote economic development, citing singular examples of success drawn from thedeveloping world. For example, in defence of their ‘HomeBox,’ a ‘web content creation tool forthe Developing World,’ Piper and Hwang (2001) describe a farming village in Peru as ‘oneexample of a community that directly benefited from access to the Internet. Two years afterInternet services were established, the average yearly income rose from US$300 to US$1500’(145). Thus, ICT4Peace programmatic initiatives seek to recreate this success by increasinginformation flows and allowing local producers to participate in a global market. In addition tothe internet, advanced ICT like GIS are being incorporated into peace operations in regionsrecovering from conflict like Kosovo, to increase transparency and convert field-basedinformation into a more effective development program (Boltz 2002). In the hopes of reversingthe destructive effects of war on state economies, The African Education Knowledge Warehouse(AEKW) is using ICT multimedia and skills training to rehabilitate child soldiers in Angola,Liberia and Rwanda ‘into main stream society’ (AEKW 2007). Further, Bankes and Burge(2004) have suggested that mobile phones have the potential to ‘[leapfrog] the technological gapbetween the developed and developing world’ (Banks & Burge 2004: 5). The theme ofLiberalism present in the ICT4Peace discourse promotes a particular set of causal assumptionsregarding the links between development, democracy and peace. These assumptions areexemplified by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs’ (NDI) assertion that‘it is no coincidence that the world's most prosperous and peaceful nations are also the mostdemocratic’ (NDI.org). ICTs are expected to incur the same results in the developing world, asthe West attributes to them in the developed world (See Alty 2006). In addition to using ICTs toencourage economic development the programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are designed toencourage the social development of conflict-affected countries. Consequently the Liberaldiscursive theme encourages the assumption that transparency and increased communicationflows from ICTs are a harbinger of democracy and ultimately peace (Stauffacher et al. 2005: 7).

Social DevelopmentThe Liberal discursive theme in ICT4Peace supports a view of ICT hinged on the premise thatincreased communication flows will inevitably support the further promotion of liberal freedomsand democracy around the world (Kedzie 2002: 106). This view emphasises the nature ofadvanced ICTs to permit the rapid, relatively unconstrained diffusion of single-to-many andmany-to-many forms of communication, whereas the former had previously been a monopolyheld by central authorities, and the later had been prohibitively expensive (Rosenau & Johnson2002: 70). Programmatic initiatives highlight the ability of individuals to rally together,challenging traditional power structures and empowering their cause through collective action.Kedzie’s (2002) research into the link between ICTs, democracy and peace suggests that‘through communication come different and higher levels of consciousness, at which pointpeople can begin to set the agenda of world politics and the parameters of discourse themselves’(108). Imbued with liberalism, this discourse rests on the cyclic cause and consequence logic that‘democracy is embodied in communicative practices’ (ibid: 107), therefore increasedcommunication leads to democratisation, which in turn leads to greater ‘freedom[s] to know,share, and find out’ (ibid), which are further democratising. Thus a central goal of ICT4Peaceinitiatives is to stress the ‘participatory structures’ of ICT that ‘mimic the participatory nature of

democracies’ (Linder 2006: 19). As an example, the Philippines in 2002 is suggested asproviding the first real test of mobile telephony as a democratic tool, when hundreds ofthousands of text messages were used to organise massive rallies which eventually helped totopple President Joseph Estrada (Hong 2005). Other programmatic initiatives aimed at socialdevelopment focus on the informational capacities of ICTs and in particular the quality oftransparency.

In this capacity ICTs are seen to produce global transparency, where vast amounts ofinformation, previously unavailable or hidden, are exposed. The ICT4Peace discourse is rife withreferences to the democratic and peaceful effects of transparency. The UNDP (2005) has positedthat, when used with the proper intentions, ICTs may create ‘a new kind of transparency whereour contribution to humanity becomes visible for the rest of the world to see’ (23-24). Similarly,Kedzie (2002) maintains that the ‘increase in transparency works to mitigate the harshness ofworld anarchy by opening new avenues for the evaluation of credibility and intent’ (108). Byexpanding access to information, ICTs are believed to also expand the global frontiers ofdemocracy and limit the ability of governments to exercise their power, the result being ‘thatgovernments cannot lie and act with their otherwise characteristic impunity (Steele & Stein2002: 35). As President Mbeki of South Africa anticipates, increased transparency ‘cannot butenhance the legitimacy of the democratic state, tap the initiative and intellect of millions ofcitizens, limit any tendency towards arbitrary rule and reinforce social stability and peace’(Mbeki 1995).

There are numerous online examples, of websites devoted to increasing transparency andsubsequently democratic accountability. Amnesty International’s Eyes on Darfur website(Eyesondarfur 2007) leverages the power of high-resolution satellite imagery to documentevidence of atrocities committed in Darfur. The initiative is intended to increase the transparencyof the conflict and protect human rights ‘by allowing people around the world to literally “watchover” and protect twelve intact, but highly vulnerable, villages’ (ibid). Referring to this initiativeCole and Crawford (2007) have commented that ‘one trend is clear - this type of technology willmake it harder for regimes to take action in the dark.’ In what has come to be known as the‘Zapatista Effect’ a small group of indigenous fighters in Chiapas, Mexico used technology totransform their violent insurgency into a ‘non-violent, less overtly destructive, but still highlydisruptive movement that […] had both foreign and national repercussions for Mexico’ (Ronfeldt1998: 4). The Liberal theme that dominates the ICT4Peace discourse reifies communication andtransparency as democratizing forces. As the AEKW initiative, the Eyes on Darfur website andthe Zapatista’s peaceful use of ICTs demonstrate, there is certainly great potential for these toolsto contribute to global and regional peace-building. What this discursive theme alsodemonstrates is a failure to explore possibilities outside of this framework, to question theassumption that communication and transparency increase peace and democracy.

2.5 Peace-building Applications and PositivityEven more idealistic than the programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are the peace-building

applications, designed to build the global foundations for cooperation and transform conflictzones by harnessing the virtues of communication. The large body of research that has emergedfrom the field of conflict resolution indicates that communication is able to transform tensionsbetween antagonists through analysis, exploration, questioning and reframing individual interestsand positions (Hattotuwa 2005: 5). Kadende-Kaiser (2003) has described the ability of ICTs toadvance these forms of communication as their ‘mediation potential;’ applauding the Internet’sability to serve as ‘a medium through which the parties can communicate with each other’(Kadende-Kaiser 2003: 27). ICT initiatives designed to encourage dialogue between warringfactions or affected populations are a product of the political environment of the post-Cold Warera dominated by relatively small inter- and intra-state conflicts, often focused on ethnicrivalries. The impacted countries have frequently been left divided along complex ethnic lineswith limited, if any, cross-border communication. Progressively, ICT4Peace initiatives are beingdesigned to address these lingering hostilities and gaps in communication by encouraging ICTmediated contact between the parties through video, radio, and the tools of the internet –websites, emails, chat rooms and VoIP. Peace-building applications largely fall into twocategories: communication within conflicts, designed to encourage direct contact between rivalsides or among conflict-affected populations, and communication outside of conflicts - aimed atencouraging peaceful communication within diaspora populations, or the internationalcommunity. ICTs are used to connect geographically or socially distant populations, in the hopethat connecting people is also protecting them from the prejudice and the violence reinforced byisolation. These peace-building applications have been designed with an overwhelminglypositive view of communication; a consideration of the possible risks of communication isconspicuously absent from the discourse. Instead, the Positive discursive motif has contributed tothe naïve assumption that there is a direct causal link between ICTs and peace-building throughconstructive grassroots involvement and communication.

Communication within conflictsWithin conflict environments the allure of ‘virtual communication’ is undeniable. Fear andparanoia are endemic to these societies and a desire to remain isolated from perceived orimagined enemies is expected (Kadende-Kaiser 2003: 271). Hattotuwa (2005) has noted thatinteractions in virtual spaces are particularly important because even in the absence of contact inperson, ‘virtual interactions using ICTs can help sustain and nourish processes of conflicttransformation’ (7). Hattotuwa is particularly eager to suggest the possibility of using ICTs as ameans to encourage grassroots interventions that can ‘integrate and connect stakeholders in eachvillage […] in the country, into multi-sector and holistic peace-building processes’ (Hattotuwa2005: 13). An emphasis on grassroots communication is common when discussing peace-building initiatives, and Linder (2006) suggests that it is the ultimate goal of connectivity toempower the local community members to rebuild their country (iv). This assumption of positivegrassroots interaction is embodied in phrases such as: ‘engage and empower grassrootscommunities’ (Hattotuwa 2005: 14); ‘relying on the community to generate, share, and interpretcontent’ (Linder 2006: iv); and ‘designed to establish a sense of community among the users’(Laouris 2004: 76). Examples of these initiatives can be found addressing a host of current andpast conflicts around the world, including in the Middle East (Stuart & Harel 1997), Cyprus

(Laouris 2004; Laouris & Anastasiou 2005), Sri Lanka (Hattotuwa 2002; Hattotuwa 2005), theSolomon Islands (People First Network), and Burundi (Burundinet).

In Cyprus several different initiatives have been designed to address the protracted conflictand limited channels for communication between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Due to arelatively high level of economic development, a large English speaking population and highliteracy and education levels it has been relatively easy for ICT4Peace initiatives to proceed inCyprus (Laouris 2004: 69-70). The Technology For Peace (TFP) project was designed with afocus on individuals and to create a channel for members of both communities interested inpromoting peace to meet online, and discuss ideas (ibid: 75). Laouris (2004) has noted that ‘theclose relations and interactions of grass-root citizens with top-level diplomats [are instrumentalin this process]’ (77). In addition to providing a forum for peaceful discussions, the website alsoprovides a service for free SMS (Short Message Service) communications between the Northernand Southern portions of the ethnically divided island. A similar initiative, designed to addressthe ongoing tensions in the Middle East is SHALOM/SALAAM, a project focused on the‘language of conflict,’ that relies primarily on email to distribute and keep an ‘archive ofdiscourse’ (Stuart & Harel 1997). The project aims to be an interactive medium that ‘will collectthe common metaphors, stories and top-of-the-mind analogies of participants […] It is an effortto foster that deeper understanding of cultures in conflict’ (Stuart & Harel 1997). In the SolomonIslands the peace-building applications of ICT4Peace have been combined with theprogrammatic applications to create the People First Network (PFN). PFN is a web-basedinitiative designed to promote development and peace by enabling rural ‘information exchangebetween stakeholders’ and is ‘deployed with full community ownership’ (People First Network2007). Despite a lack of peer-reviewed research to support the success of these initiatives, newpeace-building projects designed with the latest forms of ICT continue to be popular. Theircredibility is premised in large part on emerging ICT trends in the developed world – farremoved from the realities of conflict zones. Linder (2006) suggests that the popularity ofvarious social networking sites in the West, like Facebook and Wikipedia, has changed thedominant view of the internet. Whereas the Internet had traditionally been viewed as only ameans to access information – a virtual library – the increased participation involved in socialnetworking has refocused attention on the Internet as a community-like network (11). Projectslike Mandate the Future (MtF), a forum designed to give Sri Lankan youth the opportunity tocommunicate their views on peace and global issues, hope to enlist social networking to create‘[global communities] based on the merger of the grassroots and web based communities’(Hattotuwa 2002: 4). Also based in Sri Lanka is Info-Share, a collaboration software platformdesigned to support ongoing communication and information sharing on the peace process and to‘enable public participation in the process from the grassroots upwards’ (Hattotuwa 2005: 1).

As the trend of online shopping booms in the developed world, another applicationpopularised in the West and hoped to have possible relevance to peace-building is OnlineDispute Resolution (ODR). ODR refers to the various online means of Alternative DisputeResolution (ADR), or resolving mostly financial disputes outside of the courts and traditionallitigation processes. Parlade (2003) has suggested that by adapting ADR techniques to the onlineenvironment, ODR might evolve to address more than just financial disputes, coveringmechanisms for dispute prevention, including education, and outreach, ‘ombudsman programs,conflict management, assisted negotiation, early neutral evaluation and assessment.’ In thedeveloped world ODR-for-profit sites such as SmartSettle, Square Trade and Cybersettle have

settled millions of financial disputes, Cybersettle alone has serviced more that a billion U.S.dollars in settlements (Cybersettle 2007). The success of these services in the more affluentregions of the world has led to conjecture regarding ODR’s relevance for peace-building in thedeveloping world. Parlade (2003) has speculated that delays in the administration of justice indeveloping countries seriously impact the quality of justice in these regions, and may be a rootcause for conflict. Balvin (2005) following this line of reason, concludes that the goal of ODR,‘to solve a given dispute in a manner that has the least negative impact on the involved parties,’could easily be applied to online services addressing the concerns of conflict protagonists. Theultimate benefit of such a service would be that once users become acquainted with the values ofa culture of peace, ‘they can practice them in conflict situations and personal disputes’ (ibid).

Communications outside of conflictStauffacher et al. (2005) have indicated that another promising avenue for ICT4Peace, issupplementing local exchanges by linking people to people, both in country and in Diasporapopulations (48). Here, it is constructive to envision Rohozinski’s (2004) concept of ‘Glocal’where initiatives designed to address peace at local levels are ‘increasingly played out on aplanetary scale’ (Rohozinski 2004b). Thus, notions of the individual and the global communityare seamlessly combined and mediated through the perception of ‘connectivity’. The HarvardLaw Schools’ peace-building initiative Global Voices Online uses ICTs to ‘shed new light on thenature of our interconnected world’ (Global Voices Online 2007). The project is designed tobuild connections across the gulfs that divide people from understanding each other more fully,emphasising the power of ICT engendered connectivity. Embracing the notion of ‘Glocal,’ theinitiative insists that the ‘bond between individuals from different worlds is personal, politicaland powerful […believing that] conversation across boundaries is essential to a future that isfree, fair, prosperous and sustainable - for all citizens of this planet’ (ibid). Similarly, Interlocalsis a website devoted to paying service to local practice by providing a forum for internationalcommunications—hence its name, ‘Inter-locals’. Despite large portions of the site written inEnglish, Interlocals is intended to target non-English speakers, ‘creating a space for people-to-people dialogue and understanding (Interlocals 2007).

As many protracted conflicts also experience large movements of populations and thecreation of diasporas, several peace-building initiatives are designed to connect members of thediaspora, ideally contributing to peace in their native communities. As an example, the GurtongPeace Trust Project hopes to create a coalition for the promotion of peace among the SouthSudanese diaspora as well as those in Sudan itself, thus linking ‘the members of the Diasporaand Home in a spirit of reconciliation and sincere love for the homeland’ (Gurtong Peace TrustProject 2007). By using the Internet to bridge the gap between different cultures and connectingSudanese all over the world the site intends to ‘make a significant contribution to the search forunity and peace’ (ibid). During the conflict in Burundi, ‘the diaspora exchanged views andagendas on Burundinet,’ (Kadende-Kaiser 2003: 273) ‘[discussing] the situation, [debating] rootcauses, and [figuring] out ways to move forward’ (Burundinet 2007).

By favouring the positive implications of communication, the peace-building applications ofICT4peace suppose that ICTs constructively address the root causes of conflict. The concept of‘collective knowledge’ is frequently cited as the means by which broad technologicalapplications will address the root causes of conflict. Stauffacher et al. (2005) suggests that well-designed ICT initiatives ‘build societies’ capacities for collective problem-solving in tense post-conflict situations’ (48), while the PFN describes the process as a ‘cross-fertilisation’ of ideas

that takes place at the national level (2007). Laouris & Anastasiou (2005) go as far as to describehow collective positivity adds to a ‘national culture of confidence and transmits a euphoria’ (9)which in turn contributes to global levels of euphoria.’ The Positive discursive theme, similar tothe Neutral and Liberal themes, obscures more than it illuminates. It is too early in thedevelopment of ICT4Peace to indicate whether or not the assumptions bred by these themes arecorrect. However, it is the ideal time to examine the likelihood that alternative implications arepossible. What the ICT4Peace discourse clearly demonstrates is a need for self-reflection, tochallenge the assumptions that ICTs encourage equality, that transparency and information flowsare democratizing and that ICTs encourage peace-building by addressing the root sources ofconflict. The following chapter, while modest in scope, hopes to introduce a new discourse, onethat challenges the assumptions thus far taken for granted within ICT4Peace.

CHAPTER THREE- Critique -

3.1 Critique of the Neutral theme: ICTs may not engender equalityReduced to its most basic unit, modern ICTs are composed of binary digits—bits—taking a

value of one or zero. Excluding science fiction tales of artificial intelligence, this technology isincapable of forming independent moral judgements, a fact that is frequently used to qualify thegeneral motif in ICT4Peace literature that ICTs are neutral and value-free. As the previousliterature review has indicated, the theme of Neutrality is often expressed by noting both thepositive and negative potential uses of these technologies but, as they are designed to addresspeace, they tend to limit their focus to those uses deemed beneficial to the creation of an‘Information Society.’ The relative silence addressing alternative implications of ICTs in conflictzones neglects the possible detrimental effects of technology, those which may aggravateexisting inequalities or possibly escalate societal tensions. Certainly, there are numerousexamples of these tools being applied to the benefit of communities immersed in conflict. Duringthe war in Kosovo BaBe (Be active, Be emancipated), a Croatian women’s’ human rights group,used the Internet to document abuses and seek support from the international community (Kee2005: 35). Similarly, during the Taliban regime the Revolutionary Women’s Association ofAfghanistan (RAWA) used hidden cameras, email and the internet to document abuses of womenwhile working with international counterparts to disseminate the images and seek both emotionaland financial support (Kee 2005: 34). These are ideal examples of ICT4Peace and technologyimproving global equality for women (Povey 2003; Kandiyoti 2005). However, technology canalso be used to further marginalise minority communities or to promote criminal endeavours.Rohozinski (2003) remarks that in the Balkans, for example, ‘organized criminal gangs havetaken to cell phones and the internet with equal vigour, using them to sustain criminal enterprisesand networks that penetrate the larger region and range across sectarian lines’ (Rohozinski 2003:221). While these examples do support the claim that technology can be used for both beneficialand detrimental applications, they do not attest to the neutrality of ICTs. If neutral is understoodin the political sense, meaning abstaining from taking sides in a conflict (Downing & Thigpen1989: 505), then the ease with which ICTs are drafted to both favourable and detrimental—evencriminal—uses, implies that this technology is not neutral but rather ambiguous. Thus, critiquingthe assumption that ICTs encourage equality in conflict zones begins first by highlighting theambiguity of this technology, and the possible inequalities that it may sustain or provoke.

Research devoted to the philosophy of technology has overwhelmingly sided against the viewof technology as neutral. More than simple binary characters, ICT can be reduced to thelanguage that surrounds the technology, the political nature of the decision whether or not toemploy technology and even the anatomy of technology, each of which ‘point to technologybeing value-laden, not neutral or value-free’ (Davies 1995: 133). The theme of neutrality withinmuch of the ICT4Peace discourse may largely be a result of an organizational norm devoted toemphasizing this quality. Many of the groups devoted to ICT4Peace and embroiled in dangerousconflict zones, like the UN or the ICRC rely on humanitarian inviolability and safe passagebased on the pillars of neutrality and impartiality (Anderson 2004). Thus incorporation of thesethemes into organisational discourse is necessary, ‘especially during war, when the cooperationof the belligerent parties is essential to the relief of suffering’ (ibid: 41). In this sense the themeof Neutrality can be characterized more as a hopeful expectation of the communities they wish to

create than a tangible reality. Ribeiro (1997) suggests that this inaccurate portrayal of neutralitymay be a ‘common characteristic of all imagined communities [giving] the impression thateveryone is equal once qualified’ (4). Contrary to these hopeful expectations, ICTs favour thosebest and most able to exploit them and these uses do not always favour peace.

ICT4Peace highlights the theme of Neutrality to lament the great disparities that exist on earth,but often fails to recognize how the ambiguity of this technology may in fact exacerbate globalinequalities. Violent conflict is in itself a global inequality which disproportionately affectsdeveloping countries. Between 1960 and 1999 ‘one half of the least developed countries […]suffered conflict’ (Stewart 2003: 326). Technology is not like potable water, food or shelter inthe sense that its value is universally shared. Technology is valuable only to those who knowhow to use it, and even then the most advanced and experienced users will incur disproportionatesuccess. As Gunkel (2003) suggests, ‘the value of this technology has been determined by uniquecircumstances that are only applicable to a small fraction of the world’s population’ (508). Thisis currently the case, as by any measure only a small subset of the world’s population enjoys anoverwhelming proportion the world’s technological prowess. The U.S. has more computers thanthe rest of the world combined and contains 50 percent of the world’s internet users. WhereasSouth Asia, which has 23 percent of the world’s people, claims less than one per cent of theworld’s Internet users (Dagron 2001: 28-29). ‘The typical Internet user worldwide is male, lessthan 35 years old, with a university education and high income, urban-based and Englishspeaking— a member of a very elite minority’ (ibid). Similar inequalities persist with otheradvanced forms of ICT seeing as 92 percent of the market in production and consumption ofcomputer hardware, software, and services are represented within the twenty-nine members ofthe Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; Norris 2000b: 2-3).These figures are not supportive of the idealistic claims of advanced technology’s rationalneutrality, rather they indicate that the skills required to benefit from ICTs promise to accrue tothose best able to exploit them, those with the most experience with them, and those most able toshape their development. Rosenau and Singh (2002) suggest that if ‘this is the same group thathas always exploited technological innovations […] then we should expect, by extension, littlechange in international political processes and outcomes’ (9). The future that Rosenau and Singhpredict is one where global inequalities remain ultimately unaffected by the advancement anddistribution of ICTs. Those who emphasis the neutrality of technology and promise a cyberdomain that is capable of engendering equality have failed to note ‘how much the new worldoverlaps and rests on the traditional world in which power depends on geographically basedinstitutions […] the information revolution exists in the context of an existing political structure’(Keohane & Nye 1998: 82, 85). More ominous than the prospect of ICTs supporting the statusquo of global disparities, is Norris’s (2000a) suggestion that ‘far from promoting greater equalitybetween nations,’ ICTs like the internet ‘could allow more advanced economies to pull fartherahead’ (2). Davies has echoed this sentiment by recalling that ‘the benefits of [technologies are]often unequally distributed in favour of the resourcers’ (Davies 1995: 133), notably the Westerndeveloped world.

While there are segments of the global population that stand poised to unequally reap thebenefits of the ‘Information Society’ there are also possible disparities within states that must beaddressed. Gurumurthy (2005) describes elites in developing countries as being outside theburden of the ‘digital divide,’ suggesting that a privileged few within developing countries tendto dominate the control and direction of ICTs in the early stages of diffusion. It is useful to recall

that the diffusion of agricultural technology to developing states known as the “GreenRevolution” did not benefit all landowners equally. While the American inspired research didproduce hybrid grain seeds which increased crop yields, the intensive capital inputs that werenecessary favoured large and wealthy landowners disproportionately (Layton 1992: 10-11). Farfrom being neutral, the Green Revolution was ‘formed and governed by the social and economicconditions specific to the US of the time’ (ibid) and ultimately the effect in developing countrieshas been that ‘the knowledge gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” has widened’(Dagron 2001: 29).

In the context of ICT4Peace, it becomes clear that the ambiguity of technology has seriousimplications for conflict zones by favouring those best able to manipulate the technology, ratherthan those with the noblest of intentions. Examples from Rwanda suggest that the tools importedto support the operational applications of ICT4Peace were ‘neither neutral nor inconsequential inthe eyes of conflict protagonists on the ground’ (Rohozinski 2003: 219). Rohozinski (2003)describes how at the most benign end of the spectrum UN radios were frequently stolen by localsto pirate UN frequencies for long personal conversations. More portentously, these same toolswere allegedly used by the key perpetrators of the 1994 genocide to pass coded messages acrossthe country (219) and further fuel the conflict. Thus, technology intended to promote peaceinstead favoured the innovative, albeit seditious use of inciting violence. As trends in violentconflict shift further away from interstate conflict towards growing intrastate violence (Hensel2002: 1), power relations within countries will be of increasing relevance. The theme of treatingICTs as neutral, in conjunction with the assumption of equality, threatens to further accentuateschisms within states. Peters (2001) warns that the ‘underlying trend is that privileged groupsacquire and use technology more effectively, and because the technology benefits them, theybecome more privileged’ (34). There is ample evidence to suggest that ICTs are simply notcapable of engendering equality where it has not previously existed.

Development theorists have offered the ‘digital divide’ as a much needed critique showingthat this utopian rhetoric remains oblivious to the fact that access to technology is ‘limited byspecific circumstances, and should not be assumed to be automatic or universally applicable’(Gunkel 2003: 500). Although the notion of a ‘digital divide’ has been criticised as furtherperpetuating a prejudicial paradigm of development, limited in its engagement with societiesonly to the point of addressing what they lack (Potter 2006), it is nevertheless useful foridentifying extant inequalities (Gunkel 2003: 507). By its very definition the ‘digital divide’addresses different levels of technical and socioeconomic barriers to equality. For the purposesof this research the term is understood to refer to the gap between those who do effectively usenew ICTs, and those who do not. Broadly speaking the digital divide can be separated into twocategories of disparities: access inequalities —technical impediments to adopting thetechnology, for example financial, physical infrastructure, and literacy concerns; and structuralinequalities —deep-seeded social and cultural inequalities that are reflected in the adoption oftechnology, for example gendered, ethnic, and racial divisions. The remainder of this critiqueexamines the access and structural inequalities that cast doubt upon the assumption the ICTs aretools of peace, engendering equality.

Access InequalitiesSeemingly, global ICT distribution is rapidly increasing; all African countries now have accessto the internet, compared to only 11 in 1996 (Miller 2001). Mobile phone use in particular hasshown a penchant for reaching populations affected by conflict ahead of telephone landlines,

mains electricity and even drinkable water, like in Somalia, Liberia and the Democratic Republicof Congo (White 2003). Clearly this reflects substantial progress in the diffusion of ICTs outsidethe developed world; however it would be a mistake to assume that a levelling of theinternational technological landscape has begun. As Miller (2001) has noted, many of theinternet connections in Africa consist of just one internet service provider (ISP) located in capitolcities, while many Africans who do have internet access may only have unreliable access toemail. Technical impediments to accessing ICTs are numerous, but in areas of conflict the mostobvious are a lack of necessary infrastructure and financial destitution. Rice (2003) hassummarised this impediment as, ‘[for] an estimated 2 billion people, access to fresh water orelectricity is a daily challenge of more fundamental concern than access to the informationsociety’ (Rice 2003: 82). For countries affected by violent conflict, often the world’s poorestcountries, up to 80 percent often live in rural areas that simply lack the infrastructure to supportadvanced ICTs (Peters 2001: 27). While this disparity deprives rural populations of access to thistechnology, it may also further emphasise urban-rural inequalities. The market remains the mostwidely used mechanism for the dispersion of ICTs; therefore it is quite probable that disparitiesin access to these technologies will follow global and domestic economic patterns (Rosenau &Johnson 2002: 61). Golding (2000) suggests that throughout history this pattern of marketdispersal has led to what he describes as the ‘fallacy of universal abundance’. While in the pastconsumer goods have inevitably progressed from more affluent groups to the less affluent, recentICTs do not follow this pattern. While earlier innovations were introduced during periods ofrapid economic growth and rising popular affluence, none of these trends are currently present(174). Additionally, reminiscent of the Green Revolution, ICTs require recurrent investments forupgrades, replacements, peripherals, and a host of other incidental costs (ibid). ‘Even a $600 PCor $100 Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) phone is far beyond the reach of the vast majorityof the world's population, when nearly 3 billion live on less than $2 a day’ (Peters 2001: 29).Other technical impediments that merit consideration include basic literacy, the ability tounderstand the basic mechanics of the technology to repair and maintain it, as well as thelanguage skills necessary to operate technologies dominated by English. Research hasdemonstrated that even among the relatively few internet users in Africa, a higher education andEnglish language skills remain a necessity (Peters 2001: 27; Mercer 2006: 252). Largely forpractical reasons, these technical aspects of the ‘digital divide’ are the most frequently discussed.Of even greater relevance to ICT4Peace, yet more difficult to overcome, is the development of asocial divide, or the structural inequalities that affect discriminated groups within society.

Structural InequalitiesBy limiting discussion of the ‘digital divide’ to technical inequalities, the response also becomeslimited to a technical solution, usually greater technology transfer and improved infrastructure.When considering the possible inequalities supported by ICTs it is also necessary to consider that‘ICT disparities usually exacerbate existing disparities based on location (such as urban-rural),gender, ethnicity, physical disability, age, and, especially, income level’ (Peters 2001: 34).Providing, inexpensive or free access to ICTs, attends only to the access inequalities and not tothe underlying social inequalities antithetical to peace. Only 46 percent of women living inpoverty are literate, ‘53 percent of the world’s poor do not speak the official language in thecountry where they live and more than two-thirds of people living in poverty also live in ruralareas’ (Rice 2003: 82). Thus, it is unlikely that minority groups stand to experience greatadvantages from the introduction of ICTs. Statistics on internet use indicate that gender

represents a profound structural inequality in ICT use. Internet access studies in Ethiopia,Senegal, and Zambia have shown respectively that 86 percent, 83 percent, and 64 percent ofInternet users are male, while only 4 percent of users in the Arab world are female (Peters 2001:27). These statistics are indicative of large structural inequalities that ICTs may help to furtherperpetuate. McKay & Mazurana (1999) have demonstrated that there are a host of socialconstraints to female access to ICTs in developing countries including high illiteracy rates,language, time constraints, and cultural and traditional inhibitions. As ‘gender roles are nowheremore prominent than in war’ (Goldstein 2001), the possibility that ICTs may promote existinginequalities should be an important consideration for ICT4Peace initiatives. Particularly since incountries ‘where women are not allowed to learn to read, let alone use a computer, theincorporation of the computer into that society will only benefit men, thus increasing inequality’(Peters 2001: 36).

A discourse based on the theme of neutrality, and one that perpetuates the assumption thatICTs engender peaceful equality disregards the realities of conflict zones and the internationalpolitical arena where ‘information does not flow in a vacuum but in a political space that isalready occupied’ (Keohane & Nye 1998: 84). ICT4Peace has thus far ignored the ambiguity oftechnology—the possibility that these tools will not be used for their intended purposes—and thereality that ICTs can and do favour those best able to manipulate the technology. A digital divideexists, both in terms of technical access and structural inequalities. What is most alarming is thatthese technologies may be capable of exacerbating existing societal tensions in areas sensitive topower differentials, discrimination, and violence. As Rohozinski (2003) has astutely noted, ICTsfollow patterns of appropriation that support the unique social behaviours, cultural norms andpolitical struggles in which they find themselves (233), regardless of what ICT4Peace initiativesintend or the international community deems legitimate.

3.2 Critique of the Liberal theme: ICTs may not be democratizingDuring the Cold War era international politics were heavily dominated by the inter-systematic

feuding between liberalism and communism, a conflict of values so fundamental that ‘both“camps” claimed universal validity and exclusive legitimacy’ (Schimmelfennig 2000: 123). Ascommunism in Europe collapsed, the Western international community found itself in a positionto declare its own values as ‘the only internationally recognized principles of legitimatestatehood’ (ibid). Liberals have come to optimistically presume that the norms and values ofliberalism universally apply to all regions of earth and all spheres of life (Kedzie 2002: 107).Subsequently the ‘coincident revolutions’ at the end of the 20th Century—emerging democraciesaround the world and the proliferation of ICTs—inspire Western societies to conclude that thetwo trends are linked, despite only anecdotal evidence to this effect (Kedzie 1997). For thepurposes of this critique democracy is defined quite broadly as a combination of representativegovernment and individual freedoms (Kedzie 1995). As the literature review attests the Liberaldiscursive theme in ICT4Peace tends to err toward modernism and enlightenment, emphasisingthe positive rather than the negative aspects of increased transparency bred by ICTs. Liberals, intheir conviction that ICTs are ‘particularly well suited to carry the message of democracyabroad,’ (Kedzie 2002: 108) are remiss to note that ICTs are also useful tools of deception, statepropaganda and terror (Eriksson & Giacomello 2006: 231). In many cases ICTs are simplyinadequate to serve the demands of democratic development, particularly in countries affected byconflict. The following critique demonstrates that the democratising potential of ICTs cannot betaken for granted. Increased transparency and ICT proliferation do not always threatenauthoritarian regimes, and in fact sometimes they are beneficial to them. The critique also takes amore critical eye to transparency, concluding that there are both quantitative and qualitativebarriers to democracy.

ICTs and authoritarian regimesICT4Peace, dominated by liberalism, sees ICT as having a special mediating role in democraticpeace theory— the claim that democracies are unlikely to fight each other (Kedzie 2002: 108).By transporting democracy around the globe and threatening the rule of authoritarian regimes,ICTs are believed to be ‘promoting pacific modes of international cooperation’ (ibid). While acritique of democratic peace theory is beyond the span of this research (see for examples Layne1994, Raknerud & Hegre 1997 and Rosato 2003), there is plenty of evidence to cast doubt on theassertion that ICTs threaten authoritarian regimes.

To begin with, the barriers to access described in the previous section (3.1) and embodied inthe ‘digital divide,’ simply preclude many individuals under authoritarian regimes frombenefiting from any democratising potential that ICTs may engender. While ICTs may have theability to foster certain liberties in these societies, adopting these technologies also necessitatesthe existence of certain liberties, including access to education and at least modest freedoms tospeak one’s mind. The ultimate irony ‘is that those who might most benefit from the net’sdemocratic and informational potential are least likely either to have access to it, the tools to useit, or the educational background to take advantage’ (Barber 1997: 224). To suggest, as BillClinton has, that ICTs have the power to ‘make a closed political and economic society“impossible” and ultimately bring down [communist regimes]’ (Lord 2006: 15), ignores the greatamount of domestic power these regimes wield and their ability to control the flow ofinformation within their borders. It is an incorrect assumption that authoritarian regimes areaverse to ICTs and transparency. In fact, these regimes tend to encourage those ICTs that they

are most able to control, therefore often encouraging television use, while strengthening thebarriers to adopting the internet (Corrales & Westhoff 2006: 912). Despite ICT4Peace’sportrayal of the internet as a portent of liberal democracy, many authoritarian states have beenable to embrace the internet without suffering great challenges to the power of their regimes.Increasingly, wealthy, market-oriented autocratic states have begun to allow internet access tocitizens. For while they may fear the possible political consequences of greater informationflows, these states also celebrate the economic payoffs of internet expansion (ibid: 911). Notably,Singapore has championed a massive state-led initiative to emerge as the ICT hub in the AsiaPacific region, giving its entire population high-speed access to the internet, while having ‘nointention of surrendering political control in the process’ (Lord 2006: 104). Singapore’s shrewdability to reconcile the economic benefits of transparency, with the objective of maintainingpolitical control has become a model for other authoritarian regimes including China (ibid: 113).China has taken advantage of the fact that 38 per cent of its internet users are exclusivelyinterested in ‘entertainment’ (Corrales & Westhoff 2006: 929). By providing access—albeitheavily censored—the state has further consolidated its control by diminishing a great manycitizens’ dissatisfaction with the status quo. Corrales and Westhoff (2006) predict that thecumulative effect might actually be ‘insufficient pressure for democratization, and consequently,postponed democratization’ (929). Authoritarian regimes are skilled at adapting technology tosuit their own demands. While ICT4Peace research highlights how ICTs have promoted civicinvolvement in Western democratic countries, better communications and transparency can alsohelp rulers keep tabs on and intimidate their citizens.

Since ICTs frequently rely on communication networks comprised of computers locatedwithin the sovereign jurisdiction of the state, governments are free to restrict the content of thesenetworks (Lord 2006: 97). This is particularly the case with the Internet which, as LawrenceLessig notes, both democratic and authoritarian governments can regulate by manipulating theunderlying code and the legal environment in which it operates (in Kalathil & Boas 2003).Therefore many authoritarian regimes are becoming adept at blocking unwanted content from theeyes of citizens and monitoring and punishing violators. In 2003, eight of the Middle Eastern andNorth African (MENA) countries had implemented censorship or surveillance regimes, and haddesignated specially formed government departments to police their population’s use of e-mailand the internet (Rohozinski 2004a: 2). The intensity of these efforts varies between states, as dothe tactics used. Syria blocks the entire Israeli Internet domain (.il), Tunisia actively monitorsinternet usage detaining and arresting offenders, and in Egypt police pose as online homosexualsto entrap and prosecute those who respond to their advances (ibid). The emphasis withinICT4Peace on free flows of information and the democratising power of free speech in blogs andwebsites is not reflective of the reality in many countries where draconian regulations are used topersecute individuals for content posted to the web (See “Malaysia cracks down” 2007). Inperhaps the most extreme case—although not atypical of the tension present in conflictzones—Rohozinski (2004) describes how Palestinian telecommunications are routed by way ofISPs to Israeli security services, where this information has been used to carry out targetedassassinations (2). As authoritarian regimes open up their telecommunications markets they willhave no shortage of willing partners in carrying out their content restrictions. Foreignmultinational corporations—eager to gain access to virgin markets—provide these regimes withintrusive user information and allow content restrictions in return for the chance to do business.States have the means and the motivation to control the use of ICT, consequently it is unrealistic

to expect these tools to democratise people if challenging the status quo presents a genuine andpalpable threat. Thus, it is likely that rather than being a determinant of societal change, ICTs aremore often a mirror of the larger society in which they operate (Barber 1997: 210).Quantitative barriers to promoting democracy

Rational debate, political deliberation (Raiti 2006: 3), and prudence are the features thatdefine the ideal democratic process (Barber 1997: 208-209). These paced and considered valuespose an immediate challenge to applying ICTs—by nature high-speed—to promoting thedemocratic process. Also relevant is the overwhelming amount of information distributed byICTs. In 2002, the Internet alone contained 532,897 terabytes of information (UCB 2003), avalue that would be much larger in 2007, and nonetheless is equal to more 53,000 times theamount of information printed in the US Libraries of congress (ibid). The vast growth ofinformation made possible by ICTs has led to what Zinnbauer (2001) refers to as ‘informationglut’ and resulted in ‘attention poverty’. This information glut requires a near constant capacityto receive information and a distinct willingness to analyse and assess data on behalf of the user.Subsequently, ‘if the bottleneck was ever availability of information it has now shifted toattention’ (ibid). Keohane and Nye (1998) have also warned of the detrimental effects ofattention poverty, indicating that as attention becomes a scarce resource it will be thoseindividuals capable of distinguishing between the valuable signals and the white noise that gainthe most power (89), and this group is likely to be those who have designed the technology.Contrary to claims of democratisation, information glut and attention poverty indicate thataverage citizens may be overwhelmed and marginalised by their experiences with ICT,particularly in countries with very little familiarity with advanced technology. The amount ofinformation and the speed with which it is transmitted necessitate efficient knowledgemanagement systems which are often lacking in conflict situations. Steele and Stein (2002) makereference to this dilemma, describing how in the period leading up to World War I the speed ofnewly developed ICTs ‘severely limited the opportunities for a diplomatic solution to the crisis’(27). This problem exists to an even greater extent in the age of satellite and wireless ICTdevices. Holohan (2003) suggests that during the conflict in Kosovo the ‘biggest danger wasbeing drowned in a deluge of detail while suffering a dearth of useful and non-time consuminganalysis’ (36). This raises another concern regarding the usefulness of the informationtransmitted by ICTs. The assumption that ICTs are democratising relies on the promise of easilyaccessible and useful information available to citizens. As Barber suggests: ‘strong democracycalls not only for votes but for good reasons; not only for an opinion but for a rational argumenton its behalf’ (Barber 1997: 223).

Qualitative barriers to promoting democracyOn its own the quantity of information available through ICTs means little to the promotion ofdemocracy. What is probably more important is the quality of the information, and what it standsto contribute to democratic discourse. Unfortunately ICTs—particularly the internet andSMS—suffer from a reputation problem. The supposed ‘democratization of online publishing’(Zinnbauer 2001) has led to a vast plurality of sources. As Lord (2006) has so eloquently stated‘transparency is not synonymous with truth’ (5). Western observers, with a longer history ofusing digital sources, feel relatively comfortable distinguishing between reality and rumour, factand perception. However, conflict environments are vulnerable to fear and speculation andindividuals may have insufficient exposure to these technology systems to discriminate betweenreliable sources and propaganda. Dyson (1998) maintains that even Western societies have yet to

learn ‘Net literacy,’ often taking a story’s appearance online as ‘proof that it has been subjectedto rigorous journalistic standards’ (50-51). While ICT4Peace may position ICTs as tools oflearning and democratic participation, research into the actual uses of these tools contests this.Gunkel (2004) reports that some of the most popular services on the internet are sex chat rooms,online game playing and retail shopping; young internet users are mostly interested inentertainment. In Yemen only 5 per cent of users employ the internet for academics and 95 percent have tried to access pornography (Rohozinski 2004a: 19). In fact, accessing pornography onthe internet is common around the world. In Nigeria up to 40 per cent of usage is related tobrowsing sex sites (Longe & Longe 2005: 60) and in Tanzania at least a quarter of Internet use isrelated to pornography (Mercer 2006: 34).

Certainly, the possibility for the internet and other ICTs to offer citizens access to news,science and diverse opinions from around the globe is astonishing. Unfortunately, researchconfirms that ‘once digitally enabled, all groups – by income, ethnicity, gender and education –fall into almost identical patterns of usage’ (Gunkel 2004). The research presented in this portionof the critique indicates that there is strong evidence to suggest that ICTs do not inevitably andirreversibly create democracy. In reality, ICTs are often manipulated by authoritarian regimes tointimidate populations and consolidate their own political control. Ward & Gleditsch (1998) findthat new ‘rocky’ democracies, particularly those that experienced rapid transitions, are at anincreased risk of being involved in warfare. With this consideration, ICT4Peace initiatives mustproceed with caution, aware of the social and political power differentials that are being created.By 1990, one out of every thirteen Rwandans owned a radio, an initiative which had beenheavily promoted by UNESCO as a democratic development tool (Lord 2006: 59). Four yearslater these tools were used as weapons of war. When former US Vice-President Al Gore predictsthe creation of a ‘new Athenian Age of democracy’ (Lord 2006), he speaks of ICTs as being a‘metaphor for democracy itself’ (ibid). However, a critique of this assumption prompts theominous reminder that ‘in Athens neither women nor slaves got much of a political look in’(Golding 2000: 175).

3.3 Critique of the Positive theme: ICTs may not promote grassroots interactionsAs the discourse analysis presented in Chapter Two indicates, a Positive discursive theme

runs through much of ICT4Peace, always favouring the beneficial possibilities of ICTs at theneglect of addressing the more malignant prospects of this technology. This theme is mostobvious in ICT4Peace’s near-complete disregard of the limits to social and individualappropriation of ICTs. In reality, the near 50 percent failure rate of ICTs in developing countries(Câmara & Fonseca 2007: 121) should cast doubt on the assumption that these tools incurpositive interactions at the grassroots level. By failing to consider how these tools might bedetrimental to individuals and communities in conflict zones, the sustainability of theseinitiatives is questionable. Guerin (2005) has argued that in order for technological innovationsto be sustainable, there must be major investment and participation on the behalf of the affectedcommunities; ‘the quality of life must improve, and citizens must be empowered’ (5). To datethe ICT4Peace discourse has largely assumed that access to ICTs is a ‘good thing’ (Mercer 2004:51), and have thus been unreceptive to possible unintended and negative consequences. NicholasNegroponte personifies this assumption by refusing to address criticism directed towards his OneLaptop Per Child (OLPC) project (designed to provide inexpensive laptops to children of thedeveloping world), suggesting that ‘criticising [OLPC] is like criticising the church, or the RedCross’ (Aihe 2006). Nevertheless, there is a relevant and persuasive critique of ICT4Peace thatsuggests that these tools may not be relevant or appropriate for developing communities affectedby conflict, and that other stake-holders stand to gain much more than the local communities.Without a consideration of local conditions, even the most philanthropic intentions can besubverted and used to further local violence. An instructive example is the GooB projectmentioned in section 2.3. Designed to build governance capacity and local ownership throughthe use of ‘ready-made ICT tools for civilian administrations’ (CMI 2004), the project has failedto consider how ethnic tension or corruption might undermine its positive intentions. While theGooB is premised on the assumption that ‘civil registration is an important first step to givinglocal people a sense of belonging and to regulating their daily lives’ (CMI 2004), it is notdifficult to imagine how such a database of sensitive information could be misused in conflictenvironments. In Sri Lanka for example, the U.N. has accused the government’s security forcesof helping to abduct child soldiers to fight the Tamil Tigers (‘Sri Lanka army’ 2006).Additionally, had the GooB program existed in Rwanda during the genocide, it seems unlikelythat the ‘vulnerable group module’ designed as ‘a simple tool to register vulnerable groups’(CMI 2004) would have been used for noble intentions. ICT4Peace must stand accountable tothe intended recipients of these initiatives, addressing both the questionable local content and theintent of its designs.Questionable local content in ICT4Peace

The Positive discursive motif in ICT4Peace, by assuming that ICTs have desirable impacts ina community, portray sustainability as a technical property of the technology—its durability,ease of use, or universality. What is of greater importance is the social and cultural properties ofICTs, that is to say whether or not the technology serves a particular need of the community orprovides meaningful local content. In this case more than just basic computer literacy is needed,meaningful local content is understood to be an expression of each particular community’sexperiences and indigenous knowledge. In studies designed to examine ‘local content,’ theprincipal findings demonstrate that international ICT initiatives fail to coherently define ‘localcontent’ (Noronha 2004: 8). Influenced by notions of ‘glocal’ interactions, ‘one person’s “local”

content is another’s “global” content’ (ibid). Regarding sustainability, what is most important isthat local content is reflective of the community it is designed for, that rather than being viewedas content for local communities, it is seen as content from local communities (ibid). Thus thecontent of these initiatives—both hardware and software—must emanate from the needs of thecommunity, a feature that is noticeably absent from many ICT4Peace initiatives. RecentUNESCO research conducted in the Pacific region shows that some island countries are stilltrying to reach even 10 percent of local content on television (Gonzalez 2004: 12). Manyinitiatives do not even achieve the most basic language requirements of ‘local content,’ sinceEnglish-dominated digital spaces are ill-equipped for non-Latin based text. ICT4Peace initiativesalso ignore the more nuanced cultural qualities of these communities where, as in much of Africaand South Asia, physical meetings and orality are integral components of communication(Noronha 2004: 7; Mercer 2004: 59). Mercer (2004) has demonstrated that email can beanathema to these cultures, generally eschewed in favour of more personal and direct forms ofcommunication (59). In Tanzania for example, locals often are not used ‘to seeing objects as asource of information,’ preferring ‘to ask people’ rather than replacing personal contact (ibid:59-60).

The Positive discursive theme of ICT4Peace generally assumes that local engagement in ICTsis the only rational approach that individuals can take (Heeks 1999: 10), refusing to acknowledgethat wilful non-participation is a legitimate choice as well. Notions of beneficial ‘local content’are undermined by usage statistics that indicate a high prevalence of pornography on the internetand a ubiquity of information otherwise irrelevant to conflict communities: 10 out of every 12emails are spam, and 1 in 12 is a virus (Postini.com 2007). Even in developed Western societies,studies indicate a large body of voluntary nonusers of ICTs. Nearly 40 percent of Hispanic non-users in the US cite ‘don’t need’ as their reason for abstaining from the internet, with another 6percent of responses being ‘too old’ or ‘not interested’ (Gunkel 2004). When a third of all non-users in the US are ‘just not interested’ in computers (ibid), the relevance of these tools inconflict communities is speculative, even dangerous if negative externalities exist. Embodied inthe Positive discursive theme of ICT4Peace is the Contact Hypothesis, postulating that greaterand broader contact between individuals of antagonistic social groups will encourage thepeaceful and deliberative settlement of disputes, thus reducing inter-group tension (Lord 2006:46). This optimistic hypothesis predicts that conflict—simply ‘rooted in miscommunication andmisunderstanding’—can be alleviated through increased communication at the grassroots level(Steele & Stein 2002: 26). Despite the heuristic appeal of this assertion there is a great deal ofresearch to indicate that conflict resolution and the channels of communication have complexand at times antagonistic interactions. Putnam has identified an important distinction between‘bridging’ contact groups ‘that function to bring together disparate members of the community,’and ‘bonding’ contact groups ‘that reinforce close-knit networks among people sharing similarbackgrounds and beliefs’ (Norris 2002: 1). This distinction is particularly relevant to conflictcommunities; while bridging groups tend to produce positive externalities, bonding groups are ata greater risk of producing negative externalities (ibid). The possibility that online communitiesmay reinforce likeminded beliefs and prejudices, rather than communal understanding isparticularly germane to zones of conflict, where as the case of Rwanda demonstrates, fear and in-grouping may corrupt the possibility of bridging contact. The contact hypothesis assumes thatcontact is experienced among equals with shared goals, however in environments corrupted byviolence and asymmetrical power relations, contact may exacerbate and widen on-going conflict

and social cleavages (Norris 2002: 1). Kadende-Kaiser (2003), though a proponent of computermediated communication (CMC), acknowledges that ‘if power and influence are not outside, butare at least partly encoded within us’ it becomes unlikely that the distancing, isolation andanonymity of CMC serve to displace or dilute tensions (276). In what is ‘arguably the mostsignificant [work] in social psychology’ (Fine 2004: 663), Muzafer Sherif’s (1961) researchestablished that merely increasing the opportunities for contact between rival groups was notenough to encourage cooperation, and in fact could possibly elevate the levels of conflict (Sherif1961). Ultimately, if the contact is asymmetrical in nature, reflecting existing social inequalities,contact alone will not act as a venue of change, but rather as a catalyst for further aggression(Maoz 2001: 190-191). In communities embroiled in ‘fear, contests over power, or historicalperceptions of wrongdoing’ (Lord 2006: 52), it becomes a distinct possibility that in-groups willuse contact to increase their own self-worth by devaluing the out-group (ibid).

Rather than benefiting local communities, Akpan’s (2003) research indicates that ‘[private-sector] interests and for-profit organizations appear to be the immediate beneficiaries’ (271) of adiscourse that favours the use of ICTs to aid in the development of conflict communities.Noronha (2004) refers to ‘information colonialism’ as the process by which large portions of theworld are converted into ‘“downloading” societies and consumers of information, instead of“uploading” ones and producers of information’ (6). As advanced ICTs diffuse across the worldthe trend favouring large proprietary companies threatens to increase the inequality in contentdistribution and favour the Western developed world (Peters 2001: 38). The fact that ICT4Peaceis now on the global agenda, does not necessarily reflect the intrinsic merit of this issue.According to Luyt (2004), it is instead indicative of a ‘particular convergence of interests andtheir ability to collectively set the political agenda in a certain way.’

Questionable intent in ICT4PeaceSimilar to Mazrui’s (1978) critique of political development, ICT4Peace can easily be evaluatedas ‘a process of acquiring Western skills of government, Western restraints in politicalbehaviour, and Western institutions for resolving conflict.’ As developing countries, includingthose affected by conflict, increasingly act as lucrative markets for ICTs as well as peripheralICT service providers, it is necessary for these markets to establish adequate levels ofinfrastructure to support this development. Thus the capitalistic motives of the West, fitremarkably well with a discourse premised on ‘automatic and unproblematic catch-up,leapfrogging, and progress to the ideal represented by the developed countries’ (Wilson 2001:12). Keohane and Nye (1998) argue that, being the ‘first on the scene,’ the U.S. is well placed tocreate the standards and architecture of the global information system (88). This proposition isexemplified by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the privateAmerican corporation solely responsible for administering the identifier systems of the internet.ICANN is frequently accused of ‘not fostering accountability’ and ultimately favouring theinterests of the industry sector (Ó Siochrú 2007: 28). By portraying ICT4Peace as a struggle tocatch up with the Western developed world, there is great risk that the developing world willexperience only imitation and dependency. That is, ‘imitation may engender vulnerability tocontinued manipulation by Western economic and political interests’ (Mazrui 1978). This trendis already present, symbolized by the 15 percent of the world’s population that provides nearlyall of the world’s technological innovation, the approximately 50 percent only able to adapt thistechnology in production and consumption, and the small remainder who exist completelydisconnected from both innovation and adoption (Rice 2003: 82). Regardless of the proposed

benefits of ICTs in conflict-affected countries, ‘the ancillary benefits for corporations andstakeholders to developing rural regions […] are to place conduit devices in the hands of asmany potential consumers as possible’ (Raiti 2006). ICT4Peace initiatives will introducetechnology that has large associated costs that primarily benefit Western corporations. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, around US$24 billion dollars is paid each year to mostly U.S.-basedsoftware companies to secure the use of proprietary products (May 2006: 123). HoweverAfricans need to work much longer than their Western counterparts to afford the software.Ghosh has calculated that considering the amount of work hours needed to purchase a US$560license for Microsoft XP, in Africa the equivalent price is US$30,297 (cited in May 2006: 136).It is probable that corporate and private interests in ICT4Peace are only in their nascent stages,and are liable to become more widespread in the future. The UNICTTF report suggests that‘more needs to be done to engage the private sector’ and ‘leverage the business community’sexpertise’ (Stauffacher et al. 2005: 62). This is despite research that indicates that the benefits ofthese partnerships with private firms accrue asymmetrically to the corporate sponsors (Reed2000: 12).

Returning to the concept of sustainability, initiatives driven by capitalistic tendencies areunlikely to have the grassroots success that ICT4Peace predicts. As Thabo Mbeki has indicated,the developing world is ‘extremely interested to ensure that [they] are not mere importers andconsumers of a predetermined content. Rather, [they] also want to be […] active and significantparticipants in the creation, production and formulation of content’ (Mbeki 1995). As countriesrecovering from conflict increasingly form alliances with large propriety companies, for exampleRwanda and Microsoft, many are unaware of the political implications of proprietary software(Gurumurthy 2005). Without the freedom to copy, modify and distribute software, localcommunities will ultimately be constrained in their efforts to create context-specific andmeaningful content. As May (2006) has noted, ‘when the source code of software is protected,reverse engineering of specific programmes for local modification is inhibited [… furtherrestraining] local innovators to improve off-the-shelf technologies to reflect local conditions’(May 2006: 134).

A century ago, a British ambassador upon considering the social implications of the telegraph,declared that ‘[it] is impossible that old prejudices and hostilities should longer exist’ as this newdevise would allow people the world over to share their thoughts and hopes with one another(Lord 2006: 46). In the past, just as now, the Western developed world’s understanding oftechnology has been intimately bound to its perceived assumptions regarding the revolutionsthese innovations are expected to engender (Rohozinski 2003:16). A critical eye finds a greatdeal of evidence to cast doubt upon overly positive assumptions, particularly at the grassrootslevel of conflict. There is certainly the possibility that ICTs have a worthy contribution to maketo conflict communities, but without a rigorous consideration of these initiative’s faults, they arelikely to be unsustainable and possibly dangerous.

CHAPTER FOUR- Conclusion –

The very nature of designing technological systems to suit social and cultural purposes iswhat Fitzpatrick (2003) has described as a ‘wicked problem,’ where there is no answer to befound but rather a trial and error process that continually reveals more about the nature of theproblem (x). Hence, a critique of ICT4Peace that is limited only to criticism fails to beenlightening. Rather, such a critique should take what is assumed and ‘show that these thingshave their history, […] that the starting point is not a given but a construct, usually blind to itself’(Johnson 1981: xv). The Neutral, Liberal and Positive discursive themes of ICT4Peace have theirorigins in the West’s unique experiences with technological modernity. This critique does notnecessarily suggest that these themes are wrong, rather that they are an incomplete picture of thesocial implications of technology in regions of conflict. Postman has noted that ‘anyone whopractices the art of cultural criticism must endure being asked, what is the solution to theproblems you describe?’ (1993: 181). Of course, there are no ‘solutions’ to wicked problems,only novel ways of approaching them.

In computer science, programs are ideally designed to ‘gracefully degrade,’ meaning possiblefailures are considered during the design phase to ensure the program functions well even ifsome components fail. Given that it is impossible to predict with certainty the social effects thata technology will experience, ICT4Peace must struggle to design initiatives that are deeplyconsiderate of possible design flaws and the characteristics of the adopting society. If the‘Information Society’ is unable to function exactly as the West has come to expect, these failuresmust be considered during the design phase of the initiatives. Chapter 3 has indicated that ICTsare unlikely to succeed as tools of participation, development, or peace if they are not linked toexisting cultural, political and technological experiences. Equality and shared community goalsproduce sustainable technologies, not the reverse. In Somalia, the epitome of a ‘failed state,’where clan based militias maintain violent domination, three local cellular operators arecooperating to provide telephone and Internet to over 70 percent of the country (Rohozinski2003: 1). This network is not a success due to heavy-handed Western intervention; rather, the‘best and cheapest telephone system in all of east Africa’ (ibid) is an exemplar of shared interestsand local demand surpassing violent clan rivalries (CMI 2004). Further, the dominance ofproprietary software in most ICT4Peace initiatives is not suggestive of graceful degradation;adopting parties have no recourse to alter these tools as the needs of their environment demand.If, as Richard Stallman has argued, software is like language and should not be owned because itis foundational to society (May 2006: 134), ICT4Peace must develop improved mechanisms toencourage communities to modify the technology to reflect their specific needs. Such a goalmight necessitate the use of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS; See May 2006 for adescription of FOSS) for those societies in a position to benefit from it.

There is a great deal obscured by a discourse premised on the assumption that ICTs encourageequality, democracy, and local communities of peace. Ultimately, what the ICT4Peace discoursemost obscures is the ample evidence to indicate that its framework is flawed, and premised onthe West’s experiences with technology and the ‘Information Society.’ Each of the themes andassumptions discussed, merit further study to better understand the ICT societal complex,particularly in areas impacted by conflict. By way of conclusion, I include Lawrence Lessig’s(2002) insightful proposition that ‘[a] time is marked not so much by the ideas that are argued

about, but by the ideas that are taken for granted.’ Without a reflection on how to design the‘Information Society’ to gracefully degrade in locations distinct from the Western developedworld, ICT4Peace stands to be marked not by its noble intentions, but regrettably by its flawedassumptions.

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1 The Positive discursive theme is intended to reflect an optimistic trend of technologicaldeterminism and is not to be confused with the philosophical notion of positivism