8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

1/49

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

2/49

the planned demonstration and stated thatthe demonstration or rall cannot becancelled because it has alread been agreedupon in the meeting. Pagcu e(plained furtherthat the demonstration has nothing to do 3ith

the Compan because the union has no:uarrel or dispute 3ith Management9

0. That Management, thru Att. C.;. de )eon,Compan personnel manager, informedPBME! that the demonstration is aninalienable right of the union guaranteed bthe Constitution but emphasi"ed, ho3ever,that an demonstration for that matter shouldnot undul pre+udice the normal operation ofthe Compan. &or 3hich reason, the Compan,thru Att. C.;. de )eon 3arned the PBME!

representatives that 3or4ers 3ho belong tothe 'rst and regular shifts, 3ho 3ithoutprevious leave of absence approved b theCompan, particularl , the ocers present3ho are the organi"ers of the demonstration,3ho shall fail to report for 3or4 the follo3ingmorning #March 2, /0/$ shall be dismissed,because such failure is a violation of thee(isting CBA and, therefore, 3ould beamounting to an illegal stri4e9

6. That at about 8@ P.M. on March >, /0/,

another meeting 3as convo4ed Companrepresented b Att. C.;. de )eon, , /0/, Companreiterated and appealed to the PBME!representatives that 3hile all 3or4ers ma+oin the Malaca1ang demonstration, the3or4ers for the 'rst and regular shift of March

2, /0/ should be e(cused from +oining thedemonstration and should report for 3or49and thus utili"e the 3or4ers in the 5nd and>rd shifts in order not to violate the provisionsof the CBA, particularl Article DD%*@ N!

)!C!-T = N! ;TR%E. All those 3ho 3ill notfollo3 this 3arning of the Compan shall bedismiss9 ?e )eon reiterated the Compans3arning that the ocers shall be primarilliable being the organi"ers of the massdemonstration. The union panel counteredthat it 3as rather too late to change theirplans inasmuch as the Malaca1angdemonstration 3ill be held the follo3ingmorning9 and

7. That a certain Mr. Filfredo Ariston, adviser

of PBME! sent a cablegram to the Compan3hich 3as received /@8 A.M., March 2, /0/,the contents of 3hich are as follo3s@RE%TERAT%NG REH-E;T EDC-;E ?AI ;J%&TEMP)!IEE; 7, Anne( K&K, pp. 252>,rec.$

Because the petitioners and their members numberingabout 2 proceeded 3ith the demonstration despite thepleas of the respondent Compan that the 'rst shift 3or4ersshould not be re:uired to participate in the demonstration

and that the 3or4ers in the second and third shifts should beutili"ed for the demonstration from 0 A.M. to 5 P.M. on March2, /0/, respondent Compan prior notice of the massdemonstration on March 2, /0/, 3ith the respondent Court,a charge against petitioners and other emploees 3hocomposed the 'rst shift, charging them 3ith a Kviolation of;ection 2#a$0 in relation to ;ections > and 2, as 3ell as;ection 8, all of Republic Act No. 768, and of the CBAproviding for No ;tri4e and No )oc4out. K #Anne( KAK, pp./5, rec.$. The charge 3as accompanied b the +oint

5

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

3/49

adavit of Arthur ). Ang and Cesareo de )eon, >2, rec.$

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts

submitted b the parties, , rec.$, respondent Compan averred that hereinpetitioners received on ;eptember 55, /0/, the orderdated ;eptember 6 #should be ;eptember 8$, /0/9 thatunder ;ection 8 of the amended Rules of the Court of

%ndustrial Relations, herein petitioners had 've #8$ das from;eptember 55, /0/ or until ;eptember 56, /0/, 3ithin3hich to 'le their motion for reconsideration9 and thatbecause their motion for reconsideration 3as t3o #5$ daslate, it should be accordingl dismissed, invo4ing Bien vs.Castillo,13hich held among others, that a motion fore(tension of the 'veda period for the 'ling of a motion forreconsideration should be 'led before the said 'vedaperiod elapses #Anne( KMK, pp. 002, rec.$.

;ubse:uentl, herein petitioners 'led on !ctober 2, /0/their 3ritten arguments dated !ctober , /0/, in support

of their motion for reconsideration #Anne( K%K, pp. 086>,rec.$.

%n a resolution dated !ctober /, /0/, the respondent enbanc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of hereinpetitioners for beingpro forma as it 3as 'led beond thereglementar period prescribed b its Rules #Anne( K

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

4/49

!n !ctober >, /0/, herein petitioners 'led 3ith therespondent court a petition for relief from the order dated!ctober /, /0/, on the ground that their failure to 'le theirmotion for reconsideration on time 3as due to e(cusablenegligence and honest mista4e committed b the president

of the petitioner -nion and of the oce cler4 of theircounsel, attaching thereto the adavits of the saidpresident and cler4 #Anne(es KK, KK and K5K, rec.$.

Fithout 3aiting for an resolution on their petition for relieffrom the order dated !ctober /, /0/, herein petitioners'led on November >, /0/, 3ith the ;upreme Court, anotice of appeal #Anne( K)K, pp. 777/, rec.$.

I

There is need of brie restating basic concepts andprinciples 3hich underlie the issues posed b the case atbar.

#$ %n a democrac, the preservation and enhancement ofthe dignit and 3orth of the human personalit is thecentral core as 3ell as the cardinal article of faith of ourcivili"ation. The inviolable character of man as an individualmust be Kprotected to the largest possible e(tent in histhoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person.K(

#5$ The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of

libert, e:ualit and securit Kagainst the assaults ofopportunism, the e(pedienc of the passing hour, theerosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derisionof those 3ho have no patience 3ith general principles.K 3

%n the pith language of Mr.

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

5/49

Kneed breathing space to survive,K permitting governmentregulation onl K3ith narro3 speci'cit.K9

Propert and propert rights can be lost thru prescription9but human rights are imprescriptible. %f human rights are

e(tinguished b the passage of time, then the Bill of Rightsis a useless attempt to limit the po3er of government andceases to be an ecacious shield against the trann ofocials, of ma+orities, of the inuential and po3erful, and ofoligarchs = political, economic or other3ise.

%n the hierarch of civil liberties, the rights of free e(pressionand of assembl occup a preferred position as the areessential to the preservation and vitalit of our civil andpolitical institutions9 1and such priorit Kgives theseliberties the sanctit and the sanction not permittingdubious intrusions.K 11

The superiorit of these freedoms over propert rights isunderscored b the fact that a mere reasonable or rationalrelation bet3een the means emploed b the la3 and itsob+ect or purpose = that the la3 is neither arbitrar nordiscriminator nor oppressive = 3ould suce to validate ala3 3hich restricts or impairs propert rights. 1(!n theother hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of humanrights re:uires a more stringent criterion, namel e(istenceof a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil 3hichthe ;tate has the right to prevent. ;o it has been stressed inthe main opinion of Mr.

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

6/49

3or4ersO %ts failure to defend its o3n emploees all the more3ea4ened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressivepolice 3ho might have been all the more emboldenedthereb sub+ect its lo3l emploees to further indignities.

%n see4ing sanctuar behind their freedom of e(pression 3ellas their right of assembl and of petition against allegedpersecution of local ocialdom, the emploees and laborersof herein private respondent 'rm 3ere 'ghting for their versurvival, utili"ing onl the 3eapons aorded them b theConstitution = the untrammelled en+oment of their basichuman rights. The pretension of their emploer that it 3ouldsuer loss or damage b reason of the absence of itsemploees from 0 ocloc4 in the morning to 5 ocloc4 in theafternoon, is a plea for the preservation merel of theirpropert rights. ;uch apprehended loss or damage 3ouldnot spell the dierence bet3een the life and death of the

'rm or its o3ners or its management. The emploeespathetic situation 3as a star4 realit = abused, harassmentand persecuted as the believed the 3ere b the peaceocers of the municipalit. As above intimated, thecondition in 3hich the emploees found themselves vis)a)vis the local police of Pasig, 3as a matter that vitallaected their right to individual e(istence as 3ell as that oftheir families. Material loss can be repaired or ade:uatelcompensated. The debasement of the human being bro4enin morale and brutali"ed in spiritcan never be fullevaluated in monetar terms. The 3ounds fester and thescars remain to humiliate him to his ding da, even as he

cries in anguish for retribution, denial of 3hich is li4erubbing salt on bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, the primac of human rights =freedom of e(pression, of peaceful assembl and of petitionfor redress of grievances = over propert rights has beensustained. 1+Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as acoveted boon = at once the shield and armor of the dignitand 3orth of the human personalit, the allconsuming idealof our enlightened civili"ation = becomes !ur dut, if

freedom and social +ustice have an meaning at all for him3ho toils so that capital can produce economic goods thatcan generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstrationagainst police ocers, not against the emploer, asevidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a

violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a causefor the dismissal from emploment of the demonstratingemploees, stretches undul the compass of the collectivebargaining agreement, is Ka potent means of inhibitingspeechK and therefore inicts a moral as 3ell as mortal3ound on the constitutional guarantees of free e(pression,of peaceful assembl and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement 3hich '(es the 3or4ingshifts of the emploees, according to the respondent Court%ndustrial Relations, in eect imposes on the 3or4ers theKdut ... to observe regular 3or4ing hours.K The strain

construction of the Court of %ndustrial Relations that astipulated 3or4ing shifts den the 3or4ers the right to stagemass demonstration against police abuses during 3or4inghours, constitutes a virtual trann over the mind and lifethe 3or4ers and deserves severe condemnation.Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated onsuch a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged b the emploees on March2, /0/ could not have been legall en+oined b an court,such an in+unction 3ould be trenching upon the freedome(pression of the 3or4ers, even if it legall appears to be

illegal pic4eting or stri4e. (The respondent Court of%ndustrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that themass demonstration 3as not a declaration of a stri4e Kas thesame not rooted in an industrial dispute although there isconcerted act and the occurrence of a temporar stoppage3or4.K #Anne( K&K, p. 28, rec.$.

The respondent 'rm claims that there 3as no need for all itsemploees to participate in the demonstration and that thesuggested to the -nion that onl the 'rst and regular shift

0

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

7/49

from 0 A.M. to 5 P.M. should report for 3or4 in order that lossor damage to the 'rm 3ill be averted. This stand failedappreciate the sine *"a non of an eective demonstrationespeciall b a labor union, namel the complete unit ofthe -nion members as 3ell as their total presence at the

demonstration site in order to generate the ma(imumsmpath for the validit of their cause but alsoimmediatel action on the part of the correspondinggovernment agencies 3ith +urisdiction over the issues theraised against the local police. Circulation is one of theaspects of freedom of e(pression. (1%f demonstrators arereduced b onethird, then b that much the circulation ofthe issues raised b the demonstration is diminished. Themore the participants, the more persons can be apprised ofthe purpose of the rall. Moreover, the absence of onethirdof their members 3ill be regarded as a substantial indicationof disunit in their ran4s 3hich 3ill enervate their position

and abet continued alleged police persecution. At an rate,the -nion noti'ed the compan t3o das in advance of theirpro+ected demonstration and the compan could have madearrangements to counteract or prevent 3hatever losses itmight sustain b reason of the absence of its 3or4ers forone da, especiall in this case 3hen the -nion re:uested itto e(cuse onl the dashift emploees 3ho 3ill +oin thedemonstration on March 2, /0/ 3hich re:uest the -nionreiterated in their telegram received b the compan at /@8in the morning of March 2, /0/, the da of the massdemonstration #pp. 252>, rec.$. There 3as a lac4 of humanunderstanding or compassion on the part of the 'rm in

re+ecting the re:uest of the -nion for e(cuse from 3or4 forthe da shifts in order to carr out its mass demonstration.And to regard as a ground for dismissal the massdemonstration held against the Pasig police, not against thecompan, is gross vindictiveness on the part of theemploer, 3hich is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

%%%

The respondent compan is the one guilt of unfair laborpractice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent'rm to permit all its emploees and 3or4ers to +oin the massdemonstration against alleged police abuses and thesubse:uent separation of the eight #7$ petitioners from the

service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on thefreedom of e(pression, freedom of assembl and freedompetition for redress of grievances, the respondent 'rmcommitted an unfair labor practice de'ned in ;ection 2#a$in relation to ;ection > of Republic Act No. 768, other3ise4no3n as the %ndustrial Peace Act. ;ection > of Republic ActNo. 7 guarantees to the emploees the right Kto engage inconcert activities for ... mutual aid or protectionK9 3hile;ection 2#a$ regards as an unfair labor practice for anemploer interfere 3ith, restrain or coerce emploees in thee(ercise their rights guaranteed in ;ection Three.K

Fe repeat that the obvious purpose of the massdemonstration staged b the 3or4ers of the respondent 'rmon March 2, /0/, 3as for their mutual aid and protectionagainst alleged police abuses, denial of 3hich 3asinterference 3ith or restraint on the right of the emploeesto engage in such common action to better shieldthemselves against such alleged police indignities. Theinsistence on the part of the respondent 'rm that the3or4ers for the morning and regular shift should notparticipate in the mass demonstration, under pain ofdismissal, 3as as heretofore stated, Ka potent means ofinhibiting speech.K ((

;uch a concerted action for their mutual help and protectiondeserves at least e:ual protection as the concerted action ofemploees in giving publicit to a letter complaint chargingban4 president 3ith immoralit, nepotism, favoritism andiscrimination in the appointment and promotion of banemploees. (3Fe further ruled in the Republic ;avings Ban4case, s"pra, that for the emploees to come 3ithin theprotective mantle of ;ection > in relation to ;ection 2#a$on Republic Act No. 768, Kit is not necessar that union

6

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

8/49

activit be involved or that collective bargaining becontemplated,K as long as the concerted activit is for thefurtherance of their interests. ()

As stated clearl in the stipulation of facts embodied in the

:uestioned order of respondent Court dated ;eptember 8,/0/, the compan, K3hile e(pressl ac4no3ledging, thatthe demonstration is an inalienable right of the -nionguaranteed b the Constitution,K nonetheless emphasi"edthat Kan demonstration for that matter should not undulpre+udice the normal operation of the companK andK3arned the PBME! representatives that 3or4ers 3hobelong to the 'rst and regular shifts, 3ho 3ithout previousleave of absence approved b the Compan, particularl theocers present 3ho are the organi"ers of thedemonstration, 3ho shall fail to report for 3or4 the follo3ingmorning #March 2, /0/$ shall be dismissed, because such

failure is a violation of the e(isting CBA and, therefore,3ould be amounting to an illegal stri4e #9$K #p. %%%, petitionersbrief$. ;uch threat of dismissal tended to coerce theemploees from +oining the mass demonstration. Jo3ever,the issues that the emploees raised against the localpolice, 3ere more important to them because the had thecourage to proceed 3ith the demonstration, despite suchthreat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them 3asto lose a das 3age b reason of their absence from 3or4on the da of the demonstration. !ne das pa meansmuch to a laborer, more especiall if he has a famil tosupport. Iet, the 3ere 3illing to forego their oneda salar

hoping that their demonstration 3ould bring about thedesired relief from police abuses. But management 3asadamant in refusing to recogni"e the superior legitimac oftheir right of free speech, free assembl and the right topetition for redress.

Because the respondent compan ostensibl did not 'nd itnecessar to demand from the 3or4ers proof of the truth ofthe alleged abuses inicted on them b the local police, itthereb concedes that the evidence of such abuses should

properl be submitted to the corresponding authoritieshaving +urisdiction over their complaint and to 3hom suchcomplaint ma be referred b the President of thePhilippines for proper investigation and action 3ith a vie3 todisciplining the local police ocers involved.

!n the other hand, 3hile the respondent Court of %ndustrialRelations found that the demonstration Kparal"ed to a largee(tent the operations of the complainant compan,K therespondent Court of %ndustrial Relations did not ma4e an'nding as to the fact of loss actuall sustained b the 'rm.This signi'cant circumstance can onl mean that the 'rmdid not sustain an loss or damage. %t did not presentevidence as to 3hether it lost e(pected pro'ts for failure tocompl 3ith purchase orders on that da9 or that penalties3ere e(acted from it b customers 3hose orders could notbe 'lled that da of the demonstration9 or that purchase

orders 3ere cancelled b the customers b reason of itsfailure to deliver the materials ordered9 or that its o3ne:uipment or materials or products 3ere damaged due toabsence of its 3or4ers on March 2, /0/. !n the contrar,the compan saved a si"able amount in the form of 3agesfor its hundreds of 3or4ers, cost of fuel, 3ater and electricconsumption that da. ;uch savings could have amplcompensated for unreali"ed pro'ts or damages it mighthave sustained b reason of the absence of its 3or4ers foronl one da.

%*

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of freespeech and assembl as 3ell as the right to petition forredress of grievances of the emploees, the dismissal of theeight #7$ leaders of the 3or4ers for proceeding 3ith thedemonstration and conse:uentl being absent from 3or4,constitutes a denial of social +ustice li4e3ise assured b thefundamental la3 to these lo3l emploees. ;ection 8 ofArticle %% of the Constitution imposes upon the ;tate Kthepromotion of social +ustice to insure the 3ellbeing and

7

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

9/49

economic securit of all of the people,K 3hich guarantee isemphasi"ed b the other directive in ;ection 0 of Article D%*of the Constitution that Kthe ;tate shall aord protection tolabor ...K. Respondent Court of %ndustrial Relations as anagenc of the ;tate is under obligation at all times to give

meaning and substance to these constitutional guaranteesin favor of the 3or4ing man9 for other3ise theseconstitutional safeguards 3ould be merel a lot ofKmeaningless constitutional patter.K -nder the %ndustrialPeace Act, the Court of %ndustrial Relations is en+oined toeect the polic of the la3 Kto eliminate the causes ofindustrial unrest b encouraging and protecting the e(erciseb emploees of their right to selforgani"ation for thepurpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion oftheir moral+ social and economic ,ell)bein.K %t is mostunfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of%ndustrial Relations, the ver governmental agenc designed

therefor, failed to implement this polic and failed to 4eepfaith 3ith its avo3ed mission = its raison d-etre= asordained and directed b the Constitution.

*

%t has been li4e3ise established that a violation of aconstitutional right divests the court of +urisdiction9 and as aconse:uence its +udgment is null and void and confers norights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at thesacri'ce of constitutional liberties, ma be obtained throughhabeas corpus proceedings even long after the 'nalit of

the +udgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remed to obtainthe release of an individual, 3ho is convicted b 'nal+udgment through a forced confession, 3hich violated hisconstitutional right against selfincrimination9 (5or 3ho isdenied the right to present evidence in his defense as adeprivation of his libert 3ithout due process of la3, (*evenafter the accused has alread served sentence for t3entt3o ears. (7

Both the respondents Court of %ndustrial Relations andprivate 'rm trenched upon these constitutional immunitiesof petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rightsand aggravated the inhumanit to 3hich the aggrieved3or4ers claimed the had been sub+ected b the municipal

police. Javing violated these basic human rights of thelaborers, the Court of %ndustrial Relations ousted itself of+urisdiction and the :uestioned orders it issued in the instantcase are a nullit. Recognition and protection of suchfreedoms are imperative on all public oces including thecourts (+as 3ell as private citi"ens and corporations, thee(ercise and en+oment of 3hich must not be nulli'ed bmere procedural rule promulgated b the Court %ndustrialRelations e(ercising a purel delegate legislative po3er,3hen even a la3 enacted b Congress must ield to theuntrammelled en+oment of these human rights. There is notime limit to the e(ercise of the freedoms. The right to en+o

them is not e(hausted b the deliver of one speech, theprinting of one article or the staging of one demonstration. %tis a continuing immunit to be invo4ed and e(ercised 3hene(igent and e(pedient 3henever there are errors to berecti'ed, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to becondemned. !ther3ise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights3ould be vitiated b rule on procedure prescribing theperiod for appeal. The battle then 3ould be reduced to arace for time. And in such a contest bet3een an emploerand its laborer, the latter eventuall loses because hecannot emplo the best an dedicated counsel 3ho candefend his interest 3ith the re:uired diligence and "eal,

bereft as he is of the 'nancial resources 3ith 3hich to pafor competent legal services. (+-%

*%

The Court of %ndustrial Relations rule prescribes that motionfor reconsideration of its order or 3rit should 'led 3ithin 've#8$ das from notice thereof and that the arguments insupport of said motion shall be 'led 3ithin ten #$ dasfrom the date of 'ling of such motion for reconsideration

/

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

10/49

#;ec. 0$. As above intimated, these rules of procedure 3erepromulgated b the Court of %ndustrial Relations pursuant toa legislative delegation. (9

The motion for reconsideration 3as 'led on ;eptember 5/,

/0/, or seven #6$ das from notice on ;eptember 55, /0/of the order dated ;eptember 8, /0/ or t3o #5$ das late.Petitioners claim that the could have 'led it on ;eptember57, /0/, but it 3as a ;unda.

?oes the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration 3as'led t3o #5$ das late defeat the rights of the petitioningemploeesO !r more directl and concretel, does theinadvertent omission to compl 3ith a mere Court of%ndustrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for'ling a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail

over constitutional rightsO The ans3er should be obvious inthe light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremac to theforegoing rules of the Court of %ndustrial Relations over basichuman rights sheltered b the Constitution, is not onlincompatible 3ith the basic tenet of constitutionalgovernment that the Constitution is superior to an statuteor subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violenceto natural reason and logic. The dominance and superioritof the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of%ndustrial Relations procedural rule of necessit should bearmed. ;uch a Court of %ndustrial Relations rule as appliedin this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen

the constitutional rights aected, but instead constrict thesame to the point of nullifing the en+oment thereof b thepetitioning emploees. ;aid Court of %ndustrial Relationsrule, promulgated as it 3as pursuant to a mere legislativedelegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beond theauthorit granted b the Constitution and the la3. A periodof 've #8$ das 3ithin 3hich to 'le a motion forreconsideration is too short, especiall for the aggrieved3or4ers, 3ho usuall do not have the read funds to meetthe necessar e(penses therefor. %n case of the Court of

Appeals and the ;upreme Court, a period of 'fteen #8$das has been '(ed for the 'ling of the motion for rehearing or reconsideration #;ee. , Rule 89 ;ec. , Rule859 ;ec. , Rule 80, Revised Rules of Court$. The dela in the'ling of the motion for reconsideration could have been onl

one da if ;eptember 57, /0/ 3as not a ;unda. This factaccentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of %ndustrialare concerned.

%t should be stressed here that the motion forreconsideration dated ;eptember 56, /0/, is based on theground that the order sought to be reconsidered Kis not inaccordance 3ith la3, evidence and facts adduced during thehearing,K and li4e3ise pras for an e(tension of ten #$das 3ithin 3hich to 'le arguments pursuant to ;ections 8,0 and 6 of the Rules of the Court of %ndustrial Relations#Anne( KGK, pp. 860, rec.$9 although the arguments 3ere

actuall 'led b the herein petitioners on !ctober 2, /0/#Anne( K%K, pp. 66>, rec.$, long after the da periodre:uired for the 'ling of such supporting arguments countedfrom the 'ling of the motion for reconsideration. Jereinpetitioners received onl on !ctober 57, /0/ the resolutiondated !ctober /, /0/ dismissing the motion forreconsideration for beingpro forma since it 3as 'led beondthe reglementar period #Anne( K

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

11/49

Jo3ever, a constitutional issue can be raised an time, evenfor the 'rst time on appeal, if it appears that thedetermination of the constitutional issue is necessar to adecision of the case, the ver lis mota of the case 3ithoutthe resolution of 3hich no 'nal and complete determination

of the dispute can be made.

3

%t is thus seen that aprocedural rule of Congress or of the ;upreme Court gives3a to a constitutional right. %n the instant case, theprocedural rule of the Court of %ndustrial Relations, acreature of Congress, must li4e3ise ield to theconstitutional rights invo4ed b herein petitioners evenbefore the institution of the unfair labor practice chargedagainst them and in their defense to the said charge.

%n the case at bar, enforcement of the basic humanfreedoms sheltered no less b the organic la3, is a mostcompelling reason to den application of a Court of

%ndustrial Relations rule 3hich impinges on such humanrights.3-%

%t is an accepted principle that the ;upreme Court has theinherent po3er to Ksuspend its o3n rules or to e(cept aparticular case from its operation, 3henever the purposes of+ustice re:uire.K 3- Mr.

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

12/49

suspension of a Court of %ndustrial Relations rule that clash3ith the human rights sanctioned and shielded 3ithresolution concern b the speci'c guarantees outlined in theorganic la3. %t should be stressed that the application in theinstant case ;ection 8 of the Court of %ndustrial Relations

rules relied upon b herein respondent 'rm is unreasonableand therefore such application becomes unconstitutional asit subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and3or4ers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstancesrevealed b the record.

The suspension of the application of ;ection 8 of the Courtof %ndustrial Relations rules 3ith reference to the case at isalso authori"ed b ;ection 5 of Common3ealth Act No.>, the C.%.R. charter, 3hich en+oins the Court of %ndustrialRelations to Kact according to +ustice and e:uit andsubstantial merits of the case, 3ithout regard to

technicalities or legal forms ...K

!n several occasions, Fe emphasi"ed this doctrine 3hich3as restated b Mr. , The Court of%ndustrial Relations shall adopt its, rules orprocedure and shall have such other po3ersas generall pertain to a court of +ustice@Provided, ho3ever, That in the hearing,investigation and determination of an:uestion or controvers and in e(ercising anduties and po3er under this Act, the Court

shall act according to +ustice and e:uit andsubstantial merits of the case, 3ithout regardto technicalities or legal forms and shall notbe bound b an technical rules of legalevidence but ma inform its mind in such

manner as it ma deem +ust ande:uitable. B! this provision the ind"strialco"rt is disenaed from the riidit! of thetechnicalities applicable to ordinar! co"rts.Said co"rt is not even restricted to thespeci6c relief demanded b! the partiesbutma issue such orders as ma be deemednecessar or e(pedient for the purpose ofsettling the dispute or dispelling an doubtsthat ma give rise to future disputes. #AngTiba v. C.%.R., G.R. No. 202/0, &eb. 6, /29Manila Trading L ;uppl Co. v. Phil. )abor, 6

Phil. 52.$ &or these reasons, Fe believe thatthis provision is ample enough to haveenabled the respondent court to consider3hether or not its previous ruling thatpetitioners constitute a minorit 3as foundedon fact, 3ithout regard to the technicalmeaning of ne3l discovered evidence. ...#Alonso v. *illamor, 0 Phil. >89 Chua iong v.Fhita4er, 20 Phil. 867$. #emphasis supplied.$

To appl ;ection 8 of the Court of %ndustrial Relations rules3ith Kpedantic rigorK in the instant case is to rule in eect

that the poor 3or4ers, 3ho can illaord an alert competentla3er, can no longer see4 the sanctuar of humanfreedoms secured to them b the fundamental la3, simplbecause their counsel = erroneousl believing that hereceived a cop of the decision on ;eptember 5>, /0/,instead of ;eptember 55, /0/ 'led his motion forreconsideration ;eptember 5/, /0/, 3hich practicall isonl one da late considering that ;eptember 57, /0/ 3asa ;unda.

5

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

13/49

Man a time, this Court deviated from proceduretechnicalities 3hen the ceased to be instruments of +ustice,for the attainment of 3hich such rules have been devised.;ummari"ing the +urisprudence on this score, Mr. ,, /0, 5 ;CRA 068.$, decided as farbac4 as /, Ktechnicalit. 3hen it deserts itsproperoce as an aid to +ustice and becomesits great hindrance and chief enem, deserves

scant consideration from courts.K #Ibid., p,>55.$ To that norm, this Court has remainedcommitted. The late Phil. 52 />0Q$ 3as of a similarmind. &or him the interpretation of proceduralrule should never Ksacri'ce the ends +ustice.KFhile Kprocedural la3s are no other thantechnicalitiesK vie3 them in their entiret,the 3ere adopted not as ends themselvesfor the compliance 3ith 3hich courts haveorgani"ed and function, but as meansconducive to the reali"ation the

administration of the la3 and of +ustice #Ibid.,p.,57$. Fe have remained steadfastlopposed, in the highl rhetorical language, rec.$. Counsel for respondent 'rm insinuates that notall the 2 or so emploee participated in thedemonstration, for 3hich reason onl the -nion and its

thirteen #>$ ocers 3ere speci'call named in the unfairlabor practice charge #p. 5, respondents brief$. %f that 3ereso, then man, if not all, of the morning and regular shiftsreported for 3or4 on March 2, /0/ and that, as aconse:uence, the 'rm continued in operation that da anddid not sustain an damage.

The appropriate penalt = if it deserves an penalt at all =should have been simpl to charge said oneda absenceagainst their vacation or sic4 leave. But to dismiss the eight

>

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

14/49

#7$ leaders of the petitioner -nion is a most cruel penalt,since as aforestated the -nion leaders depend on their3ages for their dail sustenance as 3ell as that of theirrespective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blo3to unionism, 3hile at the same time strengthening the

oppressive hand of the pett trants in the localities.

Mr.

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

15/49

protection, #;ection > of the %ndustrial PeaceAct ...$ This is the vie3 of some members ofthis Court. &or, as has been aptl stated, the/oinin in protests or demands+ even b! asmall ro"p of emplo!ees+ if in f"rtherance of

their interests as s"ch+ is a concerted activit!protected b! the Ind"strial Peace Act. It is notnecessar! that "nion activit! be involved orthat collective barainin be contemplated.#Annot., 0 A.).R. 5d 20 /2/Q$.

((( ((( (((

%nstead of stiing criticism, the Ban4 shouldhave allo3ed the respondents to air theirgrievances.

((( ((( (((

The Ban4 defends its action b invo4ing itsright to discipline for 3hat it calls therespondents libel in giving undue publicit totheir lettercharge. To be sure, the right ofselforgani"ation of emploees is notunlimited #Republic Aviation Corp. vs. N)RB>52 -.;. 6/> /28Q$, as the right of theemploer to discharge for cause #PhilippineEducation Co. v. -nion of Phil. Educ.Emploees, )>66>, April 5/, /0$ isundenied. The %ndustrial Peace Act does nottouch the normal e(ercise of the right of theemploer to select his emploees or todischarge them. %t is directed solel againstthe abuse of that right b interfering 3ith thecountervailing right of self organi"ation#Phelps ?odge Corp. v. N)RB >> -.;. 66/2Q$...

((( ((( (((

%n the 'nal sum and substance, this Co"rt isin "nanimit! that the Ban3-s cond"ct+identi6ed as an interference ,ith theemplo!ees- riht of self)orani$ation or as aretaliator! action+ andSor as a refusal to

bargain collectivel, constituted an unfairlabor practice 3ithin the meaning andintendment of section 2#a$ of the %ndustrialPeace Act. #Emphasis supplied.$ 33

%f free e(pression 3as accorded recognition and protectionto fortif labor unionism in the Republic ;avings case, supra,3here the complaint assailed the moralit and integrit ofthe ban4 president no less, such recognition and protectionfor free speech, free assembl and right to petition arerendered all the more +usti'able and more imperative in thecase at bar, 3here the mass demonstration 3as not against

the compan nor an of its ocers.

FJERE&!RE, +udgement is hereb rendered@

#$ setting aside as null and void the orders of therespondent Court of %ndustrial Relations dated ;eptember 8and !ctober /, /0/9 and

#5$ directing the re instatement of the herein eight #7$petitioners, 3ith full bac4 pa from the date of theirseparation from the service until re instated, minus onedas pa and 3hatever earnings the might have reali"edfrom other sources during their separation from the service.

Fith costs against private respondent Philippine BloomingCompan, %nc.

:aldivar+ Castro+ %ernando and Es"erra+ JJ.+ conc"r.

;a3alintal+ C.J+ too3 no part.

8

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

16/49

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

17/49

previous leave of absence approved b theCompan, particularl the ocers present3ho are the organi"ers of the demonstration,3ho shall fail to report for 3or4 the follo3ingmorning #March 2, /0/$ shall be dismissed,

because such failure is a violation of thee(isting CBA and, therefore, 3ould beamounting to an illegal stri4e9

6. That at about 8@ P.M. on March >, /0/,another meeting 3as convo4ed. Companrepresented b Att. C.;. de )eon, , /0/, Companreiterated and appealed to the PBME!

representatives that 3hile all 3or4ers ma+oin the Malaca1ang demonstration, the3or4ers for the 'rst and regular shift of March2, /0/ should be e(cused from +oining thedemonstration and should report for 3or49and thus utili"e the 3or4ers in the 5nd and>rd shifts in order not to violate the provisionsof the CBA, particularl Article DD%* KN!)!C!-T = N! ;TR%EK. All those 3ho 3illnot follo3 this 3arning of the Compan shallbe dismissed9 ?e )eon reiterated theCompans 3arning that the ocers shall be

primaril liable being the organi"ers of themass demonstration. The union panelcountered that it 3as rather too late tochange their plans inasmuch as theMalaca1ang demonstration 3ill be held thefollo3ing morning9 and

7. That a certain Mr. Filfredo Ariston, adviserof PBME! sent a cablegram to the Compan3hich 3as received /@8 A.M., March 2, /0/,

the contents of 3hich are as follo3s@RE%TERAT%NG REH-E;T EDC-;E ?AI ;J%&TEMP)!IEE;

Additionall, the trial court found that Kthe pro+ecteddemonstration did in fact occur and in the process paral"edto a large e(tent the operations of the complainantcompanK. #p. 8, Anne( &$.

-pon these facts the Prosecution ?ivision of the Court of%ndustrial Relations 'led 3ith said court a complaint for-nfair )abor Practice against petitioners charging that@ .

>. That on March 2, /0/, respondents#petitioners herein$ particularl those in the'rst shift, in violation of the e(isting collective

bargaining agreement and 3ithout 'ling thenecessar notice as provided for b la3, failedto report for 3or4, amounting to a declarationof stri4e9

2. That the above acts are in violation of;ection 2#a$ subparagraph 0, in relation to;ections >, 2 and 8 of Republic Act No.768, and of the collective bargainingagreement. #Pars. > and 2, Anne( C.$

After due hearing, the court rendered +udgment, thedispositive part of 3hich reads@

%N *%EF JERE!&, the respondent PhilippineBlooming Mills Emploees !rgani"ation isfound guilt of bargaining in bad faith and ishereb ordered to cease and desist fromfurther committing the same and itsrepresentatives namel@ respondent &lorencioPadrigano, Ru'no Ro(as, Mariano de )eon,

6

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

18/49

Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio *acuna,Ben+amin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino andRodulfo Monsod 3ho are directl responsiblefor perpetrating this unfair labor practice act,are hereb considered to have lost theirstatus as emploees of the PhilippineBlooming Mills, %nc. #p. 7, Anne( &.$

Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners3ere noti'ed of this decision on ;eptember 5>, /0/, thereseems to be no serious :uestion that the 3ere actuallserved there3ith on ;eptember 55, /0/. %n fact, petitionersadmitted this date of notice in paragraph 5 of their Petitionfor Relief dated !ctober >, /0/ and 'led 3ith theindustrial court on the follo3ing da. #;ee Anne( .$

%t is not controverted that it 3as onl on ;eptember 5/,

/0/, or seven #6$ das after the 3ere noti'ed of thecourts decision, that petitioners 'led their motion forreconsideration 3ith the industrial court9 as it is also notdisputed that the 'led their KArguments in ;upport of theRespondents Motion for ReconsiderationK onl on !ctober2, /0/. #;ee Anne( %.$ %n other 3ords, petitioners motionfor reconsideration 3as 'led t3o #5$ das after the lapse ofthe 've #8$ da period provided for the 'ling thereof in therules of the Court of %ndustrial Relations, 3hereas theKArgumentsK 3ere 'led 've #8$ das after the e(piration ofthe period therefor also speci'ed in the same rules.

Accordingl, the 'rst issue that confronts the Court is theone raised b respondent private 'rm, namel, that in vie3of the failure of petitioners to 'le not onl their motion forreconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof3ithin the periods respectivel '(ed in the rules therefor,the Court of %ndustrial Relations acted correctl and 3ithinthe la3 in rendering and issuing its impugned order of!ctober /, /0/ dismissing petitioners motion forreconsideration.

Respondents contention presents no problem. ;:uarelapplicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Courtin Eli$alde & Co. Inc. vs. Co"rt of Ind"strial9elations 13herein it 3as ruled that@

August 0, /0>. Petitioner received a cop ofthe decision of the then Associate

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

19/49

= there is no doubt. The fact that there isneed for computation of respondent Perladosovertime pa 3ould not render the decisionincomplete. This in eect is the holding of theCourt in Pan American Forld Air3as ;stem#Philippines$ vs. Pan American EmploeesAssociation, 3hich runs thus@ %t is ne(tcontended that in ordering the Chief of theE(amining ?ivision or his representative tocompute the compensation due, the %ndustrialCourt undul delegated its +udicial functionsand thereb rendered an incomplete decision.Fe do not believe so. Computation of theovertime pa involves a mechanical function,at most. And the report 3ould still have to besubmitted to the %ndustrial Court for itsapproval, b the ver terms of the order itself.

That there 3as no speci'cation of the amountof overtime pa in the decision did not ma4eit incomplete, since this matter shouldnecessaril be made clear enough in theimplementation of the decision #see MalateTa(icab L Garage, %nc. vs. C%R, et al.,)767, Ma , /80$.

5. But has that +udgment reached the stage of'nalit in the sense that it can no longer, bedisturbedO

C%R Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the+urisprudence of this Court both ans3er the:uestion in the armative.

;ection 8 of the C%R Rules re:uires that one3ho see4s to reconsider the +udgment of thetrial +udge must do so 3ithin 've #8$ dasfrom the date on 3hich he received notice ofthe decision, sub+ect of the motion. Ne(tfollo3s ;ection 0 3hich sas that the motion

must be submitted 3ith arguments supportingthe same. But if said arguments could not besubmitted simultaneousl 3ith the motion,the same section commands the the movantshall 'le the same 3ithin ten #$ das fromthe date of the 'ling of his motion forreconsideration. ;ection 6 of the same rulesadmonishes a movant that K#f$ailure toobserve the abovespeci'ed periods shall besucient cause for dismissal of the motion forreconsideration or stri4ing out of the ans3erandSor the supporting arguments, as the casema beK.

Not that the foregoing rules stand alone.720, Ma 5, /0$pronounced that 3here a motion to reconsideris 'led out of time, the order or decisionsub+ect of reconsideration comes 'nal. And soalso, 3here the arguments in support of the

motion for reconsideration are 'led beondthe tenda reglementar period, the preforma motion for reconsideration althoughseasonabl 'led must nevertheless be denied.This in essence is our ruling in )ocal 6, Press& Printin %ree 0or3ers

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

20/49

thereof 3ere 'led out of time, the order ordecision sub+ect of the motion becomes K'naland unappealableK.

Fe 'nd no dicult in appling the foregoing

rules and pronouncements of this Court in thecase before us. !n August 0, petitionerreceived a cop of the +udgment of

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

21/49

Precisel because the conclusions of the main opinion arepredicated on an e(position of the constitutional guaranteesof freedoms of speech and peaceful assembl for redress ofgrievances, so scholarl and masterful that it is bound toover3helm -s unless Fe note carefull the real issues inthis case, % am constrained, over and above m sincereadmiration for the elo:uence and "eal of Mr.

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

22/49

Petitioners, therefore, in 'ling this petition fora 3rit of certiorari, humbl beg this JonorableCourt to treat this petition under Rule 2> and08 of the Rules of Court.

((( ((( (((

The basic issue therefore is the application bthe Court en banc of the strict and narro3technical rules of procedure 3ithout ta4inginto account +ustice, e:uit and substantialmerits of the case.

!n the other hand, the complete argumentsubmitted b petitioners on this point in theirbrief runs thus@

%%%

%;;-E;

. ?oes the refusal to heed a 3arning in thee(ercise of a fundamental right to peaceablassemble and petition the government forredress of grievances constitute bargaining inbad faithO and,

?o the facts found b the court belo3 +ustif

the declaration and conclusion that the union3as guilt of bargaining in bad faith meritingthe dismissal of the persons allegedlresponsible thereforeO

5. Fas there grave abuse of discretion 3henthe respondent court refused to act one 3aor another on the petition for relief from theresolution of !ctober /, /0/O

%*

ARG-MENT

(he respondent Co"rt erred in 6ndin the

petition "nion "ilt! of barainin in bad faithand conse*"entl! dismissin the personsalleedl! responsible therefor+ beca"se s"chconcl"sion is co"ntr! to the evidence onrecord> that the dismissal of leaders ,asdiscriminator!.

As a result of e(ercising the constitutionalrights of freedom to assemble and petition thedul constituted authorities for redress oftheir grievances, the petitioners 3ere chargedand then condemned of bargaining in bad

faith.

The 'ndings that petitioners 3ere guilt ofbargaining in bad faith 3ere not borne out bthe records. %t 3as not even alleged norproven b evidence. Fhat has been allegedand 3hich the respondent compan tried toprove 3as that the demonstration amountedto a stri4e and hence, a violation of theprovisions of the Knoloc4out = no stri4eKclause of the collective bargaining agreement.Jo3ever, this allegation and proof submittedb the respondent compan 3ere practicallresolved 3hen the respondent court in thesame decision stated categoricall@

The compan alleges that the3al4out because of thedemonstration is tantamount toa declaration of a stri4e. Fe donot thin4 so, as the same is notrooted in an ind"strial disp"te

55

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

23/49

altho"h there is a concertedact and the occ"rrence of atemporar! stoppae of ,or3.#Emphasis supplied, p. 2, 8thparagraph, ?ecision.$

The respondent courts 'ndingsthat the petitioner unionbargained in bad faith is nottenable because@

%irst+ it has not been alleged nor proven bthe respondent compan9 .

Second, before the demonstration, thepetitioner union and the respondent companconvened t3ice in a meeting to thresh out the

matter of demonstration. Petitionersre:uested that the emploees and 3or4ers bee(cused but the respondent compan insteadof granting the re:uest or even settling thematter so that the hours of 3or4 3ill not bedisrupted, immediatel threatened theemploees of mass dismissal9

(hird, the refusal of the petitioner union togrant the re:uest of the compan that the'rst shift shall be e(cluded in thedemonstration is not tantamount tobargaining in bad faith because the compan4ne3 that the ocers of the union belongedto the 'rst shift, and that the union cannot goand lead the demonstration 3ithout theirocers. %t must be stated that the companintends to prohibit its ocers to lead and +ointhe demonstration because most of thembelonged to the 'rst shift9 and

%o"rth, the 'ndings of the respondent courtthat the demonstration if allo3ed 3illpracticall give the union the right to changethe 3or4ing conditions agreed in the CBA is aconclusion of facts, opinionated and not borneb an evidence on record. Thedemonstration did not practicall change theterms or conditions of emploment because it3as onl for one #$ da and the compan4ne3 about it before it 3ent through. Fe caneven sa that it 3as the compan 3hobargained in bad faith, 3hen uponrepresentation of the Bureau of )abor not todismiss the emploees demonstrating, thecompan tacitl approved the same and et3hile the demonstration 3as in progress, thecompan 'led a -)P Charge and conse:uentldismissed those 3ho participated.

Records of the case sho3 that more or less2 members of the union participated in thedemonstration and et, the respondent courtselected the eight ocers to be dismissedfrom the union thus losing their status asemploees of the respondent compan. Therespondent court should have ta4en intoaccount that the compans action in allo3ingthe return of more or less three hundredninet t3o #>/5$ emploeesSmembers of the

union is an act of condonation and thedismissal of the eight #7$ ocers is an act ofdiscrimination #Phil. Air )ines %nc., vs. Phil. Air)ines Emploees Association, G.R. No. )7/6,!ct. >, /87$. ;eemingl, from the opinionstated in the decision b the court, 3hilethere is a collective bargaining agreement,the union cannot go on demonstration or goon stri4e because it 3ill change the terms andconditions of emploment agreed in the CBA.

5>

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

24/49

%t follo3s that the CBA is over and above theconstitutional rights of a man to demonstrateand the statutor rights of a union to stri4e asprovided for in Republic Act 768. This createsa bad precedent because it 3ill appear thatthe rights of the union is solel dependentupon the CBA.

!ne of the cardinal primar rights 3hich mustbe respected in proceedings before the Courtof %ndustrial Relations is that Kthe decisionmust be rendered on the evidence presentedat the hearing, or at least contained in therecord and disclosed to the parties aected.K#%nterstate Commerce Commission vs. ) L NR. Co., 556 -.;. 77, >> ;. Ct. 78, 86 )a3 ed.2>.$ !nl b con'ning the administrative

tribunal to the evidence disclosed to theparties, can the latter be protected in theirrights to 4no3 and meet the case againstthem. #Ang Tiba vs. C%R, G.R. No. )282/0,&ebruar 56, /2.$

The petitioners respectfull and humblsubmit that there is no scintilla of evidence tosupport the 'ndings of the respondent courtthat the petitioner union bargained in badfaith. Corollar therefore, the dismissal of theindividual petitioners is 3ithout basis either in

fact or in la3.

Additionall, in their repl the also argued that@

$ That respondent courts 'nding thatpetitioners have been guilt of bargaining inbad faith and conse:uentl lost their status asemploees of the respondent compan didnot meet the meaning and comprehension ofKsubstantial merits of the case.K Bargaining in

bad faith has not been alleged in thecomplaint #Anne( KCK, Petition$ nor provenduring the hearing of the can. The importantand substantial merit of the case is 3hetherunder the facts and circumstances alleged inrespondent compans pleadings, thedemonstration done b the petitionersamounted to on Killegal stri4eK and thereforein violation of the Kno stri4e = no loc4 outKclause of the Collective BargainingAgreement. Petitioners respectfull reiterateand humbl submit, that the respondent courthad altogether opined and decided that suchdemonstration does not amount to a stri4e.Jence, 3ith that 'ndings, petitioners shouldhave been absolved of the charges againstthem. Nevertheless, the same respondentcourt disregarding, its o3n 'ndings, 3ent outof bounds b declaring the petitioners ashaving Kbargained in faith.K The stand of therespondent court is fallacious, as it follo3s theprinciple in logic as Knonsi:uitorK9

5$ That again respondents 3anted to impressthat the freedom to assemble peaceabl to airgrievances against the dul constitutedauthorities as guaranteed in our Constitutionis sub+ect to the limitation of the agreement inthe Collective Bargaining Agreement. The

fundamental rights of the petitioners to freespeech and assembl is paramount to theprovision in the Collective BargainingAgreement and such attempt to override theconstitutional provision 3ould be null andvoid. These fundamental rights of thepetitioners 3ere not ta4en into considerationin the deliberation of the case b therespondent court9

52

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

25/49

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions thatpetitioners are not raising an issue of due process. The donot posit that the decision of the industrial court is null andvoid on that constitutional ground. True it is that the faultthe respondent court for having priced the provisions of thecollective bargaining agreement herein involved over andabove their constitutional right to peaceabl assemble andpetition for redress of their grievances against the abuses ofthe Pasig police, but in no sense at all do the allege orcontend that such action aects its +urisdiction in a mannerthat renders the proceedings a nullit. %n other 3ords,petitioners themselves consider the alleged a3 in thecourts action as a mere error of +udgment rather than thatof +urisdiction 3hich the main opinion pro+ects. &or this Courtto roundl and indignantl condemn private respondent no3for the grievous violation of the fundamental la3 the mainopinion sees in its refusal to allo3 all its 3or4ers to +oin thedemonstration in :uestion, 3hen that speci'c issue has notbeen dul presented to -s and properl argued, is to mmind unfair and un+ust, for the simple reason that themanner this case 3as brought to -s does not aord it theopportunit to be heard in regard to such supposedconstitutional transgression.

To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent courtcommitted an error of +urisdiction b 'nding petitionersguilt of bargaining in bad faith 3hen the charge againstthem alleged in the complaint 3as for having conducted amass demonstration, 3hich Kamounted to a stri4eK, in

violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, butde'nitel, this +urisdictional :uestion has no constitutionalcolor. %ndeed, Fe can even assume for the sa4e ofargument, that the trial +udge did err in not givingpreferential importance to the fundamental freedomsinvo4ed b the petitioners over the management andproprietar attributes claimed b the respondent private'rm = still, Fe cannot rightl hold that such disregard ofpetitioners priceless liberties divested Jis Jonor of+urisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine of this

Court is that Kdecisions, erroneous or not, become 'nal afterthe period '(ed b la39 litigations 3ould be endless, no:uestions 3ould be 'nall settled9 and titles to propert3ould become precarious if the losing part 3ere allo3ed toreopen them at an time in the futureK.3

% onl have to add to this that the fact that the error is in theinterpretation, construction or application of a constitutionalprecept not constituting a denial of due process, should notma4e an dierence.

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

26/49

decision has become 'nal and e(ecutor. % have actualltried to bring mself into agreement 3ith the vie3s of thedistinguished and learned 3riter of the main opinion, if onlto avoid dissenting from his 3ell prepared thesis, but itsobvious incongruit 3ith settled +urisprudence al3as comesto the fore to stie m eort.

As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if %could go along 3ith petitioners under the authorit of ourconstitutionall irreducible appellate +urisdiction under;ection 5#8$ of Article *%% of the Philippines*#reenactedpracticall ipssisimis verbis in ;ection 8#5$ of the /6>Constitution$, onl to reali"e upon further reection that thever po3er granted to us to revie3 decisions of lo3er courtsinvolving :uestions of la3#and these include constitutionalissues not aecting the validit of statutes, treat, e(ecutiveagreement, etc.$ is not un:uali'ed but has to be e(ercised

onl in the manner provided in the la3 of the Rules of Court.%n other 3ords, before Fe can e(ercise appellate +urisdictionover constitutional issues, no matter ho3 important thema be, there must 'rst be a sho3ing of compliance 3iththe applicable procedural la3 or rules, among them, thosegoverning appeals from the Court of %ndustrial Relationsinvolved herein. Conse:uentl, if b la3 or rule, a +udgmentof the industrial court is alread 'nal and e(ecutor, thisCourt 3ould be devoid of po3er and authorit to revie3,much less alter or modif the same, absent an denial ofdue process or fatal defect of +urisdiction. %t must be bornein mind that the situation confronting -s no3 is not merel

3hether or not Fe should pass upon a :uestion or issue notspeci'call raised b the part concerned, 3hich, to be sure,could be enough reason to dissuade -s from ta4ing pains inresolving the same9 rather, the real problem here is 3hetheror not Fe have +urisdiction to entertain it. And, in thisregard, as alread stated earlier, no less than

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

27/49

to controversies, courts should fro3n uponan attempt to prolong them.

)i4e3ise the stern admonition of 7 Phil. 85, thus@

... Public polic and sound practice demandthat, at the ris4 of occasional errors,+udgments of courts should become 'nal atsome de'nite date '(ed b la3. The verob+ect for 3hich courts 3ere instituted 3as toput an end to controversies. To ful'll thispurpose and to do so speedil, certain timelimits, more or less arbitrar, have to be setup to spur on the slothful. %f a vacillating,irresolute +udge 3ere allo3ed to thus 4eepcauses ever 3ithin his po3er, to determine

and redetermine them term after term, toband his +udgments about from one part tothe other, and to change his conclusions asfreel and as capriciousl as a chamelon machange its hues, then litigation might becomemore intolerable than the 3rongs it isintended to redress. #;ee Arnedo vs. )lorenteand )iongson #/$, 7 Phil., 586.$.

M disagreement 3ith the dissenters in 9ep"blic vs. J"dede los Aneles,)505, !ctober 2, /6, 2 ;CRA 255, 3as not as to the

unalterabilit and invulnerabilit of 'nal +udgments butrather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the+udgment in :uestion therein. Relevantl to this case at bar,% said then@

The point of res ad/"dicata discussed in thedissents has not escaped m attention.Neither am % overloo4ing the point of the Chief

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

28/49

that the long e(isting and constantl applied rule governingthe 'ling of motions for reconsideration in the Court of%ndustrial Relations, Kas applied in this case does notimplement on reinforce or strengthen the constitutionalrights aected, but instead constricts the same to the pointof nullifing the en+oment thereof b the petitioningemploees. ;aid Court on %ndustrial Relations Rule,promulgated as it 3as pursuant to mere legislativedelegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beond theauthorit granted b the Constitution and the la3. A periodof 've #8$ das 3ithin 3hich to 'le a motion forreconsideration is too short, especiall for the aggrieve3or4ers, 3ho usuall do not have the read funds to meetthe necessar e(penses therefor. %n case of the Court ofAppeal and the ;upreme Court, a period of 'fteen #8$ dashas been '(ed for the 'ling of the motion for rehearing orreconsideration #;ec. , Rule 89 ;ec. , Rule 859 ;ec. ,Rule 80, Revised Rules of Court$. The dela in the 'ling ofthe motion for reconsideration could have been onl oneda if ;eptember 57, /0/ 3as not a ;unda. This factaccentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of %ndustrialRelations Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant caseare concerned.K

% am afraid the "eal and passion of these arguments do not+ustif the conclusion suggested. *ie3ed ob+ectivel, it canreadil be seen that there can hardl be an factual orlogical basis for such a critical vie3 of the rule in :uestion.;aid rule provides@

M!T%!N; &!R REC!N;%?ERAT%!N

;ec. 8. The movant shall 'le the motion, insi( copies, 3ithin 've #8$ das from the dateon 3hich he receives notice of the order ordecision, ob+ect of the motion forreconsideration, the same to be veri'ed underoath 3ith respect to the correctness of theallegations of fact, and serving a cop thereof,

personall or b registered mail, on theadverse part. The latter ma 'le an ans3er,in si( #0$ copies, dul veri'ed under oath.

;ec. 0. Both the motion and the ans3er shall

be submitted 3ith arguments supporting thesame. %f the arguments can not be submittedsimultaneousl 3ith said motions, upon noticeCourt, the movant shall 'le same 3ithin ten#$ das from the date of the 'ling of hismotion for reconsideration. The adverse partshall also 'le his ans3er 3ithin ten #$ dasfrom the receipt b him of a cop of thearguments submitted b the movant.

;ec. 6. After an ans3er to the motion isregistered, or after ten #$ das from the

receipt of the arguments in support of saidmotion having been 'led, the motion shall bedeemed submitted for resolution of theCourt in banc, unless it is considerednecessar to bear oral arguments, in 3hichcase the Court shall issue the correspondingorder or notice to that eect.

&ailure to observe the abovespeci'ed periodsshall be sucient cause for dismissal of themotion for reconsideration or stri4ing out ofthe ans3er andSor the supporting arguments,

as the case ma be. #As amended April 5,/8, Court of %ndustrial Relations.$.

As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, aseverone ac:uainted 3ith proceedings in the industrial court3ell 4no3s, precisel permits the part aggrieved b a+udgment to 'le no more than a proforma motion forreconsideration 3ithout an argument or length discussionand 3ith barel a brief statement of the fundamental groundor grounds therefor, 3ithout pre+udice to supplementing the

57

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

29/49

same b ma4ing the necessar e(position, 3ith citationsla3s and authorities, in the 3ritten arguments the be 'led#$ das later. %n truth, such a proforma motion has toeect of +ust advising the court and the other part that themovant does not agree 3ith the +udgment due tofundamental defects stated in brief and general terms.Evidentl, the purpose of this re:uirement is to appriseeverone concerned 3ithin the shortest possible time that areconsideration is to sought, and thereb enable the partiesconcerned to ma4e 3hatever ad+ustments ma be3arranted b the situation, in the mean3hile that thelitigation is prolonged. %t must borne in mind that cases inthe industrial court ma involve aect the operation of vitalindustries in 3hich labormanagement problems mightre:uire datoda solutions and it is to the best interests of+ustice and concerned that the attitude of each part atever imports +uncture of the case be 4no3n to the other sothat both avenues for earlier settlement ma, if possible, bee(plored.

There can be no reason at all to complain that the time '(edb the rule is short or inade:uate. %n fact, the motion 'ledpetitioners 3as no more than the follo3ing@

;O(IO %O9 9ECOSIDE9A(IO

C!ME N!F movant respondents, throughcounsel, to this Jonorable Court mostrespectfull moves for the REC!N;%?ERAT%!N

of the !rder of this Jonorable Court dated;eptember 6, /0/ on the ground that thesame is not in accordance 3ith la3, evidenceand facts adduced during the hearing of theabove entitled case.

Movantrespondents most respectfull movefor leave to 'le their respective arguments3ithin ten #$ das pursuant to ;ection 8,0 L 6 as amended of the Rules of Court.

FJERE&!RE, it is respectfull praed that thisMotion for Reconsideration be admitted.

Manila, ;eptember 56, /0/.

To sa that 've #8$ das is an unreasonableperiod for the 'ling of such a motion is to mesimpl incomprehensible. Fhat 3orse in thiscase is that petitioners have not even ta4enthe trouble of giving an e(planation of theirinabilit to compl 3ith the rule. Not onl that,petitioners 3ere also late 've #8$ das in 'lingtheir 3ritten arguments in support of theirmotion, and, the onl e(cuse oered for suchdela is that both the President of the -nionand the oce cler4 3ho too4 charge of thematter forgot to do 3hat the 3ere instructed

to do b counsel, 3hich, according to thisCourt, as % shall e(plain anon Kis the mosthac4need and habitual subterfuge emploedb litigants 3ho fail to observe the proceduralre:uirements prescribed b the Rules ofCourtK. #Philippine Airlines, %nc. vs.Arca, infra$. And et, ver indignantl, themain opinion 3ould 3ant the Court tooverloo4 such nonchalance and indierence.

%n this connection, % might add that in m consideredopinion, the rules '(ing periods for the 'nalit of +udgments

are in a sense more substantive than procedural in their realnature, for in their operation the have the eect of eithercreating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of theparticular +udgment concerned. And the fact that the courtthat rendered such 'nal +udgment is deprived of +urisdictionor authorit to alter or modif the same enhances suchsubstantive character. Moreover, because the have theeect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, itma be said that said rules parta4e of the nature also ofrules of prescription, 3hich again are substantive. No3, the

5/

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

30/49

t3in predicates of prescription are inaction or abandonmentand the passage of time or a prescribed period. !n the otherhand, procrastination or failure to act on time isun:uestionabl a form of abandonment, particularl 3hen itis not or cannot be sucientl e(plained. The most valuableright of a part ma be lost b prescription, and be has noreason to complain because public polic demands thatrights must be asserted in time, as other3ise the can bedeemed 3aived.

% see no +usti'cation 3hatsoever for not appling these selfevident principles to the case of petitioners. Jence, % feeldisinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend,for the purposes of this case the rules afore:uoted of theCourt of %ndustrial Relations. Besides, % have grave doubts asto 3hether 3e can suspend rules of other courts,particularl that is not under our supervisor +urisdiction,

being administrative agenc under the E(ecutive?epartment Fithal, if, in order to hasten the administrationof substance +ustice, this Court did e(ercise in someinstances its re po3er to amend its rules, % am positivelcertain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case in3hich the +udo has alread become 'nal and e(ecutor.

Before closing, it ma be mentioned here, that as averredtheir petition, in a belated eort to salvage their Petitioners'led in the industrial court on !ctober >, /0/ a Petitionfor relief alleging that their failure to 'le KArguments in;upport of their Motion for Reconsideration 3ithin the

reglementar period or 've #8$, if not seven #6$, das lateK3as due to e(cusable negligence and honest mista4ecommitted b the President of the respondent -nion and onoce cler4 of the counsel for respondents as sho3n attestedin their respective adavitsK, #;ee Anne(es , and 5$3hich in brief, consisted allegedl of the Presidents havingforgotten his appointment 3ith his la3er Kdespite previousinstructions and of the said oce emploee having alsocoincidentall forgotten Kto do the 3or4 instructed #sic$ to#him$ b Att. !sorioK because he K3as bus 3ith clerical

+obsK. No smpath at all can be evo4ed these allegations,for, under probabl more +usti'cation circumstances, thisCourt ruled out a similar e(planation previous case this3ise@

Fe 'nd merit in PA)s petition. The e(cuseoered respondent ;antos as reason for hisfailure to perfect in due time appeal from the+udgment of the Municipal Court, thatcounsels cler4 forgot to hand him the courtnotice, is the most hac4need and habitualsubterfuge emploed b litigants 3ho fail toobserve procedural re:uirements prescribedb the Rules of Court. The uncriticalacceptance of this 4ind of common placee(cuses, in the face of the ;upreme Courtsrepeated rulings that the are neither credible

nor constitutive of e(cusable negligence#Gaerlan vs. Bernal, )2>/, 5/

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

31/49

insistence that the 'rst shift 1should not participate butinstead report for 3or4, under pain of dismissal, theindustrial court ordered the dismissal from emploment ofthe eight individual petitioners as union ocers andorgani"ers of the mass demonstration.

Respondent courts order 'nding petitioner union guilt onrespondents complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfairlabor practice for having so carried out the massdemonstration, not3ithstanding that it concededl 3as notadeclaration of stri4e nor directed in an manner againstrespondent emploer, and ordering the dismissal of theunion oce manifestl constituted grave abuse of discretionin fact and in la3.

There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfairlabor practice since respondent 'rm conceded that Kthe

demonstration is an inalienable right of the unionguaranteed b the ConstitutionK and the union up to theda of the demonstration pleaded b cablegram to thecompan to e(cuse the 'rst shift and allo3 it to +oin thedemonstration in accordance 3ith their previous re:uests.

Neither could there be, in la3, a 3illful violation of thecollective bargaining agreements Knostri4eK clause as3ould 3arrant the union leaders dismissal, since as foundb respondent court itself the mass demonstration 3as not adeclaration of a stri4e, there being no industrial disputebet3een the protagonists, but merel the occurrence of a

temporar stoppage of 3or4K to enable the 3or4ers toe(ercise their constitutional rights of free e(pression,peaceable assembl and petition for redress of grievanceagainst alleged police e(cesses.

Respondent courts en banc resolution dismissingpetitioners motion for reconsideration for having been 'ledt3o das late, after e(piration of the reglementar 'vedaperiod '(ed b its rules, due to the negligence ofpetitioners counsel andSor the union president should

li4e3ise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse ofdiscretion. Petitioners petition for relief from the normaladverse conse:uences of the late 'ling of their motion forreconsideration due to such negligence = 3hich 3as notacted upon b respondent court = should have beengranted, considering the monstrous in+ustice that 3ouldother3ise be caused the petitioners through their summardismissal from emploment, simpl because the sought ingood faith to e(ercise basic human rights guaranteed themb the Constitution. %t should be noted further that no proofof actual loss from the oneda stoppage of 3or4 3as sho3nb respondent compan, providing basis to the mainopinions premise that its insistence on dismissal of theunion leaders for having included the 'rst shift 3or4ers inthe mass demonstration against its 3ishes 3as but an act ofarbitrar vindictiveness.

!nl thus could the basic constitutional rights of theindividual petitioners and the constitutional in+unction toaord protection to labor be given true substance andmeaning. No person ma be deprived of such basic rights3ithout due process = 3hich is but Kresponsiveness to thesupremac of reason, obedience to the dictates of +ustice.Negativel put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairnessavoided ... ?ue process is thus hostile to an ocial actionmarred b lac4 of reasonableness. Correctl it has beenidenti'ed as freedom from arbitrariness.K(

Accordingl, % vote for the setting aside of the appealed

orders of the respondent court and concur in the +udgmentfor petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.

Se%2%e O4n4on

>

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

32/49

BARRE"O,J., dissenting@

% bo3 in respectful and sincere admiration, but m sense ofdut compels me to dissent.

The bac4ground of this case ma be found principall in thestipulation of facts upon 3hich the decision under revie3 isbased. %t is as follo3s@

. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills,Compan, %nc., is a corporation e(isting andoperating under and b virtue of the la3s ofthe Philippines 3ith corporate address at 000Muelle de Binondo, Manila, 3hich is theemploer of respondent9

5. That Philippine Blooming Mills Emploees

!rgani"ation PBME! for short, is a legitimatelabor organi"ation, and the respondentsherein are either ocers of respondentPBME! or members thereof9

>. That on March 5, /0/ complainantcompan learned of the pro+ected massdemonstration at Malaca1ang in protestagainst alleged abuses of the Pasig Police?epartment to be participated b the 'rstshift #0@ AM = 5@ PM 3or4ers as 3ell asthose 3or4ing in the regular shifts #6@ A.M.to 2@ PM and 7@ AM to 8@ PM in themorning of March 2, /0/9

2. That a meeting 3as called b the Companon March >, /0/ at about @ A.M. at theCompans canteen, and those present 3ere@for the Compan@ #$ Mr. Arthur ). Ang, #5$Att. Cesareo ;. de )eon, $ and alldepartment and section heads. &or the

PBME! #$ &lorencio Padrigano, #5$ Ru'noRo(as, #>$ Mariano de )eon, #2$ AsencionPaciente, #8$ Bonifacio *acuna and #0$Ben+amin Pagcu.

8. That the Compan as4ed the union panel tocon'rm or den said pro+ected massdemonstration at Malaca1ang on March 2,/0/. PBME! thru Ben+amin Pagcu 3ho actedas the spo4esman of the union panel,con'rmed the planned demonstration andstated that the demonstration or rall cannotbe cancelled because it has alread beenagreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu e(plainedfurther that the demonstration has nothing todo 3ith the Compan because the union hasno :uarrel or dispute 3ith Management9

0. That Management, thru Att. C.;. de )eon,Compan personnel manager, informedPBME! that the demonstration is aninalienable right of the union guaranteed bthe Constitution but emphasi"ed, ho3ever,that an demonstration for that matter shouldnot undul pre+udice the normal operation ofthe Compan. &or 3hich reason, the Compan,thru Att. C.;. de )eon, 3arned the PBME!representatives that 3or4ers 3ho belong tothe 'rst and regular shifts, 3ho 3ithout

previous leave of absence approved b theCompan, particularl the ocers present3ho are the organi"ers of the demonstration,3ho shall fail to report for 3or4 the follo3ingmorning #March 2, /0/$ shall be dismissed,because such failure is a violation of thee(isting CBA and, therefore, 3ould beamounting to an illegal stri4e9

>5

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

33/49

6. That at about 8@ P.M. on March >, /0/,another meeting 3as convo4ed. Companrepresented b Att. C.;. de )eon, , /0/, Companreiterated and appealed to the PBME!representatives that 3hile all 3or4ers ma+oin the Malaca1ang demonstration, the3or4ers for the 'rst and regular shift of March2, /0/ should be e(cused from +oining thedemonstration and should report for 3or49and thus utili"e the 3or4ers in the 5nd and>rd shifts in order not to violate the provisionsof the CBA, particularl Article DD%* KN!)!C!-T = N! ;TR%EK. All those 3ho 3illnot follo3 this 3arning of the Compan shallbe dismissed9 ?e )eon reiterated theCompans 3arning that the ocers shall beprimaril liable being the organi"ers of themass demonstration. The union panelcountered that it 3as rather too late tochange their plans inasmuch as theMalaca1ang demonstration 3ill be held thefollo3ing morning9 and

7. That a certain Mr. Filfredo Ariston, adviserof PBME! sent a cablegram to the Compan

3hich 3as received /@8 A.M., March 2, /0/,the contents of 3hich are as follo3s@RE%TERAT%NG REH-E;T EDC-;E ?AI ;J%&TEMP)!IEE;

Additionall, the trial court found that Kthe pro+ecteddemonstration did in fact occur and in the process paral"edto a large e(tent the operations of the complainantcompanK. #p. 8, Anne( &$.

-pon these facts the Prosecution ?ivision of the Court of%ndustrial Relations 'led 3ith said court a complaint for-nfair )abor Practice against petitioners charging that@ .

>. That on March 2, /0/, respondents#petitioners herein$ particularl those in the'rst shift, in violation of the e(isting collectivebargaining agreement and 3ithout 'ling thenecessar notice as provided for b la3, failedto report for 3or4, amounting to a declarationof stri4e9

2. That the above acts are in violation of;ection 2#a$ subparagraph 0, in relation to;ections >, 2 and 8 of Republic Act No.768, and of the collective bargainingagreement. #Pars. > and 2, Anne( C.$

After due hearing, the court rendered +udgment, thedispositive part of 3hich reads@

%N *%EF JERE!&, the respondent PhilippineBlooming Mills Emploees !rgani"ation isfound guilt of bargaining in bad faith and ishereb ordered to cease and desist fromfurther committing the same and itsrepresentatives namel@ respondent &lorencioPadrigano, Ru'no Ro(as, Mariano de )eon,Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio *acuna,

Ben+amin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino andRodulfo Monsod 3ho are directl responsiblefor perpetrating this unfair labor practice act,are hereb considered to have lost theirstatus as emploees of the PhilippineBlooming Mills, %nc. #p. 7, Anne( &.$

Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners3ere noti'ed of this decision on ;eptember 5>, /0/, thereseems to be no serious :uestion that the 3ere actuall

>>

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

34/49

served there3ith on ;eptember 55, /0/. %n fact, petitionersadmitted this date of notice in paragraph 5 of their Petitionfor Relief dated !ctober >, /0/ and 'led 3ith theindustrial court on the follo3ing da. #;ee Anne( .$

%t is not controverted that it 3as onl on ;eptember 5/,/0/, or seven #6$ das after the 3ere noti'ed of thecourts decision, that petitioners 'led their motion forreconsideration 3ith the industrial court9 as it is also notdisputed that the 'led their KArguments in ;upport of theRespondents Motion for ReconsiderationK onl on !ctober2, /0/. #;ee Anne( %.$ %n other 3ords, petitioners motionfor reconsideration 3as 'led t3o #5$ das after the lapse ofthe 've #8$ da period provided for the 'ling thereof in therules of the Court of %ndustrial Relations, 3hereas theKArgumentsK 3ere 'led 've #8$ das after the e(piration ofthe period therefor also speci'ed in the same rules.

Accordingl, the 'rst issue that confronts the Court is theone raised b respondent private 'rm, namel, that in vie3of the failure of petitioners to 'le not onl their motion forreconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof3ithin the periods respectivel '(ed in the rules therefor,the Court of %ndustrial Relations acted correctl and 3ithinthe la3 in rendering and issuing its impugned order of!ctober /, /0/ dismissing petitioners motion forreconsideration.

Respondents contention presents no problem. ;:uarel

applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Courtin Eli$alde & Co. Inc. vs. Co"rt of Ind"strial9elations13herein it 3as ruled that@

August 0, /0>. Petitioner received a cop ofthe decision of the then Associate

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

35/49

Court undul delegated its +udicial functionsand thereb rendered an incomplete decision.Fe do not believe so. Computation of theovertime pa involves a mechanical function,at most. And the report 3ould still have to besubmitted to the %ndustrial Court for its

approval, b the ver terms of the order itself.That there 3as no speci'cation of the amountof overtime pa in the decision did not ma4eit incomplete, since this matter shouldnecessaril be made clear enough in theimplementation of the decision #see MalateTa(icab L Garage, %nc. vs. C%R, et al.,)767, Ma , /80$.

5. But has that +udgment reached the stage of'nalit in the sense that it can no longer, bedisturbedO

C%R Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the+urisprudence of this Court both ans3er the:uestion in the armative.

;ection 8 of the C%R Rules re:uires that one3ho see4s to reconsider the +udgment of thetrial +udge must do so 3ithin 've #8$ dasfrom the date on 3hich he received notice ofthe decision, sub+ect of the motion. Ne(tfollo3s ;ection 0 3hich sas that the motion

must be submitted 3ith arguments supportingthe same. But if said arguments could not besubmitted simultaneousl 3ith the motion,the same section commands the the movantshall 'le the same 3ithin ten #$ das fromthe date of the 'ling of his motion forreconsideration. ;ection 6 of the same rulesadmonishes a movant that K#f$ailure toobserve the abovespeci'ed periods shall besucient cause for dismissal of the motion for

reconsideration or stri4ing out of the ans3erandSor the supporting arguments, as the casema beK.

Not that the foregoing rules stand alone.720, Ma 5, /0$pronounced that 3here a motion to reconsideris 'led out of time, the order or decisionsub+ect of reconsideration comes 'nal. And soalso, 3here the arguments in support of themotion for reconsideration are 'led beondthe tenda reglementar period, the preforma motion for reconsideration althoughseasonabl 'led must nevertheless be denied.This in essence is our ruling in )ocal 6, Press& Printin %ree 0or3ers 8

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

36/49

support thereof = of August 5 3as 'led ontime. &or, August , the end of the 'vedareglementar period to 'le a motion forreconsideration, 3as a ;unda. But, actuall,the 3ritten arguments in support of the saidmotion 3ere submitted to the court on August

56. The period from August 5 to August 56,is a space of 'fteen #8$ das. ;urel enough,said arguments 3ere 'led out of time = 've#8$ das late. And the +udgment had become'nal.

>. There is, of course, petitioners motion ofAugust 5, /0> see4ing e(tension of time3ithin 3hich to present its arguments insupport of its motion. Counsel in his petitionbefore this Court pleads that the foregoingmotion 3as grounded on the e(tremel busand dicult schedule of counsel 3hich 3ouldnot enable him to do so 3ithin the stated tenda reglementar period. The arguments 3ereonl 'led on August 56 = 've #8$ das late,as aforesaid.

The foregoing circumstances 3ill not availpetitioner an. %t is to be noted that themotion for e(pansion of time 3as 'led onl onAugust 5, that is, one da before the duedate 3hich is August 55. %t 3as petitioners

dut to see to it that the court act on thismotion forth3ith or at least in:uire as to thefate thereof not later than the 55nd of August.%t did not. %t merel 'led its arguments on the56th.

To be underscored at this point is thatKobviousl to speed up the disposition ofcasesK, C%R Khas a standing rule against thee(tension of the tenda period for 'ling

supporting argumentsK. That noe(tensionpolic should have placed petitioner on guard.%t should not have simpl folded its arms, sitb supinel and relied on the courtsgenerosit. To compound petitioners neglect,it 'led the arguments onl on August 56,

/8>, 4no3ing full 3ell that b that time thereglementar period had e(pired.

Petitioner cannot complain against C%Rsruling of ;eptember 0, /0> dismissing themotion for reconsideration on the ground thatthe supporting arguments 3ere 'led out oftime. That ruling in eect denied the motionfor e(tension.

Fe rule that C%Rs +udgment has become 'nal

and unappealable. Fe ma not revie3 thesame.

Not3ithstanding this une:uivocal and unmista4ableprecedent, 3hich has not been in an 3a modi'ed, muchless revo4ed or reversed b this Court, the main opinion haschosen not onl to go into the merits of petitioners posethat the respondent court erred in holding them guilt ofbargaining in bad faith but also to ultimatel upholdpetitioners claim for reinstatement on constitutionalgrounds.

Precisel because the conclusions of the main opinion arepredicated on an e(position of the constitutional guaranteesof freedoms of speech and peaceful assembl for redress ofgrievances, so scholarl and masterful that it is bound toover3helm -s unless Fe note carefull the real issues inthis case, % am constrained, over and above m sincereadmiration for the elo:uence and "eal of Mr. 0

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

37/49

resolution of an constitutional issue. Admittedl, theinvocation of an constitutional guarantee, particularl 3henit directl aects individual freedoms enshrined in the bill ofrights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. %t is munderstanding of constitutional la3 and +udicial practicesrelated thereto, ho3ever, that even the most valuable of our

constitutional rights ma be protected b the courts onl3hen their +urisdiction over the sub+ect matter isun:uestionabl established and the applicable rules ofprocedure consistent 3ith substantive and procedural dueprocess are observed. No doubt no constitutional right canbe sacri'ced in the altar of procedural technicalities, veroften 'ttingl do3ngraded as niceties but as far as % 4no3,this principle is applied to annul or set aside 'nal +udgmentsonl in cases 3herein there is a possible denial of dueprocess. % have not come across an instance, and none ismentioned or cited in the 3elldocumented main opinion,3herein a 'nal and e(ecutor +udgment has been

invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the samehas the eect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutionalright, unless such violation amounts to a denial of dueprocess.

Fithout support from an provision of the constitution oran la3 or from an +udicial precedent or reason of principle,the main opinion nudel and un:uali'edl asserts, as if it3ere universall established and accepted as an absoluterule, that the violation of a constitutional right divests thecourt of +urisdiction9 and as a conse:uence its +udgment is

null and void and confers no rightsK. Chave$ vs. Co"rt ofAppeals, 52 ;CRA 00>, 3hich is mentioned almost inpassing, does uphold the proposition that Krelief from acriminal conviction secured at the sacri'ce of constitutionalliberties, ma be obtained through habeas corpusproceedings even after the 'nalit of the +udgmentK. And, ofcourse, Chave$ is correct9 as is alsoAbriol vs.5omeres(3hich, in principle, served as its precedent, forthe ver simple reason that in both of those cases, theaccused 3ere denied due process. %n Chave", the accused

3as compelled to testif against himself as a 3itness for theprosecution9 in Abriol, the accused 3as denied his re:uest tobe allo3ed to present evidence to establish his defense afterhis demurrer to the Peoples evidence 3as denied.

As ma be seen, ho3ever, the constitutional issues involvedin those cases are a far cr from the one no3 before -s.Jere, petitioners do not claim the 3ere denied dueprocess. Nor do the pretend that in dening their motionfor reconsideration, Kthe respondent Court of %ndustrialRelations and private 'rm trenched upon an of theirconstitutional immunities ...,K contrar to the statement tosuch eect in the main opinion. %ndeed, neither in thepetition herein nor in an of the other pleading of petitionerscan an direct or indirect assertion be found assailing theimpugned decision of the respondent court as being null andvoid because it sanctioned a denial of a valuedconstitutional libert.

%n their petition, petitioners state the issue for !ur resolutionas follo3s@

Petitioners herein humbl submit that theissue to be resolved is 3hether or not therespondent Courten banc under the facts andcircumstances, should consider the Motion forReconsideration 'led b our petitioners.

Petitioners, therefore, in 'ling this petition for

a 3rit of certiorari, humbl beg this JonorableCourt to treat this petition under Rule 2> and08 of the Rules of Court.

((( ((( (((

The basic issue therefore is the application bthe Court en banc of the strict and narro3technical rules of procedure 3ithout ta4ing

>6

8/9/2019 gr no. l-31195 june 5 1973

38/49

into account +ustice, e:uit and substantialmerits of the case.

!n the other hand, the complete argumentsubmitted b petitioners on this point in theirbrief runs thus@

%%%

%;;-E;

. ?oes the refusal to heed a 3arning in thee(ercise of a fundamental right to peaceablassemble and petition the government forredress of grievances constitute bargaining inbad faithO and,

?o the facts found b the court belo3 +ustifthe declaration and conclusion that the union3as guilt of bargaining in bad faith meritingthe dismissal of the persons allegedlresponsible thereforeO

5. Fas there grave abuse of discret