GOOD NEIGHBOR

Was the United States a "GoodNeighbor" toward Latin America in the

1930s?

Viewpoint: Yes, the Good Neighbor Policy was a new beginning in U.S. for-eign policy in Latin America.

Viewpoint: No, the Good Neighbor Policy represented an ongoing effort onthe part of the U.S. government to maintain U.S. hegemony in Latin America.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933 he promised "bold,persistent experimentation" and pledged to abandon the failed policies,and failed ideas, of the past. His New Deal promised not only a new rela-tionship between the American people and their federal government, butalso new relationships between the United States and the nations of LatinAmerica.

Relations between the United States and the other nations of thehemisphere had not been easy: though the Monroe Doctrine had put theUnited States on record as opposing European colonialism in the hemi-sphere, the United States had not always recognized the sovereignty of itsneighbors. The Mexican War in the 1840s resulted in the United Statesseizing one-third of Mexico's territory; American filibusterers had tried toset up independent states in Nicaragua in the 1850s; and in 1898 Ameri-can outrage against Spanish colonialism in the Western Hemisphere hadled to war, and the United States established a protectorate over Cubaand acquired Puerto Rico as a colony. In the twentieth century, TheodoreRoosevelt had proposed a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: not onlywould the United States not tolerate European colonization in the WesternHemisphere, but, if any nation in the region demonstrated either instabilityor an inability to govern itself, the United States would intervene and takeover that nation's government to prevent its falling into the hands of aEuropean power. The United States did intervene, with military force, inHaiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. U.S. forces occupied the cityof Veracruz, Mexico, in 1915, and an expeditionary force tried to captureFrancisco "Pancho" Villa the following year. In fact, a German offer to aidthe Mexican government against the United States prompted the U.S.government to declare war against Germany in 1917.

It had been a long and complicated relationship, and continued Amer-ican military involvement, along with economic domination by Americanbusiness interests, had made many in Latin America wary of U.S. inten-tions. Franklin D. Roosevelt pledged a change, vowing to make theUnited States a good neighbor, rather than an overbearing bully, to theother nations of the hemisphere.

Was it a genuine change of policy, or just a rhetorical change of style?In these two essays, Jurgen Scheunemann and Erik Benson take differingviews. Scheunemann, a specialist in twentieth-century American diplo-macy, and generally a harsh critic of American policy, argues thatRoosevelt did indeed change the dynamics of inter-American relations.Benson, a specialist in U.S. international policy before World War II, 45

argues that though the Good Neighbor Policy promised much, Roosevelt actually changed little.The United States simply modified its policies: it did not reverse them.

Which interpretation is correct? The answer must depend on one's point of view.

Viewpoint:Yes, the Good Neighbor Policy wasa new beginning in U.S. foreignpolicy in Latin America.

Whenever a foreign policy is subjected toanalysis, its real scope and significance can onlybe determined when placed within its historicalcontext. This assessment holds especially true forFranklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy,which most scholars see as a well-meant attemptto change the pattern of a century of imperialistU.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, butthat nevertheless fell short of providing a genu-ine new beginning. In addition, many historiansnote that it was not a new concept conceived bythe Roosevelt administration, but merely a shiftin political strategy because the traditional pol-icy—military intervention and open diplomaticor economic pressure—had proven ineffectiveand costly. This general view, however, appearsdistorted when taking (and comparing) otherperiods of United States-Latin American rela-tions, and, even more importantly, integratingthe different dimensions of the Good NeighborPolicy. It would be unhistorical to judgeRoosevelt's policy in absolute terms withoutacknowledging the general thinking of his timeand the often narrow political possibilities hefaced. It would also be politically naive toassume that the Roosevelt administration wouldcompletely abandon a goal-oriented, realistic for-eign policy that primarily served Americannational interests. One must also acknowledgethe sheer differences in size, power, economy,and unity among the countries of Latin Americaand the United States. In terms of foreign policyrelations, the United States would always be themore powerful, and hence the more influential,neighbor. It is only then that the Good Neigh-bor Policy of Roosevelt and its implementationcan be appreciated as a departure from tradi-tional U.S. foreign policy in the region.Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy was in fact anew start for United States-Latin American rela-tions and ultimately laid the cornerstone for thepolicies of two later presidents.

Throughout the history of UnitedStates-Latin American relations, the southernhemisphere remained "beneath the UnitedStates," as political scientist Lars Schoultzdescribed it in Beneath the United States: A His-tory of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (1998).

During the nineteenth century, in particular, theU.S. attitude toward its neighbors was marked bya feeling of racial and cultural superiority thatfound expression in a unilateral, often imperialis-tic, style of foreign policy. This attitude reachedits climax under President Theodore Rooseveltand his "Big Stick" diplomacy. Latin Americawas largely considered the backyard of NorthAmerica, where U.S. economic and politicalinterests ruled undisturbed in the small andmostly dependent nations. When, in his firstinaugural speech, Roosevelt pledged that theUnited States would become a "good neighbor,"the promise was correctly perceived by the LatinAmerican states as a new beginning. This prom-ise was, by no means, a new grand design for aforeign policy. During FDR's two subsequentterms of office, as World War II raged acrossEurope and the Pacific, Latin America did notfigure prominently on his foreign policy agenda.Instead, the Good Neighbor Policy resembled aset of small-scale policy initiatives that neverthe-less, taken together, amounted to a new foreignpolicy. This approach had three elements: thepolicy of nonintervention, presumably the mostsignificant departure from the actions of preced-ing administrations; the competing requirementsof U.S. foreign policy during the 1930s; and thecultural dimensions of Roosevelt's policy.

U.S. intervention in Latin America emergedduring the nineteenth century and, historically,has been defined by the Monroe Doctrine of1823. In a sense, the Roosevelt Corollary of1904 was just a modernized, yet aggressive, rein-terpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. WoodrowWilson's foreign policy was the first major shiftin this orientation, because the concept of pro-moting democracy abroad was introduced as acrucial American goal in Latin America. It isequally striking, however, that Wilson had to relyon intervention to achieve his goals. One of hismost significant dilemmas was how to achieveliberal goals, such as democracy and humanrights, without the forced application of nonlib-eral tools. In this regard, even Wilson remainedwithin the framework of traditional UnitedStates-Latin American relations.

Later, President Herbert Hoover—whoactually spoke of a "good neighbor policy" in1928 during a goodwill trip to South America—cautiously began to change this policy by order-ing the removal of American troops from Nicara-gua and Haiti. This new approach, however,does not make him the father of the Good

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Neighbor Policy. It would be underestimatingthe multidimensionality of Roosevelt's new pol-icy approach to interpret his Good NeighborPolicy as a simple continuation of Republicanadministration insights into the weaknesses ofinterventionist policies. The major differencebetween Roosevelt and his predecessors is thathe created this pattern when he introduced theconcept of nonintervention in Latin Americancountries, rightfully considered the essence of hisadministration's new agenda for the region. It isbecause of this change, and those discussedbelow, that Roosevelt's policy can be clearly setapart.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twen-tieth centuries, the United States had militarilyintervened in many Latin American countries,most notably in Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti, and theDominican Republic. Between 1898 and 1920,the U.S. Army and Navy intervened twentytimes. But beginning in 1933, Calvin Coolidge'sverdict that the U.S. government had the rightand obligation to protect its interests in LatinAmerica, by force if need be, was finally put torest. During its first term, the Roosevelt adminis-tration revoked this policy publicly anddenounced it as an instrument of U.S. foreignpolicy in Latin America on several occasions,such as at the inter-American conference in Mon-tevideo in 1933, when the United States signedthe Convention on the Right and Duties ofStates, and the inter-American conference in Bue-nos Aires in 1936, where the United Statessigned the protocol on nonintervention. Thesetwo documents represented more than just signa-tures and political pledges: to the Latin Ameri-can nations they marked the turnaround of thenorthern colossus; for U.S. foreign policy, theysignaled a new beginning.

A good example for Roosevelt's new policyis the case of Cuba. When his administrationrevoked the Platt Amendment (1901) in 1934, itcanceled one of its most important political andcultural (pseudolegal) justifications for interven-tion. Under the amendment, Cuba had beencompletely subjected to American influence andmilitary power. The law had been used to justifythree military interventions in Cuba (1906-1909, 1912, 1917-1922). In addition to abrogat-ing the Platt Amendment, the Roosevelt admin-istration took a different foreign policy approachwhen, in 1931, Cuban dictator GerardoMachado y Morales suspended constitutionallyguaranteed civil rights and stepped up the politi-cal repression of his people. The new U.S.ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles, tried topersuade Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cor-dell Hull to intervene militarily, but despite thestill valid Platt Amendment, the administrationdid not make a move. However, it did pressure

Machado to step down in the end. By and large,this situation also represented a severe setbackfor the support of democracy and human rightsin the region. However, the United States haddeparted from its familiar pattern of foreign pol-icy in the region, even though American (mostlyprivate) economic interests were at stake.

A second question that arises in this context isthe economic relationship between the UnitedStates and Latin America. The long-term results ofWorld War I, and the rise of Nazi Germany thatbegan in 1933, had led to a steady decline in U.S.economic influence in Latin America throughoutthe 1920s and early 1930s. By the end of the1930s, American economic and political influencein the region faced new opposition, a fact thatoften overshadows the beginning of the policy. Anintegral part of the Good Neighbor Policy wasintensified economic exchange between the regionand the United States. The Roosevelt administra-tion did not actually attempt to give up or diminishU.S. economic leverage in Latin America. Instead,it tried to change its nature and shift its overallfocus. Given strong German economic and militaryinfluence in some Latin and South American coun-tries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and oth-ers, this new U.S. strategy served three purposes: toreaffirm American economic power in the region;to establish a greater level of economic partnership;and (beginning in 1939) to reduce and ultimatelydestroy the German war machine by pressuringLatin American countries to terminate exports toNazi Germany. On the one hand, this might beconsidered classic "carrot and stick" diplomacy, butin the end it spawned a different approach to eco-nomic ties between North and South America. Thesingle most important step was the establishmentof the Import-Export Bank in 1934, which wasoriginally founded to funnel loans to U.S. export-ers. By 1940 it also served as an institution forgranting loans to Latin American governments,which in fact was tantamount to direct financialU.S. government assistance. This measure obvi-ously served American interests: the loans increasedLatin America's dependence on the United States.At the same time, however, it stabilized the regioneconomically, supported development in somecountries, and ultimately proved a tentative precur-sor for subsequent U.S. development aid in theaftermath of World War II.

By the same token, in a desperate effort toincrease U.S. exports in the wake of the GreatDepression, the Roosevelt administration triedto negotiate bilateral trade agreements, most ofwhich focused on reducing or abolishing tariffswith many Latin American countries. But theUnited States was unable to sign trade agree-ments with Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Uru-guay (to name only the most important ones). Thissuggests that these countries were not economi-

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cally dependent on U.S. exports, and, more impor-tantly, it demonstrates how times had changed. Theprocess of these trade negotiations, and their fail-ure in some instances, is evidence of how the GoodNeighbor Policy was a new departure. The UnitedStates did use economic and diplomatic pressure toreach agreements with countries such as Cuba in1936, and officially boycotted Mexican and Boliv-ian oil exports; but it ultimately limited itself toemploying means it regarded as ethical in interna-tional negotiations between sovereign states. InBolivia and Mexico, where American oil companieswere nationalized in 1937 and 1938, the UnitedStates accepted the new status quo without inter-vening. This strategy represented another novelaspect of the Good Neighbor Policy. The UnitedStates showed the same new attitude during negoti-ations for a multilateral, inter-American financialinstitution. In the course of the talks, which, in1940, ultimately failed, it became clear that LatinAmerican and U.S. economic interests were diamet-rically opposed. While attempting to impose itsinterests on the other nations in the negotiations,the United States finally had to back down in theface of Latin American resistance. The balance ofpower had not really changed; but these countrieshad obviously gained self-confidence, and the U.S.willingness to peacefully accept it, was in fact new.

The promotion of trade and economic assis-tance against the background of the war fought inEurope suggests the third issue, namely the culturaldimensions of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.Both in speeches and deed, the Roosevelt adminis-tration attempted to establish a common culturalidentity that the United States and Latin Americancountries could share. This common identity pre-sumably included free trade, democracy, and a cer-tain moral superiority over Fascist Europe. Itimplicitly denounced communism as an alternative,however. This idea of a "Western hemisphere,"which was to gain a new and extremely importantsignificance in the 1980s, not only drew LatinAmerican countries closer to the United States andits political beliefs, but helped create a pan-Ameri-can community.

Often neglected in this regard—but hardly tobe underestimated—are the direct propagandaefforts of the U.S. during the late 1930s and 1940sagainst the strong influence Nazi Germany exertedin the region. In late 1940, the U.S. governmentopened a special office in the State Department,the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-AmericanAffairs (OCIAA). Headed by Nelson A. Rock-efeller, its annual budget rose to $45 million by theend of the war. The office published magazines inboth English and Spanish, aired radio programs,and distributed American movies and literature. Allof these efforts were part of the Good NeighborPolicy. Despite the fact that some of these pro-grams were ideologically biased (for example, some

movies and literary works critical of U.S. culturewere not shown), they were nevertheless the expres-sion of a new policy. Instead of sending troops, theUnited States now employed more sophisticated,and ultimately more democratic, means. Ratherthan using force, it applied rhetoric as an instru-ment of its foreign policy in Latin America.

It is true that Roosevelt did not basically chal-lenge the general U.S. approach to Latin Americaor the U.S. companies' interests, nor did he repudi-ate U.S. strategic and economic stakes in LatinAmerica. But he nevertheless did more than justpromote a strategic shift to presumably reach thesame goals. He gradually changed both the U.S.attitude toward, and therefore the relationshipwith, the states of the Southern Hemisphere. Onelong-lasting and negative outcome of this policy,however, was the establishment of dictatorshipsthroughout Latin America. This was the result notonly of prior military interventions without clearpolitical strategies for the countries involved, butalso Roosevelt's resistance to using force to upholddemocracy. After World War II, most Americanpresidents did not appreciate or continueRoosevelt's policy. The global setting and Ameri-can interests during the the Cold War prevented atrue Good Neighbor Policy from being carried out.Interventions continued with presidents DwightD. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Richard M.Nixon. President Jimmy Carter was the first post-war president to try and redefine UnitedStates-Latin American relations according toRoosevelt precepts and to act as a good neighbor.To a certain degree, President Bill Clinton has alsoattempted to follow his Democratic predecessors.On the other hand, although Carter's successor,Ronald W. Reagan, largely reversed this policy and,nearly half a century after Roosevelt, even increasedthe pace of intervention, his actions did not in theleast diminish the historic significance ofRoosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.

-JURGEN SCHEUNEMANN, FOX FELLOW,YALE UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No, the Good Neighbor Policyrepresented an ongoing effort onthe part of the U.S. government tomaintain U.S. hegemony in LatinAmerica.

In the annals of U.S. diplomacy, the "GoodNeighbor" stands apart as one of the most singu-lar and popular policies. Synonymous with theadministration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, theGood Neighbor Policy is renowned for fostering

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a sense of friendship between the United Statesand Latin America unmatched in this century.Under its auspices, the United States abandoneddirect military intervention in Latin Americanaffairs and relied on diplomacy to gain supportfor its initiatives. Not surprisingly, this way ofdoing business proved popular with the govern-ments of the region. Yet, the Good Neighborwas more than a diplomatic policy. Its themes offriendship and cooperation appeared in movies,commercials, and other media. In the UnitedStates, public interest in Latin Americans andtheir culture grew rapidly, producing dancecrazes and film stars. In essence, the GoodNeighbor was a cultural phenomena. For FDR,it was a political winner, and even his successorshave invoked its name. Despite its popularity,however, the Good Neighbor Policy did not liveup to its reputation.

In both the historical profession and in pop-ular memory, the Good Neighbor Policy hasappeared as a well-defined policy that repre-sented a radical departure from past practice. Inreality, it was neither well-defined nor radical.FDR's administration used the term "GoodNeighbor" to refer to a loose collection of diplo-matic initiatives. While there were certain pre-

cepts to the Good Neighbor Policy, these couldbe contorted to support U.S. interests in theregion. Moreover, these precepts did not origi-nate with FDR. They had their roots in policychanges implemented by the Republican admin-istrations of the 1920s. FDR staked his claim tothese changes largely through the turn of aphrase. While the Good Neighbor Policyencouraged a new direction in U.S. policy, it didnot represent a radical departure. Rather, it was acontinuation of changes already under way.

The importance of seeing the continuity inthe Good Neighbor Policy is that one can betterunderstand why the United States pursued thiscourse of action in the 1930s and why it eventu-ally abandoned it. Rather than representing adeparture from traditional U.S. policy, the GoodNeighbor Policy was part of an ongoing effort tomaintain U.S. hegemony in Latin America. TheUnited States employed different means fordoing so. Instead of sending marines, it sup-ported friendly dictators. Instead of issuing uni-lateral declarations, it lobbied the nations ofLatin America to adopt its policies at hemi-spheric conferences. Admittedly, these were nota-ble changes. However, the United States had notabandoned the idea that it was destined to lead

Nicaraguan PresidentAnastasio SomozaGarcia and U.S.President Franklin D.Roosevelt inWashington, D.C., 1939

(Bettman Newsphoto)

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the hemisphere and had not lost its sense ofsuperiority vis-a-vis its neighbors. Thus, as cir-cumstances changed both during and afterWorld War II, it had little trouble forsaking theniceties of the Good Neighbor Policy. In theend, it had not changed American aims in theregion; it merely cloaked them in the guise ofbeing a friendly neighbor.

After its victory in the Spanish-AmericanWar, the United States assumed a dominant rolein the Western Hemisphere, particularly in theCaribbean Basin. The U.S. presence took manyforms, including armed intervention. During thefirst three decades of the twentieth century, thearmy, navy, and marines were all busy "policing"America's southern neighbors. Sometimes thethreat of military force was sufficient to accom-plish American aims, but on many occasionsU.S. troops ended up fighting indigenous forceson foreign soil. While most of these operationswere brief, a few turned into long-term occupa-tions. In the cases of Nicaragua and Haiti, U.S.military forces governed these nations for mostof the 1910s and 1920s.

American involvement in the regionstemmed in part from economic and strategicinterests. The U.S. government wanted stableand friendly governments there so that Americanbusiness could make profits and so that the greatpowers of Europe would have no excuse todeploy military forces so close to the UnitedStates. Yet, more than dollars and cents were atstake. American interventionism stemmed inlarge part from a sense of cultural superiority. Inthe minds of many Americans, the United States,with its stable and just political institutions, hada moral responsibility to police the lawless, cor-rupt nations to the south and tutor them in thefine art of democratic government. This view-point pervaded U.S. society as a whole. Forexample, political cartoons of the period, draw-ing upon prevalent racial stereotypes, oftendepicted the nations of the Caribbean as unrulyblack children, with Uncle Sam as the sternwhite parent endeavoring to rear them.

Despite this sense of mission, U.S. involve-ment became increasingly unpopular after WorldWar I. Repeated occupations of various nationsseemed to be fruitless and never-ending adven-tures. The most frustrating experience came inNicaragua, where U.S. forces intervened fourtimes during the 1910s and 1920s. They failed toestablish a stable government and becameembroiled in a bush war that they could not win.This war and other such operations ran up costlydefense bills, a particularly galling problem forthe frugal Republican administrations of the1920s. When the Great Depression hit, theseexpenses became all the more undesirable. Inaddition to domestic criticism, U.S. intervention-

ism drew condemnation from the nations ofLatin America. At the 1928 International Con-ference of American States, U.S. diplomatsbarely succeeded in derailing a resolution callingfor an end to U.S. interventionism. Both athome and abroad, the Latin American policy ofthe United States was becoming increasinglyunpopular.

The Republican-controlled administrations ofthe period realized that change was needed. Whilethey defended the theoretical right of the UnitedStates to resort to armed intervention, they realizedthat interventionism was not a practical policy.Undersecretary of State J. Reuben Clark Jr. statedthis opinion in a 1928 memorandum and recom-mended that the United States discontinue its"policing" of the hemisphere. When HerbertHoover assumed the presidency in 1929, he andhis secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, putClark's proposal into practice. They arranged forthe withdrawal of U.S. forces from Nicaragua in1931, and implemented plans to pull out of Haitiby the mid 1930s. More importantly, they made itclear that they had no intention of sending thetroops back. In the case of Nicaragua, Stimsondeclared that the U.S. government would not beresponsible for the welfare of U.S. citizens whochose to remain in that country—they were there attheir own risk. In both word and deed, the UnitedStates was turning a corner in its diplomatic his-tory.

Roosevelt had been an outspoken critic ofU.S. interventionism during the 1920s. How-ever, when he assumed the presidency in 1933,his overriding concern was in dealing with theDepression. Simply put, FDR was too busy toformulate a clear policy for U.S.-Latin Americanrelations. Only a diplomatic crisis would drawhis attention to the issue. In the fall of 1933, acoalition of students and noncommissionedarmy officers overthrew the Cuban government.The U.S. ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles,did not support the revolution, which he viewedas dangerously radical. He urged FDR to sendtroops. Belying his earlier criticism of interven-tionism, FDR dispatched U.S. warships to thewaters off Cuba—an invasion seemed imminent.Yet, FDR's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull,urged him not to land troops. Hull was sched-uled to attend the 1933 International Confer-ence of American States, where he planned topropose a trade agreement between the UnitedStates and Latin American nations. He worriedthat if the United States intervened in Cuba, theLatin Americans might reject his proposal. FDRheeded Hull's advice and stepped back from thebrink. Intervention was avoided, but just barely.

Clearly, FDR had not entered office with awell-defined policy for Latin America. However,in his 1933 inaugural address, he declared that

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the basis of his foreign policy would be to act likea "good neighbor." The phrase proved catchy,and it became synonymous with his administra-tion's overarching policy for Latin America.

The Good Neighbor Policy was not with-out substance. At the 1933 conference, theUnited States, while defending the right to inter-vene under international law, voted for a resolu-tion renouncing the use of unilateral militaryintervention as a policy tool. It voted for a simi-lar resolution at the 1936 meeting, this timeoffering no qualifications. In effect, U.S. diplo-mats dropped the "big stick" of military inter-vention for the diplomacy and cooperation ofthe "Good Neighbor." They then usedinter-American conferences to lobby the govern-ments of Latin America to support U.S. diplo-matic initiatives. In day-to-day matters, theyrelied on these governments to provide thedesired economic and political stability forAmerican interests. In essence, the Good Neigh-bor Policy was defined by noninterventionismand cooperation.

Yet, the Good Neighbor Policy relied uponstyle as much as, if not more than, substance.While inter-American conferences providedopportunities for dealing with real issues, theyalso served as stages from which to proclaim U.S.friendship with Latin America. For example, in1936, FDR traveled to the conference at BuenosAires. His trip was a public relations coup. Thesight of the U.S. president traveling in a motor-cade down the streets of a South American capi-tal, with Argentine children waving theAmerican flag, created an atmosphere of amityunmatched to that time. FDR's speech at theconference made no new proclamations, as hereiterated many of the old platitudes of theGood Neighbor Policy. However, it was not somuch what he said as how he said it. His warmthand charisma struck a chord with the audience.Here was a man who could touch the hearts ofthe people. Amity was growing north of the bor-der as well; in the United States, public interestin Latin American culture grew rapidly. Holly-wood produced scores of movies that used LatinAmerican locales, characters, and storylines.Latin dances became widely popular. CarmenMiranda and other Latin Americans becamestars in the United States. This interest, coupledwith the ideal of being a "good neighbor," cre-ated a sense of friendship. Thus, the GoodNeighbor was more than a policy—it was a rela-tionship.

Despite the changes, there were someimportant continuities. First, U.S. officialsremained determined to protect U.S. interests inthe region. Second, they perceived the UnitedStates to be the natural leader of the hemisphere.As a result, their neighborliness was conditional.

They expected that in return for their promisenot to intervene with military force, Latin Amer-ican governments would safeguard U.S. interests.If they failed to do so, or even acted against theseinterests, the United States would take action.For example, when the Mexican governmentnationalized the holdings of various Americanoil companies in 1938, the companies asked theU.S. government to intervene. It responded bystopping the purchase of Mexican silver, a partic-ularly damaging blow to the Mexican economy.While the United States did not resort to armedforce, it was not reluctant to employ indirectmeans of intervention. Such actions took manyforms.

Most notably the United States maintainedits influence in the region by supporting vari-ous dictators. During this decade RafaelTrujillo (Dominican Republic), FulgencioBatista (Cuba), and Anastasio Somoza (Nicara-gua) emerged as allies of the United States. Intheir respective nations they maintained orderand stability through authoritarian means, serv-ing as proxies for U.S. Marines.

World War II brought important changes inthe Good Neighbor relationship. For the UnitedStates, it became a useful instrument to arm forwar and influence the conflict. When hostilitieserupted in Europe in 1939, the United Statesconvinced its southern neighbors to join with itin declaring a neutral zone around the Americas.No warships from either combatant would beallowed to engage in military operations in thiszone. Ostensibly, this was a neutral action. How-ever, FDR was clearly not impartial. He loathedNazism and was determined to aid the Alliedcause. The zone was of great benefit to Britain'sRoyal Navy because it limited the area it wouldhave to patrol for German U-boats. In 1941,FDR further assisted the British by expandingthe neutral zone to the mid-Atlantic. In LatinAmerica, the Roosevelt administration targetedGerman economic interests and political sympa-thizers. Using diplomatic ties forged under theGood Neighbor Policy, it convinced variousLatin American governments to shut down Ger-man companies and round up suspected Fascistsympathizers. U.S. diplomatic efforts took on agreater urgency after Pearl Harbor. At the behestof the United States, most Latin American coun-tries broke diplomatic relations with the Axispowers, and some declared war. Brazil senttroops to Italy; Mexico dispatched a fightersquadron to the Pacific. Those who did not fur-nish armed forces helped in other ways. Someprovided vital raw materials at fixed prices forthe U.S. war industry. Mexico sent workers tothe United States to fill the demand for labor inthe war economy. As the Americas joined ranksto fight the Axis, the friendship fostered by the

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Good Neighbor Policy grew. Hollywoodchurned out scores of movies emphasizing thefraternity of the New World. On the surface,things had never been better.

Regardless of wartime propaganda aboutthe cordial relationship, there were disturbinginconsistencies in U.S. policy. While it boastedof its friendly and equitable treatment of thenations to the south, the United States was quiteruthless in dealing with those that opposed its

aims. The most notable victim was Argentina.Long opposed to U.S. leadership in the hemi-sphere, Argentina did not support the U.S. wareffort. It maintained relations with the Axis pow-ers and became a haven for Nazi agents. By 1944,the United States was fed up with Argentina'suncooperative stance. It imposed economic sanc-tions against the Argentines and urged theirLatin American neighbors to ostracize them. Iteven pressured Great Britain to cut its vital and

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A TIME FOR NEW RELATIONSIn an address at Chautauqua, New York, on 14 August1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt defended his GoodNeighbor Policy.

Long before I returned to Washington asPresident of the United States, I had made upmy mind that, pending what might be called amore opportune moment on other continents,the United States could best serve the causeof a peaceful humanity by setting an exam-

ple. That was why on the 4th of March, 1933,I made the following declaration:

In the field of world policy I would dedi-cate this nation to the policy of the goodneighbor—the neighbor who resolutelyrespects himself and, because he does so,respects the rights of others—the neighborwho respects his obligations and respects thesanctity of his agreements in and with a worldof neighbors.

This declaration represents my purpose;but it represents more than a purpose, for itstands for a practice. To a measurabledegree it has succeeded; the whole worldnow knows that the United States cherishesno predatory ambitions. We are strong; butless powerful nations know that they neednot fear our strength. We seek no conquest,we stand for peace.

In the whole of the Western Hemisphereour good-neighbor policy has producedresults that are especially heartening.

The noblest monument to peace and toneighborly economic and social friendship inall the world is not a monument in bronze orstone, but the boundary which unites theUnited States and Canada—3,000 miles offriendship with no barbed wire, no gun or sol-dier, and no passport on the whole frontier.Mutual trust made that frontier. To extend thesame sort of mutual trust throughout theAmericas was our aim.

The American republics to the south ofus have been ready always to cooperate withthe United States on a basis of equality andmutual respect, but before we inauguratedthe good-neighbor policy there was amongthem resentment and fear because certainadministrations in Washington had slightedtheir national pride and their sovereign rights.

In pursuance of the good-neighbor pol-icy, and because in my younger days I hadlearned many lessons in the hard school ofexperience, I stated that the United Stateswas opposed definitely to armed intervention.

We have negotiated a pan Americanconvention embodying the principle of nonin-tervention. We have abandoned the PlattAmendment, which gave us the right to inter-vene in the internal affairs of the Republic ofCuba. We have withdrawn American Marinesfrom Haiti. We have signed a new treatywhich places our relations with Panama on amutually satisfactory basis. We have under-taken a series of trade agreements with otherAmerican countries to our mutual commercialprofit. At the request of two neighboringrepublics, I hope to give assistance in thefinal settlement of the last serious boundarydispute between any of the Americannations.

Throughout the Americas the spirit of thegood neighbor is a practical and living fact.The twenty-one American republics are notonly living together in friendship and inpeace—they are united in the determinationso to remain.

Source: Peace and War: United States Foreign Pol-icy 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office. 1942), pp. 323-329.

extensive trade with Argentina, despite the Britishbelief that the Argentines were no threat to theAllied cause. Clearly, the United States was notgoing to tolerate a challenge to its hemispheric lead-ership. Moreover, as the war progressed, U.S. poli-cymakers increasingly neglected their neighbors.They sent little military aid to the armed forces ofLatin America and ostracized them from the wareffort. They did not invite Latin American repre-sentatives to many of the postwar planning confer-ences.

Such treatment foreshadowed what was tocome. In the postwar years, Europe received bil-lions of dollars in U.S. aid under the auspices of theMarshall Plan, but the United States told the LatinAmericans that it could spare no economic aid forthem. Even in the American public, the friendshipidealized in Hollywood had its limits. A strongsense of cultural superiority remained amongNorth Americans vis-a-vis their neighbors. CarmenMiranda, with her "tutti-frutti" hat, was entertain-ing and sexy, not serious and intellectual. LatinAmericans were viewed as fun-loving and easygo-ing, not sober and reflective. Off the screen, theycould become targets of resentment and violence.For example, during the war, there were frequentclashes between Mexican youth and U.S. militarypersonnel in southern California. Thus, while themovies made much ado about the friendly hemi-sphere, there remained in American society anunfriendly attitude.

Eventually the Good Neighbor Policy fell bythe wayside as a policy. There is much debate as toits time of death. Some claim that the end of thewar and the passing of FDR signaled its demise.Others cite the U.S.-sponsored 1954 overthrow ofthe Arbenz government in Guatemala as the deathknell. Such arguments assume that there was a spe-cific time of death because there was a clear-cut andradically different policy. However, this was not thecase. The Good Neighbor Policy was largely a shiftin style, and, as with most styles, it did not end sud-denly, but rather slowly faded. FDR's successorscontinued to invoke the ideal of the Good Neigh-bor Policy for many years. Like FDR, they contin-ued to talk of friendship and cooperation whilemaking use of collective bodies such as the Organi-zation of American States (OAS). However, as inFDR's day, U.S. officials continued to view theUnited States as the natural leader of the hemi-

sphere, and they would tolerate no challenge to thisself-perceived status. At times their methods wouldbe more direct than those employed under theGood Neighbor Policy, but often their methodsdiffered little. Overall, the Good Neighbor Policypopularized a new manner for dealing with theneighbors—it did not change American views aboutthem.

-ERIK BENSON, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

References

Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover'sLatin-American Policy (Stanford, Cal.: StanfordUniversity Press, 1951);

Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: UnitedStates Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1979);

David Green, The Containment of Latin America: AHistory of the Myths And Realities of the GoodNeighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,1971);

Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner His-tory of American Empire, 1900-1934 (Lexing-ton: University Press of Kentucky, 1983);

Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy:The United States and Latin America (Balti-more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991);

Frederick B. Pike, FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: SixtyTears of Generally Gentle Chaos (Austin: Uni-versity of Texas Press, 1995);

Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A Historyof U.S. Policy Toward Latin America(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1998);

Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics ofU.S.-Latin American Relations (New York:Oxford University Press, 1996);

Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good NeighborPolicy (Austin: University of Texas Press,1985);

Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1961).

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 3: AMERICAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1900-1945: PURSUIT OF PROGRESS 53