Golden GrowthRestoring the Lustre of the European Economic Model

2

The European Economic Model

Trade

Finance

Enterprise

Innovation

Labor

Government

3

The achievements

Trade

Finance

Enterprise

Innovation

Labor

Government

Convergence Machine

Brand Europe

Lifestyle Superpower

4

Europe—“Convergence Machine”

5

The convergence machine

Figure 1: In Europe, a rapid convergence in living standards—not much elsewhere

(annual growth of consumption per capita between 1970 and 2009, by level of consumption in 1970) 

Note: n = number of countries. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011); see Chapter 1.

Corr. = -0.80***n = 26

0

2

4

6

0 3 6 9 12 15

Europe

Corr. = -0.21n = 15

0 3 6 9 12 15

East Asia

Corr. = -0.25n = 22

0 3 6 9 12 15

Latin America

Ann

ual p

er c

apita

con

sum

ptio

n gr

owth

perc

ent,

1970

-200

9

Initial level of consumption per capita, 1970PPP, thousands of 2005 international dollars

6

Trade (goods)

Figure 2: Almost half of the global goods trade involves Europe

(merchandise trade in 2008, US$ billion)

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WTO (2009); see Chapter 2.

7

Trade (services)

Figure 2.19: India and the United States have more sophisticated services exports than the European Union members and candidates

(Service EXPY, 1990–2007, and shares in service exports EXPY, 2007)

Note: In the right panel, traditional services are in blue shades, modern in yellow and brown.

Source: Lundstrom Gable and Mishra (2011); see Chapter 2.

8

New members’ trade has become more diversified

Figure 2.3: The European Union’s new members are more important partners for the EU15, the EU15 less for the new

(shares of regional trade for EU15, EU10, Bulgaria and Romania, and SEE, 1996–2008)

Note: The EU10 includes new member states joined the EU in 2004, except Cyprus and Malta.

Source World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade; see Chapter 2.

3

4

5

6

7

50

55

60

65

70

40

50

60

70

40

45

50

55

60

1996 2000 2004 2008 1996 2000 2004 2008 1996 2000 2004 2008 1996 2000 2004 2008

EU15: trade with EU10 EU10: trade with EU15 BGR+ROM: trade with EU15 SEE: trade with EU15

All products: Exports Imports

Per

cen

tag

e o

f tot

al t

rade

9

Factory Europe has become brainer

Figure 2.9: Advanced and emerging Europe are trading more sophisticated intermediate goods

(EXPY for intermediate goods, thousands of US$, 1996–2008)

Note: Trade in intermediates is defined by the BEC nomenclature.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade, and WDI; see Chapter 2.

11

12

13

14

15

16

13

14

15

16

17

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Exports Imports

EU10 with EU15 World BGR+ROM with EU15 WorldSEE with EU15 World World with EU15

Trade in intermediate goods of:

10

Financial integration

Figure 3.2: Capital flows in emerging Europe are large

(percentage of GDP; period average of group median values)

Note: “EU coh.” refers to the EU cohesion countries, “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries, “LAC” refers to the Latin America and the Caribbean region. CA stands for current account and FX is foreign exchange.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO; Stojkov and Zalduendo (2011); see Chapter 3.

-16

-12

-8

-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

EU15 EU Coh. EU12 BGR+ROM SEE E. prtn. East Asia LAC EU15 EU Coh. EU12 BGR+ROM SEE E. prtn. East Asia LAC

2001-2004 2005-2008

FDI Portfolio Other Total Capital Flows CA Balance FX Reserves, change

11

Financial flows have helped in emerging Europe

Figure 4: In Europe, foreign capital has boosted growth in emerging economies

(current account deficits and annual per capita growth, 1997–2008, by groups of countries, percent)

Note: Average growth rates calculated using 3 four-year periods in 1997-2008.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO; Stojkov and Zalduendo (2011); see Chapter 3.

12

More equity flows to the east, more debt in the south

Figure 3.14: Greater debt exposure in Southern Europe, more equity exposure in the east

(aggregate external net equity and net debt exposures, percentage of GDP, 2002–09)

Note: Arrows begin in 2002 and end in 2009. The arrows for each region are median values. The dot is the median value for the referenced group. Ireland is excluded from net debt position as its data are distorted because international mutual funds hosted by Ireland are recorded as positive net debt, even though these resources are not related to the domestic economy.

Source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); see Chapter 3.

EU12

BGR+ROM

SEE

Eastern partnership

EU cohesion Asia (2009)

LAC (2009)

-80

-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

Ne

t eq

uity

pos

itio

n, 2

002-

09

-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40

Net debt position, 2002-09

13

Needed: real integration

Box figure 1: More monetary and financial than real integration in Europe during the last decade

(arrows begin in 1997 and end in 2008; the origin indicates complete nominal and real integration)

Note: The figure shows the extent of economic integration. The vertical axis combines in one index of dissimilarity three indicators of nominal integration—volatility of exchange rates, convergence in inflation rates, and convergence in interest rates. The horizontal axis does the same with three indicators of real integration—extent of synchronization in business cycles measured by indexes of industrial production, trade integration, and per capita income.

Source: Sugawara and Zalduendo (2010).

EU12

Eastern partnership

Greece

Ireland

Czech Republic

Poland

Bulgaria+Romania

CroatiaEU150

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

No

min

al i

nte

gra

tion

(0

= f

ull

inte

gra

tion

)

0 1 2 3 4

Real integration (0 = full integration)

14

European workers are less mobile

Figure 15: Europeans are less mobile, even within their own countries

(labor mobility, share of working-age population that has moved, 2000-2005)

Source: Bonin and others (2008); and OECD (2005 and 2007); see Chapter 6.

European Convergence

See Spotlight One.

16

“Europe”—Global Brand

17

The making of “Brand Europe”

Table 1: Relentless growth in the United States, revival in Asia, and a postwar miracle in Europe

(average annual compound growth rates, GDP per capita, 1820–2008, US$ 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP estimates)  

Note: Regional aggregates are population weighted; see Spotlight One for details.

Source: Maddison (1996); and Conference Board (2011).

18

The making of “Brand Europe”

Figure 5: European enterprises have delivered jobs, productivity, and exports

(performance of European sub-regions and benchmark countries, 1995–2009)

Note: Growth rates in employment and productivity are compound annual growth rates. Average values by group are shown. China and Japan are also included in the calculation of East Asia regional average.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WDI and ILO (2010); see Chapter 4.

1.3

1.3

0.4

-0.7

0.6

-0.1

1.2

-0.1

1.0

1.7

2.4

1.4

1.0

3.0

3.0

4.1

6.6

1.6

1.2

7.8

2.0

0.4

50.2

49.4

57.5

39.6

32.8

38.7

11.2

13.4

26.7

64.0

23.2

EFTA

EU15

EU12

Bulgaria+Romania

SEE

Eastern partnership

United States

Japan

China

East Asia

Latin America

-1 0 1 2 0 2 4 6 8 0 20 40 60

Employment growth, percent Productivity growth, percent Exports, percentage of GDP, 2009

19

Two productivity gaps

Figure 5.1: Gap 1: North vs. South; Gap 2: EU vs. US

(GDP per hours worked in Geary/Khamis $, United States =100)

 

Note: EU15 North = Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; EU15 Continental = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; EU15 South = Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Conference Board (2011); see Chapter 5.

20

40

60

80

100

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

EU15 North EU15 Continental EU15 South EU12 BGR+ROM

20

Productivity levels differ in Europe—as expected

Figure 6a: Much of Europe is becoming more productive, but the south has fallen behind

(labor productivity levels in 2002, thousands of 2005 US$)

Note: For Belgium, Greece, and Norway, productivity levels refer to 2003. The three lines show average values for countries covered by each line.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; see Chapter 4.

21

Productivity growth—not exactly what was expected

Figure 6b: Much of Europe is becoming more productive, but the south has fallen behind

(labor productivity growth, 2002–08, annual percentage increase)

Note: The period considered varies: Belgium and Norway (2003–08), Greece (2003–07), and the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Romania, and the United Kingdom (2002–07). The three lines show average values for countries covered by each line. Expected growth for EU15 South is obtained by computing gaps in productivity levels between EU15 South and each of the other two groups and then applying these shares to the difference in growth between the first (that is., EFTA, EU15 North, and EU15 Continental) and the third (EU12) groups.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; see Chapter 4.

22

Entrepreneurial structures must be suitable for a big market

Figure 7: Smaller firms contribute half of value added in the EU15 South, but just a third elsewhere

(contributions to value added by size of enterprises, 2009)

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the total value added expressed in billions of constant 2005 U.S. dollars. The EU15 comprises Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Continental); and Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South). The EU12 comprises Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (North); the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (Continental); and Bulgaria and Romania (South).

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; see Chapter 4.

23

FDI has turned eastward, away from the south

Figure 8: Western European investors have been looking east, not south

(foreign direct investment inflows in Europe, percent, 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2008, percent)

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the amount of inflows expressed in billions of U.S. dollars.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UNCTAD (2010); see Chapter 4.

24

FDI has turned eastward, away from the south

Figure 8: Western European investors have been looking east, not south

(foreign direct investment inflows in Europe, percent, 1985, 1995, 2005, 2008 and 2010, percent)

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the amount of inflows expressed in billions of U.S. dollars.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UNCTAD (2011); see Chapter 4.

22.4

0.70.5

76.4

10.60.80.4

11.3

77.0

9.42.82.09.4

76.4

13.4

5.74.2

10.9

65.8

11.2

3.91.7

11.4

71.7

0

20

40

60

80

100

FD

I in

flow

sh

are

in E

uro

pe

pe

rce

nt

1985(16.9B)

1995(138.3B)

2005(529.2B)

2008(563.2B)

2010(335.9B)

EU15 NorthEU15 ContinentalEFTA

Emerging Europe

BGR+ROM

SEE

EU15 South

25

Doing business is now most difficult in the EU15 South

Figure 9: Southern and Eastern Europe must make it easier to do business

(principal components index of the ease of doing business in 2011, scaled from 0 [poor] to 100 [excellent])

Note: Averages are computed using principal component analysis. EFTA here comprises Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. The EU15 comprises Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (Continental); and Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South). The EU12 comprises Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (North); the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (Continental); and Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania (South).

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Doing Business; see Chapter 4.

90.7

82.879.5

76.0

87.2

74.4

64.469.4

74.568.0 66.5

62.3

0

30

60

90

Qu

ality

of r

egu

latio

ns, 2

011

0-1

00: h

ighe

r, b

ette

r

USA JPN EFTA EU15 North Conti-nental

South EU12 North Conti-nental

South SEE

26

Another productivity gap has been growing—between the EU15 and the US

Figure 10: Productivity growth in Europe’s larger economies has slowed down since the mid-1990s

(EU15 labor productivity, indexed to the United States and Japan)

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the OECD Productivity Database; see Chapter 5.

27

Europe specializes in old sectors, the US in new

Figure 11: The United States specializes in younger, more R&D intensive products

(relative technological advantage and R&D efforts by young and old innovation leaders in the United States, Europe and the rest of the world)

Note: R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D spending to total sales, for firms established after 1975 (young leading innovators or “Yollies”) or before 1975 (“Ollies”). The relative technological advantage is calculated as the share of each region or country (say Europe) in the R&D of a particular sector (say the Internet) relative to the share of Europe in world R&D; values greater than 1 indicate the region is technology specialized in the sector.

Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on the European Commission’s Institute for Prospective Technological Studies R&D Scoreboard; see Chapter 5.

28

Some economies are doing well, but they are small

Figure 5.3: Europe’s leaders invest as much in innovation as the United States and Japan

(business and public R&D expenditure, percentage of GDP)

Note: Data refer to different years by country.

Source: European Commission (2011) and UNESCO; see Chapter 5.

0

.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

IND

BR

AR

US

CH

NU

SA

JPN

MN

E

MK

DC

YP

SR

B

GR

CB

GR

LV

AP

OL

RO

M

SV

KL

TU

HR

VT

UR

MLT

ES

TIT

A

HU

NE

SP

PR

TN

LD

CZ

E

NO

RG

BR

IRL

SV

N

LU

X

BE

LF

RA

ISL

DE

U

AU

T

DN

KC

HE

SW

EF

IN

R&D Expenditure, % of GDP: Business Public

29

And the US lead in top tertiary education is growing

Figure 5.16: Europe is falling behind the United States in top university rankings

(world’s top 100 universities)

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Thomson Reuters/Times; see Chapter 5.

30

Europe—Lifestyle Superpower

31

The lifestyle superpower

Figure 12: Outspending the rest of the world

(general government spending on defense [United States] and social protection [Europe], 2004–09, share of total world spending)

Note: For social protection spending, due to the data availability, averages over 2004–09 by country are used. n is the number of countries included in the calculations. Data cover general government but, if unavailable, refer to central government only.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011), IMF GFS, WDI, World Bank ECA Social Protection Database, and Weigand and Grosh (2008).

UnitedStates43%Rest of

the world57%

Military (n=124)2010

Europe(n=36)58%

Rest ofthe world

42%

Social protection (n=96)2004-09

Government expenditurepercentage of world total

32

Fewer workers in Europe

Figure 14: Europe’s labor force will shrink by about a million workers every year

(projected cumulative change in working-age population, percent, 2010–50, percent)

Note: North America is the US and Canada; North-East Asia includes China, Hong Kong SAR, China, Japan, Macao SAR, China, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, China. SEE and Bulgaria and Romania are also included in Emerging Europe.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base; see Chapter 6.

North America

North-East Asia

Western EuropeEmerging Europe

SEEBulgaria+Romania

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Wo

rkin

g-a

ge

po

pu

latio

n,

20

10

=0

2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

33

Europeans are living longer, and retiring earlier

Figure 13: Europe’s pension systems have to support people for many more years

(changes in life expectancy at 60 and effective retirement age, 1965–2007)

Source: OECD (2011) and updated data from OECD (2006).

34

European governments spend about 10 percent of GDP more

Figure 16: Governments in Europe are big

(the world resized by government spending in dollars, 2009)

Source: World Bank staff using IMF WEO.

35

Social protection spending is the (only) reason

Figure 17: Social protection explains the difference in government size between Europe and its peers

(government spending, percentage of GDP, 2007–08)

Note: “Social protection” includes benefits related to sickness and disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, and housing. Western Europe comprises Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Center); Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South).

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF GFS and IMF WEO; see Chapter 7.

14.8

7.1

6.7

20.1

15.8

7.1

5.4

16.7

17.4

6.2

4.6

16.9

16.6

4.9

5.3

11.7

16.1

4.1

4.0

11.3

18.3

4.5

3.9

12.2

18.1

4.2

6.2

12.6

16.4

7.8

6.3

7.3

12.7

7.4

3.9

12.7

0

10

20

30

40

50

Go

vern

me

nt

spe

nd

ing,

20

07

-08

pe

rce

nta

ge

of

GD

P

North CenterWestern Europe

South EU12 BGR+ROM

SEE EasternPartnership

UnitedStates

Japan

Social protection Education Health Non-social spending

36

Others also subsidize the elderly, but not for nearly as long

Figure 18: Small differences in annual pensions per beneficiary, big in overall public pension spending

(public pension spending in 2007)

Note: Median values by group are shown. Western Europe comprises Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Center); Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South). Anglo-Saxon comprises Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat and the OECD Pensions Statistics; see Chapter 7.

37

Big adjustments ahead, because of current imbalances and future health costs

Figure 19: Western Europe has to reduce fiscal deficits by 6 percent of GDP, emerging Europe by less

(illustrative fiscal adjustment needs, 2010–30, percentage of GDP)

Note: The fiscal impacts of aging on pensions and health care systems are missing for EU candidate and eastern partnership countries. For this exercise, the sum of adjustment in health care spending is assumed to be the same as for the new member states. The adjustment in pension related spending is assumed to be the same as that for southern Europe. For the country composition in each group, see note for figure 17.

Sources: Calculations by staff of the Institute for Structural Research in Poland and the World Bank, based on IMF WEO; see Chapter 7.

38

Reducing public debt in SEE

SEE, Bulgaria and Romania have experienced the reduction in public debt

(general government gross debt, percentage of GDP, 2000–10)

Note: In the right panel for SEE, the dash lines show interquartile range.

Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO.

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Bulgaria + Romania SEE (median)

39

Imperatives

Towards a greener economic model

See Spotlight Two.

41

Greening: cleaner production …

Europe is promoting the clean energy transition

(percentage of final energy from renewables in 2009—and the targets for 2020 (where available))

Source: REN21 (2011); See Spotlight Two.

42

… but falling short on greener consumption

Europe is the world’s largest importer of carbon dioxide

(net carbon dioxide emission transfers in million tons of carbon dioxide [territorial minus consumption emissions])

Source: Source: World Bank staff, using data from Peters and others (2011); See Spotlight Two.

43

Bulgaria has become a net importer of carbon emissions

Bulgaria has become a net importer of carbon emissions as the importance of heavy industries has dropped

(Net carbon dioxide emission transfers in million tons of carbon dioxide [territorial minus consumption emissions] and steel production in thousand tons)

Net transfers of CO2 emissions

Steel production

Source: Peters et al. (2011). Source: World Steel Association.

-5

0

5

10

15

20

MtC

O2

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

thou

sand

ton

s

44

Green growth: Many opportunities …

… but who will be able take advantage of them?

(Total gross value added induced by renewable energy deployment in 2005, billion euros)

Source: Ragwitz and others (2009); See Spotlight Two.

45

Global green growth

• “Leakage” of European green incentives

• Chinese solar PV production increased 20 fold between 2006-2010 (> 90%

for export)

• How can EU12 and neighborhood countries take advantage of

policy induced green growth opportunities?

• 3 trillion Euro market by 2020

• Europe must focus on R&D, innovation, high end manufacturing

(“Green Apples”)

46

Keeping what has been achieved

• Restarting the Convergence Machine: Services• Facilitate the trade in business services• Strengthen regulatory coordination for finance

• Rebuilding Brand Europe: Productivity• Restart the convergence machine• Improve enterprise where productivity growth has slowed• Download “killer apps” of innovation from the United States

• Remaining the Lifestyle Superpower: Demography• Restart the Convergence Machine• Rebuild Brand Europe• Make labor markets more competitive• Make government more efficient, or make it smaller

47

Imperatives, strengths and weaknesses

Government

Labor

Innovation

Enterprise

Finance

Trade

Demographic Trends

Productivity Growth

Modern Services

48

It’s been done before (in Europe)

Table 8.1: Benchmark countries for selected policies 

Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.worldbank.org/goldengrowth.

Policy areaSelected countries

Europe World

1 Restructuring private debt Sweden Korea, Rep.

2 Managing financial foreign direct investment (EU) Poland (Non-EU) Croatia

3 Crisis-proofing financial integration Czech Republic Canada

4 Increasing value-added Slovak Republic Singapore

5 Job creation Ireland New Zealand

6 Export generation Germany Korea, Rep.

7 R&D policy Switzerland United States

8 Tertiary education United Kingdom United States

9 Management quality Sweden United States

10 Internal mobility Ireland United States

11 Labor legislation Denmark United States

12 Immigration policies Sweden; United Kingdom Canada; United States

13 Social security Iceland Japan

14 Social service delivery Finland Singapore

15 Reducing public debt Turkey New Zealand

16 Green growth policies Germany California (US)

49

Available at

www.worldbank.org/goldengrowth

50

References used in this presentation

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Conference Board, The. 2011. “Total Economy Database.” January 2011, The Conference Board, New York, NY. Available at www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase.

European Commission. 2011. Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) 2010: The Innovation Union’s Performance Scoreboard for Research and Innovation. Brussels: European Commission.

Heston, A., R. Summers, and B. Aten. 2011. “Penn World Table Version 7.0.” May, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices, University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, PA.

ILO (International Labour Office). 2010. Key indicators of the Labour Market, Sixth Edition. Geneva: ILO.

Iwulska, A. 2011. “Country Benchmarks.” Prepared for this report. Available at www.worldbank.org/goldengrowth.

Lane, P., and G. Milesi-Ferretti. 2007. “The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004.” Journal of International Economics 73 (2): 223–250.

Lundstrom Gable, S., and S. Mishra. 2011. “Service Export Sophistication and Europe’s New Growth Model.” Policy Research Working Paper 5793, World Bank, Washington, DC. Background paper for this report.

Maddison, A. 1996. “Macroeconomic Accounts for European Countries.” In Quantitative Aspects of Post-War European Economic Growth, ed. B. van Ark, and N. Crafts: 27–83. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2005. OECD Employment Outlook 2005. Paris: OECD.

———. 2006. Live Longer, Work Longer. Paris: OECD.

———. 2007. OECD Economic Surveys: European Union 2007. Paris: OECD.

———. 2011. Health at a Glance 2011: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD.

Peters, G., J. Minx, C. Weber, and O. Edenhofer. 2011. “Growth in Emission Transfers via International Trade from 1990 to 2008.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (21): 8903–8908.

Ragwitz, M., W. Schade, B. Breitschopf, R. Walz, N. Helfrich, M. Rathmann, G. Resch, C. Panzer, T. Faber, R. Haas, C. Nathani, M. Holzhey, I. Konstantinaviciute, P. Zagam’e, A. Fougeyrollas, and B. Le Hir. 2009. “EmployRES – The impact of renewable energy policy on economic growth and employment in the European Union.” Report prepared for the Directorate- General for Energy and Transport in the European Commission, Fraunhofer ISI, Karlsruhe.

REN21. 2011. Renewables 2011 Global Status Report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2011. SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Stojkov, A., and J. Zalduendo. 2011. “Europe as a Convergence Engine: Heterogeneity and Investment Opportunities in Emerging Europe.” Policy Research Working Paper 5906, World Bank, Washington, DC. Background paper for this report.

Sugawara, N., and J. Zalduendo. 2010. “How Much Economic Integration Is There in the Extended EU Family?” ECAnomics Note 10/1, Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. Background paper for this report.

UNCTAD (Untied Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2010. World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy. New York, NY: UN.

———. 2011. World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development . New York, NY: UN.

Weigand, C., and M. Grosh. 2008. “Levels and Patterns of Safety Net Spending in Developing and Transition Countries.” Social Protection Discussion Paper 0817, Human Development Network, World Bank, Washington, DC.

WTO (World Trade Organization). 2009. International Trade Statistics 2009. Geneva: WTO.