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Academician Dan BERINDEI, PhD

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Major General BEng Teodor INCICA, PhD

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erban CIOCULESCU, PhD

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ROMANIANMILITARY

THINKINGJournal of Military Science and Security Studies Published

by the Defence Staff

Founded in 1864 under the name �România Militară�– new series, year XV –

ISSN Print: 1841-4451ISSN Online: 1842-824X

Romanian Military Thinking is a scientific journalwith acknowledged prestige in the field

of �Military Science, Intelligence and Public Order”, in keepingwith the evaluation carried out by the National Council for Titles,

Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU) in 2011(http://www.cnatdcu.ro/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/reviste-militare1.pdf)

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No.No. 1/2020 1/2020 2

A LEGACY SINCE 1864A LEGACY SINCE 1864

The Romanian Armed Forces road to modernity started in 1859, once the United Principalities General Staff Corps, currently the Defence Staff, was established.

Soon after it, in 1864, a group of nine captains, graduates of the first series of the Officer Cadet School in Bucharest, took the initiative to develop a “military science, art and history journal” named “România Militară/Military Romania”.

The initiators of the publication – G. Slăniceanu (Captain, Chief of the Engineer Battalion), A. Gramont (Staff Captain), G. Borănescu (Engineer Captain), G. Anghelescu (Staff Captain), A. Anghelescu (Artillery Captain), E. Arion (Artillery Captain), E. Boteanu (Staff Captain), E. Pencovici (Staff Captain) and C. Barozzi (Engineer Captain) –, educated not only in Romania but also abroad, were inspired by the necessity to develop a substantial theoretical activity in the Romanian Army too.

The journal manifesto1, included in the first issue, which appeared on 15 February 1864, contained innovative ideas and approaches that were meant to:

�- contribute to the organisation of our military system the Legislative Chamber is about to decide upon soon;

- assemble and examine the Country old military institutions that had made for the glory of Romania for several centuries and ensured our existence;

- explore, in the absence of any military study, all the aspects related to the Army training, the most solid basis of the armed forces;

- get the Romanian Troops well-informed about the military events in the world;

- join efforts to work concertedly and whole-heartedly to develop and strengthen the edifice that is meant to ensure the future of our country�2.

“România Militară” was an independent publication, under the aegis of the War Ministry, and it ceased to appear in 1866 as there were no sufficient funds and subscribers. The publication was resumed in 1891, about a quarter of a century later, also as the result of the initiative of a group of officers in the Great General Staff who intended to “reproduce the serious studies on the organisation, strategy and art of commanding troops under any circumstances”3. Shortly after it, by the Royal Decree no. 3663 issued on 8 December 1897, “România Militară” became the “Great General Staff official publication”.

1 Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul aniversării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1939, București, 1939, p. 31.

2 Ibidem, p. 32.3 România Militară, no. 1, 1981, p. 6.

English version by Diana Cristiana LUPU.

ROMANIANROMANIANMILITARYMILITARYTHINKINGTHINKING

3

G. Anghelescu (Staff Captain)

C. Barozzi (Engineer Captain)

E. Pencovici (Staff Captain)

G. Borănescu (Engineer Captain)

G. Slăniceanu (Captain, Chief of the Engineer

Battalion)

E. Boteanu (Staff Captain)

E. Arion (Artillery Captain)

A. Anghelescu (Artillery Captain)

No.No. 1/2020 1/2020 4

The GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ Journal Awards

are yearly bestowed, by the Romanian Armed Forces Defence Staff,

on the most valuable works in the field of military science, published in the previous year

“Division GeneralŞtefan Fălcoianu“

Award

“Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu“

Award

“Marshal Alexandru Averescu“

Award

“Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu“

Award

“Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu“

Award

The deadline for submitting books for this yearʼs edition is 15 March 2020. For more information, please visit our website: gmr.mapn.ro.

5 CONTENTSCONTENTS

CONTENTSCONTENTS

EDITORIAL Vasile TOADER 6 DEFENCE BEGINS AT HOME

INTELLIGENCE

AND SECURITY

Iulian CHIFU 10

NON-CONVENTIONAL THREATS AND THE NEW TYPES OF CONFLICTS OF

HYBRID NATURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Antonia COLIBĂªANU 28

A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON

STRATEGY

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS: A SHAPER OR A FACILITATOR FOR GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS?

Iulia ANGHEL 44

SOCIAL MEDIA AS HYBRID WARFARE TOOL – PUTTING RUSSIA’S

INFORMATIONAL STRATEGY IN CONTEXT –

Adrian-Vasile POPA 64

THE TWO CANALS AND NATO’S WILD CARDS

IN THE PONTO-BALTIC ISTHMUS

Adriana SAULIUC 82

GROWING USA – IRAN TENSIONS INCREASE THE VOLATILITY

IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION

Vasile CERBU

Valentin CIOROIANU 98

THE ARCTIC – A DISPUTED TERRITORY,

OBJECTIVE OF A “NEW GEOPOLITICAL GREAT GAME”

MILITARY THEORY

AND ART

Silviu CONSTANTINIANU 122

RED TEAM – CRITICAL THINKING MAIN TOOL IN THE OPERATIONS

PLANNING PROCESS –

Vasile-Cristian Vasile-Cristian

ONESIMIUCONESIMIUC 136 THE INFLUENCE OF CYBER OFFENSIVE ACTIONS ON MILITARY CONFLICTSTHE INFLUENCE OF CYBER OFFENSIVE ACTIONS ON MILITARY CONFLICTS

Lucian Valeriu SCIPANOVLucian Valeriu SCIPANOV 150 AMPHIBIOUS AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS SPECIFIC CONCEPTSAMPHIBIOUS AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS SPECIFIC CONCEPTS

Vasile Florin POPESCUVasile Florin POPESCU 166 C5ISR-D REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS AND PROCESSESC5ISR-D REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES

Laurenþiu-Răducu Laurenþiu-Răducu

POPESCUPOPESCU 176

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE INTEGRATION

IN THE NEAR FUTURE OF THE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IN THE NEAR FUTURE OF THE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

IN THE MILTARY ACTIONSIN THE MILTARY ACTIONS

DEFENCE

RESOURCES

MANAGEMENT

Dragoº ILINCA 192

THE NEW PROFILE OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION

IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE

Ion ANGHELIon ANGHEL

Cezar VASILESCUCezar VASILESCU 210

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS

FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY EXPENDITUREFOR THE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Valentin-Marian Valentin-Marian

IORDACHEIORDACHE 228

IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT ON SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT ON SAFETY

AND EFFICIENCY IN AERONAUTICAL ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSESAND EFFICIENCY IN AERONAUTICAL ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSES

66No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

DEFENCE BEGINS AT HOMEDEFENCE BEGINS AT HOME

Major General Vasile TOADERDeputy Chief of Defence Staff for Operations and Training


7

Defence Begins at HomeDefence Begins at Home

7 EDITORIALEDITORIAL

A simple scan of the current security environment reveals a certain intensification of its complexity, instability and uncertainty, and there is no reason to believe that there is

a tendency to relief in the near future. Wars are packaged in forms that are different from what we used to understand through a classic conflict and, most importantly, they are not declared.

Conventional, hybrid and asymmetrical threats are interconnected in different ways and patterns, from the Baltic Sea through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, being generated by state and non-state actors, or by failed states belonging to the area of instability that surrounds Europe, having ramifications in the Middle East and North Africa.

We note that a fierce competition to control the Arctic region was launched, but the tensions between the USA and Iran earlier this year have highlighted the Middle East on the world map! The danger of an armed conflict escalation was at extremely high levels ... fortunately, the reason has so far prevailed. It remains to be seen for how long and under what conditions.

The overall picture is complemented by a true arms race in which the USA, China and Russia are undisputed leaders, fully capitalising on the benefits of the current technological revolution. From military satellites to the use of social media, and from hypersonic missiles and attack drones to stealth aircraft, everything indicates a need for each state actor to reposition, both regionally and globally.

If we refer strictly to our area of interest, apart from the challenges in the Balkans, we are witnessing an extremely complex situation in the Black Sea Region, a geostrategic

area that has become a priority for Russia. With the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the recrudescence of the foreign policy relying on force, adopted by the Russian Federation, became a fact that no longer needs to be demonstrated, and the projection of instability at all levels has been the instrument preferred by the Kremlin in its intention to change the global status quo for its own benefit.

Since 2004 there has been a permanent increase in the military facilities in the Crimean Peninsula, including the consolidation of A2/AD capabilities in the region. It is obvious that Russia’s control over the Black Sea would provide it with the ability to project its power not only in Europe, especially in the Balkans and Central Europe, but also in the eastern Mediterranean, the southern Caucasus and the northwest Asia regions.

The attack on a Ukrainian ship by Russian forces in November 2018 represents an alarm signal regarding the fragility of security in the Black Sea. It is also visible Russia’s effort to resort to a series of tactics aimed at preventing access to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Examples in this regard are the military exercises conducted in the Black Sea, which have caused the restriction of maritime traffic, being aimed at limiting NATO activity in the region. Such an unstable security environment poses a risk not only to the countries bordering the Black Sea, but also to the entire eastern flank of the Alliance.

Measures to counteract this state of affairs have already been initiated, both at the Alliance level and at the member states level, and they are generally related to

intensifying deterrence and strengthening NATO posture, by ensuring a forward presence

8

Major General Vasile TOADERMajor General Vasile TOADER

8No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

in the eastern flank. Beyond any concrete measures, the Alliance power lies in the unity, solidarity and cohesion of its member states, and these are the values that must be protected at any cost.

The decisions adopted at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 represented a turning point regarding the Alliance concept of collective defence. The implementation of the NATO Readiness Action Plan has increased the response level of the allies. In 2016, at the Warsaw Summit, through a series of important decisions, NATO adopted a credible and solid defence and deterrence posture, as well as a forward presence in the Alliance eastern flank. Moreover, in 2018, in Brussels, the Allies focused on reinforcing transatlantic solidarity, on defence budgets, and on strengthening defence and deterrence capabilities. Romania’s objectives were correctly reflected in the decisions adopted in Brussels. Thus, the decisions regarding the increase in the Black Sea profile, the consolidation of the Multinational Brigade South East (MN BDE-SE) so that it could act in a wide range of situations, the development in our country of the Multinational Corps South East HQ, in the context of the adaptation of the Alliance command structure, are concrete examples that the main objective of Romania, to consolidate NATO eastern flank, has been achieved. No less relevant are the decisions resulting in: promoting the Allied flanks omnidirectional approach, so that NATO support could be equitably distributed in the southern and eastern regions, for the Alliance sustainable and credible defence and deterrence posture, as well as in growing the national profile in an allied framework, by highlighting the constant contribution of our country to the allied efforts meant to project stability.

Romania has understood that defence begins at home and has allocated, in this regard, a budget that will ensure the predictability of the military body modernisation

efforts, while meeting all the operational commitments undertaken as a member state of the Alliance and as a pillar of stability in this part of Europe. In this context, it is worth noting the determination of our country to continue to meet the commitments for a fair share of the Alliance burden, on the three levels – cash, capabilities and contribution to operations and missions.

The participation in international operations and missions to meet the commitments to NATO and EU is one of the priorities of the Romanian Armed Forces. Thus, in 2020, the Romanian Armed Forces will contribute 2,376 military and civilian personnel to missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state, meaning 474 more military personnel compared to the previous year. While for 2019 the element of novelty related to Romania’s involvement in global theatres of operations was the participation with a military helicopter detachment in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Republic of Mali, in 2020 Romania will participate with a flagship in NATO missions in the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea.

The participation in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan remains a priority of the Romanian Armed Forces contribution to international missions and operations. In addition to the main NATO lines of effort, namely the theatres of operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, the Romanian Armed Forces will continue the mission with an anti-aircraft detachment within the battlegroup meant to ensure the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Poland, as well as with maritime capabilities in Standing NATO Maritime Groups. Moreover, there will be provided the necessary resources to contribute to the observation, monitoring and training missions under the aegis of the UN, EU and OSCE.

The contribution to the cooperation initiatives in the field of defence capabilities development carried out at NATO or EU level is also a priority for the Romanian

Armed Forces in order to develop national capabilities. Currently, the model of multinational


9

Defence Begins at HomeDefence Begins at Home

9 EDITORIALEDITORIAL

cooperation in the defence field is represented by the German initiative “Framework Nations Concept”. Romania became a member of this initiative in June 2015 and it is actively involved in the two pursued directions, one being the establishment of an Army Corps level large unit, to be allocated to the NRF, through the affiliation of combat units within the Land Forces, and the other being the capabilities clusters, Romania contributing to the majority of clusters as either participant or observer. Moreover, within the initiative, the Romanian troops participate in a series of training activities, together with German and Dutch troops, to practise staff procedures, so that the Romanian Mechanised Brigade could be affiliated to the German Rapid Reaction Division/Division Schnelle Krafte – DSK. The active engagement in this initiative contributes to strengthening Romania’s position in the allied context and demonstrates our country’s commitment to jointly develop the forces and capabilities that are necessary to meet the Alliance level of ambition, by intensifying cooperation with European allies.

PESCO is an initiative launched in 2017. It represents an intensified form of cooperation in line with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to relaunch the process of developing defence capabilities at European level on a solid basis, by reducing duplication, pooling resources and providing the necessary forces for the execution of EU missions and operations. Romania is involved in several projects within PESCO such as: European Medical Command; Military Mobility; EU Training Mission Competence Centre – EU TMCC; Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures – MAS MCM; Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security; training for helicopter operation in hot and highhot and high (high temperature and high altitude) conditions etc.

At strategic level, one of the major concerns of the Defence Staff is the configuration and development of force packages/battlegroups that are necessary to timely respond, if

required, to the risks and threats manifested in Romania’s area of strategic interest.The equipment activity is carried out in parallel for more than 100 procurement

programmes, some of them being strategic procurement programmes. However, the most important aspect regarding the strategy of implementing new combat capabilities is represented, including in the military field, by the development of the human resource. In this regard, I note that since the beginning of the major procurement programmes (F-16 aircraft, Patriot missile systems etc.), the personnel necessary to operate these new weapon systems have been trained with the unconditional support of the Alliance partners.

We have imported, in the period of time that has passed since the beginning of the major procurement programmes, not only technique and knowledge but also something much more difficult to quantify, although having an extraordinary intrinsic value: a new mentalitya new mentality ... which is rooted in knowledge-based performance. We have learned to achieve more with less, to anticipate and to act accordingly, to be realistic.

IIn conclusion, it can be stated that, in the context of a permanently dynamic security n conclusion, it can be stated that, in the context of a permanently dynamic security environment, in which the main global and regional actors make decisions and act on environment, in which the main global and regional actors make decisions and act on

the edge of international treaties, Romania represents a pillar of stability in the Black Sea Region. the edge of international treaties, Romania represents a pillar of stability in the Black Sea Region. The Romanian Armed Forces are actively involved in both the main regional initiatives and in The Romanian Armed Forces are actively involved in both the main regional initiatives and in the areas of strategic interest of the Alliance partners and meet the commitments undertaken the areas of strategic interest of the Alliance partners and meet the commitments undertaken through the partnerships to which our country has acceded, thus confirming Romania’s status through the partnerships to which our country has acceded, thus confirming Romania’s status as a security provider within NATO and the EU.as a security provider within NATO and the EU.

1010No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

NON-CONVENTIONAL THREATS NON-CONVENTIONAL THREATS AND THE NEW TYPES OF CONFLICTS AND THE NEW TYPES OF CONFLICTS

OF HYBRID NATURE IN THE 21OF HYBRID NATURE IN THE 21STST CENTURY CENTURY

Iulian CHIFU, PhDSenior Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest

President of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre, Bucharest

The evolution of international relations, the turbulence and acceleration of both integration and fragmentation of the International World Order lead to unexpected and unconventional forms and types of threats to national and international security. Some come from the technological development, some from the impact of technologies on our societies, some others from the rise of populism and identities, and last but not least, from our own minds and perceptions that are influenced dramatically by our preconceptions and easiness of the rational thinking. All these have a huge impact on the new threat assessment, on the security and defence of a nation. That is why such facts need to be explored, known and approached in a scientific and comprehensive manner in order to prevent strategic surprise in the mentioned areas and the emergence of new types of conflicts.

Keywords: unconventional threats, hybrid conflicts, technological society, identity gap, factfulness.


11

Non-conventional Threats and the New Types of Conflicts of Hybrid Nature in the 21Non-conventional Threats and the New Types of Conflicts of Hybrid Nature in the 21stst Century Century

11 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY IN THE LAST 30 YEARS. THE EUROPEAN SCHOOL OF SECURITYSecurity has proved to be much more than a collection of military

conventional threats. Moreover, things evolved much more than the classical definition of the European School of Copenhagen1, with the 5 dimensions of the security that became, in 1991, with the Strategic Concept in Rome2, the basics of NATO approach to security – military, political, social, economic, environment3. We added to that first approach three objects to be “securitized” – state, society and individual4.

That type of approach in looking at security in a broader way extended into a new type of approach called initially “non-traditional threats” and then “emerging security challenges”, since NATO looked at other new threats, entering new and uncertain territory. That area usually includes terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, disruption of energy supplies and even extends to climate change and migration5. That approach was so important that in August 2010, around 50 staff members from NATO’s International Staff and International Military Staff were moved into the new “Emerging Security Challenges Division”6.

1 The Copenhagen School of security studies is an academic school that employs a critical approach to security studies. It is part of the postpositivist movement in the field of international relations (IR), which became a salient part of post–Cold War scholarship. See Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Copenhagen School in Bruce A. Arrigo. “The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy”, SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks.

2 NATO Strategic Concept Rome, Article 24, in “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, 7 November 1991, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, retrieved on 4 August 2019.

3 Barry Buzan, Popoarele, Statele și Teama, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2012, p. 386.4 Ibidem, p. 385, Iulian Chifu, Gândire Strategică, Editura Institutului de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii

Internaţionale al Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 2013, p. 335.5 NATO’s New Division: A Serious Look at “Emerging Security Challenges” or an Attempt at

Shoring up Relevance and Credibility?, ISIS Europe Briefing Note, No. 51, September 2010, https://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATOs_New_Division_0.pdf, retrieved on 10 October 2019.

6 Ibidem.

That type of approach in

looking at security in a

broader way extended into

a new type of approach

called initially “non-traditional

threats” and then “emerging

security challenges”, since NATO

looked at other new threats,

entering new and uncertain

territory.

12

Iulian Iulian CHIFUCHIFU

12No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

The EU and NATO established a common cooperation because NATO and the European Union are surrounded by the same security environment. The first area of that cooperation addresses hybrid threats. So, according to the strategy adopted at the Foreign Ministerial meeting, the EU and NATO establish how the two organisations are going to fight hybrid threats7. According to this strategy, the first responder is the state involved, but the EU and NATO assistance come right after in support to the targeted country. And this cooperation was translated in the fact that several NATO Allies and European Union members decided to formally establish in Helsinki, on 11 April 2017, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats8.

THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIESBut, in spite of those developments, the speed of the evolution

of our society, the international relations and security introduce new categories of non-conventional or unconventional threats. Thus, external threats are doubled by internal vulnerabilities turning to threats. That is because, in reality, they belong to the hybrid typology of threats9, but have external sources. It is the case of all the characteristics of the liberal democracy, values and principles, which we respect because they represent our way of leaving, but which are considered to be vulnerabilities by some players (specifically the Russian Federation)10 that build instruments in order to take advantage of those characteristics, considered as vulnerabilities. In such a way, we can very easily see them as threats with external sources against our societies11.

7 Press statements by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, 1-2 December 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_125361.htm, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

8 NATO Welcomes Opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats, 11 April 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_143143.htm, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

9 Iulian Chifu, Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride, Revista Infosfera, February 2018, pp. 23-30.

10 Iulian Chifu, Simona Țuțuianu, Torn between East and West: Europe’s Border States. Routledge, London and New York, 2017, p. 270; Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century, Routledge, London and New York, 2017, p. 278.

11 See the debate and definition on threats, risks and vulnerabilities in Iulian Chifu, Gândire Strategică, op. cit.

The speed of the evolution of our society, the international relations and security introduce new categories of non-conventional or unconventional threats. Thus, external threats are doubled by internal vulnerabilities turning to threats.


13



Those threats come from the speculation of the values and principles of our democratic systems12 but also from the same use of the internal vulnerabilities of our liberal-democratic societies13 coming from the evolution of technology and its impact on societies14. Social media and information warfare, drones and hypersonic weapons are shaping the security environment of the future, with impact on the approach and the way of thinking security-related matters. And specifically, the most profound change comes from the impact of technology on democracy itself15.

Technology has a tremendous impact on democracy and society16 via the direct influence on the criteria and behaviour related to the societal cohesion – solidarity, the sense of community, alienation and fragmentation17. On the other hand, the sense of lack of privacy, altered identity – individual and collective, need for dignity and respect18, all are the new effects of technology on our day by day life that have an impact on our societies and the participation in the democratic processes, as well as on the life of the community, on the substance of our democracy19.

These specific processes have been already underlined in a number of studies or the study is just at the beginning. In some other cases, the psychological processes linked to our reaction as humans to the speed

12 Jan-Werner Muller, Ce este populismul, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2017, p. 179; Steve Richards, The Rise of the Outsiders. How Mainstream Politics Lost Its Way, Atlantic Books, London, 2017, p. 314.

13 Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back. America and Our Imperiled World, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2018, p. 179.

14 Iulian Chifu, Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations, in proceedings, 15th International Scientific Conference “Strategies XXI” Strategic Changes and International Relations, 11-12 April 2019, Bucharest, Romania, National Defence University, pp. 11-23.

15 Ibidem.16 Nicu Gavriluță, Noile religii seculare. Corectitudinea politică, tehnologiile viitorului și trans-

umanismul, Editura Polirom Iași, 2018, p. 221.17 Arjun Appadurai, Donatella de la Porta, Nancy Fraser, Heinrich Geiselberger (coordinator),

Marea Regresie: De ce trăim un moment istoric, Editura Art București, 2016, p. 354; Condoleezza Rice, Amy Zegart, Political Risk. Facing the Threat of Global Insecurity in the Twenty First Century, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2018, p. 321; James Kirchick, Sfârșitul Europei. Dictatori, demagogi și Noul Ev Întunecat, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018, p. 326.

18 Francis Fukuyama, Identity. Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition, Profile Books Ltd, London, 2018, p. 218.

19 Martin Gurri, The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium, Stripe Press, Stripe Matter Inc., 2018, p. 445.

Technology has a tremendous

impact on democracy and society via the

direct influence on the criteria and behaviour related to the

societal cohesion – solidarity, the sense of community,

alienation and fragmentation.

14


14No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

of change20 are playing against ourselves. In all those cases, the deep study has to be launched and we have to consider that those evolutions themselves are creating vulnerabilities to our society21 that we have to cope with. And the bases of this reaction should be building resilience for our societies. Not so easy, since resilience needs the involvement of the state, society and individuals alike, and that cohesion could be forged only if there is a reasonable level of trust in the authorities22.

DRONES, TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPACT ON SOCIETAL SECURITYThe UAV or drone technology has changed the shape of the war

and created an important impact on the psychology of the democratic societies. Air vehicles and sea drones are used to hit targets and the development of this capability is becoming more obvious nowadays. It all began in 2002 with the US drones for surveillance, then with armed drones used to kill on site terrorist operatives in Yemen23, then in Syria and Iraq. Then terrorists took the technology and used it in attacks, including in Syria against Heymim Russian military base, on 25 October 201824.

The use of drones has proved to be far more extensive, with a tremendous impact on the day by day life of normal people. First, drones are used in surveillance, in crowded environments, and the lack of norms in western cities has shown an abuse on private life, paparazzo photos, private surveillance, illegal intrusion in personal life. Then drones have been used to disturb and block airports

20 Hans Rosling, Factfulness. Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World--and Why Things Are Better Than You Think, Sceptre, 2018, p. 341.

21 Wolfgang Ishinger, Lumea în pericol. Germania și Europa în vremuri nesigure, Editura CurteaVeche, București, 2019, p. 303.

22 Iulian Chifu, Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride, Revista Infosfera, February 2018, pp. 23-30.

23 On 5 November 2002, Al-Qaeda operatives in a car traveling through Yemen were killed in a targeted killing by a missile launched from a CIA-controlled Predator drone, first public known use of a drone attack, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_drone_strikes_in_Yemen#cite_note-Addicott-11, retrieved on 5 August 2019.

24 Tass Russian News Agency, Drone Attack on Russia’s Syrian Airbase Was Elaborate Pentagon Operation, Says Expert, 25 October 2018, https://tass.com/defense/1027834, retrieved on 5 August 2019.

The UAV or drone technology has changed the shape of the war and created an important impact on the psychology of the democratic societies. Air vehicles and sea drones are used to hit targets and the development of this capability is becoming more obvious nowadays.


15



on Christmas Eve – see the Gatwick case in London25. Then a threat of using drones to block airports has been aired and tried by ecologists26.

Attacks on the transportation lines and on the critical infrastructure, as well as the major attacks on production of oil came naturally during 2019. First, the attacks on May, June and July on the oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and on the UAE exclusive economic zone showed the vulnerabilities of the transportation lines – be they with air drones, water unmanned vessels or with mines27. Most recently, a drone attack targeted the production and supplies of oil at global level by targeting Saudi Arabia oil facilities Abqaiq and Khurais. The result brought the US and Iran on the edge of a war, as it happened in June, but attacks were avoided at the last moment28. Then new concerns appeared

25 Iulian Chifu, Lovitură hibridă anonimă cu drone împotriva Guvernului Britanic, 31 December 2018, https://adevarul.ro/international/europa/lovitura-hibrida-anonima-drone-guvernului-britanic-1_5c29cdd3df52022f751606b2/index.html, retrieved on 10 August 2019; Iulian Chifu, 1000 de zboruri, 200.000 de călători de Crăciun, nici un vinovat. Cea mai mare lovitură împotriva Guvernului Britanic, Evenimentul Zilei, 28 December 2018, https://evz.ro/1000-de-zboruri-200000-de-calatori-de-craciun-nici-un-vinovat.html, retrieved on 10 August 2019; Sarah Young, Kate Holton, Drones Paralyze British Airport, Grounding Christmas Travelers, Reuters, 20 December 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-drones-gatwick/drones-paralyze- british-airport-grounding-christmas-travelers-idUSKCN1OI2TN, retrieved on 10 August 2019; Josua Taylor, Gatwick Drone Attack Theories - Who Is Behind the Airport Sabotage?, Mirror, 23 December 2018, https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/gatwick-airport-drone-attack-theories-13771643, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

26 Simon Calder, Are Climate Change Activists Going to Shut Down Airport and Why?, Independent, 11 September 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/heathrow-drone-protest-pause-climate-change-airport-extinction-rebellion-nats-a9101346.html, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

27 Iulian Chifu, Cine forţează războiul SUA cu Iranul? Inconştienţă calificată la Teheran sau provocări ale terţilor interesaţi?, 21 June 2019, https://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/cine-forteaza-razboiul-sua-iranuln-inconstienta-calificata-teheran-provocari-tertilor-interesatin-1_5d0c8d63892c0bb0c69e4d1a/index.html, retrieved on 10 August 2019; BBC, Gulf of Oman Tanker Attacks: What We Know, 18 June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48627014, retrieved on 10 August 2019; Raf Sanchez, US Blames Iran for Oil Tanker Attack in Gulf of Oman amid Rising Tensions,13 June 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/13/oil-tankers-hit-fresh-attack-gulf-oman/, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

28 Iulian Chifu, SUA, Israel, Arabia Saudită, pregătite de războiul împotriva Iranului după atacurile cu drone, Adevarul, 17 September 2019, https://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/sua-israel-arabia-saudita-pregatite-razboiul-iranuluidupa-atacurile-drone-1_5d80d312892c0bb0c6aef489/index.html, retrieved on 10 August 2019; Iulian Chifu, Cutremur pe piața globală de petrol: Atacuri iraniene cu drone la rafinăriile saudite, Evenimentul Zilei, 17 September 2019, https://evz.ro/cutremur-pe-piata-globala-de-petrol-atacuri-iraniene-cu-drone-la-rafinariile-saudite.html, retrieved on 10 August 2019; BBC, Saudi Oil Attacks: US Says Intelligence Shows Iran Involved, 16 September 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49712417, retrieved on 10 August 2019; Amrith Ramkumar and Joseph Wallace, Crude Prices Soar After Attack on Saudi Facilities, Threatening Global Growth, The Wall Street Journal, 16 September 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-prices-soar-after-saudi-attack-11568585160, retrieved on 10 August 2019; Paul LeBlanc, Kylie Atwood, Jeremy Diamond and Sarah Westwood, CNN, Trump: US “Locked and Loaded depending on Verification” of Attack on Saudi Oil Field, 16 September 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/15/politics/trump-us-saudi-arabia-attack-iran-iraq/index.html, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

A drone attack targeted the

production and supplies of oil at global level

by targeting Saudi Arabia oil facilities Abqaiq

and Khurais.

16


16No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

after noticing that China is selling to Serbia armed drones29 in the heart of Western Balkans and at the borders of Romania.

Thus, such capabilities threaten military security, if used in theatres of operations. They could have terrorist use or indirect disturbing effect on critical infrastructure like airports. Drones could target economic security, and security of supplies, including energy security. They could be used in surveillance and psychological operations – when targeting a specific individual, harassing him or surveying its minor moves.

Drones have a societal impact, as well as a psychological individual impact that harms societal security: pressing individuals, imposing a sense of continuous surveillance, the feeling of being constantly hunted, due to the weapons capabilities installed on drones, all this having an important impact on the behaviour of individuals in a society and on the society itself – being paranoid about general surveillance, about the possibilities of being directly shut or about the assault on privacy in day by day life.

DIGITALISATION: SOCIAL MEDIA IMPACT ON SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACYThe second tier of the impact of technology on society and

democracy, with consequences on political security and societal security alike, comes from digitalisation. It is a natural evolution but with a tremendous speed that prevents the society, the political class and the authorities from studying consequences and reducing side effects and negative impact. The evolution is natural, but the consequence management is very hard to be put in place.

29 Sophia Yan, China Sells Armed Drones to Serbia amid Concerns Arms Deal Could Destabilise Region, The Telegraph, 11 September 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/09/11/china-sells-armed-drones-serbia-amid-concerns-arms-deal-could/, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

The second tier of the impact of technology on society and democracy, with consequences on political security and societal security alike, comes from digitalisation.

Drones have a societal impact, as well as a psychological individual impact that harms societal security: pressing individuals, imposing a sense of continuous surveillance, the feeling of being constantly hunted, due to the weapons capabilities installed on drones, all this having an important impact on the behaviour of individuals in a society and on the society itself.


17



First, in the case of social media, the impact of propaganda, disinformation and information warfare is very well known30. Less known and studied are the indirect threats to security, namely the impact of the social media on political security and societal security. This is done via the changes in the human individual behaviour, via the impact of technology on society development and community spirit, as well as the impact on democracy and liberal democracy specifically.

The means of social media influence on society are several, and those negative side effects should not prevent the huge positive effects of this tremendous technical achievement. The Internet itself has originally created a side effect in transforming the population into a far more contemplative and passive one, being used to react in front of a computer rather than to take the streets or protest in reality. Social media has an important capacity of finding people with the same concerns and ways of living, thinking alike, which leads to building uncritical and isolated bubbles from the critical arguments or opposite positions. It creates environments very friendly to each of the opinions, but that approach creates stronger and unchallenged perceptions of the truth and reality. If not confronted with other arguments, it never verifies those perceptions with the reality and truth around us.

Social media has a side effect of fragmenting the society. This type of bubbles that could self-isolate are creating strong new types

30 Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, op.cit; Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Război informațional: tipizarea agresiunii informaționale a Federației Ruse, Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale “Ion I. C. Brătianu” al Academiei Române, București, 2016, p. 542; Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Information Warfare. The Pattern of Aggression, The Publishing House of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations “Ion I. C. Brătianu” of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 2016, 554; Iulian Chifu, Informational Warfare, from STRATCOM to Psyops, in Working Papers of the World LUMEN Congress Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty, 12-17 April 2016, Iași, International conference, Lumen Media Publishing UK, 2016, (ISI Thomson), pp. 132-133; Iulian Chifu, Cristina Ivan, Rolul democrației participative, al meta-narațiunilor și autorului colectiv în secolul XXI. Mesaj din viitor, Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence, RRSI no. 10/December 2013, București, pp. 221-239; Iulian Chifu, Război hibrid, lawfare, război informaţional. Războaiele viitorului, in Universitatea Naţională de Apărare, Strategii XXI. Complexitatea şi dinamismul mediului internaţional de securitate, Editura UNAp “Carol I”, 2015, pp. 200-209; Iulian Chifu, Războiul informaţional: componentă a războiului hybrid şi instrument de acţiune agresivă cu relevanţă strategică, Revista Infosfera, 2016; Iulian Chifu, Trei generații de război informațional. Nivelul dezvoltării domeniului în partea sa publică, Revista Infosfera, September 2017, pp. 20-28; Iulian Chifu, Cum alterăm realitatea în războiul informațional: Post-adevăr, post-factual, post-umanitate, Revista Infosfera, December 2018.

Social media has an important

capacity of finding people with the same concerns and

ways of living, thinking alike,

which leads to building

uncritical and isolated bubbles from the critical

arguments or opposite

positions. It creates

environments very friendly

to each of the opinions, but

that approach creates

stronger and unchallenged

perceptions of the truth and

reality.

18


18No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

of identity but also isolated from the real debate of ideas and confrontation with other people’s arguments31. Social media supports the development of populism, favouring strong statements and giving equal saying to all participants in a conversation despite the credentials and legitimacy, so that anybody could attract the traffic and win a debate of popular vote instead of expert or specialist credentials, turning aside arguments less adapted to the communication at the general level of education and in the real world. Thus, populism wins by taking over the numbers of followers in social media32.

Nationalism is another point very well defined in social media, with very clear ideas and coherent statements, harsh ones, that attract traffic and that privilege nationalist and extreme statements, anti-system beliefs, and thoughts and opinions well supported and spread via conspiracy theories33. As we have seen before, social media has awkward and biased impact on participation, keeping people away from reality and protests rather through likes and dislikes in a contemplative virtual space, on the other hand being able to mobilise huge numbers of people that do not know each other, once the emotion involved and the level of excitement reach and touch an important number of followers.

Social media has also an impact on the behaviour of individuals linked to socialisation, humanitarian approach as well as community involvement and participation. It creates new types of behaviour in different individuals. But the most important part is linked to post-truth perceptions and realities and the psychological impact of this instrument used by specialised users with bad intentions that could harm individual conscience, will or social behaviour of people34.

Identities are at stake through this instrument easy to use in creating new types of identities and groups, with several new demands and requests, claiming specific new categories of rights, which have an impact on political security. Support for nationalist, populist, extremist discourses – also already overseen by automatic mechanisms – harms mainstream parties and elites, technical experts and specialists.

31 Arjun Appadurai, Donatella de la Porta, Nancy Fraser, Heinrich Geiselberger (coordinator), op. cit., p. 354.

32 Wolfgang Ishinger, op. cit.; Jan-Werner Muller, op. cit.; Francis Fukuyama, op. cit.33 Condoleeza Rice, op. cit.34 Martin Gurri, op. cit.

Social media has also an impact on the behaviour of individuals linked to socialisation, humanitarian approach as well as community involvement and participation. It creates new types of behaviour in different individuals.


19



In a similar vein, social media helps promoting extreme progressist approaches that harm individual identities and social, group identities35. Once their manifestations create the sense of threat to a number of individuals who feel pressed, threatened and prevented from their liberty of assuming and exposing their identity, the reaction of those individuals moving to the extreme and populist ideas is supported via the activity developed and favoured by social media.

It is not about the instrument, but about the way this instrument is used, once it has the advantage of reaching targeted audiences, geographic locations and preferences in political, social beliefs or ways of living the religious feelings. Moreover, being a tool that could let everybody reach all of us across borders and barriers of any type, social media has an important share of the impact on the changes in society and individual preferences.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LABOUR MARKET, USELESS CLASS, DIGITAL DICTATORS AND HACKING HUMAN MINDSArtificial Intelligence (AI) is another tremendous tool that could

help us and assist humanity in the day by day life, and its effects are far more important. AI operates easily with enormous data bases in practically no time, it has an important speed in reacting to different stimuli and crisis situations, taking automated decisions in a short time lapse, with an enormous advantage over a human being. The impact of AI on the individual, the society and our day by day life is even more important and less studied than social media, not talking about the unknown side effects.

What we can see is the impact on societal cohesion – creating differences and divisions, accelerating the fragmentation of the society – community and societal will. It supports all the ideas that derail, criticise and break all types of cohesion or projected action and, ultimately, alters the liberty of choice and behaviour at the individual and societal level.

In a medium to long term, the effects are even more complicated. AI alters the labour market, replacing humans with robots doing the repetitive and hard work, while the new jobs are developing in more

35 Robert Kagan, op. cit.; Nicu Gavriluță, op. cit.

Artificial Intelligence

(AI) is another tremendous tool

that could help us and assist

humanity in the day by day life, and its effects

are far more important. AI

operates easily with enormous

data bases in practically no

time, it has an important speed

in reacting to different stimuli

and crisis situations.

20


20No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

time than the replacement of humans in old jobs is happening, and the adaptation of humans is far more difficult and less rapid each time and at every such change of job. This leads to unadaptable people and creates the useless class, replacing today’s working class36. Last but not least, new threats are coming from the military use of AI. Continuing its stance on information warfare, the Russian Federation has moved to create capabilities to alter the behaviour of human beings37, using AI.

In some cases, under extreme scenarios, AI could lead to the technological destruction of the world and of the human beings, as some thinkers are warning38. Bioengineering displays divine abilities like that of creating life, selecting traits of the living creature, and projects the creation of bodies, brains and minds as spare parts of a human being. How can we deal with that perspective without committing cosmic mistakes that could extinguish the human race? Manipulating emotions, sensations and behaviours is as risky as altering the attributes and evolution of our own bodies.

Technology is a plus and will help us unless we do not have excessive aspirations to reach the capacities of the machines, for the future humans to be created. The intelligence and discipline that help in the work and are required from the robots have no compassion, neither sensibility, and have limited creativity. The perspective of a useless class of humans alters the society and the fight against exploitation could be replaced with a different type of struggle in order to fight against irrelevance. And this changes completely the society39.

At the political level, we already have the use of AI in avoiding unwanted ideas to flow in the virtual space of some states – beginning with China, Russia and continuing with Turkmenistan or North Korea –

36 Darrell M. West, John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the World, Brookings, 24 April 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/, retrieved on 5 October 2019.

37 N. Wright (editor), AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives, https://nsiteam.com/ai-china-russia-and-the-global-order-technological-political-global-and-creative-perspectives/, retrieved on 5 October 2019; Susan Michie, James Thomas, Marie Johnston, Pol Mac Aonghusa, John Shawe-Taylor, Michael P. Kelly, Léa A. Deleris, Ailbhe N. Finnerty, Marta M. Marques, Emma Norris, Alison O’Mara-Eves, and Robert West, The Human Behaviour-Change Project: Harnessing the Power of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Evidence Synthesis and Interpretation, 18 October 2017, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5648456/, retrieved on 5 October 2019.

38 Yuval Noah Harari, 21 de lecții pentru secolul XXI, Editura Polirom, Iași 2018, p. 364; Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus. Scurtă istorie a viitorului, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018, p. 388.

39 Ibidem.

Continuing its stance on information warfare, the Russian Federation has moved to create capabilities to alter the behaviour of human beings, using AI.


21



but the last two on more physical barriers than the more nuanced filters of ideas “acceptable” and allowed in that society. The perspective of a general survey using personal data and our behaviour leads to both digital dictator perspectives as well as to the will to hack humans, as today some are hacking the machines, internet, computers and so one40. AI can know and understand us better than we can and so it can learn what we do not know about ourselves, including how to modify our behaviour. That is the path Putin has given to its AI use in building capabilities to alter the behaviour of human beings41.

CAPACITY TO ADAPT TO SUDDEN AND RAPID CHANGES OR UNEXPECTED TRENDSHuman minds are very adaptable and ready to face new challenges

in life. But the inertia of our way of thinking and looking at the current evolution is making us being surprised by the speed of this evolution. The moment we learn some solid truth put at the basis of our arguments, we tend to give them continuity and stability and that is why we evolve in our mindsets slower than the real evolution of the world. Therefore, we are subject to misleading trends due to the lack of capacity of our minds to adapt, and to our perceptions that are influenced dramatically by our preconceptions. We tend to favour the easiest ways and models in our rational thinking and so we come far away in our judgements from the truth, reality or real trends of evolution.

The best expression and study on those differences between natural perceptions and way of thinking developed by humans and realities are discussed in several books, but the most relevant is Hans Rosling’s Factufulness42. It presents ten human instincts – in reasoning that are common weaknesses in evaluating the speedy evolution of today’s trends. With a solid experimental bases at the highest level of knowledge, it is proved that we tend to overlook some evolutions, we are inclined to find the easiness of categories and splits in the reality

40 Yuval Noah Harari, New Challenges of the 21st Century, 16th YES Annual Meeting Happiness Now. New Approaches for a World in Crisis, 12-14 September 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WA4t9uK2ZX8, 5.26.00-6.20.00, retrieved on 10 October 2019.

41 Ryan Daws, Putin Outlines Russia’s National AI Strategy Priorities, 31 May 2019, https://artificialintelligence-news.com/2019/05/31/putin-russia-national-ai-strategy-priorities/, retrieved on 15 October 2019.

42 Hans Rosling, Factfulness…, op. cit., p. 34.

The perspective of a general survey using

personal data and our

behaviour leads to both

digital dictator perspectives as well as to

the will to hack humans, as today some are hacking

the machines, internet,

computers and so one. AI can know and understand us better than we

can and so it can learn what

we do not know about ourselves,

including how to modify our

behaviour.

22


22No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

among us, we are led by our common knowledge to fear, to be pessimistic in appreciating our own evolution, to assume constant trends and a straight line evolution.

It is an immense amount of data and statistics that lie at the root of this book showing us that the very solid things that we think we know are obsolete and they are subject to the psychology that defines our life, the easiness of thinking but also the reflection of basic emotions and approaches to multiple simplified models that we tend to use in our assessments, argumentation and thinking. The combination of mathematics, logics and psychology reveals us how badly equipped we are in facing trends that change dramatically by accelerating after long periods of time, with developments in a very strict and simple manner of evolution.

Fact is that it is what we are living today: huge and rapid changes, uncertainties, alteration of known models and the relativization of very clear, certain and solid grounds. Gap – dividing model in opposite categories, negativity, constant and steady evolution, fear instinct, psychology of the size – big numbers, generalisation approach, destiny instinct or existence of a single perspective – unique way of seeing things, blame and urgency sense, all prove the limits of our approach to reality.

All those models that come from education and experience, which we learn from past realities of the world and our conservatism, psychological reactions to speedy change, limit our ability to realise the dramatic evolutions we are witnessing. And it is worth studying and knowing this reality since it is the “normal” way that our co-citizens and the whole of humanity are perceiving and reacting to the impact of high magnitude, as the one we are living nowadays. And the reaction of the general public is subject to that limitation of our minds.

SOCIETAL SECURITY, POLITICAL SECURITY AND THE DIRECT IMPACT ON HARD SECURITYAll these societal and political security threats have a huge impact

on the new threat environment, on any current threat assessment. And all come amplified in any current and future attempt to cope with the security and defence of a nation. That is why all those non-conventional and unconventional threats that are harming

Hans Rosling reveals us how badly equipped we are in facing trends that change dramatically by accelerating after long periods of time, with developments in a very strict and simple manner of evolution.


23



the internal immutable realities we used to consider as fixed, constant and solid need to be explored, known and approached in a scientific and comprehensive manner in order to prevent strategic surprise on those areas and the emergence of the new types of conflicts.

It should be easy to realise that those gaps in perception and the surprises at the level of common knowledge, the impact of those technological developments on individual and societal threat perceptions influence the internal security at the highest level. The alteration of societal security, fragmentation and alienation of individual, loosing sense of community spirit or societal cohesion directly influence the security of a nation. Moreover, the new vulnerabilities could be used by external actors that could take advantage of those evolutions and lack of prevention.

Support for decision-makers and political approaches claim trust and understanding of the real evolution of the threats and security concerns coming from experts at the level of the whole population. Financing security need is also linked to a clear perception of that evolution and a general understanding where we are all wrong as humans and how it happens that we are all subject to those collective mistakes or misleading43. Assuming that a part of the general information linked to security is not a subject of the public area and that there are things we cannot know and we are not supposed to know is another point that needs to be taught and realised at a societal level, in order to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings or the accentuation of vulnerabilities due to the lack of public trust.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, Al-Qaeda Operatives in a Car Traveling through Yemen Were

Killed in a Targeted Killing by a Missile Launched from a CIA-controlled Predator Drone, First Public Known Use of a Drone Attack, 5 November 2002, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_drone_strikes_in_Yemen#cite_note-Addicott-11

2. ***, BBC, “Gulf of Oman Tanker Attacks: What We Know”, 18 June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48627014; Raf Sanchez, “US Blames Iran for Oil Tanker Attack in Gulf of Oman amid

43 Iulian Chifu, Intelligence and Crisis Decision-making: a Bridge Too Far? in IAFIE – EUROPE 2019, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, 14.04-17.04.2019, to be published in proceedings.

All those non-conventional and

unconventional threats that are harming the internal immutable

realities we used to consider as

fixed, constant and solid need to be explored,

known and approached in a scientific and comprehensive

manner in order to prevent

strategic surprise in the mentioned

areas and the emergence of

the new types of conflicts.

24


24No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

Rising Tensions”, 13 June 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/13/oil-tankers-hit-fresh-attack-gulf-oman/.

3. ***, BBC, “Saudi Oil Attacks: US Says Intelligence Shows Iran Involved”, 16 September 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49712417.

4. ***, NATO’s New Division: A Serious Look at “Emerging Security Challenges” or an Attempt at Shoring up Relevance and Credibility?, ISIS Europe Briefing Note, No. 51, September 2010, https://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATOs_New_Division_0.pdf.

5. ***, “NATO Welcomes Opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats”, 11 April 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_143143.htm.

6. NATO Strategic Concept Rome, Article 24, in “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, 7 November 1991, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.

7. ***, Press Statements by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, 1-2 December 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_125361.htm.

8. Tass Russian News Agency, “Drone Attack on Russia’s Syrian Airbase Was Elaborate Pentagon Operation, Says Expert”, 25 October 2018, https://tass.com/defense/1027834.

9. Arjun Appadurai, Donatella de la Porta, Nancy Fraser, Heinrich Geiselberger (coordinator), Marea Regresie: De ce trăim un moment istoric, Editura Art, București, 2016.

10. Bruce A. Arrigo, The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy, SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks.

11. Barry Buzan, Popoarele, statele și teama, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2012.

12. Paul LeBlanc, Kylie Atwood, Jeremy Diamond, Sarah Westwood, CNN, Trump: US “Locked and Loaded Depending on Verification” of Attack on Saudi Oil Field, 16 September 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/15/politics/trump-us-saudi-arabia-attack-iran-iraq/index.html.

13. Simon Calder, “Are Climate Change Activists Going to Shut Down Airport and Why?”, Independent, 11 September 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/heathrow-drone-protest-pause-climate-change-airport-extinction-rebellion-nats-a9101346.html.

14. Iulian Chifu, Gândire Strategică, Editura Institutului de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale al Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 2013.

15. Iulian Chifu, Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride, Revista Infosfera, February 2018.


25



16. Iulian Chifu, Simona Țuțuianu, Torn between East and West: Europe’s Border States. Routledge, London and New York, 2017.

17. Iulian Chifu, Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations, in Proceedings, 15th International Scientific Conference “Strategies XXI” Strategic Changes and International Relations, 11-12 April 2019, Bucharest, Romania, National Defence University.

18. Iulian Chifu, “Lovitură hibridă anonimă cu drone împotriva Guvernului Britanic”, 31 December 2018, https://adevarul.ro/international/europa/lovitura-hibrida-anonima-drone-guvernului-britanic-1_5c29cdd3df52022f751606b2/index.html.

19. Iulian Chifu,“1000 de zboruri, 200.000 de călători de Crăciun, nici un vinovat. Cea mai mare lovitură împotriva Guvernului Britanic”, Evenimentul Zilei, 28 December 2018, https://evz.ro/1000-de-zboruri-200000-de-calatori-de-craciun-nici-un-vinovat.html.

20. Iulian Chifu, “Cine forţează războiul SUA cu Iranul? Inconştienţă calificată la Teheran sau provocări ale terţilor interesaţi?”, 21 June 2019, https://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/cine-forteaza-razboiul-sua-iranuln-inconstienta-calificata-teheran-provocari-tertilor-interesatin-1_5d0c8d63892c0bb0c69e4d1a/index.html.

21. Iulian Chifu, “SUA, Israel, Arabia Saudită, pregătite de războiul împotriva Iranului după atacurile cu drone”, Adevarul, 17 September 2019, https://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/sua-israel-arabia-saudita-pregatite-razboiul- i ranuluidupa-atacuri le-drone-1_5d80d312892c0bb0c6aef489/index.html.

22. Iulian Chifu, “Cutremur pe piața globală de petrol: Atacuri iraniene cu drone la rafinăriile saudite”, Evenimentul Zilei, 17 September 2019, https://evz.ro/cutremur-pe-piata-globala-de-petrol-atacuri-iraniene-cu-drone-la-rafinariile-saudite.html.

23. Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Război informațional: tipizarea agresiunii informaționale a Federației Ruse, Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale “Ion I. C. Brătianu” al Academiei Române, București, 2016.

24. Iulian Chifu, “Information Warfare, from STRATCOM to Psyops”, in Working Papers of the “World LUMEN Congress Logos Universitality Mentality Education Novelty”, 12-17 April 2016, Iași, International Conference, Lumen Media Publishing, UK, 2016.

25. Iulian Chifu, Cristina Ivan, Rolul democrației participative, al meta-narațiunilor și autorului colectiv în secolul XXI. Mesaj din viitor, Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence, no. 10/December 2013, București.

26. Iulian Chifu, Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride, Revista Infosfera, February 2018.

27. Iulian Chifu, Războiul informaţional: componentă a războiului hibrid şi instrument de acţiune agresivă cu relevanţă strategică, Revista Infosfera, 2016.

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28. Iulian Chifu, Trei generații de război informațional. Nivelul dezvoltării domeniului în partea sa publică, Revista Infosfera, September 2017.

29. Iulian Chifu, Cum alterăm realitatea în războiul informațional: Post-adevăr, post-factual, post-umanitate, Revista Infosfera, December 2018.

30. Iulian Chifu, Intelligence and Crisis Decision-Making: A Bridge Too Far? in IAFIE – EUROPE 2019, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, 14.04-17.04.2019, to be publish in proceedings.

31. Francis Fukuyama, Identity. Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition, Profile Books Ltd, London, 2018.

32. Nicu Gavriluță, Noile religii seculare. Corectitudinea politică, tehnologiile viitorului și trans-umanismul, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018.

33. Martin Gurri, The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium, Stripe Press, StripeMatter Inc, 2018.

34. Yuval Noah Harari, New Challenges of the 21st Century, 16th YES Annual Meeting “Happiness Now. New Approaches for a World in Crisis”, September 12 – 14, 2019.

35. Yuval Noah Harari, 21 de lecții pentru secolul XXI, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018.

36. Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus. Scurtă istorie a viitorului, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018.

37. Wolfgang Ishinger, Lumea în pericol. Germania și Europa în vremuri nesigure, Editura CurteaVeche, București, 2019.

38. Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back. America and Our Imperilled World, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2018.

39. James Kirchick, Sfârșitul Europei. Dictatori, demagogi și Noul Ev Întunecat, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018.

40. Susan Michie, James Thomas, Marie Johnston, Pol Mac Aonghusa, John Shawe-Taylor, Michael P. Kelly, Léa A. Deleris, Ailbhe N. Finnerty, Marta M. Marques, Emma Norris, Alison O’Mara-Eves, and Robert West, The Human Behaviour-Change Project: Harnessing the Power of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Evidence Synthesis and Interpretation, 18 October 2017.

41. Jan-Werner Muller, Ce este populismul, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2017.42. Amrith Ramkumar, Joseph Wallace, Crude Prices Soar After Attack on

Saudi Facilities, Threatening Global Growth, The Wall Street Journal, 16 September 2019.

43. Condoleezza Rice, Amy Zegart, Political Risk. Facing the Threat of Global Insecurity in the Twenty First Century, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2018.

44. Steve Richards, The Rise of the Outsiders. How Mainstream Politics Lost Its Way, Atlantic Books, London, 2017.

45. Hans Rosling, Factfulness. Ten Reasons We’re Wrong about the World and Why Things Are Better than You Think, Sceptre, 2018.


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46. Daws Ryan, Putin Outlines Russia’s National AI Strategy Priorities, 31 May 2019.

47. Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century, Routledge, London and New York, 2017.

48. Josua Taylor, Gatwick Drone Attack Theories - Who Is behind the Airport Sabotage?, Mirror, 23 December 2018.

49. Sarah Young, Kate Holton, Drones Paralyse British Airport, Grounding Christmas Travelers, Reuters, 20 December 2018.

50. Sophia Yan, China Sells Armed Drones to Serbia amid Concerns Arms Deal Could Destabilise Region, The Telegraph, 11 September 2019.

51. Darrell M. West, John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the World, Brookings, 24 April 2018.

52. N. Wright (editor), AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives, https://nsiteam.com/ai-china-russia-and-the-global-order-technological-political-global-and-creative-perspectives/.

2828No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING THE A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON STRATEGYIMPACT OF INNOVATION ON STRATEGY

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS: A SHAPER TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS: A SHAPER OR A FACILITATOR FOR GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS?OR A FACILITATOR FOR GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS?

Antonia COLIBĂȘANUSenior geopolitical analyst and Chief operating officer, Geopolitical Futures,Associate Professor, “Carol I” National Defence University, D.R.E.S.M.A.R.A.

Innovation is usually associated with technological progress. In intelligence analysis, progress is driven by the challenges the analysts see in discerning useful information from the vast array of data available. For geopolitical analysis – which is used during the strategic decision-making process, progress aims at understanding those details that influence the national status quo, and ultimately the state’s security related imperatives. This is why it is important to understand what really constitutes “change” and how progress, including technological progress, may help (or limit) our ability in pointing it out and underline its importance from the very beginning. This article aims at delivering a conceptual framework for looking at the way progress shapes society – and how it is linked with innovation for strategic decision-making.

Keywords: innovation, technological progress, strategic decisions, geopolitical analysis, strategy.


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A Framework for Considering the Impact of Innovation on StrategyA Framework for Considering the Impact of Innovation on StrategyTechnological Progress: A Shaper or a Facilitator for Geopolitical Analysis?Technological Progress: A Shaper or a Facilitator for Geopolitical Analysis?


DEFINING INNOVATION AND CHANGE FOR GEOPOLITICSInnovation refers to new ideas, to those elements that are helping

us better the way we do things. A new idea always brings change. Not all new ideas, not all changes are relevant, however – at least that’s the case when it comes to geopolitical analysis. Geopolitics organizes societies into complex, geographically defined systems and then studies their behavior. In modern terms, those systems are called nation-states. Geopolitics looks into the three dimensions of the state: the political, the economic and the military in order to see potential shifts into the state’s evolution and its imperatives. So, for geopolitical analysis, it is important to learn which of those new ideas out there have an impact at the national and international level, which is capable to produce change within the society, at a complex level.

The new ideas are “triggers for change” – so, in evaluating them, we always look for their strategic impact. That is, we try to understand what a particular nation state (actor) will do with regards to a new idea. For that, one method that’s largely used is the “functional method”1: where refers to the way it is anticipated that the I = the nation state (or the actor whose status we investigate) will react, considering its current estate , the environment = E and what the other = O does.

The actor or the nation state under evaluation is “the I” of the function as, through the analytical process, the analyst is putting his or herself in its shoes, trying to determine its reactions and evaluate their consequences. Therefore, in the context of new ideas potentially creating change – the main and most important question is “What shall I do, if the other, considering the new idea, does X and, by doing that, the other modifies the environment in which we both live?”. While we use this simple judgment function for almost all the questions regarding

1 The functional method is also described and commented an article written by the same author, titled “Building the Framework for Useful Intelligence – the Contemporary Needs and Risks” and published in the Proceedings of the XXth International Conference Intelligence in the Knowledge Society 2014, Ed. Academiei Naționale de Informații “Mihai Viteazul”, 2015, pp. 57-72.

Innovation refers to new

ideas, to those elements that are helping us better the way

we do things. A new idea always

brings change. Not all new

ideas, not all changes

are relevant, however – at

least that’s the case when

it comes to geopolitical

analysis.

30

Antonia COLIBĂªANUAntonia COLIBĂªANU

30No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

an actor’s or country’s standpoint on particular matters, this particular question relates to the potential for change, for a transformation from the current status quo into another.

As we try to understand what ideas produce an impact we must consider the stages for the idea to produce change: an idea first needs to be turned into a prototype, showing the benefits for it to be implemented and later have enthusiasm to adopt them as change factors. Considering societies as self-regulating systems, there are three kinds of structural changes2. The first kind is natural, intuitive: everyone expects something to happen, as it is clear a certain (natural) need that is currently not met will need to be met (in the economic but also the broader, social sense) and therefore, sooner or later, we will deal with a case of evolutionary change. The second kind is a change that virtually no one is awaiting, even if, after it happens, it is a logical, obvious improvement of the way things were before it happened and people adapt to the “new normal” relatively fast, as they want to get the benefits of the improvement – this is the revolutionary change. The third kind is disruptive change: it is unexpected and, while an improvement, it is not easily implemented – the improvements brought are not obvious at first glance and people not only need to adapt, but also adjust the way they are doing things in order to benefit from the change.

A first observation is that only positive change is correlated to innovation. While all changes create the opportunity for new ideas, not all generated ideas are relevant to the society on the whole and not all are innovative. Ultimately, not all innovations have an impact. Which explains the other observation, referring to the scientific literature available which relates to the subject: the vast majority of literature on innovation refers to business, and generally to (micro) economic systems. There is little written on political innovation and most of the texts see communication techniques to be key for driving positive change. There is limited literature on military innovation, except for the announcements of new weaponry – for good reason. And even less is available to be read on innovation that affects society on a whole and our social life in general.

2 Geoff Mulgan (coord.), “Social innovation. What it is, why it matters and how it can be accellerated”, Oxford Skoll Center for Social Entrepreneurship, pp. 14-15.

As we try to understand what ideas produce an impact we must consider the stages for the idea to produce change: an idea first needs to be turned into a prototype, showing the benefits for it to be implemented and later have enthusiasm to adopt them as change factors.


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Figure 1: Types of structural change Source: author

There are, however, a lot of natural and human-made changes that address wide social problems. For example, the zero carbon housing schemes solution belongs to the bucket of proposals that are responding to the wider problem of climate change, which is, at the core, a social issue. From a geopolitical perspective, we need to address those novelties – and the innovation sources for ideas that can become potential solutions to social problems, considering their implications for political, economic and military domains. A change in society implies policy changes and multiple chances make for a potential re-draw of strategy.

Therefore, as we look at the three dimensions of geopolitics, we also need to refer to the analytical layers, in order to categorize potential sources for change. For this purpose, we use the intelligence analysis framework. At the tactical level, we have the intel puzzles3 – the analysis that needs to provide solutions fast (from minutes, to hours). At the strategic level, there are two kinds of analysis: mystery analysis – the analysis where questions beginning with “why?” and “how?” are prevalent and end up in scenario building, and complex analysis – high level, sense-making analysis that establishes the center of gravity of the issue questioned. All kinds – from tactical to strategic analysis give a vision of the future, be it on the short, the medium or the long term.

3 W. Agrell, G.F. Treverton, “Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy. National Intelligence and Science”, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 32-34.

From a geopolitical perspective, we need to

address those novelties – and the innovation

sources for ideas that can become

potential solutions to

social problems, considering their

implications for political,

economic and military domains. A

change in society implies policy changes

and multiple chances make for a potential

re-draw of strategy.

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32No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

As national imperatives have to do with the very physical geography of the nation state, the place having shaped the state’s history and culture, the national interest refers to the way the state defends its imperatives, in different times in history. The tactical analysis speaks of the change and its outcomes for the short term, being able to underline anything that’s disruptive, but not yet affecting national interest. The strategic geopolitical analysis addresses societal shifts determined by the change(s) identified under tactical analysis, with the purpose of establishing the impact on the national interest.

Change, as a transformative action over the society requests of geopolitical analysis to explore the future. This process requires us to identify those qualitative determinants of individual social life that are able to produce significant shifts for communities and, ultimately, nation states. The complexity of such an endeavor gets geopolitical analysis close to forecasting. This attribute is also what geopolitics is useful for: it helps shaping and changing, if and when needed, tactics and even strategy.

SOURCES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE AND PROGRESS Geopolitical analysis needs to deliver on societies change – but

societies are made of individuals. This is why the way the human beings act, their motives are critical for understanding societies – the geopolitical analysts need to know about the (universal) individual before they know about the countries individuals live in. That is a complex and yet a simple endeavor: it’s about us, human beings. By trying to be better, by seeking to improve their work and lifestyle, humans are effectively changing their environment every day.

We take some of the very small processes at our workplace and try to improve them, have work done faster and spend more time with our loved ones. By doing that, we are creating new premises for tomorrow. While our own persona may seem insignificant for the global perspective, we all share the same goal: we are trying to be better at what we doing order to gain quality time to enjoy ourselves with our kind. In effect, we’re, every day, struggling against time while we’re also building up the future.

Both time and future are social constructs. Time is a social construct due to its relativity ‒ to each and every of us, individuals and, historically, to communities. Geopolitically, we refer to eras and epochs; we rarely

Change, as a transformative action over the society requests of geopolitical analysis to explore the future. This process requires us to identify those qualitative determinants of individual social life that are able to produce significant shifts for communities and, ultimately, nation states.


33



discuss months or years. It is us and the significance we give to a certain period of time that defines its importance – while we talk about time defining our life, in reality; it is exactly the other way around.

We not only give relevance to the past, to the history, but we are also creating what comes, which makes the future a social construct as well. Considering that the future is formed of all potential transformations that will modify our society (a specific social system), we may even define a mathematical model for what holds to come, considering probabilities for each transformation, each resulted from a clear set of resources and potential actions that communities within the social system could (or not) take. In the end, it is the potential, but also the will for communities and for the social system as a whole, to go in a certain direction or another – which defines what’s likely to come.

The relativity of time and future as social constructs makes both of them dependent on the human essence and, in turn, makes it impossible for us to fully know them, in the same way it is impossible to fully know ourselves – there is always something left to be discovered about the human being, which is beyond the known. What makes us humans and more, what makes us a community and indeed, a nation state is linked to the mystery of philosophical questions: “who am I?” and “what is love?” interlinked. The fact that each of us has one mother, one first language: the mother’s, one unique way of seeing the world, which first came to be known by us through our mother’s eyes, all this makes us who we are at our core – and all this we can’t express in a definition or an equation. This uniqueness links us both to our time and to our future – it’s our own perception and our own influence over the other and the environment we live in that creates our present world and ties us to the future one.

Figure 2: Personal social constructsSource: author

While it is important to understand the sources for social change (innovation being the positive change) in order to figure out the future of the world – geopolitically, we refer mostly to nation states and how

The relativity of time and

future as social constructs

makes both of them dependent

on the human essence and,

in turn, makes it impossible for us to fully

know them, in the same way

it is impossible to fully know

ourselves – there is always something left

to be discovered about the

human being, which is beyond

the known.

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34No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

they interact with one another. But it is the individuals, the movements and the organisations that we must examine before conclusion – all in the context of the nation state. So, we have to be aware of the “stories about the future” that exist for each culture – as those will influence the individuals’ minds.

We also need to correlate those stories with the way individuals together, in movements, are coming up with solutions to everyday problems and therefore are carrying ideas for change until these take concrete forms. The feminist or environmentalist movements are examples for how individuals work in broad networks, supporting similar ideas, at global levels. Movements can exist within and outside nation states, and while working for their own goals, they do not have a clear structure and grow organically. That means that, from the nation state perspective, they will also be used by state or non-state actors for projecting influence, potentially serving particular interests at times.

Individuals are also pushing for change in an organized manner – through organisations that set themselves the goal of coming up with ideas to solve specific problems. The origins of the internet came from within the U.S. military and the early understanding of climate change came from NASA. Neither the U.S. military or NASA thought of the impact their discoveries would have for the global society – both have understood the importance of both for themselves and their relevance for the U.S.

What came next was that both the internet and the idea that we live in an endangered world triggered responses from individuals, communities and ultimately nation states. Responses did not come in the very same time, but in batches, based on the specific environment(s) defining the individuals, the communities and ultimately the nation states. For example, for the internet to be serviced to the population, specific technologies – and cables had to be in place. Infrastructure had to be built and the money to build such infrastructure needed to be paid off by specific needs that were met. The fact that the world is endangered by climate change needed to be proven and convincing theories, some more scientific than others, developed. Bottom line, both changes had one thing in common: the seeds of the ideas were planted progressively and successfully into peoples’ minds.

Ideas are what made the changes successful. If we are convinced something will make us and our lives better, we will seek taking

While it is important to understand the sources for social change (innovation being the positive change) in order to figure out the future of the world – geopolitically, we refer mostly to nation states and how they interact with one another. But it is the individuals, the movements and the organisations that we must examine before conclusion – all in the context of the nation state.


35



that something, that idea. But the right conditions (environment) have to be in place for us to realise that an idea is good or, on the contrary, bad. And more, to act upon doing something – changing the status quo. From the geopolitical perspective, it is always important to understand what makes nation states act – and when, in order to learn about their tactical moves.

Knowing about the imperatives of a nation state allows us to understand the state’s broad strategic goals – but learning what makes them act tells us about how and, most importantly, when they might pursue strategic interests, tactically. In security or military terms, that allows us understanding how to fight back against the enemy’s tactics or against unwanted events within our own social system.

There is a lot written on how to increase creativity and drive change. But there is really little to consider, analytically, if we are to consider timeliness for change. Instead of trying to understand what may trigger changes within a particular society and establish timeliness for each factor involved, it is usually easier to understand the barriers for change, especially when talking about those changes impacting the national interest – once barriers are crossed, change will come along with tactic moves.

Psychologically, what drives people’s actions and what constitute barriers for progress is embedded in individual fears4, which, extrapolated at the national level, tell us about national threats (and opportunities). It is not ambition, it is the fear that something will go wrong that inhibits action – but fear is also a strong determinant for action when nothing else works. Among the most common fears that constitute barriers are the following:

• fear of poor performance – individuals resist all reforms in the short run as they tend to cut down efficiency. In all social systems, different elements have optimized around each other over time – simply put, the interdependencies between the elements that constitute a social system go beyond the apparent and are subtler than they may appear in any research study will show them. They are interpersonal – breaking them,

4 The explanation on barriers for change coming off fears is drawn from the work by T.J. Hämäläinen and R. Heiskala, (eds) in “Social innovations, institutional change and economic performance: making sense of structural adjustment processes in industrial sectors, regions and societies”, edward elgar publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, 2007.

Knowing about the imperatives

of a nation state allows us to understand

the state’s broad strategic

goals – but learning what

makes them act tells us about

how and, most importantly,

when they might pursue strategic

interests, tactically.

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36No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

even if the break will produce positive returns on the long-run, will likely cause inefficiency on the short-run;

• fear of losing – individuals love stability. Change means, by definition, instability. The benefits of introducing change need to be higher than the benefits of continuity for something that works;

• fear of breaking norms – humans are defining security by their affiliation to a set of values and assumptions that they take as norms. Reforms sometimes hit barriers that relate to mindsets already shaped around a clear set of norms and changes are difficult to implement. However, once this barrier is broken, changes come for logic “salvation” as a new set of norms is needed when the previous got invalidated by the very need for change;

• fear of isolation – the worst that may happen to a human being is loneliness. Personal relationships form a governing system – each of us has a specific role in the family, in the office, etc. at a given time. The society is nothing else but a network of personal relationships. Obviously, some are more important than others – people change jobs and relationships with their now former colleagues change, some even break. It rarely happens for individuals to break with their families (and when that happens, it is dramatic). This is why, change imposed by breaking apart networks is the most difficult – but also the most durable.

The same set of fears is also considered by the existing literature and research addressing the future. Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-1987)5 explained the future as a sum of scenarios and uncertainty that gives the opportunity for action. In his case, the unknown was not translated into fears but into freedom of choice. Limitations came from knowing what is possible and what not, but didn’t refer to predisposition for change.

His German contemporary, Ossip Kurt Flechtheim (1909-1998) saw the future as programmed on possible projections, based on specific prognosis that is established on ideologic criticism, which evaluates

5 The most known work of Bertrand de Jouvenel is “L’art de la Conjecture” (“The Art of Conjecture”), first published in 1967 and latest English version published by Routledge, in 2017.

Bertrand de Jouvenel explained the future as a sum of scenarios and uncertainty that gives the opportunity for action. In his case, the unknown was not translated into fears but into freedom of choice. Limitations came from knowing what is possible and what not, but didn’t refer to predisposition for change.


37



all possibilities based on „our” goals and motivations6. That puts national imperatives as foundational elements to everything related to the future and fundamentally limits scenarios to political motivations. In his view, the future is shaped by ideologies ‒ which have the power of shaping mentalities and seed ideas, while also breaking up fears, considering goals and motivations.

The American Alvin Toffler (1928-2016) saw the future as a consequence of human actions7, which can only be studied if we may rationally analyse selected data that drive information on social change, creating social models for development. He introduced the idea of “social change” as baseline for all the studies on the future and, as he saw countries able to implement models for development, he also hoped mathematical models could help understanding the world of tomorrow. In seeking to understand different development patterns between societies, he was also turned to the smaller groups that were not necessarily linked to the nation states interests.

Michael Young (1915-2012) was the first to talk about “social innovation”8 – the product of understanding the future is in humans’ hands and that the force of influence and creativity are the only ones that tell the world of tomorrow. His model doesn’t consider national imperatives – but underlines the importance of the individual, in a fast-changing world.

All models and methods on ‘analysing’ the future have one thing in common: working with the abstract. Analysts need to imagine, while knowing, as much as they can, details on the individual, the geography and history that has set a particular mindset for the humans living in a particular place, in order to understand what they fear most. By doing that, we seek understanding both the population’s limits for change and its force of influence. We try to tell, balancing their fears against their power of influence, what is it that will make them react and how.

6 O.K. Fleichtheim most representative work is “Futurologie, Der Kampf um die Zukunft”, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Koln, 1970.

7 A. Toffler most popular works on are “Future Shock” (1970, Bantam Books) and “The Third Wave” (1980, Bantam Books).

8 Michael Young subsequently played a key role in shaping the post-war welfare state in the U.K. after writing, in 1945 the Labour Party manifesto which ushered Clement Attlee’s government into power. In 1957 he authored ‘The Rise of Meritocracy’ – his best known work, where he also coined the term „social innovation”.

Alvin Toffler saw the future as a

consequence of human actions, which can only

be studied if we may rationally

analyse selected data that drive information on social change, creating social

models for development.

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38No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

Social progress, driven by social innovation, speaks of changes in the political and economic systems, which, in turn, affect the security sectors. In the same time, while progress is always hoped for, the reality of present days – which portray the transition from yesterday to tomorrow, is the only guidance we have. The constant monitoring of world affairs delivers elements that relate to interdependencies between individuals, communities, nation states or movements – all those that transcend borders, while affecting nation states in different ways.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE – COMMUNICATION AND DEFENSE FOR TOMORROW Society as a system is progressing as its elements seek progress.

The end of the Cold War marked a close for an era of divisions. It also marked the beginning of the digital era – in 1991, CERN introduced the world wide web. The expression “surfing the internet” became popular a year later. Personal computers became portable and even affordable by the late 90s. All new technologies, starting with the microprocessor (launched in ’89) and ending with artificial intelligence related applications have the microchip at their core and all have promised, in their beginnings, a better, faster communication for the end user. Globalisation – the promise of the 90s and early 2000s – was defined by global interconnectivity, first and foremost.

Digitisation, while affecting all elements of the society, is also deeply connected to the country’s industrial base. Technological changes, just as any other change, are built on specific needs coming from those using it. The internet was embedded in the needs of the U.S. military as more effective (faster) communication was needed between its operating units. Between 1969 and until 1987, the U.S. Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET)9 visibly funded projects that had to do with the internet build-up. But since research was done in academic research centers and business laboratories, the idea hit the market as well. Its popularity grew as utility was proven – even if that has also been in tandem with political leadership support.

9 ARPANET ‒ U.S. Defense Departmentʼs Advanced Research Projects Agency Network; more on the history of internet: https://www.livescience.com/20727-internet-history.html

All new technologies, starting with the microprocessor (launched in ’89) and ending with artificial intelligence related applications have the microchip at their core and all have promised, in their beginnings, a better, faster communication for the end user. Globalisation – the promise of the 90s and early 2000s – was defined by global interconnectivity, first and foremost.


39



With the microchip and the internet related innovations, the cyberspace was created. At first view, it does not seem to hold patterns of physical geography. The cyberspace is not only a constantly new environment – the fact that it is still “under construction” makes it also a completely free, in part lawless space. However, there are boundaries – and even borders: in the cyberspace these are visible through infrastructure. The internet is not “the same” everywhere – we associate better internet with higher speeds, making this relatively new feature of our society relative to time. In fact, for us it is important to have a message sent and received “as fast as possible” if not instantly.

When we say speed for our cyber communications is dependent on technology available we refer to several parameters. The range to internet nodes defined as the physical distance between internet hosts and ultimately, the distance between internet exchange points, which is given by the physical infrastructure through which internet service providers (ISPs) and content delivery networks (CDNs) exchange traffic between their networks are the first parameters that need to be taken into consideration when defining speed – on land, the larger the distance, the slower the communication. The other parameter to be considered refers to the quality of the transmission network: on land, we currently have submarine cables, microwave networks and fiber optic cables networks.

Considering the map of the world, we will easily observe that the microwave networks are prominent in the mountainous areas of the world’s rather problematic regions like the Western Balkans and Central Asia. Building fiber optic is not necessarily difficult, while more expensive – but the will to build depends on all geopolitical related factors: politics, economics and security. The more peaceful the area, the more fiber optic – if we take Crimea for instance, that is one “blind area” as, while fiber optic infrastructure existed before 2014, links no longer appear on the map since several years now, considering the effective cut-off from Ukraine.

Another parameter defining the speed of communication refers to the distance of a certain location to radio base station and the characteristics of the radio access network. This has to do with cellular networks that support mobile communications ‒ the 2G (GSM), 3G and 4G networks. In their case, the physical geography of the earth not only conditions communication speed horizontally (linear distance

The cyberspace is not only a

constantly new environment – the fact that it

is still “under construction” makes it also a completely free, in part

lawless space. However, there are boundaries

– and even borders: in the

cyberspace these are

visible through infrastructure.

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40No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

between the stations), but also vertically, considering all obstacles between stations limit access (what we refer to “no signal” situations). Mountains remain relevant, but it is the economic needs that drive the change of network ‒ to switch from cables only to radio base stations investment is needed. Worldwide, such networks belong to the more developed regions of the world.

It is not by chance that 5G technology is largely debated and discussions swirled around the infrastructure needed to deliver communication services. Besides the economic interests held in the matter, there is also a political layer that has to do with both economics and security. Probably the most important aspect the 5G technology, which holds its new-ness for society, is the fact that, with 5G, satellites could bring communication to areas where terrestrial connectivity companies consider it too expensive to build fiber-optic cables or radio stations. While telecommunications have long been served by satellites, the fact that civilian communications may become directly dependent on satellites10 constitutes an important change of perspective – and geography.

10 There are multiple articles in the media on the opportunity for “space internet” with 5G. I only selected two, published at about an year difference: https://www.space.com/5g-in-space- internet-satellites.html; https://spacenews.com/what-the-satellite-industry-needs-to-know-about- where-5g-stands/

Figure 3: Map of Eurasia – land connectivity Source: ITU

Probably the most important aspect the 5G technology, which holds its new-ness for society, is the fact that, with 5G, satellites could bring communication to areas where terrestrial connectivity companies consider it too expensive to build fiber-optic cables or radio stations.


41



To understand sources of social change, we’d need to look at satellites as well, which now bring another layer of physical geography. There is little understanding of what’s in space, but, by examining the spatial map of the earth, it looks crowded. Not long ago, in the early 2000s, satellites were „planted” only by nation states – that is no longer the case. Companies and researchers have the ability to launch satellites if they go by the rules. Legislation does exist and it is shaped by the nation states – innovation, however, goes fast. Satellites themselves went from bus size to shoe size, which points to the fact that we are dealing with a generational technological change. While we’re talking still about microchips – their applications and development have contributed to geographically shape our world.

It is not by chance that the U.S. Space Force11 became an independent service of the U.S. military in 2019. For now, the impact of the developments in outer space is minimal on our society. But it is expected to increase. To understand the pace of change, it’s enough to note that the map of the world is now updated daily from space – five years ago, it was updated annually. We are now able to have real live satellite feeds. We have discovered places that we didn’t know existed before. Constellations of satellites are working in coordination with one another on the same orbit and we’re able to use airborne satellites for important missions12.

All this points to decision making having to change. With more information available from space, strategic thinking needs to adapt. It may become faster and more focused. Civilians do not yet understand what all this means for them – but, as they look at change through the prism of time, and define its utility in terms of effectiveness, it is likely that their need for security will increase. As fear of isolation diminishes with the promise of more communication, fear of the unknown relates to quality: how much communication do we need in order to live a good life? What is the good life, considering the new realities? The old, universal questions that never diminish in importance have yet to be addressed by leadership and defense strategists. As individual-related patterns that both surpass and lie under the nation state, the defense functions of the nation states need to be both focused and flexible in addressing social changes.

11 U.S. Space Force was signed into law on 20 December 2019, https://www.military.com/space-force12 C. Tucker, “A planet of 3 billion”, Atlas Observatory Press, 2019, pp. 345-346 (Kindle Ed.)

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42No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

CONCLUSIONWith new ideas coming into play, societies change. This is not

new, nor is it abnormal. Much of the transformations taking place are referring to technology: ever since industrialization, humans have tried finding ways to increase efficiency. This is why geopolitics, while focused on nation states, cannot ignore individuals and groups of individuals that are actively changing the state’s complex system. It is because the source of change is held in those ideas aimed at reforming the society – and precisely because only some of them are able to do so, geopolitical analysis needs to have the means to look into details while keep the broad picture in focus.

Two decades into the 21st century, humanity has used digitization to the point where geography starts changing. Obviously, the physical geography of the earth remains largely the same – as it naturally evolves, in time, under the work of humans. But, with the new generation of telecommunication technologies, our dependence on the outer-space will likely increase. All that, while satellites are working in coordination with one another, the humans’ accessibility in space has grown dramatically in less than ten years.

Talk about the galaxies in outer space is no longer exotic – it slowly becomes the reality of all those interested in geography, and ultimately, in strategy. Geopolitics looks to determine the potential for grand shifts, which have an impact on national imperatives. Daily analysis work also focuses on highlighting tactical shifts, those policies that address specific short-term challenges. With space becoming the next battlefield in all spheres, not only militarily, our analytical framework is fundamentally changed as a new layer of geography needs to be observed. Strategically, this will produce results as societies all over the world, in the form of nation states and not only, react to this big change that comes of increased global interconnection.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, ARPANET – U.S. Defense Departmentʼs Advanced Research

Projects Agency Network; more on the history of internet: https://www.livescience.com/20727-internet-history.html.

2. W. Agrell, G.F. Treverton, Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy. National Intelligence and Science, Oxford University Press, 2015.


43



3. Geoff Mulgan (coord.), “Social innovation. What it is, why it matters and how it can be accellerated”, Oxford Skoll Center for Social Entrepreneurship.

4. C. Tucker, A Planet of 3 billion, Atlas Observatory Press, Kindle Ed., 2019.

5. https://www.military.com/space-force6. https://www.space.com/5g-in-space-internet-satellites.html;

https://spacenews.com/what-the-satellite-industry-needs-to-know-about-where-5g-stands/.

4444No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

SOCIAL MEDIA AS HYBRID WARFARE TOOL SOCIAL MEDIA AS HYBRID WARFARE TOOL – PUTTING RUSSIA’S INFORMATIONAL – PUTTING RUSSIA’S INFORMATIONAL

STRATEGY IN CONTEXT –STRATEGY IN CONTEXT –

Iulia ANGHEL, PhDLecturer, Faculty of Communication Sciences, Ecological University of Bucharest, Romania

Nowadays conflicts tend to become rather “wars of choice”, wherefore the problem of legitimacy, public perception and identity plays a critical part, often challenging the traditional warfare means and rules. Digitalisation of politics and de-territorialisation of hegemony and power are not for certain new trends. However, the contemporary turn of these technology driven revolutions is accentuated by the intervention of multiple non-state actors, as S. Svetoka pointed out in 2016, struggling to acquire effective instruments to conduct asymmetrical, irregular and hybrid wars. In this context, the research intends to discuss the theme of the narrative operations, used as a part of a hybrid warfare in Russia vs NATO Crimean scenario, addressing topics as: post-state security threats and weaponization of social media, patterns of pro-Russian cyber propaganda and perspectives of development for regional security landscape, under siege of digital modernity.

Keywords: social media, hybrid warfare, information strategies, narrative cyber operations, NATO, Russia.


45

Social Media as Hybrid Warfare Tool Social Media as Hybrid Warfare Tool – Putting Russia’s Informational Strategy in Context –– Putting Russia’s Informational Strategy in Context –


INTRODUCTION. “WARS OF CHOICE” AND NEW EQUATIONS OF SOFT POWERHow social media has become a weapon of war stays linked to the

ascent of two related processes: weaponization of culture, information and money1 and militarisation of globalisation. The concept of “weaponization of culture and ideas”2, essential for understanding the hybrid use of new digital networks, was coined by Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss in 2014, in an early attempt to frame Russia’s new 21st-century “hybrid” or “non-linear” conflict strategy. Moreover, taking into account Frank Hoffman’s ground-breaking observation, related to the “blurred character of modern wars”3, tending to conceal the borders amid peace and conflict, along with the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, famous quote, claiming that “The role of non-military means (…) have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness”4, weaponization of culture may announce a major change within contemporary representations of security and power. Weaponization of culture, ideas, information and money have become vital processes within the Kremlin’s, and not only, new approaches upon hybrid and non-linear wars, as a result of a silent information revolution. The ascent of digitalisation, subsequent to 2010 landmark, disclosed new socialisation and association patterns, challenging the nation-states monopoles upon foreign and public affairs and fostering the autonomisation of different non-state bodies. Military lobbies, economic networks, civic platforms or malign political and ideological

1 Peter Pomerantsev, Michael Weiss, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, The Institute of Modern Russia, New York, 2014, p. 12.

2 Ibidem, p. 14.3 Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century. The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for

Policy Studies, Virginia, USA, 2007, p. 12.4 Valery Gerasimov, Ценность науки в предвидении, Voenno-promyshlennyy Kuryer

(27 February - 5 March 2013), http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf. English translation by Robert Coalson and commentary by Mark Galeotti, http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/, retrieved on 25 September 2019.

The concept of “weaponization

of culture and ideas”,

essential for understanding the hybrid use of new digital

networks, was coined by Peter

Pomerantsev and Michael

Weiss in 2014, in an early attempt to frame Russia’s new 21st-century

“hybrid” or “non-linear”

conflict strategy.

46

Iulia ANGHELIulia ANGHEL

46No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

groups are only a few of the new stakeholders entering the security arena in recent times, their influence upon domestic and foreign policies being connected to soft power formulas as propaganda, disinformation, fake news and cyber-attacks.

Militarisation of globalisation revealed among other things the tensional lines arisen amid westernisation’s5 cultural model and the vernacular reactions occurred at democracy’s edges. Indigenisation has come as a world-wide evolution paradox, the initial adoption on behalf of non-Western societies of western liberal thinking being followed by traditionalist, nationalist and nativist responses. Those initial cultural vulnerabilities of the ’90s were aggravated by the digital modernisation, which enabled movements as de-territorialisation of power, ingravescence of social cleavages, decline of national solidarities and not lastly, the growing power of alternative community and association vectors. Fragmentation of national audiences and radicalisation of dormant publics resulted in decay of the previous security equilibriums and pacts, the use of social media as hybrid warfare tool becoming the trade mark of present conflicts6. Since many modern conflicts are labelled as “wars of choice”7, requiring high degrees of legitimacy and popular support, multiple state and non-state actors are struggling in building and acquiring new tools for fighting asymmetrical and hybrid warfare. Moreover, the global interplay between civic-based social media movements and ascension of populist policies, grafted also on digital grounds, calls for reflection. The initial optimistic expectation concerning the democratising potential of digital sphere was replaced by the spectrum of dark information operations, determining inversions of the democracy in the region and authoritarian echoes.

It is considered that targeted narrative operations can achieve results no less impressive than attacks on critical infrastructure8, the weaponization of social media collocating activities and effects

5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, USA, 2007, p. 74.

6 Sanda Svetoka, Social Media as Tool of Hybrid Warfare, NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence, Riga, 2016, p. 10.

7 Thomas Elkjer Nissen, Social Media’s Role in Hybrid Strategies, NATO Strategic Centre for Excellence in Communication, Riga, 2019, p. 5.

8 Ibidem, p. 10.

Fragmentation of national audiences and radicalisation of dormant publics resulted in decay of the previous security equilibriums and pacts, the use of social media as hybrid warfare tool becoming the trade mark of present conflicts.


47



as: Targeting, Intelligence Collection, Defence, Command and Control, Inform and Influence and Hybrid Operations9. The increasing complexity of the narrative-oriented hybrid measures recently deployed in social media playground, shadowing gradually the traditional cyberspace measures, as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated, may conduct to a provocative hypothesis. Not only that the nature of contemporary conflicts has changed, gliding towards complex multi-modal operations, blending kinetic and cyber approaches10, but the future of warfare may encompass a second generation of hybrid warfare. While narrative patterns tend to reshape the reality perception, political commitment, national borders and identity formations of increasingly divided audiences, the rise of the hybrid use of communication sphere may conduct in the near future towards the proliferation of new power actors. State and non-state bodies, media outlets, inland diasporic communities or ethnic enclaves may use the magnifying impact of social media in order to litigate the classical hegemons. The following sections engage in pursuit of this hypothesis, aiming to discuss the new trends and strategic orientations revealed by Russia’s cyber approach to the Crimean conflict, concentrating mostly upon the hybrid use of communication and cultural narratives.

THE SECOND GENERATION OF HYBRID WARFARE AND THE POST-STATE SECURITY CHALLENGESBeyond any doubt, Russia’s invasion in Ukraine sparked vivid

debates upon traditional geopolitical norms and warfare tactics11, but also inaugurated a new phase into the already complicated spectrum of non-traditional conflicts. The well-known definition launched by analyst and author Frank Hoffman concerning the new versions of modern war, considers that hybrid confrontations have as distinctive feature the “blend of the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular war”12. Further expanded

9 Ibidem, p. 11. 10 Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Håkan Gunneriusson, Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century’s New Threats

to Global Peace and Security, Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, 2015, p. 78.

11 Eve Hunter, Piret Pernik, The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare, International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, April, 2015, p. 3.

12 Ibidem, p. 3.

The increasing complexity of the narrative-

oriented hybrid measures

recently deployed in

social media playground,

shadowing gradually the

traditional cyberspace

measures, as the Russian-

Ukrainian conflict has

demonstrated, may conduct to

a provocative hypothesis.

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48No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

definitions depict the hybrid phenomena as a new formula of warfare that reunites at least three interrelated layers: complex campaigns that combine low-level, both conventional and special operations, offensive cyber and space actions and psychological operations designed to influence popular perception and international opinion13. Thereby, the new Russian informational strategy has apparently targeted a well-established class of objectives, including: the recovery of a cultural ecumene, in its near vicinities through the instrumentality of “Novorussia” doctrine, the limitation of EU project dominance, the control upon strategic resources and energy pipelines, and the stimulation of a divide within Western political and security pacts14.

However, the startling reconversion of the global and regional landscapes under the pressure of digitalisation offered unpredictable outcomes, all the more as information revolution will continuously change the nature of borders, identities and even power actors. Digitalisation has determined important consequences as rampant modernisation of traditional and fragmented societies, political mobilisation of new social groups or revival of national, ethnic and religious identities. These background processes were translated within the security and warfare arena by tendencies as: diffusion of power from governments to non-state actors worldwide, redistribution of economic and military power, ascension of alternative global and local governance institutions15 and increasing mobility of large populations, fuelled by growing social inequality. Second-order effects encompassed by new informational, cultural and political trends also involved deepening of internal social fractures, contagion of social conflicts, violent extremism, nationalist and isolationist reactions16. While the changing picture of international security environment, along with power diffusions from governments to non-state actors worldwide, challenged the initial geopolitical quests of the Ukrainian secession, new subsurface evolutions began to redraw the modern and hybrid confrontation game. Considering that the borders amid state and non-state actors have become increasingly blurred17,

13 Military Balance 2015, apud. Eve Hunter, Piret Pernik, The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare, p. 3.14 Ibidem, p. 4.15 NATO Report, Strategic Foresight Analysis, Virginia, 2017, p. 7.16 Ibidem, p. 9.17 Ibidem, p. 85.

Digitalisation has determined important consequences as rampant modernisation of traditional and fragmented societies, political mobilisation of new social groups or revival of national, ethnic and religious identities.


49



validating the hypothesis of a hybridisation of power players, assuming from now on multiple identities and several actions means, the stake of recent conflicts began to glide towards identity and cultural strategies. Taking into account the early 2000 NATO and Russia security policies, grounded dominantly on conventional tactics and using communication operations as secondary and adjuvant propaganda tools (rather sanctioning the results of confrontations than deciding the gainer), present conflicts tend to be progressively dependent on narrative strategies.

New information environment changed the features of warfare, confrontations not ending with the conclusion of hostilities, because the results may be reversed by the intervention of narratives about “who was right/wrong or won/lost”18. The need to construct interpretative structures and strategic narratives, in which audiences can identify meanings, justifications of groups and state actions or legitimacy of foreign or domestic power policies, transformed social media and digital communication in instruments of war, with similar purposes and consequences as the use of force19. The mediatisation and virtualisation of politics enhanced thus the potential of hybrid conflicts, while restyling the term’s meanings. New definition attempts concerning the hybrid phenomenon emphasise the presence of two distinctive versions of hybrid confrontations. Even if hybrid conflicts are still largely characterised by “integrated deployment of multiple military and non-military means”, the increasing relevance of additional layers as disinformation, influencing, military intimidation, employment of deception, ambiguity and deniability20 could signalise a change into the fabric and goals of hybrid warfare.

Hybrid conflict is still understood mainly as a conflict between states, but the growing relevance of disruptive, elusive operations, difficult to assign to a certain party, may open the road for a new pattern of hybrid aggression, involving non-state contenders. The discrete autonomisation of various institutional and organisational components, acting as proxies or grey flag action groups, both under

18 Thomas Elkjer Nissen, #The Weaponization Of Social Media, @Characteristics of Contemporary Conflicts, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015, p. 19.

19 Ibidem, p. 20. 20 Frans-Paul van der Putten, Minke Meijnders (eds.), Hybrid Conflict: The Roles of Russia, North

Korea and China, Dutch National Network of Safety and Security Analysts (ANV), May 2018, p. 5.

The need to construct

interpretative structures

and strategic narratives, in

which audiences can identify

meanings, justifications

of groups and state actions or legitimacy

of foreign or domestic

power policies, transformed social media

and digital communication

in instruments of war, with similar

purposes and consequences as the use of force.

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the patronage of nation-states and beyond that, raise new questions about accountability and the future development of security policies. The transformations occurred within the strategies of major security blocs, as NATO and Russia, act as a meaningful proof for these reconfigurations of hybrid warfare, hybrid threats and mostly hybrid toolbox. It is considered that the most notable aspect of the way in which Russia has lately engaged hybrid conflicts consists in shaping public opinion21. Moreover, Russia has apparently shifted from being offensive against Western political influence, detaching from previous isolationist discourses and assuming chameleonic and subversive measures. These discrete and efficient hybrid operations included seizing and controlling new communication platforms and networks, destabilising democratic processes and institutions in European societies, weakening the liberal values and most important, reviving vernacular affinities for populist and personalist leadership models22. This essential change marked the transition from an insular strategy to a diffusion move. Nevertheless, the new cultural and narrative-based approaches required the creation of complex eco-systems, bringing together non-governmental organisations, economic actors, transnational networks based on ethnic, cultural, religious or political identity vectors, and most of all, establishing media outlets and social media web. By using multiple epicentres and diffusion strings, the new stage of Russia’s hybrid responses may also trigger subsidiary consequences. Many of the contractors of its hybrid campaigns are non-state bodies, claiming partial autonomy and parallel promotion of their own strategic agendas, as the populist moves supported across Europe proved, after they secured political power. It is the case of Hungary’s privileged relations with Russia, still affected by Orban regime nationalistic drifts. Another useful example may appeal Russia’s complicated alliance with Germany23, constantly put under pressure by other competitive coalitions, as Western security partnerships.

21 Ibidem, p. 2.22 Ibidem. 23 Dmitri Trenin, Russia and Germany: From Estranged Partners to Good Neighbours, Carnegie

Moscow Center, June 2018, p. 2, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Article_Trenin_RG_2018_Eng.pdf, retrieved on 30 September 2019.

The new cultural and narrative-based approaches required the creation of complex eco-systems, bringing together non-governmental organisations, economic actors, transnational networks based on ethnic, cultural, religious or political identity vectors, and most of all, establishing media outlets and social media web. By using multiple epicentres and diffusion strings, the new stage of Russia’s hybrid responses may also trigger subsidiary consequences.


51



The second generation of hybrid threats remain hence inextricably linked to the influence of new communication environments, constantly questioning the previous patterns of identity building, association and legitimacy. New hybrid approaches, employed by Russia in Eastern and Central Europe, demonstrate the resilience of old-fashion strategic objective (expansion of influence, control of proximal space, limitation of Western influence), but translated from this time forward in innovative patterns, difficult to counteract or to discern from actions of subsidiary power players. Altogether, the information revolution started after 2010 and reaching the zenith point after 2015, contributed to the inauguration of a post-state security order, within the bounds of hybrid approaches started to compete other traditional means in assuring, projecting and exerting hegemony and power. “Masquerade of non-involvement”24, to invoke Bachmann and Gunneriusson influential phrase, recalls for an increase use of ambiguity, making difficult, if not impossible, the attribution of responsibility or efficient counter reactions. In post-Crimea years, Russia has developed robust capacities for information operations on the Internet25, Russian cyber-methods focusing rather on perception and discursive power than on support of direct military operations. Going one step further, if initial disinformation media campaigns were started by in-house sites as Russia Today and Sputniknews26, new hybrid attacks went far beyond simple manipulation of digital media, by instrumentality of fake news, trolls farms and forged public and civic spheres. However, the contemporary developments of hybrid actions may claim that the first generation of trolls and fake-news may be close to its twilights, since increasingly sophisticated means of hybrid communication enter the scene. The long-term objective of Russian influence is to weaken and divide NATO and the UE, larger populations and audiences being targeted through traditional and new media. Still, minorities, refugees, extremists, radical nationalist and various diasporic stances are used to deepen the social, national

24 Sascha Dov Bachmann, Håkan Gunneriusson, Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in the East. The Integral Nature of the Information Sphere, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 198, 2015, p. 202.

25 Ibidem, p. 202. 26 Ibidem.

In post-Crimea years, Russia

has developed robust capacities

for information operations on

the Internet, Russian

cyber-methods focusing rather

on perception and discursive

power than on support of

direct military operations.

Going one step further, if initial disinformation

media campaigns

were started by in-house sites as

Russia Today and Sputniknews,

new hybrid attacks went far

beyond simple manipulation of

digital media, by instrumentality

of fake news, trolls farms and forged

public and civic spheres.

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52No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

and cultural divides27, as covert agents of the new soft-influence doctrine. Half-controlled, half-autonomous, these local actors, trapped into an extensive network of allies and front organisations, engage into a conjugated effort for the “reconstruction of reality” and rewriting of public beliefs, legitimacy credos and support28. The externalisation of the hybrid operations and the growing segmentation of Russian strategy, alternatively adapted to national and local realities, make difficult to track the changes supervened within the geopolitical and security situation, all the more that narrative approaches could evade their expected consequences. The major effort made for controlling media narratives surrounding the events in Ukraine was pictured as pre-requisite condition of the combat29. Henceforth, subsequent hybrid clashes highlighted the ambivalence of media campaigns and their underground dynamic. For instance, Eastern and Central Europe social-media civic movements ceased under the stress of reigniting populism, while Russian propaganda sometimes nourished strong and coherent countercultures, revamping the national agendas under the auspices of modern and liberal frames. Still, the growing dependence, announced since 2014, on cyber-enabled capabilities, both in civilian and military realms, may forecast a paradigm shift. The following section investigates the evolution and patterns of Russia’s new hybrid strategy, placed under the influences of narrative approaches, which have become the epitome expression of new power confrontations.

RUSSIA AGAINST NATO. NARRATIVE-DRIVEN STRATEGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL MEDIAThe war days in Ukraine have demonstrated that cyberspace may

play a critical role in conducting narrative-driven operations, as a part of hybrid strategy, wherein “the main targets are not the machines or networks, but the minds of the people”30. The Internet and the social media have the ability to multiply the information at high speed

27 Geir Hågen Karlsen, Divide and Rule: Ten Lessons about Russian Political Influence Activities in Europe, Palgrave Communications, vol. 5, 2019, p. 2.

28 Ibidem, p. 202.29 Ibidem. 30 Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili, Sanda Svetoka, Strategic Communication and the Social Media in

the Russia Ukraine Conflict, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, 2018, p. 105.

The externalisation of the hybrid operations and the growing segmentation of Russian strategy, alternatively adapted to national and local realities, make difficult to track the changes supervened within the geopolitical and security situation, all the more that narrative approaches could evade their expected consequences. The major effort made for controlling media narratives surrounding the events in Ukraine was pictured as pre-requisite condition of the combat.


53



and significantly lower costs, which made them available for propaganda use, information warfare or influence operations31, ever since the new virtual arena of communication was established. Moreover, the concept of social cyber-attack has been brought into prominence by the growing popularity of social networks, its employment during the Ukrainian crisis demonstrating the power of highly dynamic contents and the inherent difficulties in pursuing the genuine sources of digital news. The social cyber-attacks have as general purpose the manipulation of a society perception and values, generating in the same time span disruptive behaviours, and they should be addressed in broader terms of Psychological Operations tradition32. PSYOPS constitutes a classical military activity aiming to influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of target populations, often consisting in civilians or foreign audiences. PSYOPS objectives were traditionally reached by the instrumentality of complex operations as the release of a master narrative, contaminating the public debates, the use of symbols or mythology landmarks and the exploitation of cultural biases and group identities.

In PSYOPS casuistry, the influence upon a certain target audience is achieved by spreading rumours, using three major manipulation patterns33: hate rumours exploit the ingrained dislikes and prejudices of the target populations, fear rumours make appeal to a human tendency to validate the worst-case scenario, while hope rumours respond to the latent wishes for a favourable turn of events and conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the proposed taxonomy presents itself as reductionistic, offering yet a comprehensive image upon the main stimuli engaged in the creation and control of digital crowds, by the intervention of narrative structures. It remains important to stress that the ascent of the narrative equations of hybrid aggression was potentiated by subsidiary structural facts as the lacunar and sometimes disconnected form of textual messages (posts, status updates, #tags, memes, and comments), the trust-based experience of social networks, imitating the image of genuine like-minded groups, and the opportunity to assume false identities for network users

31 Ibidem, p. 105.32 Ibidem.33 Ibidem.

In PSYOPS casuistry, the

influence upon a certain target

audience is achieved by

spreading rumours, using

three major manipulation

patterns: hate rumours exploit

the ingrained dislikes and

prejudices of the target

populations, fear rumours make

appeal to a human tendency

to validate the worst-case

scenario, while hope rumours

respond to the latent wishes

for a favourable turn of events

and conflict resolution.

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54No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

and influencers34. Following Rebecca Goolsby broad definition, social cyber-attacks involve crowd manipulation and hysteria propagation, ending in chaotic mass behaviour, escalation of rumour, confusion, panic and uncontrolled violence35. Acting under false pretences or anonymously, the designers of the social cyber-attacks may release a new and distinctive signal into the social media environment, or could capture and distort an existing signal36. The attacks may concern the legitimacy of a combative group (the example of the Syrian insurgency), the validation of a fatal scenario (the menace of foreign intervention and civil war in the context of social media-driven Arab Springs) or the confirmation of the presumptive winning force, within unclear and frozen conflicts situations (Transnistria remains an ideographic sample for forged or disputed combative success). Since Russia is no stranger to false flag intervention strategies in the Balkans and its near vicinity, the spreading of rumours and use of narrative covert operations was exploited long before the advent of digitalisation.

However, the social age of the Internet disclosed new strategic opportunities, mostly derived from its de-territorialised nature, non-attributable and undelayed impact, and universal meaning. The recent times social cyber-attacks were directed under narrative formulas, insomuch as actions of pro-Russian “Cyber Berkut” (КиберБеркут) or its nemesis, the Ukrainian “Cyber Hundred” (Киберсотня) demonstrated during the Crimean crisis37. Even if the mentioned unconventional action groups were made famous by their successful attacks against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE), their core activities were linked to the narrative aggressions. The Cyber Berkut conducted a massive cyber operation during the Ukrainian parliamentary elections from October 2014, hacking electronic advertising billboards in order to promote videos depicting the important Ukrainian leaders as “war criminals”, “oligarchs”, and “traitors”38. The structure of master narrative was in this very case

34 Ibidem.35 Rebecca Goolsby, On Cybersecurity, Crowdsourcing, and Social Cyber-Attack, Policy Memo

Series, vol. 1, 2013, p. 4.36 Ibidem, p. 105.37 Ibidem, p. 106. 38 Ibidem.

The social age of the Internet disclosed new strategic opportunities, mostly derived from its de-territorialised nature, non-attributable and undelayed impact, and universal meaning. The recent times social cyber-attacks were directed under narrative formulas, insomuch as actions of pro-Russian “Cyber Berkut” (КиберБеркут) or its nemesis, the Ukrainian “Cyber Hundred” (Киберсотня) demonstrated during the Crimean crisis.


55



based on a simplification and isolation hypothesis. The audience, simply defined under the label of “Ukrainian citizens”39 (the releaser intentionally ignoring the strong ethnic, cultural and political divides), was turned against politicians, using a potpourri of stereotypes. The function of the master narrative was to engage further rumours, distortions and concerns, exploiting already deep-rotted psychological apprehensions. By invoking the “futility of elections”40, the maleficent expression of Western influence, the endanger of chronically civil war, or the urge to action against government and deputies, the master narrative aimed to give a comprehensive answer to fear, hope and hate rumours, circulated already within its target audiences. The message was issued afterward on social media, generating strong debates, increasing audiences’ cleavages and shadowing the real setting-agenda of the electoral moment.

The cyber equation of narrative operations reiterates old-fashioned manipulation theories, but the virtual space may engage new subsidiary opportunities such as snowballing (the initial message is propagated without supplementary costs, the sources fading into the background), the majority illusion (the audiences are constantly manipulated to believe that a specific opinion and perspective constitutes the dominant social conviction) or the increasingly popular snapshot technique, where the public has the delusion of real time participation into the event.

The Ukrainian case put under debate the traditional strategic communication solutions by blending cyber-attacks, digital intelligence operations and classical narrative manipulation campaigns, the release of a supposed intercepted phone conversation between the US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Geoffrey Pyatt, the US Ambassador to Ukraine in early 2014, serving as a living proof for this new hybrid approach. The allegedly leaked conversation revealed a presumed Western intervention upon Ukrainian post-Yanukovych transition, highlighting also strong biases against possible successors from the Opposition41. The apparently bugged conversation was released

39 Ibidem. 40 Ibidem. 41 Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call, BBC News, 7 February 2014, https://

www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957, retrieved on 25 September 2019.

Invoking the “futility of

elections”, the maleficent expression of Western

influence, the endanger of

chronically civil war, or the urge

to action against government and

deputies, the master narrative

aimed to give a comprehensive

answer to fear, hope and hate rumours,

circulated already within

its target audiences. The

message was issued afterward on social media,

generating strong debates,

increasing audiences’

cleavages and shadowing the

real setting-agenda of

the electoral moment.

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56No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

on Youtube also referring to the growing tensions amid the EU and NATO. In defiance to the authenticity sham, on which the scenario was built, the case involves rather a narrative approach. The tailored narrative aims in this situation to appeal latent anti-Western and conspiracy rumours, acting as a catalyst for later developments of collective perception and legitimacy attribution. During the Ukrainian conflict, Russia made use of complex narrative scripts, disseminated simultaneously on traditional and new media, by the instrumentality of “breaking” and eye-witness’ accounts, these venues mutually reinforcing the connections amid older and younger audiences42. The manipulation and distribution of purported atrocities committed by the Ukrainian army had the role to alienate the general audience from the state’s institutional identity and to create a community fracture. By circulating fake news and false testimonies about tortured civilians, organ trafficking, burning crops, child soldiers and use of heavy weapons against civilians43, the concerted social-media campaigns influenced for a long time span the target population behaviour and reactions.

As a fact, the Romanian reader may find some of these counterfeited stories peculiarly disturbing, as the early post-revolutionary months issued a strong resemblance and similar narrative techniques, disseminated at that time in newspapers and television. Going back to the Ukrainian scene, new coined epithets, as “ruscist” (combining the terms “fascist” and “Russian”)44 proved the ascent of hybrid communication aggressions in other social media cells, beyond Facebook and Vkontakte45, insomuch as some analyses of Twitter posts from 2014 confirmed. Social media hoaxes passed in many cases unsanctioned, the waves of indignations and false confirmations increasing the credibleness of the master narrative. The list of rumours divulged through the instrumentality of social media during the Ukrainian conflict grew to be quite long, key narratives including the creation of concentration camps, under the direct orders of the European Union and the Kyiv government, the confiscation of private

42 Ibidem, p. 106. 43 Ibidem, p. 107. 44 Ibidem. 45 Russian social media networking, imitating the Facebook platform interface and structure.

During the Ukrainian conflict, Russia made use of complex narrative scripts, disseminated simultaneously on traditional and new media, by the instrumentality of “breaking” and eye-witness’ accounts, these venues mutually reinforcing the connections amid older and younger audiences.


57



property, the pressure of right-wing guerrillas, hiding into the woods, or the future nationalisation of private property46. The exacerbated rumours were placed in sharp contrast with the counter-campaign of “Polite People”47, supporting the Russian occupation of Crimea. The two pictures were in fact part of a layered master narrative opposing different reality translations. The complicated train of events preceding Crimea’s annexation included nevertheless the presence of a strong Russian affinity48, rooted in decade-long interactions and community building processes, but the extreme polarisation of the two images was purportedly fabricated.

The development and resolution of Crimea’s case offered considerable evidences that social media was from then on extensively used to support military and influence action on the ground, the new hybrid cyber strategies employing concomitantly attacks upon infrastructures and the psychological influence of target audiences. Since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has proved the unquestionable alteration in the structure of modern war, the lines between cyber and information offensive becoming also blurred, an important question tends to emerge. What has become the stake of post-Crimean narrative hybrid operations, engaged by Russia and not only, in the framework of a multi-polar, post-national and increasingly instable regional picture?

Psychological Warfare opportunities, means and impact have changed the dissemination of information under formulas of narrative structures in order to achieve effects such as shape, inform, manipulate, expose, diminish, promote, coerce and deter, bringing sometimes paradoxical results49. The methods of influence utilised in social media sphere may be divided in two main categories: overt, implying creation of official websites, accounts, channels, forums, and covert, making use of fake identities, botnets and trolling. Nevertheless, the arsenal al social media started to combine, the blend between the open means and the dark paradigm of covert operations creating new security dilemmas. Russia’s narrative propaganda in the Ukrainian scenario

46 Ibidem, p. 107.47 Ibidem.48 Iulia Anghel, Russia and NATO Hybrid Clash: History and Legacies, Proceedings of Strategies XXI,

The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment, Florian Cîrciumaru, Mirela Atanasiu (eds.), Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare“Carol I”, 2018, p. 27.

49 Sanda Svetoka, Social media as Tool of Hybrid Warfare, p. 17.

The methods of influence utilised

in social media sphere may be divided in two

main categories: overt, implying

creation of official websites,

accounts, channels,

forums, and covert, making

use of fake identities,

botnets and trolling.

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was presented as an undisputed success. Still, the query persists. Was it meant to be? NATO does not officially foresee the use of covert or clandestine operations to influence attitudes, behaviours and engagement of civil audiences, beyond the limits of military campaigns. For NATO PSYOPS remain defined as “planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives”50.

Meantime, undemocratic players or simply non-state bodies make use of covert cyber operations, in order to achieve miscellaneous economic, strategic and political purposes51. What should be NATO’s response in front of this proliferation of hybrid threats, originated in communication realm? The answer may lay at the bottom of digitalisation-globalisation phenomena. The subtle and irreversible change occurred within the nature of nation-states under the pressure of digital modernity created parallel association and community structures. The mushrooming of NGOs, the autonomisation of media outlets and the enlargement of economic transnational networks or the growing activism of diasporic stances enable them to act like proxies in favour of democratisation projects or at least to make more complicated the classical influence and manipulation operations. Even when these new emerged actors do not act in synergy with security providers and real time hegemons, their very existence may hinder the efficiency of cyber warfare, especially in its cultural and psychological equations. The enclavisation of the Eastern European youth within the bounds of former traditional and parochial societies or the reignited radical affinities in the peripheral spaces of well-established Western democracies are for sure the symptoms of a divided landscape. The decline of classical unidirectional mass communication and the rise of parallel information and communication networks stimulated furthermore an alienation process, whose beneficiaries are still cast in shadow.

50 NATO Standard, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, February 2019, p. 118, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/797323/doctrine_nato_conduct_of_ops_ajp_3.pdf, retrieved on 25 September 2019.

51 Ibidem, p. 17.

The enclavisation of the Eastern European youth within the bounds of former traditional and parochial societies or the reignited radical affinities in the peripheral spaces of well-established Western democracies are for sure the symptoms of a divided landscape. The decline of classical unidirectional mass communication and the rise of parallel information and communication networks stimulated furthermore an alienation process, whose beneficiaries are still cast in shadow.


59



Against this background, the ascent of non-state and post-state bodies will determine new hybrid threats in the field of cyber-attacks, so much the more technology-driven propaganda conducted to the empowerment of malign groups and individuals. It remains clear that the major security players will not ignore these tendencies, many of the new digital challengers in the field of strategic communication being already placed under the tutelage of classical power structures. In spite of that, some of the “troll armies”, “social bots” and “fake users” may originate beyond the lines of what Russian theorist Igor Panarin calls “information special forces”52. The externalisation of hybrid cyber operations intensifies the risks of misuse and misappropriation.

In Ukraine’s case, Russia confronted a well-structured Western offensive, grounded on clear objectives such as preservation of democracy in the region, protection of national borders and regional status quo and limitations of strategic pressures exerted against NATO. The army of proxies and subcontractors faced a common security agenda, but it may not be the case in other less polarised scenarios. Another recurrent debate topic asks if NATO should use the same unconventional panoply, giving the fact that cyber security has become a hot topic on international agenda.

The “Panarin School”53, built around the writings of Russian scholar Igor Panarin, claims that Western forces, including NATO security alliance, developed and implemented “information aggression” operations ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “coloured revolutions” wave and the Middle East Springs being also incriminated as expressions of cultural propaganda54. The basic terms engaged by this perspective upon information warfare include: social control, social manoeuvring, for targeting and dividing special audiences, information manipulation, disinformation and not lastly lobbying55. Actually, Russian criticism against westernisation processes generated adjacent queries about setting the limits of narrative-driven operations. What should be considered as a cyber-attack, derived from PSYOPS panoply, and what should be labelled as an open campaign in favour

52 Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare. The Crimean Operation, a Case study, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, May 2014, p. 14.

53 Ibidem, p. 15.54 Ibidem.55 Ibidem.

The “Panarin School”, built

around the writings of

Russian scholar Igor Panarin,

claims that Western forces, including NATO

security alliance, developed and

implemented “information aggression”

operations ever since the

collapse of the Soviet Union, the “coloured

revolutions” wave and the

Middle East Springs being

also incriminated as expressions

of cultural propaganda.

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of a cultural credo? Can we speak about narrative operations that could evade the hybrid label? The prolongation of the Russia vs NATO informal warfare is strongly connected to the reconfiguration of power balance in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Still, most of the analyses dedicated to Russia vs NATO hybrid confrontation stop on the fringes of the Ukrainian study case. However, later phenomena as imitating grass-roots movements using social media vector (known as “astroturfing”56) or distorting communication and public consensus by releasing rumours may call for reflection. On this account, the dynamic of recent days hybrid confrontations should be addressed in the context of the multiplication of the actors involved in circulating and building influencing narratives, channelling the meanings of already complicated topics like nation, sovereignty, identity or legitimacy.

CONCLUSIONS The hybrid war concept has undergone major transformation

during the past decades. Originally coined in the early 2000 in order to describe the multi-modal activities carried out by a non-state actor against a traditional state body, as the Chechen struggle against Russia proved through the instrumentality of guerrilla tactics, blended with coordinate military operations57, the hybrid warfare meanings have gradually evolved to extremely complex varieties. The Israeli war against Lebanon from 2006 revealed the image of a non-state actor, Hezbollah, employing successively terrorist activities and high-tech military capabilities58, and measures traditionally attributed to nation-states, as extended diplomatic and communication campaigns. Hezbollah potential in imitating the behaviour and actions of a classical state-actor opened influential debates related to the future of hybrid approaches. Incrementally, the hybrid solutions were transferring from the side of non-state bodies towards classical security actors and further to the use of global hegemons. Certainly, the Ukrainian casuistry demonstrated how hybrid war became associated with state behaviour, NATO labelling the Russian methods in Crimea

56 Sanda Svetoka, Social Media as Tool of Hybrid Warfare, p. 27.57 Elinor Sloan, Hegemony, Power and Hybrid War, Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute,

Berlin, 2018, p. 2.58 Ibidem.

The Israeli war against Lebanon from 2006 revealed the image of a non-state actor, Hezbollah, employing successively terrorist activities and high-tech military capabilities, and measures traditionally attributed to nation-states, as extended diplomatic and communication campaigns.


61



as ones of hybrid approach59. Since then scholars and analysts consider hybrid conflicts presuming the existence of state-led activity that incorporates non-state actors and other components60.Yet, the recent developments of hybrid challenges may disclose further evolutions of the hybrid toolkit and expansion of its gallery of purchasers. Not only that a myriad of non-state malign and benign bodies recall the use of hybrid operations, mostly targeting communication sphere, in order to achieve political, economic or strategic dominance, but the state-led security policies may be put under scrutiny. Russia new cultural propaganda and influencing measures exceed the limitations of original hybrid reactions, and at the same time offer essential autonomy to adjacent players. The reconstruction of a Russian cultural heartland may be a security objective for sure, but who will make sense by this strategic legacy is still unclear. Moreover, the hybridisation and fragmentation of state-actors remain conclusively based on the opportunities and vulnerabilities arising from the new virtual communication environments. Miscellaneous audiences could act as pressure vectors, influencing and conditioning the actions, policies and strategies of governments, while the state’s security institutions and economic organisations may also experience the revelation of autonomy. The growing distances between centres and peripheries, and the polyphony of the new rhetoric arena enhanced the internal borders and surpassed the national and physical boundaries. New equations of identity, solidarity and association were made available for the use of unanticipated diverse malign and benign actors, their empowerment raising complex questions upon further evolution of security and democracy in the region.

As Bachmann wisely concluded61, traditional combat is here to stay, no matter what sophisticated means of actions could be provided by social networks, media outlets or political influencers. Any doubt in this matter may inflict dramatic costs, as the 2019 war timeline already proved. The growing interest manifested by terrorist groups, radical activists or separatists and anti-state forces for defence and military technologies demonstrates beyond any doubt that narrative-driven

59 Ibidem.60 Ibidem.61 Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Håkan Gunneriusson, op. cit., p. 79.

Russia new cultural

propaganda and influencing

measures exceed the limitations of

original hybrid reactions, and at

the same time offer essential

autonomy to adjacent

players. The reconstruction

of a Russian cultural

heartland may be a security objective for

sure, but who will make sense by this strategic

legacy is still unclear.

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operations are, at least for the moment, just supportive measure for war and peace. Nonetheless, contemporary culture is trapped under the siege of major changes, markets turning into conversations62, states acting as “imagined communities”63, image dominating the new language syntax. In light of these considerations, the new generation of digital crowds will be one of hybrid confrontations, governed by heterogeneous publics and multi-modal older and newer hegemons.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, NATO Standard, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of

Operations, February 2019.2. ***, NATO Report. Strategic Foresight Analysis, Virginia, 2017.3. ***, Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call, BBC News,

7 February 2014.4. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, UK, 2006.5. Iulia Anghel, Russia and NATO Hybrid Clash: History and Legacies,

Proceedings of Strategies XXI, The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment, Florian Cîrciumaru, Mirela Atanasiu (eds.), Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2018.

6. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Håkan Gunneriusson, Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in the East. The Integral Nature of the Information Sphere, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 198, 2015.

7. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Håkan Gunneriusson, Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security, Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, 2015.

8. Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare. The Crimean Operation, a Case study, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, May 2014.

9. Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century. The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Virginia, USA, 2007.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, USA, 2007.

11. Eve Hunter, Pernik Piret, The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare, International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, April 2015.

12. Geir Hågen Karlsen, Divide and Rule: Ten Lessons about Russian Political Influence Activities in Europe, Palgrave Communications, volume 5, 2019.

13. Valery Gerasimov, Ценность науки в предвидении, Voenno-promyshlennyy Kuryer, 27 February-5 March, 2013.

62 Rick Levine et alia, The Cluetrain Manifesto, Basic Books, New York, USA, 2011, p. 75.63 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, 2006, p. 7.


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14. Rebecca Goolsby, On Cybersecurity, Crowdsourcing, and Social Cyber-Attack, Policy Memo Series, vol. 1, 2013.

15. Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili, Sanda Svetoka, Strategic Communication and the Social Media in the Russia Ukraine Conflict, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, 2018.

16. Rick Levine, Christopher Locke, Doc Searls, David Weinberger, The Cluetrain Manifesto, Basic Books, New York, USA, 2011.

17. Thomas Elkjer Nissen, #The Weaponization Of Social Media, @Characteristics of Contemporary Conflicts, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, 2015.

18. Thomas Elkjer Nissen, Social Media’s Role in Hybrid Strategies, NATO Strategic Centre for Excellence in Communication, Riga, 2019.

19. Peter Pomerantsev, Michael Weiss, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, The Institute of Modern Russia, New York, 2014.

20. Elinor Sloan, Hegemony, Power and Hybrid War, Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, Berlin, 2018.

21. Sanda Svetoka, Social Media as Tool of Hybrid Warfare, NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence, Riga, 2016.

22. Dmitri Trenin, Russia and Germany: From Estranged Partners to Good Neighbors, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2018.

23. Frans-Paul Van der Putten, Minke Meijnders (eds.), Hybrid Conflict: The Roles of Russia, North Korea and China, Dutch National Network of Safety and Security Analysts (ANV), May 2018.

6464No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

THE TWO CANALS THE TWO CANALS AND NATO’S WILD CARDS AND NATO’S WILD CARDS

IN THE PONTO-BALTIC ISTHMUSIN THE PONTO-BALTIC ISTHMUS

Adrian-Vasile POPAPhD candidate, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest

The Russian Federation’s recent buildup of A2/AD forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, two major infrastructure developments ‒ Kanal Istanbul in case of the Black Sea, respectively Vistula Spit canal in case of the Baltic Sea ‒ may represent a game changer for the security environment in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus in the near future. This paper discusses the Central and Eastern Europe countries driving narrative behind the expected operationalisation of these two canals and outlines their potential contribution to NATO’s enforcement of credible security guarantees in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.

Keywords: Baltic Sea, Kanal Istanbul, NATO, the Russian Federation, Vistula Spit Canal.


65

The Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic IsthmusThe Two Canals and NATO’s Wild Cards in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus


INTRODUCTIONNowadays, the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus is the hotspot where the

Russian Federation’s strategic Rimland clashes with NATO’s Eastern flank. Indeed, this is in general terms the space whose domination is the first key step for the ultimate world domination as referred to it by both the British strategist Halford Mackinder – who initially called it the geographical pivot of history1 and later Heartland2 – and the American strategist Nicholas Spykman – who identified it as one of the most important parts of his Rimland theory3.

The Great Power status cannot be fully-claimed by the Russian Federation unless it ensures its full-access to open seas. The loss of hegemonic influence on Central and Eastern European countries once they joined NATO was assumed by the Russian Federation as a never-again compromise inherent in the process of transition from the USSR. Further shrinking of its shores in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus could not be any more tolerated by the Russian Federation. Indeed, depicting the outcome of the Cold War as a victory for the Atlantists amid an alleged betrayal of Mikhail Gorbachev that lead to the self-destruction of the tellurocratic power4, Aleksandr Dugin appraises Boris Eltsin’s decision of August 1999 to appoint Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation5. Indeed, it was during Vladimir Putin’s leadership when the Russian Federation strongly denied through hardcore military interventions Ukraine and Georgia’s aspirations for NATO membership.

1 Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographic Journal XXIII, no. 4 (1904), pp. 421-437.

2 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1919, pp. 92-95.

3 Nicholas John Spykman, “Frontiers, Security and International Organization”, Geographical Review 32, no. 3, 1942, pp. 441-442.

4 Aleksandr Dugin, Last War of the World-Island, London: Arktos Media Ltd., 2015, pp. 38-40.5 Ibid, p. 70.

The loss of hegemonic

influence on Central

and Eastern European

countries once they joined NATO

was assumed by the Russian

Federation as a never-again compromise

inherent in the process of

transition from the USSR.

66

Adrian-Vasile POPAAdrian-Vasile POPA

66No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

The following lines are going to discuss both the Russian Federation’s re-emergence as a potential threat in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus and the Central and Eastern European countries driving narrative behind the expected operationalisation of two major infrastructure developments – Kanal Istanbul in the case of the Black Sea, respectively Vistula Spit canal in the case of the Baltic Sea – that may ultimately represent NATO’s wild cards for enforcing credible security guarantees in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S RE-EMERGENCE AS A POTENTIAL THREAT IN THE PONTO-BALTIC ISTHMUSThe Russian Federation’s re-emergence as a potential threat is

coupled nowadays with an increasing confronting rhetoric comprising allegations of airspace violations6 and even incidents limiting the freedom of navigation7 in the Black and Baltic Seas. This might not be a surprise though for those who have thoroughly followed the geostrategic evolutions in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.

On the one hand, the role of the Black Sea as the Southern part of both the Russian Federation’s strategic Rimland and NATO’s Eastern flank is modeled by the interests pursued in this regional security complex by the Great Powers. Over the centuries to date, the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea has been based on the role that this region played simultaneously as a ‘connecting bridge’ and ‘border’ between former powers and empires and as a ‘buffer’ and ‘transit’ zone between Europe and Asia8.

6 See The Moscow Times, Russia Says It Intercepted U.S., Swedish Spy Jets Over Baltic Sea, 11 June 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/06/11/russia-says-it-intercepted-us-swedish-spy-jets-over-baltic-sea-a65956, retrieved on 20 June 2019; Radio Free Europe, Estonia Says Russian Plane Again Violates Airspace, 21 June 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-russian-plane-violates-airspace/29310815.html, retrieved on 22 June 2019.

7 See BBC, Russia-Ukraine Tensions Rise after Kerch Strait Ship Capture, 26 November 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46340283, retrieved on 18 June 2019; David B. Larter, Russian military ‘harassed’ US-flagged merchant ship in the Baltic ahead of exercises, Defence News, 27 June 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/06/27/russian-military-harassed-us-flagged-merchant-ship-in-the-baltic-ahead-of-exercises/, retrieved on 18 June 2019.

8 George Cristian Maior, Noul aliat. Regândirea politicii de apărare a României la începutul secolului XXI, 2nd edition, Editura RAO, București, 2013, p. 73.

Over the centuries to date, the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea has been based on the role that this region played simultaneously as a ‘connecting bridge’ and ‘border’ between former powers and empires and as a ‘buffer’ and ‘transit’ zone between Europe and Asia.


67



In the twentieth century, the Euro-Atlantic thalassocratic powers referred to the Black Sea as almost a ‘Russian lake’, being a genuine power projection platform for the Soviet naval forces into the Mediterranean Sea9. However, the disintegration of the USSR has altered the Black Sea power relations as emerging states have diminished the shore area of the newly-formed Russian Federation and further oriented their foreign policy towards better relations with the West.

The Wider Black Sea Region evolved into a key-component of the Euro-Atlantic strategic defence. In this sense, while NATO formed and strengthened the Southern part of its Eastern flank, the United States multiplied its military bases in the Wider Black Sea Region by using the infrastructure of the riparian allies and partners ‒ for example, since the Cold War in Turkey ‒ Incirlik Air Base and Izmir Air Station; but also nowadays in Romania ‒ Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, Babadag training base, Smârdan training area, Cincu training area and the AEGIS Ashore missile defence facility in Deveselu; Bulgaria – Aytos Logistics Center, Novo Selo Range, Bezmer Air Base and Graf Ignatievo Air Base; Ukraine - Ochakov Naval Base; and Georgia ‒ a potential joint development of Vaziani military aerodrome.

Overall, probably the most important position in terms of security for the Wider Black Sea Region remains the Bosphorus-Dardanelles system, which facilitates sea-going navigation to the Planetary Ocean. Having been signed in 1936, the Montreux Convention sets the navigation rules through the Straits for both merchant vessels and warships in time of peace and in time of war10. The Montreux Convention has established the Turkish control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits and has limited in terms of tonnage and stationing the naval presence of non-riparian states at the Black Sea. However, the Russian Federation’s destabilising actions in the region, culminating with the annexation of Crimea, transformed the Black Sea into a two-hegemon regional security complex. Recent increase

9 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Marea tablă de șah, Editura Universul Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p. 48.10 For full details regarding the provisions of the Montreux Convention, see League of Nations,

“Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, with Annexes and Protocol. Signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936”, Treaty Series CLXXHI, No. 4001-4032, pp. 213-241 (1936).

Having been signed in 1936,

the Montreux Convention sets

the navigation rules through the Straits for

both merchant vessels and

warships in time of peace and in

time of war.

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in the US focus on the Wider Black Sea Region suggests its desire to alter the current status quo by contesting the anachronic provisions of the Montreux Convention, especially in terms of the access and stationing in the Black Sea of warships belonging to the non-riparian states. This potential development would fully-ensure the security guarantees offered to its allies and partners in the region. The operationalisation of Kanal Istanbul, the man-made canal sought to be completed by Ankara in 2023 as a celebration of the centenary of the Turkish republic, might be a chance for the alteration of the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea as it would probably require the renegotiation of the current provisions of the Montreux Convention.

On the other hand, representing the Northern part of both the Russian Federation’s strategic Rimland and NATO’s Eastern flank, the Baltic Sea is also highly-important in terms of geostrategy. As Michael Peck put it, in the Baltic region, “geography is not on NATO’s side. The Baltic States are on Russia’s western border, near Russian bases, supplies and reinforcements, while NATO forces are mostly in Western Europe and the United States (…) which means that NATO cannot count on relieving the Baltic nations before Russia had time to entrench”11. In addition, the shallow waters and narrow straits of the Baltic make it easy for the Russian Federation to lay mines and hard for NATO to maneuver warships (…) making it impossible to support the tiny Baltic states in case of a war12. Not ultimately, as Robbin Laird argued, “the Russians with the advantage of having significant Russian minorities in the Baltics (as a result of the dissolution of the USSR) can play a probing game similar to Ukraine if they deem this necessary or useful”13.

11 Michael Peck, Want to Stop Russia from Invading the Baltic States? Turn Poland Into a Military Powerhouse, The National Interest, March 23, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/want-stop-russia-invading-baltic-states-turn-poland-military-powerhouse-48692, retrieved on 24 June 2019.

12 Sabine Siebold, Germany strengthens Baltic naval alliance to counter Russian buildup, Reuters, October 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-baltic-military/germany-strengthens-baltic-naval-alliance-to-counter-russian-buildup-idUSKCN1N0287, retrieved on 23 June 2019).

13 Robbin Laird, European Direct Defense: The Case of the Baltics, Second Line of Defence, January 25, 2019, https://sldinfo.com/2019/01/european-direct-defense-the-case-of-the-baltics/, retrieved on 23 June 2019.

The Baltic Sea, as a potential area of Russian influence, is indissolubly linked to the Kaliningrad enclave ‒ located on its shores between Poland and Lithuania.


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The Baltic Sea, as a potential area of Russian influence, is indissolubly linked to the Kaliningrad enclave ‒ located on its shores between Poland and Lithuania. Over time, Kaliningrad was a strategically important area, with the Russian fleet stationing in this area from where an offensive against the West could be launched anytime14. The Kaliningrad enclave holds currently the Russian Federation’s only uncontested European maritime port that does not freeze in winter – except for the Port of Sevastopol whose annexation by the Russian Federation is highly-disputed – allowing it to keep its borders secured. After the United States announced that elements of its missile defence shield will be installed near Kaliningrad, the Russian Federation has endowed its Baltic fleet with high-tech capabilities15. Indeed, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might be questioned by the Russian Federation in the near future. In this sense, there is no surprise that this year’s Baltic Operations naval drill headed by the US reborn 2nd Fleet, with some exercises being staged off the coast of Kalinigrad16, was counter-maneuvered by the Russian Federation through a similar training operation in the area17.

As a consequence, only through a strengthened presence at the Baltic Sea could NATO at least balance potential Russian aggressions while fully-ensuring the security guarantees offered to its members. Indeed, the 2016 Warsaw summit represented a turning point in the perception of NATO vis-à-vis the defence of its members at the Baltic Sea. As Iulia Joja and Octavian Manea remarked, “though in the aftermath of the Crimea annexation the Alliance promised to increase readiness in Europe and consolidate defense on the Eastern flank, the 2016 Warsaw focused only on the Baltic Sea.

14 Alexander Diener and Joshua Hagen, “Geopolitics of the Kaliningrad Exclave and Enclave. Russian and EU Perspective”, Eurasian Geography and Economics 52, no. 4 (July 2011), p. 574.

15 BBC, Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers NATO, 22 November 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38070201, retrieved on 22 June 2019.

16 Carlos Munoz, U.S. Navy Sends Message to Russia with 2nd Fleet’s Baltic Operations, The Washington Times, 22 May 2019,https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/22/navy-2nd-fleet-sends-message-russia-baltops-drill/, retrieved on 24 June 2019.

17 Alexander Prokopenko and Roman Goncharenko, NATO and Russia: Maneuvers and Countermaneuvers in the Baltic Sea, Deutsche Welle, 14 June 2019 https://www.dw.com/en/nato-and-russia-maneuvers-and-countermaneuvers-in-the-baltic-sea/a-49188875, retrieved on 24 June 2019.

Poland ‒ NATO’s main defence

pillar in the Northern part of the Eastern flank – proved

that is ready to complement the Alliance’s efforts

by conducting national security

projects aimed at strengthening

its position in relation with

the Russian Federation.

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The differentiation between the Northern (Baltic Sea) and the Southern part (Black Sea) of the Eastern flank was conceptualised as ‘enhanced’ versus ‘tailored’ forward presence and translated into four battalions of Western combat troops on the ground and the continuous rotational presence in the North, while only training and staff units, no Western framework nations and intermittent rotational presence in the South”18.

In addition, Poland ‒ NATO’s main defence pillar in the Northern part of the Eastern flank – proved that is ready to complement the Alliance’s efforts by conducting national security projects aimed at strengthening its position in relation with the Russian Federation. Indeed, after the 2015 inauguration of the liquefied natural gas plant in Swinoujscie19, four more major projects are expected to be operationalised on the Polish territory in this respect in the near future – i.e. the Baltic Pipe infrastructure project20, Vistula Spit canal21, the Central Transport Hub22 and the American military base known as Fort Trump23.

Overall, facing the aforementioned prospective challenging geostrategic context in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, NATO’s Eastern flank countries cannot wait for the ‘great game’ between the West and the Russian Federation to reach an outcome, but they rather are meant to act pro-actively in order to ensure their security and prosperity.

18 Iulia Joja and Octavian Manea, 2018 NATO Summit: Finally a Focus on the Black Sea?, Real Clear Defense, 11 July 2018, https://www. realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/11/2018_nato_summit_finally_a_focus_on_the_ black_sea_113596.html, retrieved on 25 June 2019.

19 See Radio Poland, Świnoujście gas terminal officially opened, 12 October 2015, http://www.thenews.pl/1/12/Artykul/224582,Swinoujscie-gas-terminal-officially-opened, retrieved on 25 June 2019.

20 See Natalia Konarzewska, “Baltic Pipe to Cut Poland’s Gas Dependence on Russia”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 69 (May 2019).

21 See The Telegraph, “Poland to build canal in order to avoid ships passing through Russian waters”, 13 October 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/13/poland-to-build-canal-in-order-to-avoid-ships-passing-through-ru/, retrieved on 25 June 2019.

22 See Poland In, Central Transport Hub to include 1,600km of new railway lines, 25 March 2019, https://polandin.com/41899932/central-transport-hub-to-include-1600km-of-new-railway-lines, retrieved on 25 June 2019.

23 See William J. Hennigan, Fort Trump? The Pentagon Takes a Step Toward Establishing Base in Poland, Time, 14 March 2019, https://time.com/5551061/poland-military-base-fort-trump/, retrieved on 25 June 2019).

NATO’s Eastern flank countries cannot wait for the ‘great game’ between the West and the Russian Federation to reach an outcome, but they rather are meant to act pro-actively in order to ensure their security and prosperity.


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KANAL ISTANBUL AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATOThe official argument for the construction of this canal of about 50

km in length running parallel to the Bosphorus is to divert the critical volume of the maritime traffic from the Straits that have become some of the world’s busiest choke points. Apart from being an initiative directed to ensure the safety of navigation – the Straits are notorious for maritime accidents as over 140 occurred since 200624 –, Kanal Istabul would allow the Turkish authorities to charge the shippers a transit fee for crossing it, a limited provision in this sense being available nowadays to Turkey when managing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits.

Turkey has not adopted yet an official position regarding the inclusion of Kanal Istanbul under the provisions of the Montreux Convention. As a consequence, two options can be considered in the case of Kanal Istanbul when taking into account its potential for the emergence of a NATO wild card for enforcing credible security guarantees at the Black Sea.

First, the Turkish authorities might not introduce Kanal Istanbul under the provisions of the Montreux Convention. In this sense, Binali Yıldırım, the last holder of the position of Turkish Prime Minister until the recent government system changes in Turkey from parliamentary to executive presidency, declared in January 2018 that Kanal Istanbul would not be subject to the Montreux Convention25. As a consequence, in this case the deployment of naval assets in the Black Sea by NATO non-riparian states would be committed only to the jurisdiction imposed by Turkey and not to a binding international agreement as of now. Not ultimately, this strategic option would allow NATO’s enforcement of credible security guarantees at the Black Sea through a permanent fleet. However, the crystallisation of this option is limited

24 Mehmet Ogutcu, Revising the Montreux Convention, Hurriyet Daily News, 12 April 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/mehmet-ogutcu/revising-the-montreux-convention-130148, retrieved on 20 June 2019.

25 Apud Helene Franchineau, How Istanbul’s man-made canal project could trigger an arms race in the Black Sea – and why China is watching closely, The South China Morning Post, 3 June 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2149025/how-istanbuls-man-made-canal-project-could-trigger-arms-race-black, retrieved on 20 June 2019.

First, the Turkish authorities might not

introduce Kanal Istanbul under the provisions

of the Montreux Convention.

As a consequence,

in this case the deployment of

naval assets in the Black

Sea by NATO non-riparian states would

be committed only to the jurisdiction imposed by

Turkey.

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by the expected vehement opposition of the Russian Federation and consequently, it ultimately relies on the evolution of the relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation on one side and between Turkey and the US on the other side.

Second, Turkey might introduce Kanal Istanbul under the provisions of the Montreux Convention. In this sense, the operationalisation of Kanal Istanbul may trigger all the other Black Sea riparian states to constrain Turkey in order to accept consultations over the legal system of this infrastructure project because as of now the Straits are the only maritime routes to the world’s oceans available to them. As a consequence, in this case the deployment of naval assets in the Black Sea by NATO non-riparian states would be decided upon the negotiation on the new provisions of the Montreux Convention, to beconducted most probably by its original signatories26. Not ultimately, this strategic option would probably maintain the current operational limits imposed by the Montreux Convention in case of the vessels of non-riparian states. However, the crystallization of this option is limited by the expected US determination to alter the current status quo and consequently, it also ultimately relies on the evolution of the relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation on one side and between Turkey and the US on the other side.

Even though nowadays Turkey has some of its best relations with the Russian Federation, a look into the recent history can show that Turkey’s national security can be highly-affected if found unprepared in assuring its own security. The Turkish Straits crisis is such an episode. Turkey had attempted to remain neutral during the Second World War, but it was forced – under the pressure of the Soviet Union’s request to impose discriminatory transit regulations through the Straits – to call for US protection and NATO membership after the end of the WWII. A more recent episode happened on 6 December 2015, amid tensions between Ankara and Moscow as a result of the 2015 Russian Su-24 shutdown by Turkey, after footage emerged of a serviceman aboard the Russian Federation’s Caesar Kunikov landing ship apparently

26 Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia (seat inherited by Serbia), Turkey, UK and USSR (seat inherited by the Russian Federation).

Even though nowadays Turkey has some of its best relations with the Russian Federation, a look into the recent history can show that Turkey’s national security can be highly-affected if found unprepared in assuring its own security.


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aiming a surface-to-air missile launcher towards Turkey’s largest city Istanbul while crossing Bosphorus27 .

Coming back to the present, while the impact of the operationalisation of Kanal Istanbul on the security environment in the Wider Black Sea Region is still awaiting its results, Turkey’s cautiousness in terms of assuming a legal status for this prospective project might be a sign that the die has not been cast yet in Istanbul. Indeed, as Toucas argued, “if it wants to remain a leading stakeholder in the region, Ankara will have to strengthen ties with Romania and Bulgaria (…) Only then would Turkey be able to talk to Russia as an equal and positively use its peculiar relationship with Moscow as an asset to stabilize the region”28. Overall, as Asim Suleymanov pointed out, by the end of construction of Kanal Istanbul, everything will depend on the leadership of Turkey29 .

VISTULA SPIT CANAL AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATODespite the Baltic Sea is arguably the world’s most heavily regulated

sea area30, this situation might change in the near future. In this sense, a potential trigger might be represented by the operationalisation of Poland’s intention to continue the construction of Vistula Spit canal.

Authorised by the Polish Parliament in 2017 and announced officially to be started in February 2019, Vistula Spit canal – which will connect the Baltic Sea to the Vistula Lagoon bypassing the Russian Federation’s territorial waters – is going to allow ships to reach directly the Polish port of Elblag without the compulsory as of now access of the Vistula Lagoon through the Russian port of Baltiysk ‒

27 Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey not planning to revise Montreux Convention on Bosphorus rights, 8 December 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-not-planning-to-revise-montreux-convention-on-bosphorus-rights-92226, retrieved on 18 June 2019.

28 Boris Toucas, Turkey Has No Allies in the Black Sea, Only Interests, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 13 February 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-has-no-allies-black-sea-only-interests, retrieved on 18 June 2019.

29 Asim Suleymanov, Turkey is the Guarantor of Peace in the Black Sea region, Modern Diplomacy, 22 May 2019 https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/05/22/turkey-is-the-guarantor-of-peace-in-the-black-sea-region/, retrieved on 18 June 2019.

30 Centrum Balticum, Baltic Sea Law, Baltic Area Legal Studies, 2019, http://www.centrumbalticum.org/en/projects/baltic_area_legal_studies/baltic_sea_law, retrieved on 2 July 2019.

Vistula Spit canal – which

will connect the Baltic Sea to the

Vistula Lagoon bypassing

the Russian Federation’s

territorial waters – is

going to allow ships to reach

directly the Polish port of

Elblag without the compulsory

as of now access of the Vistula

Lagoon through the Russian port of Baltiysk ‒ the main naval base

of the Russian Federation’s

Baltic Fleet ‒ located on the

shores of Pilava Strait.

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the main naval base of the Russian Federation’s Baltic Fleet31 ‒ located on the shores of Pilava Strait.

Tracing its original plan back to the 16th century, Vistula Spit canal is intended to finally put an end to the Cold War era dispute originating in the 1945 Polish-Soviet border agreement that is not fully respected in the sense of allowing Polish merchant vessels to access freely the Pilava Strait off the Vistula Lagoon in order to reach the port of Elblag32. Even nowadays the access of Polish merchant vessels through the Pilava Strait is allowed only upon paying navigation rights to the Russian Federation meanwhile the stationing of the latter’s Baltic Fleet in the nearby port of Baltiysk imposes a series of restrictions, including limited access for foreign-based vessels.

Therefore, Poland’s decision to start the construction of Vistula Spit canal resides in this country’s ambition to fully-ensure its own sovereignty. As Jaroslaw Kaczynski revealed, “Vistula Spit canal is important for Poland’s status (…) in the end Poland needs to shed the last traces of being a dependent state. We need to show that times Russia dictated what we could or not do on our territory are over”33. Indeed, Vistula Spit canal might serve a military end because Elblag hosts NATO’s Multinational Division Northeast, which is in charge of training the alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroups. Consequently, Poland’s Former Army Commander General Miroslaw Rozanski assumed it to be the underlying cause for the canal digging project34.

Furthermore, Vistula Spit canal might represent NATO’s wild card for enforcing credible security guarantees at the Baltic Sea as it can

31 Maritime Herald, Poland Began to Build a Canal Through the Baltic Spit, 19 February 2019, http://www.maritimeherald.com/2019/poland-began-to-build-a-canal-through-the-baltic-spit/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.

32 Pawel Pawłowski, New Road to the Baltic Sea, Warsaw Institute, 19 March 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/new-road-baltic-sea/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.

33 Matthew Day, ‘Days they dictate to us are over’: Poland vows to build Baltic Sea canal to bypass Russia, The Telegraph, 25 September 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/25/days-dictate-us-poland-vows-build-baltic-sea-canal-bypass-russia/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.

34 In Pawel Pawłowski, New Road to the Baltic Sea, Warsaw Institute, 19 March 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/new-road-baltic-sea/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.

Vistula Spit canal might represent NATO’s wild card for enforcing credible security guarantees at the Baltic Sea as it can offer the Alliance an unhindered access to the naval corridor linking the Baltic Sea with Vistula Lagoon.


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offer the Alliance an unhindered access to the naval corridor linking the Baltic Sea with Vistula Lagoon. However, the operationalisation of this infrastructure project, according to its current parameters, offers limited advantage to NATO as the low-water levels in the Vistula lagoon maintained by the construction of the canal will definitely constitute an impediment for the potential deployment of large warships in the area35.

Not ultimately, the construction of Vistula Spit canal is facing strong opposition from both the Russian Federation and various groups of green activists: first, Moscow complains that it had not been consulted over the canal and that the construction of this waterway threatens the ecology of the lagoon36; second, green activists organise protests against the continuation of the aforementioned project, depicting it as an “illegal environmental hooliganism”37.

Overall, despite the European Commission urged Polish authorities to put a halt on all plans until a decision is reached at the European level38, Warsaw offers assurances that Vistula Spit canal will be operationalised as this project is a matter of national security”39. As a consequence, Pawel Pawlowski’s remark on the yet unknown fate of Vistula Spit canal seems to offer the most-feasible prediction: fortune may perhaps favor the brave40.

35 Stratfor, Poland: Warsaw Hopes to Increase Its Autonomy with a New Canal, 27 September 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/poland-warsaw-hopes-increase-its-autonomy-russia-new-canal, retrieved on 2 July 2019.

36 Matthew Day, loc. cit.37 Emily Macintosh, €800M Polish canal is ‘Environmental Hooliganism’, The News Channel of

the European Environmental Bureau, 26 February 2019, https://meta.eeb.org/2019/02/26/e800m-polish-canal-is-environmental-hooliganism/, retrieved on 2 July 2019.

38 Gabriela Baczynska and Kevin Liffey, EU says Poland cannot build Vistula Spit canal without approval – official, Reuters, 1 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-poland-vistulaspit/eu-says-poland-cannot-build-vistula-spit-canal-without-approval-official-idUSL5N20O5T8, retrieved on 3 July 2019.

39 Karol Witenberg, Poland defies green activists, EU with Baltic canal project, Reuters, 4 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-environment-vistulaspit/poland-defies-green-activists-eu-with-baltic-canal-project-idUSKCN1QL1AN, retrieved on 3 July 2019.

40 Pawel Pawłowski, New Road to the Baltic Sea, loc. cit.

In the case of Kanal Istanbul,

there are various actions that

can be taken by NATO members and partners in order to ensure

the strategic advantage

that can be conferred to the

Alliance by the operationalisation

of the aforementioned

infrastructure project.

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WAYS OF DENOUNCING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S OPPOSITION TO THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE TWO CANALSThe Central and Eastern European countries along with other

interested NATO states have various ways of denouncing the Russian Federation’s opposition to the operationalisation of the two canals in favour of the Alliance.

On the one hand, in the case of Kanal Istanbul, there are various actions that can be taken by NATO members and partners in order to ensure the strategic advantage that can be conferred to the Alliance by the operationalisation of the aforementioned infrastructure project. First, US together with the Black Sea riparian states NATO members and partners could promote stronger ties with Turkey in order to make certain that either Kanal Istanbul will be a subject of the Montreux Convention or not, the Turkish authorities are going to lift or at least improve the current restrictions on the access and stationing in the Black Sea of warships belonging to the non-riparian states. Second, NATO could negotiate with the Russian Federation a non-enhanced naval presence at the Black Sea in exchange with the Russian Federation’s restoration of the status quo prior to the annexation of Crimea. Third, NATO could revive and support the operationalisation of the 2016 Romanian initiative for an enhanced naval cooperation with the other Black Sea riparian states NATO members and partners in order to create the premises for a de facto permanent NATO Black Sea Fleet in accordance with the current provisions of the Montreux Convention. Fourth, the Alliance could reflag some naval assets under the Black Sea members and partners’ flags in order to boost permanent Allied naval capabilities in the area. Fifth, NATO could create a chain of Allied A2/AD bubbles around the Russian A2/AD bubble in Crimea aimed to restrict the Russian Federation’s freedom of action in the Black Sea and ultimately to enhance the security guarantees offered to its Black Sea riparian allies and partners.

On the other hand, in the case of Vistula Spit canal, Poland supported by its allies can take various actions to ensure the operationalisation of this infrastructure project in spite of the Russian Federation’s vehement opposition to it. First, Poland could offer credible guarantees

In the case of Vistula Spit canal, Poland supported by its allies can take various actions to ensure the operationalisation of this infrastructure project in spite of the Russian Federation’s vehement opposition to it.


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that Vistula Spit canal is going to be realized respecting all the norms of the current international environmental law – in this way Poland can also offer assurances to the concerned green activists. Second, the Russian Federation’s environmental narrative when it comes to the construction of Vistula Spit canal could be strongly combated by the Polish authorities through a similar narrative when it comes to the construction of Nord Stream 2. Third, Poland might consider putting a halt to the construction of Vistula Spit canal only after the Russian Federation agrees to lift the transit fees for all vessels crossing the Pilava Strait, including those belonging to third-party states.

Alternatively, the Central and Eastern European countries along with other Euro-Atlantic stakeholders might consider two transitory solutions until the construction of the two canals and their legal regulation could reach a positive result for them. The first one could be the implementation of the Central and Eastern European countries’ interconnection projects proposed under the framework of the Three Seas Initiative41. The second could be the operationalisation of the interwar idea of Gdansk-Galati canal that could connect the Black and Baltic Seas through an infrastructure project led by the consortium Poland-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova-Romania42.

CONCLUSIONSThe Russian Federation’s re-emergence as a potential threat in

the Ponto-Baltic Isthmuscalls for the Central and Eastern European countries to strengthen their geostrategic position. Within this context, two expected-to-be operationalized infrastructure projects might represent a game-changer for the security environment in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus in the near future-Kanal Istanbul, respectively Vistula Spit canal.

In case of Kanal Istanbul, Turkey has not adopted yet an official position regarding its inclusion under the provisions of the Montreux

41 For details, see The Three Seas Initiative Summit Bucharest, The Three Seas Initiative – Priority Interconnection Projects, 17-18 September 2018, http://three-seas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/list-of-priorityinterconnection-projects-2018.pdf, retrieved on 22 May 2019.

42 For details, see Grigore Gafencu (Foreign Minister of Romania 1939-1940), Telegramă cifrată către Ambasada României în Varșovia, MAE, No. 15608, March 9, 1939, AMAE, Folder 71/Polonia/1939, Issue 60: Relații cu România, pp. 94-97.

Alternatively, two transitory

solutions can be taken until

the construction of the two

canals and their subsequent legal regulations could

reach a positive result for NATO,

namely the implementation

of the interconnection

projects proposed under the framework

of the Three Seas Initiative,

respectively the operationalisation

of the Gdansk-Galați canal.

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Convention. As a consequence, two options can be considered in its case when taking into account its potential for the emergence of a NATO wild card at the Black Sea. On the one hand, if Kanal Istanbul will not be included under the provisions of the Montreux Convention, the deployment of naval assets in the Black Sea by NATO non-riparian states would be committed only to the jurisdiction imposed by Turkey and not to a binding international agreement as of now. This strategic option would allow NATO’s enforcement of credible security guarantees at the Black Sea through a permanent Black Sea Fleet. On the other hand, if Kanal Istabul will be included under the Montreux Convetion, the deployment of naval assets in the Black Sea by NATO non-riparian states would be decided upon the negotiation on the new provisions of the Montreux Convention. This strategic option would probably maintain the current operational limits imposed in case of the vessels belonging to non-riparian states. Overall, both options ultimately depend on the evolution of the relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation on one side and between Turkey and the US on the other side.

In case of Vistula Spit canal, Poland seems to be determined to operationalise this infrastructure project in spite of the Russian Federation and green activists’ vehement opposition. This development is meant to ensure Poland’s sovereignty by allowing national and third party’s vessels to reach freely the Polish port of Elblag without the compulsory as of now access of the Vistula Lagoon through the Russian port of Baltiysk. Ultimately, Vistula Spit canal might represent NATO’s wild card at the Baltic Sea as it can offer the Alliance an unhindered access to the naval corridor linking the Baltic Sea with Vistula Lagoon.

The Central and Eastern European countries along with other interested NATO members have various ways of denouncing the Russian Federation’s opposition to the operationalisation of the two canals. Alternatively, two transitory solutions can be taken until the construction of the two canals and their subsequent legal regulations could reach a positive result for NATO, namely the implementation of the interconnection projects proposed under the framework of the Three Seas Initiative, respectively the operationalisation of the Gdansk-Galați canal. Finally, probably nothing fits better the context


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than historian Marek Chodakiewicz’s remark: “History is alive in the East. Sorting out the past is the key to the future”43.

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10. Helene Franchineau, How Istanbul’s man-made canal project could trigger an arms race in the Black Sea – and why China is watching closely, The South China Morning Post, 3 June 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2149025/how-istanbuls-man-made-canal-project-could-trigger-arms-race-black

43 Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Intermarium: the Land between the Black and Baltic Seas, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2013, p. 531.

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11. Grigore Gafencu, Telegramă cifrată către Ambasada României în Varșovia, MAE, No. 15608, 9 March 1939, AMAE, Folder 71/Polonia/1939, Issue 60: Relații cu România.

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14. David Larter, Russian military ‘harassed’ US-flagged merchant ship in the Baltic ahead of exercises, Defence News, 27 June 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/06/27/russian-military-harassed-us-flagged-merchant-ship-in-the-baltic-ahead-of-exercises/

15. Emily Macintosh, €800M Polish canal is ‘Environmental Hooliganism’, The News Channel of the European Environmental Bureau, 26 February 2019, https://meta.eeb.org/2019/02/26/e800m-polish-canal-is-environmental-hooliganism/.

16. Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographic Journal XXIII, no. 4, 1904.

17. George Maior, Noul aliat. Regândirea politicii de apărare a României la începutul secolului XXI, 2nd edition, Editura RAO, București, 2013.

18. Carlos Munoz, U.S. Navy sends message to Russia with 2nd Fleet’s Baltic Operations, The Washington Times, 22 May 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/22/navy-2nd-fleet-sends-message-russia-baltops-drill/.

19. Michael Peck, Want to Stop Russia from Invading the Baltic States? Turn Poland Into a Military Powerhouse, The National Interest, 23 March 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/want-stop- russia-invading-baltic-states-turn-poland-military-powerhouse- 48692.

20. Alexander Prokopenko and Roman Goncharenko, NATO and Russia: Maneuvers and countermaneuvers in the Baltic Sea, Deutsche Welle, 14 June 2019 https://www.dw.com/en/nato-and-Russia-maneuvers-and-countermaneuvers-in-the-baltic-sea/a-49188875

21. Sabine Siebold, Germany strengthens Baltic naval alliance to counter Russian buildup, Reuters, 26 October 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-baltic-military/germany-strengthens-baltic-naval-alliance-to-counter-russian-buildup-idUSKCN1N0287


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22. Nicholas Spykman, “Frontiers, Security and International Organization”, Geographical Review 32, no. 3, 1942.

23. Asim Suleymanov, Turkey is the Guarantor of Peace in the Black Sea region, Modern Diplomacy, 22 May 2019 https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/05/22/turkey-is-the-guarantor-of-peace-in-the-black-sea-region/

24. Boris Toucas, Turkey Has No Allies in the Black Sea, Only Interests, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 13 February 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-has-no-allies-black-sea-only-interests

25. Karol Witenberg, Poland defies green activists, EU with Baltic canal project, Reuters, 4 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-environment-vistulaspit/poland-defies-green-activists-eu-with-baltic-canal-project-idUSKCN1QL1AN.

8282No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

GROWING USA – IRAN TENSIONS GROWING USA – IRAN TENSIONS INCREASE THE VOLATILITY INCREASE THE VOLATILITY

IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGIONIN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION

Adriana SAULIUC Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Prevention & Early Warning, Bucharest

Teaching Assistant, “Titu Maiorescu” University, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Bucharest

The blatant anti-Iran policy of the USA has brought major changes that have profoundly affected the Middle East. A space which, as a result of the events and incidents it has experienced in recent months, has become an extremely volatile area, while Tehran’s dissatisfaction with the evolution of the JCPOA nuclear agreement raises fears in the European capitals regarding Iran’s resumption of the nuclear programme and the return of the Iranian nuclear crisis on the international agenda. At the same time, the incidents in the Persian Gulf risk turning this space into a confrontation zone where oil tankers and drones are targeted, increasing the tensions between the USA and Iran to a dangerous point.

Keywords: Middle East, security, the Iranian nuclear crisis, Iran, USA.

The article was written in late 2019, before the recent developments in Iran.


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Growing USA – Iran Tensions Increase the Volatility in the Persian Gulf RegionGrowing USA – Iran Tensions Increase the Volatility in the Persian Gulf Region


INTRODUCTIONThe Middle East, an area troubled by crises and conflicts, is

currently experiencing a difficult time. This is because the regional changes caused by the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy have led to developments that bring to light the gloomiest scenarios, which do not exclude a conflict between the United States of America and Iran. A possible scenario of which many fear, considering the possible consequences of such an event, given the fact that Iran is a military power in the Middle East, while the USA has strong allies in the region (Saudi Arabia and Israel), declared enemies of Tehran.

For a better understanding of the current developments, taking a look at how the relations between the two countries have evolved becomes desirable. This is because, over time, the bilateral relations between the two countries have been sensitive to the changes at the White House and to the way the successive US administrations have understood the relations with Tehran. Also, they have been influenced by Iran’s willingness to develop close relations with the USA, or its preference for a relentlessness position vis-à-vis the USA, in all cases with major regional and international effects.

USA-IRAN RELATIONS – A BRIEF HISTORYThe US involvement in Iran during the Cold War represented a

decision subordinated to the fierce competition to win new territories to the detriment of the USSR, based on the zero-sum game model. In 1953, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq resigned following an initially failed coup organised by the United States and the United Kingdom1. In this context, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s last Shah2, who was strongly supported by the Americans, increased

1 How the CIA Overthrew Iran’s Democracy in 4 Days, NPR, 7 February 2019, https://www. npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days?t=1569000449644, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

2 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Last King of Iran, France24, 14 January 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190114-mohammad-reza-pahlavi-last-king-iran, retrieved on 10 May 2019.

The Middle East, an area troubled

by crises and conflicts, is

currently experiencing a

difficult time. This is because

the regional changes caused

by the Trump Administration’s

Foreign Policy have led to

developments that bring

to light the gloomiest

scenarios, which do not exclude a conflict between

the United States of America and

Iran.

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Adriana SAULIUCAdriana SAULIUC

84No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

his monarchic power, also being the one who gave Washington enough confidence to include Iran, in 1957, in the “Atoms for Peace” programme initiated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower3.

Under this initiative, the USA and Iran signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, subsequently being built and inaugurated, in 1967, the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre equipped with a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, which initially used highly enriched uranium. Based on good economic and diplomatic relations, in 1978, Iran and the USA signed a nuclear agreement through which Iran agreed a set of guarantees beyond the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (signed on 1 July 1968). In return, the United States of America granted Iran the “most favoured nation” status so that Iran would not be discriminated against when seeking permission to reprocess US-supplied nuclear fuel4.

However, 1979 was about to bring the big change – the revolution which removed the Shah from power, then the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Iran (4 November 1979 – 20 January 1981) were events that, at that time, were clear signals that everything the USA and Iran had built in the field of bilateral relations, was severely damaged, events that, for Washington, were strong reasons to cut off all ties with the Iranians. Moreover, the revolution can be seen as a turning point which led to a reconfiguration of the relations of the “new” Iranian state – the Islamic Republic of Iran – with partner countries up to that time, but also with neighbouring countries, Iran’s foreign policy experiencing a major change of direction.

Other events or developments that have changed/damaged the US-Iran relations are: the downing of a civilian aircraft operated by Iran Air on 3 July 1988 over the Persian Gulf, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war, an incident in which 290 Iranians, mostly pilgrims who were travelling to Mecca, lost their lives. Then, in 2002, President George W. Bush accentuated the enmity between the two states when he included Iran in the so-called “axis of evil”, along with North Korea

3 Abbas Milani, The Shah’s Atomic Dreams, Foreign Policy, 29 December 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/29/the-shahs-atomic-dreams/, retrieved on 20 August 2019.

4 Semira N. Nikou, Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Activities, United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities, retrieved on 5 July 2019.

1979 was about to bring the big change – the revolution which removed the Shah from power, then the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Iran (4 November 1979 – 20 January 1981) were events that, at that time, were clear signals that everything the USA and Iran had built in the field of bilateral relations, was severely damaged.


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and Iraq5. Subsequently, in the 2000s, the fears that Tehran could develop a clandestine nuclear programme attracted sanctions and kept US-Iran relations at a high level of animosity. But things changed significantly in 2013, when moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani sworn in as President, an event that led to changes in the USA-Iran relations with Barack Obama at the White House and in the context of Iran’s awareness that the effects of the Iranian nuclear crisis were harmful for the state’s economy.

Other incidents have, over time, strained the relations between the two states, among them counting the capture, on 12 January 2016 of two US Navy boats by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CGRI), as a result of the entry, because of a navigation error, in the Iranian territorial waters near the Farsi Island situated in the Persian Gulf. The US soldiers were released 15 hours later, but not before the Iranians photographed them during the detention, namely in a less honourable position, and made the photos public, thus generating negative reactions in the USA6.

Moreover, Iran and the USA experienced some incidents involving US drones and the Iranian airspace. More accurate, on 5 December 2011, sources from the Iranian Armed Forces announced the downing of an American drone that entered into the Iran’s airspace in the eastern part of the country, a RQ-170 Sentinel spy aerial vehicle, which was captured almost intact. According to the authorities in Tehran, the aerial vehicle penetrated Iran’s airspace and was detected in Iranian space at 225 km away from the Afghan border. It was intercepted by the “electronic warfare unit” of the Iranian Armed Forces while it flew over the eastern city of Kashmar7.

A second event took place on 4 December 2012, when the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the capture

5 US-Iran Relations: A Brief History, BBC, 21 July 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661, retrieved on 5 July 2019.

6 Sarah N. Lynch, US Sailors Captured by Iran Were Held at Gunpoint: US Military, Reuters, 18 January 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-boats-idUSKCN0UW1Q7, retrieved on 10 July 2019.

7 Scott Peterson, Downed US Drone: How Iran Caught the “beast”, CS Monitor, 9 December 2011, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&ved=2ahUKEwjM_fGZ-9_kAhVVAxAIHTlyCBkQFjAMegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.csmonitor.com%2FWorld%2FMiddle-East%2F2011%2F1209%2FDowned-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast&usg=AOvVaw3DP0PfVU0THQeU1FI8NNcG, retrieved on 9 August 2019.

In the 2000s, the fears that Tehran could

develop a clandestine

nuclear programme

attracted sanctions and

kept US-Iran relations at a

high level of animosity. But

things changed significantly

in 2013, when moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani

sworn in as President, an

event that led to changes in the USA-Iran

relations.

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of a ScanEagle-type American drone in the Iranian airspace, images of it being broadcast by the state television. According to Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, before being captured by the Iranian Armed Forces, the unmanned aircraft had carried out reconnaissance missions over the Persian Gulf. At that time, Washington denied the information, announcing that no American drone disappeared in the Middle East those days8.

THE TRUMP ERA AND THE USA-IRAN MAJOR DETERIORATION OF RELATIONSIf previously (2003-2014/15) Iran was perceived as an outcast by

the international community, and here we refer in particular to the period prior to accepting the negotiations with the P5 + 1 states (the five permanent member states of the Security Council, plus Germany), the acceptance of cooperation in the sensitive nuclear field has changed Iran’s situation, transforming it from an uncomfortable state for the international community into a cooperation partner in the nuclear domain, the negotiations during 2013 and 2015 ending with reaching a nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA.

The signing of the nuclear agreement on 14 July 2015 represented a resounding triumph of nuclear diplomacy, Barack Obama, the Democratic leader that changed the US position regarding major international dossiers, preferring an “outstretched hand” policy towards everyone whom George W. Bush threatened with punitive measures specific to a hard power approach, having a significant contribution. Therefore, the signing of the JCPOA in July 2015 was undoubtedly a result of the change of policy in Washington, the Obama Administration later identifying, as a result of the replacement of the intransigent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with the moderate president Hassan Rouhani in Tehran, a favourable ground for solving one of the most problematic crises on the international agenda – the Iranian nuclear crisis.

8 Shiv Malik, Iran Claims Capture of US Drone, The Guardian, 4 December 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/04/iran-claims-capture-us-drone, retrieved on 9 August 2019.

The signing of the nuclear agreement on 14 July 2015 represented a resounding triumph of nuclear diplomacy, Barack Obama, the Democratic leader that changed the US position regarding major international dossiers, preferring an “outstretched hand” policy.


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The subsequent entry into force of the JCPOA (16 January 2016)9, offered the opportunity for Iran to prove its good intentions and its seriousness regarding the status of country party at this agreement, while the International Atomic Energy Agency monitored closely the implementation of the agreement by the Iranians, the small skids, such as possessing a larger quantity of enriched material than the amount allowed under JCPOA, being immediately remedied by Tehran.

But what Barack Obama managed to “fix” in the US-Iranian bilateral relationship, after decades of tensions and the lack of diplomatic relations following the 1979 events (the US hostage crisis, the formal cut of the diplomatic ties etc.), has been damaged by the current American leader, who, starting with the presidential campaign, focused on the good relations cultivated by his predecessor with Tehran, indicating a possible change of situation in the case of being elected as president. A situation which became reality with his arrival in the Oval Office because of the fact that the anti-Iran rhetoric used in his speeches in the election campaign was put into practice by Donald Trump, culminating on 8 May 2018 with the unilateral withdrawal of the United States of America from the JCPOA. A move perceived as a powerful blow against the success of the nuclear diplomacy which, after decades of crisis and years of negotiations, transformed Iran from a defiant actor regarding the international norms into a cooperative partner in relation with the international community in the sensitive, especially for Tehran, nuclear field.

And if Trump chose to sabotage the United States of America’s relations with Iran, despite the efforts made mainly by the European international actors (the EU and the European countries that prefer a different evolution from the one imposed by Trump), the traditional allies of the Americans in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia and Israel, which during the Obama Administration felt betrayed and abandoned by the Democratic leader who preferred to approach Iran even if it meant moving away from those two countries, were and continue to be the main beneficiaries of the Trump-Era foreign policy change,

9 Miklos Gaspar, JCPOA Implementation Day Ushers in New Phase for IAEA in Iran: Director General Amano, International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 January 2016, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/jcpoa-implementation-day-ushers-new-phase-iaea-iran-director-general-amano, retrieved on 19 August 2019.

The anti-Iran rhetoric used

in his speeches in the election

campaign was put into

practice by Donald Trump,

culminating on 8 May 2018 with

the unilateral withdrawal of

the United States of America from

the JCPOA.

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both Saudi Arabia and Israel becoming more assertive in their relationship with Tehran with the arrival of the current US leader at the White House.

FROM THE WAR OF DECLARATIONS TO THE WAR OF OIL TANKERSIf, through the policy of “outstretched hands”, Obama succeeded in

changing the attitude of the regime in Tehran towards the international community and the West in general, with Donald Trump at the White House, since January 2017, all the results of his Democratic predecessor’s efforts have been reversed. Thus, the anti-Iran rhetoric of the current US President has become a watchword in the US foreign policy with Trump arrival at the White House, becoming reality as a result of Trump Administration decisions, such as the temporary ban of the access of the Iranian citizens on the territory of the United States of America (27 January 2017), by the executive order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”10, or the unilateral withdrawal, on 8 May 2018, from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action11, with all the effects of such an action.

The tensions between the two states continued to increase in the following period, especially because the two countries were quite active in sending more or less bellicose formal messages. In this regard, there can be mentioned the developments immediately after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the announcement regarding Washington’s intention to re-impose sanctions, which were followed by Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in case the White House would consider reintroducing restrictive measures against the Iranian oil industry.

The year 2019 has not brought more peace to the deteriorated US-Iran relations, on the contrary: on 8 April, President Trump announced

10 Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States Initial Section 11 Report, 27 January 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Executive%20Order%2013780%20Section%2011%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf, retrieved on 5 July 2019.

11 President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal, whitehouse.gov, 8 May 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/, retrieved on 9 May 2019.


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the USA would formally designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, being the first time in history when the United States of America has ever named a part of another government as a foreign terrorist organisation12.

FROM TANKERS WAR TO THE DRONE WARThe deterioration of the USA-Iran relations passed beyond the

sphere of declarations and decisions made especially by the USA, being fully felt on the ground, more precisely in the Persian Gulf area, where a number of incidents have further complicated the situation. The first of the “Trump Era” took place in July 2018 when, in the context of a harsh exchange of messages at the official level between the two countries, amid the deterioration of the bilateral relations (on 8 May 2018 Trump announced the USA withdrawal from the nuclear deal, and on 5 July 2018 Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz), a Saudi oil tanker with about two million barrels of oil on board was attacked in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a geographic point located near the port of Hodeida, by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, Iran being accused for this incident13.

Later, in 2019, things got complicated and have led to an even greater tension in the Persian Gulf area: Trump decided to supplement the military presence in the region, invoking insights from intelligence structures regarding a planned campaign by Iran and its regional allies against US forces and US interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq. The increased US military presence in the area, however, remained ineffective, given that other incidents similar to the one that took place in July 2018 occurred. In this context, it can be mentioned the attack on 12 May 2019 on four vessels (two oil tankers belonging to the Saudi oil company Aramco Oil, a Norwegian ship and an Emirate ship) near the port of Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman14. Another incident took place

12 Michael R. Gordon, Warren P. Strobel, Nancy A. Youssef, US to Designate Iranian Guard Corps a Foreign Terror Group, The Wall Street Journal, 5 April 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-designate-iranian-guard-corps-a-foreign-terrorist-organization-11554499401, retrieved on 19 August 2019.

13 Saudi Arabia Suspends Oil Exports through Bab al-Mandeb, Aljazeera, 26 July 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/saudi-arabia-suspends-oil-exports-bab-el-mandeb-180725215417388.html, retrieved on 2 September 2019.

14 Patrick Wintour, Saudi Oil Tankers Show “Significant Damage” after Attack – Riyadh, The Guardian, 13 May 2019, see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/12/uae-four-merchant-ships-reported-sabotaged, retrieved on 2 September 2019.

The deterioration

of the USA-Iran relations

passed beyond the sphere of declarations

and decisions made especially

by the USA, being fully felt on the ground, more precisely in the Persian

Gulf area, where a number

of incidents have further

complicated the situation.

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on 13 June 2019, that time near the Strait of Hormuz, two tankers (one under the Japanese flag, the other under the Norwegian flag) being attacked as they crossed the Gulf of Oman15.

As in the previous case (May 2019), Iran was the target of the US accusations, Washington’s position being supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, while Germany brought into discussion the existence of some “strong evidence” that Iran was responsible for the attack on the two oil tankers.

But the last period was marked not only by incidents involving oil tankers but also by those at much more complicated level, namely incidents involving drones. Thus, on 6 June 2019, the Houthi rebels shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone (Predator B)16, while the US Armed Forces accused that the attack on the US military UAV was carried out with Iranian assistance.

Shortly after, another incident involving an American drone increased tensions between the United States of America and Iran at alarming levels: the downing, on 20 June 2019, of an American RQ-4A Global Hawk type surveillance drone, this time a military move officially assumed by the Iranians that accused Washington of violating the Iranian airspace.

As expected, the two states accused each other of responsibility for the incident, offering contradictory GPS coordinates: the Iranians invoked the penetration of the state territory about 12 miles from the border, while the USA claimed that the drone was in the international airspace above the Strait of Hormuz, both countries offering a pure sample of enmity and highlighting the diametrically opposed positions incompatible with a close relationship. At the same time, the bellicose rhetoric of both regimes has revived the possibility of an imminent confrontation in the Gulf region: the United States Central Command described the drone incident as an “unprovoked attack”, the US leader

15 Junko Fujita, “Flying Objects” Damaged Japanese Tanker during Attack in Gulf of Oman, Reuters, 14 June 2019, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&ved=2ahUKEwi6zbKQ4uTkAhXQJpoKHfqmAQwQFjAKegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Farticle%2Fus-mideast-tanker-japan-damage%2Fflying-objects-damaged-japanese-tanker-during-attack-in-gulf-of-oman-idUSKCN1TF0M9&usg=AOvVaw0yP-sVRsXQ2JtbfFG-E5vlm, retrieved on 20 June 2019.

16 Ed Adamczyk, MQ-9 Reaper Drone Shot down over Yemen on June 6, CENTCOM says, UPI, 17 June 2019, https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2019/06/17/MQ-9-Reaper-drone-shot-down-over-Yemen-on-June-6-CENTCOM-says/5261560787417/, retrieved on 10 August 2019.


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calling it “a big mistake”, while the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander, Hossein Salami, considered the downing of the US drone a “clear message” for the USA, also warning that although Iran does not seek a confrontation with the USA, it is “fully prepared” for such a situation17.

TENSIONS IN THE GULF DEMAND THE RESUMPTION OF THE USA-IRAN CONTACTSIn the complicated regional context, the subject of the US-Iran

negotiations has reappeared in 2019, especially amid heightened tensions. After the incidents in the Gulf of Oman and the intensification of the war of declarations, on 19 May 2019, Trump warned that “if Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran”, a statement that received a prompt response from Tehran: “genocidal taunts won’t ˂ end Iran˃”, wrote Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, on Twitter. He also added: “#NeverThreatenAnIranian. Try respect – it works!”18.

Later, on 1 June 2019, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani hinted that the regime in Tehran might be interested in talks with the United States of America, indicating that Iran will not be affected by the pressure of sanctions and the increased US military presence in the region.

On 2 June, Mike Pompeo gave the US response to Rouhani’s exploratory talks, saying that Washington is ready for talks without preconditions. However, he added that the United States will continue to pressure the Iranian state until it begins to act like a “normal country”: “the US is prepared to engage with Iran without pre-conditions about its nuclear programme but needs to see the country behaving like <a normal nation>, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, adding however, that “the American effort to fundamentally reverse the malign activity of this Islamic Republic, this revolutionary force, is going to continue”19.

17 Rob Picheta, Bianca Britton, What is a RQ-4A Global Hawk Drone, the US Military Aircraft Shot Down by Iran?, CNN, 20 June 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/20/us/rq4a-global-hawk-drone-intl/index.html, retrieved on 20 August 2019.

18 Trump's “Genocidal Taunts” Will Not End Iran – Zarif, BBC, 20 May 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48338168, retrieved on 20 August 2019.

19 US Ready to Talk with Iran “With No Preconditions”: Mike Pompeo, DW, 2 June 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/us-ready-to-talk-with-iran-with-no-preconditions-mike-pompeo/a-49007582, retrieved on 10 August 2019.

On 19 May 2019, Trump

warned that “if Iran wants to

fight, that will be the official

end of Iran”, a statement

that received a prompt response

from Tehran: “genocidal

taunts won’t ˂end Iran˃”.

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A remark that was not well received in Tehran, where the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Abbas Mousavi, said: “the Islamic Republic of Iran does not pay attention to word-play and expression of hidden agenda in new forms”, the Iranian MFA also excluding US-Iran talks if Trump Administration does not change its “general behaviour”20.

Following this less protocolary exchange of messages between the two states and Tehran’s taking into account the possibility of dialogue with the USA, the developments in the Gulf region have not created the favourable framework for advancing the situation in this direction. Thus, the incident in the Gulf of Oman (13 June 2019) involving the Japanese and Norwegian oil tankers, the announcement made by the USA on 17 June 2019, regarding the supplementing of the number of the US military in the Middle East with 1,000 soldiers, as well as the downing of the RQ-4A Global Hawk drone on 20 June 2019, and the measures that followed, (information regarding Trump’s approval of a cyber-attack on CGRI systems, new sanctions announced on 24 June against the Iranian leadership and senior level of CGRI, targeting including the Iranian Supreme Leader) have strained the USA-Iran relations.

THE USA-IRAN NEGOTIATIONS – A CAT AND MOUSE GAME Inevitably, all the events of the past two years that have affected

the bilateral relations of the two states have only fed the parties with mutual distrust, while concrete actions led the enmity between Washington and Tehran too far for high level discussions to be considered.

In this case, the individual situation of each party is also important. Thus, it is clear that Donald Trump will not accept to meet his Iranian counterpart if his position would not be a dominant one, a situation totally disliked by Iran, which has repeatedly announced that the Iranian state will not enter into any form of discussion/negotiation from a lower position. But in the current situation, the Iranian state is the one in a less favourable position, because of the new regime of sanctions that are affecting its economy, while the less “friendly”

20 TOI Staff and Agencies, Iran Rules out Talks Unless US Changes “Behaviour”, Times of Israel, 2 June 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-rules-out-talks-unless-us-changes-behavior/, retrieved on 21 August 2019.

All the events of the past two years that have affected the bilateral relations of the two states have only fed the parties with mutual distrust, while concrete actions led the enmity between Washington and Tehran too far for high level discussions to be considered.


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statements of Trump and his staff regarding Iran, risk again damaging its international image. In such a situation, the Iranian leader, in need to unlock the current situation, will have to find the resources to accept a meeting with Donald Trump. A meeting that would undoubtedly take place as expected, in the sense that Rouhani would have as interlocutor an American President whose attitude would show superiority, a desire for dominance and expectations from the Iranian counterpart to accept, from the beginning, a position of inferiority.

However, at least until now, the Tehran regime does not seem to have reached the point where it is willing to accept such a situation, which for the Iranians is most likely degrading. And the failure to accept such a position is evidenced by the way senior officials in Tehran position themselves regarding talks with the USA. Talks, otherwise wanted by Iran, as evidenced by the statements of President Hassan Rouhani, who, on 26 August 2019, reiterated that Iran is ready to negotiate an exit from the crisis that is due to the developments caused by the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Also, the Iranian President’s the manner of expression on this subject reveals a rather pragmatic and mature discourse than the ideas of a president animated by superiority and a desire to impose: “If I knew that going to a meeting and visiting a person would help my country’s development and resolve the problems of the people, I would not miss it. Even if the odds of success are not 90% but are 20% or 10%, we must move ahead with it. We should not miss opportunities”21, said the Iranian President, being obvious that the person he referred to is Donald Trump.

CONCLUSIONSSuch a position of President Rouhani is most likely related to the

fact that, despite the lack of sympathy for the occupant of the Oval Office, in Iran, the same country where even at the high-level the slogan “Death to America!” is used on different occasions, there is an awareness that bilateral talks with the USA cannot be postponed

21 Iranian President Rouhani: Trump Must First Lift Sanctions Before Talks, Huffpost, 27 August 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iran-president-rouhani-trump-sanctions-talks_n_5d6511c3e4b0d2fa2db109de?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAFXYtRu8wIDJY0ITy4PW-kq3fiTku_HgkErrba4S0W3Vzh1eNmqbqUEJMQHNS0zmHt0b_s3aWAy8Orvz-2hvNqwpphXPv8mTV14Z0foikpJKhLhvZ0cxDMGC0cRPXoV86ykOHcCjiOhTcAA8TIIuJg_21Gz70c2fSlrF6NMrja_o, retrieved on 5 September 2019.

“If I knew that going to a

meeting and visiting a person

would help my country’s development

and resolve the problems of the people, I would

not miss it. Even if the odds of

success are not 90% but are 20% or 10%, we must

move ahead with it. We

should not miss opportunities.”

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indefinitely, not if the Iranian state wants to get out of this deadlock. Also, the awareness that a negotiation with the USA cannot be delayed too much comes from the fact that, in Tehran, the idea of re-electing Trump for another term is not excluded, which would mean the continuation of the current situation if the two states do not reach a point where the current deadlock is exceeded.

Therefore, we are witnessing a new phase of USA-Iran relations from the perspective of the latter, meaning that, after 40 years of defiance of Washington and a sudden warming of the bilateral relations during Barack Obama’s second term, Tehran is in a position to manage a new stage – the one in which the American leader is blatantly hostile to Iran, and Tehran must find a negotiating formula, which can offer it the perspective of avoiding a situation in which, from the beginning, the Iranian state would be in the loser’s position. But the situation from this point of view is extremely complicated with Donald Trump at the White House, given the fact that, the “lack of preconditions” announced by the US leader regarding the talks with Tehran does not mean for Iran that it does not have to understand the status it would have in negotiations, being obvious that Trump would stand in front of his counterpart as the (only) dominant party. But despite his openness to dialogue, Rouhani does not seem willing to accept such a situation.

Based on the statements made by Hassan Rouhani on 26 August 2019, we identify a change of tone at Teheran, taking into consideration the statements the Head of the Iranian diplomacy made shortly after (on 29 August), which makes it difficult to guess what Iran is considering regarding the discussions with the USA, but most likely indicate the position Iran would embrace during the negotiations. Of course, a position of strength if we consider that Mohammad Javad Zarif accused the USA of “economic terrorism” talking also about “the basic principle of civilised world” which says “that you do not negotiate with terrorists”, so, according to the Head of Iranian diplomacy, the Americans, “if they want to negotiate, they have to abandon terrorism”22.

22 Amy Chew, Iran’s Zarif to Trump: Drop “Economic Terrorism” before Talks, Aljazeera, 29 August 2019, See https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/iran-zarif-trump-drop-economic-terrorism-talks-190829061054099.html, retrieved on 20 September 2019.

The awareness that a negotiation with the USA cannot be delayed too much comes from the fact that, in Tehran, the idea of re-electing Trump for another term is not excluded, which would mean the continuation of the current situation if the two states do not reach a point where the current deadlock is exceeded.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, How The CIA Overthrew Iran’s Democracy In 4 Days, NPR,

7 February 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days?t=1569000449644.

2. ***, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Last King of Iran, France24, 14 January 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190114-mohammad-reza-pahlavi-last-king-iran.

3. ***, US-Iran Relations: A Brief History, BBC, 21 July 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661.

4. ***, Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States Initial Section 11 Report, 27 January 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Executive%20Order%2013780%20Section%2011%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.

5. ***, President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal, whitehouse.gov, 8 May 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/.

6. ***, Saudi Arabia Suspends Oil Exports through Bab al-Mandeb, Aljazeera, 26 July 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/ s a u d i - a r a b i a - s u s p e n d s - o i l - e x p o r t s - b a b - e l - m a n d e b - 180725215417388.html.

7. ***, Trump’s “Genocidal Taunts” Will Not End Iran – Zarif, BBC, 20 May 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48338168.

8. ***, US Ready to Talk with Iran “With No Preconditions”: Mike Pompeo, DW, 2 June 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/us-ready-to-talk-with-iran-with-no-preconditions-mike-pompeo/a-49007582

9. ***, TOI Staff and Agencies, Iran Rules out Talks unless US Changes “Behavior”, Times of Israel, 2 June 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-rules-out-talks-unless-us-changes-behavior/

10. ***, Iranian President Rouhani: Trump Must First Lift Sanctions before Talks, Huffpost, 27 August 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iran-president-rouhani-trump-sanctions-talks_n_5d6511c3e4b0d2fa2db109de?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAFXYtRu8wIDJY0ITy4PW-kq3fiTku_HgkErrba4S0W3Vzh1eNmqbqUEJMQHNS0zmHt0b_s3aWAy8Orvz-2hvNqwpphXPv8mTV14Z0foikpJKhLhvZ0cxDMGC0cRPXoV86ykOHcCjiOhTcAA8TIIuJg_21Gz70c2fSlrF6NMrja_o

11. Ed Adamczyk, MQ-9 Reaper Drone Shot Down over Yemen on June 6, CENTCOM says, UPI, 17 June 2019, https://www.upi.com/Defense-

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News/2019/06/17/MQ-9-Reaper-drone-shot-down-over-Yemen-on-June-6-CENTCOM-says/5261560787417/

12. Amy Chew, Iran’s Zarif to Trump: Drop “Economic Terrorism” before Talks, Aljazeera, 29 August 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/iran-zarif-trump-drop-economic-terrorism-talks-190829061054099.html

13. Junko Fujita, “Flying Objects” Damaged Japanese Tanker during Attack in Gulf of Oman, Reuters, 14 June 2019, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&ved=2ahUKEwi6zbKQ4uTkAhXQJpoKHfqmAQwQFjAKegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Farticle%2Fus-mideast-tanker-japan-damage%2Fflying-objects-damaged-japanese-tanker-during-attack-in-gulf-of-oman-idUSKCN1TF0M9&usg=AOvVaw0yPsVRsXQ2JtbfFG-E5vlm

14. Miklos Gaspar, JCPOA Implementation Day Ushers in New Phase for IAEA in Iran: Director General Amano, International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 January 2016, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/jcpoa-implementation-day-ushers-new-phase-iaea-iran-director-general-amano

15. Michael R. Gordon, Warren P. Strobel, Nancy A. Youssef, U.S. to Designate Iranian Guard Corps a Foreign Terror Group, The Wall Street Journal, 5 April 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-designate-iranian-guard-corps-a-foreign-terrorist-organization-11554499401

16. Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Sailors Captured by Iran Were Held at Gunpoint: U.S. Military, Reuters, 18 January 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-boats-idUSKCN0UW1Q7

17. Shiv Malik, Iran Claims Capture of US Drone, The Guardian, 4 December 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/ 04/iran-claims-capture-us-drone

18. Abbas Milani, The Shah’s Atomic Dreams, Foreign Policy, 29 December 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/29/the-shahs-atomic-dreams/

19. Semira N. Nikou, Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Activities, United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/ timeline-irans-nuclear-activities

20. Scott Peterson, Downed US Drone: How Iran Caught the “Beast”, CSMonitor, 9 December 2011, https://www.google.com/url?sa= t&rct= j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&ved=2ahUKEwjM_fGZ-9_kAhVVAxAIHTlyCBkQFjAMegQIARAB&ur l=https%3A%2F%2Fw w w.csmoni tor.com%2FWor ld%2FMidd le -


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East%2F2011%2F1209%2FDowned-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast&usg=AOvVaw3DP0PfVU0THQeU1FI8NNcG

21. Rob Picheta, Bianca Britton, What Is a RQ-4A Global Hawk Drone, the US Military Aircraft Shot Down by Iran?, CNN, 20 June 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/20/us/rq4a-global-hawk-drone-intl/index.html

22. Patrick Wintour, Saudi Oil Tankers Show “Significant Damage” after Attack – Riyadh, The Guardian, 13 May 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/12/uae-four-merchant-ships-reported-sabotaged.

9898No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

The Arctic Ocean, the smallest and shallowest of the world’s oceans, opens two new maritime communications routes and has an extremely harsh polar climate throughout the year. The region is a mixture of geopolitical and economic interests, hosting a very diverse range of natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, but also gold, silver, uranium and other rare metals, whose exploitation is unsustainable for the time being. The Arctic area is a space of geopolitical disputes between the riparian states, which try to impose its jurisdiction over a large area of the territory, but also of non-riparian powers, such as China, Japan, Germany. Due to the importance it has acquired lately, the riparian states, especially the Russian Federation, but also those with interests in the area, have begun to reconfigure their military presence beyond the Polar Circle. The stakes have transformed Arctica into an objective of a “new big geopolitical game”.

Keywords: the Arctic, natural resources, geopolitical disputes, arming, geopolitical game.

THE ARCTIC THE ARCTIC – A DISPUTED TERRITORY,– A DISPUTED TERRITORY,

OBJECTIVE OF A “NEW GEOPOLITICAL GREAT GAME” –OBJECTIVE OF A “NEW GEOPOLITICAL GREAT GAME” –

Colonel Vasile CERBU, PhD2nd Infantry Division “Getica”, Buzău

Colonel Valentin CIORANU582th Reconnaissance Regiment “Vlad Țepeș”, Brăila


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The Arctic – A Disputed Territory, Objective of a “New Geopolitical Great Game” –The Arctic – A Disputed Territory, Objective of a “New Geopolitical Great Game” –


INTRODUCTION Before approaching geopolitical or geo-economic issues, it is

necessary to make an overview of the area.The Arctic Ocean is located in the North Pole region and is the

smallest of the world’s oceans. Although it has the smallest surface (approximately 788,000 Km2), it is wider than Europe, it has a relatively circular shape and the centre approximately on the North Pole. It is bounded by the northern shores of Europe, Asia (Siberia) and North America continents as well as those of Greenland. It communicates freely with the Atlantic Ocean and through a narrow strait (Bering Strait) with the Pacific Ocean.

Figure 1: The Arctic – positioning Source: www.maps-of-arctic

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Vasile CERBU • Valentin CIORANUVasile CERBU • Valentin CIORANU

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The shores of the three continents bordering it are very sinuous, forming many peninsulas, bays, estuaries, and fjords. One of the main features of this ocean is that it has no contact with the continents that delimit it except through marginal seas. Another important feature is the presence of ice1.

In the Arctic Ocean there are two maritime communications: • The North Passage represents the shortest route through

northern Siberia between western Russia (Murmansk port) and eastern Russia (Vladivostok port);

• The Northwest Passage which crosses the Arctic waters through the north of the planet, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.

Even though, not long ago, the two paths were inaccessible, today, thanks to modern icebreakers and special-purpose ships, they are frequently used.

The region has a harsh polar climate, which is influenced throughout the year by the cold polar air, and is characterised by very low temperatures, between -32-360 C and 0-100 C (sometimes much lower). Precipitations range from 75 to 500 mm/year.

In the past, the Arctic Ocean had a number of islands that are currently under water and many of them are on the Asian continental shelf and fewer around the other continents (North America, Asia and Europe). The most important islands are: Makarov, Bredly, Andreev, Djils, Explorers of the North Pole, Keenan, Spitsbergen, etc.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARCTICThe Arctic region represents an interesting mix of economic and

geopolitical interests, from energy resources to access routes and trade routes. The economic importance of the area increased with the political-military conflicts in the Middle East area, which forced the search for alternatives, with the rise of India and China as great economic powers with growing energy resource needs and as a result of climate warming and melting glaciers that make the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources more accessible, estimated at over 25% (some estimate them at 50%) of the world’s unexploited resources (estimated at about 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,680 trillion cubic meters

1 ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oceanul_Arctic, retrieved on 07.05.2019.

The Arctic region represents an interesting mix of economic and geopolitical interests, from energy resources to access routes and trade routes.


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of gas). The interest for this area from an economic point of view is also accentuated by the presence of gold, silver, uranium, lead, zinc and nickel deposits2.

The importance of the Arctic is also amplified by the possibility of opening 2 new navigation routes, called passages: the Northwest Passage through the North Canadian space and the North Passage, alongside the Russian Federation coastline and to the North of the Norwegian coastline. This is possible because the ice sheet melts at amazing speed, and the surface of the Arctic ice has shrunk, which makes it possible for navigation to take place longer for part of the year without the use of icebreakers. According to the journal “Science”, which refers to a report that was released by the US Arctic Research Commission, it is estimated that, in about 10 years, ships that are

2 http://blog.adrianmariusdobre.eu/, retrieved on 07.05.2019.

Figure 2: The Arctic resources Source: http://romanian.ruvr.ru/news

The importance of the Arctic is also amplified

by the possibility of opening 2

new navigation routes, called passages: the

Northwest Passage

through the North Canadian

space and the North Passage,

alongside the Russian Federation

coastline and to the North of the Norwegian

coastline.

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not especially equipped will be able to sail in these passages during the summer3 and through the North Passage, along the coast of the Russian Federation and along the north coast of Norway.

In the following, we will present some aspects, appreciated as being more relevant regarding the two passages.

The Northwest Passage has a length of 5,780 km, being a maritime route that runs from northern Europe through northern North America, and connects the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans4. This passage has generated one of the inevitable ongoing conflicts between the US and Canada

The Northwest Passage is made up of several islands, crossed by numerous straits and has become a reason for political dispute because the US and Canada cannot agree on the legal status of this archipelago.

Canada wants the waters that make up the North-West Passage to be treated as inland water on which to exercise full sovereignty.

Figure 3: The Northwest Passage – positioningSource: www.maps-of-arctic

The US wants the passage to be recognised as a strait at the international level, which greatly reduces Canada’s ability to exercise its sovereignty over these waters5. The seaworthiness of the passage

3 https://wsl.jw.org/ro.walorg/d/r34/lpm/102003848, retrieved on 25.05.2019.4 www.referat.ro/referate_despre_oceanul_arctic_referat-html, retrieved on 26.05.2019.5 http://www.cass_ro.org/arctica/Alexandru_Grumaz, retrieved on 19.05.2019.


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over a longer period of time during the year would shorten the transport distance between Europe and Asia by approximately 8,400 km, compared to the route through the Panama Canal or by 22,000 km, compared to the Cape Horn route, for oil tankers that cannot navigate the Panama Canal.

Another reason for the dispute is the natural resources that are estimated to be hidden in the depths. This issue has implications for both Canada and the US.

If the area becomes an international strait, Canada would be in the vicinity of international waters, which can be used freely, without control, by freighters around the world. Moreover, the free international movement involves risks, one being the terrorist one ‒ terrorist groups could easily reach the American continent and internationalise their status.

For the US, providing passage navigation brings direct and indirect benefits as a result of lower transportation costs for US companies operating in Asia or exploiting Alaska’s resources and exporting to European markets. Another effect would be that it could lose Canada as an ally, in favour of Russia (which Canada has been close to in recent years)6.

International mechanisms are difficult to apply to this conflict. UNCLOS is difficult to apply because no agreement has been reached ‒ the passage is considered land (being frozen much of the year), as appreciated by the natives (Canada’s main argument), or water (as appreciated by the US).

There is no binding mechanism for conflict resolution in this area, the convention (UNCLOS) having no real power over the states that have ratified it, let alone over those that have not ratified it (the US case).

If climate change in the area continues at this rate, it is possible to reignite old conflicts between the US and Russia, but in another international context, in which the existence of other world powers with growing interests in the area will further complicate the decision making. We can appreciate that the geopolitical changes in the area and the great interests of the states can influence the relations between allies (when their interests are in antagonistic positions)7.

6 Ibid.7 Final Report at Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium, 17-18 April 2001,

available online on http://www.star.nesdis.roaa.gov/star/documents/2007/IceSymp/Final ArcticReport.2001.pdf, retrieved on 19.05.2019.

The seaworthiness of the passage

over a longer period of time

during the year would shorten the transport

distance between Europe

and Asia by approximately

8,400 km, compared

to the route through the

Panama Canal or by 22,000 km, compared to the Cape Horn route,

for oil tankers that cannot

navigate the Panama Canal.

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The Northern Passage or the Northern Seaway, as it is called by the Russians, is the shortest waterway between Asia and Europe, stretching along the entire northern shore of the Russian Federation, between the ports of Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Vladivostok. This smoother route is an alternative to the traditional routes between Shanghai and Rotterdam through the Suez Canal, about 20,000 km long. The route shortens the distance by about 5,000 km or the duration by 10-12 days (of the duration, on the traditional route, of about 50 days), reduces fuel and insurance costs for ships and cargo, avoids areas threatened by piracy, and most importantly, avoids the Malacca Strait, this energy jugular of China, which is the main shipping passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans8.

We can say that the traditional routes through the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal have an accelerated deterioration regarding the degree of operability of the navigation and of risk regarding the exploitation of the infrastructure by the fact that, in relation to the increasing volume of traffic, it is approaching their maximum capacity.

In this way, the attention and efforts to find new navigation routes, one being the North Passage, are justified.

Figure 4: The Northern Seaway

The attempt to find a northern navigation route dates back to the time of the great geographical discoveries, when the Portuguese and the Spanish held the monopoly of navigation on the seas and oceans

8 Alexandru Ionuț Cățoi, “Northern Maritime Route” available online at Geopolitis.ro/calea_maritima_de_nord/.

The attempt to find a northern navigation route dates back to the time of the great geographical discoveries, when the Portuguese and the Spanish held the monopoly of navigation on the seas and oceans that made the connection between Europe and the Far East.


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that made the connection between Europe and the Far East. The first attempt belongs to Russia, which employs the Dutch navigator Barents, who fails to reach this goal, reaching only the Novaya Zemlya Islands. Following this failure, Russia organises land expeditions to the east in Siberia and the Far East, also researching the northern shores. The expeditions aimed at finding an alternative sea route were resumed during the time of Peter the Great and later, the reference being the attempts of naval officer Vitus Bering, who explores the shores of the Kamchatka Peninsula and Alaska, demonstrating that the Far East is not linked to the American continent. For the first time, the Nordic route was crossed by a team led by Swedish scientist Nordenskjold, funded by a Russian mine owner named Sibriakov in 1797. The author of this expedition believes that the route will not be viable and sustainable in order to promote trade at sea. But the area is gaining strategic importance with the coming into power of the communists, who have developed the port infrastructure, a fleet of icebreakers and the means and infrastructure needed for air surveillance. The peak of transport activities on this route is reached in 1987, later declining until several years ago9.

But the shipping industry is cyclical, and after a period of decline, there is a new upswing following global warming, reducing the surface area of the Arctic Ocean ice, potential resources and growing interests for this region, manifested not only by the Arctic countries, but also by non-Arctic countries such as China, Japan, Germany, etc. In the last period, there has been a marked increase in the demand and issuance of navigation permits on this route, estimating a major impact on the economic activities in the future10. The fact that this sea route is of major imp ortance is underlined by the legislative proposal drafted by expert s of the Russian Ministry of Defence, which imposes rules that must be respected by all ships wishing to use the North Passage. In the version that will be approved and imposed as international legal norms, all ships will have to announce their intention to sail 45 days in advance, to allow a Russian navigator to board to monitor the entire

9 Alexandru Ionuț Cățoi, op.cit.10 Mioara Stoica, “A new commercial route has been launched among the glaciers of the Arctic

Ocean”, available online at epochtimes_romania.com/news/s_a_lansat_o_nouă_ruta_comerciala_ printre_ghetarii_din_oceanul_artic_201482, retrieved on 30.05.2019.

The fact that this sea route

is of major importance is underlined by the legislative

proposal drafted by experts of the Russian Ministry

of Defence, which imposes rules that must be respected by

all ships wishing to use the North

Passage.

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voyage11. At the same time, the justification must include the name of the ship, its purpose, the route and the period of navigation, and the characteristics of the ship such as length, width, weight, draft and type of engine power12. Failure to follow these rules can lead to punitive measures such as seizure or even sinking of ships. The stated purpose of this legal act is to protect the environment and the safety of naval traffic, but in fact the real purpose hides Russia’s intention to ensure full control over navigation. To better understand the geopolitical confrontations and the directions of military systems development in the region, it is necessary to also analyse the obligatory crossing point, the connection between the North Passage and the Northwest Passage called the GIUK Gap. In military terms, the GIUK Gap is the acronym for Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom and is important as it allows the naval connection between the North Sea/North Passage and the Atlantic Ocean/North West Passage in the event that the English Channel is blocked.

It proved its importance in the Second World War, but also during the Cold War, especially after 1950, because it represented the only exit of Soviet submarines from the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. NATO, worried about Soviet submarines threatening, which had their base in the Kola Peninsula, based its military strategy in the region on blocking this gap, by installing surveillance systems for obtaining information, and arranging platforms with anti-submarine weapons in the region (nuclear-powered submarines, frigates, etc.)13.

After the fall of the USSR, this point lost its military importance, but maintained its economic importance, because the area was filled with most of the underwater cables that provided communications between Europe and North America, knowing that a great deal of communications is done through fiber optic supports.

In the new conditions, in the new geopolitical context, the gap is the crossing point of the Russian submarines but it is vulnerable in the sense that the Russians can supervise and monitor the communications through fiber optics, and in certain situations they can even destroy them.

11 https://www.digi24.ro/externe/Rusia_ameninta_ca_va_scufunda_navele_straine_care_traverseaza_oceanul_artic_1093522, retrieved on 30.05.2019.

12 https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/201903/izvestia_what_awaits_foreign_military_versus_northern_ sea_route/, retrieved on 31.05.2019.

13 Alexander Grumaz, A new front for Russia, available online at https://adevarul.ro/international /artica_un _nou_front_de_lupta_pentru_rusia/.../index.html, retrieved on 29.05.2019.

To better understand the geopolitical confrontations and the directions of military systems development in the region, it is necessary to also analyse the obligatory crossing point, the connection between the North Passage and the Northwest Passage called the GIUK Gap.


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THE GEOPOLITICAL ACTORS IN THE REGION AND THE DISPUTES BETWEEN THEMIn the early years after the end of the “Cold War” in the 1990s,

the Arctic area attracted little attention in the international media. This huge territory of approximately 21,000,000 km2 located between the North Pole and the North Polar Circle, which was of extraordinary strategic importance in the 1980s, for both US and USSR naval forces, has begun to attract increasing interest as a result of global warming and the implications this phenomenon has for mankind in general and especially for the states bordering on its regions, in particular. The global warming changes the economic coordinates in the sense that the exploitation of resources can be executed more easily14. The measurements carried out last year have shown general trends of continuous decrease of the ice layer, so the recent projections indicate summers without ice between the years 2030-203515.

But this changing climate phenomenon generates a change in geopolitics in the sense that a “good economic area at global level” is considered a fierce reason for conflict for this “gold mine” alleged or challenged by the global actors in the area16.

Because geo-economics is highly important, the right to property must be demonstrated and/or imposed, even if the exploitation

14 politica.org.ro/geopoliticaa-z/geopolitica_conflictul_arctic_un_razboi_rece_intr-o_zona_inghetata/22362/, accessed on 08.05.2019.

15 Ibid.16 Ibid.

Figure 5: The GIUK Gap satellite view© Flickr/NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

This huge territory of

approximately 21,000,000 km2

located between the North Pole and the North

Polar Circle, which was of

extraordinary strategic

importance in the 1980s, for

both US and USSR naval forces, has

begun to attract increasing

interest as a result of global

warming and the implications this

phenomenon has for mankind

in general and especially for the states bordering on its regions, in

particular.

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of these resources is inefficient at the moment. Another argument is that, compared to energy resources in the Middle East and Africa, where political violence and instability are present, Arctic energy reserves can be exploited without such risks.

Figure 6: Territorial disputesSource: http://romanian.ruvr.ru/news

According to US institutions (eg. US Ecological Survey) assessment of energy resources in the Arctic region, the largest oil reserves in the region are Alaska’s Arctic Basin, Amerasia Basin north of Canada, the eastern and western basins of Greenland, as well as in northern Russia (north and south of the White Sea, east of the Siberian Sea, Chukchi Sea and Barents Sea)17.

According to the UN Convention on Maritime Law (UNCLOS), the sovereignty of the states extends to 200 nautical miles, which is an exclusive economic zone. In some cases, states can extend their jurisdiction up to 350 nautical miles by submitting geological evidence to the UN commission regarding the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), within 10 years from the ratification of the maritime law. The political actors involved in this process are Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway, as coastal states of the Arctic area, acting within the UN Convention. The US acts as a coastal state, but outside the UN framework, because it has never ratified this convention18.

17 According to Keith J. Bird and collective, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas of the Arctic Circle”, available online at https//pubs.gov/fs/2008/3049/ retrieved on 20.05.2019.

18 According to P. Singh, “What Arctic Is Anyways?”, available online at https//idso.in/publications retrieved on 09.05.2019.

Because geo-economics is highly important, the right to property must be demonstrated and/or imposed, even if the exploitation of these resources is inefficient at the moment.


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CLCS does not deal with territorial disputes, being a technical body. The boundaries of the plateau are established by the states, through bilateral agreements, between the five coastal states in the Arctic Ocean. A map of the possible areas of interest of the coastal states in the Arctic shows that they intersect only on small sections, the conclusion being that the possible disagreements could be resolved through negotiations, which does not imply the presence of NATO in any form, because these are problems that do not require a military solution. In other words, the Arctic is a “territory of dialogue” as President Putin said in 2010 at the meeting of the Arctic Committee representatives19.

Figure 7: The Arctic ‒ Territorial disputes

19 Ibid.

A map of the possible areas

of interest of the coastal states

in the Arctic shows that

they intersect only on small sections, the

conclusion being that the possible

disagreements could be

resolved through negotiations,

which does not imply the

presence of NATO in any

form, because these are

problems that do not require a

military solution.

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In 2001, Russia submitted a request to the UN to take possession of 1,240 underwater miles on what is called the Lomonosov Ridge, arguing that this underwater mountain is an extension of the Siberian surface. In this regard, they organised a scientific expedition, in 2007, that placed a Russian flag on the bottom of the Arctic water, under the North Pole. Subsequently, strategies and plans were developed to enable the development and exploitation of the area. If the commission recognises this right, the Russian Federation will expand its exclusive economic zone almost all the way to the North Pole20.

In 2015, Russia submitted a new request to the UN, claiming a territory of over one million km2in the Arctic, as a result of clear evidence that part of the Lomonosov Ridge, the Mendeleev Ridge and Podvodnikov Valley belong to them21. A response to this request has not yet been received.

Canada, by its geographical position, issues a request for a large portion of the Arctic Ridge, including claims that the Lomonosov Ridge is an underwater extension of Ellesmere Island. Canada’s request to the UN since December 2013 is a source of open conflict with Russia and Denmark. Arctic sovereignty is appreciated by Canadians as a priority, the Canadian government acting in this respect for the acquisition of eight military (armed)22 icebreakers, execution of military exercises, high-level political visits, establishment of a fortified military base on the northern tip of Ellesmere Island23.

The interests of the coastal states of the Arctic are also demonstrated by the efforts made to exercise their authority, reflected in the image attached above24.

Denmark, in 2012, organised a scientific expedition to show that 155,000 km2 from the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, including the North

20 http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2014_10_30/Oamenii_de_stiinta_au_demonstrat_ca_Rusia_are_dreptul_sa_revendice_teritorii_arctice/0883/, retrieved on 20.05.2019.

21 According to Keith J. Bird and collective, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas of the Arctic Circle”, loc. cit.

22 https//www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova_scotia/otawa_sign_288m_contact_fr_desing_of_artic_ships_11312194, retrieved on 16.05.2019.

23 https//www.ctnews.ca/Canadian_forces_carry_out_artic_training_exercises_1319026, retrieved on 17.05.2019.

24 According to Scott Borgerson and Caytlyn Antrim, “An Arctic Circle of friends”, available online on https//www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/opinion/28borgerson, accessed on 17.05.2019.


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Pole, are part of its area and should be included in the Kingdom of Denmark (in addition to Greenland and the Faroe Islands)25.

The question arises whether Russia, Denmark and the other Arctic neighbouring states intend to respect the law of the sea on the delimitation of borders. Moscow can only benefit from a peaceful evolution of the situation, because due to the Siberian coast, with a length of about 20,000 km, it acquires huge areas at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean and it is unlikely that it will risk these potential benefits by having problems with a small territory claimed by Denmark or Norway. The chances of finding and exploiting natural gas or oil in the near future near the North Pole are reduced or almost non-existent26.

When considering the role of Denmark27 in the geopolitics of the Arctic, the status of Greenland should be taken into consideration. Since 2009, it has wide autonomy (even though Denmark is the one that generates the kingdom’s foreign policy, including its autonomous territories). The distribution of state powers is gradually changing, due to the fact that Greenland is gaining influence and prestige internationally28.

In August 2019, a special event took place, US President Donald Trump made Denmark a proposal to start negotiations to buy Greenland and was rejected. The reasons behind this act are the huge natural resources of the island in hydrocarbons, iron, zinc, gold, rare metals, etc., whose exploitation may become possible as a result of the rapid melting of ice, increasing US geopolitical importance in the region, as the US can impose jurisdiction over a huge area of the Arctic Ocean and exercise control over the Giuk Passage by developing the existing military infrastructure (Thule air base). It should be mentioned

25 According to Alex Vărzaru, “Canada officially wants the North Pole”, available online at www.ziare.com/international/canada/canada-vrea-oficial-polul-nord-272124, retrieved on 15.05.2019.

26 http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2014.08.09_Canada_intentioneaza_ sa-si_extinda_teritoriul_in_Arctica-61491, retrieved on 16.05.2019.

27 According to Paul Raynolds, “Russia ahead in Arctic’ Gold Rush”, available online at www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6925853.stm, retrieved on 18.05.2019.

28 Greenland has been under Danish rule for over 300 years. It has a population of about 55,000 inhabitants, an extended autonomy status with the right to benefit from its own resources and the Greenlandic language spoken by the Eskimo natives has become the official language. It is not part of the European Community since 1985, which it joined in 1975 as part of Denmark. It holds negotiations for full independence and has a dispute with Canada over the sovereignty over Hans Island. Since 2009 it is an almost independent territory with its own government and policies, except for the foreign and security policy. Greenland is a federal state that is negotiating for full independence.

The chances of finding and

exploiting natural gas or oil in the near

future near the North Pole are reduced or

almost non-existent.

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that until recently, for the US, the Arctic played a minor role in military strategy, the military facilities in the area having the role of anti-ballistic protection of the air territory. This political gesture of the President shows a shift of paradigm in the US military strategy.

Norway and Russia have recently reached an agreement on the properties of the Barents Sea, the stake being the huge energy deposits lying in the Arctic area as unexploited oil reserves around the world are running out29.

Figure 8 : Russian fleet in the ArcticSource http://romanian.ruvr.ru/news/

In the region, there are institutions that define the relations between the employed states: the Arctic Council, the North-European Dimension of the EU, the Nordic Council, the Euro-Arctic Council of the Barents Sea, established in 1993, with the participation of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Russia, and the recently established Arctic Economic Council in 2014, with the participation of all neighbouring states. Starting 2012, the Arctic Council also holds meetings at the level of chiefs of defence member states30.

The problems in the area are economic and political but also concern the national pride. Since 2013, the Russian army has intensified its presence in the Arctic, which is again a place of strategic interest for Moscow, but also for the coastal states and for some major non-coastal powers.

29 Ibid.30 https//:adevărul.ro/internațional/n-lume/batalia-resursele-energetice-oceanul-artic-1-50,

retrieved on 20.05.2019.

Norway and Russia have recently reached an agreement on the properties of the Barents Sea, the stake being the huge energy deposits lying in the Arctic area as unexploited oil reserves around the world are running out.


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THE EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES IS NOT YET SUSTAINABLEBut in the area there are not only contrary interests, there are also

opportunities for cooperation. Thus, Russia has access to Norwegian oilfield technology, with cooperation between Norway Stanoil and Russian companies Gazprom and Rosneft underway. The exploitation of resources has also led to the development of transport infrastructure, in particular naval infrastructure, through the development of port infrastructure in Norway, but also in Russia (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk31).

At the same time, new competitors have emerged in the area for this new and last great energy border of the world. Another “big geopolitical game” is in progress. China, which has a research base in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago since 2004, is building its first nuclear-powered icebreaker.

Figure 9: Energy resources of the ArcticSource: http://www.cass-ro.org/arctica

France, Japan and Korea are cramming together for a bigger role in the area. But these competitors are not received at the negotiating table. Thus, at the meeting of the members of the Arctic Council this year it was appreciated that “more opinions would complicate things”32.

31 http://prosistem.worpress.com/2011/07/11/se-ncinge-lupta-pentru-controlul-Arcticii/, retrieved on 30.05.2019.

32 http://geopolitics.ro/cat-de-rentabila-este-exploatarea-resurselor-energetice-din-zona-arctica-partea-a-doua/, retrieved on 31.05.2019.

Another “big geopolitical game” is in

progress. China, which has a

research base in Norway’s

Svalbard archipelago

since 2004, is building its first

nuclear-powered icebreaker.

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Unlike all other regions in the world rich in energy resources, the Arctic is characterised by a series of challenges that make extraction and transportation difficult, but especially costly.

As an example, oil fields in Saudi Arabia do not experience the long periods of darkness that exist in the Arctic, they are not at thousands of kilometres away from the nearest urban centre, there are no obstacles in terms of weather and expertise. All of these obstacles translate into rising costs.

Onshore drilling is a common problem, but offshore drilling in the Arctic is an issue that requires expertise that not all companies have (for example, Gazprom uses the expertise of the Norwegian company Stahloil), which is expensive and sometimes obtained in exchange for geopolitical concessions (signing by Russia and Norway of the Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic Ocean, through which Russia has agreed to the territorial claims of Norway)33.

The increase of oil and natural gas world production was made possible by the increase in the number of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) terminals worldwide and the exploitation of shale gas. These sources are, however, cheaper than the Arctic’s energy resources.

The market is needed to make a profit, but some producers (Russia, USA, Canada) already have excess energy. Most Arctic energy resources are located offshore, need offshore platforms, require underwater pipelines, infrastructure must be built from frost-resistant materials, and construction materials are more expensive. Also, the low temperatures at which they are delivered (can reach -40o C or more) generate a decrease in the efficiency of the work. It is estimated that work efficiency in the Arctic area is reduced by 15% compared to normal conditions.

Lack of visibility is also a major problem, especially for transportation. Ship transport is difficult. The ships travel on known routes, being supported by expensive surveillance systems34. In Arctic areas, ecosystems are more vulnerable, and human activity also creates risk of accidents.

33 http://geopolitics.ro/cat-de-rentabila-este-exploatarea-resurselor-energetice-din-zona-arctica-partea-a-doua/, retrieved on 31.05.2019.

34 Ibid.

The market is needed to make a profit, but some producers (Russia, USA, Canada) already have excess energy. Most Arctic energy resources are located offshore, need offshore platforms, require underwater pipelines, infrastructure must be built from frost-resistant materials, and construction materials are more expensive.


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At this point, there is a lack of proper maritime maps throughout the region. To have a clearer picture, only 1/8 of Canada’s Arctic waters are explored to modern standards, and the heavy pace of mapping leads us to conclude that the action will take many years. But as the ice melts, economic interests are likely to give mapping action a faster pace.

In recent years, there is an increasing demand for permission to use the North Passage. In 2018 alone, 500 vessels obtained this permit, and the fact that most of them were Russian leads us to the conclusion that behind these actions are Russia’s geopolitical interests and less economic interests35.

THE ARCTIC IS MILITARISINGThe unique natural resources of the Arctic, in particular

hydrocarbons, and the fear of competition for their control and exploitation, have made the Russian Federation consolidate its military presence in the region36. This situation led to the review of security strategies by the other Arctic coastal states, but also by the non-coastal ones that seek to promote their interests in the region.

Figure 10: Arctic Ocean Navy and Coast Guard Ships

35 http://geopolitics.ro/cat-de-rentabila-este-exploatarea-resurselor-energetice-din-zona-arctica-partea-a-doua/, retrieved on 20.05.2019

36 Russia Opens a New Battle Front, available online at https://striripesurse.ro/

The unique natural

resources of the Arctic,

in particular hydrocarbons,

and the fear of competition for

their control and exploitation,

have made the Russian Federation

consolidate its military presence

in the region. This situation

led to the review of security

strategies by the other Arctic

coastal states, but also by the

non-coastal ones that seek

to promote their interests in the

region.

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Russia’s objectives in the region are military ‒ providing ground, air and naval capabilities, covering the entire area – and economic – the exploitation of hydrocarbons, which will require deposits, new and costly technologies, the reopening of the seas.

In this regard, Russia has embarked on an ambitious program of militarisation of the region. Thus, the Kola Peninsula has a special role, being the main base of the Russian strategic submarines (with nuclear propulsion or with propulsion and nuclear armament). The Kola Peninsula has an ideal position not only for nuclear submarines as a core component of nuclear triad, but also for nuclear bombers and intercontinental rocket launch facilities. In this regard, the Russian Federation has increased the number of nuclear warheads from 1,400 in 2014 to 1,796 in 2017, according to information released by the US State Department37. Particular emphasis was given to the modernisation of the infrastructure and armament of all categories of forces.

Naval forces have a special role to play. In this regard, the Joint Strategic Joint Command was created, which includes the North Fleet and all major newly created or existing units belonging to the land and air forces meant to provide control and security of the region. This structure includes 38 surface vessels and approximately 40 submarines, 8 of them carrying ballistic missiles. There are 4 other submarines of the Boron class currently under construction, with the same role of protecting the sovereign waters and ensuring the protection of the forces under the thick layers of ice to inhibit the operations on the ice surface38.

The permanent naval base in the Arctic shelters a group of ships from the North Fleet, which are in permanent alert since 2014 (“Gheorghi Podonomeset” and “Kondopoga” landing vessels, “Sergei Osipov” supply ship, a nuclear powered icebreaker, other additional ships carrying technology, equipment and personnel of the Arctic Armed Group ‒ special structure that is intended to protect Russia’s interests in the region). Also, Moscow has created two infantry brigades, members of the group, for the Arctic areas39. They are located

37 Alexadru Grumaz, op. cit.38 Ibid.39 http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2014_09_10/Flota-nordica-a-Rusiei-va-avea-propria-baza-in-

Arctica-4036/, retrieved on 19.05.2019.


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in the military facilities on Vranghel Island and in the Otto Shmidth Cape, built in the form of a star (which allows free movement inside) and include apartments, canteens, administrative units, gyms, saunas, psychiatric offices40.

Also, the Russian Federation has invested in unmanned research capabilities adapted to Arctic conditions, located in two bases, one of them just 420 nautical miles from Alaska. An indication of the importance of the region is the change of the Russian military strategy in which the particularly important role of the region is explicitly mentioned. The importance of this space also results from the speeches of President Vladimir Putin on different occasions. His statements are followed by concrete actions. There are large and medium range radar systems of Murmansk BN and Nebo class in the area. Russia also reopened some of the former Soviet bases and built new modern bases. It modernised the entire airport and port infrastructure from Tikrit, Yorkuta, Alykel, Rogachyovo and Anadir.

Since 2013, there are growing signs of Russia’s desire to militarise the region. They set up s military base in the Novosibirsk Archipelago, reopened seven aerodromes in the New Siberian Islands, developed its infrastructure for landing fighter and transport aircraft, fuel, nitrogen and oxygen, and pilot training. The MiG-31 BM, Tu-95 and IL-76 M fighter aircraft crews tested the landing on the new aerodromes and performed missions in the area.

They also created an anti-aircraft defence system with only new AA missile systems. It also ordered the renewal of the fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers, three out of six being already operational.

There are signs that the Russian Federation has also created a hybrid naval component that has ships equipped with electronic equipment and which can serve as a “host ship” for mini-submarines capable of diving at great depths. These capabilities have the role of concealing the action of obtaining the information from the fiber optic cables, existing in particular in the area of the GIUK range, and under certain conditions even of cutting them. All these actions of Russia, declared to be only defensive, are part of the anti-access/area-denial strategy (A2/AD) which aims to reduce NATO’s freedom of navigation in the region41.

40 http://romanian.ruvr.ru/news/2014_09_08/Rusia-a-inceput-sa-costruiasca-baze-militare-in-Arctica-9373/, retrieved on 19.05.2019.

41 Ibid.

Since 2013, there are

growing signs of Russia’s desire

to militarise the region.

All these actions of Russia,

declared to be only defensive, are part of the

anti-access/area-denial

strategy (A2/AD) which aims

to reduce NATO’s freedom of

navigation in the region.

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Competition for resources, territories and dominance of the Arctic trade routes implies a militarisation of the region and the darkest scenario is that of a military conflict.

By its claims, Russia collided with all the states in the area. Being engaged on several open fronts, Russia promotes an open policy, and the military presence in the Arctic area is strengthened from year to year.

States with territory in the Arctic also develop plans to build infrastructure, improve their military capabilities, by introducing intelligence, research and surveillance (ISR) systems, training forces to withstand extreme weather conditions and developing the ability of ships to navigate through the ice42.

Norway and Denmark, states bordering the Arctic Ocean, entered the military competition, creating an Arctic battalion.

42 According to Adrian Marius Dobre, “Geopolitics of the people: the struggle for resources in the Arctic area”, available online at https//:calea_europeana.ro/mapamont-geopolitica-nordului-lupta-for-resurse-din-zona-artica-amd/, retrieved on 15.05.2019.

Figure 11 : Russia Fortifying Bases in Arctic RegionRussian fleet in the Arctic – Source http://romanian.ruvr.ru/news/


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In recent years, Canada has intensified its military exercises in the Arctic. Canada also created a team, a force of about 5,000 rangers, ready for action in this region. In this way, it is trying to restore the operational capacity lost as a result of participating in the actions in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONSAll Arctic coastal states have taken into account, in the long

term, the economic and geopolitical potential of the area. Until the investments are profitable, these states will claim areas as wide as possible, trying to extend their ownership and exclusive economic or geopolitical rights. As the existing international mechanisms are inefficient, the disputed issues will be resolved bilaterally.

The natural resources estimated to be in the area are scattered over very large areas, which will cause great problems for exploitation and transport. Following the problems that would involve exploiting the resources of the area, we must look at the plans drafted with great scepticism.

For now, there are unimaginable impediments. We can say that “A New Great Geostrategic Game” is in progress in the Arctic Ocean, whose stakes are known, but not the final result.

Figure 12: Arctic territorial claims

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BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, “Guardian in the path of the storm” magazine collection, years

2010-2015.2. ***, Final Report at Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium,

17-18 April 2001, available at http://www.star.nesdis.roaa.gov/star/documents /2007/IceSymp/FinalArcticReport.2001.pdf

3. Adrian Corobană, “The Triangle of Geopolitical Forces – US-China-Russia”, Editura ARS DOCENDI, București, 2012.

4. Paul Dobrescu, “Geopolitics”, Editura Comunicare.ro, București, 2003.5. Nicolae Dolghin, “Geopolitics. Dependencies on Energy Resources”,

Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2004.6. Aleksandr Dughin, “The Foundations of Geopolitics and the

Geopolitical Future of Russia”, Editura Euroasiatica, București, 2010.7. Ion Porojan, “Aspects of Geopolitics of Energy Resources”, in

“Asymmetry of Energy Resources”, Geopolitics, Journal of Political Geography, Geopolitics and Geostrategy, year V, No. 23, Editura Top Form, București, 2007.

8. Alvin Toffler, “The Third Wave”, Editura Politică, București, 1983.

WEBOGRAPHY:1. http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-revista_presei_international-9396922-

time-Putin_ incinge-cursa-pentru-controlul-arcticului-10000-soldati-rusi-indreapta-spre-nord.html

2. www.referat.ro/referate_despre_oceanul_arctic_referat-html3. http://blog.adrianmariusdobre.eu/4. www.ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oceanul_Arctic5. politica.org.ro/geopoliticaa-/geopolitica_conflictul_arctic_un_

razboi_rece_intr-o_zona_inghetata/22362/6. http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2014_10_30/Oamenii_de_stiinta_au_

demonstrat_ca_Rusia_are_dreptul_sa_revendice_teritorii_arctice/0883/

7. http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2014_08_09_Canada_intentioneaza_sa-si_extinda_ teritoriul_in_ Arctica-61491/

8. http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2014_09_10/Flota-nordica-a-Rusiei-va-avea-propria-baza-in-Arctica-4036/

9. http://romanian.ruvr.ru/news/2014_09_08/Rusia-a-inceput-sa-costruiasca-baze-militare-in-Arctica-9373/

10. www.zf.ro/business_international/zona_arctica_urmatoarea_frontiera_in_lupta_ pentru_resursele_energetice_12535003/

11. http://geopolitics.ro/cat-de-rentabila-este-exploatarea-resurselor-energetice-din-zona-arctica-partea-a-doua/

12. http://ziarullumina.ro/pagina-de-istorie/realitati-si-influente-economice-politica -externa-rusiei


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13. http://www.zf.ro/politica/politica-externa/rusia-vorbeste-de-razboi-in-lupta-pentru-resurseleenergetice-4360567/

14. http://geopolitics.ro/noul-proiect-geopolitic-al-rusiei/15. http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2014_09_10/Flota-Nordica-a-Rusiei-va-

avea-propria-baza-in-Arctica-4036/16. https//www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova_scotia/otawa_sign_288m_

contact_fr_desing_of_artic_ships_1131219417. https//www.ctnews.ca/Canadian_forces_carry_out_artic_training_

exercises_131902618. https://wsl.jw.org/ro.walorg/d/r34/lpm/10200384819. www.referat.ro/referate_despre_oceanul_arctic_referat-html

http://www.cass_ro.org/arctica/Alexandru_Grumaz20. https://www.digi24.ro/externe/Rusia_ameninta_ca_va_scufunda_

navele_straine_care_tranverseaza_oceanul_artic_109352221. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/201903/izvestia_

what_awaits_foreign_military_versus_northern_sea_route/22. http://prosistem.worpress.com/2011/07/11/se-ncinge-lupta-

pentru-controlul-Arcticii/23. http://geopolitics.ro/cat-de-rentabila-este-exploatarea-resurselor-

energetice-din-zona-arctica-partea-a-doua/24. https//:adevărul.ro/internațional/n-lume/batalia-resursele-

energetice-oceanul-artic-1-50.25. Scott Borgerson, Caytlyn Antrim, ,,An Arctic Circle of Friends”,

available online at https//www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/opinion/28borgerson

26. Alexandru Grumaz, A New Battle Front for Russia, available online at https://adevarul.ro/international/artica_un_nou_front_de_lupta_pentru_rusia/.. ./index.html

27. P. Singh, “Whose Arctic is it anyway?”, available online at https//idso.in/publications

28. Alex Vărzaru, “Canada vrea oficial Polul Nord”, available online at www.ziare.com/internațional/canada/canada-vrea-oficial-polul-nord-272124.

122122No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

RED TEAM RED TEAM – CRITICAL THINKING MAIN TOOL – CRITICAL THINKING MAIN TOOL

IN THE OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS – IN THE OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS –

Major (N) Silviu CONSTANTINIANUThe Romanian Naval Forces Staff

Within the operations planning process we often encounter situations where the quality of the commanders’ thinking can make the difference between failure and success. Regardless of the level of experience or personality, a commander must be the person to see the overall picture, to see what really happens even when the events take a new and unexpected turn.

Despite these qualities, the commander is likely to create his own psychological and logical barriers in making effective decisions. Challenging these barriers is the attribute of critical thinking, the red team being its main tool.

Under these conditions, the activity of the red team within the operations planning process will play a decisive role in achieving the objectives at either strategic, operational or tactical level.

Keywords: red team, critical thinking, commander, operations planning process, psychological and logical barriers.


123

Red Team – Critical Thinking Main Tool in the Operations Planning Process –Red Team – Critical Thinking Main Tool in the Operations Planning Process –

123 MILITARY THEORY AND ARTMILITARY THEORY AND ART

INTRODUCTIONThe modern war is a complex one and more than ever it integrates

in its actions, besides the armed forces, governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations and other civil institutions. These new and ever-changing problems represent a challenge to the quality of the command act and are inherent in the ability of commanders to make decisions in an operational environment so unfit for classical military thinking. Thus, military leaders need to see the problem through several lenses.

Recent conflicts and events have confirmed the dynamic nature of the operational environment, as well as of all actors in and around the area of operations. The flexibility, adaptability and non-traditionality of the modern adversary requires a continuous reassessment of how he thinks and acts. The inventiveness and ability of the military to think freely when others have their blinders on is a necessity in solving the increasingly complex problems that the Romanian Armed Forces are faced with.

Being part of an organisation with its own culture, military personnel will most often share similar mindsets and beliefs. On the other hand, a system that works frequently under stressful conditions will require the existence of a solid moral component. This feature is often an asset, but it can become a weakness as long as it leads to limiting thinking, discouraging people from expressing their views, or excluding alternative perspectives.

Increasingly, the military is expected to respond promptly to all the challenges that come with exercising the command. Whether talking about making intuitive or analytical decisions, commanders must possess the skills needed for critical thinking whereby the solution found to be the most effective. The lack of critical thinking in the operations planning process is an important failure factor at all levels – strategic, operative or tactical.

Recent conflicts and events

have confirmed the dynamic

nature of the operational

environment, as well as of all

actors in and around the area

of operations. The flexibility,

adaptability and non-

traditionality of the modern

adversary requires a

continuous reassessment of

how he thinks and acts.

124

Silviu CONSTANTINIANUSilviu CONSTANTINIANU

124No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

In addition to a continuous reassessment of the operational environment, commanders should periodically review the processes, structures and practices used in a broader context. The military system needs that ability to adapt quickly to new and unexpected challenges. The lessons learned from modern operations or conflicts suggest that we need to improve the process of planning and executing operations not only among fighters but also within support structures. These lessons show the need to understand the problem, to learn, to adapt and to anticipate.

Originally developed as a need for people to think freely, the term critical thinking has evolved throughout history, taking some of the most complex forms and undergoing continuous transformation. Finally, critical thinking has become a structured process that is based on a series of well-defined tools and has clear goals, based on realities and well-stated beliefs.

Critical thinking is a means to improve the quality of analytical and intuitive decisions, and nullifying or diminishing the effects of groupthink1 can generate new possibilities. The commander must encourage and support the use of critical thinking tools in the process of operations planning.

THE COMMANDER AND THE OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESSDue to their complexity, military operations require the

simultaneous use of a high volume of information and data, which often leads to disorientation within the staff members. We can say that the main role of a commander in the planning process is precisely to lead, coordinate, facilitate and clarify the activities that his staff has to carry out. In order to reach this goal, a commander must be able to understand the operational environment and, in particular, the problem which the structure he/she represents is faced with. The involvement of the commander in the planning process is illustrated in figure no. 12.

1 Groupthink is a process that occurs when a group of individuals reaches a decision without critical reasoning, expressing opinions, suggesting other perspectives etc., which may contradict the majority opinion.

2 See Iulian Martin, Raționament și argumentare în planificarea operațiilor, Editura UNAp, București, 2015, p. 144.

The main role of a commander in the planning process is precisely to lead, coordinate, facilitate and clarify the activities that his staff has to carry out. In order to reach this goal, a commander must be able to understand the operational environment and, in particular, the problem which the structure he/she represents is faced with.


125



It is noted that a commander must first visualise the operational approach. Basically, he must be aware of what he has to do in order to reach the end state. Thus, the operational approach can be defined as a description of the broad actions which the structure/ force/ unit must take to transform the current conditions into those desired as end state.

Figure no. 1: Relations between commander and staff during the Operational Planning Process

The US Army War College, in its online courses3, highlights no less than four planning methodologies made available to a commander to determine the operational approach. They are:

• centre of gravity factor analysis;• operational design methodology;• joint mission essential task list – JMETL/ doctrines;

Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) – specific to the operational level and the different service branches.

At the same time, the commander is the person who draws the guidelines within a group and, more than that, identifies and diminishes the effect of psychological and logical barriers on critical thinking.

3 Arguing the OE, Episode 10: Integrating Four Planning Practices, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HovfTjztX3U, retrieved on 21 August 2019.

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126No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

The main psychological barriers to critical thinking include, among others:

• loyalty, herd instinct, and groupthink; • archetypes, prejudice, stereotypes, and scapegoats/finger

pointing; • wishful thinking, mirror-imaging, and self-deception; • rationalisation and denial.

The most common formal or informal logical fallacies within the operations planning process include among others:

• appeal to authority – when an assumption is considered valid only because it is the commander’s assumption;

• straw man – supporting an argument based on the distortion of an opponent’s opinion;

• fallacy of composition – inferring that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole;

• false dilemma – it is assumed that there are only two alternatives when, in fact, there are more than two;

• proof by example – one or more examples are given to support a general statement;

• burden of proof – the opponent will have the responsibility to prove something;

• irrelevant conclusion (red herring or misdirection) – attempting to redirect the argument to another issue to which the person doing the redirecting can better respond;

• faulty analogy – when two elements that appear to be similar but have totally different properties are compared;

• questionable statistics – assuming that because two things are alike in one or more respects, they are necessarily alike in some other respect4.

RED TEAM – OVERVIEWRed team first appeared in the post-World War II period when the

US military made the decision to simulate certain high-level strategies and evaluate the results. In 19635, an article in The Journal of Conflict, written by Robert Davis describes the results of a simulation (war

4 Texas State University website, https://www.txstate.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/Faulty-Analogy.html, retrieved on 27 August 2019.

5 See https://www.sixdub.net/?p=705, retrieved on 28 August 2019.

The most common formal or informal logical fallacies within the operations planning process include: appeal to authority; straw man; fallacy of composition; false dilemma; proof by example; burden of proof; irrelevant conclusion; faulty analogy; questionable statistics.


127



game) in which the blue team (US) had to work with the red team (Soviet Union) to sign a potential weapons control treaty. Davis’s work was one of the first official records of using the red team to test the decision-making process during an exercise.

Since the 21st century, the concept has undergone a gradual development and has become a formal method of analysis. It has been formally adopted by the US military to plan future operations, industry activities, to verify courses of action and, to a large extent, to test intelligence estimates.

The term red team is used in multiple frameworks, being interpreted in a variety of ways by different people and organisations. In essence, it is a function or tool by which a commander, leader or manager may enhance his knowledge and understanding of a situation through consideration of alternative perspectives6.

The red team appeared under the conditions of the already existing red cell concept (structure used mainly during the war game), and this seems to have created confusion. Moreover, it was not always fully understood within the operations planning groups. If the red cell is part of the intelligence group and has specific responsibilities during the operations planning process (represents the simulated adversary), the red team represents a structure made up of trained and educated experts that provides the commander with a tool necessary for critical analysis from – an alternative perspective, reviewing the plans and analysing the adversary’s capabilities in order to support the decision-making process.

The main objectives of the red team are the following:• to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats;• to contest assumptions in order to verify their viability;• to propose alternative strategies;• to test the plan by simulation;• to improve the decision-making process and to achieve more

efficient results.The red team is therefore a structure that supports the commanders

and the planning groups (complementary to the intelligence, operations and planning groups). Moreover, it allows them to fully explore the alternatives to the plan, the concepts, structures and available

6 A Guide to Red Teaming, https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/cde/rr_ukdcdc.pdf, retrieved on 30 August 2019.

The red team appeared under

the conditions of the already

existing red cell concept

(structure used mainly during

the war game), and this seems

to have created confusion.

Moreover, it was not always

fully understood within the

operations planning groups.

The red team is a function or

tool by which a commander,

leader or manager may

enhance his knowledge and understanding

of a situation through

consideration of alternative perspectives.

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capabilities, all of them in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of their own forces, adversaries as well as other actors participating in the operation. The red team provides a better understanding of the enemy way of action and visualisation of the operational environment; it is an important analytical tool for improving the decision-making process.

The red team improves the way the commander sees the problem and gives him/her a better encompassing view. Each way of seeing the problem may require a different approach, ranging from a thorough examination provided through tests and war games, to proposing alternatives or by identifying the actions and reactions of others. Any project may require a combination of these approaches and produces conclusions, as presented in figure no. 27

Figure no. 2: The Red Teaming spectrum

7 A Guide to Red Teaming, loc. cit.

The red team improves the way the commander sees the problem and gives him/her a better encompassing view. Each way of seeing the problem may require a different approach, ranging from a thorough examination provided through tests and war games, to proposing alternatives or by identifying the actions and reactions of others. Any project may require a combination of these approaches and produces conclusions.


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RED TEAMING OR RED TEAM AT WORKRed teaming is a deliberate process, accomplished by a qualified

team, with access to relevant expertise and capable of critical and alternative analysis. Red teaming varies depending on objective, field or on the context in which it is used. For example, this activity could be undertaken in order to:

• deliberately challenge own plans and assumptions;• test a system, plan or approach through the eyes of an

adversary/outside;• better understand the options available for adversaries by

generating plausible assumptions based on their past behaviour and their culture;

• prevent enemy deception;• better understand partners, local populations or other

influential actors (also known as white, green or brown teaming);

• better prepare an organisation against the unexpected.• In other words, red teaming must fulfil three main tasks:• aid in the planning and development of operations and decision

support;• critically review and analyse existing plans;• provide information support.

Red teaming could be described as being the art of applying an alternative structured and independent critical thinking to a specific type of organisation. At the same time, it is the art of contesting assumptions and fully exploring alternative results with the objective of reducing vulnerabilities and increasing opportunities8. Red teaming is the independent application of a range of structured, creative and critical thinking techniques to assist the end user to make a better-informed decision or produce a more robust product9. In other words, the term uses a set of tactics, techniques and procedures aimed at testing own plans by identifying vulnerabilities and improving the decision-making process.

All organisations that aim to solve problems, find conclusions, develop plans, develop concepts, produce information, create

8 A Guide to Red Teaming, https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/cde/rr_ukdcdc.pdf, retrieved on 30 August 2019.

9 Red Teaming Guide – second edition, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142533/20130301_red_teaming_ed2.pdf, retrieved on 30 August 2019.

In other words, red teaming

must fulfil three main

tasks: aid in the planning and

development of operations and

decision support; critically

review and analyse existing

plans; provide information

support.

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scenarios, conduct experiments, simulate opponents’ way of action or simply make decisions can benefit from the activity of red teams. Using innovative methods and techniques, these teams contribute decisively to solving complex problems, counteracting institutional biases and stimulating critical and creative thinking10. In conclusion, red teams can support decision-making regardless of the type of organisation they are a part of.

In order for a red team to effectively contribute to these decisions, the following elements must be considered:

1. The ability to think critically about a problem – while this may seem obvious, the reality is that critical thinking is a set of skills that requires training, education and the use of a set of tools. The military system, even if it is composed of people from different social backgrounds, remains one of the most rigid social systems. Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of this kind of system is that people tend to share the same biases11 and mindset. The common values that we can see in the military culture have their own specificity and are not universal outside this culture.

2. Critical thinking and challenging the groupthink is an unnatural act for military personnel. To do this effectively requires tools and methods that allow leaders to see different perspectives and ways of approaching the problem.

3. The red team needs cover given by the upper echelons to allow it to challenge the thinking and experience of the leaders of an organisation. Regardless of the quality of the red team or the methods it uses, dictatorial or toxic leaders will not create the necessary framework for the development of a successful activity.

4. Red teaming is not easy and not everyone can do it. Team members must be very good communicators, both orally and in writing. They should also have recognition and expertise in the area in which they operate, which will give them credibility. They must be able to constructively challenge the operations plan, be able to explain why this plan is being

10 JP 5-0 Joint Planning, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf, retrieved on 30 August, 2019.

11 The term bias is defined as an inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair.

Critical thinking and challenging the groupthink is an unnatural act for military personnel. To do this effectively requires tools and methods that allow leaders to see different perspectives and ways of approaching the problem.


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challenged, focus on what is really important, and provide some alternative ways of thinking about the problem.

5. There is no template used by the red team – its activity must be tailored to the specific requirements. At the same time, it must be taken into account that the time available, the expertise, the composition of the team, the type of leaders the team will work with, all of these are critical factors during red teaming.

The red team works best “behind the scene”, assisting the commander and the staff in a non-critical and useful way, without taking credit (it is quite difficult to accept someone who criticises your thinking as extremely unpleasant if that person does it out loud and in a repulsive way).

During red teaming, certain activities are required in a clearly established order:

• identifying the problem that the red team needs to solve;• establishing the red team composition according to their

members expertise, experience and communication skills;• setting goals to be achieved;• establishing how the products resulting from red teaming will

be used.According to the fact that the red team is a useful tool in solving

a problem, the first step to be followed is identifying the analytical problem or the issues to be considered, whether these are strategic, operational or tactical12:

• strategic level: contesting ideas and sustaining hypothesis or decisions regarding acquisition programmes;

• operational level: contesting assumptions, the combat capacity of units or the urgent operational plans or requests;

• tactical level: verifying the training process of units, the completed plans executed in a timely manner or certain ongoing programmes.

Once the problem is identified and the initial analysis is completed, the next step conducts to identifying a proper red team. The team should be a successful combination of both competences and expertise features in order to fulfil the issue given, and it may be formed by experts, critical thinkers, analysts and adversarial role players. Some studies state that the amount of personnel should totalise 2 to 25 members (an optimal value is between 5 and 9)13, yet the number

12 A Guide to Red Teaming, loc. cit.13 Red Teaming Guide – second edition, loc. cit.

During red teaming,

certain activities are required

in a clearly established

order: identifying the

problem that the red team

needs to solve; establishing

the red team composition according to

their members expertise,

experience and communication

skills; setting goals to be

achieved; establishing how

the products resulting from

red teaming will be used.

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can constantly change depending on the dimension of the planning group, the level of the central command unit or the operation difficulty. Regardless the approach, it is obvious that a reduced number of members might reduce creativity and diversity, while a bigger number of members might affect the quality of the products.

The red team will further need defined objectives, guidance through the interaction process with the planning group and, whenever is possible, an informing schedule of the red team conclusions. In this case, the commander must order the implementation process of the red team outcomes.

Using the red team means completing the following:• creating the necessary conditions – the red team needs a

challenge-opened environment;• undergoing of the red team activity during the making decision

process – otherwise it cannot be created and it should not be undertaken when the process is over;

• acknowledging the red team support – the contribution should be evaluated and used to improve the expected results;

• defining specific objectives for both red team and planning group;

• choosing a proper red team for accomplishing the aims (properly skilled members);

• acknowledging the necessity of connecting the red team with the planning group – the red team will support the planning group, yet the approach should remain critical and opposite;

• focusing of attention on key aspects – the red team will contribute to the development of a qualitative, rather than quantitative thinking process;

• acknowledging the uselessness of an improper red team – the activity might be misguiding and lead to fake confidence.

The red team products – written estimations, wargaming results – offer the commander, leader or manager an independent capacity of using alternative concepts, projects, plans or operational design.

The main characteristics of the red team are defined by the command unit needs. In establishing red teaming, certain questions should be considered:

• how the red team should be organised and compound of? (on-place, permanent, by one person or on-call);

• which is the red team main role? (states and evaluates assumptions, explores alternatives and consolidates acknowledge);

The red team products – written estimations, wargaming results – offer the commander, leader or manager an independent capacity of using alternative concepts, projects, plans or operational design.


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• who is more entitled to do that? (the rank, age and experience are not primary factors in choosing the red team members – they should be proactive, critical, creative and curious);

• when will red teaming take place? (permanent, on request, during the planning process);

• to whom is the red team subordinated? (to commander/chief of staff);

• where does red teaming take place? (during all planning steps).The methods, instruments and activities undertaken by the red

team are various and have in common the analysing and testing processes of a certain military structure using alternative perspectives. Considering the military organisation specificity, methods should check the following14:

• structured techniques: mind mapping, concept mapping;• creative techniques: brainstorming, reversed brainstorming,

six thinking hats, creative combinations;• diagnosis techniques: verifying the key assumptions, role play,

general thinking, analysis of future alternatives, analysis of contradictory assumptions, wargame, experiment, identifying the misguiding actions, major impact analysis/reduced probability, verifying information quality;

• challenging techniques: team A/team B, devil’s advocate, “what if” analysis.

Comparing red teaming with intelligence analysis, it is noted that a red team member is different from an intelligence analyst in several respects. First of all, red teaming is not constrained by a certain plan developed by the staff or by the need to find evidence. Thus, a red team member is more like a historian (whose job is to ask general questions in search general answers). On the other hand, the intelligence analyst aims to find answers to very specific questions. That is why red teaming pursues more than the understanding of the operational environment, it seeks to identify how the environment can be shaped15.

In the operations planning process, it is obvious that the whole planning group plays the role of the blue team. Its role, in relation to the red team, is to defend its operations plan and to demonstrate and argue for each planning assumption considered. A comparative

14 Buletinul UNAp, https://revista.unap.ro/index.php/revista/article/view/666, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

15 Reflections from a Red Team Leader, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr07/ Craig.pdf, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

The methods, instruments

and activities undertaken by

the red team are various and

have in common the analysing

and testing processes of a

certain military structure using

alternative perspectives.

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analysis between the activity of the blue and the red teams highlights the importance of the latter in identifying the vulnerabilities of the entire planning process16:

Operations Planning Process Blue Teaming Red TeamingUnderstanding the Operating Environment

Alongside each other to develop understanding

Understanding the Problem (end state, objectives, centres of gravity, decisive conditions/ points)

States assumptions

Red challenge Blue assumptions and/or develops own assumptions

Develops outcomes

Red critiques Blue outcomes

Formulate Potential Courses of Action

Formulates potential courses of action

Formulates own potential courses of action

Red critiques Blue courses of action

Red produces alternative Blue courses of action

Develop and Validate Courses of Action

Wargaming

Red plays Red or

Red provides independent judgement or

Red facilitatesEvaluate Courses of Action

Commanders Decision Alongside each other to produce plansTable no. 1: Sequencing Red and Blue Planning

CONCLUSIONSThe Red Team is an analytical tool through which the learning and

understanding that underlies effective adaptation and anticipation are developed. To be successful, it must use robust methods and include the right people to do it. Moreover, the results should be taken seriously, even if they prove to be unexpected or unpleasant.

The red team is also an absolutely essential component of strategic planning and tactical information protection. Although expectations

16 A Guide to Red Teaming, loc. cit.


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are often too high, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of the red team’s activity is simple: to challenge and test the proposed plan or system through a critical but grounded attitude. If the team achieves this goal, then it will contribute to the development of an organisation, regardless of its nature.

Despite its many advantages, the red team is not a guarantee of success. As we have seen, its credibility depends on the quality and experience of its members, the approach, the set of tools used and, to a large extent, the quality of the leadership. It is unlikely that an uninformed, overly confidential or biased team will bring added value – in undesirable conditions the activity of this team may come at the expense of the beneficiary structure. In addition, as noted above, the products of a successful red team will not be of any benefit if they are rejected or disregarded by the commander.

The value of the red team does not come from the tools it uses – whether they are related to the operational environment or the planning process – but rather from its degree of independence, from its direct interaction with the staff or the planning group and from the confidence the commander offers. The red teams do not try to replace the professionals, but rather to help them17.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, A Guide to Red Teaming, https://www.act.nato.int/images/

stories/events/2011/cde/rr_ukdcdc.pdf.2. ***, Arguing the OE, Episode 10: Integrating Four Planning Practices,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HovfTjztX3U.3. ***, Armed Forces Journal, http://armedforcesjournal.com/dont-

box-in-the-red-team/4. ***, Buletinul UNAp, https://revista.unap.ro/index.php/revista/

article/view/666.5. ***, JP 5-0 Joint Planning, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/

Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf,6. ***, Red Teaming Guide ‒ second edition, https://assets.publishing.

service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142533/20130301_red_teaming_ed2.pdf.

7. ***, Reflections from a Red Team Leader, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr07/Craig.pdf.

8. Iulian Martin, Raţionament şi argumentare în planificarea operaţiilor, Editura UNAp, Bucureşti, 2015.

17 Armed Forces Journal, http://armedforcesjournal.com/dont-box-in-the-red-team/, retrieved on 16 September 2019.

Despite its many advantages,

the red team is not a guarantee

of success. As we have seen,

its credibility depends on

the quality and experience of its members,

the approach, the set of tools used and, to a

large extent, the quality of the leadership. It

is unlikely that an uninformed,

overly confidential or

biased team will bring added

value – in undesirable

conditions the activity of this

team may come at the expense of

the beneficiary structure.

136136No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

THE INFLUENCE OF CYBER OFFENSIVE THE INFLUENCE OF CYBER OFFENSIVE ACTIONS ON MILITARY CONFLICTSACTIONS ON MILITARY CONFLICTS

Lieutenant Colonel (AF) Vasile-Cristian ONESIMIUCPhD Student, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest

The accelerated advance of digital infrastructure directly affects almost all aspects of human life and has an important effect on the Armed Forces and its development. Cyber operations have already been involved in nowadays conflicts and it has become certain that their role will further increase in all Armed Forces activities. As a consequence, in order to be able to successfully carry out their missions, the Armed Forces need to be able to adapt to a new security environment where cyber threats are a constant presence. Such adjustment represents a challenge that will require time and other resources more or less available.

Keywords: Armed Forces, conflicts, offensive cyber operations, security, capabilities.


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The Influence of Cyber Offensive Actions on Military ConflictsThe Influence of Cyber Offensive Actions on Military Conflicts


INTRODUCTIONThe accelerated development of digital technology at global level

directly influences the development of the military forces, having a considerable impact on the aspect of military conflicts as well. Such a development of digital technology brings obvious benefits to military forces, causing all processes carried on in time of peace, as well as those performed during crisis or war, to be more efficient, while, at the same time, brings a destabilising effect by creating new vulnerabilities that could be exploited by different actors, interested in disturbing the proper conduct of the activities of one state’s military forces.

The ever more faster developing rhythm of conflicts leads to an increased use of resources, from all areas, either directly involved or related. The integration of modern digital technology in supporting the conduct of current activities may optimise and reduce associated costs, whereas the arms race and its support becomes increasingly expensive and difficult to sustain by the economic growth, due to the higher costs of top military technologies.

ARMED FORCES AND THE NEWS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT The technological progress, accompanied by the doctrine changes

as imposed by introducing new types of armament systems, does not diminish the importance of the conventional war, the armed forces are formed and equipped so that they could get engaged in any type of war, while, at the same time, developing new capabilities, to ensure that they will be able to offer a suitable response to the complex tendencies of evolution of the global security level, are being considered.

For example, one of the sophisticated weapon systems the USA used in Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the aerial drone, has been successfully penetrated1 by insurgents using a software available on the internet for a small amount of money ($26). The video images

1 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/17/skygrabber-american-drones-hacked, retrieved on 09.09.2019.

The ever more faster developing rhythm of

conflicts leads to an increased

use of resources, from all areas, either directly

involved or related. The

integration of modern digital

technology in supporting

the conduct of current activities

may optimise and reduce

associated costs, whereas the

arms race and its support becomes

increasingly expensive

and difficult to sustain by

the economic growth, due to

the higher costs of top military technologies.

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Vasile-Cristian ONESIMIUCVasile-Cristian ONESIMIUC

138No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

were sent unencrypted between the drones of the US Armed Forces and the ground control stations. The software allowed the insurgents to access the video images, to possibly determine the location of future targets and to take measures to avoid being hit.

The US military command was aware that the videos sent were not encrypted, but it considered the data interception as being over the technically available capabilities of the insurgents. Following the discovery of a large number of images with the insurgents, it was decided to encrypt the videos sent by the drones, in order to eliminate the identified vulnerability. Although the US officials suspected Iran to have been involved by providing the military technique used to intercept the images, the author of the article alleges that the problem of intercepting the video images could have been easily solved, possibly by accident, by tuning a TV on the signal emitted by the drone.

The above given example presents very easily one of the ways major investments in the advanced military armament programmes of a powerful state are countered by a much more modest opponent with respect to technology. One of the lessons learned is that any state can be a possible target, the major disturbance in conventional armed forces engaged in military conflicts could be significantly reduced by performing offensive or defensive cyber operations. The nature of cyber operations, the hidden way of performing, could offer a significant military advantage to the attacker and, at the same time, until it is discovered, through the lack of visible actions against the targeted/attacked armament systems, could create a safety feeling for the obviously superior armed forces.

The US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has been aware of the deep changes which appeared in the cyberspace since its creation,

The nature of cyber operations, the hidden way of performing, could offer a significant military advantage to the attacker and, at the same time, until it is discovered, through the lack of visible actions against the targeted/attacked armament systems, could create a safety feeling for the obviously superior armed forces.


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by stating “Achieving superiority in the physical domains in no small part depends on superiority in cyberspace”2. The joint way of performing conventional military operations and achieving superiority against the opponent is essentially connected to the cyber component; however, in order to achieve such superiority, there has been identified the necessity of a new approach, which should be aligned with the new strategic reality. One of the important elements recognised as such by the document (see the image on the right), also valid for other state, we can even say it is a generally valid assertion, is that offensive cyber operations are taking place under the level where they could be considered as part of a military conflict. The lack of overcoming this threshold, after which cyber operations could be classified as military operations, determines the delay or even no response by the one which is under attack. The USA has acknowledged the importance of holding powerful cyber capabilities, able to stop adversaries’ attacks before they could cause damages, but, at the same time, able to cause a change in the adversary’s behaviour and to induce a feeling of insecurity in performing actions. Holding powerful cyber capabilities will be able to extend military options of response currently found at the disposal of state and military leaders, but the desired cyber superiority is not implicitly ensured, it being constantly under attack by other actors which have cyber capabilities. This document identifies five essential conditions to meet the desired objectives. The second condition3, as identified within the document – “Create cyberspace advantages to enhance operations in all domains. Develop advantages in preparation for and during joint operations in conflict, as well as below the threshold of armed conflict. Integrate cyberspace capabilities and forces into plans and operations across all domains” – represents a clear statement of the intentions of the USA, to use cyber operations, in the same way adversaries use them, under the limit where they are seen as being part of a military conflict, but integrated from the very beginning in the military operations.

The so-called “militarisation” of the cyberspace4 is an effect of actions performed within the cyberspace, the US efforts to actively

2 See https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4419681/Command-Vision-for-USCYBERCOM- 23-Mar-18.pdf, p. 1, retrieved on 08.09.2019.

3 Ibidem, p. 8, retrieved on 08.09.2019.4 Ibidem, p. 10, retrieved on 08.09.2019.

The USA has acknowledged

the importance of holding

powerful cyber capabilities, able to stop adversaries’

attacks before they could cause damages, but, at

the same time, able to cause a

change in the adversary’s

behaviour and to induce a feeling

of insecurity in performing

actions.

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protect its interests and its allies being a consequence of the aggressive actions of its adversaries.

NATO evaluated the cyber threat5 and found the need to adopt some capabilities that are able to protect the Alliance from cyber-attacks. Therefore, in 2008, it was adopted the first NATO policy for cyber defence. Further on, in 2014, cyber defence became an element of common defence, the Alliance stating that a cyber-attack can lead to invoking article 5 from the NATO Treaty, the collective defence clause.

The fast evolution of the cyber threat resulted in recognising, in 2016, the cyberspace as a domain for military operations. Naturally, it has led to the need to strengthen, as a priority, the cyber defence of national networks and infrastructure. Likewise, NATO adopted new policies in the field of cyber defence (2017), which restate the important role of the cyber defence within the collective defence, confirm the application of international laws to cyberspace, and are meant to develop some capabilities, both at NATO level and at member states’ level, the main purpose being to protect the networks NATO already has and uses.

NATO Communiqué following the Brussels Summit6 (2018), in article 20, presents as clearly as possible the objective desired by the Alliance in cyberspace: “We must be able to operate as effectively in cyberspace as we do in the air, on land, and at sea to strengthen and support the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence posture”. This defensive posture shall be achieved through integrating all cyber capabilities of the Alliance’s member states, willingly presented. A problem raised for NATO’s cyber doctrine is how the deterrence and defence capacity influence the lack of strong cyber offensive capabilities7, a question that faces the reluctance of the Alliance’s member states in declaring the offensive cyber capabilities they held. Acknowledging the complex issue of designating the author of a cyber-attack, the Alliance admits that the responsibility of such designation is a sovereign national prerogative.

The problem of recognising the attribution of cyber-attacks is much bigger, since, at the moment, there are no legal norms or unanimously

5 See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm, retrieved on 07.09.2019.6 See https://www.mae.ro/node/46405, retrieved on 07.09.2019.7 See https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-role-of-offensive-cyber-operations-

in-nato-s-collective-defense, retrieved on 08.09.2019.

NATO evaluated the cyber threat and found the need to adopt some capabilities that are able to protect the Alliance from cyber-attacks. Therefore, in 2008, it was adopted the first NATO policy for cyber defence. Further on, in 2014, cyber defence became an element of common defence, the Alliance stating that a cyber-attack can lead to invoking article 5 from the NATO Treaty, the collective defence clause.


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approved behaviours, so that all actors that act within the cyberspace (states, organisations and so on) have the possibility to choose whether to perform an attack or create a cyber incident, to establish their level of complexity or ways to respond when methods of cyber defence are applied.

Another element which intricates the use of cyber offensive actions is the lack of clear limits with respect to the response levels to various types of cyber-attacks, beginning with the current ones up to an advanced persistent threat (Advanced Persistent Threat). Likewise, the multitude of definitions used to define the terms and expressions used in cyber domain, without being widely accepted, does not help to clarify the concern in the area and leads to an apparent acceptance of some terms and expressions frequently used, but whose meaning may be different for the user.

Romania’s Cyber Security Strategy8 defines the terms used in the cyber domain, as follows:

Cyberspace: “a virtual environment, generated by cyber infrastructures, including information processed, stored or transmitted content, as well as actions performed by users in it”.

Cyber security: “the normal status which results from the application of a series of proactive and reactive measures by which confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-rejection of information in electronic format are being ensured, of resources and public or private services, from cyberspace. The proactive and reactive measures may include policies, concepts, standards and security guidelines, risk management, awareness and training activities, implementation of technical solutions to protect the cyber infrastructure, the identity management, the management of consequences”.

Cyber defence: “actions performed within the cyberspace with the purpose of protecting, monitoring, analysing, finding, fighting back against aggressions and ensuring the right response to threats on cyber national defence infrastructure”.

Cyber-attack: “civil operation performed within the cyberspace which may affect cyber security”.

8 See https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gm3demzrgq/strategia-de-securitate-cibernetica-a-romaniei-hotarare-271-2013?dp=gy2dsnjugu4ts, section 3 (1), retrieved on 07.09.2019.

The problem of recognising the

attribution of cyber-attacks

is much bigger, since, at the

moment, there are no

legal norms or unanimously

approved behaviours, so that all actors

that act within the cyberspace

(states, organisations

and so on) have the possibility to choose whether

to perform an attack or create

a cyber incident, to establish

their level of complexity or

ways to respond when methods

of cyber defence are applied.

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For instance, Tallinn Manual 2.09 provides the following definition for cyber- attack: “A cyber-attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonable expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects”.

It is easily noticeable how complex the issue of defining cyber-attack is, from the perspective of only two different entities that use the same term. Giving multiple definitions to the same term has further repercussions to understanding all aspects that definition refers to, and to the actual operations performed within cyberspace. In the absence of unanimously internationally recognised definitions, there are problems with establishing a legal framework for regulating operations within cyberspace, in a similar way to that adopted for conventional military operations performed on land, sea and air. Nevertheless, unlike conventional military operations, where the conduct of an attack is the responsibility of the military forces of that state, within cyberspace conducting an attack does not need approval or support from that state.

Military conflicts have evolved along with the evolution of the weapon systems found in the possession of the armed forces engaged in a conflict. The action range for the weapon systems allowed contact of the enemy from the moment it finds itself within the visual range of the top limit of the used systems, that is from hundreds to thousands of km10. This evolution of the armament systems has to be closely mirrored by a change in the way military strategist and those who use the armament think, so as to a more complete integration of new armament systems into military strategies and tactics.

The effect of the weapon systems found within the armed forces (artillery systems, aircraft, missile systems and so on) has, among others, a common characteristic which singles them out from the effect of offensive cyber operations, namely that they take a different amount of time to achieve the effect on the target, this amount of time being larger where the distance to the target is bigger. On the other hand, the global interconnection of digital technology leads to an almost instantaneous effect, without being influenced by the distance between the cyber -attack and the target. Moreover, such an attack

9 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd edition, p. 415.10 See https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/

November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/, retrieved on 08.09.2019.

The effect of the weapon systems found within the armed forces (artillery systems, aircraft, missile systems and so on) has, among others, a common characteristic which singles them out from the effect of offensive cyber operations, namely that they take a different amount of time to achieve the effect on the target, this amount of time being larger where the distance to the target is bigger.


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can, at the same time, have effects on other domains which do not appear to have direct connection with the aimed target.

Although traditionally the security environment, with its threats, risks and associated vulnerabilities, is being scrutinised and regulated mainly form a military perspective, the current security environment has to be analysed within a larger framework, which should include elements from different fields, outside the strict military area.

The National Defence Strategy of our country11 identifies the fact that “the security environment shall continue to be influenced by multiple challenges, some with predictable and linear expressions, that represent consequences of the strategies followed, in the long term, by various state and non-state actors, while others, on the contrary, with unpredictable, non-linear and deeply disturbing character, which could generate strategic surprises”. What becomes obvious is, of course, the big challenge posed by the security environment, found in a continuous dynamics, over the decision-making factors, that, in turn, have to ensure, through the means available, the development of military capacities and not only, so as to provide the security of the state and its inhabitants.

Being a member of both the European Union and NATO means building and adapting the security environment to the currently in force standards, as found within these organisations, which shall maintain in focus the evolution of the regional security environment. It is obvious that the national security cannot be ensured individually and that the cooperation within the international structures that we are a member of can contribute to maintaining a secure climate. However, the fortification of the national military and civil forces to standards that allow defence against hostile actions should not be neglected.

The National Defence Strategy of our country12 identifies the courses of action to develop the response capacity towards the new challenges of the security environment, to consolidate the national defence capacity, including by the efficient use of existing mechanisms of NATO: development of necessary capabilities of reaction to asymmetric threats, adaptation of the security industry to the equipment requests of the armed forces, as well as to ensure

11 The National Defence Strategy to Protect the Country between 2015 and 2019. A Strong Romania in Europe and Worldwide, București, 2015, paragraph 27, p. 11.

12 Ibidem, paragraphs 72-75, pp.18-19.

The National Defence Strategy

of our country identifies

the fact that “the security environment

shall continue to be influenced

by multiple challenges, some with predictable

and linear expressions,

that represent consequences

of the strategies followed, in the

long term, by various state

and non-state actors, while

others, on the contrary, with unpredictable, non-linear and

deeply disturbing character, which

could generate strategic

surprises”.

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the mechanisms of prevention and counter-attack of cyber-attacks on information strategic infrastructures. The above identified courses of action have a defensive character, reactive to threats on national security.

The analysis of the actual security environment shall lead to “creating modern, flexible and efficient armed forces, capable to execute the entire range of missions, from those of crisis management, to high intensity combat operations”.13

The need to have credible military forces, able to defend the national territory and at the same time to discourage military operations of a possible aggressor is more and more pressing, but not enough to meet objectives in all cases. The simple ownership of modern fighting equipment, which in theory should be able to discourage a possible aggressor, is not a warranty to eliminate potential threats from it.

The authors of the article Cyber and Deterrence14 states that in order “to achieve deterrence and/or successful defence with respect to such a conflict or potential conflict situation, particularly against high-end cyber adversaries, the military, civil authorities, the ISPs, and grid operators will need to work closely together both prior to and during the conflict”.

In my opinion, this cooperation between military forces and civil entities with responsibilities in ensuring support to the military forces’ actions becomes more and more important, especially with respect to adversaries holding advanced capabilities to act in cyberspace. A limited success rate of a conventional operation against the military forces of a state, most likely will highlight the possibility to perform combat operations over related domains, which could have direct consequences over the on-going combat operations of the military forces of the other. It is clear that civil entities and military forces have to perform active operations in peacetime in order to ensure the security for domains with dual purpose, civil and military.

13 Military Strategy of Romania, approved by Decision no. 708 of 28 September 2016, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 789 of 7 October 2016, see Hotărârea nr. 708 din 28 septembrie 2016, retrieved on 19 September 2019.

14 Franklin D. Kramer, Robert J. Butler, Catherine Lotrionte, Cyber and Deterrence, see http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Cyber_and_Deterrence_web_0103.pdf, p. 1, retrieved on 07.09.2019.

The analysis of the actual security environment shall lead to “creating modern, flexible and efficient armed forces, capable to execute the entire range of missions, from those of crisis management, to high intensity combat operations”.


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The authors of the article suggest15 a possible action plan in the USA, which is made up of the following steps:

• creating back up plans for involved entities (military and civil authorities), developed according to the planning processes currently in use and practiced during simulated emergency situations;

• setting up clear command chains, for civilian-military cooperation, but also for the use of military authorities with responsibilities in the area, having the final purpose to create a legal framework for the performance of unified cyber operations;

• analysing, in order to establish effective protection measures, the resilience and re-growth of the operational capacity of the objectives under attack;

• developing and clarifying the role of each party of the response teams in case of significant cyber-attacks;

• ensuring the necessary funds for maintaining resilience and re-growth of the operational capacity of the critical infrastructure under cyber-attacks;

• using offensive operations to disturb plans and performance of the adversary’s cyber operations.

The action plan proposed for the US military forces can be used as a model and followed during the process of adaptation of one’s own military forces, but with some necessary adjustments. These adjustments are mandatory considering the following: provided that, at the level of the targeted objective as per the action plans, there are no differences, the objective being to ensure a high degree of protection for one’s own forces, the differences in size of the allotted forces, as well as the financial possibilities that are available, shall be reflected in the different level of adaptation to challenges raised by cyber operations.

Another important element of the adaptation process is identifying all those sectors of the civil part that have the potential to have disruptive effects on the action possibilities of the military system elements. For that, it is necessary to admit the fact that cyber operations against civil facilities have already been performed during conflicts that are more or less conventional and, most likely, the probability of using

15 Ibidem, p. 2.

The authors of the article Cyber and Deterrence

suggest a possible action

plan in the USA, which is

made up of the following steps:

creating back up plans for

involved entities; setting up clear

command chains; ensuring

the necessary funds for

maintaining resilience and re-growth of

the operational capacity of the critical

infrastructure under cyber-

attacks; using offensive

operations to disturb plans and

performance of the adversary’s

cyber operations.

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offensive cyber operations against a series of large civil objectives will increase in the future.

The impossibility to identify with accurate precision the objectives that are likely to be attacked shall determine an adaptation process based on erroneous hypothesis, and, consequently, there have to be taken active measures to make pertinent analysis to identify effective protective measures, resilience and re-growth of operational capacity of the objectives under attack.

Although a very important first step, the correct identification of the objectives that pose an increased risk of cyber-attacks does not guarantee per se the identification of viable protection measures able to ensure resilience and afterwards the re-growth of the operational capacity. Similar to the way the basic missions of military forces are prepared, by following the planning steps, ensuring the necessary means to perform the activities, the sequential repetition of the mission and afterwards its repetition as part of a joint operation, it is necessary to re-think all these elements, whilst considering integration of both offensive, and defensive cyber operations.

One should not overlook the dual nature of activities in cyberspace, the legitimate and the bad faith parts. The technological development also occurs in the technology with disruptive effects, therefore providing new opportunities for those interested. The attack over a civil objective with dual usage shall have the same effect for the military forces of different states with different sizes for their respective forces, but the possible effect of cyber operations will be greater for those military forces that hold more and modern combat equipment. The possible, even temporary, unavailability of the combat equipment can cause the risk of neutralising that equipment from the early stages of a military conflict.

It is, in this way, that the possibility of using offensive operations to performing hits on those critical infrastructure elements, of communications and transport, that are usually hit at the beginning of a military conflict, with the purpose of destabilising or even completely freezing the enemy’s defence, is being designed. Thus, operations in cyberspace can become a substitute for classical hitting means, and the desired results can be obtained with less risks for the classical hitting means used for the execution of such missions (mainly aerial

Similar to the way the basic missions of military forces are prepared, by following the planning steps, ensuring the necessary means to perform the activities, the sequential repetition of the mission and afterwards its repetition as part of a joint operation, it is necessary to re-think all these elements, whilst considering integration of both offensive, and defensive cyber operations.


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means are subject to a higher risk during execution of hitting missions of objectives found deep behind the enemy lines).

However, notwithstanding the fact that at first sight using offensive cyber operations may seem to have more advantages in comparison with the execution of a conventional mission to hit a target, there have to be analysed those aspects that are less obvious to the untrained eye of dual-use objectives, as well as the collateral damages resulted from the execution of cyber operations. One of these aspects to be considered is the increased difficulty to label these targets as being legitimate military targets due to the uncertainty related to their most likely usage purpose, military or civil. The difficulty to identify with a higher degree of certainty the legitimacy of a target, will, surely, have implications on the evaluation of the effects caused by hitting it, the priority having been given to the pure military effects that may overlook the unsuspected effects in the civilian part.

Where conventional hitting means are used for the execution of a target-hitting operation, the effects caused are permanent, the physical changes brought cannot be annulled. In case offensive cyber operations are used, depending on the intended level, methods can be applied to calibrate the intended effects of executed attacks, for temporary freeze of a target or rather its elimination.

Offensive cyber operations give the possibility of a more precise dosage as per the effects on the target, subject to the relevant assessment of hitting effects over the target in all domains it may have direct implications. The use, even if limited, of offensive cyber operations, aims at disabling or at least causing disturbance to the adversary’s activity, and therefore, from the point of view of the subject of the offensive cyber operations, these activities are labelled as being hostile.

Military operations are legally regulated, given the long history of military conflicts that has allowed for the development and application of a widely accepted legal framework. Unlike the legal framework for military conflicts, the legal framework for cyberspace is less developed, it being at rather early stages. Legal restrictions are applicable only to those states that decide to abide by those restrictions, if they exist or if voluntarily imposed on its own military forces. The voluntary restrictions shall not be applicable to other actors of the cyber domain, which,

Where conventional

hitting means are used for the

execution of a target-hitting

operation, the effects caused

are permanent, the physical

changes brought cannot be

annulled. In case offensive cyber operations are

used, depending on the intended

level, methods can be applied

to calibrate the intended effects

of executed attacks, for

temporary freeze of a target

or rather its elimination.

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in turn, have the possibility to perform offensive cyber operations as they please. Therefore, for maintaining an efficient discouraging capability, it is necessary to add to one’s own weaponry some credible offensive cyber capabilities to allow for a reasonably strong response against a hostile cyber-attack. Offensive cyber- attacks will shape the battlefield in the future16, being used by states, as well as other actors, to execute hitting operations by cyber means.

General Paul M. Nakasone, USCYBERCOM Commander, made a parallel assessment between nuclear and cyber deterrence: “Unlike the nuclear realm, where our strategic advantage or power comes from possessing a capability or weapons system, in cyberspace it’s the use of cyber capabilities that is strategically consequential. The threat of using something in cyberspace is not as powerful as actually using it because that’s what our adversaries are doing to us”.

CONCLUSIONSIt becomes obvious that possessing a strong cyber capability only

does not provide the state with a stable and secure environment. The less visible effects of cyber offensive actions at international level, as compared to the effects of using a nuclear weapon, can tempt holders of offensive cyber instruments to use the arsenal found in their possession, thereby risking a reaction of the attacked state, especially when the limits of response to the hostile action are not clearly defined. It is highly probable the use of offensive cyber action at state level for permanently testing the civil and military capacities of the adversary, beginning in peacetime.

Surely, such a probability will become a certainty during future military conflicts, offensive cyber operations shall be a constant presence among a wide range of threats which, in the future, will definitely affect the security environment. The difficulty in identifying and recognising attribution, the execution of offensive cyber operations under the level where they become military operations, the legal vagueness, and the lack of a widely accepted set of rules, the fast pace under which targets are being engaged, the impossibility to ensure

16 See https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-role-of-offensive-cyber-operations-in-nato-s-collective-defense, retrieved on 08.09.2019.

The less visible effects of cyber offensive actions at international level, as compared to the effects of using a nuclear weapon, can tempt holders of offensive cyber instruments to use the arsenal found in their possession, thereby risking a reaction of the attacked state, especially when the limits of response to the hostile action are not clearly defined.


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cyber defence for absolutely all objectives, as well as the possibility to calibrate the offensive cyber operations are only a few of the elements that show us the way military conflicts could be influenced in the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, Strategia Militară a României, in Monitorul Oficial al României,

Part I, no. 789 on 7 October 2016.2. ***, Strategia Naţională de Apărare a Ţării pentru perioada 2015-2019,

O Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume, Bucureşti, 2015.3. ***, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber

Operations, 2nd Edition, 2017.

WEBOGRAPHY:1. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/17/skygrabber-

american-drones-hacked.2. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4419681/Command-

Vision-for-USCYBERCOM-23-Mar-18.pdf.3. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.4. https://www.mae.ro/node/46405.5. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-role-of-

offensive-cyber-operations-in-nato-s-collective-defense.6. https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gm3demzrgq/strategia-de-securitate-

cibernetica-a-romaniei-hotarare-271-2013?dp=gy2dsnjugu4ts.7. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/

English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/.

8. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Cyber_and_Deterrence_web_0103.pdf.

9. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-92/jfq-92.pdf.

150150No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

AMPHIBIOUS AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS AMPHIBIOUS AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS SPECIFIC CONCEPTSSPECIFIC CONCEPTS

Colonel (N) Lucian Valeriu SCIPANOV, PhD, BEngSenior Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest

Within this approach, I have proposed to carry out an introspection within some particular areas of the Navy where they can conduct military actions, the maritime and fluvial domains, with projection regarding the conceptualisation of specific terms of the amphibious and riverine operations, an approach by which I want to highlight some concepts specific to these operations in order to be adopted and used in the doctrine of amphibious and riverine operations.

The specific concepts of the amphibious and riverine operations have an intrinsic connection with the maritime and fluvial environments, characterised as predominantly amphibious environments. The concepts of these areas are applicable, by specific means of maritime operations (in the case of amphibious operations) and by modalities particular to the actions in the fluvial environment, as part of the riverine environment (in the case of riverine operations).

I consider that my approach is appropriate due to the fact that the arguments presented may represent benchmarks regarding the enrichment of the conceptual language of the specific doctrines of the amphibious and riverine operations of the Navy.

Keywords: amphibious environment, riverine environment, amphibious operations, riverine operations, amphibious capabilities.


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Amphibious and Riverine Operations Specific ConceptsAmphibious and Riverine Operations Specific Concepts


INTRODUCTIONThe present approach is an introspection into some military

actions conducted by the Navy, carried out in two particular areas, the maritime and the fluvial areas. The main objective is to conceptualise specific terms for amphibious and riverine operations. In fact, by this approach, I want to highlight some specific concepts to maritime operations to be adopted and used in the doctrine of amphibious and riverine operations.

For that, I intend to identify some concepts and their definitions to create a comprehensive picture of these elements, which can be easily conceptualised, if they are not. Thus, in the context of my approach, I will refer to the following concepts: amphibious environment; riverine environment; amphibious area; riverine area; amphibious operations; riverine operations; amphibious capabilities; riverine capabilities; amphibious forces; riverine forces.

The hypothesis that lies at the basis of this approach is that these concepts specific to the two areas are applicable, by specific means, to maritime operations, in the case of amphibious operations, and, by particular modalities, to the actions in the riverine environment, in the case of riverine operations, as I have stated in my previous interventions on these issues1.

In order to get into the proposed issue, I would like to clarify certain aspects related to the semantics of some terms that can create confusion and for which I have identified different meanings.

In my opinion, the concepts specific to the amphibious and riverine operations have an intrinsic connection with the maritime and fluvial environments, which are characterised as predominantly amphibious environments that are in the area of responsibility of the Romanian Naval Forces, through the two components, the Maritime Fleet

1 See Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, Doctoral Thesis: Participarea Forțelor Navale Române la proiecția forței în operații amfibii și riverane, defended in 2017 at “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest.

The concepts specific to the

amphibious and riverine

operations have an intrinsic

connection with the maritime

and fluvial environments,

which are characterised as

predominantly amphibious

environments that are in the area of

responsibility of the Romanian Naval Forces,

through the two components, the

Maritime Fleet and the Fluvial

Flotilla.

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Lucian Valeriu SCIPANOVLucian Valeriu SCIPANOV

152No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

and the Fluvial Flotilla. If in the case of the Maritime Fleet, the area of responsibility can be identified as the related maritime and coastal area, in the case of the area of responsibility of the Fluvial Flotilla some clarifications must be made.

The area of responsibility of the Fluvial Flotilla can be characterised as having some peculiarities. This covers a variety of interference environments of areas under the responsibility of other categories of forces. For the fluvial, deltaic, lagoon and coastal environments, the area of responsibility of the Fluvial Flotilla partially overlaps or is adjacent to areas of responsibility of national capabilities. On the coast, near the deltaic coast, the area of responsibility is adjacent to that of the Maritime Fleet.

At the river, the area of responsibility overlaps, within the limit of the armament strike on board of the fluvial ships or the potential for the action of the Marines, with areas under the responsibility of the Land Forces. In the case of the Delta or the lagoon complex, the situation is clearer, these environments being the responsibility of the fluvial forces, but the actions of the fluvial forces on the coastal area, in the vicinity of the river and the continental area, can be supported on the flanks by the action of the Land Forces, of the Maritime Fleet, and of other types of forces of the Army branches.

If in the case of the amphibious term there are no contradictory interpretations regarding its meaning, in order to be able to make a convincing step, I will also refer to the following working hypothesis that will allow me to explain the riverine term. I have often encountered the misinterpretation of the meaning of the phrases where the English terms riverine and river are found. The aspect regarding the erroneous translation is due to short-term interpretations in which the translator, most often, associates the terms as synonymous or referring to the same field.

I mention that when identifying the meaning of the term riverine within the phrase riverine operations, the term riverine does not come from the translation of the term river2. Riverine represents, according to English dictionaries, “related to or situated on river or riverbank, riparian”. It is noted that the term riverine refers to areas in relation

2 Macmillan Essential Dictionary, 2003, p. 623, “a large area of water that flows towards the sea”.

In the case of the Delta or the lagoon complex, the situation is clearer, these environments being the responsibility of the fluvial forces, but the actions of the fluvial forces on the coastal area, in the vicinity of the river and the continental area, can be supported on the flanks by the action of the Land Forces, of the Maritime Fleet, and of other types of forces of the Army branches.


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to a river, located on the banks of a river, or with reference to a synonymous (riparian) form that is defined as a buffer zone between a river and land, a riverbank. Also, the term riverine by its synonym riparian is used in the sense of neighbour.

For example, the phrase coastal countries refers to countries near flowing water. In these situations, the translation is made from the fact that the area referred to is directly adjacent to the river, the flowing water (the country has at least one waterfront neighbour). In other situations, it refers to areas in the vicinity of a lake or a sea. In this situation, the term is translated from the perspective of the neighbourhood3.

In the Romanian dictionary, I have identified the definition of the riverine term as a region located on the shore of the water, bordered or crossed by a watercourse, marginal, ashore4.

Therefore, the term riverine/riparian was established in the usual language as being synonymous with the immediate proximity of a river, water, lake, sea, etc., which made the term widely used to be interpreted as having the sense of neighbourhood. So now it is used in different terms that are not related to water, if you emphasise the meaning of neighbour with something, from someone close.

I think that the term riverine assigned to Naval Forces (Serbian Riverine Flotilla (1915), Soviet Riverine Forces (RM II), Polish Riverine Flotilla, United States Riverine Squadrons etc.) is cumulatively due to the fact these capabilities have acted or continue to operate on rivers, in shallow water5, brown-water6 areas and in proximity to them with a wide range of capabilities specific to riverine forces. The term river attributed to fluvial forces (Romanian River Naval Forces, Romanian River Flotilla, Serbian River Flotilla etc.) underlines the fact that they operate predominantly on rivers and inland waterways but do not possess all the capabilities specific to fighting in the riverine environment (we will see what they are).

The meanings of the English terms derived from river, fluvial and riverine are translated into Romanian fluviu, fluvial and riveran,

3 See dexonline.ro, retrieved on 02.10.2019.4 Ibidem, Romanian “aflat pe malul unei ape, de-a lungul unui râu, la ţărm, străbătut de apă”.5 Shallow water, Romanian, ape puțin adânci, ape costiere, lacuri.6 Brown water, Romanian, râuri, fluvii, canale și comunicații pe ape interioare.

The phrase coastal countries

refers to countries near

flowing water. In these situations,

the translation is made from

the fact that the area referred to is directly adjacent to

the river, the flowing water

(the country has at least

one waterfront neighbour). In

other situations, it refers to areas in the vicinity of a lake or a sea.

In this situation, the term is

translated from the perspective

of the neighbourhood.

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concluding different terms. They are met in the concepts of river zones, fluvial operations, riverine operations, and others, terms taken from foreign specialised documentation7.

If we look at the mentioned bibliography, we observe terms that refer to the aspects outlined above, where among the elements characteristic to the riverine environment are presented: river; Riverine Landing Areas-RLAs; Riverine Landing Sites-RLSs8, which underline that the translation of the terms riverine and river does not refer to the same terms with which we operate in Romanian language.

Having presented these conceptual details, I recommend that the term river should be used in the usual Romanian language with the sense of râu or fluviu, the term riverine should be used with the meaning of riveran/riverane/riverană, if it appears in terms specific to the area addressed such as riveran environment (mediu riveran); riveran area (zonă riverană); riverine operations (operații riverane); riverine forces (forțe riverane) and not with the sense of neighbour, and the term fluvial to be used with the obvious meaning referred to (in association or connection with the river)9.

From another perspective, in the case of amphibious and riverine operations, I came across different generic names: “amphibious operation”, “riverine operation”, “fluvial operation”, “combined operations”, “land attack from the sea”, “maritime landing operations”, “fluvial landing operations”, “maritime invasion”, “maritime landing forces”, “fluvial landing forces”. Therefore, I can conclude that the terms “amphibious” and “riverine” are dual, because they are associated with both the maritime and the fluvial environment, that is, they belong to environments in which water and land are intertwined. If in the case of the amphibious environment, communications can only be made by water, I emphasise that in the case of the riverine environment, communications are predominantly amphibious in the absence of land communications, but maneuvering solutions can be identified on combined communications (land, aerial and amphibious).

7 ATP-08(B), vol. I, Change 3, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, NSA, 2008, Chapter 11, Riverine Operations.

8 Ibidem, sect. 3, 1107 (a), p. 11-4.9 See https://dictionary.cambridge.org›dictionary, retrieved on 04.10.2019.

If in the case of the amphibious environment, communications can only be made by water, I emphasise that in the case of the riverine environment, communications are predominantly amphibious in the absence of land communications, but maneuvering solutions can be identified on combined communications (land, aerial and amphibious).


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After this presentation of personal opinions on the meaning of terms specific to the analysed areas, I will continue to enter into the essence of the proposed approach by identifying those definitions that refer to the proposed concepts and terms.

Amphibious environmentThe amphibious environment is considered a less permissive, even

hostile environment, due to its particularity, on the one hand, and due to the presence of a potential enemy, on the other hand, considering that the potential enemy, as a rule, exploits the advantage of these particularities.

In my opinion, the amphibious environment represents the environment related to the three dimensions (aerial, water surface and submarine environment) of the Black Sea related to the Romanian coast, bounded by beaches, waterways, ports, inland waters from the coast and the outer waters to the wide limit of the area of responsibility of the Navy.

Riverine environmentThe riverine environment refers to the environment related to the

three dimensions, on the surface, in air and underwater, corresponding to the coastal maritime areas, the inland waters of the coast, the fluvial, lagoon and deltaic areas near the coast and within it.

The riverine environment is a predominantly amphibious environment, usually delimited in areas near and close to the land.

From a military point of view, the riverine environment comprises the fluvial communications lines, located on the rivers, on the navigable channel, on the canals, on the lakes, on the irrigation channels etc., which the military forces can use, including passing them by air, where the land routes are missing or impracticable due to the marshy or disturbed terrain, the percentage of water/land being the one that characterises the environment as a riverine.

In the NATO doctrine conception, the riverine environment represents the environment related to the three dimensions, surface, aerial and underwater, corresponding to deltas, rivers, canals, lakes, lagoons, the coastline delimited by these environments, where communication lines can be made10.

10 ATP-08(B), op. cit., p. 11-1.

The amphibious environment

is considered a less permissive,

even hostile environment,

due to its particularity,

on the one hand, and due

to the presence of a potential

enemy, on the other hand,

considering that the potential enemy, as a

rule, exploits the advantage

of these particularities.

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It is noted that the riverine environment is often referred to as a fluvial environment11. The appearance is due to the possibilities offered by the waterways related to rivers, canals, lakes, and aquatories, which are often used by fluvial forces or those with amphibious capabilities and can operate in this complex environment12. I would emphasise that the fluvial environment is a distinct component of the riverine environment.

In my opinion, the riverine environment located in the area of responsibility of the Navy represents the environment related to the three dimensions (aerial, surface water and underwater) that interfere, delimit and correspond to the Danube river and its banks, the Danube Delta and the deltaic lakes, the canals, waterways, the Danube-Black Sea canal, the Razem-Sinoe lagoon complex, the inland coastal waters delimited by the baselines, beaches, and mouths of the Danube river.

Amphibious areaThe amphibious area is part of the operations area, the term being

used when referring to the dimensions of the amphibious environment in which amphibious operations are carried out. In specialised papers, the amphibious area is sometimes referred to as the amphibious objective area or the amphibious operations area13. The generic term I will continue to use to refer to this aspect will be the amphibious area.

The amphibious area is related to the coastal area. This includes those “terrestrial districts (with the adjacent sea and associated airspace) that are predominantly susceptible to employment and influence from the sea”14. So, the amphibious area can comprise different components: the litoral area, the land area, the coastal area, the area of a target, the alignments, the rayons, the bridgeheads, and so on.

Riverine areaAccording to the dictionaries, the riverine area is an inland or coastal

area that encompasses both land and water, characterised by limited

11 Martin Ewence, IHS Jane’s Navy International, November 2016, vol. 121, issue 9, “Shallow Debate”, p. 26.

12 Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, Operații amfibii și riverane, soluție la consolidarea securității regionale, Ed. U.N.Ap. “Carol I”, București, 2018, p. 55.

13 ***, F.N. – 1.3.1, Doctrina pentru operaţii amfibii, București, 2018, annex no. 1.14 ***, Ibidem, Chapter I, sect. 2, art. 4(1).

The amphibious area is part of the operations area, the term being used when referring to the dimensions of the amphibious environment in which amphibious operations are carried out. In specialised papers, the amphibious area is sometimes referred to as the amphibious objective area or the amphibious operations area.


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land communication lines, with extended water surfaces and/or inland waterways that provide natural routes for surface transportation15.

The riverine area represents an extension of the coastal area in the vicinity of the coast, consisting of the harbour aquatories, lagoon complexes, lakes, deltas, rivers, canals, and adjacent areas.16 In the opinion of some international specialists17, the riverine area includes archipelagos, river basins, deltas, bays, ponds and marshes, flooded areas, rice fields, watercourses, lakes etc.18. The peculiarities of the amphibious environment extend to the riverine environment. The American doctrine for riverine operations19 defines the riverine area as the area where there are waterways but there are no firm roads.

According to the specifications identified in the national publication, the 2009 edition, the riverine area represents: “the inland, coastal or delta area comprising both the land area and the river area (flowing water), characterised by a limited number of lines (routes) of communications”20, similar to the description in the Allied manual for amphibious operations21.

The riverine area under the responsibility of the Naval Forces represents, in my opinion, an inland extension of the Black Sea coast area, consisting of the following elements: the inland coastal area; the coastal area; the delta area; the river area, arms, and waterways; the lagoon complexes; the lakes and ponds; the waterways and inland waterways, the areas near them that include both the land area and the associated airspace. This is my opinion that I supported in the doctoral thesis and that I promote.

Amphibious operations

According to the American doctrine, JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, an amphibious operation is defined as “... launched from the sea by an amphibious force (AF) to conduct

15 See https://www.theefreedictionary.com, retrieved on 03.10.2019.16 ATP-08(B), ibidem.17 See https://www.history.navy.mil/, retrieved on 03.10.2019.18 ATP-08(B), ibidem.19 JP 3-06T, Riverine Operations Doctrine, The US Department of the Navy’s Joint Test Publication.20 ***, Manualul pentru operații amfibii, Bucharest, 2009, chapter XI, Operații riverane, sect. 1,

Generalități privind operațiile riverane, art. 159 (1).21 ATP-08(B), ibidem.

The riverine area under the

responsibility of the Naval Forces

represents, in my opinion, an

inland extension of the Black

Sea coast area, consisting of

the following elements: the inland coastal

area; the coastal area; the delta area; the river

area, arms, and waterways; the lagoon

complexes; the lakes and ponds;

the waterways and inland

waterways, the areas near them

that include both the land area and the

associated airspace.

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landing force (LF) operations within the littorals. The littorals include those land areas (and their adjacent sea and associated air space)”22.

According to NATO doctrine, the amphibious operation represents: “a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force (LF) embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the LF ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile”23.

According to the national manual for amphibious operations, the amphibious operation represents “the military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force, in order to execute (coordinate, lead) the tactical actions of the amphibious offshore area”24.

I emphasise that the amphibious operations are carried out from the sea towards the coast, including the land areas and the airspace adjacent to the coast25, which is near the area of responsibility of the participating forces.

Riverine operations

The riverine operation is a military action that takes place in a complex geographical area, called a riverine area, by specially designed forces that have specific means of combat and transport, for the projection of the force from the sea, river, lakes or areas adjacent to them, on land, water or air, as a stand-alone operation or in addition to amphibious or other operations26.

The US Naval Historical and Heritage Command – NHHC presents the riverine operation in the following terms: “the projection of power from the sea to the coast and within it on waters and rivers that reach the sea”27.

Rear Admiral Ernest Eller, Commander of the NHHC, referring to the riverine operation, appreciated that “the action or projection

22 See http://www.navy.mil, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, JP 3-02/2014, Chapter 1, General, al.a. p. I-1, retrieved on 01.10.2019.

23 ATP-08(B), op. cit., Chapter I, art. 0101.24 ***, F.N. – 1.3.1, Doctrina pentru operaţii amfibii, chapter I, sect. 2, art. 4(1).25 See http://www.navy.mil, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, JP 3-02/2014, p. I-1,

Chapter 1, General, aln.a. retrieved on 01.10.2019.26 Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, op. cit., subcap. Operația riverană în concepție națională.27 See https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/

r/riverine-warfare-us-navys-operations-inland-waters.html, retrieved on 10.10.2019.

The riverine operation is a military action that takes place in a complex geographical area, called a riverine area, by specially designed forces that have specific means of combat and transport, for the projection of the force from the sea, river, lakes or areas adjacent to them, on land, water or air, as a stand-alone operation or in addition to amphibious or other operations.


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of force into/from inland waters bears the name of war in the riverine environment”28.

According to the national manual for amphibious operations29 and the American homonymous manual30, by comparison, I can conclude that the riverine operation is a military action that takes place in a complex geographical area, similar to the amphibious environment, by specially designed forces that have specific means of combat and transport environment, for force projection to control the entire riverine area. I would point out that the riverine operation can be launched, from the sea, on the river, lakes or areas adjacent to them, from land, water or air, as an independent operation or in support of an amphibious operation or other combined maritime or land operations.

I point out that the particularities of fighting in the riverine environment do not differ from the particularities of fighting in the amphibious environment, because both environments are similar and even intertwine. In the national manual, the amphibious and riverine area where the force projection is performed is considered a “hostile or potentially hostile”31 environment, similar to the descriptions in the NATO manual32 and the American manual for amphibious operations33.

According to the opinions taken from the international press, riverine operations have become topical and more and more fleets are engaging their riverine capabilities in such operations34.

In the American doctrine, the riverine operation is still present, even though its peak was considered the Vietnam War. In the old documents, it is mentioned that the riverine operations differ from the terrestrial ones but they must be known and considered to be applied by the specialised naval forces in the riverine environment which differs from the terrestrial one35. The effort must be coordinated and put together. The riverine operation is also a distinct operation, which even though it has some particular commonalities with the amphibious

28 Apud Martin Ewence, IHS Jane’s Navy International, vol 121, issue 9, 2016, “Shallow Debate”, p. 27.

29 ***, F.N. – 1.3.1, Doctrina pentru operaţii amfibii, op. cit., chapter I, sect. 2, art. 4(1).30 JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 2014.31 ***, F.N. – 1.3.1, chapter I, sect. 2, art. 5 (1)32 ATP-8(B), op. cit., chapter I, art. 0101.33 JP 3-02/2014, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.34 Martin Ewence, op. cit. 35 FM 31-75, Field Manual Riverine Warfare, January 1971.

In the American doctrine,

the riverine operation is still

present, even though its peak was considered

the Vietnam War. In the old documents, it is mentioned

that the riverine operations

differ from the terrestrial ones

but they must be known and considered to be applied by

the specialised naval forces

in the riverine environment which differs

from the terrestrial one.

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operation, requires capabilities with different characteristics than the more specialised and more diversified amphibious, in which the capabilities have to be versatile and dynamic.

I must point out that the riverine operation is not a fluvial operation, but an operation carried out in a specific environment represented by the stretches of water from the coast, located within the baselines (inland waterways), inland waters, rivers, lakes, aquariums, canals etc., which offer the possibility of realising and exploiting the natural paths of communication by specially designed and equipped forces, riverine and amphibious forces as the case may be36.

Having presented these arguments, I reiterate the fact that the riverine operation acquires characteristics similar to the amphibious operation. The process of planning the amphibious operation also applies during the planning of the riverine operation. The riverine and amphibious operations are carried out by specialised forces capable of exploiting the unique characteristics of the amphibious and riverine environments to repel, limit, neutralise, destroy the enemy and prohibit them from having control of these areas.

Amphibious capabilitiesIn the specialised bibliography, I have identified different meanings

of the term capability: “the ability to be capable; capacity, aptitude”37.The capabilities employed in amphibious operations represent

those capabilities of specialised forces (called amphibious forces, debarkation forces, landing forces etc.) that enable them to perform their specific missions during amphibious operations.

The success of an amphibious operation is the ability of the amphibious force to launch its amphibious capabilities from the sea, to project the amphibious force into a coastal area (amphibious area). Success is appropriately exploited if the alignment enforcement of the anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) interdiction systems is achieved without weakening the center of gravity of the amphibious force38. Amphibious capabilities meet the requirements of efficiency and performance (Moe/Measures of efficiency and MOP/Measure of performance).

36 Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, op. cit.37 See https//dexonline.ro, retrieved on 11.01.2017.38 ***, F.N. – 1.3.1, Doctrina pentru operații amfibii, op. cit., chapter I, sect. 2, art. 5(1).

The success of an amphibious operation is the ability of the amphibious force to launch its amphibious capabilities from the sea, to project the amphibious force into a coastal area (amphibious area). Success is appropriately exploited if the alignment enforcement of the anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) interdiction systems is achieved without weakening the center of gravity of the amphibious force.


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Riverine capabilitiesThe capabilities employed in the riverine operations represent

those capabilities of specialised forces (called riverine forces, riverine debarkation forces, riverine landing forces etc.) that enable them to perform their specific missions during riverine operations.

For both operations (amphibious operation and riverine operation) we can consider that the terms amphibious capability or riverine capability refer to the moral, intellectual, aptitude, qualitative and quantitative capability of some amphibious and riverine forces, in close correspondence with the main components of the power: “physical; morality; cognitive and doctrinal” mentioned in the main doctrine of the Romanian Army (DAR)39.

In my opinion, the capabilities of some national amphibious or riverine forces depend on the particularities of the area of responsibility of the Navy; technological development and own doctrine (FN-1, the Navy Doctrine). In both particular cases of national, amphibious and riverine capabilities, I believe that they are represented by the ability of the Romanian Navy to coordinate all maritime and riverine capabilities, namely amphibious and riverine forces, through the synergy of the combat components from the amphibious environment and national riverine environment.

Ships and combat means used in riverine operations are adapted to respond to employment in a specific environment: increased mobility; speed; flexibility; versatility; surprise; practically to harness a series of principles of war that they transform into virtues.

Amphibious forcesIn amphibious operations, the amphibious force executes

maneuvers that highlight the combat potential depending on the particularity of the amphibious area. The amphibious force seeks to occupy an advantageous position on the coast about the enemy, conquering a bridgehead located on the shore, from which it can exercise its power over it. The maneuver will be directed to a decisive point or to a critical/essential vulnerability, which will influence the center of gravity/COG of the enemy40.

39 ***, Doctrina Armatei României, 2012, art. 0122 (1), p. 25.40 ***, F.N. – 1.3.1, op. cit., chapter I, sect. 2, art. 4(1).

Ships and combat means used in riverine

operations are adapted

to respond to employment in a specific

environment: increased

mobility; speed; flexibility;

versatility; surprise;

practically to harness a series

of principles of war that they

transform into virtues.

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Riverine forcesNATO’s Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of

Excellence-CJOS COE presents the riverine forces as organised, trained and equipped forces to operate on inland waters41. The riverine forces can be represented by the capabilities of the land, air and naval forces that can integrate and employ various types of capabilities (combat means, armament and specialised personnel). The riverine forces that can be organised and integrated into heterogeneous structures, able to perform the maneuver of forces and means to act in the riverine environment.

The riverine forces represent structures from small dimensions (elements, groups) to large structures (battalions/divisions/fleets/TG/TF) equipped with a wide range of armaments, platforms of varying sizes, from boats to large battleships, auxiliary and support ships, with its command and control structure, ground, air, and naval combat support, sensors, combat, and logistical support, capable of conducting military actions in the riverine environment. I must point out that the riverine operations are distinct and have nothing in common with the actions of forcing and crossing watercourses that are actions specific to land forces acting with forces supported with the flank placed on the river42.

If we follow the Allied conception regarding the action of NATO forces in riverine operations, we can draw up some conceptions of action of the national forces in the riverine operations, which we identified in the contents of the manual for amphibious operations of the 2009 edition, in the chapter related to riverine operations (ch. XI)43. For the riverine environment related to the area of responsibility of the Navy, the fluvial forces represent a specific national capacity, which can be transformed into an indigenous riverine force if it develops certain capabilities, in addition to the current ones.

41 Martin Ewence, op. cit.42 ATP-08(B), op. cit., chapter 11, Riverine Operations, 1101 (1), p. 11-1.43 ***, Manualul pentru operații amfibii, București, 2009, chapter XI, Operații riverane, sect. 1,

Generalități privind operațiile riverane, art. 159 (4 a, b), p. 158.

The riverine forces represent structures from small dimensions (elements, groups) to large structures (battalions/divisions/fleets/TG/TF) equipped with a wide range of armaments, platforms of varying sizes, from boats to large battleships, auxiliary and support ships, with its command and control structure, ground, air, and naval combat support, sensors, combat, and logistical support, capable of conducting military actions in the riverine environment.


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CONCLUSIONSThe area of responsibility of the Fluvial Flotilla expanded with

the subordination of the Marines. This corresponds to the areas of responsibility of the Fluvial Forces and extends to those of the Marine Infantry Regiment (RIM). In this idea, I think that in the area of responsibility of the Navy, the areas that meet all the characteristics of the riverine environment are: the Danube Delta; the lagoon area Razelm-Sinoe; the lakes and ponds; the Danube River; the inland and coastal waters; the Black Sea Danube Canal as well as the fluvial ports and the seaports.

I think it is appropriate to capitalise on the local potential of action in the riverine environment of the structures of forces within the Fluvial Flotilla and develop those capabilities that would give them the status of authentic riverine capabilities, with which they could act independently, in a joint or multinational context.

The structures of the amphibious and riverine forces can vary from small structures to large structures and their equipment can include a wide range of capabilities44.

I notice that neighbouring states, with a tradition of acting in the riverine environment, have developed riverine forces grouped into maritime and fluvial naval groups, having their own command and control structure, benefiting from land, air, and naval combat support, operating sensors and UAVs, they have complex combat armaments and benefit from their own logistical support structure.

The forces participating in the amphibious and riverine operations must be able to control the three environments and use the amphibious and riverine communication routes for the transport of forces, under specific conditions of a predominantly amphibious environment. The peculiarity of amphibious landing forces is that they can participate in both amphibious and riverine operations, by the nature of their capabilities. These forces are not the only ones, because the most specialised forces capable of conducting and developing riverine operations are the riverine forces, which are much more complex and specialised45.

44 FM 31-75, Field Manual Riverine Warfare Headquarters, Department of The Army, January 1971, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/r/riverine-warfare-manual-1971.html, retrieved on 10.10.2019.

45 ATP-08(B), vol. I, Change 3, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, NSA, 2008, art. 1101, Riverine Operations.

I think that in the area of responsibility

of the Navy, the areas that

meet all the characteristics of the riverine

environment are: the Danube

Delta; the lagoon area

Razelm-Sinoe; the lakes and

ponds; the Danube River; the inland and

coastal waters; the Black Sea

Danube Canal as well as the

fluvial ports and the seaports.

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Due to the particularities of the riverine forces, I think that they can be considered forces with extensive capabilities of employing a potential enemy, much more complex than the capabilities of the amphibious forces. In addition to the offensive, expeditionary capabilities, the riverine forces must possess capabilities for special operations combined with defensive capabilities in specific riverine environments.

The diversity of the capabilities of the fluvial naval forces is related to the geographical position of Romania. That is why I believe that there is no model of the structure and destination of the amphibious and riverine forces that we must follow. In the case of the Romanian Navy, their missions take into account aspects of a geographical nature and are adapted to the possibilities of seagoing and fluvial navigation, considering the existence of the Danube Delta and the Black Sea coast.

I am sure that these concepts will be useful to the working groups within the Navy Staff that will develop doctrinal documents, manuals or procedures, to those responsible for reviewing the doctrines for amphibious and riverine operations, specialists, officers, doctoral or master degree students or all students in the Navy schools, who would like to study the field, discuss or disseminate this information. By this approach, I believe that we will have a common starting point and can use a uniform language.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2006.2. ***, ATP-08(B), vol. I, Change 3, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations,

NSA, 2008.3. ***, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US Department of

Defense, 2005.4. ***, Dictionary of Military Terms, US Department of Defense, New

York, 2013.5. ***, Doctrina Armatei României, 2012.6. ***, FM 31-75, Field Manual Riverine Warfare, Department of the

Army, 1971.7. ***, F.N. – 1.3.1, Doctrina pentru operaţii amfibii, București, 2018.8. ***, JP 3-02/2014, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations JP 3-06T

Riverine Operations Doctrine, The US Department of the Navy’s Joint Test Publication.

9. ***, Manualul pentru operaţii amfibii, București, 2009. 10. Martin Ewence, IHS Jane’s Navy International, 2016, vol. 121, issue 9,

“Shallow Debate”.

The diversity of the capabilities of the fluvial naval forces is related to the geographical position of Romania. That is why I believe that there is no model of the structure and destination of the amphibious and riverine forces that we must follow. In the case of the Romanian Navy, their missions take into account aspects of a geographical nature and are adapted to the possibilities of seagoing and fluvial navigation, considering the existence of the Danube Delta and the Black Sea coast.


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11. Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, Doctoral Thesis: Participarea Forţelor Navale Române la proiecţia forţei în operaţii amfibii şi riverane, Universitatea Națională de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2017.

12. Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, Operații amfibii și riverane, soluție la consolidarea securității regionale, Editura U.N.Ap. “Carol I”, București, 2018.

WEBOGRAPHY: 1. https//dexonline.ro2. https://dictionary.cambridge.org›dictionary3. https://www.history.navy.mil/4. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/

title-list-alphabetically/r/riverine-warfare-us-navys-operations-inland-waters.html

5. https://www.theefreedictionary.com, accesat la 03.10.2019

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Just as the world has been transformed by the smartphone revolution in a very short time, the IoT (Internet of Thinks) will be a major shift towards a honeycomb-based “ecosystem of things” that involves applications, user interfaces, messaging/data and infrastructure. The sensors will allow new systems to communicate with each other and upgrade older systems to join the network. All armed forces should see the potential of this change and develop revolutionary systems and processes to integrate all systems into a C5ISR-D structure (Command, Control, Communications, Information Systems, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, for DECISION).

Keywords: Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, C5ISR-D.

C5ISR-D REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS C5ISR-D REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS AND PROCESSESAND PROCESSES

Lieutenant Colonel Vasile Florin POPESCU, PhD, BEng, BEcPsychological Operations Centre “Samoilă Mârza”, Bucharest


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C5C5ISRISR-D Revolutionary Systems and Processes-D Revolutionary Systems and Processes


INTRODUCTIONThere are a lot of acronyms and terms the defence staff personnel

should be familiarised with. Today, some of the most important and used terms are related to the concept of C4ISR/C5ISR.

C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) is a broad term referring to “systems, procedures and techniques used to collect and disseminate information”1, as it can be seen in figure no. 1.

Figure no. 1: C4ISR

C4ISR systems are essentially a “marriage” between Command &Control, Communications, Computers and ISR.

The term command and control “C2” does not have a strict definition in universally accepted literature, but experts around the world agree that C2 can generally be described as the exercise of authority in a particular environment in search of a mission. In simple terms, it is about where orders come from and where decisions are made. In what follows some of the visions found in the literature on C2 are presented.

C2, ISR, C4IR, C5ISR – DEFINITIONS AND APPLICABILITY � Command and control in the concept of NATO is “the exercise

of authority and leadership by an appropriately appointed individual with the resources allocated to achieving a common goal”.

1 Neville Stanton, Christopher Baber, Don Harris, Modelling Command and Control: Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 1 January 2008.

C4ISR (Command,

Control, Communications,

Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance,

Reconnaissance) is a broad

term referring to “systems,

procedures and techniques used

to collect and disseminate

information”.

168

Vasile Florin POPESCUVasile Florin POPESCU

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The United States Army’s 3-0 Manual, defines C2 as “the exercise of authority and direction by an appropriately appointed commander on the forces assigned and attached to a mission”2.

In the view of other authors such as M. Vassiliou, A. David, A. Jonathan (2015), Command and Control, C2 is a “set of organisational and technical attributes and processes ... using human resources, physical and information to solve problems and fulfil missions”3.

� The ISR concept is the coordinated and integrated information acquisition, processing and delivery, accurate and consistent, in a timely manner to support the conduct of commanders’ activities4. Terrestrial, maritime, air and space platforms have critical ISR roles in supporting operations in general. The ISR comprises several activities related to the planning and operation of systems that collect, process and disseminate data in support of current and future military operations5. Examples of ISR systems include surveillance and reconnaissance systems from satellites to manned aircraft such as U-2 or to unmanned aircraft systems such as the US Air Force Global Hawk and Predator, air, sea, or space equipment, as well as intelligence teams. The data and information provided by these ISRs can take many forms, including optical, radar, infrared, or electronic signals. ISR data can provide early warnings about enemy threats to allow forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality6.

� C4ISR includes not only information products and services but also communication standards that support secure information exchange by C4ISR systems (digital, voice and video data at the appropriate command levels).

Technologies include hardware such as radios, receivers, satellites, relays, routers, computers and other information technology infrastructures. For intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), the examples of technology used include the use of remote sensors

2 United States Army Field Manual: FM 3-0 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 2001; FM 3-0, Operations. Washington, DC: GPO. OCLC 50597897. Archived from the original (PDF inside ZIP–SFX) on 19 February 2002, retrieved 19 August 2013; Carl H. Builder, Steven C. Bankes, Richard Nordin, Command Concepts – A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control, MR775, RAND, 1999.

3 Marius Vassiliou, David S. Alberts, Jonathan R. Agre, C2 Re-Envisioned: the Future of the Enterprise, CRC Press, New York, 2015, p. 1.

4 AJP-3.15(A) NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices.5 Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of

Representatives – General Accounting Office, 2008-03-15.6 Ibidem.

The ISR concept is the coordinated and integrated information acquisition, processing and delivery, accurate and consistent, in a timely manner to support the conduct of commanders’ activities . Terrestrial, maritime, air and space platforms have critical ISR roles in supporting operations in general. The ISR comprises several activities related to the planning and operation of systems that collect, process and disseminate data in support of current and future military operations.


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(infrared, optical, radio frequencies) placed on platforms, such as unmanned satellites and vehicles.

For Command and Control, technologies require power algorithms and computational algorithms to merge multiple sensor inputs and data streams into decision support software to ensure situational awareness. Other algorithms and software applied to C4ISR include those that provide interoperability between disparate communications systems, encryption algorithms to ensure secure communications, signal detection and image processing methods, anti-jitter, and low probability of interception techniques signals, communications and navigation protocols. Hazard warning systems and electronic countermeasures, such as jamming techniques, are also included in this technology area.

Skills and education include computer, mechanical, electrical, programming and software engineering; information technology; math; physics; statistics and earth sciences.

Imagine the power of a fully integrated, redundant, resilient and networked armed force operating in the battle space. This vision is highlighted by the aphorism: “No platform is fighting alone”. Today, with the Internet of Things (IoT) more and more in the shopping area, it is easier to view a military IoT where the most important battle systems are connected to a knowledge network.

Figure no. 2: ISRSource: The National Academies Press

For Command and Control, technologies

require power algorithms and computational

algorithms to merge

multiple sensor inputs and

data streams into decision

support software to ensure

situational awareness.

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Just as the world has been transformed by the smartphone revolution in a very short time, the introduction of IoT will be a major shift towards a “honeycomb” software “ecosystem of things” that involves applications, user interfaces, messaging/communication, data and infrastructure. The sensors will allow new systems to communicate with each other and upgrade older systems to join the network. All armed forces should see the potential of this change and slowly develop C5ISR revolutionary systems and processes to integrate all systems into an enhanced C5ISR honeycomb structure.

How long will it take this to happen and what is it done today? Let us explore this and project what might be at stake in ten or fifteen years.

� C5ISR is Command, Control, Communications, Information Systems, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, but the major challenge in the new battlefield is the threat of cyberwar and the impact of smart machines.

According to a recent study by Martti Lehto at the 11th International Cyber Security and Security Conference, “a real-time situation and a common awareness of the situation needs to be achieved more and more ... The current war is entirely dependent on the C5ISR system ... the C5ISR system is the most vulnerable and therefore must be the most important object of the cyber defence of the armed forces”.

The need for military decision makers to view the battlefield in more and more complex areas is pressing. US military analysts Robbin F. Laird, Edward Timberlake and Richard Weitz acknowledged this in 2013 when they published a paper titled Rebuilding the US Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy. In this study they said: “For the United States to have an effective military role in the new set of regional networks, an essential requirement will be the efficiency and security of the combined command, control and communications, related to advanced computing capabilities to global information, regional and local, recognition and oversight tools (C5ISR). Indeed, C5ISR is evolving to become C5ISR-D (for decision-making), whereby C5ISR’s goal is to shape effective, combined and joint decision-making”.

The authors believe that the decision-making process is the key element. They see every military platform as a source of information that can interact in a knowledge network and increase the ability of a distributed force to function as a honeycomb to extract the maximum benefit of the whole force. This stacked or honeycomb knowledge network, with each system that interacts with information, could

C5ISR is Command, Control, Communications, Information Systems, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, but the major challenge in the new battlefield is the threat of cyberwar and the impact of smart machines.


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provide decision makers with the ability to understand and engage the enemy.

Such interactivity requires improved computing power as future wars will be waged on computer networks, with kinetic blows that dramatically improve and operate at higher speeds. A combat commander has to acknowledge a multitude of factors – enemy capabilities, possible actions and reactions – to be able to decide and act on a matter in nanoseconds, or be overtaken and killed by his enemy.

Today, the human operator is “looped” for most semi-autonomous systems. With the emergence of a new autonomous system, especially missile and unmanned combat systems, this loophole concept becomes increasingly inefficient. Unmanned future systems will act in micro- or nano-seconds and can be programmed and optimised with political and legal constraints that will not require human decision-making. These systems will work so quickly that human decision-making will slow down the process.

Instead of the “loop” human operator, the man will be “out of the loop”, observing and acting only by exception. One of the essential requirements to keep human “loop” control is an efficient user interface (UI) or a common operating picture (COP), communicated in real time or, more effectively, at the speed of light.

One way to improve the information needed to form an efficient C5ISR-D COP is to digitise ancient analogue ISR sensors such as radar and electronic warfare (EW).

This process, in essence, brings IoT to the battle space, allowing cars to talk with cars at an extremely fast speed to increase awareness. With the advancement and miniaturisation of computers and communications, inherited terrestrial systems could also be upgraded to join this knowledge network.

Tactical systems in all fields could now become nodes of the knowledge network, and their redundancy can provide resistance.

In August 2016, Raytheon took a step forward in integrating systems with its EW-Cyber COP version of the US Army’s “Cyber Quest” exercise. Raytheon Cyber and the Electromagnetic Battle Combat System (CEMBM) are designed to provide a common operational picture of electronic warfare and cybernetic systems in combat space. Frank Pietryka, Director of air information operations at Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, explained: “With CEMBM, the teams now have a common operational picture where they can deliberately move between cyber, EMS and physical ground”.

A combat commander has to acknowledge

a multitude of factors – enemy

capabilities, possible actions

and reactions – to be able to decide and act on a matter in nanoseconds,

or be overtaken and killed by his

enemy.

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This is an important step in viewing the “unseen”, but there is still a long way to go before all combat systems are integrated into a C5CSR-D COPC to help military decision-makers recognise the patterns of a multi-domain fight and react timely. All domains need to be integrated and viewed in real time – a complex and difficult task that will require the development of dedicated and focused systems.

A similar effort to integrate communications and visualisation of ground, air and space systems is underway in DARPA’s Hallmark programme. Hallmark is an effort to develop situational awareness tools to integrate space systems into knowledge honeycombs. The purpose of the programme is to provide a real-time COP of space-to-space systems, as well as external interfaces to air, cyber, land, maritime, command and control. According to a DARPA article written by Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Raley: “DARPA’s Hallmark programme is trying to provide a full spectrum of real-time systems and capabilities to help address these technical and strategic challenges”. The expected system would merge information from various sources, would simulate potential actions and would determine the effects in advance, considerably reducing the time needed for decision-making, execution and observation of the results.

In the distant horizon, there will be more exotic ways to get a level of unprecedented situational awareness by eliminating the gap between man and machine. A new DARPA programme, Neural Engineering System Design, aims to develop a neural implantable interface capable of delivering unprecedented signal resolution and a bandwidth of data transfer between the human brain and the digital world. “The best today’s brain-computer interface systems are like two supercomputers trying to talk to each other using an old-fashioned modem ...”, said Phillip Alvelda, Neural Engineering Design Programme Manager – DARPA. “Imagine what will become possible when we update our instruments to really open the channel between the human brain and the modern electronic ones”.

The speed at which decisions and actions must take place in the current multi-domain battle space can increasingly outweigh the cognitive ability of people and already requires automatic assistance. Displaying the unusual virtual world, such as the virtual world of cyber operations, and connecting physical and virtual battles to provide action information require extraordinary technology and a honeycomb connection of sensors, transmitters and platforms.

DARPA’s Hallmark programme is an effort to develop situational awareness tools to integrate space systems into knowledge honeycombs. The purpose of the programme is to provide a real-time COP of space-to-space systems, as well as external interfaces to air, cyber, land, maritime, command and control.


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In today’s battlefield, military decision-makers have to see the complete pattern of enemy activity in physical and virtual space, and they have to make a quick decision and apply counter-models over time. With autonomous machines that act and decide in nanoseconds, weapons that use robot technology, and more cyber-attacks that happen in real-time, the need for a COPIS-COP of easy speed to visualise the common situational picture of the entire battle space is an ingredient key to exploring emerging military technologies.

C5ISR MARKET OVERVIEWThe C5ISR market was valued at $ 104,953 million in 2015 and is

expected to reach $ 131,733 million by 2022, recording a 3.3% increase in the 2016-2022 forecasting period. The base year considered for the study is 2015 and forecasting years vary between 2016 and 2022. In the coming years, regional instability is expected to cause future conflicts, which raises concerns about the security at the borders of different nations. Developing countries invest a lot in defence equipment/tools to gain a competitive advantage over their opponents. Moreover, increasing automation in security and surveillance technology allows countries to improve their military infrastructure.

North America is the dominant region for the C5ISR market due to the adoption of new technologies, the large number of market players and innovative solutions. The region has the highest weight in global defence spending in terms of value. Expenses are geared to the development of radar, EW and communications programmes, and to the growing concern about cyber security.

The factors that drive the growth of the C5ISR market include the increased use of unmanned platforms, the need for integrated solutions, the increased global terrorism and the increased security concerns over border security. However, the fall in defence spending in developed countries affects market growth over the projection horizon.

Major players on the C5ISR market include:• Lockheed Martin Corporation;• Northrop Grumman Corporation;• Raytheon Company;• SAAB Group;• Thales Group;

North America is the dominant

region for the C5ISR market

due to the adoption of new

technologies, the large number of

market players and innovative solutions. The region has the highest weight

in global defence spending in

terms of value. Expenses are geared to the

development of radar, EW and

communications programmes,

and to the growing concern

about cyber security.

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• General Dynamics;• Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd;• Finmeccanica Spa;• BAE Systems.

Other companies include SELEX ES, Almaz-Antey, Reutech Radar Systems, Aselsan, Ausair Power, Huntington Ingalls Industries, L-3 Communications, United Aircraft Corp., Honeywell International, SAFRRAN, Hindustan Aeronautics, ThyssenKrupp, CACI International and Tactical Missiles Corp.

CONCLUSIONSThe C4ISR/C5ISR-D concepts entail providing information and

knowledge to political-military decision-makers to ensure a higher situational awareness. In the 21st century, military operations are carried out with greater precision than ever, and the effectiveness of a mission is increasingly dependent on C4ISR/C5ISR-D systems, which are complex subsystems. Command and control have been and will continue to be a predominantly human activity, but with the ongoing military revolution and the acceleration of technological innovation cycles, technical systems, processes and tools are increasingly supporting the command.

In order to reach an understanding of the C4ISR/C5ISR-D concepts it is necessary to examine the processes and systems in the composition, such as:

• ISTAR system;• knowledge development;• knowledge management;• knowledge sharing;• lessons learned.

Knowledge has become the decisive resource of all social processes and social organisations. The decision-making process within NATO and the European Union is built on knowledge, derived from a holistic analysis of the challenges that need to be addressed. In order to get there, a continuous system of systems analysis must be carried out, taking into account the knowledge requirements of all stakeholders.

Unfortunately, what C4ISR does not have yet is a solid enough community to meet the operational needs of today and tomorrow. In ISR we can see the “I” communities that are isolated by the “S (TA) R” communities.

The C4ISR/C5ISR-D concepts entail providing information and knowledge to political-military decision-makers to ensure a higher situational awareness. In the 21st century, military operations are carried out with greater precision than ever, and the effectiveness of a mission is increasingly dependent on C4ISR/C5ISR-D systems, which are complex subsystems.


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As a result, a unified vision for C4ISR must emerge in NATO to build a common, interoperable and interdependent C4ISR capability that allows for the superiority of decisions.

Exact and real-time exchange of data in a C4ISR architecture between all involved systems and other multinational and national IT systems is essential for developing a common operational picture for increased situational awareness.

Future C5ISR-D sites will enable commanders to make timely decisions by creating a common picture of the operational situation and exchanging operational information. C5ISR-D systems have the tools to enable the command to manage military operations in complex operational scenarios, not only in the air, land and sea, but also in the cyberspace that is continually developing.

The C5ISR-D systems integrate the information received from operational and logistic forces, allied forces units and existing civilian agencies. This generates the operational situation, manages plans, orders, reports and diffuses information between the different levels of command.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES:1. ***, AJP-3.15(A) NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised

Explosive Devices.2. ***, Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee

on Armed Services, House of Representatives – General Accounting Office, 2008-03-15.

3. ***, United States Army Field Manual: FM 3-0 Headquarters, Department of the Army (14 June 2001). FM 3-0, Operations. Washington, DC: GPO. OCLC 50597897. Archived from the original (PDF inside ZIP–SFX) on 19 February 2002.

4. Carl H. Builder, Steven C. Bankes, Richard Nordin, Command Concepts – A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control, MR775, RAND, 1999.

5. Neville Stanton, Christopher Baber, Don Harris, Modelling Command and Control: Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., January 2008.

6. Marius Vassiliou, David S. Alberts, Jonathan R. Agre, C2 Re-Envisioned: the Future of the Enterprise, CRC Press, New York, 2015.

Future C5ISR-D sites will enable

commanders to make timely

decisions by creating a common

picture of the operational

situation and exchanging operational

information. C5ISR-D systems

have the tools to enable the command to

manage military operations in complex

operational scenarios, not only in the air, land and sea,

but also in the cyberspace that

is continually developing.

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE INTEGRATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE INTEGRATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE

OF THE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES OF THE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IN THE MILTARY ACTIONSIN THE MILTARY ACTIONS

Colonel (AF) Laurențiu-Răducu POPESCU, PhD, BEngSenior Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest

The concept of using UAVs in the battle is still insufficiently explored in the Romanian military science. The UAVs will produce a revolution in the military field, a true Revolution in Military Affairs, due to the profound changes they will bring to military doctrine, to the operational and organisational concepts. By using the UAVs in operations, the technological confrontation is emphasised especially in the offensive military actions and less in the defensive ones. The value of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will be proved especially in deterrence actions, significantly reducing the importance of the operational military strategy. The massive integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into military actions is a reality and at the same time a necessity, both regarding the procurement of the information necessary to make decisions, being an economic and safe alternative to the execution of the operations, but also from the perspective of changing the profile of future military actions. Some operational requirements of the latest generation UAVs are discussed in the paper as they present challenges to designers, manufacturers, as well as to users.

Keywords: UAV, RPAS, UAS, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, intelligence gathering, communications, Air Forces.


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Considerations regarding the Integration in the Near Future of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Considerations regarding the Integration in the Near Future of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Miltary Actionsin the Miltary Actions


INTRODUCTION There is no longer an element of novelty that NATO and especially

the USA are currently using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the theatres of operations as they have been widely employed especially in the fight against terrorism. The missions of collecting information as well as of striking the enemy have already been classical for this technical category, which is in the equipment of the armed forces of technologically advanced countries. At the beginning, the integration of UAVs into operations was timid, as even some commanders were reserved in developing these types of capabilities. Over time, however, with the development of advanced communications technologies, they have improved so much that currently there is no question of planning an operation without including this type of aircraft in the structure of forces. The main advantage is represented by the diminution up to zero of the losses of human lives, combined with the facilitation of having permanent real time information from the place and from the moment of the action.

Unfortunately, this concept of using UAVs in the battle is still insufficiently explored in the Romanian military science. A convincing argument is represented by the practical achievements in the field, respectively by the current stage of procurement and training with this technology within the categories of forces of the security and defence structures of our country. From the lessons learned regarding their use in the theatres of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, I could easily conclude that there is an interest in extending their use in operations other than war. This approach is more accepted within the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Military specialists have taken into consideration the option of replacing the classic means of combat with UAVs in many missions. There are some public statements expressed in the mass media as well as in the framework of studies that testify in this respect. Expanding this logic, considering the allocation of funds for the development of this field and the new prototypes of aviation technology, we can confirm Sherman N. Mullin’s statement expressed a long time ago that “UAVs will change the tactics of the Air Forces

At the beginning, the integration

of UAVs into operations

was timid, as even some

commanders were reserved in developing

these types of capabilities.

Over time, however, with

the development of advanced

communications technologies,

they have improved so

much that currently there is no question

of planning an operation

without including this

type of aircraft in the structure

of forces.

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Laurenţiu-Răducu POPESCULaurenţiu-Răducu POPESCU

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in the 20th century. We see them now, but we are only at the beginning, there will be more and more”.

Indeed, they are more and more. In addition, the concept of using and integrating UAVs into military actions began to bear fruit, to produce mutations at the applicative/practical level through their implementation in national and international legislation, through the organisational changes of the institutions that use such technologies. Expanding slightly what Sherman N. Mullin said, UAVs will also change the tactics of land forces and naval forces. They will change the tactics of military actions as a whole.

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY ACTIONSThe military actions of the future will take place in a multidimensional

space, not only in the three-dimensional one as before. I would mention in this respect the electromagnetic area, the information one etc., areas that are still treated in the Romanian military science with superficiality.

It has been lately discussed about obtaining strategic value effects with tactical value forces. From here comes the change in the features of the future military actions. It is obvious the fact that this cannot be accomplished without adequate equipment and without a replacement/transformation of the current military technology. However, this aspect is not enough. In parallel, the doctrines and the concepts of use in battle must be modified or changed. With the approval of the new technology, an essential component is the training of the military and, last but not least, the change in the structures of the military and leadership organisations. The current logistics structures need to be restructured. They are not adapted and prepared for the moment to ensure the logistics that is necessary to operate the UAVs.

I consider that, by using the UAVs in operations, the technological confrontation is emphasised especially in the offensive military actions and less in the defensive ones. The value of the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will increase particularly in deterring actions, significantly reducing the importance of the operational military strategy. In this regard, I will provide as an argument the obvious imbalances from the technological point of view and here I refer to the present equipment of the various actors in conflict. As it can be seen, the strategic military

The concept of using and integrating UAVs into military actions began to bear fruit, to produce mutations at the applicative/practical level through their implementation in national and international legislation, through the organisational changes of the institutions that use such technologies.


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actions have been increasingly transformed into shows of force, the hybrid war being present in its characteristic forms.

Until now, the success in battle has depended firstly on the strategic concept initially expressed. It has to be flexible depending on: the evolution in time of the military actions, the use of available forces, the quality, the quantity of weapon systems, and here I will refer in particular to the technological level reached and, last but not least, to the level of training of the military formations.

In the future military framework, I believe that the human factor will maintain its current importance, starting from the political decision-maker, which will ultimately decide how the war will unfold, and continuing with the military decision-maker. The military decision-maker will implement these decisions in practice, the UAVs operators being the basic human factors regarding the execution of these types of missions (together will other military who handle different types of combat technology from the combat device framework). In the near future, I do not think that the human control over the military equipment will be given up completely. There are several projects for the use of fully autonomous UAVs in military actions, but they are temporarily activated on certain sequences of the operations. Most UAVs provide operators with the opportunity to reconfigure in real time the “automatic flight/fight mode” and switch to “manual mode”.

The destructive capacity and the surprise generated by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles influence/harass the enemy psychologically. Lately, it has been discussed a lot about psychological strikes. These “strikes” can cause a state of insecurity, fright, continuous fear. If they are doubled by the “information attack” inherent in the current military actions, we can conclude that in the future we will depend entirely on technology. On a small scale, the psychological strikes/actions were present in the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The noise produced by the operation of the UAV engines, combined with the precise strikes from them, or from the weapon systems connected to them, created panic among the enemy’s troops. There were cases (video recorded) when the enemy surrendered or temporarily stopped his activity in such situations.

In this context, the equipment of the armed forces with UAVs represents a top priority. The current procurement legislation related to the new technology must be urgently adapted to the needs of the present military actions, but especially to the future ones. The delay

Until now, the success

in battle has depended firstly on the strategic concept initially

expressed. It has to be flexible

depending on: the evolution in time of the

military actions, the use of

available forces, the quality,

the quantity of weapon systems,

and here I will refer in

particular to the technological level reached and, last but

not least, to the level of training

of the military formations.

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in procurement contracts in the field of UAVs is obvious. From here, the training of the staff leaves much to be desired. The educational forms/institutions for the training of the future UAV operators are not very clearly defined.

Therefore, the philosophy of conducting military actions will change radically in the future. There will no longer be clear boundaries in the space of battle nor in terms of the action itself, but rather shades. The military conflicts will no longer be considered as strictly temporary.

The border between military and civilian will no longer be as pronounced as it is at present, especially in this field of the UAVs use. Researchers/specialists, either civilian or military, and here I refer to theorists, manufacturers and beneficiaries alike, will be concerned about the optimisation of UAVs platforms, their payload and their use under different conditions. The military will no longer be the ones (compared to civilians) concerned to use UAVs in hostile conditions (weather, terrain, specific combat/action conditions). The civil component will become the centre of gravity in the future, especially regarding the First-Class UAVs (less than 150 kg)1.

THE MASSIVE INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES INTO MILITARY ACTIONS Being an engineer, at the beginning I was particularly concerned

about the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles branch from a technical point of view. Later, acquiring the status of military teacher, I have emphasised throughout my career the study on the use of these systems in military actions. (As a proof, there are the numerous national but also international publications). After these studies, which lasted for many years, I could draw some realistic conclusions about the phenomenon as a whole.

In the past period, the robotics has confirmed its present and future practical utility, starting from the civilian applications (The Machine Building Industry, Medicine etc.) and continuing with the military ones. In fact, things have evolved in the opposite direction in the UAV field. However, this is not the aspect that I want to highlight, but the fact that robots, either aerial, terrestrial, or marine, will restructure the civilisation of the Third Millennium. Being aware of this aspect, the state and non-state entities want to be promoters in the field.

1 The Second Class UAV (150-600 kg), The Third Class UAV (over 600 kg).

The philosophy of conducting military actions will change radically in the future. There will no longer be clear boundaries in the space of battle nor in terms of the action itself, but rather shades. The military conflicts will no longer be considered as strictly temporary.


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If we take into account the lessons learned in the theatres of operations, we will come to realise the huge potential of UAVs. In general, all the armed forces services want to have available technologies that allow them to fulfil the functions for which they are created. For the moment, nobody can say that it has reached a maximum degree of use of UAVs in the operations in which they were involved. The big challenge is to integrate them safely into the combat device. How the concept of using UAVs will be adapted to the new types of systems, threats and conflicts remains to be seen. In any case, it represents a topic of current debate, in a clear way, from the perspective of the fact that they will multiply exponentially in a not so distant period. And as the current crowding of manned aircraft would not be sufficient, strict and precise regulations must be developed in the field of UAVs for their integration into the non-segregated airspace. I must state that I have never used the word “restricted”, but “strict and precise regulation” because the UAV is a beneficial instrument, but also an evil instrument. In comparison, cars or cameras can be used in both situations. This does not mean that they must be restricted. Many times, due to the simplification of the aerial situation, the aeronautical authorities, either civilian or military, have not encouraged or been prepared to handle an explosive situation of “invasion” in the non-segregated airspace of the UAVs.

We are in the twelfth hour, because the new legislation of the European Commission must be implemented also in Romania (more precisely, the Regulation for the Implementation of the EU 2019/947 issued by the European Commission of 24.05.2019 on the rules and procedures for operating the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – with application from 01.07.2020). As a result, the Romanian Civil Aeronautical Authority as well as the National Military Aeronautical Authority must pronounce very clearly, both on the area of effective operation and on aspects related to personnel training/licensing; in other words, education in the field of UAV. Thus, the involvement of UAVs in military actions must be and will be an integral part for us in the whole spectrum of military actions.

Studies are being conducted on the development perspective of UAVs and all emphasise the idea that the biggest profits will come from their commercial use. Therefore, it will be more and more pressure, which will aim at integrating the flight into the same categories of airspace of aircraft with and without pilot. From the point of view of providing the Air Police combat service (more precisely the peace

If we take into account the

lessons learned in the theatres of operations, we will come to realise the

huge potential of UAVs. In

general, all the armed forces

services want to have available

technologies that allow them

to fulfil the functions for

which they are created. For the

moment, nobody can say that

it has reached a maximum

degree of use of UAVs in the operations in

which they were involved. The big

challenge is to integrate them safely into the

combat device.

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situation) it is obvious that the UAV will be a challenge that the newly acquired aircraft, the American F-16 fighters, are not prepared to face. The special combat devices attached can be an arming variant. In fact, I have not heard that such dedicated devices for the fight against UAVs are mounted on other types of pilot aircraft. “Anti-drone” studies have appeared, but it will take a while until these devices reach maturity and until the new aircraft will have such combat/neutralisation systems on board. The vulnerability of the phenomenon appears even in the situation of the precise and strict regulations existence. Precise responsibilities must be established as soon as possible in each institution in the national defence and security system, with an emphasis on the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

From a military point of view, it is extremely important to integrate UAV systems into C4I system architecture in the area of responsibility. The standardisation process of UAV instruments and products, according to the unanimously accepted standards, has started to be present in Romania. And here are some examples:

• Provision No. S.M.Ap. 79/2018 acceptance STANAG 4703 – Certification of airworthiness of light aircraft without pilot on board;

• Provision No. S.M.G. 85/2017 acceptance STANAG 4671 – Certification of airworthiness of unmanned aircraft with a mass over 150 kg;

• The Romanian Air Code, Law No. 399/2005 supplemented by Law No. 98/ 04.07.2014 (Published in the Official Gazette Part I No. 506 on 08.07.2014);

• Specific regulations to the UAV domain of the Romanian Civil Aeronautical Authority etc.

The great diversity of unmanned aircraft models is not beneficial to us from the point of view of operability. The present models have particularities regarding:

• the payload; • the procurement systems given; • the command and control systems; • the physical dimensions etc.

It is interesting that from the military perspective the different profile of the missions should be mentioned as it is dependent on the technical-tactical elements such as:

• the useful mass;

From a military point of view, it is extremely important to integrate UAV systems into C4I system architecture in the area of responsibility. The standardisation process of UAV instruments and products, according to the unanimously accepted standards, has started to be present in Romania.


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• the operating altitude; • the duration of flight operation; • the ray of tactical action etc.

Operationally important, it is also the planning time for the search, identification and execution of the missions to hit the mobile targets. There is a significant progress in reducing these times from a few days (hours) as it was in the past to a few minutes today.

Within the perspective studies on the development of UAVs, missions are planned, which are performed today by pilot aircraft. We are dealing with a realistic perspective, considering that unmanned aircraft, from simple targets in the distant past, have taken over aerial research missions, striking missions since 2002 and newer SEAD.

Therefore, the massive integration of aircraft without human pilot on board in the military actions is a reality and a necessity, both in terms of obtaining the necessary information and from the profile of future military actions.

THE GENERAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FUTURE UAVsWhat are their operational requirements?Next, I will try to present some operational requirements for the

latest generation of UAVs, which are also challenges for designers, manufacturers, as well as for users. First, we must consider the instructions and their use as efficiently as possible in the operations. They must have a high operational flexibility, so that the operator can reconfigure the missions in a short time depending on the situation created, the choice of targets being made almost instantly. For this, it requires an increased capacity of acquisition, data processing and a transmission of them encrypted to any fighter aircraft available in the operations area. The ideal goal would be to be able to employ the most dangerous target. This aspect cannot always be achieved. It also depends on the ability to program the UAV’s route in a short time. It is necessary to create the binomial “prepared man – machine”, which also ensures a high capacity for survival in the respective fighting environment. It is also important the implementation of “the stealth type technology” for UAVs. If it is not possible, it is ideal to reduce as much as possible the surface of reflection or, as some specialists say, “the radiolocation imprint”. In this way, the aircraft can cross the enemy’s space and avoid an imminent attack. The high capacity

Within the perspective

studies on the development of UAVs, missions

are planned, which are

performed today by pilot aircraft. We are dealing with a realistic

perspective, considering

that unmanned aircraft, from

simple targets in the distant past, have taken over aerial research

missions, striking missions since

2002 and newer SEAD.

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of resistance to jamming is also part of the complex of features that ensure survival. Also, the response capacity/higher fight-back should be in the future the UAVs. This aspect involves a real-time transmission of information about targets directly to the hitting system on board. It also implies a high transport capacity. The armament and the explosive material have a large mass. These must be within the limit of the UAV’s payload. That is why the first class of UAVs is less recommended in combat missions. It is important to have as much transport capacity as possible to achieve the destruction of many targets in a single mission. That is another reason why it is also important the characteristic of ubiquity. This feature is also common for research/hunting aircraft with pilot. Specific for first and second-class UAVs is that they can be kept in the air for a long time, a feature that is far superior to other aircraft, thus being able to operate in a large sector. In a crisis or war situation, this is more than necessary to fulfil this aspect. The exceptional mobility is compulsory for the concentration of the struggle effort in the critical or decisive points/areas of the battle theatre (some specialists call it “the centre of gravity”).

As it can be seen, all these operational characteristics are related to each other. For this, the UAV must have the following technical-tactical characteristics:

• a high operational ray, depending on the class of UAV to which it belongs. The operational ray also involves providing a minimum data/radio link required to accomplish the mission, as well as a reserve that is necessary to accomplish the mission. I think it must be at least 80 km (even for some first-class UAVs);

• a high endurance, depending on the class of UAV to which it belongs. By endurance I mean the ability of the UAV to fly a certain period without a recover of the flight capacity. This autonomy also depends on the time frame in which the missions are executed. At the tactical level, I think the endurance of at least 12 hours is very good. Ideally it would be 14-16 hours. At operational level, ideally, it would be over 24 hours, and at strategic level over 48 hours;

• a high operating altitude, also according to the UAV class of which it is part. A minimum altitude of 4500 m must be ensured even by the first-class UAVs;

• a high flight speed, covering the entire opening of the flight heights, corresponding to each UAV engine. To leave as quickly as possible the area of vulnerability or the area of action of the anti-aircraft, it is important also the ascension speed (the speed

The high capacity of resistance to jamming is also part of the complex of features that ensure survival. Also, the response capacity/higher fight-back should be in the future the UAVs. This aspect involves a real-time transmission of information about targets directly to the hitting system on board. It also implies a high transport capacity.


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on the Y axis of the flight vector). This parameter is dependent on the type of the engine on the UAV and on what maximum traction force is able to offer depending on the altitude. Things are different when we have electric engines or piston engines, and when we have turboprop or turbojet engines;

• a high structural resistance, depending on the most demanding flight regime. Some UAVs withstand the overloads of 20 g. The structural resistance depends on the materials from which the main elements of the structure of the aircraft are made (struts, smooth-bore etc.);

• a high operating capacity at launch, under different terrain conditions. Here I refer to launch systems and the capabilities of the UAV to be able to operate both manually and automatically, with or without rolling, on lanes arranged briefly or not at all.

HOW WILL UAVS WORK IN THE FUTURE? In figure no. 1, we can see some main directions for the development

of the future UAV systems2: • heavily armed (minimising weaponry and ammunition); • implementation of new materials (energy sources, propulsion,

structure, payloads etc.) materialised by reaching supersonic speeds;

Figure no. 1: The main directions for the development of future UAV systems (RPAS3)

2 Laurenţiu-Răducu Popescu, Întrebuințarea sistemelor aerospațiale fără pilot uman la bord, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, p.117.

3 RPAS – Remotely Piloted Aircraft System – the new name of the UAVs in the ICAO documentation.

The UAV must have

the following technical-tactical characteristics: a high operational

ray; a high endurance; a

high operating altitude; a high flight speed; a high structural

resistance; a high operating

capacity at launch.

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• use of transport platforms to take off more UAVs;• supply in the air, with long endurance;

• “Stealth” technology implementation; • ensuring the interoperability of the systems; • use of neural networks; • extra-stratospheric displacement capabilities (>50 km).

Some of these directions are already in the testing phase (in figure no. 1 with the “check sign”). In figure no. 2, it can be observed how the orders given to the UAV by the operator have been optimised. In the future, these commands will be efficiently connected to the muscle tissue of the operator. For a simulation of reality as close to the flight conditions of the UAV, the operator will have a vest that represents sensory actions, the turbulent zones, the limit overloads and other dangerous flight conditions. On the helmet or on the pair of glasses, there will be designed both the flight parameters and the images recorded from the front camera of the UAV or other useful information.

Figure no. 2: The manoeuvres of the UAV operator coordinated from operational centres and distributed to the beneficiaries.

The sensors on board the UAV will be more and more efficient. The electronic-optical device will acquire images with a resolution proportional to the information processing capacity and with the speed of their transmission. There are proposals and tests for configuring a “swarm” network. In these networks, the UAVs can also operate autonomously. The “swarm” network offers the beneficiaries chronological information about a certain location as well as the activity in the area, all stored in a database (digital library). Of course, this concept must be adapted to the military environment

For a simulation of reality as close to the flight conditions of the UAV, the operator will have a vest that represents sensory actions, the turbulent zones, the limit overloads and other dangerous flight conditions. On the helmet or on the pair of glasses, there will be designed both the flight parameters and the images recorded from the front camera of the UAV or other useful information.


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by encrypting information and by limited access, depending on the echelon. Regarding UAVs, data on UAV missions as well as telemetry data can be accessed.

The armament on board the UAVs will be miniaturised. I provide as an argument The American Program of Experimentation of Miniaturized Ammunition Technology (MMTD). Here, tests were performed for a light bomb (which was guided by GPS), known as “GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb” (SDB), a performance bomb with a mass of 110 kg which can penetrate 3 meters of reinforced concrete4. There are other projects in progress with much lower weight.

Figure no. 3: The effect of SDB on target

In the future, weapons will be based on very powerful frequencies of microwaves (e-bomb) or electromagnetic bombs. In fact, the principle is based on emission of a strong electromagnetic field that can be transformed into a concentrated microwave flow towards the target. This flow can remove from the fight any weapon or fighting equipment that is based on electricity. We can also remind The Active Denial System Program (the millimetre wave weapon), a non-lethal combat system against energy-directed personnel (for dispersing people) as well as the electromagnetic cannon with a projectile speed of 7 times the speed of sound. Regarding the use of this cannon on UAVs, it is premature to pronounce. The difficulty consists in the manufacture of a sufficiently advanced current generator to power this cannon. I think the problem is the same for the laser weapons that will be mounted on UAVs. At first, I think they will be mounted on UGV5 or USV6.

4 21st Century’s American Intelligent Bombs, https://www.airvectors.net/avusmtb_2.html, retrieved on 16 August 2019.

5 UGV – Unmanned Ground Vehicle.6 USV – Unmanned Surface Vehicle.

The armament on board the UAVs will be

miniaturised. I provide as

an argument The American

Program of Experimentation

of Miniaturized Ammunition

Technology (MMTD). Here,

tests were performed for

a light bomb (which was

guided by GPS), known

as “GBU-39/B Small Diameter

Bomb” (SDB), a performance

bomb with a mass of 110

kg which can penetrate

3 meters of reinforced

concrete. There are other

projects in progress with

much lower weight.

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The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS7) is still a case study of UAVs. Most are based on GPS/GLONASS (BEIDOU and GALILEO in the future). Beside GNSS system, the UAV also uses accelerometers, gyroscopes or magnetometers, which help to steer it on all 3 axes of rotation. These systems represent a vulnerability because the signal can be jammed thus resulting a loss of the connection with the Ground Control System (GCS8). In the future, a safe UAV recovery solution will have to be found regarding the loss of GPS signal. A solution would be to bring the rotation angles of the UAV to zero or neutral when the signal is lost so that it can glide for a certain period also being equipped with a parachute. There is also the solution offered by The Precision Inertial Navigation System (PINS)9. High precision atomic accelerometers, as well as atomic gyroscopes, have been made. The system does not need data transmission from the GCS to the flight vector; the PINS system has already a precision close to the GPS system.

The provision of communications services for UAVs will have to be optimised in the future. Due to the fact that a large part of the bandwidth is rented and due to the fact that the bandwidth allocation involves very high costs, it will have to establish its own communications infrastructure. It is likely that the laser will be used to establish communications with the UAV. The big operational advantage is that an increased protection will be achieved against jams. However, the optical communication systems have a problem, namely the absorption of waves by the atmosphere. In addition, the precision of directing the laser beam (this one having a very narrow width) from and to the UAV will really be a challenge. These optical routers are favourable for UAVs that operate at high heights, from the third class (Global Hawk, Boeing’s Phantom Eye etc.).

Power supply is another innovation. Here, I will refer to the power supply through the laser beam for small (first class) UAVs. Multi-rotor UAVs have not solved the problem of autonomy which is very low (electric engines) due to accumulators on board. The variant of wireless charging of these accumulators is also being studied. The efficiency

7 GNSS – Global Navigation Satellite System.8 GCS – Ground Control System.9 PINS – The Precision Inertial Navigation System uses a computer, motion sensors

(accelerometers), and rotation sensors (gyroscopes) to continuously calculate the position, orientation and speed (direction and speed of movement) of a moving object without the need of external references. The GPS has an accuracy of at least 10 metres, while with PINS the accuracy is around 30 metres.

Beside GNSS system, the UAV also uses accelerometers, gyroscopes or magnetometers, which help to steer it on all 3 axes of rotation. These systems represent a vulnerability because the signal can be jammed thus resulting a loss of the connection with the Ground Control System (GCS). In the future, a safe UAV recovery solution will have to be found regarding the loss of GPS signal.


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of this concept remains to be seen. Maybe these UAVs will only be used in a limited environment. It is very likely that the laser will be used in data transmission because it would work without interruptions. The USA is also studying the combination of laser technology with that of photovoltaic cells. This concept involves sending a laser from the ground to the photovoltaic cells on the UAV and transforming the laser, which is also a form of energy, into electrical energy. If this project is implemented in practice, then the UAVs will be permanently flying in the operational ray of the laser. There may also be hazards in terms of UAV security if the laser steering is faulty and reaches areas that may affect certain vital components of the flight. Therefore, the precision of laser is essential. Solutions should also be sought if the beam fails to target only the photovoltaic cell. One of the solutions would be to dissipate the excess heat generated by the laser on the surface of the UAV.

In figure no. 1 another major development direction can be observed, namely the Ensuring Interoperability of the Systems. Simultaneous connection on the systems is vital so that the information can be transmitted in real time, in both directions and in the format required by the beneficiaries. At present, there are 5 levels of interoperability that can only be achieved by standardising the interfaces between the elements of the UAV system and between the GCS and the external C4I systems. These interfaces must allow the use of the communication protocols and the corresponding message formats, both for the UAVs of the future and for the already existing ones. Their absence can lead to errors between the beneficiary’s information collection system and the system used by the UAV.

The concept of using some transport platforms for UAVs to take off is being tested for the moment. This concept generates many debates due to the complexity of operating the system safely. The concept consists of the existence of a ship/aircraft considered “basic” with pilot placed in the vicinity of the operations area. It will be used to launch a series of UAVs (piloted either from a distance, or by a pilot of combat aircraft or fully autonomous aircraft) to carry out research/strike missions in the depths of the adversary territory as well as in areas of strong anti-aircraft equipment.

Mini UAVs can create big problems even with technologically advanced weapon systems, being able to penetrate any space. On the Internet it is already a video presentation, which seriously made

This concept involves sending a laser from the

ground to the photovoltaic

cells on the UAV and

transforming the laser, which

is also a form of energy, into

electrical energy. If this project is implemented in

practice, then the UAVs will

be permanently flying in the

operational ray of the laser.

There may also be hazards in terms of UAV security if the laser steering

is faulty and reaches areas

that may affect certain vital

components of the flight.

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me think, a mini drone that can be programmed to kill in confined spaces, by facial recognition of the victim.

The implementation of “Stealth” technology for UAVs is not a new concept. The first jet aircraft of this type was designed by the Horten brothers, in Nazi Germany. Aircraft with Stealth technology have been developed for piloted aircraft, such as Horten, B2, F-117, and also for unmanned ones, such as X-45, X-47 and Neuron.

The implementation of artificial intelligence in UAVs is another research direction. What is meant to be achieved with priority is the autonomous planning of the flight path. The UAV’s onboard computer will be able, together with the onboard sensors, to identify the enemy targets, to prioritise them and to be able to engage the target (if the autonomous mode is set, depending on the level of autonomy in the decision set by the software). So, a problem that continues to generate interest is related to the degree of maximum autonomy so that the whole phenomenon will not get out of control.

At present, other objectives for integrating UAVs into military actions are on the table of designers, logistics being one of them. The transport of military equipment/material is taken into consideration. The variant of human transport is not excluded, at least in the version of the extraction of the personnel behind the enemy contact line and of the medical evacuation. Performing tasks during maintenance is a reality, at least for civilian technology (aircraft inspection). Of course, it can be applied to heavy military equipment or strategic military transport aircraft.

In the end, we must not forget the capacity for extra-atmospheric displacement. Here I am referring first to the cosmic component in the area of driving and connectivity with the UAVs coming in and being extra atmospheric (space vehicles without human pilot on board as well as the rovers sent to the Moon and Mars, the space probes that cross the solar system, the space observers etc.).

CONCLUSIONSWe must face the new challenges of the future. Robots represent

one of them. First, the mind-set of future commanders from all armed forces services regarding the use in combat of aircraft systems without human pilot on board must be changed rapidly. They are effective tools in the hands of those who know how to successfully plan, organise, coordinate and control subordinate forces. They are also now accessible

The implementation of “Stealth” technology for UAVs is not a new concept. The first jet aircraft of this type was designed by the Horten brothers, in Nazi Germany. Aircraft with Stealth technology have been developed for piloted aircraft, such as Horten, B2, F-117, and also for unmanned ones, such as X-45, X-47 and Neuron.


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tools for the Romanian National Defence and Security System. For the moment, I can say with enough confidence that the

UAVs will produce a revolution in the military field, a true Revolution in Military Affairs, due to the profound changes they will trigger, in the military doctrine, in the operational concepts. In the future, the doctrine technology and the organisational structure will act combined and independently regarding the conduct of military actions.

I do not want to tip the balance towards an exaggerated optimism regarding the use of UAVs in the future, starting from the fact that nothing is perfect and history has proven this. With the appearance of a new weapons system, a relatively recent antidote has also emerged; let us say “the paradox of high technology”. What is this? The more complex a system is, the greater its vulnerability to enemy’s attacks will be. Some UAVs can be jammed and automatically lose the control in operation, an outcome that is not to be desired. However, jamming is also achieved with the advanced technology. This is the paradox.

The importance of the need to monitor and study the UAV phenomenon is obvious. Who will not take into consideration the change will be surely surprised. Surprises are not desirable in the case of military actions. It is good to pay attention to this evolving phenomenon for the timely detachment of the necessary conclusions and the measures to be taken, both at the level of the military users and at the one of the political/economic beneficiaries. Only in this way, we can have sustainable development strategies and policies and what I consider extremely important is the equipment with the proper military technology to meet the new demands of the modern battlefield.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES:1. ***, 21st Century’s American Intelligent Bombs, https://www.

airvectors.net/avusmtb_2.html.2. Laurenţiu-Răducu Popescu, Întrebuinţarea sistemelor aerospaţiale

fără pilot uman la bord, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2012.

The importance of the need to

monitor and study the UAV

phenomenon is obvious. Who

will not take into consideration

the change will be surely

surprised. Surprises are not desirable in the case of

military actions. It is good to

pay attention to this evolving

phenomenon for the timely

detachment of the necessary

conclusions and the measures to

be taken, both at the level of the

military users and at the one

of the political/economic

beneficiaries.

192192No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

THE NEW PROFILE OF EUROPEAN THE NEW PROFILE OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCECOOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE

Dragoş ILINCA, PhDBranch Chief, Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History,

Ministry of National Defence, Bucharest

European cooperation in the field of defence is not a new topic, being a constant feature in the last decades. The entry into force of the new EU Treaty (Lisbon Treaty – 2009) made it possible for the cooperation in the field of defence to be upgraded to a more integrated approach, under the institutional auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The key features are centred on a more practical approach in the field of capabilities development with real industrial output. Equally, this process was incentivised through the EU Security Strategy, which made defence cooperation a top priority. Within this framework, several concepts and ideas were put forward, which generated practical initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Coordinated Annual Defence Review (CARD), European Defence Fund (EDF). However, there are certain questions to be answered on the future of this European project, considering the level of maturity reached in a very short time.

Keywords: European defence, CSDP, Lisbon Treaty, PESCO, EU Security Strategy.


193

The New Profile of European Cooperation in the Field of DefenceThe New Profile of European Cooperation in the Field of Defence

193 DEFENCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENTDEFENCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTIONDebating European security and defence cooperation is equally

a generous and challenging task. Despite a relatively short history, this subject is an integral part of an extremely dynamic paradigm, which generated strategic changes in European Union’s profile in the international security context, and more specifically in the crisis management domain. Furthermore, in analysing the subject, one should not overlook the substantial complexity attached to it, generating the need for a more interdisciplinary and multidimensional approach. That is mainly because of the very nature of the European Union as well as of the interacting parameters between institutional set-up and member states. These elements were fundamental in guiding the evolution of security and defence cooperation in the European context.

Equally, debating the European security is one of the most important aspects of the contemporary security agenda, posing a theoretical challenge, centred on the fundamental questions regarding the essential elements of this approach and the way they are working. Finding the most comprehensive answers to these questions is the right approach to structuring the reflection on security. It is not redundant to reiterate the certain features of the current security environment, in particular, the profound asymmetry and interconnectivity of the security threats we are currently facing. The classical combination of conventional challenges and asymmetric risks is the main pattern of security. Moreover, the security evolution occurred in the last years testified that the state resilience is at stake and it is necessary to find the right and innovative answers in order to cope with insidious threats. The practical way of implementing this endeavour should be integrated into a common approach, which goes beyond the scholastic level of understanding and management of the security realities.

It is generally accepted in the academic as well as bureaucratic communities that global security is in the middle of a new phase in which the multilateral international system is under pressure.

Debating the European

security is one of the most

important aspects of the contemporary

security agenda, posing

a theoretical challenge,

centred on the fundamental

questions regarding

the essential elements of this

approach and the way they are working.

Finding the most comprehensive

answers to these questions is the right approach

to structuring the reflection on

security.

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Dragoş Dragoş ILINCAILINCA

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Adapting to the new realities is definitely the challenge of this century in which the EU has to find its way under certain geopolitical pressure coming simultaneously from West and East. Moreover, challenges cross national borders, emphasising the relevance of cooperation between the countries on common lines of actions. The major responsibility is on the multinational structures, from both conceptual and practical perspectives of transforming their way of action in the current security complexity. To a similar extent, the challenge lies in finding the right synergies and practical complementarities between multinational actors. Within this shifting security paradigm, the European Union must find its role and contribution in order to preserve the interests of its members. The answer was developed gradually in the last decades towards an own model of involvement in the security management aspects.

A CONSISTENT LEGACYChronologically, the inception moment is placed around the context

of the Balkan wars, started at the beginning of the 90s, in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The real incapacity of Europeans to manage the security decline as well as the humanitarian dramas occurred in this context increased the awareness, both public and political, of the sense of urgency in developing the capacity to deal with this kind of threats. In the next years, this debate generated concrete results, as it was the case of Saint-Malo Declaration1, through which the European cooperation received the political boost of implementation along the lines of operational readiness to engage autonomously in operations. One year later, the political consensus reached between the two major European actors in the defence area was further strengthened by the institutional agreement reached at the European Council in Helsinki. Best known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (HLG)2, the decisions adopted during the Finnish Presidency of EU Council were meant to give a tangible profile of the defence cooperation between member states. The objective adopted envisaged the establishment, by the end

1 St. Malo Declaration, adopted by France and United Kingdom during the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo (3-4 December 1998). See the full text in Chaillot Paper 47. From St. Malo to Nice. European Defence: Core Documents, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2001, pp. 8-10.

2 The parameters of the decision on Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 in Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm, retrieved on 12 September 2019.

It is generally accepted in the academic as well as bureaucratic communities that global security is in the middle of a new phase in which the multilateral international system is under pressure. Adapting to the new realities is definitely the challenge of this century.


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of 2003, of a Rapid Reaction Force up to 50-60,000 military, able to be deployed within 60 days and sustained in the theatre of operations at a strategic distance from the EU territory for one year. The operational engagement was integrated under the institutional framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), meant to provide the overarching framework for the activities in these fields.

Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goal in 2003 was matched by the first operational commitments deployed under EU flag in the Western Balkans (EUFOR Concordia ‒ Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Africa (EUFOR Artemis – Democratic Republic of Congo). Additionally, the signs of progress reached in 2003 in the field of defence cooperation included the adoption of the very first European Security Strategy (ESS)3, which provided the guidance for future defence and security cooperation in order to boost the profile and contribution in the overall security context. It is worth mentioning that the ESS opened a new chapter for ESDP evolution by bringing closer the operational objectives to the need of improving the capabilities development process at the EU member state level. On this path, the European Council in June 2004 endorsed additional decisions to refine the quantitative approach in determining the parameters of defence cooperation. A focus was placed on the actual features, such as: deployment, rapid decision-making and ability to cope with difficult conditions in a hostile environment. These were at the centre of the new Headline Goal4, focused on the creation of sufficiently rapid reaction capabilities, in the form of Battle Groups that would be made available by member states for EU operations.

The attention paid to the qualitative aspects of the politically agreed objectives to increase the profile of EU in the field of security and defence was complemented by a new focus on improving the defence capabilities. In this vein, the Thessaloniki European Council promoted the idea of creating a dedicated structure as an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research

3 The first security strategy was adopted by the European Council in December 2003 under the name A Secure Europe in a Better World. It was drafted under the coordination of Javier Solana, High Representative for Common Foreign Security Policy (1999-2009).

4 Headline Goal 2010 approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 and further endorsed by the European Council of 17-18 June 2004, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/sede110705headlinegoal2010_/sede110705headlinegoal2010_en.pdf, retrieved on 13 September 2019.

The adoption of the very

first European Security Strategy

(ESS) opened a new chapter for ESDP evolution

by bringing closer the

operational objectives to

the need of improving the

capabilities development

process at the EU member state level.

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acquisition and armaments5. Following the political agreement reached on these subjects, one year later the European Defence Agency was created, which gradually developed into the main actor in supporting the efforts made by member states to generate the capabilities in an integrated matrix, involving the industrial and commercial components in Europe.

CONTINUITY IN MANAGING THE CAPABILITIES SHORTFALLSThe Lisbon Treaty introduced several initiatives, which have the

potential for future consolidation of European cooperation in the field of defence. From a purely institutional perspective, the new treaty established the Common Security and Defence Policy as an instrument designed to ensure the overarching framework for more structured development of defence and security at EU level. The strategic guidance encapsulated in the Treaty defined CSPD as “…an integral part of the common foreign and security policy; that it provides the Union with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets; that the Union may use such assets in the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; that the performance of these tasks is to be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States in accordance with the principle of a single set of forces”6. The implementation of these tasks is supported by a reinforced institutional set-up, centred on the role and responsibilities of High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HVRP) and European External Action Service (EEAS). Their competences are designed in the preservation of the existing framework related to the European Council and minister’s format in the EU Council. From this point of view, the major innovation

5 The Thessaloniki decision was based on the recommendation made in the context of European Convention gathered to draft the Constitutional Treaty (2002). From this perspective, Group VIII, coordinated by Michele Barnier, recommended the creation of such a body in order to boost cooperation in Europe in this respect. Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-03-3_en.htm, retrieved on 14 September 2019.

6 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of European Union, no. 326/26.10.2012.

The Lisbon Treaty established the Common Security and Defence Policy as an instrument designed to ensure the overarching framework for more structured development of defence and security at EU level.


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is related to increased autonomy in guiding the overall activities developed under CSDP and, subsequently, to a rebalanced relationship with member states.

Within this framework, security and defence benefited substantially from the structural approach promoted by the Lisbon Treaty. On this base, the concept of European capabilities and armaments policy (Art 42(3)) was introduced as a major priority for cooperation agenda in the field of defence. At the same time, it was established an institutional link between CSDP and other levels of activity, centred on a more scrutinising role of European Defence Agency and European Commission (Article 45(2)) in defence capabilities development process. In addition to that, Lisbon provisions highlighted the central role of EDA in supporting the development of joint capability projects between member states. In performing this task, EDA enforced a comprehensive process aiming to generate defence planning guidance.

For the sake of coherence and continuity, it is worth mentioning some aspects of the experiments developed before Lisbon. Basically, the problem of capabilities shortfalls was not a new subject for European states, as, until the Helsinki Headline Goal, it was addressed in the NATO framework. Afterwards, the situation changed substantially due to the need to develop a procedure to manage the capabilities aspects, associated with the implementation of the objective agreed in Helsinki. In this regard, the Laeken European Council adopted the decision to launch an initiative to support the process to alleviate capability shortfalls identified in the planning process of HLG, namely European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)7. This was placed under the coordination of EU Military Committee supported by the EU Military Staff, being one of the new instruments put in place in the context of EU defence planning process, in order to respond to the following requirements:

• improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of European cooperation in the field of defence;

• stimulate the cooperation between member states with a view to increasing the potentiality of joint cooperation projects;

• implementation of a bottom-up approach in the context of identifying the necessary solution for improving the European

7 Chaillot Paper 51, From Nice to Laeken. European Defence: Core Documents, vol. II, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2002, pp. 129-130.

Security and defence

benefited substantially

from the structural approach

promoted by the Lisbon Treaty.

The concept of European

capabilities and armaments

policy was introduced as a

major priority for cooperation

agenda in the field of defence.

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capability domain, with optimal use of member states contributions;

• ensure the proper coordination simultaneously between member states and with NATO.

The priorities identified in this framework were debated in dedicated working groups, which prepared tailored recommendations for improvement, covering different types of solutions8, ranging from pooling the existing resources of member states to acquisition, lease, coordination with NATO.

Type of shortfalls analysed under ECAP 1 Attack Helicopters/Support Helicopters2 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection (NBC)3 Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV)/Surveillance and Target Acquisition

(STA) Units4 Medical Role 3/Medical Collective Protection Role 35 Special Operations Forces (SOF)6 Carrier-Based Air Power7 Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)8 Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR)9 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)10 Cruise Missiles/Precision Guided Munitions11 Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence12 Deployable Communication Modules13 Headquarters (OHQ, FHQ, CCHQs)14 Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Picture16 Strategic ISR IMINT Collection17 UAV (HALE, MALE and tactical UAVs)18 Early Warning and Distant Detection Strategic Level19 Strategic Air Mobility/Outsized Transport Aircraft, General Cargo

Aircraft20 Roll-On-Roll-Off Vessels (RO-RO)/General Cargo Shipping

Nevertheless, the ECAP exercise failed to achieve tangible results since the solutions identified were not followed by practical implementing measure. Furthermore, despite the decision regarding

8 A broad indication on possible solutions identified through ECAP process in Military Commitments Declaration, March 2003, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/Military%20capabilities%20-%20EN.doc.html, retrieved on 14 September 2019.

The ECAP exercise failed to achieve tangible results since the solutions identified were not followed by practical implementing measure.


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the establishment of dedicated project groups for every type of shortfall, the pace and substance of the work were far of the initial expectations. In the same vein, the Single Progress Report presented in May 2004 highlighted that the progress achieved was marginal, recommending further clarification and guidance. From this perspective, the responsibility for review process regarding the capabilities shortfalls was assumed by EDA9.

A NEW PARADIGMThe new approach was focused on identifying a comprehensive set

of priorities, in close consultation with member states, which could reflect all national perceptions and views on maximising the coherence of the member states contribution. The main output of the consultation process was represented by the Capabilities Development Plan (CDP), which presumably became the main tool for defence capability planning in EU, for a cycle lasting not less than four years. In this respect, the latest version of CDP put forward the following areas of cooperation as main priorities in the field of capabilities development10:

Enabling capabilities for cyber response operation

Cyber cooperation and synergies;Cyber R&T;Systems engineering framework for cyber operations;Cyber education and training;Specific cyber defence challenges in the air, space maritime and land domain.

Space-based information and communication services

Earth observation;Positioning, navigation and timing;Space situational awareness;Satellite communication.

9 Declaration on European Military Capabilities, Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004, available at https://www.europarl.europa. e u / m e etd o c s / 2 0 0 4 _ 2 0 0 9 / d o c u m e nt s / d v /s e d e 1 1 0 7 0 5 m i l i ta r yca p a b i l i ti e s _ /sede110705militarycapabilities_en.pdf, retrieved on 14 September 2009.

10 Capabilities Development Plan 2018, available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/capability-development-plan, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

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Information superiority Radio spectrum management;Tactical CIS;Information management;Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Ground combat capabilities Upgrade, modernise and develop land platforms (manned/unmanned vehicles, precision strike);Enhance the protection of forces. (CBRN, CIED, individual soldier equipment).

Enhanced logistic and medical supporting capabilities

Military mobility;Enhanced logistics;Medical support.

Naval manoeuvrability Maritime situational awareness;Surface superiority;Power projection.

Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea

Mine warfare;Anti-submarine warfare;Harbour protection.

Air superiority Air combat capability;Air ISR platforms;Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) capability;Air-to-air refuelling;Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).

Cross-domain capabilities contributing to achieving the EU’s level of ambition

Innovative technologies for enhanced future military capabilities;Autonomous EU capacity to test and to qualify EU developed capabilities;Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within EU’s LoA.

Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector

Military access to airspace;Ability to protect the confidentiality of mission-critical information;Coordination with civilian aviation authorities;Adaptation of military air/space C2 capability.

Air mobility Strategic air transport;Tactical air transport including air medical evacuation.


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Obviously, fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives is a challenging task both in terms of quantitative aspects against national commitments as well as on promoting a flexible approach towards cooperative projects. In this respect, the Lisbon Treaty provided additional incentives for stimulating the cooperative approach on defence. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is by far the most relevant instrument in this regard, especially from the perspective of allowing the development of a more profound cooperation in the field of defence between member states that are interested in it and are able to do it (opened to any member state that proceeds more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments11.

Besides the practical opportunities, PESCO, romantically called “The sleeping beauty of the Treaty”, is one of the real expressions of variable geometry governing the new path of European cooperation in the field of defence promoted through the Lisbon Treaty. To an equal extent, there are many opinions debating on PESCO as a concrete manifestation of the multiple-speed approach in the field of defence. That could be the logical explanation for the active interests of the large majority of member states which firmly choose to participate in this format. At the same time, the resort to the EU Treaty provisions was a direct consequence of the relatively slow pace of capabilities development process. PESCO was perceived as a more effective instrument in promoting a more ambitious and integrated European project in the field of defence. To a similar extent, PESCO should be an instrument meant to provide strategic guidance for European defence cooperation with a better reflection of the national interests and priorities in the field of capabilities development.

PESCO was activated at the end of 2017, following the notification signed by the foreign and defence EU ministers. The legally binding nature and scope of PESCO were reiterated along the lines of 20 commitments covering an extensive inventory of topics associated with the capability development process, ranging from the financial

11 The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty could be found in Article 42, 46 of EU Treaty and Protocol No. 10 on Permanent Structured Cooperation.

The Lisbon Treaty provided

additional incentives for

stimulating the cooperative

approach on defence. The

Permanent Structured

Cooperation (PESCO) is by far the

most relevant instrument in

this regard, especially from the perspective of allowing the

development of a more profound

cooperation in the field of

defence between member

states that are interested in it

and are able to do it.

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contribution of the member states to the actual participation in EU-led operations. The relevance of PESCO was highlighted through the evaluation mechanism meant to provide a clear picture of the progress achieved by the member states against the commitments assumed politically in the framework of this initiative12. It is beyond any doubt that in the absence of strong political support for creating the new framework of cooperation, PESCO activation would not be possible. This approach is reflected by the substantial results in developing the institutional and normative aspects associated with PESCO functionality. The immediate follow-up of the decision to use PESCO was expressed in developing practical cooperation projects. In less than two years, participating member states made 34 cooperation proposals on various domains, responding to the objectives assumed collectively through CDP. Proposals covered the capability development as well as operational aspects, involving different levels of participation of the member states, such as: European Medical Command, EU Training Mission Competence Centre, Cyber Rapid Response Teams, Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security, Military Disaster Relief, an upgrade of Maritime Surveillance, the creation of an European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network, a joint EU Intelligence School, Helicopter Training13. From this perspective, PESCO should be a constitutive part of an initiatives package in defence put forward in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty implementation.

But not everything is covered by the Treaty. Additional lines of action were provided through the EU Global Strategy endorsed by the General Affairs Council in October 2016. The strategic guidance provided was centred on the idea of deepening the integration in the field of defence, with a special view on “Gradual synchronisation and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices can enhance strategic convergence between the Member States”14. This objective was further detailed one month later

12 List of the commitments as well as the main parameters of PESCO evaluation mechanism in Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining list of participating Member States in Official Journal of European Union, No. L33, pp. 57-77.

13 Complete inventory of the agreed PESCO projects in Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1797 amending and updating Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO, in Official Journal of European Union, L294, pp. 18-22.

14 EU Global Strategy, pp. 20-21 available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

But not everything is covered by the Treaty. Additional lines of action were provided through the EU Global Strategy endorsed by the General Affairs Council in October 2016. The strategic guidance provided was centred on the idea of deepening the integration in the field of defence.


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in the Conclusions adopted by the foreign affairs and defence ministers meeting. In this context, a special emphasis was placed on deepening defence cooperation and delivering the required capabilities together. In support of the implementation, the EU ministers invited High Representative and EDA to formulate concrete proposals for setting up the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence15. The CARD mechanism was approved by the EU Council in May 2017, with a view to launching a trial phase in 2018, as an initial step for implementing a formal procedure starting with 2019. The working philosophy designed for CARD consisted, essentially, on a sequenced process developed as follows: collecting national data on defence capabilities aspects at the national level – reviewing of the compiled information against CDP priorities – formulating recommendations. According to the guidance provided by the Council, the review process focused on three major components: member states defence plans; implementation of the CDP priorities; development of European cooperation. These aspects were integrated into a CARD Aggregated Analysis, which represents the base for reporting on the outcome of the trial phase. From the capability development perspective, CARD is designed to include the military assessment of the state of play and the availability of the required capabilities for supporting EU operations. According to EDA Annual Report for 2018, the recommendations coming from the trial-phase “highlighted the overall positive trend in defence investment but raised some concerns with the decreasing R&T spending. A notable part of the investment is devoted to activities that support priorities agreed through the CDP, confirming the relevance of this process. Tailored collaborative opportunities were well received and will serve as a useful link to the first full CARD cycle”16. From a more practical perspective, the member states interest focused on: Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD), armoured vehicles (including main battle tanks), helicopters (light and medium), medical support, cyber defence, satellite communications, tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), maritime mine countermeasures and maritime security. At the same time, the military evaluation highlighted the existence of significant shortfalls in terms of the required capabilities to fulfil the agreed

15 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

16 European Defence Agency, Annual Report 2018, p. 8.

According to EDA Annual

Report for 2018, the

recommendations coming from

the trial-phase “highlighted the overall positive

trend in defence investment but

raised some concerns with

the decreasing R&T spending.

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objectives of CSDP, according to the Level of Ambition advanced through the EU Global Strategy17. Based on these elements, the Council decision in November 2018 reiterated the importance of CARD for the overall development of European cooperation in the field of defence. From this perspective, CARD became a standing activity, with a full cycle starting in November 2019 in order to “… provide further guidance on collaborative opportunities and a detailed assessment of the European capability landscape, also taking into account the short-, mid- and long-term trends of capability development”18.

MAXIMISING THE CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT The fourth component of the defence package developed in the

last years is related to industrial cooperation. Since the initial steps have been taken on the path of defining the parameters of European defence cooperation, industrial aspects represented one of the main priorities. Two main interlinked processes can be decrypted in tracing the evolution of this process regarding the consolidation of a genuine European approach in industrial cooperation and connecting the CSDP development with this domain. The initial steps were made by adopting the Strategy on European Defence, Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB)19, which was meant to put in place the framework for enabling the mechanisms for improving the European defence capabilities. The main drivers of this undertaking were the deep fragmentation of the defence industry in Europe as well as the insufficient level of financing of the defence sector at the national level. Within this picture, EDTIB Strategy proposed a more interconnected approach between five components: industrial structure; defence spending; defence market; defence industrial production and technology. On the same path of improving the coherence, Steering Board EDA, in the ministerial format, approved in November 2007 a set of collective benchmarks for managing the defence resources at the national level.

17 The main conclusion of CARD trial-phase, available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card), retrieved on 15 September 2019.

18 Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy, 19 November 2018, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37030/st13978-en18.pdf, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

19 Endorsed by the EDA Steering Board on 14 May 2007.

The Strategy on European Defence, Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) was meant to put in place the framework for enabling the mechanisms for improving the European defence capabilities. The main drivers of this undertaking were the deep fragmentation of the defence industry in Europe as well as the insufficient level of financing of the defence sector at the national level.


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Although voluntary in their nature, it was envisaged that the member states would seek to reach:

• Equipment procurement (including R&D/R&T): 20% of total defence spending;

• European collaborative equipment procurement: 35% of total equipment spending;

• Defence Research & Technology: 2% of total defence spending;• European collaborative defence R&T: 20% of total defence R&T

spending20.Simultaneously, the normative framework was further consolidating

by adopting: � Code of best practice in the supply chain, adopted by EDA

Steering Board on 27 March 2007. By using this instrument, defence industries can advertise their subcontracting opportunities through an Electronic Bulletin Board managed by EDA.

� European Armaments Co-operation Strategy (EACS), promoting a bridging approach between European capabilities development, EDTIB and defence investment. To an equal extent, this strategy forwarded a substantial inventory of practical solutions to stimulate industrial cooperation under the guidance of CDP priorities and common military requirements21.

� European Defence Research and Technology Strategy (EDRTS), emphasising the need for a concerted approach in defence investment, in order to “enhance and develop more effective research collaboration in science, technology and demonstrators to deliver in time the right technologies in support of military capabilities for short, medium and long term needs”22.

� Strategy for a Stronger More Competitive European Defence Industry23, proposed in December 2007 by the European Commission

20 https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/Benchmarks, retrieved on 16 September 2019.

21 Adopted by the EDA Steering Board in October 2008, text of EACS Strategy available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/EDA_European_Armaments_Co-operation_Strategy.pdf, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

22 EDRT Strategy adopted by the EDA Steering Board in November 2008, available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/edrt_strategy.pdf, retrieved on 15 September 2019.

23 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‒ A strategy for a stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0764&from=EN, retrieved on 16 September 2019.

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as an additional instrument to complement the intergovernmental approach promoted by EDA in consolidating the defence industry in Europe.

The practical results became visible in due time, mainly through the developments of tailored cooperation programs by an increased contribution of the member states and with the support of EDA. It was the case for Joint Investment Program (JIP) “Protecting Armed Forces” with a value of 13.1 million €.

As it was the case for the capability development process, the Treaty of Lisbon opened new perspectives on defence industrial cooperation. In the same spirit, Global Strategy framed this domain as a major priority for the CSDP development, emphasising the need for a more coherent defence industry in order to support the new profile of EU in the overall security context being also an opportunity to generate additional opportunities for economic development. “A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP. It can also stimulate growth and jobs. A solid European defence, technological and industrial base needs a fair, functioning and transparent internal market, security of supply, and structured dialogue with defence relevant industries. Furthermore, ensuring participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the defence sector can improve innovation and investment in the military technologies of tomorrow”24.

Under these auspices, the European Commission elaborated the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), which framed the objectives for the next decade for stimulating the defence cooperation on the European integration path. This undertaking includes three major elements: set up of a European Defence Fund (EDF); foster investments in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), start-ups, mid-caps and other suppliers to the defence industry; strengthen the European Single Market for defence25. The breakthrough was represented by the idea of developing a dedicated instrument to make a difference by creating financing opportunities for the defence industry and in accordance with

24 EU Global Strategy, p. 46, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, retrieved on 16 September 2019.

25 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European Defence Action Plan, Brussels, 30 November 2016, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0950, retrieved on 16 September 2019.

The practical results became visible in due time, mainly through the developments of tailored cooperation programs by an increased contribution of the member states and with the support of EDA. It was the case for Joint Investment Program (JIP) “Protecting Armed Forces”.


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the CDP priorities. From this perspective, EDF it is intended function from 2021, providing financial support of 13,000,000,000 Euros structured in two areas (windows) of cooperation. The first one relates with capabilities development, sustained through 8,900,000,000 Euros dedicated to the cooperative projects promoted by an industrial consortium consisting at least 3 entities from 3 member countries. A special emphasis is placed on the PESCO projects, which can benefit from an increased funding rate. The second window will manage the defence research aspects with a financial envelope of 4,100,000,000 Euros. At the same time, EDF will stimulate the development of disruptive technologies for defence, allocating at least 5 % and up to 10%26. In order to create the necessary conditions for the proper functioning of EDF, the Commission adopted the first Program on European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) at the end of 2018, which will function between 2019-2020. The main objective is to support the defence industry cooperation in the EU. The work programme developed under this framework will be co-funded by the EU budget with 500 million Euros for projects between member states related to the joint industrial development of defence equipment and technologies in all domains (air, land, sea, cyber and space)27. The priorities28 on which EDIDP is focused are:

• enabling operations, protection and mobility of forces; • intelligence, secured communication & cyber;• ability to conduct high-end operations;• innovative defence technologies & SMEs.

CONCLUSIONS Considering all these aspects, it is beyond any doubt that CSDP

enriched significantly in a very short period. All the above-mentioned evolutions indicate the creation of a genuine model for European

26 The Regulation establishing the European Defence Fund, approved by the European Parliament in April 2019, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0412_EN.html, retrieved on 17 September 2019.

27 Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 July 2018, establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the Union’s defence industry, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R1092, retrieved on 17 September 2019.

28 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/european-defence-fund-2019-mar-19_en, retrieved on 17 September 2019.

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cooperation in the field of defence in which the most important aspect is the interaction between the intergovernmental profile of CSDP and the integrated paradigm between various instruments and policies. The current state of play could not be evaluated thoroughly without considering the entire dynamics of the European project in the field of defence in the last two decades. It is beyond any doubt that we cannot talk about a linear evolution but what really matters is the continuity of the cooperation on this subject. In this sense, it is worth highlighting the constant support expressed by the public opinion for the consolidation of the European Union’s profile in the field of defence. That involves both developing institutional architecture and more preeminent European ownership on the practical aspects such as capabilities, operations and so on.

Of course, there are open questions regarding the perspectives of this project. From the overall perspective of the European integration process, CSDP is one of the most consensual in terms of the way in which member states are approaching it. There is a certain convergence in seeing the CSDP development as an additional engine, that could facilitate the substantive continuation of integration within the European Union. Many expectations are attached towards successful developments of the European cooperation in the field of defence, underlining the importance of preserving the coherence between various strands of work in order to maintain an adequate pace of the implementation of the agreed agenda. To an equal extent, this objective involves a thorough discussion about matching the resources with the ambitions vis-à-vis CSDP future developments. In designing a practical formula for CSDP development, special attention should be devoted to avoiding duplications formula with similar undertakings and practical initiatives developed by other organization. In this respect, the cooperation between the EU and NATO is the main framework, which generates substantial opportunities. The cornerstone of this undertaking is the practical reality of the single set of forces and capabilities made available by member states of both organisations.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES:1. ***, Capabilities Development Plan 2018, https://www.eda.europa.

eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/capability-development-plan. 2. ***, Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee

CSDP enriched significantly in a very short period. All the above-mentioned evolutions indicate the creation of a genuine model for European cooperation in the field of defence in which the most important aspect is the interaction between the intergovernmental profile of CSDP and the integrated paradigm between various instruments and policies.


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and the Committee of the Regions ‒ A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0764&from=EN.

3. ***, Declaration on European Military Capabilities, Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/d o c u m e n t s / d v / s e d e 1 1 0 7 0 5 m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i ti e s _ /sede110705militarycapabilities_en.pdf.

4. ***, Headline Goal 2010 approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 and further endorsed by the European Council of 17-18 June 2004, http://www.europarl .europa .eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/sede110705headlinegoal2010_/sede110705headlinegoal2010_en.pdf.

5. ***, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf.

6. ***, Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 of the European Parliament and the of the Council of 18 July 2018, establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the Union’s defence industry, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R1092.

7. ***, St. Malo Declaration, adopted by France and the United Kingdom during the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo (3-4 December 1998). The integral text in Chaillot Paper 47. From St. Malo to Nice. European Defence: Core Documents, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2001.

210210No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF ANALYSIS FOR THE EFFICIENCY

OF MILITARY EXPENDITUREOF MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Colonel Ion ANGHEL, PhD StudentDefence Staff

Colonel Cezar VASILESCU, PhD, BEngProfessor, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest

The efficient use of the defence budget for the achievement of military capabilities is a process that generates wide discussions, because it involves a systematic approach of the different economic, military and political aspects. The article highlights some of the methods of analysing the efficiency of the military expenses offered by the specialised literature, which result in identifying the relevant elements, with an impact on the development of military capabilities – as an investment process, which involves short-term costs, but also long-term advantages, from industrial development to ensuring national security. Thus, the efficient use of the defence budget offers a valuable dividend to the national economy. Last but not least, the developed military capabilities can, directly or indirectly, influence the nature of the conflicts, as well as the way in which insecurity is perceived.

Keywords: defence budget, military capability, efficiency, military expenditures, logistic system.


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Methods and Techniques of Analysis for the Efficiency of Military ExpenditureMethods and Techniques of Analysis for the Efficiency of Military Expenditure


INTRODUCTIONThis article focuses on analysing the efficiency of military

expenditures, in the context of their influence on military research and development (R&D) and cooperation in the field, by highlighting methods and techniques for measuring the efficiency of allocating the financial resources existing in the defence budget. It is important to have evaluation methods in order to improve the public decision regarding the approach of a budgetary flow with patrimonial consequences.

In economic science, the defence covers a wide variety of topics that fall into two broad fields of application of theories: the public economy and the industrial economy. At a more detailed level, it is found that it covers areas such as: defence spending, purchase of military equipment and human resources management, arms race, innovation and military research and development, arms trade, conflict theory, impact and economic causes of conflicts1.

The article addresses the relationship between the defence budget allocated to the Ministry of National Defence (MoD), as the main instrument for achieving the military capabilities and the economic effects of the military expenditures. The analysis is related to the available resources and the efficiency of their use, starting from two aspects, the military and the economic-financial one. In this context, it is agreed that the term defence budget should include the budget allocated to the MoD for this purpose. Thus, we can define the defence budget as that document by which the incomes and expenses or, as the case may be, only expenditures, depending on the financing system of public institutions are provided and approved each year.

It is considered that “the efficiency of public spending expresses an optimal dimension of a determined ratio between the financial efforts (the consumption of public financial resources) and the commensurable

1 Keith Hartley, Todd Dandler, Handbook of Defence Economics, North-Holland, 1995.

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Ion ANGHEL • Cezar VASILESCUIon ANGHEL • Cezar VASILESCU

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or estimative effects, obtainable on the basis of the objectives financed by the state”2.

We started from the premise that military spending is an extremely important component of public spending, part of the state budget. Depending on the needs and policies in the field of defence, a percentage of public resources should be allocated to finance this public sector of major interest. Following the implementation of defence projects, which may consist of operating and maintaining existing capabilities or investing in new military capabilities, the efficiency or inefficiency of the defence budget execution can be highlighted. As mentioned in the Defence White Paper, the capability is understood as “the ability to execute actions for the purpose of achieving certain objectives”3.

The economic problem of defence is treated from the perspective of public spending: the provision of a public good as the defence belongs to the state that must allocate the necessary human and material resources (production factors), within the limits of the available financial resources. Thus, two major implications appear, namely the defence effort cannot be reduced below a certain threshold without ruining the efficiency of the defence, and this effort should not neglect any of the essential parameters of the operational efficiency (recruitment, training, equipping, maintaining in operational conditions, sustaining an industrial and technological base for consistent defence, research and development).

In this context, the absence of a budget margin is likely to compromise the achievement of the financing level, which can be affected by the existence of a double risk: an economic risk linked to the general situation (low growth rate, very volatile fuel market) and another regarding financing operations for international interventions that may be at random levels and recurrences (see interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Romania has spent considerable amounts).

2 Tatiana Moştianu, Emilia Câmpeanu, Lucian Țâţu, Finanţe publice, Editura Universitară, București, 2005, p. 89.

3 Carta Albă a Apărării (Defence White Paper), published in Monitorul Oficial, Part I, no. 939 of 28 November 2017, p. 31.

The economic problem of defence is treated from the perspective of public spending: the provision of a public good as the defence belongs to the state that must allocate the necessary human and material resources (production factors), within the limits of the available financial resources.


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THE DEFENCE BUDGET – AN INSTRUMENT FOR ACHIEVING MILITARY CAPABILITIESThe rapid evolution of the security situation degradation, of the

globalization of hybrid actions, consistently overcomes the economic capacity to adapt the military technologies or evinces the caused abandonment in favour of the non-military capabilities.

As mentioned in the Defence White Paper, the capabilities of the Romanian Armed Forces are developed in the following areas: command, control and communications, employment, information, force projection, protection and support4.

At the same time, according to Documentul sinteză privind politicile și programele bugetare pe termen mediu ale ordonatorilor principali de credite pentru anul 2018 și perspectiva 2019-2021 (Synthetic Document regarding Budgetary Policies and Programmes in the Medium Term of the Main Authorising Officers for the Year 2018 and the 2019-2021 Time Period)5, a special attention will be paid to the further development of capabilities within the multinational framework provided by NATO and the EU through the use of multinational initiatives in the field of defence (“framework nation concept”, “smart defence”, “connected forces initiative”, “pooling & sharing”), as well as participation in the development projects of the defence capabilities proposed in the context of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defence at EU level, for which Romania has identified a potential for involvement”. Thus, it is mentioned that the whole process regarding the constitution, development and maintenance of capabilities is conducted taking into account a series of requirements and actions that include elements of doctrine, organisation, preparation, control, equipment, personnel, infrastructure and interoperability. The process of developing military capabilities aims to effectively use available resources by setting priorities, both in terms of capabilities that can be achieved through national efforts and those developed jointly with other Member States or Allies in a multinational format (NATO, EU or other regional cooperation formats). The specificity of the military

4 Ibidem.5 Document sinteză privind politicile și programele bugetare pe termen mediu ale ordonatorilor

principali de credite pentru anul 2018 și perspectiva 2019-2021, http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/buget/2018/anexa3/Ministerul %20Apararii%20Nationale.pdf, retrieved on 20.06.2018.

Capabilities of the Romanian Armed Forces are developed

in the following areas:

command, control and

communications, employment, information,

force projection, protection and

support.

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capability consists of “... the ability to provide an operational effect required by specific standards in a designated environment, within a specified time and to sustain that effect for a specified period of time”6.

In Table no. 17 it is presented the complete series of allocations in the MoD budget, compared to the estimated level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), until 2026. From the perspective of the financial resources allocated through the defence budget, it is observed the assurance of the level of 2% of GDP for the period of reference, in accordance with the provisions of the Government Programme 2017-2020, which will lead to the achievement of the planned military capabilities. Given that the inflation rate will remain within the planned limits, we can speak of an increase in real terms of defence allocations, with significant influences on the national crisis response capacity and other threats to national security. From the analysis of the presented data we can find that the defence expenses, provided in the budget of the MoD, constitute an important part of the total public expenses and at the same time, through its different components, an important element of the investments that can be accomplished within the national economy, and the defence industry respectively.

The present analysis does not include the expenditures planned in the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Intelligence Services for the procurement of weapons, ammunition, dual-use products and other services from the national economy.

We started from the premise that the defence budget is not decoupled from the rest of the economy, this being indirectly linked to the context of economic growth and the public deficit, two strongly interdependent phenomena.

In the current situation, the margins of budgetary manoeuvre are limited by the effects of the national political pact on the allocation of 2% of GDP for defence, so it is difficult to adjust the costs of defence according to the risks incurred, in particular to be able to finance major purchases of military equipment, the revitalisation of the defence industry and the external operations in which the Armed Forces are

6 Ibidem.7 Carta Albă a Apărării, cit. doc., p. 48.


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Indicator Code

Indi

cato

r na

me

th

ousa

nd R

ON

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

1TO

TAL

M

oD18

.920

.000

20.3

21.2

9021

.294

.000

22.1

45.7

6023

.031

.590

23.9

52.8

5424

.910

.968

25.9

07.4

07

2GD

P Es

timat

ed

valu

e94

6.00

0.00

01.

014.

000.

000

1.06

4.70

0.00

01.

107.

288.

000

1.15

1.57

9.52

01.

197.

642.

701

1.24

5.54

8.40

91.

295.

370.

345

Table no. 1: The financial resources estimated to be allocated in the period 2019-2026, based on the national political agreement on increasing the funding for defence

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involved.If we admit that the defence budget is spent effectively, strictly

referring to the missions entrusted to the armed forces, the observance of the constraints of the political pact can limit the achievement of the necessary budgetary level, by the existence of a double risk, respectively an economic risk related to the general situation and a risk of financing determined by the situation of international financial markets.

In this context, in order to mitigate the permanent risk facing the defence field, European solidarity has become indispensable, in order to rebalance and coordinate the defence efforts between the different European countries. These are the considerations that have caused the Defence to become a new chapter in the European budget, and the evolution of the budget proposed by the European Commission for the European Defence Fund, from 2021 to 2027, will show a significant increase.

If we talk about the efficiency of using the defence budget, the implementation of a public-private partnership, including the financing of the project, may seem contradictory in a simple patrimonial approach, since the capital costs are lower for the state than for its contractors. This approach will be of interest as it will lead to a new description of the requirement, which will result in a reduction in production costs on the one hand and a redistribution of risks between partners on the other hand.

The question arises related to the most efficient method that would allow the state to choose between a classic acquisition or the use of a public-private partnership. In order to choose this method, we have identified the need to go through several stages, starting with the expression of the need, in case it is agreed to examine the possibility of developing a public-private partnership. At the same time, when evaluating the offers and negotiating the contract, it is necessary to involve some multidisciplinary experts able to analyse not only the operational and technical, legal aspects, but also those regarding the real implications on public finances (spending consolidation, commitment and off-budget risks for the budget). Last but not least, the choice of evaluation techniques and various reorientation

In order to mitigate the permanent risk facing the defence field, European solidarity has become indispensable, in order to rebalance and coordinate the defence efforts between the different European countries. These are the considerations that have caused the Defence to become a new chapter in the European budget, and the evolution of the budget proposed by the European Commission for the European Defence Fund, from 2021 to 2027, will show a significant increase.


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modalities, which could calculate the necessary purchase, is another very important step.

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYSING THE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY EXPENDITURESThe use of the methods and other techniques applicable to the

defence field is necessary to measure the economic efficiency of the defence budget, as well as to deduce the rules for effectively allocating the resources needed for defence investment programmes.

The reasons for determining the efficiency of public expenditure8 can be the insufficient financial resources, using the efficiency criterion in establishing priorities. The political and economic decision is based on efficiency, and efficiency is based on a medium- and long-term approach.

The importance of efficiency analysis lies in the division of economic activity between the market and the non-market sector or the segmentation of the market between the public and the private sector. It can be considered that the non-market public sector aims to optimally allocate financial resources among users. In this regard, we consider that it is possible to measure the efficiency of defence spending by building the efficiency frontier of the decision-making units, with a high degree of applicability and support in making decisions, as well as in finding any inefficiencies. Thus, several points of view can be considered by using the methods of macroeconomic, microeconomic, financial analysis, “Data Envelopment Analysis” (DEA) and cost-benefits.

The macroeconomic and budgetary point of view uses international comparisons using common references and an adapted methodology. Such a method must take into account the purchasing power parities, the total remuneration (benefits in kind, pensions), the correction of certain structural specificities of the expenditures (research&development, the defensive/offensive armed forces missions) and finally, the consideration of budgetary constraints and specific

8 Dan Moraru, Mihai Nedelcu, Cristina Stănescu, Oana Predea, Finanţe publice, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2007.

The importance of efficiency analysis lies

in the division of economic

activity between the market and the non-market

sector or the segmentation of the market between the

public and the private

sector. It can be considered that the non-market public

sector aims to optimally

allocate financial resources among

users.

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situations (macroeconomic environment) between countries.For example, the quantitative comparison method could be applied

in a fictitious exercise on a possible integration of the armed forces of the European Union member countries. It would make possible to clarify the differences in the military spending structure for the analysed countries. Taking into account, at the same time, the limits of the exercise, the method would be limited only to certain areas and would only lead to the research of convergence conditions. However, the approach must indicate the overlapping and merging domains.

From the microeconomic point of view, there is an interest in optimising the relationship between the employer and the employee in the procurement and innovation policy, while considering the economic outsourcing.

If we refer to the financing costs of the equipment used in the development of financial and industrial partnerships, a relationship between the state and industry is redefined in terms of sharing the incomes/profits. This redefinition is embodied in the application of a method of comparing costs and assessing the specificity of the defence, as well as in a new policy of management and risk sharing.

The non-parametric analysis method DEA provides information on the efficiency relative to the data considered. However, this method cannot calculate absolute efficiency. For example, the existence of a company that has limited resources entails their use on the basis of rationality criteria. Thus, by tracking the optimal way of allocating resources, the necessary economic efficiency can be achieved.

The efficiency of public spending is seen in two aspects:• efficiency of resource allocation (Pareto optimum)• X - resource efficiency.

An allocation of resources corresponds to the optimal Pareto, without negatively affecting the well-being of the final consumer9. Thus, the allocation of resources is aimed at:

• efficiency of exchange – the marginal rate of substitution between two goods is equal for all consumers;

9 Ibidem.

The non-parametric analysis method DEA provides information on the efficiency relative to the data considered. However, this method cannot calculate absolute efficiency. For example, the existence of a company that has limited resources entails their use on the basis of rationality criteria. Thus, by tracking the optimal way of allocating resources, the necessary economic efficiency can be achieved.


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• the technical efficiency – the marginal rate of substitution between two factors of production is equal for all the goods produced;

• ubiquitous efficiency – the marginal rate of transformation of the factors is equal to the marginal rate of substitution. This confirms that the allocation of resources cannot make a person richer while making another one poorer.

The application of the cost-benefit analysis method is of particular interest for streamlining the defence budget for the development of military capabilities. This method starts from the assumption that any action taken entails certain costs to obtain the desired results. The application of this method, in the field of defence, is based on the hypothesis that these expenses represent an investment producing future incomes for the individual and society.

Thus, both the state and the individuals should be interested in the professional development of the members of the society, so as to limit the costs to a lower level and to favour the amplification of the benefits, ensuring the matching between the demand and the job offer, not only on the whole, but also on different specialisations.

The implementation of the methods and instruments for assessing and improving the efficiency of military expenditures takes into account the following elements:

1. Use of appropriate cost comparison tools:• the costs of an operational unit of measure are based on

international comparisons, with specific limitations;• in the field of equipment, emphasis is placed on a classic or

future investment programme or an equivalent non-equity acquisition programme.

2. Measuring the externalities associated with the defence expenses that determine the innovation processes (technological externalities) that come from the supply of equipment for the armed forces.

3. Reduce as much as possible the demand for military specifications in favour of the civil sector.

4. Reducing the demand for national specifications to unify efforts at European level to increase the degree of interoperability of the armed forces and their equipment.

The application of the cost-

benefit analysis method is

of particular interest for

streamlining the defence

budget for the development

of military capabilities. This method

starts from the assumption that any action taken

entails certain costs to obtain

the desired results.

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5. The use of new contractual forms with suppliers in order to ensure the transition from a specification to a service provision to leave the technical initiative to the contractor and reduce production costs, greater availability to adapt to technological developments and constantly changing operations and a better distribution of risks between the contractor and the beneficiary.

According to these elements, the idea is that the export potential of a programme, in terms of future profits, must be in relation to the investment and research costs shared between the state and the industrial companies.

The impact of increasing the efficiency of defence spending is manifested by the positive effects generated in the economic and social life, both at the level of the individual and at the society as a whole, and must be appreciated in relation to the financial efforts.

There is a direct relationship between defence spending and the Gross Domestic Product of each country, to determine the share of these expenditures in GDP. In this regard, a method of quantifying the budgetary provisions for defence spending has been outlined, taking into account a minimum percentage of predictable GDP, according to the following relation:

Cpi = PIBp x cwhere: Cpi = public defence expenditures foreseeable in the budget; GDP = predictable gross domestic product; c = percentage share of GDP for these expenditures10.

In order to achieve a high efficiency, the increase in the military expenditures must be correlated with the increase in the GDP, so that the planned result obtained through the financing of the defence must also include an increase of labour productivity, which can be found in an increase in the Gross Domestic Product.

Specific indicators can be calculated to measure the efficiency of military expenditures, such as the term of recovery of these expenditures, on account of the increase of the GDP that can be achieved within a period of time. In the case of military expenses, most cost elements are quantifiable and allow them to be compared for choosing the optimal option.

10 Gheorghe Filip, Finanţe publice, Editura Junimea, Iaşi, 2010.

The impact of increasing the efficiency of defence spending is manifested by the positive effects generated in the economic and social life, both at the level of the individual and at the society as a whole, and must be appreciated in relation to the financial efforts.


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The positive impact of public defence spending on the sustainable development of society, against the background of the contemporary scientific-scientific revolution, makes them to be considered investments in human capital that can be capitalised in the long term, with significant benefits.

Studies undertaken in this direction attest that the contribution of the defence to the economic growth is a very important one, which has been appreciated for the previous decades at quotas of up to 30% of the GDP. In the same vein, from the point of view of the productivity of the work, the strong interaction between the level of this indicator and the levels of education completed by the subjects, in the sense of a greater increase of the former towards the latter is highlighted11.

In another study by Maria Hagiu (2017)12 that uses the non-parametric model “Data Envelopment Analysis” for analysing the efficiency of the national defence expenditures in 2009 and 2012, it is used as input variables – Public expenditures with the armed forces (% GDP) and Military personnel (mil.), and as a result Military equipment procured through collaborations (mil. euro) and Weight of troops deployed as % of total military personnel.

Through this model the efficiency scores of the defence field were identified to form the efficiency boundary. It uses in the calculation of the efficiency score the input variables and the variable scale yields (VRS), thus being able to observe those changes of values of the inputs, the results being constant. Thus, the DEA model used by Hagiu identifies the VRS frontier, increasing returns to scale, constant returns to scale, inefficient decision-making units, as well as their efficiency targets.

From the data analysis for 14 countries introduced in the model, it resulted in the existence of 5 efficient countries in the two years: Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, and the emergence in 2012 of Romania on the frontier of efficiency,

11 Ibidem.12 Maria Hagiu, Analiza eficienței cheltuielilor publice utilizând metoda Data Envelopment

Analysis, Working papers ABC-UL LUMII FINANCIARE, WP no. 5/2017, see http://www.fin.ase.ro/ABC/fisiere/ABC5_2017/7.pdf, retrieved on 10.08.2019.

In another study by Maria

Hagiu (2017) that uses the

non-parametric model “Data Envelopment Analysis” for

analysing the efficiency of the

national defence expenditures in 2009 and 2012,

it is used as input variables

– Public expenditures

with the armed forces (% GDP)

and Military personnel

(mil.), and as a result Military

equipment procured through

collaborations (mil. euro) and

Weight of troops deployed as %

of total military personnel.

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as a country that manages resources efficiently, through the distribution of expenditures with the armed forces of only 0.7% of GDP. This was the lowest share of the investigated countries, with a staff of 66 thousand people and a percentage of 2.1% deployed troops.

Another result of this study was the identification of the requirements to be taken into account by those countries considered inefficient, namely the reduction of the input variables and a more efficient management of them.

THE EFFICIENCY INCREASE IN THE USE OF THE DEFENCE BUDGETFollowing the aforementioned studies, we have found necessary

to take into account the best practices at European level, in order to achieve a rapid impact of increasing the efficiency in the use of the defence budget. For example, in Europe, the United Kingdom (UK) seems to be a reference for its partners, especially in the field of personnel policy, oriented towards efficiency in integrating the notions of responsibility and autonomy of the agents, the remuneration according to the civil and private labour market, the consideration of the specific military profession and a permanent effort to pursue the training or recruitment of specialists. Moreover, the experience in implementing the cost comparison tools and carrying out a budget execution with the consideration of the patrimonial accounting after 2000 are other elements to consider, resulting in a policy of asset valuation and management of moral wear through updating.

Although the UK experience often serves as a reference on these topics, Germany’s outsourcing practices, Spain or Portugal in terms of funding should also be noted. From the comparative analysis of the countries mentioned in Hagiu’s study (2017), it follows that Romania has also adopted the same methods and techniques regarding outsourcing, with results that have to be quantified.

By, internationalising military operations, weapons programmes carried out in cooperation or jointly, within the mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation, it is possible to compare the methods and measurement instruments used by different countries and thus to improve the efficiency of defence spending.

By internationalising military operations, weapons programmes carried out in cooperation or jointly, within the mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation, it is possible to compare the methods and measurement instruments used by different countries and thus to improve the efficiency of defence spending.


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According to Nicole Ball and Len le Roux13, the effective use of defence resources must take into account four relevant factors, namely:

� Sustainability that ensures the possibility of ensuring the maintenance of capabilities on their entire life cycle for high efficiency. This will be achieved by observing the defence plan and the costs incurred, through an efficient use of the defence budget. Particular attention should be paid to assessing the influence of exchange rate fluctuations on the costs over the entire life of the equipment.

� Financing the operations, as their execution cannot be planned ahead of time because they are unforeseen. Examples of short notification operations are peace support missions, rescue missions and even limited war. Trying to plan a budget for these unforeseen missions leads to a blockage of funds, and the only way to solve this problem would be through a central reserve fund managed by the Finance Ministry or available to the government.

� Determining an optimal ratio between increasing the proportion of deployable soldiers and reducing the number of military personnel working in administrative areas. The determination of the size and capacity of the support structures can be done only after the force has been planned, using the modern techniques of designing business processes that can help solve this problem. These techniques will only be effective if the commanders are engaged in this case and consistent in its application.

� Direct customer-supplier relationships that allow freedom of choice and establish contractual relationships.

Other potential solutions for improving efficiency are: outsourcing and public-private partnerships, improving coordination between services and management information by using better information technologies, using reserves, better using civilians in defence ministries and improving management and leadership through education, training and development.

13 Nicole Ball, Len le Roux, A Model for Good Practice in Budgeting for the Military Sector, p. 28, see https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu02.pdf, retrieved on 10.08.2019.

Examples of short notification

operations are peace support

missions, rescue missions and

even limited war. Trying to plan

a budget for these unforeseen

missions leads to a blockage of funds, and the only way to solve this

problem would be through a

central reserve fund managed by the Finance

Ministry or available to the

government.

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A 2009 Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) study, described by Mackenzie Eaglen and Julia Pollak14, examines the benefits of performance-based logistics and explains why and how governments should support this military logistics system so that it becomes more effective and efficient, in 5 areas:

• Product support throughout the life cycle covers the logistics required to maintain weapons and equipment during use. This includes repairs, renovations, alterations and upgrades. Performance-based logistics would expand the development of public-private partnerships in this area.

• Inventory management improves the efficiency of the supply network with products, ensuring fast delivery and reducing storage costs and stock levels.

• Asset mobility and support infrastructure would copy the best transport practices of the commercial sector to support logistics and optimise the distribution process.

• Operations theatre services mainly support combat and humanitarian missions in regions around the world. These include opening ports; building, staffing and operating theatre facilities, such as permanent and transit depots; distribution of weapons and materials at intermediate locations. Performance-based logistics would improve the pre-planning stages with the host countries, the nations leading the operation and the contractors, especially for the use of airfields and ports, and would rely more on contractors in the pre-negotiated contracts.

• Logistic information systems. A system as extensive and complex as the armed forces logistics system could work better and more efficiently when backed by state-of-the-art information technology and modern supply chain systems.

As defence capabilities develop, the logistics system must continually adapt. Performance-based logistics is an alternative approach that aims to improve the overall efficiency of military logistics. The aim is to organise the logistics system around the increase in the combat capabilities, thus generating great savings from increased efficiency.

14 Mackenzie Eaglen, Julia Pollak, How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department, 10.01.2011, The Heritage Foundation, see https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/how-save-money-reform-processes-and-increase-efficiency-the-defense-department, retrieved on 09.08.2019.

Operations theatre services mainly support combat and humanitarian missions in regions around the world. These include opening ports; building, staffing and operating theatre facilities, such as permanent and transit depots; distribution of weapons and materials at intermediate locations.


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CONCLUSIONSIn order to achieve a rapid impact of increasing the efficiency in the

use of military expenditures, we consider that it is possible to measure the efficiency of its use by adopting varied and complementary methods and techniques. In this regard, we have identified several conditions for increasing the efficiency of the public spending for the defence field as follows:

• choosing the most economical alternative in relation to the final result;

• maximising the utility of consumers by improving the mode of supply;

• minimising the price paid by the consumer;• forecasting capacity within the agreed time horizon.

From the analysis, we have found that the armed forces must innovate and invest in advanced capabilities and improve the immediate response, but at the current level of recruitment it is difficult to estimate the level that can be reached. Investing in a modernisation and rapid reaction, in parallel with smarter and more efficient management, would allow the armed forces to carry out their missions. How the money is spent matters more than the size of the defence budget15. Therefore, it can be considered that the military expenditures have a major influence on the development, capital and labour force of the economy, there being an undeniable link between them and the rate of economic growth.

Scott Gebicke and Samuel Magid16 have generally identified a potential of 40% to 60% to increase the quality and productivity of the maintenance, repair and overhaul function, without increasing costs. They have found that the best performing military organisations eliminate unnecessary variety, intelligently use outsourcing, excel at contracting and constantly optimise their maintenance processes.

15 James N. Miller, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Quality over Quantity: US Military Strategy and Spending in the Trump Years, Brookings Institute Report, January 2019, see https://www.brookings.edu/research/quality-over-quantity-u-s-military-strategy-and-spending-in-the-trump-years/, retrieved on 06.08.2019.

16 Scott Gebicke, Samuel Magid, Lessons from Around the World: Benchmarking Performance in Defense, see https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/public%20sector/pdfs/mck%20on%20 govt/defense/ mog _benchmarking_v9.ashx, retrieved on 10.08.2019.

Investing in a modernisation

and rapid reaction, in

parallel with smarter and

more efficient management,

would allow the armed forces to

carry out their missions. How

the money is spent matters

more than the size of the

defence budget. Therefore, it can

be considered that the military

expenditures have a major

influence on the development,

capital and labour force of

the economy, there being an

undeniable link between them

and the rate of economic

growth.

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The results of their evaluations provide valuable guidance information through which money can be saved, as well as areas where maximum efficiency can be achieved without increasing costs – both critical goals in today’s world.

Defence, the most important mission of the state, is thus echoed in the economic domain, composed on the part of the state sector, which produces a defence service of vital interest for Romania and from an industrial sector that produces the necessary means and tools to perform this service.

Decision-makers should continuously pursue greater efficiency in defence activities and eliminate duplication in the defence budget. The use of the methods and techniques for measuring the efficiency of the military expenditures described could achieve significant annual savings. The government should allow the use of the savings generated for the payment of urgent priorities, such as upgrading the equipment of the armed forces services. This will create incentives for efficiency improvement, while strengthening the operational level of the force structure.

The efficient allocation of financial resources is the key to developing the future capabilities necessary for the transformation of the Armed Forces into a modern structure, by increasing the role of the defence budget as a basic instrument for analysing, controlling and ensuring the financial balance in organising and carrying out specific activities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, Carta Albă a Apărării, published in Monitorul Oficial, Part I, no.

939 on 28 November 2017.2. ***, Document sinteză privind politicile și programele bugetare pe

termen mediu ale ordonatorilor principali de credite pentru anul 2018 și perspectiva 2019-2021, http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/buget/2018/anexa3/Ministerul%20 Apararii%20Nationale.pdf

3. Nicole Ball, Len le Roux, A Model for Good Practice in Budgeting for the Military Sector, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/ SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu02.pdf

4. Mackenzie Eaglen, Julia Pollak, How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department, 10.01.2011, The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/defense/ report/

Defence, the most important mission of the state, is thus echoed in the economic domain, composed on the part of the state sector, which produces a defence service of vital interest for Romania and from an industrial sector that produces the necessary means and tools to perform this service.


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how-save-money-reform-processes-and-increase-efficiency-the-defense-department

5. Gheorghe Filip, Finanţe publice, Editura Junimea, Iaşi, 2010.6. Scott Gebicke, Samuel Magid, Lessons from Around the World:

Benchmarking Performance in Defense, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/public%20sector/pdfs/mck%20on%20govt/defense/mog_benchmarking_v9.ashx

7. Maria Hagiu, Analiza eficienței cheltuielilor publice utilizând metoda Data Envelopment Analysis, Working Papers Collection ABC-ul LUMII FINANCIARE WP no. 5/2017, http://www.fin.ase.ro/ABC/fisiere/ABC5_ 2017/7.pdf

8. K. Hartley, T. Dandler, Handbook of Defence Economics, North-Holland, 1995.

9. Gheorghe Marin, Noi tipuri de ameninţări la adresa securităţii. Mecanisme instituţionale şi capacităţi de contracarare, in Impact Strategic, no. 4 [33]/2009, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare “Carol I”, Bucureşti.

10. James N. Miller, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Quality over Quantity: US Military Strategy and Spending in the Trump Years, Brookings Institute Report, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/quality-over-quantity-u-s-military-strategy-and-spending-in-the-trump-years/

11. Dan Moraru, Mihai Nedelcu, Cristina Stănescu, Oana Predea, Finanţe publice, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2007.

12. T. Moştianu, E. Câmpeanu, L. Țâţu, Finanţe publice, Editura Universitară, București, 2005.

228228No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT ON SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY DEVELOPMENT ON SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY

IN AERONAUTICAL ORGANISATIONAL IN AERONAUTICAL ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSESPROCESSES

Lieutenant (AF) Valentin-Marian IORDACHE90th Airlift Base

Technological development is a continuous process which affects not only the aeronautical organisational system, but the whole society. The processes used in planning and operational execution stages change due to new opportunities that modern technology offers and which redefines the behavioural limitations of the systems in time and space. A change within a system can affect the operational state, therefore the functionality of the system, and the complexity of modern systems requires the implementation of control processes. Modern technology is designed to reduce or eliminate known risks; by implementing new systems risk has a different dimension, sometimes having a complex form that the known, and successfully applied in the past, mitigation methods are no more the appropriate ones. The risks are more and more varied, and internal processes require changes, depending on the operational characteristics of the organisation in order to manage all the variables that affect safety and efficiency.

Keywords: risk, efficiency, modern technology, systems, control.


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Implications of Technological Development on Safety and Efficiency Implications of Technological Development on Safety and Efficiency in Aeronautical Organisational Processesin Aeronautical Organisational Processes


INTRODUCTIONThe successful implementation of new technologies is a process

that begins with executive decisions, but it is not limited to that. People perform at peak level when they are inspired in their activities and it is the management structures responsibilities to assure organisational openness to new ideas. The problem in this era of aviation is to create and manage an organisational climate conducive to knowing, understanding and operating new technologies.

Given worldwide globalisation, passivity and the use of classical methods is not an option. If there is no progress – innovation, development – then the organisation loses and this is not only a characteristic of the aeronautical industry, but of all industries.

The benefits of modern aviation technologies are as obvious as possible. They represent the main elements that have led to the development of technical or organisational aeronautical systems. Either for airports, aircraft or any other adjacent processes of flight activities, technology has brought a level of safety, efficiency and high confidence among operators and users of air transport.

The importance of innovation is not a new aspect for the executive structures of an aeronautical organisation. Unfortunately, innovation brings new risks, which are more complex having multiple implications, and this aspect induces a reluctance to change from the executive structures in the aeronautical industry1.

THE MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY CULTURE AT ORGANISATIONAL LEVELOrganisational culture summarises the usual practices and habits

of aviation structures; however, certain practices and customs that have become the norm in daily operations do not provide a high level of safety. These actions, as well as overstressing the aircraft

1 Executive Perspective: Fostering Technological Innovation in Organizations, Satair, 2018, see https://blog.satair.com/how-to-foster-innovation-in-an-organisation, retrieved on 12.02.2019.

The benefits of modern aviation technologies are

as obvious as possible. They represent the

main elements that have led to

the development of technical or organisational

aeronautical systems. Either

for airports, aircraft or any other adjacent

processes of flight activities,

technology has brought a level of safety, efficiency and

high confidence among

operators and users of air transport.

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Valentin-Marian IORDACHEValentin-Marian IORDACHE

230No.No. 1/2020 1/2020

by reaching the flight envelope limits can become customary in activities of an aviation structure. Once they have become norms and the aviation structures have become accustomed to them and accept them, those elements that represent a real danger are omitted. In aviation, it is accepted that the systems used are exposed to errors and personnel must be aware of practices and habits that have become a norm. Certain beliefs, practices and habits that exist in aviation structures can be perceived as both positive and negative. In some cases, dangerous practices can be exploited; some people believe that such practices – attitudes – demonstrate superior skills and they are nothing but a manner in which superior skills can be demonstrated. In other situation, safe practices, such as the refusal to fly tired or when the weather conditions are at the acceptable limit, can be perceived as negative by the operational air units or the management structures2.

Organisations are universal systems in society and organisational theories originate from organisational practices. Productivity development and new technologies cause changes in organisational environment and practices, which force organisational theories to evolve continuously. From the perspective of human-machine relationship, classical organisational theories have created a new field of study of scientific management, replacing arbitrary management with scientific and rational procedures, but which ignore human nature3.

The organisational management tries to obtain the adaptability characteristic of organisational complexity by two levels: the one of adaptable components of the basic systems and by the structure of the systems that fit on these components4.

Organisational culture is intrinsically linked to safety and should positively affect safety culture within aeronautical organisations.

Culture in the structure of aeronautical organisations can have significant differences from one organisation to another (from a unit to another). The philosophies, values and expectations shared

2 Michael W. Sedam, Organizational Culture: It Can Impact Safety, 2006, see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247220440_Organizational_Culture_Market_Orientation_Innovativeness_and_Firm_Performance_An_International_Research_Odyssey, retrieved on 12.08.2019.

3 C.X. Yang, H.M. Liu, X.X. Wang, Organization Theories: From Classical to Modern, Journal of Applied Sciences 13 (21), China, 2013.

4 Henry Mintzberg, James A. Waters, Tracking Strategy in an Entrepreneurial Firm, in Academy of Management Journal, 1982, vol. 25, pp. 465-499.

Productivity development and new technologies cause changes in organisational environment and practices, which force organisational theories to evolve continuously.

Organisational culture is intrinsically linked to safety and should positively affect safety culture within aeronautical organisations.


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at the group level can be considered the culture of the organisation. The attitudes and practices regarding safety developed at group level are the direct result of the organisational culture.

Safety rules are an indispensable part of safety management within high risk systems. These rules are widespread in areas such as aviation, transportation in general, the electrical/nuclear power industry, medicine and other high-risk industries, being found in the form of books, checklists or procedures. A recommended and standardised way of human action and interaction (with other individuals as well as with machines) is intended to be a way in which errors are reduced and risks eliminated. Rules are typically developed and introduced by experts, starting from risk and task analysis, which are intended to influence and control human behaviour. The main idea of making safety improvement rules is the assumption that workloads can be modelled and controllable at all times and that organisational control should be used to identify and eliminate the risks that may affect the state of safety state5. Moreover, it has been questioned in science that such an approach to safety can be wrong and that the rules in specific organisational context do not work in such a simplistic manner6.

Patrick Hudson states in his work7 that the evolution of safety can be seen as a linear progression made up of elements of different nature:

• pathological, or indifference to safety, but fear of not being caught;

• reactive, where safety is important, but organisational beliefs, working methods and practices are rudimentary;

• calculative, following the necessary logical steps;• proactive, when current problems are understood and

corrective actions are in progress, taking into consideration the future possible situations;

• generative, where appropriate safety behaviour is integrated into all the activities of the organisation.

5 Andrew Hale, David Borys, Working to Rule, or Working Safely?, Part 1: A State of the Art Review, in Safety Science, 2013, no. 55.

6 Johann Weichbrodt, Safety Rules as Instrument for Organizational Control, Coordination and Knowledge: Implications for Rules Management, in Safety Science, no. 80, Elsevier B.V., 2015.

7 Patrick Hudson, Safety Management and Safety Culture. The Long, Hard and Winding Road, Centre for Safety Research, Leiden University, the Netherlands, 2003.

Safety rules are an indispensable

part of safety management

within high risk systems.

These rules are widespread

in areas such as aviation,

transportation in general,

the electrical/nuclear power

industry, medicine and

other high-risk industries, being

found in the form of books,

checklists or procedures.

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At the pathological level, safety is not a major priority for the organisation. At the reactive level, safety becomes more and more important due to both internal and external factors, but also due to previous incidents that have caused delays in operations; at this stage the organisation begins to adopt values that will increase safety, but the existent beliefs, methods and practices are the basis of safety. The management within the reactive organisations considers accidents as the result of inherent mistakes, lack of attention or intentional violations of regulations by the personnel8.

At calculative stage, safety becomes of major importance in operations. The calculative term is used to highlight the fact that safety is calculated following rigorous analysis and evaluation; such measures can determine the effectiveness of the proposed measures. Impressive statistics can be obtained from these calculations, but safety remains a function, a mechanical application within a management system. A culture of safety in the true sense of the word goes beyond the level of calculations.

The safety culture can be considered developed in the proactive or generative stages of its evolution. Safety becomes a belief and the attitude towards the way the system is managed or the way the air operations are conducted is closely related to the specific practices for maximum efficiency in safe conditions. With deliberate procedures, the organisation can decide the level of safety perception, but the values are not completely internalised, the methods are still new and the individual beliefs are not correlated with the organisational intentions. This demonstrates a significant feature of a strong safety culture; the values of the system associated with safety and the working environment must be internalised as conscious beliefs and the whole approach of the organisation regarding operational activities should be based on safety.

The organisational norms are unwritten rules and the working environment practices that are accepted in general are considered the way in which the organisation operates. These rules may have a negative or positive effect on safety, but at the same time may provide information about the organisational culture.

8 Ibidem.

The safety culture can be considered developed in the proactive or generative stages of its evolution. Safety becomes a belief and the attitude towards the way the system is managed or the way the air operations are conducted is closely related to the specific practices for maximum efficiency in safe conditions.


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Figure no. 1: Evolution of safety culture (adapted after Hudson, 2003)

If a high level of safety is desired, real efforts to achieve safety must acknowledge the need to understand the culture and various cultural influences existing throughout operations. The fundamental premise is that it is essential to build on the strengths of national culture and to develop professionalism and organisational culture in order to achieve a robust safety culture.

There is a link between safety culture, commitment of management structures, safety performance and strategic risk management. The success of a safety programme requires top management to demonstrate not only the existence of a simple interest in a particular situation, but a long-term commitment regarding safety improvements.

Each managerial action must, to some extent, demonstrate leadership and send a clear message about the commitment to safety and efficiency. This will highlight the relative importance of the perception for the management structures regarding attitudes and behaviours within the safety climate, in direct relation with other functions such as selection, planning, discipline, execution, training, among others.

The commitment of management structures to establish, maintain and develop a robust safety culture will result in increased financial, operational and strategic planning benefits, giving the organisation the opportunity to control costs and exploit new opportunities with higher efficiency9.

9 Donald L. Van Dyke, Management Commitment: Cornerstone of Aviation Safety Culture, Concordia University, Canada, 2006.

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UNDERSTANDING CONTROL SYSTEMS WITH THE PURPOSE OF ENHANCING OPERATIONAL SAFETY AND EFFICIENCYControl processes help to shape attitudes so that they can be

consistent with the organisation planning ideas. Organisations require a certain level of compliance; the control function is the one that must ensure compliance with the organisational requirements and accomplishment of the most important objectives. Coordination and organisation of all the various interests and potential diffuse behaviours of the members is largely a control function; many problems of organisational functionality and individual adjustments arise in this situation. Control is inevitably correlated with the organisation, having far greater implications. It involves all aspects of social life that are of particular importance to all people. It considers issues related to choices/decisions and freedom, at individual level, correlated with those related to will and prosperity. It is not just about what happens inside the organisation, but also about the relationship of the organisation with other external structures/systems10.

In the operation of a management system the reaction speed of a system is very important, regarding optimal processing of information, decision making, transmission of tasks to the personnel and execution by the systems with operational functions; otherwise the saturation phenomenon can occur when the information quantity entered into the system exceeds the processed information.

Regardless the nature or form of control, there is a characteristic number of elements specific for an effective control system. Control systems can have both positive and negative effects. It is important that they are realised and implemented in a constructive manner so that they bring benefits.

Hicks and Gullet stated, in 1976, that systems should be easy to understand, economic, correlated with decision-makers’ perception; they need to record changes quickly, be selective, flexible and provide corrective action. Based on these elements suggested by Hicks and Gullet, we can identify a number of very important characteristics of a control system.

For a control system to make sense, it must be understood by those involved in the operations. The purpose of the control system

10 Arnold S. Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations: Individual Adjustment and Organizational Performance, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968.

Control is inevitably correlated with the organisation, having far greater implications. It involves all aspects of social life that are of particular importance to all people. It considers issues related to choices/decisions and freedom, at individual level, correlated with those related to will and prosperity. It is not just about what happens inside the organisation, but also about the relationship of the organisation with other external structures/systems.


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and the information it provides must be very clear to those who act on results. The information must be presented in a simple form; if it is not understood there are very high chances that it will not be taken into consideration and the potential of a control system cannot be understood. The control system must be compliant with the structure of the organisation and it must be linked to the decision-makers responsible for performance. The information should be provided to managers who have responsibility for well-defined activity areas and who are able to use the information with the purpose to evaluate the level of success in accomplishing objectives; it should allow managers to control their area of responsibility and should be presented in a manner that highlights when corrective actions are required11.

An efficient control system must report deviations from the standard performance level as quickly as possible. It is preferable that potential deviations should be identified before they occur. It is important that the deviations from the initial plan should be timely reported so that corrective actions remedy the situation in a timely and compliant manner. For example, the information that the budget can be exceeded, or cannot be reached, must reach the managers in a timely manner to allow them to make decisions in this regard, avoiding situations/drastic actions/limits at the last moment.

The control system must draw attention to the important critical activities that influence the success of the organisation. A high number of unnecessary control methods and unimportant activities are a problem from the economic and time standpoint; they can have a demoralising effect on the staff of the organisation and can lead to loss of other key points in the control process. Some control elements are more important than others; control must be carefully maintained in key areas and in those activities crucial to the success of the organisation.

The control system must be consistent with the activity objective to which it refers. In addition to identifying deviations from the planned performance standards, the control system must be sufficiently complex to indicate the means by which performance can be improved. The control system can highlight a number of problem areas that

11 Laurie Mullins, Management and Organizational Behaviour, 9th ed., Pearson Education Limited, 2010, https://www.academia.edu/40242911/Management_and_Organisational_Behaviour_9th_ed_Laurie_Mullins_Dr.Soc_

The control system must be compliant with the structure of

the organisation and it must be

linked to the decision-makers

responsible for performance.

The information should be

provided to managers who have

responsibility for well-defined

activity areas and who are

able to use the information with

the purpose to evaluate the

level of success in accomplishing

objectives; it should allow

managers to control

their area of responsibility

and should be presented in a manner

that highlights when corrective

actions are required.

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require corrective action. The management should investigate these possibilities and determine the appropriate corrective action to address the causes of the deviation and to solve the problems identified.

Figure no. 2: The five phases of organisational control (adapted after Mullins, 2010)

The main purpose of management control systems is to achieve objectives congruence. Such systems function as a way of distributing resources and responsibilities, according to certain criteria, through planning, monitoring, evaluation and reward. Complementary to this initial objective of achieving goal congruence is the principle of using management control systems to reduce uncertainty.

All accidents and incidents are the result of multiple factors. They are not the result of a single factor or the actions of one person (if this is the case, then it indicates that the system does not have enough control elements in its structure). It is obvious that most safety issues do not belong exclusively to humans or technology. In modern aeronautical systems, they are the result of complex interactions between people, technology and the environment in which these interactions occur. For this reason, aviation accident investigation should start by analysing human behaviour before examining how the organisation manages risks. The framework suggests that there are two ways in which the investigation can be approached; thus, we can speak of either the “human approach” or the “system approach”. These two approaches are briefly described below12.

12 Human Factors. Resource Guide for Engineers, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Australia, 2013.

Most safety issues do not belong exclusively to humans or technology. In modern aeronautical systems, they are the result of complex interactions between people, technology and the environment in which these interactions occur. For this reason, aviation accident investigation should start by analysing human behaviour before examining how the organisation manages risks.


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The human approach tends to focus on individual errors and violations, while the system approach has the role of identifying causal factors throughout the organisation.

The approach from the system standpoint focuses on the measures needed to be taken within the organisation and on the operations, not on the individuals who have committed errors. Adequate training and education can provide an understanding of what needs to be done if resources are limited.

ADAPTING ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSES, UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMS AND THEIR INTERACTION IN OPERATIONAL SPECTRUM. USING STAMP MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING POTENTIAL HAZARDSThere is no mathematical system that can model with precision

a physical system. It will always be uncertainty. Uncertainty refers to the fact that the final output of a physical system cannot be accurately predicted even if the input is very well understood. Uncertainty is based on two sources: ignorance, unpredictable inputs (disturbances, noises etc.) or unpredictable dynamics.

Safety can be seen as a control problem, being managed by a control structure embedded in an adaptable socio-technical system. The purpose of the control structure is to impose restrictions on the system and on the operation of system for the safe operation. In this context, understanding why an accident occurred requires determining why the control structure was inefficient. Preventing accidents in the future requires designing a control structure which must implement the necessary limits. Given the present complexity of systems, a solution may be considered to design control processes by using advanced models for systems safety. Understanding models and adapting to organisational requirements and particularities represent solutions for implementing new technologies while continuing operational processes in a safe and efficient manner13.

System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is a thorough accidents model designed by Nancy Leveson, Professor

13 Nancy G. Leveson, A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aeronautics and Astronautics, USA, 2002.

Safety can be seen as a control

problem, being managed by a

control structure embedded in an adaptable

socio-technical system. The

purpose of the control structure

is to impose restrictions on

the system and on the operation of system for the

safe operation. In this context, understanding

why an accident occurred requires

determining why the control

structure was inefficient.

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at M.I.T. and expert in the field of systems safety; in STAMP, accidents are the results of an inadequate implementation of safety constraints in the structure, development and operation. STAMP includes, as a subset, traditional methods of systems analysis, but it uses thorough approaches for system analysis in order to include dysfunctional interactions between the functional components, software errors and logical structures, errors in complex decision-making processes, different organisational factors – workforce, safety processes and standards – and other organisational, social and cultural management factors. The hypothesis underlying this model is that control theory is a useful way by which accidents, especially systems accident, can be analysed. Having this perception of safety, accidents occur when external disturbing factors, components failure or dysfunctional interaction between components are not properly managed by the control system; they occur due to the inadequate control or the exaggeration of safety measures implemented in the structure or in the systems operation.

STAMP is made on three basic concepts: restrictions (limitations), hierarchical levels of control and process models. With the help of these concepts it can be made a classification of control errors that can lead to accidents. The basic concept in STAMP is not an event, but a restriction. In systems theory and control theory, systems are seen as hierarchical structures where each level imposes restrictions on activity from the lower level; therefore, the cause of an accident is not perceived as a series of events, but as a result of the failure to impose restrictions. In the terminology related to systems theory, safety is an emergent property that arises when systems components interact in an environment.

In this model, systems are seen as a sum of interconnected components, which are maintained in a state of dynamic equilibrium by the response loops of information and control. A system in this conceptualisation is not static – it is a dynamic process that constantly adapts to reach a result and to respond to changes, in its own structure and environment. The original structure must not only impose the necessary safety measures on the behaviour to ensure the safe operation; the system must operate safely as different changes occur. The process leading to the accident can be described

STAMP includes, as a subset, traditional methods of systems analysis, but it uses thorough approaches for system analysis in order to include dysfunctional interactions between the functional components, software errors and logical structures, errors in complex decision-making processes, different organisational factors – workforce, safety processes and standards – and other organisational, social and cultural management factors.


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as an adaptive response function, which fails to maintain the safety state, while performance changes to assure a set of goals and values. Instead of defining the safety management in the context of preventing the event of failure at component level, it is defined as a continuous control task to impose the necessary measures in order to limit the behaviour of the system to safety changes and adaptations. Using this model, an accident can be understood in a way to determine why the control implemented did not prevent or detect defective changes by identifying the safety limits that were violated and determining why the control elements were not the proper ones.

This model redefines the perception of accidents, becoming the result of the absence of certain limitations. The role of a person or structure with safety prerogatives is to identify the necessary limits of system, in order to continue safe operations; at the same time, it must be ensured that systems structures, including its social and organisational aspects, not just the physical ones, contribute to increasing safety. Instead of breaking down systems and developing explanations for accidents in the form of structural components and event flows, as is the case of most event analysis models, a control-based model describes systems and accidents from the control hierarchy standpoint depending on the ability to adapt the response mechanisms.

The impact of decisions on objectives and values from a higher level to a lower level must be adequately and formally evaluated. While some generic functions will be needed at a particular level to avoid accidents, the details of how the functions can be performed may be delegated to lower levels. New goals can be imposed at any level. The feedback is necessary to measure the success of operating functions. Usually, success is determined by test reports, reviews and various risk analyses. The most common form of inconsistency occurs when one or more procedural models are incomplete in terms of inability to define the proper behaviour of the system for each particular state, or all possible disturbances, including the faulty management of technical failure. Nevertheless, no model is complete in the true sense; the purpose is to make them as complete as possible so that no safety limit is breached when applied.

The role of a person or

structure with safety

prerogatives is to identify

the necessary limits of system,

in order to continue safe

operations; at the same time, it must be ensured

that systems structures,

including its social and

organisational aspects, not

just the physical ones, contribute

to increasing safety.

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This model, based on control theory, enables approaching the risk from a different perspective; nowadays, risk evaluation is made with probabilistic methods, and a major process for the future, in the case of complex systems, may require innovative approaches that can start from completely different theoretical foundations. This model can also be used to improve performance analysis.

On 14 April 1994, in Iraq, two F-15 Eagle fighter jets from the United States Air Force, flying under AWACS control, have identified two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from the United States Army as Mi-24 Hind from the Iraqi Air Force. The F-15s pilots launched missiles and shot down the two helicopters; both helicopters were destroyed and the passengers – 26 military and civilian personnel – were killed. As a result of the investigation, the AWACS operator was considered guilty, being in the end acquitted. Following the STAMP analysis of this incident, 130 elements were identified – operational, organisational etc. – which were vulnerabilities in that particular moment; each identified element would have been suffice to trigger another event with fatal consequences, not just this one.

CONCLUSIONSOrganisational success consists in achieving a set of objectives in

the context of the challenges and economical and financial situation at a certain moment; the most important element is represented by people – human resource – that must have the knowledge about and master the modern methods and procedures and the operating modes for available/provided equipment; they must also be aware of their involvement, quality of work and responsibility at group, team and management level.

All modern organisations operate under risk. The risk occurs due to environmental conditions and internal factors; the environment generates direct threats connected with the economic, strategic, organisational, operational and legal aspects. Threats within the organisation are connected with the operations, in particular with the aeronautical activities, and with all the internal organisational processes; these threats arise as a result of decisions taken at certain levels in different times. The need to make decisions is of fundamental importance in strategic organisational management.

All modern organisations operate under risk. The risk occurs due to environmental conditions and internal factors; the environment generates direct threats connected with the economic, strategic, organisational, operational and legal aspects.


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Risk management comes in support of a more efficient organisational management as it helps in understanding and assessing the threat. The process should not only be limited to an operational structure, but it must be part of a much larger process – organisational management (decisions made at organisational level, mainly those with a strategic character).

An effective risk management is very important for an efficient management in modern aeronautical systems, because the probability to obtain the proposed objectives and to limit the influence of risk factors on operational processes is higher.

Aeronautical safety is fundamental in air operations; it is directly proportional with the quality and level of training in aeronautical organisation structures, but also depends very much on the quality of leadership, implemented management, equipment provided, procedures, methods and instruments used for identifying, evaluating, processing and capitalising on the information obtained from analysing different flight events.

An essential thing is to have control over all the elements that could endanger the safe conduct of air operations; this is not possible without a strong commitment to safety. Therefore, beginning with knowledge and awareness, analysing with objectivity and morality all the elements related to air operations (on the ground and in the air), a state of safety can be achieved, a state of controlling risks, offering the possibility of extending the objectives within the aeronautical organisation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:1. ***, Executive Perspective: Fostering Technological Innovation in

Organizations, Satair, 2018, https://blog.satair.com/how-to-foster-innovation-in-an-organisation?fbclid=IwAR0iv4gozzgWEi5TZhLdg60NXTC5maU97bTOuaOd89EcNa5HTX9t-9s8Dw

2. ***, Human Factors. Resource Guide for Engineers, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Australia, 2013.

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4. Jonathan Berman, Peter Ackroyd, Ann Mills, Toyin Davies, Management Toolkits: Solutions for Rule Compliance, 2007. In J.R. Wilson, B. Norris, T. Clarke, A. Mills (eds.), People and Rail Systems: Human Factors at the Heart of the Railway, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK.

An effective risk management is very important for an efficient management

in modern aeronautical

systems, because the probability

to obtain the proposed

objectives and to limit the

influence of risk factors on

operational processes is

higher.

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5. R.H. Chenhall, Management Control Systems Design within Its Organizational Context: Findings from Contingency-based Research and Directions for the Future. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 2003, 28.

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14. J.C. McCarthy, P.C. Wright, A.F. Monk, L.A. Watts, Concerns at Work: Designing Useful Procedures, Hum.-Comput. Interact. 13, 1998.

15. B. McKelvey, Complexity Theory in Organization Science: Seizing the Promise or Becoming a Fad? Emergence, 1999.

16. Henry Mintzberg, James A. Waters, Tracking Strategy in an Entrepreneurial Firm, in Academy of Management Journal, 1982, vol. 25.

17. Laurie Mullins, Management and Organizational Behaviour, 9th ed., Pearson Education Limited, 2010, https://www.academia.edu/ 40242911/Management_and_Organisational_Behaviour_9th_ed_Laurie_Mullins_Dr.Soc_

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19. Arnold S. Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations: Individual Adjustment and Organizational Performance, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968, https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/86669/tannenbaum-admin_sci_quart_1962.pdf?sequence=1


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20. Donald L. Van Dyke, Management Commitment: Cornerstone of Aviation Safety Culture, Concordia University, Canada, 2006.

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– “Promotion of Culture”(Presidential Decree no. 483 on 30.06.2014)

Order “Meritul Cultural”in the rank of “Officer”, F Category

Order “Meritul Cultural” in the rank of “Knight”, F Category – “Promotion of Culture”(Presidential Decree no. 646 on 24.08.2004)

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