GMO Regulations and Food Self- Sufficiency Rate Qianqian Shao, Maarten Punt, Justus Wesseler...
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TUM 1
GMO Regulations and Food Self-Sufficiency Rate
Qianqian Shao, Maarten Punt, Justus Wesseler
Technische Universität München
TUM 2
Main Idea
• Using a standard political economy model to show the GMO policy as an outcome of the political process.[Grossman Helpman (1994) and Eerola (2004)]
• Lobbying cost and GM regulations affect Food Self-Sufficiency Rate(SSR)s.
TUM 3
Previous Studies
• Josling et al. (2003): political economy analysis is important to show consumer preferences and conflicting pressure on governments.
• Graff et al. (2009): conceptual political economy framework of formulating biotechnology regulations.
• Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011): dynamic political economy model to explain regulation in the EU and US.
TUM 4
Food Self-sufficiency Rate
TUM 5
GM Regulations and SSR
• Many countries with different SSR have a similar biotechnology agricultural policies.
• A government cannot ignore domestic food availability concerns while formulating agricultural policies.
• The level of GM input may influence food supply in a country.
TUM 6
Paper Structure
• Socially determined GMO regulations
• Politically determined GMO regulations
• GMO regulations with SSR
TUM 7
The Economy
• Production (domestic)
Two sectors:– Tradable numeraire goods– Agricultural food sector including two firms
• GM firm: GM input (g), regulated to and conventional inputs (q)
• Non-GM firm: q
z
TUM 8
Production
o Production function• GM firm:• Non-GM firm:
o Profit function• GM firm: (1)• Non-GM firm: (2)
( , )Gx kf g q ( 1)k
( )Nx f q
( ) ( , ) ( , )G G G Gp x kf g q c g q
( ) ( , ) ( , )N N N Np x f g q c g q
TUM 9
Consumers
• Three kinds of consumers– α :GM group– β: Non-GM group– (1-α-β): neither group
• Consumers in either GM or non-GM group should make contributions to the group for lobbying, and share the profits.
TUM 10
Consumers (cont.)• The net income of consumers in each group:
(3)1 1( , , ) ( )G GI w p g q B g
1 1( , , ) ( )N NI w p g q B g
1I w
TUM 11
Consumers (cont.)• The utility function
for ,• The demand functions:
,
{ ( ) ( )}maxj
j
z y
z u y D g
1
. .j
j ji i
n
s t I z p y
, ,1i
(1 ) ( , ),
(1 ) ( , ),
G G Nj
N G N
y d p p j Gy
y d p p j N
,j G N
TUM 12
Socially determined GMO level
• The domestic aggregate gross welfare
(4)
where
and ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j
j jW g w cs g g D g
0 0
( )
G Ny yj G G N N G G N N
jcs g p dy p dy p y p y
( )j G N
jg ( )D g g
TUM 13
Socially determined GMO level (cont.)
• The aggregate welfare of each group:
(5)( ) ( ) ( , , )G G GW w cs g D g p g w
( ) ( ) ( , , )N N NW w cs g D g p g w
1 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )G NW w cs g cs g D g
TUM 14
Socially determined GMO level (cont.)
• The effects of changing GM policy on welfare:
(6)
where , , , ,• The socially optimal GM input level is
determined by:
(7)
( )( , , ) [ ( ) ( )]G G G
g g g
W gp g w cs g D g
g
( )( , , ) [ ( ) ( )]N N N
g g g
W gp g w cs g D g
g
1 ( )(1 )[ ( ) ( )]j
g gj
W gcs g D g
g
1( *) ( *)( *)( )0
W g W gW gW g
g g g g
( ) 0Ggcs g ( ) 0G
g g ( ) 0Ngcs g ( ) 0N
g g 0gD
TUM 15
The Political Process
• Government payoff function:
(8)
and • Lobbying cost of each group:
(9)• The optimal contribution level of each group:
(10)
( ; , ) ( ) ( ) ( )G g C C aW g C g C g
( ) max[0, ( )]i i iC g W B
( ) (1 ) ( )i i iB g C g
*( ) ( )(1 )i i
i
W g C g
g g
TUM 16
The Political Process (cont.)• The optimal politically determined GM policy:
(11)• Rewrite the equation:
(12)
• The lobbying process changed the outcome of GM regulations from social point of view. The change of welfare benefit or loss depends on the lobbying efficiency of two groups.
( )( )( ) ( )0
C gC gG g W ga
g g g g
1( ) ( )( )( ) 1 10
1 1
W g W gW gG ga a a
g g g g
TUM 17
GMO regulations with SSR
• From (11)
and (10)
we found that the more concern on contributions, the less concern on the welfare.
• If the government is more inclined to listen to the lobbying groups, it consider the SSR less.
( )( )( ) ( )0
C gC gG g W ga
g g g g
*( ) ( )(1 )i i
i
W g C g
g g
TUM 18
GMO regulations with SSR (cont.)• Rewriting the lobbying costs:
where (13)• The contribution equilibrium:
(14)• Interest groups have less incentive for lobbying
due to the less increase in welfare from more contribution in a low SSR country.
• The lobbying behavior is more efficient when the SSR is high, that is,
( ) (1 ) ( )ii iB g C g
s
*( ) ( )(1 )i i iW g C g
g s g
0 1s
(1 ) (1 )i i
l hs s
TUM 19
GMO regulations with SSR (cont.)
• We conclude our discussion that since a lower lobbying cost, lobbying is more efficient in a high SSR country.
• If the government pays more attention to the social welfare than contributions from the lobbying groups, the GM regulation will be less strict, and the SSR will be increased.
• Or: If in a low SSR country, GM regulation is strict, the government pays less attention to SSR.
TUM 20
GMO regulations with SSR (cont.)
• We proved the result by comparing the marginal effects of changing GM policy to the government payoff in a low SSR country to a high SSR country:
• A stricter GM regulation will not induce a higher payoff effect to the government in a low SSR country, so the policy will be lenient.
0.l hs sg gG G
TUM 21
Summary
• Using a standard political economy model to explain the reasons behind the GM policy outcomes.
• Different SSR is influenced by the GM lobbying policy. A stricter GM policy will affect a country’s SSR.
• In a country with a low SSR and strict GM policy, the non-GM lobby group has a stronger influence on government policy than the GM lobby group.
TUM 22