Global Political and Security Risk Monthly Briefing - November

B r a d b u r y s Global risk partners

GLOBAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK Monthly briefing: December 2014




The OSINT Political and Security Risk Division of Bradburys Global Risk

Partners generates timely and strategic political risk and security information,

enabling clients to make informed decisions in the mitigation of operational and

investment related risks.

As such, we engage in tracking and analysis of key developments of global

security and political concern; providing academically informed, in-depth, country

and conflict-related analyses across a number of Areas of Responsibility (AoRs).

Our Monthly Briefings intend to track changes in the vector or scope of regional

issues: providing summary, analysis, and prediction of Most Likely Scenarios

(MLS) and Most Dangerous Scenarios (MDS).

Derek Crystal

Chief Editor, Political and security risk OSINT

Security | Intelligence | Risk Mitigation www.bradburys.co.uk


AFRICA

AMERICAS

ASIA-PACIFIC

EUROPE

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

Jan Philip Mairhöfer

Tancrède Feuillade

Neville Radovic

Claudia Wagner

Sophie Taylor

Burkina Faso: Civilian rule returns to Burkina Faso but armed forces retain considerable power

Nigeria: Nigeria further destabilised by attacks in the northeast

South Sudan: Hope for political resolution of conflict despite suspension of peace talks

Mexico: President Enrique Peña Nieto running out of options to address crises in states affected by drug cartels

Peru / Bolivia: Illegally mined Peruvian gold increasingly exported through Bolivia

Columbia: Negotiations between FARC and Colombian government likely to continue following release of kidnapped general

Hong Kong: Momentum of protests begins to waver as Central Chinese government refuses to offer concessions

Thailand: Enfeebled Thai political environment shored up by excessive and growing military control

Philippines: Government military offensive provokes relative resurge in Islamist sub-state violence in southern regions

Ukraine: Ukraine’s move towards West likely to provoke greater Russian involvement in east of the country

Russia: Concern over territorial expansion after Russia signs treaty with Georgian breakaway territory of Abkhazia

Armenia / Azerbaijan: Heightened tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh

Egypt: President al-Sisi’s strategy in Sinai thrown into doubt by proliferation of attacks across Egypt

Afghanistan: Taliban attacks force United States to rethink role of troops in Afghanistan post-2014

Syria: Conflict with Islamic State (IS) in Syria becomes increasingly complex


Protesters storm the parliament building in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou (The Atlantic)


Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest

Political instability

Kidnap risk

Health risk

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Street-level crime

AFRICA

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

Civilian rule returns to Burkina Faso but armed forces retain considerable power

Following violent protests in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, and other cities on 30 October, the long-time

president, Blaise Compaoré resigned and Yacouba Isaac Zida, lieutenant colonel of the presidential guard assumed

power on 31 October. A transitional government was established on 23 November under interim President Michel

Kafando, with Zida holding the position of prime minister. It will maintain power until the proposed election in 2015.

The new government will consists of a 90-member cabinet, including 30 members from the former opposition, 25

members from civil society, 25 member from the armed force, and 10 members belonging to the Compaoré faction.

Notably, the army has received six major governmental positions, including those of foreign affairs and defence,

both of which will be chaired by Zida.

The change in government creates a number of potential domestic and international impacts. Under the rule of

former president Compaoré, Burkina Faso was a reliable ally of the West. It was considered to be a mediator in the

region and a contributor to regional stability. Both the United States and France have strategic interests in the state,

as both countries have special operations groups based in Burkina Faso. On an economic level, the shift in

government will have little international impact. The main exports of Burkina Faso are gold, cotton and livestock, with

a total export value of approximately $2.8 billion. The most notable impact of the new government has been the

announcement that the minister for mining, Colonel Boubacar Ba, will be reviewing a number of mining permits

issued by the former president. However, the 23 tonnes of gold mined annually accounts for only approximately 1%

one global gold output, and an interruption in mining in Burkina Faso will have minimal impact on global prices.

Considering the short timeframe in which power has been returned to a civilian institution, the makeup of the new

interim government, and the strong outside influences of the African Union, United Nations and Western allies, such

as the United States and France, it is likely that the elections scheduled for November 2015 will take place

successfully. However, the relatively significant involvement of the armed forces in this process, and the

proportionally high number of armed forces personnel serving as members of government, may represent a cause

for concern should the electoral process fail to form a legitimate government. If realised, the remote possibility of an

interim military government emerging would threaten both the democratic progress of Burkina Faso and the stability

of the region.

BURKINA FASO

HIGH

MED

LOW

HIGH

HIGH

MED

LOW

MED

HIGH


MED

EXTR

HIGH

HIGH

EXTR

HIGH

EXTR

HIGH

HIGH

Nigeria further destabilised by attacks in the northeast

A high number of attacks over the past month have further destabilised northeastern Nigeria. The most

devastating attack occurred in Kano on 28 November: two bombs were detonated in a crowded mosque, and

gunmen then attacked survivors in the surrounding area. The total death toll is currently estimated at 120, with

another 400 people injured. While no one has yet claimed credit for the attack, it is highly likely that Boko Harem

is responsible. The attack on the Central Mosque came shortly after an attack on a bus station in the northeast of

the country in which 40 people, including five soldiers, were killed. Further attacks throughout November included

the capture of Damassak, located near the border with Niger, resulting in approximately 50 fatalities; the raid – of

a dynamite depot owned by a French mining company; and a roadside attack resulting in 35 fatalities.

While government forces have been able to make some limited progress in recapturing towns held by Boko

Haram, success has often only been possible with the support of armed civilians. It appears that Nigeria’s

security forces are struggling with the insurgency despite having the largest standing army in the region. This is

likely attributable to inadequate training and aging equipment. The continued fighting in the region has also

increased the number of internally displaced people (IDPs), with perhaps close to one million people having been

displaced. Critical for Nigeria has also been the falling oil prices generated by OPEC’s decision not to cut oil

production, and a corresponding devaluation of the Naira. Nigeria has been hit particularly hard by the falling oil

prices, and the finance minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has admitted that the natural resource saving accounts are

now conspicuously low on funds due to excessive spending over the recent years of conflict.

Attacks in the north of the country have increased over the past month, and it is likely that the number and

severity of attacks will continue to increase. Due to the inability of the Nigerian security forces to secure the

region, militants – most likely from Boko Haram – have been able to secure explosives and weapons in high

numbers, which will enable them to carry out more dramatic operations. It is highly likely that Boko Haram will

attempt to disrupt the February 2015 elections through sustained attacks in northeastern Nigeria. The growing

economic pressures created by the dropping oil prices and a devaluing currency may impose financial constraints

on the military, resulting in a reduced capacity to operate and an increase in insecurity that will likely catalyse the

territorial expansion of Boko Haram.

AFRICA

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

NIGERIA (Northeast)


Hope for political resolution of conflict despite suspension of peace talks

On the 18 November, the South Sudanese government suspended talks with rebels from the Blue Nile

and South Kordofan states. However, leaders from all were optimistic that progress had been achieved

during the negotiations. A mediator from the African Union commended the progress and expressed his

confidence that the talks would continue soon. Despite these positive developments, reports of inter-tribal

confrontations have surfaced. The Awlad Omran and Al-Ziyoud, two Arab tribes in West Kordofan state,

have attacked each other, resulting in 100 people being killed and more than 100 wounded according to

tribal leaders. The conflict is fuelled by disputes over land rights and natural resources.

Like several other African states, South Sudan has been impacted by the decreased crude oil price. Due

to the price decrease, the South Sudanese government has restricted the sale of currency, including the

US dollar, in order to ensure that enough currency remains within the country. The protracted conflict has

disrupted oil production in South Sudan, which has decreased from 245,000 bpd in December 2013 to

the current level of 160,000 bpd. This is severely impacting the country’s economy.

If the peace talks progress, there is the potential for a successful political resolution; however, this will

ultimately rely on the wider political and economic stability of this relatively fledgling country. With tribes in

many regions of the country possessing considerable arsenals, it is likely that inter-tribal disputes over

land rights and natural resources will threaten the reconciliation process. The danger is that a resurgence

of violence following the comparative peace of the rainy season could harden political dialogue, resulting

in the collapse of negotiations, and a slide towards armed conflict once again - Jan Philip Mairhöfer

AFRICA


Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

SOUTH SUDAN

HIGH

HIGH

MED

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

EXTR

EXTR


President Enrique Peña Nieto running out of options to address crises in states affected by drug cartels

Angel Aguirre, the governor of Guerrero state, Mexico, stepped down from his position on 23 October following

a string of protests over the fate of 43 students who went missing in September. The students from the Rural

Raúl Isidro Burgos teachers college in Ayotzinapa were assaulted by members of the police on the night of 26

September in the town of Iguala, Guerrero state. While the details remain unclear, the official investigation

concluded that once the students had been arrested they were handed over to the Guerreros Unidos (‘United

Warriors’) drug cartel and presumably killed. The scandal produced international outrage, and resulted in violent

protests in Guerrero. Although he does not presently face formal charges, Aguirre is blamed for having turned a

blind eye to links between local officials and the cartels. The former mayor of Iguala, José Luis Abarca, and his

wife are suspected to have ordered the attacks on the students. The couple went on the run, but were arrested

in Mexico City on 4 November. The kidnapping and presumed murder of the students is the most serious crisis

yet in President Enrique Peña Nieto’s near two-year term. He is coming under increasing fire for the country’s

dreadful human rights record and lack of respect for the rule of law. Following the arrest of several police

officials, the government has sent federal troops and police to Iguala and a dozen other municipalities.

Aguirre is the second governor to resign from his position during Peña Nieto’s mandate, after the governor of

neighbouring Michoacán state stepped down in June. The crisis in Guerrero has once again revealed the

malfunction of local government in Mexico, and has led to discussions over the ability of the executive to

dismiss a governor from his or her functions. This legislated power is established in Section 76, Article V, of the

national constitution, but has not been used since the Hidalgo case in 1975. However, the voluntary resignation

of Aguirre, who remains eligible to run for the post in the upcoming 2015 election, has underscored the

incapacity of the executive to assert itself in domestic matters. One reason for this is the deep-seated affiliation

among Mexican politicians. Aguirre, who has spent most of his political career with the ruling Institutional

Revolutionary Party (PRI), maintains close ties with the government. Hence, the political costs for Peña Nieto of

dismissing Aguirre would have been dramatic. (Cont)

AMERICAS

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

MEXICO

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

LOW

HIGH

MED


Not only would he have lost some his allies in Aguirre’s party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution

(PRD), but he would also have been required to undergo a tedious legal process.

The issues of rampant insecurity and the lack of rule of law in Mexico are structural, and relate as much to a

perverse political culture as to the absence of an appropriate legal framework. The voluntary and unapologetic

resignation of Aguirre is unlikely to resolve the current security crisis, which would require a much broader effort

to increase accountability and transparency across municipal and provincial governments. The reality is that the

Peña Nieto administration is running out of options to address the crises in Guerrero, Michoacán and other

states in which drug cartels and other criminal organisations thrive.

Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto (BBC)

AMERICAS

MEXICO


Illegally mined Peruvian gold increasingly exported through Bolivia

The heavy-handed approach to illegal gold mining adopted by Peruvian President Ollanta Humala has caused

new smuggling routes to be created through the country’s porous border with Bolivia. The Peruvian government

launched a series of drastic measures late last year to control illegal gold mining, which costs the government

around $250 million annually in lost tax revenue, and severely damages the environment in affected areas.

However, according to new data released by the Bolivian authorities, much of Peru’s illegal gold is now being

channelled through Bolivia and being exported from the capital, La Paz, on to the United States. Bolivia’s official

gold exports in the first seven months of 2014 increased threefold on last year’s level (reaching a total of 24

tonnes), despite the absence of any new mining developments. Most of the smuggled gold is transported through

the jungle near Titicaca Lake, which is located on the border between Peru and Bolivia.

The proliferation of smuggling routes through Bolivia underscores the difficulty national authorities face in

controlling the expansion of the illegal gold market, which has surged in the past decade due to a global rise in

gold prices. About 20% of Peru’s gold exports are produced illegally, with most of the mines situated in the

administrative subdivisions of Madre de Dios, Puno and Arequipa. This year, the Peruvian government estimates

that 112 tonnes of gold extracted from the country’s soil, with a total value of $3 billion, is of illegal origin.

However, the length of Peru’s border with Bolivia, which spans over 1,000 kilometres (620 miles), and its tropical

environment, makes it very difficult to monitor. The lucrative trade in illegally-mined gold also involves

international criminal organisations from various countries, and last year two illegal Peruvian mines were traced

back to a Russian oligarch.

The issue of illegal gold trade in the region also creates the need for further collaboration between states in

matters of border security and money laundering. Following the publication of the Bolivian data, the US

Department of Homeland Security has reported that it is discussing with the Peruvian authorities the investigation

of asset laundering associated with the illegal gold trade. But in the current climate, it seems unlikely that the

development of illegal gold mining and trading in Peru will come be halted soon.

AMERICAS

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

PERU

MED

MED

MED

MED

MED

MED

HIGH

HIGH

LOW



Negotiations between FARC and Colombian government likely to continue following release of

kidnapped general

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) agreed on 26 November to release a general and four

other hostages in a move aimed at resuming the halted peace talks with the government. The kidnapping on 23

November of General Rubén Darío Alzate, together with an army corporal and a defence ministry civil servant,

by the rebel Marxist group in the remote western province of Chocó derailed the negotiations, which are the

most advanced talks so far towards ending the conflict that has gone on for over five decades. In 2012, FARC

publicly renounced kidnappings for ransom; however, they remained committed to targeting members of the

military. At the beginning of the year, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos secured a second mandate on

a political platform that focused on resolving the conflict with FARC.

Alzate’s kidnapping is the most serious setback for the peace talks yet. However, the willingness of FARC to

quickly resolve the issue highlights their enduring commitment to the success of the talks. In addition, Santos

has ordered an investigation into why the general allegedly violated security protocols by being dressed as a

civilian near a ‘red zone’ territory and was away from his armed escorts.

The negotiations, which were launched in October 2012, focus on a five-point agenda that includes land issues,

participation in politics, drug trafficking, disarmament and restitution for conflict victims. So far the government

and FARC have agreed on three of the five points – land reform, political participation and illicit drugs. At the

start of November, a partial agreement on the political future for the guerrillas was announced; however, this

represents probably one of the most contentious issues on the agenda, and Colombians are sharply divided

between those who are willing to forgive FARC for their crimes and those who demand justice. Despite this, it is

likely that the issue will be successfully tackled in the not too distant future, as FARC appear increasingly

committed to the success of the talks - Tancrède Feuillade

AMERICAS

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

COLUMBIA

LOW

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

MED

MED

MED


Momentum of protests begins to waver as both Chinese central government, and Hong Kong

authorities refuse to offer concessions

The month of November has witnessed a number of telling occurrences with regards to student protests in

Hong Kong. On 15 November, reports indicated that students involved in pro-democracy protests were being

subjected to stringent stop and search, and interrogation procedures at Hong Kong-Chinese border crossing.

Many participants have been refused entry into China, imposing a salient passive cost upon participating in pro-

democracy rallies. Most notably, on 25 November, Police effectively cleared Mong Kok of the three areas

occupied by protestors. Furthermore, conflicting views of the political unrest have led to a boycott of a planned

trip to China by the British MPs.

There has been no significant change in scope; protestors still claim to be committed to their core demand of full

public nomination for the chief executive post in 2017. On the contrary the Central government and Hong Kong

authorities remain adamant in giving no concessions. It is evident thus far that the most likely scenario is that

demonstrations will continue, however; public support and media attention will gradually diminish to a point

where the leverage held by demonstrators will significantly decline. This seems to be the approach taken by

both the Central government and Hong Kong authorities, which are seeking to wait out the demonstrations

whilst giving no concessions. According to the latest reports, the Central government has refused to meet a

delegation of protesting students from Hong Kong and authorities have rejected proposals to hold by-elections

or to dissolve the Legislative Council. There seems to be no meeting point as of now between the protestors

and the authorities both in Hong Kong and Beijing. Furthermore, protest fatigue is a growing issue for

demonstrators as reflected by the decreasing number of participants each day. It is likely that authorities will

move in to clear the remaining two occupied areas once demonstrator numbers drop even lower.

A violent crackdown by authorities on demonstrators resulting in a high number of casualties would represent

the most dangerous scenario; however, the likelihood of such a scenario remains low. Even though state

controlled media has stated that failure to vacate could result in deaths and injuries, it is unlikely such drastic

measures would be employed. The Central government would be unwilling to take any measures that would

only increase international attention and portray demonstrators as victims.

ASIA-PACIFIC

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

HONG KONG

MED

LOW

LOW

LOW

LOW

LOW

MED

LOW

LOW


Enfeebled Thai political environment shored up by excessive and growing military control

The military junta established in wake of the coup d’état remains in firm control of the political environment in

Thailand. On 14 November, UN Chief Ban Ki-moon explicitly questioned the need for stringent censorship and

martial law in Thailand. It appears that these overt criticisms have not altered the internal dynamics of the military

juntas decision-making apparatus, as the announcement of the further delay of the General Election process

until 2016 and the domestic censorship of a Human Rights Watch report, on 26 and 27 November respectively

appear to evince.

International and internal pressure is likely to increase in the coming months, especially with the postponing of

general elections until 2016. The relative widespread condemnation of the coup by the international community

may lead to increased Thai isolationism and see the state become a pariah. Even if democratic elections take

place there are serious doubts over the success of any subsequent government given the inherently volatile

political environment and relative weakness of state institutions. Furthermore, Thailand has experienced 12

military takeovers since 1932, which casts serious doubt over any optimism that the military would withdraw

completely from the political scene.

The continued entrenchment of current Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha and increased civil strife would

represent the most dangerous scenario. The martial law imposed by the army is unlikely to be lifted in the

foreseeable future despite being promised by the government in earlier weeks. Martial law has seen measures

such as Internet censorship, state seizure of media outlets, nationwide curfews and the banning of all political

gatherings. Such an environment is subsequently hazardous for foreign nationals who are advised to exercise a

high degree of caution in order to safeguard their security.

There is further potential for the escalation of the Southern Thailand insurgency especially as since reports have

emerged that the government has distributed some 2,700 military grade assault rifles to villagers in a bid to

protect them from insurgent raids. Whilst predominately in the southern regions of Thailand an escalation of the

conflict could see separatists carry out attacks in major cities and areas popular amongst western tourists.

ASIA-PACIFIC

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

THAILAND

HIGH

MED

MED

HIGH

MED

MED

MED

MED

LOW


Government military offensive provokes relative resurge in Islamist sub-state violence in southern

Philippines

There has been a considerable increase in violence between government forces and Moro insurgents in the

wake of a recent government military offensive. On 2 November, Abu Sayyaf fighters killed six Philippine

soldiers in southern Philippines, whilst on the 16 November, twenty individuals, including a number of civilians,

died in clashes between government forces and the Al-Qaeda affiliated fighters in the southern Jungle region.

On 24 November the military managed to capture an Abu Sayyaf camp in the Basilan province, resulting in the

capture of mid-level organisational leader, Nasser Usman. There has been a considerable increase in violence

between government forces and Moro insurgents in wake of a recent government military offensive.

The Moro insurgency has been ongoing since 1969 and judging by recent developments the conflict seems

unlikely to be quelled in the foreseeable future. Despite the increase in clashes, the conflict will most likely

continue to remain a low intensity one, only affecting the southern Philippines. The recent government offensive

is unlikely to deliver a decisive blow, which required to completely rout Abu Sayyaf. Given the concessions

attained by the country’s largest Muslim insurgency group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), it is evident that

fringe groups such as Abu Sayyaf will lose support from the wider Muslim community, further decreasing their

ability to carry out guerrilla warfare.

The most dangerous scenario given recent events would be a breakdown of the peace accord reached between

the Philippine government and MILF. The accord negotiated in January 2014 laid the foundations for the

establishment of an autonomous Muslim-dominated region, handing the bulk of the responsibility for security to

local authorities. Furthermore, the agreement has allowed for militants to disarm and have the option of joining

the Philippine security forces. However, in light of recent outbreaks of violence with Abu Sayyaf, certain more

radical elements within MILF may perceive the government offensive as continued transgression against the

Muslim community, triggering a breakdown of the peace and renewed conflict. Despite the presence of this risk,

it is unlikely that MILF would renew hostilities with the Philippine government and subsequently lose generous

concessions attained from the peace accord - Neville Radovic

ASIA-PACIFIC

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

PHILIPPINES

HIGH

MED

MED

HIGH

HIGH

MED

MED

HIGH

MED


Donetsk, Ukraine (NBC)


Ukraines’ move towards West likely to provoke greater Russian involvement in east of the country

On 27 November, in a decisive move towards the new government pursuing a European-integration line of

policy, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) elected Volodymyr Groysman – an ally of President Petro

Poroshenko – as speaker and re-elected Arseniy Yatsenyuk as prime minister. Poroshenko also appealed to

Rada deputies to repeal the 2010 law that legislates Ukraine’s non-aligned status. The president believes this

policy does not guarantee Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity, and has urged lawmakers to support the

government’s plans to pursue NATO membership. After the parliamentary election on 29 October, two key

policies have been enacted by the Ukrainian government: a priority has been placed on increasing the capacity

of the Ukrainian army, and the decision was made to cut off state aid to eastern Ukraine, where the ceasefire

agreed between the Ukrainian military and pro- Russian separatists on 5 September continues to be regularly

violated.

Although the ceasefire still stands in theory, it is clear that it has not ended the violence in eastern Ukraine. A

UN monitoring team reported that 1,000 Ukrainians soldiers and civilians have died since the ceasefire began –

representing 13 people killed each day. The Ukrainian army has recorded 3,412 ceasefire violations during this

period. As of 20 November, the number of internally displaced Ukrainians had risen sharply to 466,829,

compared to 275,489 reported on 18 September. NATO monitors have identified an increase in Russian

movement on the border and Russian convoys carrying heavy armour, fighters and ammunition crossing into

the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Ukrainian military have reported that 7,500 Russian troops were

stationed and fighting in Ukraine. Both sides continue to fight around the airport in Donetsk – a highly strategic

area.

The conflict between the Ukrainian military and the rebels in eastern Ukraine is becoming increasingly

entrenched. It is highly likely that it will become another of the ‘frozen conflicts’ of the countries of the former

Soviet Union. According to the United Nations, there has been a total breakdown of law and order in Donetsk

and Luhansk, where parallel systems of governance have emerged (Cont.)

EUROPE

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

UKRAINE

MED

LOW

HIGH

LOW

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH


The decision by Kiev to cease supplying eastern Ukraine will increase the authority of the separatists over the

region, and Russia is likely to increase the provision of aid convoys to bolster the rebels influence. Kiev’s plans

to join NATO are highly likely to further encourage Russia to increase support to the separatists, as the NATO

charter disallows the granting of membership to countries that do not have complete territorial integrity. While

the United States has so far resisted plans to supply Ukraine with arms, the new congress may push for a

change of policy, especially considering the senate-proposed Menendez-Kirk bill, which seeks to step up

sanctions against Russia and grant Ukraine military aid. Should the bill be passed and not vetoed by President

Barack Obama, it is highly likely that the conflict will become significantly more intense.

EUROPE

Ukrainian Army troops receive munitions at a field on the outskirts of Izyum, Eastern Ukraine (Telegraph)

UKRAINE


EUROPE Concern over territorial expansion after Russia signs treaty with Georgian breakaway territory of

Abkhazia

On 24 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the leader of the Georgian breakaway territory Abkhazia,

Raul Khajimba, signed a treaty under which Russian and Abkhazian forces will form a joint force led by a Russian

commander. The Georgian foreign ministry called the deal a ‘step toward the de-facto annexation’ of Abkhazia

into the Russian Federation. Under the agreement, Russia will also double its economic aid to around $200

million from 2015 onwards. The United Nations, the European Union and NATO have all refused to recognise the

treaty, and have criticised Russia’s actions.

Russian troops have been stationed in Abkhazia since the war between the breakaway territory and Georgia in

the early 1990s. However, this recent treaty gives Russia much greater influence and power in Abkhazia.

Significantly, the deal comes shortly after a change in leadership in the territory. The previous leader, Alexander

Ankvab, was forced to step down after a series of protests that local media have speculated were devised by the

Kremlin. Ankvab had resisted pressure from the Kremlin to allow Russia to buy assets within the territory. The

current leader, Khajimba (a former KGB officer), was elected in August in elections that Georgia does not

recognise. These latest developments lend support to Western claims that Russia is seeking to expand its

territory into lands of the former Soviet Union.

Through this treaty and the annexation of Crimea in March, Russia now has substantial territorial control over the

Black Sea region. With control over the territory’s foreign policy, it is likely that Russia will seek to gain

international recognition of Abkhazia’s legitimacy, as the Kremlin has done with Crimea. It is also possible that

Russia might reach a similar agreement with the other Georgian breakaway territory, South Ossetia. The territory

already receives financial and political support from Russia, and there is a fairly strong sentiment from Ossetians

in North Ossetia (which is in the Russian Federation) and the South Ossetians to unite. Georgia has so far vowed

to appeal to international organisations, such as the European Union and the United Nations (Cont.)


Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

RUSSIA

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

MED

MED

MED

LOW

LOW


The most dangerous scenario would be a military intervention by Georgia into Abkhazia. However, this is highly

unlikely after the Georgia-Russia war of 2008, which caused a political crisis in Georgia. The political situation in

Georgia is currently unstable, with a number of ministers resigning, and it is highly unlikely that the Georgian

government would consider such a move.

EUROPE

Raul Khajimba, leader of the Georgian breakaway territory and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Japan Times)

RUSSIA


EUROPE

Armenian Mi-24 helicopter, similar to the one pictured, was shot down by Azerbaijani military forces on 12 November 2014


Heightened tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh

There has been heightened tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over violations of the ceasefire between the

military forces of the two countries in the breakaway territory Nagorno-Karabakh in November. This was

exacerbated by the downing of an Armenian helicopter by Azerbaijani military forces on 12 November, in which

three Armenian soldiers were killed. The Armenian defence ministry called the shooting an ‘unprecedented

provocation’. However, the Azerbaijani defence ministry reported that their forces had detected two helicopters

that they believe planned to shoot at Azerbaijani personnel on ground.

There has been no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries since the end of the war in 1994, when

the OSCE Minsk Group brokered a ceasefire over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The media reports

violations of the ceasefire daily; however, the number of violations has risen sharply from approximately 10 to 50

per day since the downing of the Armenian helicopter. There was also a notable increase in violence during the

summer, when more than 20 Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers were killed.

In the short term, it is likely that participants in the OSCE’s Minsk Process (co-chaired by France, Russia and the

United States) will seek to lower tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan through talks. The German foreign

minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and French President François Hollande have met with the leaders of the two

countries, though neither of these efforts at dialogue made a breakthrough. Concerns have been raised by the

mediators of the Minsk Group that Armenia and Azerbaijan may seek to resolve the ongoing crisis militarily. This

concern was heightened by a statement from Azerbaijan that claimed that the country would seize Nagorno-

Karabakh if diplomacy failed to resolve the territorial dispute - Claudia Wagner

EUROPE


Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

ARMENIA

LOW

LOW

LOW

HIGH

MED

HIGH

HIGH

MED

HIGH


President al-Sisi’s strategy in Sinai thrown into doubt by proliferation of attacks across Egypt

There was an increase in the number of explosions throughout Egypt during November, including in Cairo and its

surrounding districts. Many of these attacks targeted critical infrastructure, such as metro stations in Menufiya

province on 5 November, central Cairo on 13 November, and Beni Suef on 23 November. Although Egypt has

experienced a number of small-scale terror attacks since the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi in 2013,

these have largely been confined to the restive Sinai Peninsula. Two further infantry battalions have been

deployed to the region following discussions with neighbouring Israel, honouring the 1979 peace treaty between

the two countries. In a bid to relieve pressure along the border, Egyptian forces reopened the Rafah crossing with

Gaza, enabling the repatriation of Palestinians who had been unable to return home following the closure of the

crossing in late October.

Despite the proliferation of attacks across the country, there is no indication that terrorist groups within the region

are beginning to coordinate. Rather, the recent attacks indicate a growing frustration with Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s

presidency and the government's current security policies. Al-Sisi faces considerable challenges. When the

attention of the military was turned towards stabilising Cairo during the revolution, rebel groups were able to

exploit the power vacuum left within Sinai and seize critical infrastructure. Al-Sisi's current policy is to this, with

military attention very much focussed on regaining control and creating stability in Sinai. The latest wave of

terrorism across the country raises questions about al-Sisi's approach to combating the domestic terrorist threat

and whether it can achieve his promised reform of the security situation.

Sinai has been subject to unprecedented security measures in the last few weeks, including resettlement and the

bulldozing of homes. However, it remains a hotbed of extremism and violence, and the security measures have so

far been unsuccessful in addressing the insecurity. Nevertheless, there is likely to be a continuation and extension

of this military approach, as al-Sisi signed a new arms deal worth $1.24 billion with French President François

Hollande on 26 November (Cont.)

MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

EGYPT

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

MED

MED


MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA


Egyptian security forces and rescue workers carry an injured person on a stretcher after a small bomb exploded in a metro train on 13 November 2014 in the capital Cairo. (AFP)

It remains to be seen if this policy will eventually be effectual, or if the increased military presence in Sinai's

problematic districts, such as al- Arish, will push groups such as Ansar al-Maqdis closer to the Islamic State. The

unification of the regions various Islamist terrorist groups is a significant risk. However, it is one the international

community is cognisant of, and as such, military alliances with al-Sisi should be expected in the coming weeks.

EGYPT


Taliban attacks force United States to rethink role of troops in Afghanistan post-2014

In an embarrassing, if not expected, turn of events, the Taliban have forced the United States to re-evaluate its

position on the role of troops in Afghanistan. The latest wave of attacks follows the staged withdrawal of

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops from the country, passing combat roles to the Afghan

security forces. In a visit to Kabul on 6 November, NATO Security General Jens Stoltenberg declared that

international forces had succeeding in making the country safer for the civilian population, reducing acts of

terrorism and limiting the scale and control of the Taliban. However, only 17 days after Stoltenberg's visit, the

country experienced its deadliest attack of the year. A reported 57 people, mostly civilians, were killed in the

country's eastern province of Paktika on 23 November. Furthermore, amongst the numerous suicide bombings

the country has experienced throughout November, Kabul's diplomatic district has been targeted – an area

housing many foreign embassies and expatriate compounds. A convoy to the British mission in Afghanistan was

also targeted, alongside security bases in Helmand Province.

The attacks raise questions over the ability of Afghanistan’s forces to maintain adequate levels of peace and

development in light of the country's fragile domestic security situation. NATO members, such as the United

States and United Kingdom, have reaffirmed their commitment to support the national forces, and will remain in

the country for reconstruction and training purposes for the coming months. In a reversal of the United States'

original position, President Barack Obama announced that some of the 9,800 troops to remain in the country at

the end of this year will be engaging al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Indeed, the increase in attacks may, in part, be in

response to the latest coalition announcements and the expansion of their planned involvement after the self-

imposed deadline for withdrawal.

While the Taliban have claimed responsibility for a number of the attacks, the exact scale of their operations

remains unknown. It has widely been speculated that many Mujahideen fighters fled to neighbouring Pakistan

during the 13-year conflict to areas where they have been relatively immune from military targeting (Cont.)

MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

AFGHANISTAN

EXTR

EXTR

EXTR

EXTR

EXTR

HIGH

EXTR

HIGH

HIGH


The withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan is likely to lead to an increase in attacks throughout the

country's east, together with disruption in the capital, Kabul. The newly established government of Ashraf Ghani

and Abdullah Abdullah will need to tackle corruption outside of Kabul in order to effectively address the Taliban’s

control. Ghani has stated his intent to engage Taliban leaders in dialogue in a bid to secure peace; however, the

Taliban's position on communication with government officials remains unchanged. As such, failure to address

corruption and to secure military support could spell disaster for the country in 2015. Should the Afghan National

Army and local police forces prove ineffectual, the resulting security vacuum could allow the Taliban to wrestle

control of major territories from the government.

MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA

AFGHANISTAN



Conflict with Islamic State (IS) in Syria becomes increasingly complex

An Islamic State (IS) propaganda video purportedly showing the beheadings of US aid worker Abdul- Rahman

(Peter) Kassig and at least 18 Syrian soldiers emerged on social media on 16 November. The footage features

British-born ‘Jihadi John’, who denounces Western interference in the region. Differing from previous execution

videos, however, the latest footage shows the unmasked faces of IS members in a bid to demonstrate the group’s

international makeup. The footage contains six minutes of propagandist history relating to the crusades,

victimisation of Muslims and the strength of Wahhabi ideology. Earlier in the month, US and coalition air strikes

successful targeted Islamic State convoys in Iraq close to the strategic Mosul dam. Speculation remains over the

health and whereabouts of the IS emir, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi; however, the group later released audio

confirmation that al-Baghdadi had not been injured in the strikes.

What remains abundantly clear is the Islamic States' willingness to continue their fight for territory across Iraq and

Syria, with fierce battles occurring across strategic hotspots, such as the border town of Kobane in Syria and the

essential infrastructure of Iraq's Haditha and Mosul dams. UN figures estimate the terror group has now amassed

and seized weaponry that would allow IS to fight for a further two years. While foreign intelligence has assessed

the number of IS fighters to be in the region of 32,000, Kurdish leaders have warned the group now has access to

over 200,000 recruits given the territory it has regained.

It remains to be seen how far the international community, and the United States in particular, are willing to go in

the military battle against the Islamic State. The White House and US Senate remain divided over the role of the

US military in defeating the regional threat of IS. Airstrikes and intelligence gathering will, however, continue in a

bid to strengthen the position of local armies. Whereas support and munitions have been granted to the Kurdish

Peshmerga in Iraq, the picture remains more complex within Syria, as political and sectarian divisions continue to

escalate. Although airstrikes have supported the retention of areas in western and central Syria by forces loyal to

President Bashar al-Assad, criticism of Assad's leadership remains (Cont.)

MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA

Conflict

OVERALL RISK

Corruption

Terrorism risk

Civil unrest


Kidnap risk

Health risk

Street-level crime

SYRIA

EXTR

EXTR

EXTR

EXTR

HIGH

EXTR

EXTR

EXTR

MED


Where Islamic groups within Syria, such as the al-Nusra Front, continue to engage the Islamic State, it remains to

be seen how the role of Western allies whom, unintentionally, may support Assad's regime will affect this

dynamic. Islamic State will continue its battles for territory, which will further impact on civilian areas. Moreover,

the importance awarded to international hostages remains a concern for many. There is a danger that as the

conflict continues poverty will lead to a greater number of kidnappings by splinter groups selling their hostages on

to the resource-rich Islamic State. - Sophie Taylor

MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA

SYRIA

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Global Political and Security Risk Monthly Briefing - November

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Transcript of Global Political and Security Risk Monthly Briefing - November