Global Governance 2025

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Global Governance2025: At a Critical

Juncture

EuropeanUnionInstitute forSecurity Studies


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In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)became an autonomous Paris-based

agency o the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action o 20 July 2001, modifed

by the Joint Action o 21 December 2006, it is now an integral part o the new structures that

will support the further development of the CFSP/CSDP. The Institutes core mission is to provide

analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of the European

security and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface betweenEuropean experts and decision-makers at all levels.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies . ParisDirector: lvaro de Vasconcelos

EU Institute for Security Studies 2010. All rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the priorpermission of the EU Institute for Security Studies.

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Cond-sur-Noireau(France) by Corlet Imprimeur, Graphic design by Metropolis (Lisboa)


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Global Governance 2025:

At a Critical Juncture


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Institute for Security StudiesEuropean Union

43 avenue du Prsident Wilson

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tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30

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e-mail: [email protected] ISBN 978-92-9198-175-5

www.iss.europa.eu QN-30-10-675-EN-C

Director : lvaro de Vasconcelos doi:10.2815/21215
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Enquiries regarding this report may be made to Mathew Burrows,

Counselor to the National Intelligence Council, on +1 (703) 482-0741or, for the EU Institute of Security Studies, contactGiovanni Grevi.

EUISS

November 2010

This is the EUISS version o a report already published by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) inthe US in September 2010. US spelling has been changed and some minor amendments introducedto the original text.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Acknowledgements

In preparing this work, the National Intelligence Council and the European Union Institute or Security

Studies received immeasurable and critical help rom an array o think tanks, consulting rms, academic

and governmental institutions, and literally scores o individual experts on all ve continents. We would

rst like to thank the Atlantic Council o the US (ACUS) and the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN), who

were both partners in supporting this project. ACUS s Dr. Banning Garrett and Mr. Patrick DeGategno

were superb in arranging the numerous overseas meetings; ACUS President Frederick Kempe and Vice

President Fran Burwell also participated in the planning and discussions in several venues. Mr. James

Elles, Member o the European Parliament and head o TPN, was pivotal in helping to design the project

and in orchestrating key discussions in several capitals. He accompanied us on almost all the trips. Dr.

William Burke-White o the State Departments Policy Planning Oce provided guidance and substan-

tive advice in addition to accompanying us on all the trips. Ms. Rosemary Opacic, Administrator o the

Committee on Foreign Aairs o the European Parliament, also provided important contributions and

participated in most o the research trips.

The ollowing institutions, their directors, and participating sta were gracious in hosting us or major

seminars and, in many cases, inviting other experts in their countries and regions to the meetings:

Beijing : China Institutes o Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).

Tokyo : Japan Institute or International Aairs (JIIA).

Dubai : Dubai Consultancy Research & Media Centre (bhuth).

India : Observer Research Foundation (ORF).

Pretoria : Institute or Security Studies.

Brasilia : Secretaria De Assuntos Estrategicos (SAE).

So Paulo : Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Moscow

: Institute o World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

Special mention goes to Bruce Jones, David Steven and Alex Evans, at the Center on International Co-

operation at New York University, or providing comprehensive and critical material on ailing states,

resource issues such as water and ood, migration, and innovative biotechnologies. Charles Emmerson,

ormer head o the global risks programme at the World Economic Forum and now an independent ad-

viser, wrote the appendix on the Arctic. Dr. Alexander van de Putte o PFC Energy provided material on

energy utures. Within the NIC, Ms. Elizabeth Arens provided essential editorial support.


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Preatory note to the EUISS edition

This report was jointly prepared and drated by the EUISS and the US National Intelli-

gence Council (NIC), who were able to draw on the views contributed by a large number

o institutes and research centres in Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Arica and

the United Arab Emirates. Mathew Burrows rom the NIC took charge on the American

side and Giovanni Grevi, then Senior Research Fellow at the EUISS, took charge on our

side. The report they have produced is an insightul, meaningul contribution to the on-going debate on how to shape a multilateral order out o our multipolar world. Particu-

lar thanks are due to both researchers or having stewarded the project, as well as to the

Atlantic Council and the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) who provided invaluable

support.

Global Governance 2025 ts perectly with the Institutes ocus and work on the Euro-

pean Unions long-standing goal o achieving eective multilateralism and its recogni-

tion o the need or concomitant engagement with the new global players. Such engage-

ment is imperative i we are to adapt to a transormed international landscape where

power centres have multiplied. The preparatory stages have indicated and the reports

conclusions abundantly conrmed the signicant degree o convergence between both

the European and the American sides regarding the analysis o what should be the main

priorities or global governance in the years ahead.

The Europeans and Americans who participated in this exercise also share a proound

understanding that the West cant do without the Rest, and that world governance will

go nowhere unless pivotal states, multilateral organisations, regional groups and non-state actors are involved in joint undertakings. This in turn requires bringing together a

variety o actors who do not necessarily share the same approach to multilateralism. The

world stage has become more diverse and more complex, and all global actors, old and

new, must adapt to it and assume their international role together with renewed interna-

tional responsibilities.


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Finally this exercise also shows the importance o strategic planning and long-term analysis in

the context o an international system in transition, where the relative power o the major globalplayers is undergoing proound change. For the EU this is certainly a critical question or the de-

nition o a common strategy or its oreign policy.There is unquestionably a multilateral moment

on both sides o the Atlantic, a strong convergence that has yet to be transormed into common

initiatives to make world governance a tangible, lasting reality. Much o the uture, as this report

leads us to conclude, will depend on the decisions taken in the rst years o the coming decade.

Hopeully, it will help us seize the moment and transorm it into a multilateral and not merely

multipolar era.

lvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, December 2010


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Preace 9

Executive Summary 11

Potential scenarios 14

Introduction 17

International institutions in the late twentieth century 18

1. Expanding agenda stretching institutional capacities 19

Complex risks driving demands or global governance 20

2. Power shits complicating global governance 25

Will multipolarity enhance or erode multilateralism? 26

3. Some success in adapting 33

Inormal groupings 34

Growth o regionalism 37

Non-state actors step up to the plate 40

4. An uncertain uture 49

Weak and ailing states 49

Interlocking resource issues 52

Over-the-horizon issues or global governance 54

Conclusion 59

Future opportunities, but also limits 59

Annexes 61

Annex A: World views o global governance 61

Annex B: The prospects or regionalism 67

Annex C: The Arctic: challenge or opportunity or global governance? 73

Annex D: Are global governance tools sufcient or ragile states? 75

Annex E: Migration in the age o uncertainty 79

Annex F: Threats rom biotechnology 85Abbreviations 89

Contents


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9

Preace

The United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union Institute

or Security Studies (EUISS) have joined orces to produce this assessment o the long-

term prospects or global governance rameworks. This exercise builds on the experience

o the two institutions in identiying the key trends shaping the uture international

system. Since the mid-1990s, the NIC has produced our editions o its landmark GlobalTrendsreport. The most recent one, Global Trends 2025: A Transormed World, publishedin late 2008, noted that momentous change was ahead, with the gap between increasing

disorder and weakening governance structures widening. The EUISS produced the rst

EU-level report on the actors aecting the evolution o the international system, The

New Global Puzzle. What World or the EU in 2025?, in 2006.The report stressed that amultipolar system is emerging and that matching the new distribution o power with

new rules and institutions will be critical to preserving international peace and stability.

The US and the EU do not always see eye to eye on every issue on the international agen-

da, but they share undamental values and strategic interests to an extent not matched

by any other partners in the world. Transatlantic agreement is no longer enough to eec-

tively manage global challenges. Doing so will require renewed eorts to address govern-

ance gaps and strengthen multilateralism, in partnership with other pivotal centres o

power and with the international community at large. This report provides an inormal

contribution to an important international debate on the way orward or global, re-

gional and bilateral institutions and rameworks to meet emerging challenges. It is not

meant as an exhaustive analysis evaluating the perormance o individual institutions.While not being policy prescriptive, the report shares a strong belie as exemplied by

multilateralist approaches o the US and EU governments to resolving global problems

such as the recent nancial crisis that global challenges will require global solutions.

The report does not seek to examine all the various challenges likely to require multi-

lateralist eorts, but rather highlights several important governance gaps. We thereore

do not go into depth on prolieration or cybersecurity which we believe are receiving

greater attention. Instead, we ocus on such issues as intrastate confict, resource man-

agement, migration and biotechnology. Although recognised by many as ongoing chal-lenges, we believe that the long-term impact o these issues on the strength o the inter-

national order has not been ully appreciated.


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Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture

Global Governance 2025is the result o an inclusive process, enriched by wide-rangingconsultations with government ocials; as well as business, academic, NGO and think

tank leaders; and media representatives in Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia, South A-

rica and in the Gul region (the UAE). The diversity o the comments and insights, which

we have included in the body o the text, testies both to the richness o the debate and

to the diculty o reconciling dierent interests and standpoints when reorming glo-

bal governance. A number o experts, acknowledged elsewhere, have contributed to the

success o this project and to the high quality o this report. The Atlantic Council o the

US and the Transatlantic Policy Network have been partners in supporting the project.

NIC Counselor Mathew Burrows and Giovanni Grevi rom the EUISS have steered this

process and took charge o drating the bulk o the report. Their work has set an excel-

lent example o cooperation in delivering joint analysis and achieving a largely shared

perspective.

The Global Governance 2025project is innovative in many respects. This is the rst timethe NIC has jointly developed and produced an unclassied report with a non-US body.

Global Governance2025constitutes an important step with a view to uture joint projectson matters o common interest.


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Executive Summary

Global governance the collective management o common problems at the international

level is at a critical juncture. Although global governance institutions have racked

up many successes since they were developed ater the Second World War, the growing

number o issues on the international agenda, and their complexity, is outpacing the

ability o international organisations and national governments to cope.

With the emergence o rapid globalisation, the risks to the international system have

grown to the extent that ormerly localised threats are no longer locally containable but

are now potentially dangerous to global security and stability. At the beginning o the

century, threats such as ethnic conficts, inectious diseases, and terrorism as well as a

new generation o global challenges including climate change, energy security, ood and

water scarcity, international migration fows and new technologies are increasingly tak-

ing centre stage.

Three eects o rapid globalisation are driving demands or more eective global govern-

ance.Interdependencehas been a eature o economic globalisation or many years, butthe rise o China, India, Brazil and other ast-growing economies has taken economic

interdependence to a new level. The multiple links among climate change and resources

issues, the economic crisis, and state ragility hubs o risks or the uture illustrate

the interconnected natureo the challenges on the international agenda today. Many othe issues cited above involve interwovendomestic and oreign challenges. Domestic pol-

itics creates tight constraints on international cooperation and reduces the scope or

compromise.

The shit to amultipolarworldis complicating the prospects or eective global govern-ance over the next 10 years. The expanding economic clout o emerging powers increases

their political infuence well beyond their borders. Power is not only shiting rom estab-

lished powers to rising countries and, to some extent, the developing world, but also to-

wards non-state actors. Diverse perspectives on and suspicions about global governance,

which is seen as a Western concept, will add to the diculties o eectively mastering the

growing number o challenges.


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Brazilians eel there is a need or a redistribution o power rom developed to devel-

oping states. Some experts we consulted saw Brazil as tending to like state-centredmultilateralism.

Many o our Chinese interlocutors see mounting global challenges and undamental

deects in the international system but emphasise the need or China to deal with its

internal problems. The Chinese envisage a bigger structure pulling together the vari-

ous institutions and groups that have been established recently. They see the G-20

as being a step orward but question whether North-South dierences will impede

cooperation on issues other than economics.

For participants rom the Persian Gul region, the question is what sort o global in-

stitutions are most capable o inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack o

strong regional organisations.

The Indians thought existing international organisations are grossly inadequate and

worried about an absence o an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability. They

elt that India is not well positioned to help develop regional institutions or Asia

given Chinas preponderant role in the region.

Russian experts we consulted see the world in 2025 as still one o great powers but

with more opportunities or transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about

the relative lack o trans-Paciic security. The United States, Europe and Russia also

have scope or growing much closer, while China, with the biggest economy, will be

the main actor in changing the world.

The South Aricans assessed that globalisation appears to be strengthening regionali-

sation as opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers rom

globalisation increasingly outnumber the winners.

In addition to the shit to a multipolar world, power is also shiting towards non-stateactors, be they agents or spoilers o cooperation. On a positive note, transnational non-governmental organisations, civil-society groups, churches and aith-based organisa-

tions, multinational corporations, other business bodies, and interest groups have been

equally, i not more, eective than states at reraming issues and mobilising public opin-

ion a trend we expect to continue. However, hostile non-state actors such as criminal or-

ganisations and terrorist networks, all empowered by existing and new technologies, canpose serious security threats and compound systemic risks. Many developing countries

which are likely to play an increasing role at the regional and global level also suer


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by reluctance and resistance to intervene directly, potentially overriding another coun-

trys sovereignty. Many experts in emerging states thought their governments probablywould be particularly wary o any intervention i it is driven by the West.

Another cluster o problems the management o energy, ood and water resources

appears particularly unlikely to be eectively tackled without major governance in-

novations. Individual international agencies respond to discrete cases, particularly hu-

manitarian emergencies in individual countries. However, no overall ramework exists to

manage the interrelated problems o ood, water and energy. The stakes are high in view

o the impact that growing scarcities could have on undermining the open international

system. Resource competition in which major powers seek to secure reliable suppliescould lead to a breakdown in cooperation in other areas. Moreover, scarcities are likely to

hit poor states the hardest, leading in the worst case to internal or interstate confict and

spillover to regional destabilisation.

Other over-the-horizon issues migration, the potential opening o the Arctic, and risks

associated with the biotechnology revolution are likely to increase in importance and

demand a higher level o cooperation. These issues are dicult ones or multilateral co-

operation because they involve more preventive action. Under current circumstances,

greater cooperation on those issues in which the risks are not clear-cut will be especially

dicult to achieve.

Potential scenariosThroughout the main text, we have sprinkledictionalisedscenarios that could mate-rialise i, as we believe likely, the multiple and diverse governance rameworks struggle

to keep pace with the looming number o transnational and global challenges. The

scenarios illustrate various permutations that could happen over the next 15 years.The ollowing summarises what we see as the principal potential trajectories o the

international system as it tries to conront new challenges. We believe the risks o

an unreormed global governance system are likely to cumulate over time. Crises

so long as they are not overwhelming may actually spur greater innovation and

change in the system. Inaction over the long term increases the risks o a complete

breakdown.

Scenario I: Barely keeping afoatIn this scenario, seen as the most likely one over the next several years, no one crisis will

be so overwhelming as to threaten the international system even though collective man-


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15

Executive Summary

agement advances slowly. Crises are dealt with ad hocand temporary rameworks or in-

stitutions are devised to avert the most threatening aspects o them. Formal institutionsremain largely unreormed and Western states are probably obliged to shoulder a dispro-

portionate share o global governance as developing countries prevent disruptions at

home. This uture is not sustainable over the longer term as it depends on no crisis being

so unmanageable as to overwhelm the international system.

Scenario II: Fragmentation

Powerul states and regions try to wall themselves o rom outside threats. Asia builds

a regional order that is economically sel-sucient. Global communications ensure glo-balisation does not die, but it slows signicantly. Europe turns its ocus inward as it wres-

tles with growing discontent with declining living standards. With a growing workorce,

the US might be in a better position but may still be scally constrained i its budgetary

shortalls and long-term debt problems remain unresolved.

Scenario III: Concert o Europe Redux

Under this scenario, severe threats to the international system possibly a looming en-

vironmental disaster or a confict that risks spreading prompt greater cooperation onsolving global problems. Signicant reorm o the international system becomes pos-

sible. Although less likely than the rst two scenarios in the immediate uture, such a

scenario might prove the best outcome over the longer term, building a resilient interna-

tional system that would step up the level o overall cooperation on an array o problems.

The US increasingly shares power while China and India increase their burden sharing

and the EU takes on a bigger global role. A stable concert could also occur incrementally

over a long period in which economic gaps shrink andper capita income converges.

Scenario IV: Gaming reality: Confict trumps cooperation

This scenario is among the least likely, but the possibility cannot be dismissed. The in-

ternational system becomes threatening owing to domestic disruptions, particularly in

emerging powers such as China. Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class aspirations

or the good lie are stymied. Tensions build between the United States and China, but

also among some o the BRICs as competition grows or secure resources and clients. A

nuclear arms race in the Middle East could deal an equally destabilising blow to pros-

pects or continued global growth.

Suspicions and tensions make reorming global institutions impossible; budding region-

al eorts, particularly in Asia, are also undermined.


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Introduction

Global governance the collective management o common problems at the interna-

tional level is at a critical juncture. Although global governance has been a relative suc-

cess since its development ater the Second World War, the growing number o issues on

the international agenda, and their complexity, is outpacing the ability o international

organisations and national governments to cope. Power shits are also complicating glo-bal governance.

There has been unprecedented increase in the speed o movement o goods, people, and communica-tions. This has led to new problems and inadequacy o international paraphernalia inherited romthe 20th Century.

Former Senior Ocial, Government o India

Some progress has been made to adjust international institutions and regimes to meetthe new demands and to create workarounds, i not new rameworks. Such eorts are

unlikely to suce, however. I global governance structures and processes do not keep

up with the changes in the balance o power in the international system, they run the

risk o becoming irrelevant. Emerging powers are suspicious o current institutional ar-

rangements, which appear to avour established powers. Without adequate rameworks

to bring order to an international system in fux, disorder could prevail, uelling greater

instability. The mix o old and new challenges generates new requirements or collective

problem-solving: more international cooperation and innovative approaches. Much will

depend on leadership and political will.

The term global governanceas used in this paper includes all the institutions, regimes,processes, partnerships, and networks that contribute to collective action and problem

solving at the international level. This denition subsumes ormal and inormal arrange-

ments as well as the role o non-state actors in transnational settings. Regional coopera-

tion may also be regarded as an element o global governance insoar as it contributes

to broader eorts. Governance diers rom government, which implies sovereign pre-

rogatives and hierarchical authority. Global governance does not equate to world govern-

ment, which would be virtually impossible or the oreseeable uture, i ever.


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International institutions in the late twentieth centuryPreserving international peace and security was the central preoccupation o the archi-

tects o the post-World War II United Nations system. The UN Security Council engaged

all major powers o the time in this undertaking; UN peacekeeping operations continue

to be deployed to monitor peace agreements and ensure stability ater civil wars. BrettonWoods institutions were set up to help maintain nancial and monetary stability and to

oster the reconstruction o war-torn economies, against the backbone o the US dollar

as the international exchange and reserve currency. Both sets o institutions have had

their share o problems but have made substantial contributions in the post-Cold War

period.

Although the Cold War was punctuated by numerous smaller proxy wars led by the two

superpowers and some brutal conficts occurred, no large-scale conficts rivalling the

First or Second World Wars have broken out since the ormation o the UN in 1945.

Millions o people continue to be aected, but conficts have declined in number. Faced

with the danger o nuclear war and prolieration, nuclear and non-nuclear states struck

a global contract to stop the spread o nuclear weapons the Nonprolieration Treaty

and the United States and Russia negotiated several treaties to delimit and reduce their

respective nuclear arsenals and weapon systems.

On the economic ront, trade liberalisation under the GATT and the WTO providedanother global public good in the shape o increasingly low taris and open markets,

enhancing shared prosperity and preventing protectionism rom generating political

conrontation.

Over time, our expectations have continued to grow as the scope or cooperation has

expanded, especially in view o the push provided by globalisation to growing interac-

tions. Individual agencies ocused on specic problems have been a growing eature o

global governance. As a result, the problems o span o control, increasing stovepipes,

and lack o strategic oversight have come increasingly to the ore as major challenges toensuring eectiveness in the system.


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1. Expanding agenda stretchinginstitutional capacities

With the emergence o rapid globalisation, the risks to the international system have

grown to the extent that ormerly localised threats are no longer locally containable but

are now potentially dangerous to global security and stability. At the beginning o the

century, threats such as ethnic conficts, inectious diseases and terrorism as well as a

new generation o global challenges including climate change, energy security, ood andwater scarcity, international migration fows, and new technologies are increasingly tak-

ing centre stage. Although some o the emerging issues have been debated in multilateral

orums or over 20 years, such issues have taken on new importance in a globalised world

because o the potential or more widespread disruption.

This decade opened with the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York as well as the

Pentagon bringing transnational terrorism to the ore o the international agenda.

The danger o prolieration and use o nonconventional weapons took on new ur-

gency. Peace operations evolved to include broader mandates such as tackling the root

causes o conlict.

Climate change has trespassed the boundaries o environmental politics to become

the subject o the global political, economic and security debate and a new ocus o

multilateral cooperation cutting across these and other domains.

The nascent recovery rom the recent economic crisis has highlighted the importance

o developing countries particularly China to restarting the global economy, with

many Western countries lagging behind.

In part owing to the rise o economic powerhouses China and India and their growing

appetites or energy and other commodities, energy politics and other resource issues

are taking an increasingly pre-eminent place in international aairs.

Biotechnologies and nanotechnologies bear much potential both or progress, or

example in the health sector, and or unprecedented risks, i diverted or criminal

purposes. Genetic modiications raise proound ethical questions even while break-

throughs are likely to be critical or societies struggling with resource issues such as

ood and ageing populations.


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Complex risks driving demands or global governanceThe cumulative impact o emerging issues as well as longstanding ones is transormingthe scale and nature o the challenges acing the international community. Three eatures

o rapid globalisation are driving demands or more eective global governance: deepen-

ing interdependence, interconnected problems, and the mingling o domestic politics

with international issues. At the same time, ast technological progress alerts civil society

bodies, such as NGOs, to new challenges and to the need or cooperation and enables

them to play a stronger role.

What worries me is that you see a more chaotic world and less capable US. There are centriugalorces pulling apart the nations o the world Resource constraints will have huge implications orglobal society The trainwreck is right ahead o us...

US think tank participant

Interdependence has been a eature o economic globalisation or many years, but therise o China, India, Brazil and other ast-growing economies has taken economic in-

terdependence to a new level. The oshoring o production and business services rom

advanced to emerging countries, and increasing economic exchanges within the lattergroup, has markedly diversied trade and investment patterns and resulted in value

chains spread across dierent countries and continents. The accumulation o huge or-

eign currency reserves by emerging powers, notably China, has corresponded to the bal-

looning debt o decit countries, in particular the United States. Emerging economies

have nanced spending by the United States on their own exports. Among other actors,

such a structural imbalance produced the severe nancial crisis that fattened growth,

cut credit, and curbed private spending in the developed world. The monetary and scal

policies o the United States, China, and the EU, among other economic powers, havebecome more intertwined. The coordination o macroeconomic measures is imperative

to sustain global recovery.

Climate change is an issue o international security a threat multiplierThe core challenge is that itnot only threatens us environmentally but also that it will exacerbate conficts over resources, watershortages, and diminishing ood stocks.

Administrator, European Parliament

The multiple links among climate change, the economic crisis and state ragility hubs

o risks or the uture illustrate the interconnected natureo the challenges on the inter-national agenda today. Problems can trigger each other with a cascading eect as shown,


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1. Expanding agenda stretching institutional capacities

or example, by the potential impact o energy prices on the prospects or economic re-

covery. The interconnection o various problems is likely to generate new challenges andmake traditional ones harder to manage because o their increasing complexity.

Growing energy demand translates into higher ood prices. Concurrently, climate

change threatens agricultural output in many poor countries with expanding popu-

lations, compounding their ragility.

Technological developments and geopolitical instability require additional ocus on

the protection and resilience o the electronic and energy inrastructures underpin-

ning advanced societies.

Concerns regarding the security o energy supply, but also demand, may result in

policy choices that undermine both the environment and investment. Reliance on do-

mestic reserves o ossil uels or long-term access to oreign ields makes investment

in renewables less attractive and compounds the growth o greenhouse gas emissions.

Price uncertainty depresses investment in exploration and transit inrastructures,

possibly paving the way to supply shortages over the next decade.

Many o the issues cited above involve interwoven domestic and oreign challenges. The rootso the nancial crisis, or example, included internal and external actors. National poli-

cies prone to encourage loose credit and spiralling private debt under little supervision

have been enabled by capital fows rom emerging economies. Following the crisis, the

management o ballooning public decits and debts in some advanced countries as well

as measures to increase domestic demand in China and other emerging economies are

matters or domestic political decisions with huge global implications. Climate change is

another example o an issue involving domestic and international priorities. The national

energy and environmental policies o big emitters such as China and the United States,but also the EU, directly aect the international community, given their disproportionate

contribution to the global stock o greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the varia-

tion o climate change patterns, with dire consequences or the most exposed countries.

Domestic politics creates tight constraints on international cooperation and reduces the

scope or compromise. This was the case, or example, at the Copenhagen summit on

climate change in December 2009 where domestic politics constrained the positions o a

number o participants on reducing emissions. On a dierent matter, Chinas pervasive

priority o domestic economic development, which has been largely export-led, limits its

willingness to allow or an appreciation o Chinese currency to help rebalance its traderelations with the US and the EU. The tightening o political control on Russias largest

energy companies as well as broader concerns regarding rule o law and security o in-


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vestment within the country undermine the strengthening o the EU-Russia energy and

economic partnership.

The central challenge or most countries in their engagement with new orms o global governance is nothow to replace the state in international politics, but rather how states regain their regulatory role.

South Arican think tank participant

Projected sluggish economic growth in advanced countries over the next ew years, par-

alleled by ageing populations, suggests that public attention may become increasingly

introverted. Under such circumstances, the public would be ocused on jobs and welare,with little room or longer-term needs such as managing diverse societies, environmental

sustainability, or equity and legitimacy at the international level. Many experts see na-

tionalism and xenophobia on the rise in Russia and China; EU countries and the US are

not immune rom that either. Such tendencies contribute to making national positions

in multilateral orums less accommodating. This may trigger a vicious circle o ineec-

tive global governance, diverging perceptions and angered national public debates uel-

ling each other.

Scenario I: Barely keeping afoat

In this scenario, which is probably the mostlikely over the next several years, no onecrisis will be sooverwhelming as to threatenthe international system even thoughcollective management advancesslowly.Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporaryrameworks or institutions are devised toavertthe most threatening aspects o them.Formal institutions remain largelyunreormed and Westernstates probably mustshoulder a disproportionate share o globalgovernance as developing countries

preventdisruptions at home. This uture is notsustainable over the longer term as it dependson nocrisis being so unmanageable as tooverwhelm the international system.


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Posted 5/21/17: This is not the time to provoke China, either, with the Party unable to restrain

rising nationalism.

Posted 5/22/17: Many developing states eel that China has turned its back on them . . . It is not

clear where the US stands or whether it can bring the two sides together. Talk about an era o bad

eelings . . . everything has been aectedrom trade to the competition over resources . . .

Posted 5/23/17: Look on the bright side. Oil exploration in the Arctic is beginning to pay o.

We worried a decade ago about a Russia growing more hostile. The nancial crisis led to Russia

opening up; it needed Western technology to exploit the riches o the Arctic and now that is slowly

coming to ruition.

Posted 12/1/20: Im preparing or my Davos panel on the uture o the international system . . .

Posted 12/2/20: Tell them, given the continuing tensions in Asia, were just keeping our headsabove water . . .

Posted 12/3/20: But we havent done too badly: no nuclear war, Iran was settled, and there is a lot

more stability in the Middle East . . .

Posted 12/4/20: But Asia has yet to come o the boil, not to speak o the last Failed States Index

. . . did you see? Years o chattering on security and development and ten countries in Arica are

still on the verge o implosion, ull o youngsters and short on jobs, and we put our heads in the

sand. This multipolar world is just a lot more dicult to manage.

Posted 12/5/20: Youre right . . . our resilience has been more a matter o luck . . .


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2. Power shits complicating globalgovernance

The shit to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects or eective global gov-

ernance over the next 10 years. In the second part o the last century, the United States

shaped an international order that largely refected its liberal worldview o ree markets

and democracy. The United States oversaw provision o global public goods such as mon-

etary stability and open trade routes. In particular ater the end o the Cold War, the EUhas sought to export its model o regional integration and sovereignty-sharing and has

devised a distinctive discourse on global governance and priorities.

At issueit seems to me, is less the risk o confict, but the danger o a loss o coherence and directionin the international system while the redistribution o power plays itsel out.

European think tank participant

Today, the legitimacy and credibility o the US and the EU as political leaders is openlyquestioned by other rising power centres and large swathes o the international com-

munity.

This is partly due to their perceived shortcomings in providing the public goods they

guaranteed beore the shit to a multipolar world, such as economic stability, and to the

view that their positions on issues such as trade and climate change are unair to the

interests o others. At the same time, the expanding economic clout o emerging powers

increases their political infuence well beyond their borders. It can be argued that alterna-

tive denitions o modernity are taking hold. The virtues o open capital markets are less

than universally shared, and even on the trade ront, industrial policy appears more in

vogue, particularly in emerging economies. Far more states matter in the international

system today. Many o these states, which dier widely in terms o their economics and

ideologies, are indispensable to solving international problems.

The Western approach to global governance, with the US and the West as the centre and creator olaws and rules, diminishes the readiness o others to cooperate.

Russian think tank speaker


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Power is not only shiting rom established powers to rising countries and, to some ex-

tent, the developing world, but also toward non-state actors, be they agents or spoilers ocooperation. On a positive note, transnational non-governmental organisations, civil so-

ciety groups, churches and aith-based organisations, multinational corporations, other

business bodies, and interest groups have become increasingly active in raming policy

and generating public interest and pressure. However, hostile non-state actors such as

criminal organisations and terrorist networks all empowered by existing and new tech-

nologies can pose serious security threats and compound systemic risks.

In addition, state-owned and state-controlled companies and sovereign wealth unds,

particularly those o China and Russia, are likely to play a growing role in global govern-ance. These actors do not t neatly into traditional categories as they are driven by a mix

o political and economic considerations.

Will multipolarity enhance or erode multilateralism?In the emerging multipolar system, pivotal global and regional actors have dierent

views on sovereignty, multilateralism and legitimacy, oten stemming rom distinctive

historical experiences. Addressing such diverse perspectives will be critical to ostering

international cooperation in a number o domains.

Global governance requires giving over signicant sovereignty to others that is the view in ChinaSo ar, sovereignty is the number one priority, but China has to balance sovereignty and internationalresponsibility. When China thinks its sovereignty is guaranteed, it will go ahead to work with othercountries. There is no doubt.

Chinese think tank expert

There is a risk that the potential competition o diverse priorities within regional or glo-

bal institutions will alienate important actors and drive negotiations to gridlock in mul-

tilateral institutions.


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2. Power shits complicating global governance

Sovereigntyis alive and kicking, according to many o the experts we encountered. Theway the renewed emphasis on sovereignty will unold in the next decade will have serious

implications or global governance. The extent to which power should be delegated to in-

ternational bodies and or what purposes will be debated. The question o whether and,

i so, under what conditions the international community or international institutions

can challenge or override the authority o a state in its internal aairs will also come to

the ore.

The EU constitutes the most advanced experience to date o voluntary sharing o sov-ereignty in a unique experiment o regional integration which has largely succeeded in

including post-Communist systems into the larger regional order. Most other key glo-


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bal actors are reluctant to delegate regulatory powers, let alone assign jurisdiction, to

an international body, or to share sovereignty under majority decision-making. Whiletheir domestic political systems widely dier, the United States, Russia, China and India,

among others, share an ingrained suspicion o global governance mechanisms that could

impinge on their sovereignty. Their positions, however, vary depending on the issue.

On balance, major powers subscribe to advanced orms o international cooperation and

supervision that they regard as embodying their interests or, at least, not directly aect-

ing them. Nuclear weapon states are comortable with the intrusive powers o the IAEA

to inspect the nuclear acilities o non-nuclear weapon states. However, countries are re-

luctant to endorse rules constraining their behaviour in areas o comparative advantageor strong competition, such as energy policy or bans on specic types o weapons. Such a

selective approachis, however, running into trouble becausethose powerul enough to try to

opt out aregrowing more numerous.

In a more heterogeneous international system, the question is how to reconcile the inter-

ests and perspectives o major powers and groupings o smaller countries in multilateral

rameworksand regimes. Participants elt a needed precondition is or all the stakehold-ers to trust the system, commit to collective action, and accept stronger prerogatives o

international institutions over their domestic governance, where need be.

We have a major concern that the new organisations do not replicate the unrepresentativeness o thepast.

Brazilian Senior Ocial

Divergence on values or principleswill also aect the prospects or multilateral coopera-tion. For example, although the positions and the policies o the US and the EU do not

always coincide, the aim o promoting democracy and supporting human rights, core

values to their domestic political regimes, broadly inorms their oreign policies. Major

powers such as China and Russia, with considerable support rom a number o emerging

and developing countries, take a more relative reading o human rights and are uncom-

ortable with the bashing or sanctioning o brutal regimes. India, the biggest democracy

in the world with a political tradition o non-alignment and a signicant nationalist

strand to its oreign policy, as well as Brazil, are cautious not to appear as exporting their

values and interering in the domestic aairs o other countries.

Over the next decade, balancing such dierent perspectives with the imperative or co-

operation, including on matters o peace, stability, and security, will pose a key chal-


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lenge to states and governance rameworks alike. New ways o cooperation will need to

be explored, according to our interlocutors, but there are some indications o greaterburden sharing by emerging powers. Many o the emerging powers are interested in in-

ternational and regional stability to better pursue their own development. For example,

while India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have long been among the top troop contributors

to UN peacekeeping, the involvement o China and Brazil in these operations is growing.

These and other emerging powers may come to play a key role in UN-mandated multilat-

eral interventions to preserve stability and build lasting peace in confict areas.

World views o global governance

Diverse perspectives and suspicions about global governance seen as a Western con-

cept will add to the diculties o eectively mastering the growing number o chal-

lenges, in the view o our interlocutors rom the countries listed below. (See Annex A or

urther discussion.)

Brazil. North-South relations and the need or redistribution o power rom developedto developing states remain central to the Brazilian outlook on international aairs. Ex-

perts saw Brazil tending to like old ashioned multilateralism, which is state-centred

and does not make room or non-state actors. Nevertheless, the issues connected with

global governance are beginning to gain prominence in Brazil, spurred in part by public

debates over climate change.

China. Many Chinese saw mounting global challenges and undamental deects in theinternational system but emphasised the need or China to deal with its internal prob-

lems. The Chinese envisage a bigger structure pulling together the various institutions

and groups that have been established recently. They saw the G-20 as being a step or-

ward but questioned whether North-South dierences would impede cooperation onissues other than economics.

India. The Indians thought existing international organisations are grossly inadequate andworried about an absence o an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability. They elt

that India is not well-positioned to help develop regional institutions or Asia given Chinas

preponderant role in the region. Some eared that a system developed by the West which

includes democracy and rule o law would suer as the East becomes more powerul.

Japan. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership thanorm or structure. Several questioned whether ormal institutions, with their huge bu-

reaucracies, are eective. At the same time, the Japanese elt the G-20 needs stronger po-


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litical cohesion. Most emphasised the need to boost national and regional means beore

reorming international organisations. Many were concerned about the lack o regionalrameworks particularly or hard security in East Asia but argued that Japan should

take a more proactive role toward regional cooperation.

Russia. Russian experts saw the world in 2025 as still largely one o great powers, althoughsome expected the infuence o multinational businesses to increase and opportunities or

greater transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about the relative lack o trans-Pa-

cic security. The United States, Europe, and Russia also have scope or growing much clos-

er, while China, with the biggest economy, will be the main actor in changing the world.

South Arica. The South Aricans assessed that globalisation appears to be strengtheningregionalisation as opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers

rom globalisation increasingly outnumber the winners. The G-20 has little Arican rep-

resentation. For Aricans, the UN remains the global institution with the only legitimate

credentials. Some interlocutors were wary o China because in their view it is interested

only in Arican resources.

UAE. For participants rom the Persian Gul region, the key question was what sort oglobal institutions are most capable o inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack

o strong regional organisations. A ramework or institution is needed to bring together

the rights o energy producers with those o consumers. Several elt let down by lack o

support rom the West on democratisation.

Managing dierences to oster cooperation leads to addressing the tension between in-

clusiveness and eectiveness in multilateral rameworks. This goes to the heart o the

legitimacy question, which held sway as the most important issue or greater multilateral

cooperation in our discussions withemerging power elites.

We need politics o inclusion o the weak not just the powerul.

Participant rom the Persian Gul region

Achieving a air and equitable distribution o burdens and responsibility probably will

become more contentious in the oreseeable uture, according to many participants. Be-

cause some major emerging powers (China and India) are relatively poor countries inpercapita terms, diverse domestic priorities generate dierent assessments o airness andequanimity. This is already apparent in negotiations between developed and developing

countries over climate change and trade.


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Scenario II: FragmentationPowerul states and regions try to wall themselves o rom outside threats. Asia builds a regionalorder that is economically sel-sucient. Global communications ensure globalisation does not die,but it slows signicantly. Europe turns its ocus inward as it wrestles with growing discontent over de-clining living standards. With a growing workorce, the US might be in a better position but probablywould continue to struggle with similar issues, particularly i its scal problems remain unresolved.


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Scenario II

Fragmentation

Financial Times op-ed entitled,Crying Over the Gs, published March 12, 2023

The Gs are almost a distant memory. The G-20ended badly, and for the first time the UnitedStates, Canada, and the Europeans have

given up on the G-7. Whats the use? they ask.The new powers wont play even if the transatlanticpartners can get their act togetherwhich is rarethese days. The political mood is indeed very sour.This began several years after the Great Recessionwhen it became apparent that it would take a longtime before the West dug itself out and got backon a reasonable growth trajectory. US-Chinese tiestook a big tumble as Beijing put off again and againa decision on allowing its currency to appreciate.It was never the right time. The US Congressstarted taking actions against Chinese imports. TheUS-China strategic and economic dialogue wassuspended. G-20 meetings became less frequent.It was always going to be hard to negotiate afollow-on to Kyoto, but the strains within the G-20,especially between the Chinese and the UnitedStates, made it virtually impossible. China put moreenergy into developing regional ties, but its rivalrywith India made even that difficult. Trade withinAsia has continued to expand. India and China aremajor trading partners now, offsetting some

of the decline in Chinese commerce with theUS and Europe.

There was no explosive tearing asunder oftransatlantic ties, just the relentless drifting apartthat finally undermined the alliance. Europehas been increasingly focused inward after theprolonged Eurozone crisis of the 2010s. Many inthe US thought Europes slow recovery was onereason for the United States tepid growth. Moreimportantly, the US sought more military helpin Afghanistan which the Europeans could notgive. Personal animosities crept in. The last G-8summit came to a screeching halt when two of itsleaders got into a shouting match over the seating

arrangements at the final dinner, symptomaticof what had been a long period the risingtransatlantic tensions.

Does all of this matter? Theres no easy answer.Perhaps it is too early to tell. The Gs never had anyreal power. Many outsiders thought they shouldnot have any power at all. Diplomats complainedabout all the preparation necessary for what werein some cases long-winded statements at the endof G summits that did not always lead to concreteactions or improvements. A lot of the unwashednon-Gs thought the Gs were trying to usurp

the UNs role. The Gs were a bit like old boysnetworksundemocratic and incestuous. We willmiss them and at some point they will have to bereinvented, although it will take a major crisis thathits everybody to bring that about. But now theinternational system is slowly unwinding.

Were not yet back in the 1930s, bracing for globalconflagration. The growing protectionism is moresubtle. Doha has been definitively shelved so thereis no forward movement. More sectors are deemedstrategic, requiring some sort of protection.Although all states are interested in energyefficiency, major concerted steps toward carbon cutsare on hold even though there is more evidence of

climate change. The UN calculates a tenfold increasein environmental migrants over the past five years.Militancy is growing among disaffected groups inIndia and China while terrorists have stepped uptheir plotting against the West. Without a strongerinternational order, I worry about a nuclear armsrace in the Middle East and South Asia. Those twoareas are not self-governing and need outsidehelp to contain or dampen the potential for conflictand regional conflagration. I have no doubt that theUnited States and the Europeans will mend fencesonce the crisis breaks, but it may be too late. At thatpoint will they be able to do anything without thehelp of the new powers?


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3. Some success in adapting

Multilateral institutions have adapted to some degree as new issues have emerged, but

the adaptations have not necessarily been intentional or substantial enough to keep up

with growing demand. Rather, they have been spurred as much by outside orces as by

the institutions themselves.

While multilateral institutions have been struggling to adapt, innovative approaches

to global governance have been coming to the ore. Three innovations are o particular

interest as pointers or uture developments: the emergence o inormal groupings o

leading countries, such as the G-20; the perspectives or urther regional cooperation,

notably in East Asia; and the multiple contributions o non-state actors to international

cooperation.

All three developments originated rom outside global multilateral institutions, whether

they were triggered by governments or civil society, and whether their scope is globalor regional. In some cases, innovative approaches stem rom dissatisaction with the

relative inertia o traditional rameworks or with their perceived Western bias. Such ap-

proaches oten involve lighter orms o cooperation than the highly legalised regimes

inherited rom the twentieth century: consultation replaces regulation, codes o conduct

prevail on binding norms, regional initiatives circumvent lengthy debates in multilateral

orums, and national prerogatives trump international authorities in implementing and

overseeing agreements.

Innovative approaches to global governance are developed through trial and error. Some

o these experiments will not stand the test o time, but on the whole they expose aun-

damental trend toward looser, moreexible, ad hoc and sometimes moreaccountable orms

o cooperation. Suchapproaches typically develop in response to ashiting international sys-

tem.

These innovative approaches cannot serve as alternatives to rule-based, inclusive mul-

tilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions can deliver public goods that summits,

non-state actors and regional rameworks cannot supply, or cannot do so in a reliableway. These are, chiefy, decisions enjoying universal legitimacy, norms setting predict-

able patterns o behaviour based on reciprocity, mechanisms or implementation and or


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overseeing national measures and, in some sectors, instruments to resolve disputes and

redress torts, such as in trade matters. As the international system grows more diverseand potentially more ragmented, the supply o these public goods will become more

important.

My preliminary conclusions: Addressing dierent issues with the same mechanism does not work we need dierent mechanisms or dierent problems. For some challenges, we need a combination obilateral, regional and global responses with a division o labour.

Chinese expert

Looking ahead, neither traditional rameworks nor new orms o cooperation are likely to

solve global governance problems exclusively. However, the two orms o global govern-

ance can complement one another, according to many o our interlocutors. The ormer

will struggle to deliver without serious reorm; the latter will likely prove unsustainable

or unreliable i disconnected rom the bedrock o multilateral bodies in terms o norms,

institutional experience and resources.

In practice, eective cooperation among institutions has been the exception and not the

norm. A crisis such as an environmental catastrophe or the implosion o a large ailedstate could spark cooperation, but a reactive approach to such extreme contingencies

probably would prove inadequate.

The global nancial and systemic nature o the crisis has compelled unprecedented government re-sponses in scope, speed, and novelty. We had global crisis-management governance.

European expert

Progress in setting up a global governance system that draws on the added value o di-erent bodies and networks in a coherent way will depend on three actors: a shared

knowledge o the issues to be conronted and their connections to other challenges; in-

novation at the interace between old and new, ormal and inormal, governmental and

nongovernmental, and global and regional governance rameworks; and an acceptable

balance between eectiveness and inclusiveness.

Inormal groupingsThe prolieration o regular summit-level meetings held outside global or regionalinstitu-

tionsis a key eature o recent global governance innovation. Inormal groupings such asthe G-8 and the G-20 have already signicantly aected global governance, with an em-


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phasis on the networked coordination o national policies and on deliverables. The deci-

sions o such orums as the G-8 and the G-20 are o a political nature and nonbinding.Thus they are unlikely to sideline the UN and Bretton Woods institutions as rameworks

or decision-making and rule-setting. Nevertheless, these ormats are experimenting with

new ways o managing shared challenges in a more diverse world, suggesting interesting

avenues or urther innovation.

Following the establishment o the G-7 in the mid-1970s and o the G-8 in 1998, new

groups have been set up in the last ew years in response to pressing issues on the inter-

national agenda. The G-20 is the most noticeable innovation because o the breadth o

its membership and the scope o its agenda. The Major Emitters Forum, set up in 2007and renamed the Major Economies Forum (MEF) in 2009, deals with climate change.

The leaders o the BRIC emerging economies met in Russia in 2009 and in Brazil in 2010

and have announced that they will meet in China in 2011.

Over the medium term, the role o the G-8 is likely to be circumscribed to sectoral is-

sues, where the small club o like-minded countries can bring added value i they are

prepared to mobilise their resources. More generally, the G-8 could remain a useul plat-

orm, among others, to elaborate ideas and bring them to larger tables, such as the G-20.

It could also do so by engaging countries on targeted initiatives, provided that these are

closely linked to the agenda o multilateral institutions and o groups such as the G-20.

In time, this may also become the principal contribution o the BRIC countries ormat

to deliberations in broader rameworks. So ar, BRIC summits have been more noticeable

or opposing existing norms than or proposing new ones and reaching out to other ma-

jor actors. Given the dierent oreseeable economic and political trajectories o the BRIC

countries over the next two decades, however, the durability o this grouping remains to

be tested.

As inormal groupings evolve, the main risk to be averted is the creation o dierent or-

mats that mirror competing geopolitical coalitions. Such a development would deeat

much o the basic purpose o summit diplomacy. The development o the Gs responds

to two basic needs: rst, the need to oster collective leadership to jointly address shared

problems outside the constraints imposed by ormal multilateral structures, and sec-

ond, the need to refect the changing balance o world power. As the world grows more

heterogeneous, the two basic rationales behind the Gs may or may not prove mutually

reinorcing. The clash o inormal groupings or stable coalitions in sector-specic nego-

tiations such as climate change and dierences on how to consolidate global economic

recovery expose the tension between the shared commitment to problem-solving and the

co-existence o dierent political priorities and agendas.


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Under these circumstances, cohesion within each grouping and coherence between them

are essential conditions or their eectiveness. Both requirements can be promoted bystronger coordination, both at the national and at the trans-governmental level, between

the sherpas preparing the various summits, to ensure the consistency o national posi-

tions in dierent ormats.

There is institutional Darwinism and we will see the survival o the ttest institution.

European expert

The perormance o the Gs will largely depend on their relations with ormalmultilateralstructures. Inormal groupings may be increasingly called upon to set the tone and direc-

tion o international cooperation on important global issues and to serve as top-level

international agenda-setting bodies, as the G-20 did in coping with the all-out o the

nancial crisis. The G-20, or example, called upon the IMF and the World Bank to ad-

vise on the summits priorities, monitor relevant national policy measures, and develop

targeted initiatives to lend nancial support to countries in need or to enhance ood

security. Inormal groupings also can become connectors between dierent rameworks.

In the energy sector, the G-20 has encouraged closer cooperation between a variety o in-

stitutions including the International Energy Agency (IEA), OPEC, OECD and the World

Bank. In addition, summit decisions can spur institutional reorm. The G-20 has trig-

gered the transition rom the Financial Stability Forum to the Financial Stability Board

and has sustained momentum or the incremental reorm o the IMF.

Inormal groupings such as the G-8 have proved fexible and proactive in expandingtheir

original purview. The agenda o the G-20 has also expanded since 2008, with the Pitts-burgh summit agreeing on a ramework or strong, sustainable and balanced growth. A

debate is under way regarding whether the G-20 has a vocation to enlarge its remit ur-ther, becoming a sort o inormal global governance hub. According to many observers,

the G-20 would suer rom acapacity defcitin dealing with a larger agenda. The G-20inrastructure is not considered robust enough to sustain the stronger fow o inorma-

tion and exchanges that would occur with a greatly expanded agenda and is not struc-

turally connected to competent bodies at the national level. However, as issues become

more challenging or crisis-driven, common interests may expand beyond acilitating an

economic recovery, requiring the G-20 to expand its agenda urther.

When inormal groupings are too small, such as the G-8, their legitimacyis contested.The limited membership o inormal groupings entails that deliberations involve ewer

countries than those aected by them. This is regarded with suspicion by the vast major-


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ity o developing countries and regional powers not engaged in the proceedings. When

inormal groupings are relatively large, like the G-20, doubts are raised regarding theirinternal cohesionand their ability to reach agreement and deliver results yet their legiti-macy remains challenged by those states inevitably let on the outside.

Options we heard to improve the Gs decision-making process include strengthening the

teams o sherpas assisting political leaders, setting up support units perhaps ocusing

on specic issues and embedded in existing multilateral bodies and enhancing coop-

eration between successive annual presidencies. Longer yearly meetings could be held be-

tween national leaders themselves, giving them the opportunity to debate issues in depth

and nalise agreements not only on guiding principles but also on concrete instrumentsand arrangements, where action oten alls short o statements.

Instead o looking at what the G-20 will look like in 2025, we should ask what will make it credibleand legitimatehow do you ensure that voices outside the G-20 are heard while also not slowing itsability to make decisions? To what extent has the G-20 championed the interests o the low-incomeand developing countries? I dont think so ar that it has.

South Arican expert

Growth o regionalismNo comprehensive trend can be detected toward deepening regional governance struc-

tures. However, some progress toward closer cooperation at the regional level has been

achieved over the last decade in regions as diverse as South America, Arica, and most

notably, East Asia. It is doubtul, however, whether increased regional groupings in the

next decade or two will be able to deal with mounting globalchallenges, compensating

or lack o updated and reormed global governance institutions.

Regional cooperation is likely to make some urther strides due to a mix o actors. First,

there is growing dissatisaction with the perormance o global governance institutions

as either ineective or carrying political agendas not tting distinctive regional contexts,

or both. Second, relative power is shiting at the regional level as well. Preeminent actors

such as China, Japan or Brazil have chosen to invest in regional cooperative rameworks

to manage political dierences and conrm their leadership. Third, the global nancial

crisis has impacted all global regions and amplied both the suspicion o external inter-

erence in regional aairs and a sense o sel-reliance to address economic and politicalchallenges.


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Regionalism could bring an important contribution to managing shared challenges at the

local and regional levels and beyond. Regional governance arrangements are closer to thesources o the problems to be tackled, be they security crises, economic disparities or trans-

regional threats. Neighbouring countries are directly aected by threats stemming rom

respective regions, such as drug tracking or state ailure, and might develop a sense o

solidarity in addressing them. National leaders may be more amiliar with one another in

regional rameworks than in global platorms and regional instruments may be mobilised

aster than those o larger multilateral organisations. In practice, however, cooperation has

allen well short o its potential in most regions. (See Annex B or urther discussion.)

Renewed interest in regional solutions in response to economic and political turbulencecould, however, create new momentum behind regional arrangements and enhance their

eectiveness. I so, the key question is whether regionalism will prove to be a building

block o global governance or a drain on it. In the ormer case, regional cooperation

would be complementary to and compatible with broader multilateral agreements, or

example in the eld o peacekeeping. However, the political capital and resources avail-

able or international cooperation are scarce. In the latter case, the investment in regional

cooperation might detract rom the ambition to strengthen global governance rame-

works, or example, in trade matters. In turn, this could lead to economic and politicalragmentation between dierent regions.

Contrary to the experience o the European Union, regional cooperation has so ar not

resulted in a signicant pooling or delegation o sovereignty. In act, most regional rame-

works uphold the principle o non-intererence in the internal aairs o member states.

It ollows that common institutions are relatively weak. Regional cooperation dynamics,

notably in East Asia and South America, refect the increasingly pivotal position o major

regional powers and the extent to which their leadership is accepted, contested or eared.

State-led projects mostly lag behind the initiative o private actors. Business has otenplayed a pioneering role in weaving a dense web o economic links at the regional level,

including when political relations are strained. This can contribute to building trust and

create incentives to orge ahead with regional cooperation. At the same time, the benets

may disproportionately accrue to the biggest economies in respective regions.

We need to reinorce regional institutions, especially in Asia.

Chinese think tank expert

A new phase oEast Asianregionalism may be dawning. Although growing nationalismmay serve as an eventual brake, experts we consulted thought both regional heavyweights


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China and Japan and the members o ASEAN will increasingly avour regional coopera-

tion as the ramework within which to resolve disputes and manage interdependence.ASEAN has developed over decades a distinctive style o regional cooperation based on

a low level o institutionalisation, a non-intrusive agenda, inormality, permanent con-

sultation, and aversion to confict. From an economic and political standpoint, Asian

interlocutors saw Chinas centrality to the region as growing.

In what has been dened as a paradigm shit, Japanese interlocutors have acknowledged

the need to adjust to the new regional context and some envisage a sort o look West

policy, turning Japans ocus rom its US ally in the Pacic to mainland Asia. Our inter-

locutors were somewhat dubious that the bilateral alliance between Japan and the USwill prove compatible with deepening multilateral rameworks in East Asia, which may

not include the United States.

Contrasting trends indicate potential or either regional cooperation or ragmentation

in South America. The region is diverse, with dierent states ollowing disparate econom-

ic policies and political trajectories. Countries such as Chile, Peru and Colombia have

been pursuing economic liberalisation and bilateral trade deals with the United States

and, increasingly, China. The countries o the Bolivarian Alliance, led by Venezuela, have

engaged in ideological competition not only against US infuence in the region but also

toward Brazil and others that have engaged in economic globalisation.

At the same time, South America is relatively stable, countries ace common transna-

tional threats such as drug tracking, and all would benet rom better transport and

energy inrastructures to boost trade and investment and harness their natural resources.

Brazil is the only country with the critical mass to build on these assets and address eco-

nomic asymmetries and political ragmentation with a view toward deepening region-

al cooperation. Some o our interlocutors thought Brazil has been punching below itsweight in the region and has no strategy or playing a leading role, despite its rapid rise.

Others saw Brazil outgrowing its neighbourhood and increasingly ocused on enlarging

its role in global vice-regional orums. Recent initiatives, such as the launch o the Com-

mon Market o the Southern Cone (UNASUR) in 2008, however, indicate some ambition

to play a greater regional role.

Unlike in East Asia and South America, no Aricancountry has sucient infuence andresources to steer regional cooperation at the continental level. South Arica has been

playing a key role by its involvement in the creation o the New Partnership or AricasDevelopment, in the shit rom the Organisation or Arican Unity to the Arican Union

(AU) in 2002, and in the establishment o the Arican Peace and Security Architecture


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(APSA). However, Arica is too big and diverse or a single regional leader to emerge. In-

stead, it was argued that the domestic evolution and oreign policy priorities o a handulo key countries such as the Democratic Republic o Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and

South Arica, among others, will be decisive or the uture o the continent.

Prospects or regionalism in Arica depend on a combination o actors besides the lead-

ership o major regional players. Crisis management and peace-building activities would

greatly benet rom better cooperation among the AU, sub-regional organisations and

the UN. From this standpoint, regionalism in Arica is likely to draw on global govern-

ance tools and resources. Greater development o home-grown civil society organisations

attuned to transnational needs would contribute to orging more eective regional net-works on such issues as climate change and resource management.

Long described as marginalised in the context o economic globalisation, Arica is today

central to the competition or resources and markets (and even or land) among major

global players. Such renewed centrality could encourage coordination and cooperation

at the regional level in dealing with external partners. However, perhaps more likely, it

could also contain the seeds o more ragmentation, with dierent countries reaping the

benets o bilateral deals outside regional arrangements.

Non-state actors step up to the plateThe experts we consulted elt that global challenges cannot be eectively tackled by in-

dividual states acting alone. Likewise, transnational challenges cannot be addressed by

governmental actors on their own. Governments oten lack the expertise, resources and

legitimacy to address issues that aect a much wider range o stakeholders. Non-state

actors are playing a central role both on the demand and supply sides o global govern-

ance. They contribute to setting the international agenda and are essential participantsin implementing solutions.

The engagement o non-state actors is critical given the complexity o the risks acing

the international community and multilateral rameworks. Challenges such as climate

change, pandemics, or the prolieration o sensitive materials and technologies require

fexible responses to a ast-changing agenda as well as capacity-building.

Increasingly non-state actors act as policy generators and are directly involved in decision-making

and implementation o policy.

European expert


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The range o non-state actors contributing to global governance is heterogeneous, in-

cluding transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs), networks o expertsand civil society groups as well as multinational corporations and business coalitions.

Private philanthropy, oten associated with business and civil society initiatives or public

authorities, has made an important dierence in areas such as health and education.

Role o mass communications

New technologies, such as the Internet, empower individuals and groups and enable non-

state actors to coordinate actions across national boundaries. As one participant stated,

The Internet is an enabler, it gives the weak a chance to do things they could not do beore. That cre-ates a kind o power shit.

In the global health arena, or example, theexposure by Chinese medical practitionersviathe Internet o provincial governments eortsto hide the spread o SARS in 2002-2003 ledBeijing nally to take action against the virus.During the colour revolutionsand more recently in Iran, democratic pressure groups used the Internet to organisemassdemonstrations. Equally, the spread o massmedia in regions largely rural thathistorically have been cut o has increasedpressures on government or bettergovern-ance particularly at home. As aconerence participant put it,

To predict the uture, you need inormation and technology, but many people in the world dont havethese tools. We need to get people the tools so they will have a stake in the uture and policy.

Wider public participation through mass communications also has been important in

putting greater emphasis on transparency honest and open transactions generating

pressure on governments. Governments eorts to adapt and be more transparent have,

in act, ed the desire or greater participation. Experts on modern diplomacy recently

noted that in a globalised world the instruments o power themselves have taken on a

dierent relative strength, with persuasion and legitimacy requiring as much attention

as military, economic and political weight.

Hybrid, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been emerging as an important eature

o global governance innovation, notably in the eld o sustainable development. The

relevance o PPPs is likely to grow in as they reach out to multiple stakeholders. The mass

communications revolution notably the invention and increasingly widespread use o


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the Internet probably has been the most important vehicle spurring the expanded role o

civil society groups and public opinion at large in agenda-setting or governance issues.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, people said we had only one superpower, but we had two: the USand international public opinion.

Economist rom a Dubai think tank

As the scope o transnational challenges has widened and gured more highly on the

international policy agenda, non-state actors have been at the oreront, pushing on in-

stitutions to adapt. They have been equally as, i not more eective than, states at re-raming issues and mobilising publics a trend we expect to continue. The International

Criminal Court (ICC) and Landmines Ban Treaties were both led by civil society actors,

supported by like-minded states. The action campaigns behind these measures bypassed

UN machinery and opposition by the United States, China and Russia. In the realm o

global health, a combination o states and non-state actors caused a veritable revolution,

with initiatives leading to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria

and new global governance regimes such as UNAIDS, involving NGOs. Philanthropic

oundations such as those led by Bill and Melinda Gates have made a key contribution

in this context. Transnational advocacy and pressure groups have been instrumental in

building and keeping momentum behind other major governance initiatives, such as the

Millennium Development Goals launched in 2000.

Maybe we are seeing a shit that is not geographical but horizontal we are seeing the emergence o aglobal management elite and wondering what that means or the uture o liberal democracy.

South Arican participant

In addition to their role as agenda-setters, non-state actors are essentialsources oknow-ledge and expertise. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an inter-

governmental scientic body gathering the contributions o thousands o scientists

worldwide to assess the evolution and impact o climate change, is perhaps the most

prominent case in point. Expertise will become more salient in all elds o international

policymaking, rom managing the implications o technological innovation to ood and

resource scarcity issues that require ongoing monitoring. Scientic advice is vital in the

eld o public health. For example, the WHO has created the Global Outbreak Alert and

Response Network, a web o over 140 scientic institutions in over 60 countries, man-dated to detect and respond to the outbreak o epidemics, alerting national and interna-

tional bodies. Insights and knowledge, oten coming rom non-governmental sources,


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are also central in the domains o peace and security, where NGOs with vast eld experi-

ence uel decision-making through their insights and play a key role in confict preven-tion and peace-building.

Gathering and sharing knowledge is the basis or setting international norms and

standards. International organisations eorts to create standards and rules are in-

creasingly complemented or paralleled by codes o conduct rom the private sector and

civil society. Multi-stakeholder cooperation, engaging business, NGOs, and public in-

stitutions, is a growing eature o international standard-setting. Important initiatives

have been undertaken, o

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