Gliptins - Launch Excellence Diabetes Market
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Transcript of Gliptins - Launch Excellence Diabetes Market
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
Launch Excellence in the Diabetes MarketLessons from History
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 2
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
Growth in the market for Type II Diabetes treatments has consistently out-performed the pharmaceutical market as a whole, and IMS believes thatthis will continue for the next decade, driven by the obesity epidemic, anaging population, and the advent of new therapies. In fact, in IMS’sperspective, diabetes stands out as one of the elite group of major therapyareas that will continue to outperform the market as a whole to 2016. Withinthis out-performing group, it is also the only primary-care-driven therapyarea of any size, the others being specialist areas.
However, while epidemiology and unmet need mean there are multi-billiondollar opportunities for successful launches and many potential contendersfor blockbuster status, success is still not a foregone conclusion.
IMS has studied the launch strategies and subsequent market performance ofthe frontrunner products in the dipeptidyl peptidase IV (DPP-IV) therapeuticclass worldwide to understand what separates clear market leaders from thosewith less impressive sales. From this, we’ve drawn key learnings pertinent tocompanies preparing to launch one of the many products currently indevelopment for Type II Diabetes.
THE NEXT DECADE: A CROWDED FIELD
Over�the�next�ten�years,�most�of�the�new�therapies�introduced�for�Type�II�Diabetes�will
cluster�in�just�a�few�drug�classes,�meaning�that�the�market�will�see�a�small�number�of
first-in-class�launches�followed�by�an�avalanche�of�follower�brands.�These�follower
products�will�naturally�face�a�challenging�launch�environment�if�they�cannot
demonstrate�value�propositions�that�are�differentiated�from�first-in-class�products�in
the�eyes�of�clinical�opinion�leaders,�prescribers,�and�payers.�
Nevertheless,�experience�has�shown�that�companies�whose�products�are�not�first�to
market�can�still�win—in�specific�segments�or�countries.�Here,�we�examine�how�various
strategies�have�played�out�for�companies�marketing�DPP-IV�inhibitors�and�consider
the�implications�for�products�in�the�pipeline.��
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 3
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
DPP-IVs: CHANGING THE TREATMENT REGIMENOf�the�two�recent�new�product�classes�to�treat�Type�II�Diabetes,�the�oral�DPP-IVs�and
the�injectable�GLP-1s,�DPP-IV�inhibitors�stand�out�for�their�success�in�overall�sales
levels,�as�they�are�used�earlier�and�for�a�broader�group�of�patients�than�the�GLP-1s.
Although�there�is�a�range�of�existing�oral�diabetes�therapies,�the�fact�that�no�class
provides�a�definitive�therapeutic�approach�to�the�disease�means�there�is�always
opportunity�for�new�classes�of�oral�agents�for�patients�post�metformin�monotherapy.
DPP-IVs�came�into�a�largely�generic�oral�market�where�the�only�on-patent�oral�agents,
the�Thiazolidinediones�(TZDs),�were�approaching�loss�of�exclusivity,�with�one�of�the
two�members�of�the�class,�Avandia® (rosiglitazone),�facing�a�major�question�on�safety.
The�first�DPP-IV�inhibitor�on�the�market�was�Januvia® (sitagliptin),�introduced�in�the
U.S.�in�2006�by�Merck�&�Co.�(Novartis’s�Galvus® (vildagliptin)�was�delayed�in�the�U.S.
due�to�questions�of�side�effects).�Since�then,�further�DPP-IVs,�Onglyza® (saxagliptin)
and�Tradjenta™�(linagliptin)�have�also�entered�the�market,�and�the�pipeline�promises
more�to�come.�
In�the�five�years�since,�DPP-IVs�have�captured�33�percent�of�worldwide�sales�of�
non-insulin,�anti-diabetic�products.�And�in�the�mature�eight�markets,�DPP-IVs
account�for�58�percent�of�the�value�growth�in�diabetes�treatments.��
JANUVIA: FIRST TO MARKET TAKES ALL Januvia�now�dominates�sales�of�DPP-IV�products�in�developed�markets.�In�2011,�the
brand�accounted�for�approximately�80�percent�of�worldwide�sales�for�plain�DPP-IV
inhibitors.�Later�launches�in�the�class—such�as�Onglyza�and�Galvus—have�been�unable
to�unseat�Januvia�from�its�leadership�position.�
In�the�U.S.,�Januvia�enjoyed�three�years�of�exclusivity�in�its�class�before
AstraZeneca/BMS�introduced�Onglyza.�During�this�time,�Januvia�used�strong
promotion�to�gain�early�buy-in�from�stakeholders�and�to�build�a�positive�brand�image.
It�secured�its�place�as�“the”�gliptin,�an�image�that�AstraZeneca/BMS�was�unable�to
change�despite�heavy�U.S.�promotional�investment.��
Similar�market�dynamics�occurred�in�Europe�where�Januvia�was�launched�in�2007.
Here,�the�next�plain�DPP-IV�inhibitor�to�be�launched�was�Galvus,�in�2008.�Since�then
Galvus�has�achieved�sales�of�just�12�percent�of�those�seen�for�Januvia�in�Europe.�
Januvia’s�success�is�particularly�meaningful�because�the�brand�has�not�demonstrated
any�clinically�relevant�differentiation�over�other�products�in�the�class1.�This�suggests
that�the�variance�in�performance�within�the�class�was�aided�by�Januvia’s�position�as
first�in�class.�Januvia�was�in�the�right�place�at�the�right�time,�and�when�subsequent
entries�came�along,�physicians�generally�did�not�move�from�their�first�gliptin�choice.
FOOTNOTE:1Key�opinion�leaders�were�unaware�of�any�differentiation�between�products�in�the�class,�and�the�only�head-to-head�trial�in�the�class�showed
Januvia’s�100mg�“non-inferiority”�compared�to�Onglyza�5�mg.��Source:�IMS�interviews�with�Key�Opinion�Leaders�as�part�of�IMS’s�Therapy
Prognosis�research�program.�
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 4
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
FIXED-DOSE COMBINATIONS: A SECOND CHANCE TO BE FIRST
Whilst�it�has�been�standard�for�plain�oral�agents�to�be�followed�by�their�combination
with�metformin,�for�TZDs�these�products�were�very�much�second�brands.�With�the
gliptins,�the�launch�of�the�combination�has�been�an�opportunity�to�gain�competitive
advantage.�
In�the�major�European�markets,�Novartis�launched�its�combination�product,�Eucreas®
(vildagliptin/metformin),�concurrently�with�its�plain�product,�Galvus.�So,�while
Galvus�was�the�second-to-market�plain�product,�Eucreas�was�the�first�launched
combination�DPP-IV�product.��(See�Fig.�1).
In�contrast,�Merck�delayed�launching�its�fixed-dose�combination�product,�Janumet®
(sitagliptin/metformin)�until�a�year�after�Januvia,�its�single-compound�product,�was
on�the�market.�This�meant�that�Janumet�was�the�second-to-market�combination
product.�In�fact,�it�lagged�behind�Eucreas�by�a�full�two�years�in�the�U.K.�
Uptake�of�Eucreas�did�not�match�that�of�Janumet�across�the�top�five�European
countries—likely�because�Janumet�benefited�from�Januvia’s�established�patient�base.
(See�Fig.�2.)�However,�within�Novartis’s�product�family,�Eucreas�performed
significantly�better�than�Galvus�in�most�European�markets.�This�is�most�apparent�in
Spain�where�in�2011,�Eucreas�and�Galvus�accounted�for�34�percent�and�3�percent�of
the�DPP-IV�inhibitor�market,�respectively.�Sales�for�Eucreas�amounted�to�83%�of
Janumet�sales,�far�exceeding�Galvus’�performance.�The�lesson�here�is�that�it�might
well�be�worthwhile�to�give�as�much—if�not�greater—focus�to�the�launch�of�the
combination�product�as�to�the�launch�of�the�plain�product.�
FIGURE 1: LAUNCH OF FIRST COMBINATION DPP-IVs IN THE EU
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
2008 2009 2010
Eucreas launched 2 yrs ahead of Janumet in UK
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 5
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
The�competitive�success�of�Eucreas�versus�Galvus�raises�questions�about�the�relative
importance�of�the�plain�and�combination�products�in�overall�diabetes�brand�success.
Novartis’�combination�product�(Eucreas)�is�a�far�bigger�proportion�of�vildagliptin-
based�sales�than�Merck’s�combination�product�(Janumet)�is�of�sitagliptin-based
products.�After�two�years�on�the�market�in�France,�Germany,�and�Spain,�for�example,
Eucreas�represents�85-90�percent�of�vildagliptin�family�sales.�In�contrast,�Janumet
represents�40-60�percent�of�sitagliptin�family�sales�two�years�after�the�launch.��
Indeed,�with�a�sub-optimal�plain�product�launch,�Novartis�concentrated�its
promotional�spending�on�Eucreas.�In�the�first�quarter�post�launch,�the�company’s
promotional�spending�(as�reported�in�IMS�audits)�on�Eucreas�was�three�times�higher
than�it�was�for�Galvus.
In�the�U.S.,�the�situation�was�different�in�that�Merck’s�products�were�the�first�to
market�both�for�the�single-compound�therapy�(Januvia)�and�the�combination�therapy
(Janumet).�The�second�combination�product�to�come�on�the�scene�was�Kombiglyze™
XR.�(Kombiglyze�XR�contains�saxagliptin�and�metformin�and�was�launched�by�BMS
with�AstraZeneca.)�Kombiglyze�XR�has�not�been�able�to�combat�Janumet’s�first-mover
advantage�and�has�seen�poor�uptake.�In�Q4�2011,�Kombiglyze�XR�only�accounted�for
two�percent�of�the�DPP-IV�market,�compared�with�23�percent�for�Janumet.��
So,�for�both�Novartis�in�Europe�and�Merck�in�the�U.S.,�there�was�a�clear�advantage�to
being�first�on�the�market�with�the�combination�product—whether�or�not�the�same
company�was�first�to�market�with�the�plain�product.��
Companies whose products are not first to market can maximize their
potential sales by pursuing specific strategies.
FIGURE 2: DPP-IV SALES/SHARE FOR SINGLE AND COMBINATION PRODUCTS IN EU
SHARE OF SALES BY COUNTRY* 2011 IN US$
*Includes licensed brands across Europe
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Share Market
France Germany Italy Spain UK
45%32%
34%19%
79%
31%
41% 37%
41%
4%14% 19%
15% 34%
6%
7% 6%10%
3%8%
2% 3% 5% 3% 5%
CUMULATIVE SALES OVER TIME, EU5*1,100
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Cumulative Sales, LCUS$ m
Q3 2007
Q6 2007
Q9 2007
Q12 2007
Q3 2008
Q6 2008
Q9 2008
Q12 2008
Q3 2009
Q6 2009
Q9 2009
Q12 2009
Q3 2010
Q6 2010
Q9 2010
Q12 2010
Q3 2011
Q6 2011
Q9 2011
Q12 2011
GalvusOnglyzaEucreasJanumetJanuvia
*European sales include local branding of Xelevia, Tesavel, Ristaben, Velmetia, Efficib, Ristfor, Zomarist, Icandra, Jalra and Xiliarx assignedaccordingly to Januvia, Janumet, Eucreas and Galvus.
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 6
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
PHARMERGING MARKETS: A DIFFERENT GAME The�dynamics�for�first-to-market�products�are�less�rigid�in�the�Tier�1�and�Tier�2
pharmerging�markets�than�we’ve�observed�in�developed�markets.�In�Brazil,�Russia,
and�India,�for�example,�Merck’s�Januvia�was�launched�before�Novartis’s�Galvus.
Nevertheless—and�unlike�mature�markets—Novartis’s�family�of�products�accounted
for�more�than�50�percent�of�the�DPP-IV�market�in�2011.�(See�Fig.�3)�Most�of�this
success�is�attributable�to�Eucreas,�which�has�outperformed�Janumet�considerably.
Meanwhile,�Galvus�has�held�its�own�against�Januvia;�its�uptake�has�been�comparable
to�that�of�Januvia�in�Brazil�and�Russia,�and�greater�than�Januvia�in�India.�
A�number�of�interacting�factors�cause�the�differences�in�market�dynamics�between
mature�and�pharmerging�markets.�The�first�is�that�companies�may�focus�on�mature
markets�at�the�expense�of�pharmerging�markets�based�on�assumptions�about�where
the�best�return�on�investment�may�be�achieved.�It�is�time�to�revisit�these�assumptions,
considering�that�in�2011,�combined�sales�for�non-insulin�anti-diabetics�across�BRIC
were�higher�than�they�were�in�each�of�Germany,�France,�or�the�UK.�What�is�more,
these�pharmerging�markets�experienced�an�average�annual�growth�of�26�percent�for
diabetes�products�from�2007-2011—a�rate�that�is�expected�to�continue.�Although
generic�products�currently�dominate�the�pharmerging�markets,�growth�of�branded
product�sales�is�stellar,�at�38�percent�between�2010�and�2011.��
Local�issues�and�local�knowledge�are�also�likely�to�have�a�big�impact�on�the�relative
success�of�different�DPP-IVs�in�the�pharmerging�markets.�Novartis’s�vildagliptin
family�of�products�gained�the�upper�hand�in�Brazil�for�a�number�of�reasons.�Novartis
promoted�Galvus�more�heavily�than�Merck�promoted�Januvia,�and�Novartis�launched
its�two�vildagliptin-based�products�together�(whereas�Merck�launched�Janumet�after
Januvia).�These�factors�combined�to�help�Novartis�achieve�sales�for�its�family�of�DPP-
IVs�that�were�40�percent�higher�in�2011�than�Merck’s�were�for�the�Januvia�family.
FIGURE 3: SPLIT OF DPP-IV CLASS VALUE SALES BY COUNTRY 2011 IN US$*
*Galvus launched Jan 2012 in China so no sales data as yet. Galvus and Eucreas not launched in USA. Indian sales include local branding ofJalra, Jalra-M, Zomelis, Zomelis-M, Istamet and Istavel assigned accordingly to Galvus, Eucreas, Januvia and Janumet.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Share of Market
EU5
TradjentaKombiglyze XROnglyzaJanumetJanuviaGalvusEucreas
USA Brazil Russia India
20%
36%
35%
3%
6%
63%
23%
10%
1%2%
1%
29%
27%
17%
17%
10%
China
55%
24%
16%
4%1%
38%
15%
16%
21%
9% • In Brazil Galvus and Eucreaslaunched at the same time;Janumet lagged Januvia
• Galvus embarked on abroader effort to promotethan Januvia
100%
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 7
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
Another�opportunity�is�to�employ�different�approaches�to�commercialization:�winning
in�pharmerging�markets�is�driven�by�adaptation�to�the�local�environment,�not�by�the
precedent�of�mature�market�success.�In�pharmerging�markets,�the�importance�of�local
knowledge�means�that�“going�it�alone”�may�not�be�an�effective�strategy.�This�is
illustrated�in�the�different�approaches�and�outcomes�for�Novartis�and�Merck�in�India.�
In�late�2008,�Novartis�joined�forces�with�a�local�partner,�USV,�to�co-promote�Galvus
and�Eucreas.�Local�branding�of�the�products�as�Jalra�and�Jalra-Met�and�a�large�sales
force�led�to�fast�market�penetration.�In�contrast,�Merck�did�not�capitalize�on�its�first-
to-market�position,�but�waited�until�after�Novartis�launched�Galvus�to�increase�its
sales�force.�Eventually,�three�years�after�launching�Januvia�and�more�than�two�years
after�the�Novartis/USV�agreement,�Merck�partnered�with�Sun�Pharma.�Together�they
launched�local�brands,�Istamet�and�Istamel,�in�2011.�This�was�too�late�to�unseat
Novartis’s�products,�however.�In�2011,�Novartis’s�family�of�products�had�secured�
56�percent�of�the�Indian�DPP-IV�market,�compared�with�34�percent�for�Merck’s�family
of�products.�
DIFFERENTIATION: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? IMS’s�research�with�Key�Opinion�Leaders,�providers,�and�payers�suggest�that�recent
DPP-IV�launches�have�lacked�clear�and�meaningful�points�of�differentiation�in�the
eyes�of�prescribers�and�patients,�despite�manufacturers’�efforts�to�the�contrary.�IMS
Therapy�Forecaster™�interviews�suggest�that�physicians�tend�to�believe�that�“all�DPP-
IV�inhibitors�are�the�same”.�That�is,�they�do�not�see�the�differentiation�that�exists�as
being�clinically�meaningful.�Onglyza,�for�example,�is�more�potent�than�Januvia�and
Galvus,�but�the�lower�doses�required�with�this�product�do�not�improve�efficacy�or
safety.�The�distinction,�therefore,�doesn’t�register�with�physicians.�
Patients,�too,�are�difficult�to�sway.�Kombiglyze�XR�is�taken�once�daily,�compared�with
twice�daily�for�Janumet.�From�the�uptake�of�Kombiglyze�XR�in�the�U.S.,�however,�it
would�appear�that�patients�do�not�value�this�additional�convenience�enough�to�switch
medications.��
Given�the�size�of�the�global�diabetes�market,�segments�of�the�diabetes�population
represent�valuable�opportunities,�and�new�products�can�be�targeted�to�capture�them.
But,�this�strategy,�too,�is�fraught�with�challenges.�Boehringer�Ingelheim�targeted�a
niche�patient�segment—those�with�renal�impairment—with�Tradjenta�because�the
product�is�not�excreted�via�the�kidneys,�unlike�other�DPP-IV�inhibitors�at�the�time.
Although�it�remains�to�be�seen�if�this�product�will�be�successful�in�the�U.S.,�it�is
experiencing�slow�uptake�in�Europe�following�two�blows.�First,�Onglyza�received
supplementary�approval�for�the�same�patient�group.�Second,�the�German�Institute�for
Quality�and�Efficiency�in�Health�Care�(IQWIG)�failed�to�find�that�Tradjenta�provided
an�added�benefit�and�ruled�that�it�should�be�compared�not�only�against�other�DPP-IV
inhibitors,�but�against�other�diabetic�agents.�This�resulted�in�Boehringer�Ingelheim
choosing�not�to�launch�in�Germany�rather�than�accept�a�sub-optimal�price,�with�wider
European�ramifications.�
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 8
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
Several�combination�products�that�have�recently�launched�have�struggled�because�the
convenience�of�the�combination�was�simply�not�great�enough�for�patients.�Merck’s
Juvasync™�(sitagliptin�and�simvastatin)�is�a�case�in�point.�Patients�still�have�to�also
take�metformin�along�with�it,�and�so�it�is�no�more�convenient�to�take�Juvasync�plus
metformin�than�to�take�Janumet�and�a�separately�administered�statin.�It�could�also�be
that�patients�and�physicians�prefer�a�regimen�consisting�of�Janumet�and�a�separately
administered�statin,�since�more�recent�statins�(such�as�atorvastatin)�may�be�preferred
(and�are�now�generic).���
Although�differentiation�of�the�follower�products�has�not�worked�for�the�DPP-IVs,�in
the�injectable�GLP-1�segment�of�the�diabetes�market,�the�follower�product,�Novo
Nordisk’s�Victoza®,�has�in�fact�done�better�than�the�first�to�market�agent,
Amylin/Lilly's�Byetta.�Here,�Victoza�had�some�clear�points�of�differentiation�to�Byetta,
including�once�daily�administration�because�of�a�longer�half�life,�less�risk�of
immunogenicity�because�it�was�fully�humanized,�and�a�superior�performance�in
lowering�blood-sugar�levels�in�head-to-head�trials.�The�lesson�here�is�that
differentiation�of�the�follower�can�work�if�it�is�seen�as�clinically�meaningful�by
prescribers�and�payers�and�if�benefits�cannot�be�taken�as�a�“class�effect,”�shared�by�all
members�of�that�class.
Four�more�DPP-IV�inhibitors�are�in�late-stage�development.�The�lessons�of�the�first
four�products�strongly�suggest�that,�unless�there�is�true�differentiation�backed�up�with
a�very�effective�campaign�across�stakeholders,�they�are�likely�to�be�chasing�ever
decreasing�portions�of�the�market�in�most�countries,�and�at�best�will�achieve�limited
success�in�certain�markets,�such�as�the�marketing�company’s�home�market.
Given the size of the global diabetes market, even patient niches represent
valuable opportunities.
FUTURE DIABETES CLASSES: FAMILIAR GROUND There�are�many�companies�with�up-and-coming�treatments�for�Type�II�Diabetes�in�the
pipeline;�all�should�be�looking�to�apply�the�lessons�of�recent�launches,�as�history�tends
to�repeat�itself�given�similar�circumstances.�And�it�does�seem�that�the�circumstances
surrounding�the�next�major�class�of�drugs�about�to�launch,�the�sodium-glucose
transporter�inhibitors�(SGLT-2s),�will�give�us�déjà�vu...
Products�in�this�class�are�likely�to�experience�market�dynamics�that�mirror�those�of�the
DPP-IV�inhibitors.�Multiple�examples�of�these�molecules�are�in�late-stage
development�and�are�expected�to�launch�around�the�same�time.�As�with�the�DPP-IV
inhibitors,�IMS�Key�Opinion�Leader�interviews�suggest�the�SGLT-2�inhibitors�may�not
be�clearly�differentiated�from�one�another�in�the�eyes�of�prescribers�and�payers�in
terms�of�safety,�efficacy,�or�convenience.��The�first-to-market�product�will�therefore,�as
with�Januvia,�have�a�significant�advantage,�and�European�approval�for�AZ/BMS’s
dapagliflozin�suggest�that�this�agent�will�enjoy�this�role;�however�it�may�still�be
possible�for�late-to-market�products�to�succeed�if�they�learn�the�lessons�of�the�DPP-IVs.
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 9
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
The�SGLT-2�inhibitors�are�destined�to�be�used�in�later�lines,�so�combinations�with�
any�of�the�existing�diabetes�classes�could�help�in�securing�market�share.�In�order�for
these�combinations�to�succeed,�though,�they�must�provide�a�real�convenience�benefit
to�patients.��
Successful Strategies for the First to Market • Do�not�allow�being�first�to�market�tempt�you�into�complacency.�Capitalize�on�your
position,�promoting�heavily�to�truly�“own”�the�market�prior�to�the�launch�of
competitors.�
• Launch�combination�products�quickly�in�mature�markets�to�reduce�the�opening�for
competitors�to�establish�a�beachhead.�
• Don’t�neglect�pharmerging�markets.�To�maximize�your�potential�in�them,�form
alliances�with�local�companies�and�consider�local�branding.�Local�partners�have�
in-depth�knowledge�of�the�target�market,�can�furnish�local�resources,�and�can
extend�sales�force�reach�and�make�better�use�of�local�relationships�and�knowledge
than�their�multi-national�counterparts.
• As�competitors�enter,�emphasize�homogeneity�in�the�class�as�a�whole,�since
physicians�tend�not�to�switch�patients�off�of�existing�therapy�for�a�new,�but
clinically�comparable,�product.�
Successful Strategies for Late-to-Market Products• Look�beyond�the�largest�markets�for�sales�opportunities.�The�pharmerging�markets
may�present�opportunities�to�be�first.
• Treat�combination�products�as�a�second�chance�to�be�first.�Aim�to�be�first�with�a
combination�product,�and�consider�positioning,�branding,�and�investing�in�this
product�as�if�it�were�a�completely�new�launch.
• Identify�points�of�differentiation,�but�ensure�they�are�truly�clinically�relevant—and
targeted�toward�identifiable�patient�segments�and�unmet�needs.
• Ensure�that�other�differentiators—such�as�those�that�deliver�patient�convenience—
will�be�recognized�and�appreciated�by�prescribers�and�patients.
It might well be worthwhile to seize the first-to-market advantage with a
combination product, even if you don’t have a single-compound product.
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET 10
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
CONCLUSION
The�diabetes�market�is�the�single�large,�predominantly�primary-care�therapy
area�that�IMS�forecasts�will�continue�to�out-perform�the�pharmaceutical
market�as�a�whole.�Accordingly,�the�success�of�launches�into�this�market�are
of�huge�importance�to�many�major�pharmaceutical�companies,�and�to�the
health�of�the�research-based�pharmaceutical�industry�as�a�whole.�Of�the�many
products�in�development�for�Type�II�Diabetes,�only�a�handful�will�enjoy�first-
mover�advantage.�That�does�not�mean,�however,�that�every�other�product
need�be�an�“also�ran.”�As�we’ve�seen�with�the�DPP-IV�inhibitors,�it�is�possible,
with�the�right�strategy,�timing,�and�resources,�to�enjoy�strong�market
performance�even�as�a�later�entrant.
This�point�in�time—with�several�major�launches�completed,�but�a�number�still
on�the�way—is�an�ideal�time�to�review�and�reflect�upon�past�experience�and
ask�what�learnings�can�be�applied�to�improve�future�diabetes�launches.�As�the
Spanish-American�philosopher�George�Santayana�said:�“Those�who�cannot
remember�the�past�are�condemned�to�repeat�it.”
For further information, please contact Sarah Rickwood or Carolyn Gauntlett
We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of James Harris to the development of this white paper
[email protected] [email protected]
+44 (0)20 3075 5322
www.imshealth.com
IMS HEALTH | LAUNCH EXCELLENCE IN THE DIABETES MARKET
WHITE PAPER | DIABETES LAUNCH EXCELLENCE
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