Giovanni Arrighi-The Long Twentieth Century 2009

479

description

History of the 20th century

Transcript of Giovanni Arrighi-The Long Twentieth Century 2009

  • TableofContents(gen)

    ContentsTheThreeHegemoniesofHistoricalCapitalism

    BritishHegemonyandFree-TradeImperialismUSHegemonyandtheRiseoftheFreeEnterpriseSystem

    2TheRiseofCapitalTheFirst(Genoese)SystemicCycleofAccumulationTheSecond(Dutch)SystemicCycleofAccumulation

    3Industry,Empire,andtheEndlessAccumulationofCapitalTheThird(British)SystemicCycleofAccumulationTheDialecticofCapitalismandTerritorialism

    4TheLongTwentiethCenturyTheDialecticofMarketandPlanTheFourth(US)SystemicCycleofAccumulationTheDynamicsofGlobalCrisis

    Epilogue:CanCapitalismSurviveSuccess?ReferencesIndex

  • TheLongTwentiethCentury

  • TheLongTwentiethCentury

    Money,Power,andtheOriginsofOurTimes

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    GIOVANNIARRIGHI

    V

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    LondonoNewYork

  • FirstpublishedbyVerso1994ThiseditionpublishedbyVerso2010GiovanniArrighi1994,2010NewmaterialGiovanniArrighi2010Allrightsreserved

    VersoUK:6MeardStreet,LondonW1FOEGUSA:20JayStreet,NewYork,NY11201VersoistheimprintofNewLeftBooksISBN-13:978-1-84467-304-9

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  • ContentsListofFiguresPrefaceandAcknowledgementsIntroductionviixi

    ITHETHREEHEGEMONIESOFHISTORICALCAPITALISM282837485975

    Hegemony,Capitalism,andTerritorialism

    TheOriginsoftheModernInterstateSystem

    BritishHegemonyandFree-TradeImperialism

    USHegemonyandtheRiseoftheFreeEnterpriseSystemTowardsaNewResearchAgenda

    2THERISEOFCAPITAL868697111130148

    TheAntecedentsofSystemicCyclesofAccumulationTheGenesisofHighFinance

    TheFirst(Genoese)SystemicCycleofAccumulation

    TheSecond(Dutch)SystemicCycleofAccumulationTheDialecticofStateandCapital

    3INDUSTRYEMPIRE,ANDTHEENDLESSAccUMULATIoNOFCAPITAL163163179200219

    TheThird(British)SystemicCycleofAccumulation

    TheDialecticofCapitalismandTerritorialism

    TheDialecticofCapitalismandTerritorialism(Continued)RepriseandPreview

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    4THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY247247277309

    TheDialecticofMarketandPlanTheFourth(US)SystemicCycleofAccumulationTheDynamicsofGlobalCrisis

    EPILOGUE336371

    CANCAPITALISMSURVIVESUCCESS?POSTSCRIPTTOTHESECONDEDITION

    ReferencesIndex387405

  • ListofFigures

    2.32.4

    2.53.13.23.33.43.53.63.73.83.9

    MenschsMetamorphosisModel

    TotalSilverCoinageinEngland,1273-1470

    TrendsintheClothTrade:ShipmentsfromEnglandandProductionatYpres

    MediterraneanRoutesofGenoaandVeniceintheMiddleages

    TheGenoeseSpace-of-Flows,LateSixteenthand

    EarlySeventeenthCenturies

    VolumeofGrainShipmentsthroughtheSound,1562-1780BritishCapitalExports,1820-1915

    TheSixteenth-centuryTradeExpansion

    TheNineteenth-centuryTradeExpansion

    LongCenturiesandSystemicCyclesofAccumulationIdeotypicalTrajectoryofMercantileExpansions

    HicksModelofMercantileExpansions

    BifurcationintheTrajectoryofMercantileExpansionsModelofLocalTurbulence

    ModelofSystemicTurbulence

    3.10MetamorphosisModelofSystemicCyclesofAccumulation

    4.14.24.3

    4.4E.1E.2E.3

    E.4R1

    USTradeBalanceandCurrentAccount,1896-1956

    USGoldReservesandShort-termLiabilities,1950-72OutflowofForeignDirectInvestmentsofDevelopedMarketEconomyCountriesDistributedbyGeographicalRegionsofOrigin,1950-83

    Long-termInterestRatesintheUnitedStates,1965-84TheRiseofEastAsiainComparativePerspectiveIncomeGapsversusIndustrializationGaps

    RateofIncreaseofAccumulatedJapaneseDirectForeignInvestment

  • TheEastAsianSpace-of-Flows,LateTwentiethCenturyEvolutionaryPatternsofWorldCapitalism

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  • Tomygraduatestudentsat5UNY-Bing/mmton,1979-94

  • PrefaceandAcknowledgements

    Thisbookbeganalmostfifteenyearsagoasastudyoftheworldeconomiccrisisofthe1970s.Thecrisiswasconceptualizedasthethirdandconcludingmomentofasinglehistoricalprocessdefinedbytherise,fullexpansion,anddemiseoftheUSsystemofcapitalaccumulationonaworldscale.TheothertwomomentsweretheGreatDepressionof1873-96andthethirty-yearcrisisof191445.Thethreemomentstakentogetherdefinedthelongtwentiethcenturyasaparticularepochorstageofdevelopmentofthecapitalistworld-economy.

    AsIoriginallyconceivedthisbook,thelongtwentiethcenturyconstituteditsexclusivesubject-matter.Tobesure,IwasawarefromthestartthattheriseoftheUSsystemcouldonlybeunderstoodinrelationtothedemiseoftheBritishsystem.ButIfeltnoneedordesiretotaketheanalysisfurtherbackthanthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury.

    OvertheyearsIchangedmymind,andthebookturnedintoastudyofwhathavebeencalledthetwointerdependentmasterprocessesofthe[modern]era:thecreationofasystemofnationalstatesandtheformationofaworldwidecapitalistsystem(Tilly1984:147).Thischangewaspromptedbytheveryevolutionoftheworldeconomiccrisisinthe1980s.WiththeadventoftheReaganera,thefinancializationofcapital,whichhadbeenoneofseveralfeaturesoftheworldeconomiccrisisofthe1970s,becametheabsolutelypredominantfeatureofthecrisis.AshadhappenedeightyyearsearlierinthecourseofthedemiseoftheBritishsystem,observersandscholarsbeganoncemorehailingfinancecapitalasthelatestandhigheststageofworldcapitalism.

    ItwasinthisintellectualatmospherethatIdiscoveredinthesecondandthirdvolumesofFernandBraudelstrilogy,CapitalismandCivilization,theinterpretativeschemethatbecamethebasisofthisbook.Inthisinterpretativescheme,financecapitalisnotaparticularstageofworldcapitalism,letaloneitslatestandhigheststage.Rather,itisarecurrentphenomenonwhichhasmarkedthecapitalisterafromitsearliestbeginningsinlatemedievalandearlymodernEurope.Throughoutthe

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    capitalisterafinancialexpansionshavesignalledthetransitionfromoneregimeofaccumulationonaworldscaletoanother.Theyareintegralaspectsoftherecurrentdestructionofoldregimesandthesimultaneouscreationofnewones.

    Inthelightofthisdiscovery,Ireconceptualizedthelongtwentiethcenturyasconsistingofthreephases:(1)thefinancialexpansionofthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,inthecourseofwhichthestructuresoftheoldBritishregimeweredestroyedandthoseofthenewUSregimewerecreated;(2)thematerialexpansionofthe1950sand1960s,duringwhichthedominanceofthenewUSregimetranslatedinaworld-wideexpansionoftradeandproduction;and(3)thecurrentfinancialexpansion,inthecourseofwhichthestructuresofthenowoldUSregimearebeingdestroyedandthoseofanewregimearepresumablybeingcreated.Moreimportantly,intheinterpretativeschemewhichIderivedfromBraudel,thelongtwentiethcenturynowappearedasthelatestoffoursimilarlystructuredlongcenturies,eachconstitutingaparticularstageofdevelopmentofthemoderncapitalistworldsystem.Itbecamecleartomethatacomparativeanalysisofthesesuccessivelongcenturiescouldrevealmoreaboutthedynamicandlikelyfutureoutcomeofthepresentcrisisthananin-depthanalysisofthelongtwentiethcenturyassuch.

    Thisrecastingoftheinvestigationinamuchlongertimeframehasresultedinacontractionofthespacetakenupbytheovertdiscussionofthelongtwentiethcenturytoaboutone-thirdofthebook.Ihavenonethelessdecidedtoretaintheoriginaltitleofthebooktounderscorethestrictlyinstrumentalnatureofmyexcursionsintothepast.Thatistosay,theonlypurposeofreconstructingthefinancialexpansionsofearliercenturieshasbeentodeepenourunderstandingofthecurrentfinancialexpansionastheconcludingmomentofaparticularstageofdevelopmentofthecapitalistworldsystemthestageencompassedbythelongtwentiethcentury.

    Theseexcursionsintothepastbroughtmeontothetreacherousterrainofworldhistoricalanalysis.CommentingonBraudelsmagnumopusfromwhichIhavedrawninspiration,CharlesTillyhaswiselywarnedusagainstthedangersofventuringonthisterrain:

    Ifconsistencybeahobgoblinoflittleminds,Braudelhasnotroubleescapingthedemon.WhenBraudelisnotbedevilinguswithourdemandsforconsistency,heparades...indecision.ThroughoutthesecondvolumeofCivilisationmatrie//e,herepeatedlybeginstotreattherelationshipbetweencapitalistsandstatemakers,thenveersaway...Preciselybecausetheconversationrangessowidely,alookbackoverthethirdvolumessubjectmatterbringsastonishment:Thegrandthemesofthefirstvolumepopulation,food,

  • PREFACEANDACKNOWLEDGEMENTSxiii

    clothing,technologyhavealmostentirelydisappeared!...ShouldwehaveexpectedanythingelsefromamanofBraudelstemper?Heapproachesaproblembyenumeratingitselements;fondlingitsironies,contradictions,andcomplexities;confrontingthevarioustheoriesscholarshaveproposed;andgivingeachtheoryitshistoricaldue.Thesumofalltheoriesis,alas,notheory....IfBraudelcouldnotbringoffthecoup,whocould?PerhapssomeoneelsewillsucceedinwritingatotalhistorythataccountsfortheentiredevelopmentofcapitalismandthefullgrowthoftheEuropeanstatesystem.Atleastforthetimebeing,wearebetterofftreatingBraudelsgiantessayasasourceofinspirationratherthanamodelofanalysis.ExceptwithaBraudellendingitextrapower,avesselsolargeandcomplexseemsdestined

    tosinkbeforeitreachesthefarshore.(Tilly1984:70-1,73-4)

    Tillysrecommendationisthatwedealwithmoremanageableunitsofanalysisthanentireworldsystems.Themoremanageableunitsheprefersarethecomponentsofparticularworldsystems,suchasnetworksofcoercionthatclusterinstates,andnetworksofexchangethatclusterinregionalmodesofproduction.Bysystematicallycomparingthesecomponents,wemaybeabletofixaccountsofspecificstructuresandprocesseswithinparticularworldsystemstohistoricallygroundedgeneralizationsconcerningthoseworldsystems(Tilly1984:63,74).

    InthisbookIhavesoughtanotherwayoutofthediflicultiesinvolvedinaccountingforthefulldevelopmentofworldcapitalismandofthemoderninterstatesystem.InsteadofjumpingoffBraudelsvesselofworldhistoricalanalysis,Istayedonittodothekindsofthingthatwerenotinthecaptainsintellectualtemperamenttodobutwerewithinthereachofmyweakereyesandshakierlegs.IletBraudelplowformethehighseasofworldhistoricalfact,andchoseformyselfthesmallertaskofprocessinghisoverabundantsupplyofconjecturesandinterpretationsintoaneconomical,consistent,andplausibleexplanationoftheriseandfullexpansionofthecapitalistworldsystem.

    ItsohappensthatBraudelsnotionoffinancialexpansionsasclosingphasesofmajorcapitalistdevelopmentshasenabledmetobreakdowntheentirelifetimeofthecapitalistworldsystem(Braudelslonguedure)intomoremanageableunitsofanalysis,whichIhavecalledsystemiccyclesofaccumulation.AlthoughIhavenamedthesecyclesafterparticularcomponentsofthesystem(Genoa,Holland,Britain,andtheUnitedStates),thecyclesthemselvesrefertothesystemasawholeandnottoitscomponents.Whatiscomparedinthisbookarethestructuresandprocessesofthecapitalistworldsystemasawholeatdifferentstagesofitsdevelopment.OurfocusonthestrategiesandstructuresofGenoese,Dutch,British,andUSgovernmentalandbusinessagenciesisdueexclusivelytotheirsuccessivecentralityintheformationofthesestages.

    Thisisadmittedlyaverynarrowfocus.AsIexplainintheIntroduction,

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    systemiccyclesofaccumulationareprocessesofthecommandingheightsofthecapitalistworld-economyBraudelsrealhomeofcapitalism.Thankstothisnarrowfocus,IhavebeenabletoaddtoBraudelssurveyofworldcapitalismsomelogicalconsistencyandsomeextramileagethetwocenturiesthatseparateusfrom1800,whereBraudelendedhisjourney.Butthenarrowingofthefocusalsohasgreatcosts.Classstruggleandthepolarizationoftheworld-economyincoreandperipherallocalesbothofwhichplayedaprominentroleinmyoriginalconceptionofthelongtwentiethcenturyhavealmostcompletelydroppedoutofthepicture.

    Manyreaderswillbepuzzledorevenshockedbytheseandotheromissions.AllIcantellthemisthattheconstructionpresentedhereisonlyoneofseveralequallyvalid,thoughnotnecessarilyequallyrelevant,accountsofthelongtwentiethcentury.Ihavepresentedelsewhereaninterpretationofthelongtwentiethcenturywhichfocusesonclassstruggleandcore-peripheryrelations(seeArrighi1990b).Havingcompletedthisbook,therearemanynewinsightsthatIwouldliketoaddtothatearlierinterpretation.Nevertheless,thereareveryfewthingsthatIwouldchange.AsfarasIcantell,thataccountstillstandsfromitsownangleofvision.Buttheaccountpresentedinthisbook,asindicatedbyitssubtitle,isthemorerelevanttoanunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenmoneyandpowerinthemakingofourtimes.

    InordertobringmyleanerversionofBraudelsvesseltothefarshoresofthelatetwentiethcentury,IhadtovowtokeepoutofthedebatesandpolemicsthatragedintheislandsofspecializedknowledgethatIvisitedandraided.LikeArnoMayer,Ifreelyadmittobeinganardentlumperandmasterbuilderratherthananavidsplitterandwrecker.Andlikehim,allIaskisapatienthearingandthat[the]bookbetakenandjudgedasawholeandnotonlyinitsdiscreteparts(Mayer,1981:x).

    TheideathatIshouldwriteabookaboutthelongtwentiethcenturywasnotminebutPerryAndersons.AfteraheateddiscussionaboutoneoftheseverallongpapersthatIhadwrittenontheworldeconomiccrisisofthe1970s,heconvincedme,aslongagoas1981,thatonlyafulllengthbookwasanadequatemediumforthekindofconstructionIhadinmind.Hethenkeptawatchfuleyeonmywanderingsthroughthecenturies,alwaysgivinggoodadviceonwhattodoandnottodo.

    IfPerryAndersonisthemainculpritformyinvolvementinthisoverambitiousproject,ImmanuelWallersteinisthemainculpritformakingtheprojectevenmoreambitiousthanitoriginallywas.InlengtheningthetimehorizonoftheinvestigationtoencompassBraudelslonguedure,Iwasinfactfollowinginhisfootsteps.HisinsistenceinourdailyworkattheFernandBraudelCenterthatthetrendsandconjuncturesofmylongtwentiethcenturymightreflectstructures

  • PREFACEANDACKNOWLEDGEMENTSxv

    andprocessesthathadbeeninplacesincethesixteenthcenturyweresufficientlyunsettlingtomakemecheckthevalidityoftheclaim.AsIchecked,Isawdifferentthingsthanhehad;andevenwhenIsawthesamethings,Igavethemadifferenttreatmentandapplicationthanhehasbeendoingin771eModernW/orld-System.ButininsistingthatthelonguedureofhistoricalcapitalismwastherelevanttimeframeforthekindofconstructionIhadinmind,hewasabsolutelyright.Withouthisintellectualstimulusandprovocation,IwouldnotevenhavethoughtofwritingthisbookinthewayIdid.

    Betweenconceivingabooklikethisandactuallywritingit,thereisagulfthatIwouldneverhavebridgedwereitnotfortheexceptionalcommunityofgraduatestudentswithwhomIhavebeenfortunatetoworkduringmyfifteenyearsatSUNY-Binghamton.Knowinglyorunknowingly,themembersofthiscommunityhaveprovidedmewithmostofthequestionsandmanyoftheanswersthatconstitutethesubstanceofthiswork.Collectively,theyarethegiantonwhoseshouldersIhavetravelled,andtothemthebookisrightfullydedicated.

    AsmastermindoftheSociologyGraduateProgramatSUNYBinghamton,TerenceHopkinsislargelyresponsibleforturningBinghamtonintotheonlyplacewhereIcouldhavewrittenthisbook.HeisalsoresponsibleforanythingthatisvaluableinthemethodologyIhaveused.Astheharshestofmycriticsandthestrongestofmysupporters,BeverlySilverhasplayedacentralroleintherealizationofthiswork.Withoutherintellectualguidance,Iwouldhavegoneastray;withouthermoralsupport,IwouldhavesettledforfarlessthanIeventuallydid.

    Anearlierversionofchapter1waspresentedattheSecondESRCConferenceonStructuralChangeintheWestheldatEmmanuelCollege,Cambridge,inSeptember1989,andwassubsequentlypublishedinReview(Summer1990)andreprintedinGill(1993).Sectionsofchapters2and3werepresentedattheThirdESRCConferenceonthesametopicheldatEmmanuelCollegeinSeptember1990.Participationinthesetwoconferences,aswellasintheprecedingoneheldinSeptember1988,addedsteamtomyvesselatatimewhenitmightotherwisehavesunk.IamverygratefultoFredHallidayandMichaelMannforinvitingmetotheentireseriesofESRCconferences,toJohnHobsonfororganizingthemeffectively,andtoalltheotherparticipantsforthestimulatingdiscussionswehad.

    PerryAnderson,GopalBalakrishnan,RobinBlackburn,TerenceHopkins,ResatKasaba,RaviPalat,ThomasReifer,BeverlySilver,andImmanuelWallersteinreadandcommentedonthemanuscriptbeforethefinalroundofrevisions.Theirdifferentspecializationsandintellectualperspectiveshelpedmeenormouslyinfixingwhatcouldbefixedintheproductofthishazardousenterprise.ThomasReiferalsohelpedmein

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    alast-minutecheckofreferencesandquotations.Withgreaterreasonthaniscustomary,Itakefullresponsibilityforwhatremainsunfixedandunchecked.

    Finally,aspecialthanksgoestomysonAndrea.WhenIbeganthiswork,hewasabouttoenterhighschool.BythetimeIwaswritingthelastdraft,hehadcompletedhistesidz[auralinphilosophyattheUniversitaStataleinMilan.Throughout,hewastrulythebestofsons.Butasthisworkwasdrawingtoaclose,hehadbecomealsoaninvaluableeditorialadviser.Ifthebookfindsanyreadershipoutsidethehistoricalandsocialscienceprofessions,Ioweitlargelytohim.

    GIOVANNIARRIGHI

    March1994

  • Introduction

    Overthelastquarterofacenturysomethingfundamentalseemstohavechangedinthewayinwhichcapitalismworks.Inthe1970s,manyspokeofcrisis.Inthe1980s,mostspokeofrestructuringandreorganization.Inthe1990s,wearenolongersurethatthecrisisofthe1970swaseverreallyresolvedandtheviewhasbeguntospreadthatcapitalisthistorymightbeatadecisiveturningpoint.

    Ourthesisisthatcapitalisthistoryisindeedinthemidstofadecisiveturningpoint,butthatthesituationisnotasunprecedentedasitmayappearatfirstsight.Longperiodsofcrisis,restructuringandreorganization,inshort,ofdiscontinuouschange,havebeenfarmoretypicalofthehistoryofthecapitalistworld-economythanthosebriefmomentsofgeneralizedexpansionalongadefinitedevelopmentalpathliketheonethatoccurredinthe1950sand1960s.Inthepast,theselongperiodsofdiscontinuouschangeendedinareconstitutionofthecapitalistworld-economyonnewandenlargedfoundations.Ourinvestigationisaimedprimarilyatidentifyingthesystemicconditionsunderwhichanewreconstitutionofthiskindmayoccurand,ifitdoesoccur,whatitmaylooklike.

    Changessinceabout1970inthewaycapitalismfunctionslocallyandgloballyhavebeenwidelynoted;thoughtheprecisenatureofthesechangesisstillamatterofsomedebate.Butthattheyamounttosomethingfundamentalisthecommonthemeofarapidlygrowingliterature.

    Therehavebeenchangesinthespatialconfigurationofprocessesofcapitalaccumulation.Inthe1970sthepredominanttendencyappearedtobetowardsarelocationofprocessesofcapitalaccumulationfromhigh-incometolow-incomecountriesandregions(Frobel,Heinrichs,andKreye1980;BluestoneandHarrison1982;Massey1984;Walton1985).Inthe1980s,incontrast,thepredominanttendencyappearedtobetowardstherecentralizationofcapitalinhigh-incomecountriesandregions(Gordon1988).Butwhateverthedirection

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  • 2THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    ofthemovement,thetendencysince1970hasbeentowardsgreatergeographicalmobilityofcapital(Sassen1988;Scott1988;StorperandWalker1989).

    Thishasbeencloselyassociatedwithchangesintheorganizationofprocessesofproductionandexchange.SomeauthorshaveclaimedthatthecrisisofFordistmassproductionbasedonsystemsofspecializedmachines,operatingwithintheorganizationaldomainsofverticallyintegrated,bureaucraticallymanaged,giantcorporationshascreateduniqueopportunitiesforarevivalofsystemsofflexiblespecializationbasedonsmall-batchcraftproduction,carriedoutinsmallandmedium-sizedbusinessunitscoordinatedbymarket-likeprocessesofexchange(PioreandSable1984;SableandZeitlin1985;HirstandZeitlin1991).Othershavefocusedonthelegalregulationofincome-generatingactivitiesandhavenotedhowtheever-increasingformalizationofeconomiclifethatis,theproliferationoflegalconstraintsontheorganizationofprocessesofproductionandexchangehascalledforththeoppositetendencytowardsinformalizationthatis,aproliferationofincome-generatingactivitiesthatbypasslegalregulationthroughonekindoranotherofpersonalorfamilialentrepreneurialism(Lomnitz1988;Portes,Castells,andBenton1989;Feige1990;Portes1994).

    Partlyoverlappingthisliterature,numerousstudieshavefollowedinthefootstepsoftheFrenchregulationschoolandhaveinterpretedcurrentchangesinthemodeofoperationofcapitalismasastructuralcrisisofwhattheycalltheFordistKeynesianregimeofaccumulation(forasurvey,seeBoyer1990;Jessop1990;TickellandPeck1992).Thisregimeisconceptualizedasconstitutingaparticularphaseofcapitalistdevelopmentcharacterizedbyinvestmentsinfixedcapitalthatcreatethepotentialforregularincreasesinproductivityandmassconsumption.Forthispotentialtoberealized,adequategovernmentalpoliciesandactions,socialinstitutions,normsandhabitsofbehavior(themodeofregulation)wererequired.KeynesianismisdescribedasthemodeofregulationthatenabledtheemergentFordistregimefullytorealizeitspotential.Andthisinturnisconceivedofastheunderlyingcauseofthecrisisofthe1970s(Aglietta1979b;DeVroey1984;Lipietz1987;1988).

    Byandlarge,regulationistsareagnosticastowhatthesuccessorofFordismKeynesianismmightbe,orindeedastowhethertherewilleverbeanotherregimeofaccumulationwithanappropriatemodeofregulation.Inasimilarvein,butusingadifferentconceptualapparatus,ClausOffe(1985)and,moreexplicitly,ScottLashandJohnUrry(1987)havespokenoftheendoforganizedcapitalismand

    oftheemergenceofdisorganizedcapitalism.Thecentralfeatureof

  • INTRODUCTION3

    organizedcapitalismtheadministrationandconsciousregulationofnationaleconomiesbymanagerialhierarchiesandgovernmentofficialsisseenasbeingjeopardizedbyanincreasingspatialandfunctionaldeconcentrationanddecentralizationofcorporatepowers,whichleavesprocessesofcapitalaccumulationinastateofseeminglyirremediabledisorganization.

    Takingissuewiththisemphasisonthedisintegrationratherthancoherenceofcontemporarycapitalism,DavidHarvey(1989)suggeststhat,infact,capitalismmaybeinthemidstofahistoricaltransitionfromFordismKeynesianismtoanewregimeofaccumulation,whichhetentativelycallsflexibleaccumulation.Between1965and1973,heargues,thedifficultiesmetbyFordismandKeynesianismincontainingtheinherentcontradictionsofcapitalismbecamemoreandmoreapparent:Onthesurface,thesedifficultiescouldbestbecapturedbyoneword:rigidity.Therewereproblemswiththerigidityoflong-termandlargescaleinvestmentsinmassproductionsystems,withtherigidityofregulatedlabormarketsandcontracts,andwiththerigidityofstatecommitmentstoentitlementanddefenseprograms.

    Behindallthesespecificrigiditieslayaratherunwieldyandseeminglyfixedconfigurationofpoliticalpowerandreciprocalrelationsthatboundbiglabor,bigcapital,andbiggovernmentintowhatincreasinglyappearedasadysfunctionalembraceofsuchnarrowlydefinedvestedinterestsastoundermineratherthansecurecapitalaccumulation.(Harvey1989:142)

    TheUSandBritishgovernmentsattempttomaintainthemomentumofthepost-wareconomicboomthroughanextraordinarilyloosemonetarypolicymetwithsomesuccessinthelate1960sbutbackfiredintheearly1970s.Rigiditiesincreasedfurther,realgrowthceased,inflationarytendenciesgotoutofhand,andthesystemoffixedexchangerates,whichhadsustainedandregulatedthepost-warexpansion,collapsed.Sincethattime,allstateshavebeenatthemercyoffinancialdiscipline,eitherthroughtheeffectsofcapitalflightorbydirectinstitutionalpressures.Therehad,ofcourse,alwaysbeenadelicatebalancebetweenfinancialandstatepowersundercapitalism,butthebreakdownofFordismKeynesianismevidentlymeantashifttowardstheempowermentoffinancecapitalvis-a-visthenationstate(Harvey1989:145,168).

    Thisshift,inturn,hasledtoanexplosioninnewfinancialinstrumentsandmarkets,coupledwiththeriseofhighlysophisticatedsystemsoffinancialcoordinationonaglobalscale.Itisthisextraordinaryefflorescenceandtransformationinfinancialmarkets

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    thatHarvey,notwithouthesitation,takesastherealnoveltyofcapitalisminthe1970sand1980sandthekeyfeatureoftheemergingregimeofflexibleaccumulation.Thespatialreshufflingofprocessesofproductionandaccumulation,theresurgenceofcraftproductionandofpersonal/familialbusinessnetworks,thespreadofmarket-likecoordinationsattheexpenseofcorporateandgovernmentalplanningall,inHarveysview,arediflerentfacetsofthepassagetothenewregimeofflexibleaccumulation.However,heisinclinedtoseethemasexpressionsofthesearchforfinancialsolutionstothecrisistendenciesofcapitalism(Harvey1989:191-4).

    Harveyisfullyawareofthedifficultiesinvolvedintheorizingthetransitiontoflexibleaccumulationassumingthatthatiswhatcapitalismisactuallyexperiencingandpointstoseveraltheoreticaldilemmas.

    Canwegraspthelogic,ifnotthenecessity,ofthetransition?Towhatdegreedopastandpresenttheoreticalformulationsofthedynamicsofcapitalismhavetobemodifiedinthelightoftheradicalreorganizationsandrestructuringstakingplaceinboththeproductiveforcesandsocialrelations?Andcanwerepresentthecurrentregimesufhcientlywelltogetsomegripontheprobablecourseandimplicationsofwhatappearstobeanongoingrevolution?ThetransitionfromFordismtoflexibleaccumulationhas...posedseriousdifhcultiesfortheoriesofanysort....Theonlygeneralpointofagreementisthatsomethingsignificanthaschangedinthewaycapitalismhasbeenworkingsinceabout1970.

    (Harvey1989:173)

    ThequestionsthathaveinformedthisstudyaresimilartoHarveys.Buttheanswersaresoughtinaninvestigationofcurrenttendenciesinthelightofpatternsofrecurrenceandevolution,whichspantheentirelifetimeofhistoricalcapitalismasaworldsystem.Oncewestretchthespacetimehorizonofourobservationsandtheoreticalconjecturesinthisway,tendenciesthatseemednovelandunpredictablebegintolookfamiliar.

    Morespecifically,thestartingpointofourinvestigationhasbeenFernandBraudelscontentionthattheessentialfeatureofhistoricalcapitalismoveritslonguedurethatis,overitsentirelifetimehasbeentheflexibilityandeclecticismofcapitalratherthantheconcreteformsassumedbythelatteratdifferentplacesandatdiflerenttimes:

    Letmeemphasizethequalitythatseemstometobeanessentialfeatureofthegeneralhistoryofcapitalism:itsunlimitedflexibility,itscapacityforchangeandadaptation.Ifthereis,asIbelieve,acertainunityincapitalism,fromthirteenthcenturyItalytothepresent-dayWest,itishereaboveallthat

  • INTRODUCTION5

    suchunitymustbelocatedandobserved.(Braudel1982:433;emphasisintheoriginal)

    Incertainperiods,evenlongperiods,capitalismdidseemtospecialize,asinthenineteenthcentury,whenitmovedsospectacularlyintothenewworldofindustry.Thisspecializationhasledhistoriansingeneral

    .toregardindustryasthefinalfloweringwhichgavecapitalismitstrueidentity.Butthisisashort-termview:

    [After]theinitialboomofmechanization,themostadvancedkindofcapitalismrevertedtoeclecticism,toanindivisibilityofinterestssotospeak,asifthecharacteristicadvantageofstandingatthecommandingheightsoftheeconomy,todayjustasmuchasinthedaysofJacquesCoeur(thefourteenthcenturytycoon)consistedpreciselyofnothavingtoconfineoneselftoasinglechoice,ofbeingeminentlyadaptable,hencenon-specialized.(Braudel1982:381;emphasisintheoriginal;translationamendedasindicatedinWallerstein

    l99l:2l3)

    ItseemstomethatthesepassagescanbereadasarestatementofKarlMarxsgeneralformulaofcapital:MCM.Moneycapital(M)meansliquidity,flexibility,freedomofchoice.Commoditycapital(C)meanscapitalinvestedinaparticularinputoutputcombinationinviewofaprofit.Hence,itmeansconcreteness,rigidity,andanarrowingdownorclosingofoptions.Mmeansexpandedliquidity,flexibility,andfreedomofchoice.

    Thusunderstood,Marxsformulatellsusthatcapitalistagenciesdonotinvestmoneyinparticularinputoutputcombinations,withalltheattendantlossofflexibilityandfreedomofchoice,asanendinitself.Rather,theydosoasameanstowardstheendofsecuringanevengreaterflexibilityandfreedomofchoiceatsomefuturepoint.Marxsformulaalsotellsusthatifthereisnoexpectationonthepartofcapitalistagenciesthattheirfreedomofchoicewillincrease,orifthisexpectationissystematicallyunfulfilled,capitaltend:toreverttomoreflexibleformsofinvestmentaboveall,toitsmoneyform.Inotherwords,capitalistagenciespreferliquidity,andanunusuallylargeshareoftheircashflowtendstoremaininliquidform.

    ThissecondreadingisimplicitinBraudelscharacterizationoffinancialexpansionasasymptomofmaturityofaparticularcapitalistdevelopment.IndiscussingthewithdrawaloftheDutchfromcommerceinthemiddleoftheeighteenthcenturytobecomethebankersofEurope,Braudelsuggeststhatsuchawithdrawalisarecurrentworldsystemictendency.Thesametendencyhadearlierbeeninevidenceinfifteenth-centuryItaly,whentheGenoesecapitalistoligarchyswitched

  • 6THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    fromcommoditiestobanking,andinthelatterhalfofthesixteenthcentury,whentheGenoesenobilivccc/7i,theofficiallenderstothekingofSpain,graduallywithdrewfromcommerce.FollowingtheDutch,thetendencywasreplicatedbytheEnglishinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,whentheendofthefantasticventureoftheindustrialrevolutioncreatedanoversupplyofmoneycapital(Braudel1984:2423,246).

    Aftertheequallyfantasticventureofso-calledFordismKeynesianism,UScapitalfollowedasimilarpathinthe1970sand1980s.Braudeldoesnotdiscussthefinancialexpansionofourday,whichgainedmomentumafterhehadcompletedhistrilogyonCivilizationmmCapitalism.Nevertheless,wecanreadilyrecognizeinthislatestrebirthoffinancecapitalyetanotherinstanceofthatreversaltoeclecticismwhichinthepasthasbeenassociatedwiththematuringofamajorcapitalistdevelopment:[Every]capitalistdevelopmentofthisorderseems,byreachingthestageoffinancialexpansion,tohaveinsomesenseannounceditsmaturity:it[is]asignofautumn(Braudel1984:246;emphasisadded).

    Marxsgeneralformulaofcapital(MCM')canthereforebeinterpretedasdepictingnotjustthelogicofindividualcapitalistinvestments,butalsoarecurrentpatternofhistoricalcapitalismasworldsystem.Thecentralaspectofthispatternisthealternationofepochsofmaterialexpansion(MCphasesofcapitalaccumulation)withphasesoffinancialrebirthandexpansion(CM'phases).Inphasesofmaterialexpansionmoneycapitalsetsinmotionanincreasingmassofcommodities(includingcommoditizedlabor-powerandgiftsofnature);andinphasesoffinancialexpansionanincreasingmassofmoneycapitalsetsitselffreefromitscommodityform,andaccumulationproceedsthroughfinancialdeals(asinMarxsabridgedformulaMM').Together,thetwoepochsorphasesconstituteafullsystemiccycleofaccumulation(MCM').

    Ourinvestigationisessentiallyacomparativeanalysisofsuccessivesystemiccyclesofaccumulationinanattempttoidentify(1)patternsofrecurrenceandevolution,whicharereproducedinthecurrentphaseoffinancialexpansionandofsystemicrestructuring;and(2)theanomaliesofthiscurrentphaseoffinancialexpansion,whichmayleadtoabreakwithpastpatternsofrecurrenceandevolution.Foursystemiccyclesofaccumulationwillbeidentified,eachcharacterizedbyafundamentalunityoftheprimaryagencyandstructureofworldscaleprocessesofcapitalaccumulation:aGenoesecycle,fromthefifteenthtotheearlyseventeenthcenturies;aDutchcycle,fromthelatesixteenthcenturythroughmostoftheeighteenthcentury;aBritishcycle,fromthelatterhalfoftheeighteenthcenturythroughtheearlytwentieth

  • INTRODUCTION7

    century;andaUScycle,whichbeganinthelatenineteenthcenturyandhascontinuedintothecurrentphaseoffinancialexpansion.Asthisapproximateandpreliminaryperiodizationimplies,consecutivesystemiccyclesofaccumulationoverlap,andalthoughtheybecomeprogressivelyshorterinduration,theyalllastlongerthanacentury:hencethenotionofthelongcentury,whichwillbetakenasthebasictemporalunitintheanalysisofworld-scaleprocessesofcapitalaccumulation.

    ThesecyclesarealtogetherdiH7erentfromthesecularcycles(orpricelogistics)andtheshorterKondratieffcyclestowhichBraudelhasattachedsomuchimportance.SecularandKondratieffcyclesarebothempiricalconstructsofuncertaintheoreticalstandingderivedfromobservedlong-termfluctuationsincommodityprices(forsurveysoftherelevantliterature,seeBarr1979;Goldstein1988).Secularcyclesbearsomestrikingsimilaritiestooursystemiccycles;theyarefourinnumber,theyalllastlongerthanacentury,andtheybecomeprogressivelyshorter(Braudel1984:78).However,secularpricecyclesandsystemiccyclesofaccumulationarecompletelyoutofsynchronywithoneanother.Afinancialexpansionisequallylikelytocomeatthebeginning,middle,orendofasecular(price)cycle(seefigure3.4onp.220,thisvolume).

    Braudeldoesnotattempttoreconcilethisdiscrepancybetweenhisdatingoffinancialexpansionsonwhichourperiodizationofsystemiccyclesofaccumulationisbasedandhisdatingofsecular(price)cycles.Andnorshallwe.Facedwithachoicebetweenthesetwokindsofcycles,wehaveoptedforsystemiccyclesbecausetheyarefarmorevalidandreliableindicatorsofwhatisspecificallycapitalistinthemodernworldsystemthansecularorKondratieffcycles.

    Indeed,thereisnoagreementintheliteratureonwhatlong-termfluctuationsinpriceswhetherofthelogisticortheKondratieffkindindicate.Theyarecertainlynotreliableindicatorsofthecontractionsandexpansionsofwhateverisspecificallycapitalistinthemodernworldsystem.Profitabilityandthecommandofcapitaloverhumanandnaturalresourcescandecreaseorincreasejustasmuchinadownswingasinanupswing.Italldependsonwhosecompetitionisdrivingpricesupordown.Ifitisthecapitaliststhemselves,howeverdefined,thatarecompetingmore(less)intenselythantheirnon-capitalistsuppliersandcustomers,profitabilitywillfall(rise)andthecommandofcapitaloverresourceswilldecrease(increase),regardlessofwhethertheoveralltendencyofpricesistoriseorfall.

    NordopricelogisticsandKondratieffsseemtobespecificallycapitalistphenomena.ItisinterestingtonotethatinJoshuaGoldsteinssynthesis

  • 8THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    oftheempiricalfindingsandtheoreticalunderpinningsoflong-wavestudies,thenotionofcapitalismplaysnoroleatall.Statistically,hefindsthatlongwavesinpricesandproductionareexplainedprimarilybytheseverityofwhathecallsgreatpowerwars.Asforcapitalism,theissueofitsemergenceandexpansionisputsquarelyoutsidethescopeofhisinvestigation(Goldstein1988:258-74,286).

    Theissueoftherelationshipbetweentheriseofcapitalismandlongtermpricefluctuationshastroubledworldsystemstudiesrightfromthestart.NicoleBousquet(1979:503)considereditembarrassingthatpricelogisticslongpre-dated1500.Forthesamereason,AlbertBergesen(1983:78)wonderedwhetherpricelogisticsrepresentthedynamicsoffeudalismorcapitalism,orboth.EvenImperialChinaseemstohaveexperiencedwave-likephenomenaofthesamekindasEurope(Hartwell1982;Skinner1985).Mostunsettlingofall,BarryGillsandAndreGunderFrank(1992:621-2)havemaintainedthatthefundamentalcyclicalrhythmsandseculartrendsoftheworldsystemshouldberecognizedashavingexistedforsome5000years,ratherthanthe500yearsthathasbeenconventionalintheworldsystemandlongwaveapproaches.

    Inshort,theconnectionbetweenBraudelssecularcyclesandthecapitalistaccumulationofcapitalhasnoclearlogicalorhistoricalfoundation.Thenotionofsystemiccyclesofaccumulation,incontrast,derivesdirectlyfromBraudelsnotionofcapitalismasthenonspecializedtoplayerinthehierarchyoftheworldoftrade.Thistoplayeriswherelarge-scaleprofitsaremade.Heretheprofitsarelarge,notjustbecausethecapitaliststratummonopolizesthemostprofitablelinesofbusiness;evenmoreimportantisthefactthatthecapitaliststratumhastheflexibilityneededtoswitchitsinvestmentscontinuallyfromthelinesofbusinessthatfacediminishingreturnstothelinesthatdonot(Braudel1982:22,231,428-30).

    AsinMarxsgeneralformulaofcapital(MCM'),soinBraudelsdefinitionofcapitalismwhatmakesanagencyorsocialstratumcapitalistisnotitspredispositiontoinvestinaparticularcommodity(e.g.labor-power)orsphereofactivity(e.g.industry).Anagencyiscapitalistinvirtueofthefactthatitsmoneyisendowedwiththepowerofbreeding(Marxsexpression)systematicallyandpersistently,regardlessofthenatureoftheparticularcommoditiesandactivitiesthatareincidentallythemediumatanygiventime.ThenotionofsystemiccyclesofaccumulationwhichwehavederivedfromBraudelshistoricalobservationofrecurrentfinancialexpansionsfollowslogicallyfromthisstrictlyinstrumentalrelationshipofcapitalismtotheworldoftradeandproduction,andemphasizesit.Thatistosay,financialexpansionsaretakentobesymptomaticofa

  • INTRODUCTION9

    Situationinwhichtheinvestmentofmoneyintheexpansionoftradeandproductionnolongerservesthepurposeofincreasingthecashflowtothecapitaliststratumaseffectivelyaspurefinancialdealscan.Insuchasituation,capitalinvestedintradeandproductiontendstoreverttoitsmoneyformandaccumulatemoredirectly,asinMarxsabridgedformulaMM.

    Systemiccyclesofaccumulation,unlikepricelogisticsandKondratieffs,arethusinherentlycapitalistphenomena.Theypointtoafundamentalcontinuityinworld-scaleprocessesofcapitalaccumulationinmoderntimes.Buttheyalsoconstitutefundamentalbreaksinthestrategiesandstructuresthathaveshapedtheseprocessesoverthecenturies.LikesomeconceptualizationsofKondratieffs,suchasGerhardMenschs(1979),DavidGordons(1980),andCarlotaPerezs(1983),ourcycleshighlightthealternationofphasesofcontinuouschangewithphasesofdiscontinuouschange.

    Thus,oursequenceofpartlyoverlappingsystemiccyclesbearsacloseformalresemblancetoMenschsmetamorphosismodelofsocioeconomicdevelopment.Mensch(1979:73)abandonsthenotionthattheeconomyhasdevelopedinwavesinfavorofthetheorythatithasevolvedthroughaseriesofintermittentinnovativeimpulsesthattaketheformofsuccessiveS-shapedcycles(seefigure1.1).Hismodeldepictsphasesofstablegrowthalongawell-definedpathalternatingwithphasesofcrisis,restructuring,andturbulence,whicheventuallyrecreatetheconditionsofstablegrowth.

    Menschsmodelrefersprimarilytogrowthandinnovationsinparticularindustriesorinparticularnationaleconomies,andassuchhasnoimmediaterelevancetoourinvestigation.Nevertheless,theideaofcyclesconsistingofphasesofcontinuouschangealongasinglepathalternatingwithphasesofdiscontinuouschangefromonepathtoanotherunderliesoursequenceofsystemiccyclesofaccumulation.Thedifferenceisthatwhatdevelopsinourmodelisnotaparticularindustryornationaleconomybutthecapitalistworld-economyasawholeoveritsentirelifetime.Thus,(MC)phasesofmaterialexpansionwillbeshowntoconsistofphasesofcontinuouschange,duringwhichthecapitalistworld-economygrowsalongasingledevelopmentalpath.And(CM')phasesoffinancialexpansionwillbeshowntoconsistofphasesofdiscontinuouschangeduringwhichgrowthalongtheestablishedpathhasattainedorisattainingitslimits,andthecapitalistworldeconomyshiftsthroughradicalrestructuringsandreorganizationsontoanotherpath.

    Historically,growthalongasingledevelopmentalpathandshiftsfromonepathtoanotherhavenotbeensimplytheunintendedoutcomeoftheinnumerableactionsundertakenautonomouslyatanygiventime

  • 10THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    >>

    Indexnumbersofgrowth

    Time

    Source:Mensch(1979:73).

    1.1MenschsMetamorphosisModel

    byindividualsandthemultiplecommunitiesintowhichtheworldeconomyisdivided.Rather,therecurrentexpansionsandrestructuringsofthecapitalistworld-economyhaveoccurredundertheleadershipofparticularcommunitiesandblocsofgovernmentalandbusinessagencieswhichwereuniquelywellplacedtoturntotheirownadvantagetheunintendedconsequencesoftheactionsofotheragencies.Thestrategiesandstructuresthroughwhichtheseleadingagencieshavepromoted,organized,andregulatedtheexpansionortherestructuringofthecapitalistworld-economyiswhatweshallunderstandbyregimeofaccumulationonaworld-scale.Themainpurposeoftheconceptofsystemiccyclesistodescribeandelucidatetheformation,consolidation,anddisintegrationofthesuccessiveregimesthroughwhichthecapitalistworld-economyhasexpandedfromitslatemedievalsub-systemicembryotoitspresentglobaldimension.

    TheentireconstructionrestsonBraudelsunconventionalviewoftherelationshipthatlinkstheformationandenlargedreproductionofhistoricalcapitalismasworldsystemtoprocessesofstateformationontheoneside,andofmarketformationontheother.Theconventionalviewinthesocialsciences,inpoliticaldiscourse,andinthemassmediaisthatcapitalismandthemarketeconomyaremoreorlessthesamething,andthatstatepowerisantitheticaltoboth.Braudel,incontrast,seescapitalismasbeingabsolutelydependentforitsemergenceandexpansiononstatepowerandasconstitutingtheantithesisofthemarketeconomy(cf.Wallerstein1991:chs14-15).

    Morespecifically,Braudelconceivedofcapitalismasthetoplayerofathree-tieredstructureastructureinwhich,asinallhierarchies,

  • INTRODUCTION1]

    theupper[layers]couldnotexistwithoutthelowerstagesonwhichtheydepend.Thelowestanduntilveryrecentlybroadestlayeristhatofanextremelyelementaryandmostlyself-sufficienteconomy.Forwantofabetterexpression,hecalledthisthelayerofmateriallife,thestratumofthenon-economy,thesoilintowhichcapitalismthrustsitsrootsbutwhichitcanneverreallypenetrate(Braudel1982:21-2,229%

    Above[thislowestlayer],comesthefavouredterrainofthemarketeconomy,withitsmanyhorizontalcommunicationsbetweenthedifferentmarkets:hereadegreeofautomaticcoordinationusuallylinkssupply,demandandprices.Thenalongside,orratherabovethislayer,comesthezoneoftheanti-mar/eet,wherethegreatpredatorsroamandthelawofthejungleoperates.Thistodayasinthepast,beforeandaftertheindustrialrevolutionisthereal

    homeofcapitalism.(Braudel1982:229-30;emphasisadded)

    Aworldmarketeconomy,inthesenseofmanyhorizontalcommunicationsbetweendifferentmarkets,emergedfromthedepthoftheunderlyinglayerofmateriallifelongbeforecapitalism-as-worldsystemroseabovethelayerofthemarketeconomy.AsJanetAbuLughod(1989)hasshown,aloosebutnonethelessclearlyrecognizablesystemofhorizontalcommunicationsbetweentheprincipalmarketsofEurasiaandAfricawasalreadyinplaceinthethirteenthcentury.Andforallweknow,GillsandFrankmaywellberightintheirclaimthatthissystemofhorizontalcommunicationsactuallyemergedseveralmillenniaearlier.

    Bethatasitmay,thequestionthatbearsdirectlyonourresearchisnotwhenandhowaworldmarketeconomyroseabovetheprimordialstructuresofeverydaylife;itiswhenandhowcapitalismroseabovethestructuresofthepre-existingworldmarketeconomyand,overtime,acquireditspowertoreshapethemarketsandlivesoftheentireworld.AsBraudel(1984:92)pointsout,themetamorphosisofEuropeintothemonstrousshaperofworldhistorythatitbecameafter1500wasnotasimpletransition.Rather,itwasaseriesofstagesandtransitions,theearliestdatingfromwellbeforewhatisusuallyknownastheRenaissanceofthelatefifteenthcentury.

    ThemostdecisivemomentofthisseriesoftransitionswasnottheproliferationofelementsofcapitalistenterpriseacrossEurope.ElementsofthiskindhadoccurredthroughouttheEurasiantradingsystemandwerebynomeanspeculiartotheWest:

    Everywhere,fromEgypttoJapan,weshallfindgenuinecapitalists,wholesalers,therentiersoftrade,andtheirthousandsofauxiliariesthe

  • 12THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    commissionagents,brokers,money-changersandbankers.Asforthetechniques,possibilitiesorguaranteesofexchange,anyofthesegroupsofmerchantswouldstandcomparisonwithitswesternequivalents.BothinsideandoutsideIndia,Tamil,Bengali,andGujeratimerchantsformedclose-knitpartnershipswithbusinessandcontractspassinginturnfromonegrouptoanother,justastheywouldinEuropefromtheFlorentinestotheLucchese,theGenoese,theSouthGermansortheEnglish.Therewereeven,inmedievaltimes,merchantkingsinCairo,AdenandthePersianGulfports.(Braudel

    l984:486)

    Nowhere,exceptinEurope,didtheseelementsofcapitalismcoalesceintothepowerfulmixthatpropelledEuropeanstatestowardstheterritorialconquestoftheworldandtheformationofanall-powerfulandtrulyglobalcapitalistworld-economy.Fromthisperspective,thereallyimportanttransitionthatneedstobeelucidatedisnotthatfromfeudalismtocapitalismbutfromscatteredtoconcentratedcapitalistpower.Andthemostimportantaspectofthismuchneglectedtransitionistheuniquefusionofstateandcapital,whichwasrealizednowheremorefavorablyforcapitalismthaninEurope:

    Capitalismonlytriumphswhenitbecomesidentifiedwiththestate,whenitisthestate.Initsfirstgreatphase,thatoftheItaliancity-statesofVenice,Genoa,andFlorence,powerlayinthehandsofthemoneyedelite.InseventeenthcenturyHollandthearistocracyoftheRegentsgovernedforthebenefitandevenaccordingtothedirectivesofthebusinessmen,merchants,andmoneylenders.Likewise,inEnglandtheGloriousRevolutionof1688markedtheaccessionofbusinesssimilartothatinHolland.(Braudel1977:64-5;emphasisadded)

    Theobverseofthisprocesshasbeeninterstatecompetitionformobilecapital.AsMaxWeberpointedoutinhisGeneralEconomicHistory,inantiquity,asinthelateMiddleAges,Europeancitieshadbeentheseedbedsofpoliticalcapitalism.Inbothperiodstheautonomyofthesecitieswasprogressivelyerodedbylargerpoliticalstructures.Nevertheless,whileinantiquitythislossofautonomymeanttheendofpoliticalcapitalism,inearlymoderntimesitmeanttheexpansionofcapitalismintoanewkindofworldsystem:

    Inantiquitythefreedomofthecitieswassweptawaybyabureaucraticallyorganizedworldempirewithinwhichtherewasnolongeraplaceforpoliticalcapitalism....[In]contrastwithantiquity[inthemodernerathecities]cameunderthepowerofcompetingnationalstatesinaconditionofperpetualstruggleforpowerinpeaceorwar.Thiscompetitivestrugglecreatedthelargestopportunitiesformodernwesterncapitalism.777eseparatestateshadtocompeteformobilecapital,whichdictatedtothemtheconditionsunderwhich

  • INTRODUCTIONl3

    itwouldassistthemtopower....Henceitistheclosednationalstatewhichaffordedtocapitalismitschancefordevelopmentandaslongasthenationalstatedoesnotgiveplacetoaworldempirecapitalismalsowillendure.(Weber

    1961:247-9;emphasisadded)

    InmakingthesamepointinEconomyandSociety,Weber(1978:3534)furthersuggestedthatthiscompetitionformobilecapitalamonglarge,approximatelyequalandpurelypoliticalstructuresresulted

    inthatmemorablealliancebetweentherisingstatesandthesought-afterandprivilegedcapitalistpowersthatwasamajorfactorincreatingmoderncapitalism....Neitherthetradenorthemonetarypoliciesofthemodernstates...canbeunderstoodwithoutthispeculiarpoliticalcompetitionandequilibriumamongtheEuropeanstatesduringthelastfivehundredyears.

    Ouranalysiswillsubstantiatetheseremarksbyshowingthatinterstatecompetitionhasbeenacriticalcomponentofeachandeveryphaseoffinancialexpansionandamajorfactorintheformationofthoseblocsofgovernmentalandbusinessorganizationsthathaveledthecapitalistworld-economythroughitssuccessivephasesofmaterialexpansion.ButinpartialqualificationofWebersthesis,ouranalysiswillalsoshowthattheconcentrationofpowerinthehandsofparticularblocsofgovernmentalandbusinessagencieshasbeenasessentialtotherecurrentmaterialexpansionsofthecapitalistworld-economyasthecompetitionamongapproximatelyequalpoliticalstructures.Asarule,majormaterialexpansionshaveoccurredonlywhenanewdominantblocaccruedsufficientworldpowertobeinapositionnotjusttobypassorriseaboveinterstatecompetition,buttobringitundercontrolandensureminimalinterstatecooperation.Whathaspropelledtheprodigiousexpansionofthecapitalistworld-economyoverthelastfivehundredyears,inotherwords,hasnotbeeninterstatecompetitionassuch,butinterstatecompetitionincombinationwithanever-increasingconcentrationofcapitalistpowerintheworldsystematlarge.

    Theideaofanever-increasingconcentrationofcapitalistpowerinthemodernworldsystemisimplicitinapatternnotedbyKarlMarxinCapital.LikeWeber,MarxattributedgreatimportancetotheroleplayedbythesystemofnationaldebtspioneeredbyGenoaandVeniceinthelateMiddleAgesinpropellingtheinitialexpansionofmoderncapitalism:

    Nationaldebts,i.e.,thealienationofthestatewhetherdespotic,constitutionalorrepublicanmarkedwithitsstampthecapitalisticera....Aswiththestrokeofanenchanterswand,[thepublicdebt]endowsbarren

  • 14THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    moneywiththepowerofbreedingandthusturnsitintocapital,withoutthenecessityofitsexposingitselftothetroublesandrisksinseparablefromitsemploymentinindustryoreveninusury.Thestate-creditorsactuallygivenothingaway,forthesumlentistransformedintopublicbonds,easilynegotiable,whichcangoonfunctioningintheirhandsjustassomuchhard

    cashwould.(Marx1959:754-5)

    Marxsfocusonthedomesticaspectsofcapitalaccumulationpreventedhimfromappreciatingthecontinuingsignificanceofnationaldebtsinasystemofstatesinconstantcompetionwithoneanotherforassistancefromcapitalistsfortheirpowerpursuits.ForMarx,thealienationoftheassetsandfuturerevenuesofstateswassimplyanaspectofprimitiveaccumulationAdamSmithspreviousaccumulation,anaccumulationnottheresultofthecapitalistmodeofproduction,butitsstartingpoint(Marx1959:713).Nevertheless,Marxdidacknowledgethecontinuingsignificanceofnationaldebts,notastheexpressionofinterstatecompetition,butasmeansofaninvisibleinter-capitalistcooperation,whichstartedcapitalaccumulationoverandoveragainacrossthespacetimeofthecapitalistworld-economyfromitsinceptionthroughhisownday:

    Withthenationaldebtaroseaninternationalcreditsystem,whichoftenconcealsoneofthesourcesofprimitiveaccumulationinthisorthatpeople.ThusthevillainiesoftheVenetianthievingsystemformedoneofthesecretbasesofthecapital-wealthofHollandtowhomVeniceinherdecadencelentlargesumsofmoney.SowasitwithHollandandEngland.Bythebeginningofthe18thcentury...Hollandhadceasedtobethenationpreponderantincommerceandindustry.Oneofitsmainlinesofbusiness,therefore,[became]thelendingoutofenormousamountsofcapital,especiallytoitsgreatrivalEngland.[Andthe]samethingisgoingonto-daybetweenEnglandandtheUnitedStates.(Marx1959:7556)

    Marx,however,failedtonoticethatthesequenceofleadingcapitaliststatesoutlinedinthispassageconsistsofunitsofincreasingsize,resources,andworldpower.AllfourstatesVenice,theUnitedProvinces,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStateshavebeengreatpowersofthesuccessiveepochsduringwhichtheirrulinggroupssimultaneouslyplayedtheroleofleaderinprocessesofstateformationandofcapitalaccumulation.Seensequentially,however,thefourstatesappeartohavebeengreatpowersofaverydifferentandincreasingorder.Asweshalldetailinthecourseofthisstudy,themetropolitandomainsofeachstateinthissequenceencompassalargerterritoryandagreatervarietyofresourcesthanthoseofitspredecessor.Moreimportantly,thenetworksofpowerandaccumulationthatenabledthestatesinquestiontoreorganize

  • INTRODUCTION15

    andcontroltheworldsystemwithinwhichtheyoperatedgrewinscaleandscopeasthesequenceprogresses.

    Itcanthusbeseenthattheexpansionofcapitalistpoweroverthelastfivehundredyearshasbeenassociatednotjustwithinterstatecompetitionformobilecapital,asunderscoredbyWeber,butalsowiththeformationofpoliticalstructuresendowedwithever-moreextensiveandcomplexorganizationalcapabilitiestocontrolthesocialandpoliticalenvironmentofcapitalaccumulationonaworld-scale.Overthelastfivehundredyearsthesetwounderlyingconditionsofcapitalistexpansionhavebeencontinuallyrecreatedinparallelwithoneanother.Wheneverworld-scaleprocessesofcapitalaccumulationasinstitutedatanygiventimeattainedtheirlimits,longperiodsofinterstatestruggleensued,duringwhichthestatethatcontrolledorcametocontrolthemostabundantsourcesofsurpluscapitaltendedalsotoacquiretheorganizationalcapabilitiesneededtopromote,organize,andregulateanewphaseofcapitalistexpansionofgreaterscaleandscopethantheprecedingone.

    Asarule,acquiringtheseorganizationalcapabilitieswasfarmoretheresultofpositionaladvantagesinthechangingspatialconfigurationofthecapitalistworld-economythanofinnovationassuch.Braudel(1977:66-7)goesasfarassayingthatinnovationplayednorolewhatsoeverinthesuccessivespatialshiftsofthecenterofsystemicprocessesofaccumulation:AmsterdamcopiedVenice,asLondonwouldsubsequentlycopyAmsterdam,andasNewYorkwouldonedaycopyLondon.Asweshallsee,thisprocessofimitationwasfarmorecomplexthanthesimplesequenceoutlinedhereimplies.Eachshiftwillbeshowntohavebeenassociatedwithatrueorganizationalrevolutioninthestrategiesandstructuresoftheleadingagencyofcapitalistexpansion.Nevertheless,Braudelscontentionthattheshiftsreflectedthevictoryofanewregionoveranoldonecombinedwithavastchangeofscalewillstand.

    TheflowsofcapitalfromdecliningtorisingcentersthatMarxnotedweretheinstrumentofattemptsonthepartofdecliningcenterstolaysomeclaimtothelarge-scalesurplusesthataccruedtothenewcenters.Flowsofthiskindhavecharacterizedallpastfinancialexpansions.Thecurrentfinancialexpansion,incontrast,issaidtodivergefromthispattern.

    AsweshalldocumentintheEpilogue,thecurrentfinancialexpansionhaswitnessedtheexplosivegrowthofJapanandlesserEastAsianstatestoanewcenterofworld-scaleprocessesofcapitalaccumulation.Andyettherewaslittleevidenceinthe1980sofamajorflowofcapitalfromthedecliningcentertothisemergentcenter.Onthecontrary,asJoelKotkinandYorikoKishimoto(1988:123)havepointedout,afterquotingfrom

  • 16THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    thepassageinwhichMarxdescribesthesecretsupportthatdecliningleadersofprocessesofcapitalaccumulationhaveaccordedtotheirsuccessors,inastunningreversalofMarxsdictum,theUnitedStatesisnotfollowingthepatternofothercapital-exportingempires(Venice,HollandandGreatBritain),butnowisattractinganewwaveofoverseasinvestment.Intheirview,thisreversalisdueprimarilytothepullexercisedonforeigncapitalbytheUnitedStatesrelativelackofcontroloverforeignbusinessactivity,expandingpopulation,physicalexpanse,vastresources,andstatusastheworldsrichestandmostdevelopedcontinentalpower.Inpartialsupportofthiscontention,theyreporttheviewofthechiefeconomistofaJapanesebankandwell-knowneconomicnationalistHiroshiTakeuchi,accordingtowhomtheUnitedStateshasthescaleandresourcesthatJapanwillneverpossess.Asaresult,JapanesesurplusesflowedtotheUnitedStatesjustasBritishsurplusesdidinthelatenineteenthcentury.TheJapaneserolewillbetoassisttheUnitedStatesbyexportingourmoneytorebuildyoureconomy.Thisistheevidencethatoureconomyisfundamentallyweak.ThemoneygoestoAmericabecauseyouarefundamentallystrong(quotedinKotkinandKishimoto1988:122-3).

    TakeuchisviewofJapanesepowerrelativetoUSpowerisbasicallythesameasthatexpressedbySamuelHuntingtonataHarvardseminaronJapanheldin1979.AsBruceCumings(1987:64)reports,whenEzraVogelopenedtheseminarbysaying:IamreallyverytroubledwhenIthinkthroughtheconsequencesoftheriseofJapanesepower,HuntingtonsreplywasthatJapanwasinfactanextraordinarilyweakcountry.Itsmostfundamentalweaknesseswereenergy,food,andmilitarysecurity.

    Thisassessmentisbasedontheconventionalviewofinterstatepowerasconsistingprimarilyofrelativesize,self-sufficiency,andmilitaryforces.SuchaviewentirelyoverlooksthefactthatthetechnologyofpowerofcapitalismtoborrowanexpressionfromMichaelMann(1986)hasbeenquitedifferentfromterritorialism.AsWeberunderscoresinthepassagesquotedabove,andasourinvestigationwillsubstantiate,competitionformobilecapitalamonglargebutapproximatelyequalpoliticalstructureshasbeenthemostessentialandenduringfactorintheriseandexpansionofcapitalistpowerinthemodernera.Unlesswetakeintoaccounttheeffectsofthiscompetitiononthepowerofthecompetingstatesandonthepowerofthestatalandnon-statalorganizationsthatassistthemeconomicallyinthestruggle,ourassessmentsofrelationshipsofforcesintheworldsystemareboundtobefundamentallyflawed.ThecapabilitiesofsomeItaliancity-statesoverseveralcenturiestokeepatbaymilitarilyandtoinfluencepoliticallythegreatterritorialpowersoflatemedievalandearlymodernEuropewouldbeasincomprehensibleasthe

  • INTRODUCTION17

    suddencollapseanddisintegrationinthelate1980sandearly1990softhelargest,mostself-sufficient,andsecondgreatestmilitarypowerofourtimes:theUSSR.

    ItisnoaccidentthattheseemingreversalofMarxsdictumnotedbyKotkinandKishimotooccurredinthemidstofasuddenescalationofthearmamentsraceandpolitical-ideologicalstrugglebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheUSSRFredHallidays(1986)SecondColdWar.Norisitbychancethatthefinancialexpansionofthe1970sand1980sattaineditsmomentofgreatestsplendorpreciselyatthetimeofthissuddenescalation.ToparaphraseMarx,itwasatthistimethatthealienationoftheUSstateproceededfasterthaneverbefore;andtoparaphraseWeber,itwasatthistimethatthecompetitionformobilecapitalbetweenthetwolargestpoliticalstructuresintheworldcreatedforcapitalismanextraordinarynewopportunityforself-expansion.

    TheflowofcapitalfromJapantotheUnitedStatesintheearly1980smustbeseeninthiscontext.PoliticalconsiderationsinspiredbyJapansdependenceon,andsubordinationto,USworldpowernodoubtplayedacriticalroleinpromptingJapanesecapitaltoassisttheUnitedStatesintheescalationofthepowerstruggle,asTakeuchiseemstoimply.Nevertheless,assubsequenteventshaveshown,politicalconsiderationswereinseparablefromconsiderationsofprofit.

    Inthisrespect,theflowofcapitalfromJapantotheUnitedStateswasnotasanomalousasKotkinandKishimotothought.Itwassomewhatanalogoustothefinancialassistancethattherisingcapitalistpower(theUnitedStates)gavethedecliningcapitalistpower(theUnitedKingdom)inthetwoworldwars.TheAnglo-Germanconfrontations,unliketheUSSovietconfrontationofthe1980s,were,ofcourse,hotratherthancold.Butthefinancialrequirementsofthetwoconfrontationsandtheprofitsthatcouldbeexpectedfrombackingthewinnerwerenonethelesscomparable.

    ThemaindifferencebetweenUSfinancialassistancetoBritaininthetwoworldwarsandJapanesefinancialassistancetotheUnitedStatesintheSecondColdWarliesintheoutcomes.WhereastheUnitedStatesreapedenormousbenefits,Japandidnot.Asweshallseeinchapter4,thetwoworldwarsandtheiraftermathweredecisivemomentsintheredistributionofassetsfromBritaintotheUnitedStateswhichhastenedthechangeofleadershipinsystemicprocessesofcapitalaccumulation.DuringandaftertheSecondColdWar,incontrast,therewasnocomparableredistribution.Infact,Japanprobablynevergotitsmoneyback.

    ThegreatestlossesweresufferedasaconsequenceofthefallinthevalueoftheUSdollarafter1985.Thismeantthatmoneyborrowedingreatlyovervalueddollarswasservicedandrepaidinundervalued

  • 18THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    dollars.ThelossesinflictedonJapanesecapitalbythedevaluationweresuchthatJapanesebusinessandtheJapanesegovernmentwithdrewtheirpreviouslyunconditionalfinancialsupportfortheUSgovernment.Inmid-1987JapaneseprivateinvestorsreversedtheirexportofcapitaltotheUnitedStatesforthefirsttimesincetheearly1980s.AndafterthestockmarketcrashofOctober1987,theJapaneseMinistryofFinancedidnothingtoencouragefinancialintermediariestosupporttheimportantauctionofUSgovernmentdebtheldinNovember1987(Helleiner1992:434).

    ThedifficultiesJapanmetinwieldingitsincreasingcommandoversurpluscapitalinordertoredistributeassetsfromUStoJapanesecontrolwerenotsimplytheresultofthehistoricallyunprecedentedpowerofUSpublicandprivateagencies,actinginconcert,tomanipulatedemandandsupply,interestrates,andratesofexchangeinworldfinancialmarkets.TheacquisitionofmaterialassetsintheUnitedStatespresenteddifficultiesofitsown.AsfarasJapanesecapitalwasconcerned,theworldsrichestandmostdevelopedcontinentalpowerprovedtobenotasdevoidofcontroloverforeignbusinessasKotkinandKishimotothought.

    Thiscontrolhasbeenmoreinformalthanformal,butisnolessrealforallthat.TherehavebeenculturalbarriersofthekindbestepitomizedbythehystericalreactiontriggeredinandbytheUSmediawhenJapanesecapitalboughttheRockefellerCenterinNewYorkCity.SinceJapanesepurchasesofUSrealestatepaledincomparisonwithEuropean,Canadian,andAustralianpurchases,thereactionsentthemessagetobuyersandsellersalikethatJapanesemoneydidnothavequitethesamerighttoacquireUSassetsasdidthemoneyofforeignersofEuropeanstock.

    IfthemassmediahavebeenthechiefprotagonistsinerectingculturalbarrierstothetransferofUSassetstoJapanesecapital,theUSgovernmenthasplayeditspartbyerectingpoliticalbarriers.ItwelcomedJapanesemoneytofinanceitsdeficitandpublicdebtandtoestablishproductionfacilitiesthatcreatedjobsintheUnitedStatesandreducedtheUSbalanceofpaymentsdeficit.Butitstronglydiscouragedthatsamemoneyfromtakingoverprofitablebutstrategicallysensitiveenterprises.Thus,inMarch1987protestsfromtheSecretaryofDefense,CasparWeinbergenandSecretaryofCommerce,MalcomBaldridge,convincedFujitsuthatitwouldbeprudenttowithdrawitsattempttotakeovertheFairchildSemiconductorCorporation.Yet,asStephenKrasner(1988:29)remarked:FairchildwasownedbytheFrenchcompanySchlumberger,sotheissuewasnotsimplyoneofforeignownership.

    Whatculturalandpoliticalbarrierscouldnotstop,thebarrierstoentrybuiltintotheverystructureofUScorporatecapitalismdid.ThecomplexitiesofUScorporatelifeprovedtobemoreinsurmountable

  • INTRODUCTION19

    barrierstoentryforJapanesemoneythanculturalhostilityandpoliticalmistrust.ThebiggesteverJapanesetakeoversintheUnitedStatesSonystakeoverofColumbiaPicturesin1989,andMatsushitastakeoverofMCAthefollowingyearfailedcompletelyintheirobjective.WhentheSonydealwasstruck,themediaover-reactedandNewswee/escovertalkedofJapansinvasionofHollywood.Andyet,asBillEmmottwroteintheop-edpageoftheNewYorkTimes(26November1993:A19),

    lessthantwoyearspassedbeforeitbecameclearthatthescaresandhyperbolehadgotitwrong....[T]heJapaneseinvasionofU.S.businesshasbeennosuchthing.EventhebestJapanesecompanieshavemadespectacularandcostlymistakesandhavenottakencontrolevenofthebusinessestheypurchased,letaloneofcultureandtechnology.(seealsoEmmott1993)

    Inshort,therealanomalyofUSJapaneserelationsduringthecurrentfinancialexpansionisnotthatJapanesecapitalflowedtotheUnitedStatesintheearly1980s;rather,itisthatJapanesecapitalbenefitedsolittlefromassistingtheUnitedStateseconomicallyinthefinalescalationoftheColdWarwiththeformerUSSR.Isthisanomalysymptomaticofafundamentalchangeinthemechanismsofinterstatecompetitionformobilecapitalwhichhavepropelledandsustainedtheexpansionofcapitalistpoweroverthelastsixhundredyears?

    Thesemechanismshaveaclearbuilt-inlimit.Capitalistpowerintheworldsystemcannotexpandindefinitelywithoutundermininginterstatecompetitionformobilecapitalonwhichtheexpansionrests.Soonerorlaterapointwillbereachedwherethealliancesbetweenthepowersofstateandcapitalthatareformedinresponsetothiscompetitionbecomesoformidablethattheyeliminatethecompetitionitselfand,therefore,thepossibilityfornewcapitalistpowersofahigherordertoemerge.ArethedifficultiesmetbytheemergingstructuresofJapanesecapitalisminprofitingfrominterstatecompetitionformobilecapitalasymptomofthefactthatthispointhasbeenreached,orisabouttobereached?Or,torephraseit,dothestructuresofUScapitalismconstitutetheultimatelimitofthesixcenturies-longprocessthroughwhichcapitalistpowerhasattaineditspresent,seeminglyallencompassingscaleandscope?

    Inseekingplausibleanswerstothesequestions,thecomplementaryinsightsofWeberandMarxconcerningtheroleofhighfinanceinthemoderneramustbesupplementedbyAdamSmithsinsightsconcerningtheprocessofworldmarketformation.LikeMarxafterhim,SmithsawintheEuropeandiscoveriesofAmericaandofapassagetotheEastIndiesviatheCapeofGoodHopeadecisiveturningpointinworldhistory.He

  • 20THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    wasnonethelessfarlesssanguinethanMarxabouttheultimatebenefitsoftheseeventsforhumanity:

    Theirconsequenceshavealreadybeengreat;but,intheshortperiodofbetweentwoandthreecenturieswhichhaselapsedsincethesediscoveriesweremade,itisimpossiblethatthewholeextentoftheirconsequencescanhavebeenseen.Whatbenefits,orwhatmisfortunestomankindmayhereafterresultfromtheseevents,nohumanwisdomcanforesee.Byuniting,insomemeasure,themostdistantpartsoftheworld,byenablingthemtorelieveoneanotherswants,toincreaseoneanothersenjoyments,andtoencourageoneanothersindustry,theirgeneraltendencywouldseemtobebeneficial.Tothenatives,however,bothoftheEastandWestIndies,allthecommercialbenefitswhichcanhaveresultedfromtheseeventshavebeensunkandlostinthedreadfulmisfortuneswhichtheyhaveoccasioned.Thesemisfortunes,however,seemtohavearisenratherfromaccidentthanfromanythinginthenatureofthoseeventsthemselves.Attheparticulartimewhenthesediscoveriesweremade,thesuperiorityofforcehappenedtobesogreatonthesideoftheEuropeans,thattheywereenabledtocommitwithimpunityeverysortofinjusticeinthoseremotecountries.Hereafter,perhaps,thenativesofthosecountriesmaygrowstronger,orthoseofEuropemaygrowweaker,andtheinhabitantsofallthedifferentquartersoftheworldmayarriveatthatequalityofcourageandforcewhich,byinspiringmutualfear,canaloneoverawetheinjusticeofindependentnationsintosomesortofrespectfortherightsofoneanother.Butnothingseemsmorelikelytoestablishthisequalityofforcethanthatmutualcommunicationofknowledgeandofallsortsofimprovementswhichanextensivecommercefromallcountriestoallcountriesnaturally,orrathernecessarily,carriesalongwithit.(Smith

    1961:II,141;emphasisadded)

    TheprocesssketchedinthispassagepresentssomestrikingsimilaritieswithBraudelsviewoftheformationofacapitalistworld-economy:thefortunesoftheconqueringWestandthemisfortunesoftheconquerednon-Westasjointoutcomesofasinglehistoricalprocess;thelongtimehorizonneededtodescribeandassesstheconsequencesofthissinglehistoricalprocess;andmostimportantforourpresentpurposes,thecentralityofforceindeterminingthedistributionofcostsandbenefitsamongparticipantsinthemarketeconomy.

    Smith,ofcourse,didnotusethetermcapitalismatermintroducedinthevocabularyofthesocialsciencesonlyinthetwentiethcentury.Yet,hisassessmentthatsuperiorityofforcewasthemostimportantfactorinenablingtheconqueringWesttoappropriatemostofthebenefitsandtoimposeontheconquerednon-Westmostofthecostsofthewidermarketeconomyestablishedasaresultoftheso-calledDiscoveries,parallelsBraudelsassessmentthatthefusionofstateandcapitalwasthe

  • INTRODUCTION21

    vitalingredientintheemergenceofadistinctlycapitalistlayerontopof,andinantithesisto,thelayerofmarketeconomy.Asweshallseeinchapter3,inSmithsschemeofthingslarge-scaleprofitscanbemaintainedforanylengthoftimeonlythroughrestrictivepractices,buttressedbystatepower,whichconstrainanddisruptthenaturaloperationofthemarketeconomy.Inthisschemeofthings,asinBraudels,theupperlayerofmerchantsandmanufacturerswhocommonlyemploythelargestcapitals,andwhobytheirwealthdrawtothemselvesthegreatestshareofthepublicconsideration(Smith1961:I,278)istrulytheanti-market,Braudelscontra-mart/76.

    However,BraudelsandSmithsconceptionsoftherelationshipbetweenthemarketeconomyanditscapitalistantithesisdifferinoneimportantrespect.ForBraudeltherelationshipisfundamentallystatic.Heneitherseesnorforeseesanysynthesisemergingfromthestrugglebetweenthesisandantithesis.Smith,incontrast,doesseesuchasynthesisemergingoutofthewitheringawayofinequalityofforceundertheimpactoftheveryprocessofworldmarketformation.Asthelastsentenceofthepassagequotedaboveindicates,SmiththoughtthatthewideninganddeepeningofexchangesintheworldmarketeconomywouldactasanunstoppableequalizerofrelationshipsofforcebetweentheWestandthenon-West.

    Amoredialecticalconceptionofhistoricalprocessesisnotnecessarilymoreaccuratethanalessdialecticalone.Asitturnedout,formorethan150yearsafterSmithadvancedthethesisofthecorrosiveimpactofprocessesofworldmarketformationonthesuperiorityofforceoftheWest,theinequalityofforcebetweenWestandnon-Westincreasedratherthandecreased.Worldmarketformationandthemilitaryconquestofthenon-Westproceededintandem.Bythe1930s,onlyJapanhadfullyescapedthemisfortunesofWesternconquest,butonlybyitselfbecominganhonorarymemberoftheconqueringWest.

    Then,duringandaftertheSecondWorldWar,thewheelturned.ThroughoutAsiaandAfricaoldsovereigntieswerere-establishedandscoresofnewoneswerecreated.Tobesure,massivedecolonizationwasaccompaniedbytheestablishmentofthemostextensiveandpotentiallydestructiveapparatusofWesternforcetheworldhadeverseen.Thefarflungnetworkofquasi-permanentoverseasmilitarybasesputinplacebytheUnitedStatesduringandaftertheSecondWorldWar,Krasner(1988:21)notes,waswithouthistoricalprecedent;nostatehadpreviouslybaseditsowntroopsonthesovereignterritoryofotherstatesinsuchextensivenumbersforsolongapeacetimeperiod.Andyet,onthebattlefieldsofIndochina,thisworld-encompassingmilitaryapparatusprovedtobewhollyinadequatetothetaskofcoercingoneofthepoorestnationsonearthtoitswill.

  • 22THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    ThesuccessfulresistanceoftheVietnamesepeoplemarkedtheapogeeofaprocessinitiatedbytheRussianRevolutionof1917,wherebytheWestandnon-WestwerereshuffledintoatripartitegroupingconsistingofaFirst,Second,andThirdWorld.Whilethehistoricalnon-WestcametobegroupedalmostentirelyintheThirdWorld,thehistoricalWestsplitintothreedistinctcomponents.Itsmoreprosperouscomponents(NorthAmerica,WesternEurope,andAustralia)joinedbyJapan,cametoconstitutetheFirstWorld.Oneofitslessprosperouscomponents(theUSSRandEasternEurope)cametoconstitutetheSecondWorld,andanother(LatinAmerica)joinedthenon-WesttoconstitutetheThirdWorld.PartlyacauseandpartlyaneffectofthistripartitefissionofthehistoricalWest,thefortunesofthenon-WestfromtheendoftheSecondWorldWartotheVietnamWarseemedtobeintheascendant.

    WritingforthebicentenaryofthepublicationoftheW/ealt/7ofNations,andshortlyaftertheUnitedStateshaddecidedtowithdrawfromVietnam,PaoloSylos-Labini(1976:230-2)speculatedonwhetherSmithsvisionwasabouttoberealizedwhetherthetimehadfinallycomewhentheinhabitantsofallthedifferentquartersoftheworld...arriveatthatequalityofcourageandforcewhich,byinspiringmutualfear,canaloneoverawetheinjusticeofindependentnationsintosomesortofrespectfortherightsofoneanother.Theeconomicconjuncturealsoseemedtosignalthatsomeequalizationofrelationshipofforcesintheworldsystematlargewasimminent.ThenaturalresourcesofThirdWorldcountrieswereingreatdemand,aswastheirabundantandcheaplabor.AgentsofFirstWorldbankerswerequeuingupintheante-chambersofThird(andSecond)Worldgovernmentsofferingatbargainpricestheoverabundantcapitalthatcouldnotfindprofitableinvestmentintheirhomecountries.TermsoftradehadturnedsharplyagainstthecapitalistWest,andtheincomegapbetweenFirstandThirdWorldcountriesseemedtobenarrowing.

    Withinsixyears,though,ithadbecomeclearthatanyhope(orfear)ofanimminentequalizationoftheopportunitiesofthepeoplesoftheworldtobenefitfromthecontinuingprocessofworldmarketformationwas,tosaytheleast,premature.UScompetitionformobilecapitalinworldmoneymarketstofinanceboththeSecondColdWarandthebuyingofelectoralvotesathomethroughtaxcuts,suddenlydriedupthesupplyoffundstoThirdandSecondWorldcountriesandtriggeredamajorcontractioninworldpurchasingpower.TermsoftradeswungbackinfavorofthecapitalistWestasfastandassharplyastheyhadswungagainstitinthe1970s,andtheincomegapbetweenthecapitalistWestandtherestoftheworldbecamewiderthanever

    (Arrighi1991

  • INTRODUCTION23

    Nevertheless,thebacklashdidnotrestorethestatusquoante.Ontheonehand,thesuperiorityofforceofthecapitalistWestseemedtohavebecomegreaterthanever.Disorientedanddisorganizedbytheincreasingturbulenceoftheworld-economy,andhardpressedbytheSecondColdWar,theUSSRwassqueezedoutofthesuperpowerbusiness.Insteadofhavingtwosuperpowerstoplayoffagainstoneanother,ThirdWorldcountriesnowhadtocompetewiththefragmentsoftheSovietempireingainingaccesstothemarketsandresourcesofthecapitalistWest.AndthecapitalistWest,underUSleadership,movedquicklytotakeadvantageofthesituationtotightenitsdefactoglobalmonopolyofthelegitimateuseofviolence.

    Ontheotherhand,superiorityofforceandthecapitalistaccumulationofcapitalseemedtodivergegeopoliticallyasneverbefore.ThedeclineofSovietpowerwasmatchedbytheemergenceofwhatBruceCumings(1993:25-6)hasaptlycalledthecapitalistarchipelagoofEastandSoutheastAsia.Thisarchipelagoconsistsofseveralislandsofcapitalism,whichriseaboveaseaofhorizontalexchangesamonglocalandworldmarketsthroughthecentralizationwithintheirdomainsoflarge-scaleprofitsandhighvalue-addedactivities.Belowthissealiethehuge,low-cost,andhighlyindustriouslaboringmassesoftheentireEastandSoutheastAsianregions,intowhichthecapitalistislandsthrusttheirrootsbutwithoutprovidingthemwiththemeansneededtorisetoorabovesealevel.

    Japanisbyfarthelargestamongthesecapitalistislands.Lesserislandsofthecapitalistarchipelagoarethecity-statesofSingaporeandHongKong,thegarrisonstateofTaiwan,andthehalfnationstateofSouthKorea.Noneofthesestatesispowerfulbyconventionalstandards.HongKonghasnotevenattainednorprobablywilleverattainfullsovereignty.ThethreebiggerstatesJapan,SouthKorea,andTaiwanarewhollydependentontheUnitedStatesnotjustformilitaryprotectionbutalsoformuchoftheirenergyandfoodsuppliesaswellasfortheprofitabledisposaloftheirmanufactures.Yet,collectively,thecompetitivenessoftheEastandSoutheastAsiancapitalistarchipelagoasthenewworkshopoftheworldisthesinglemostimportantfactorforcingthetraditionalcentersofcapitalistpowerWesternEuropeandNorthAmericatorestructureandreorganizetheirownindustries,theirowneconomies,andtheirownwaysoflife.

    Whatkindofpoweristhisthatevenanexperteyecanhardlydiscern?Isitanewkindofsuperiorityofforceor,rather,thebeginningoftheendofthesuperiorityofforceonwhich,overthelastfivehundredyears,thecapitalistfortunesoftheWesthavebeenbuilt?IscapitalisthistoryabouttoendthroughtheformationofatrulyglobalworldempirebasedontheenduringsuperiorityofforceoftheWestasMaxWeberseemedto

  • 24THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    envisage,orisitgoingtoendthroughtheformationofaworldmarketeconomyinwhichthesuperiorityofforceoftheWestwithersawayasAdamSmithseemedtoenvisage?

    Inseekingplausibleanswerstothesequestionsweshallproceedbysuccessiveapproximations.Chapter1focusesontheprocessofformationandexpansionofthemoderninterstatesystemastheprimarylocusofworldpower.TheearliestbeginningsofthisprocesswillbetracedtotheformationinlatemedievalEuropeofanorthernItaliansub-systemofcapitalistcity-states.Thissub-systemwasandremainedanenclaveofthedisintegratingmodeofruleofmedievalEuropeaformofwarlordismsubjectedtoandheldtogetherbythedualsystemicpowerofpopeandemperor.Itnonethelessprefigured,andunintentionallycreatedtheconditionsfor,theemergencetwocenturieslaterofthelargerWestphaliasystemofnationstates.

    Theglobalexpansionofthissystemwillthenbedescribedasconsistingofaseriesoftransitions,inthecourseofwhichthesystemaspreviouslyinstitutedbrokedown,onlytobereconstitutedonwidersocialfoundations.ThispreliminaryanalysisendswiththelatetwentiethcenturycrisisoftheenlargedandthoroughlytransformedWestphaliaSystem.Indiagnosingthesymptomsofthepresentcrisis,anewresearchagendawillbeformulatedwhichfocusesmoredirectlyonthespaceof-flowsofbusinessorganizationsthanonthespace-of-placesofgovernments.Itisatthispointthatourconstructionandcomparisonofsystemiccyclesofaccumulationwillbegin.

    ThecomparativeanalysisthroughwhichsystemiccyclesofaccumulationwillbeconstructedfollowstheprocedurethatPhilipMcMichael(1990)hascalledincorporatingcomparison.Thecyclesarenotpresumedbutconstructed,bothfactuallyandtheoretically,withtheexplicitpurposeofgainingsomeunderstandingofthelogicandlikelyoutcomeofthepresentfinancialexpansion.Thecomparisonisincorporatedintotheverydefinitionoftheresearchproblem:itconstitutesthesubstanceratherthantheframeworkoftheinquiry.Thecyclesthatemergefromtheinquiryareneithersubordinatedpartsofapreconceivedwhole,norindependentinstancesofacondition;theyareinterconnectedinstancesofasinglehistoricalprocessofcapitalistexpansionwhichtheythemselvesconstituteandmodify.

    Chapter2constructsthefirsttwoinstancesofthissinglehistoricalprocessofcapitalistexpansion:theGenoeseandtheDutchcycles.Chapter3addsanewstagetotheprocessbydefiningthethird(British)cycleandcomparingitwiththefirsttwo.Theconcludingsectionofthechaptermakesexplicitandseekssomeplausibleexplanationforthepatternofrecurrenceandevolutionrevealedbythecomparativeanalysisofthefirstthreecycles.Thestageisthussetfortheconstructionin

  • INTRODUCTION25

    chapter4ofthefourth(US)systemiccycleofaccumulation,portrayedasanoutgrowthoftheprecedingcyclesandthematrixofourtimes.IntheEpilogueweshallreturntothequestionsthatwehaveraisedinthisIntroduction.

    Thisreconstructionofcapitalisthistoryhasitsownlimitation.Thenotionofsystemiccycleofaccumulation,wehavenoted,derivesdirectlyfromBraudelsnotionofcapitalismasthetoplayerofthehierarchyoftheworldoftrade.Ouranalyticalconstruct,therefore,focusesonthattoplayerandoffersalimitedviewofwhatgoesoninthemiddlelayerofmarketeconomyandthebottomlayerofmateriallife.Thisissimultaneouslythemainstrengthandthemainweaknessoftheconstruct.Itisitsmainstrengthbecausethetoplayeristherealhomeofcapitalismandatthesametimeitislesstransparentandlessexploredthantheintermediatelayerofthemarketeconomy.Thetransparencyoftheactivitiesthatconstitutethelayerofmarketeconomyandthewealthofdata(particularlyquantitativedata)thattheseactivitiesgenerate,havemadethisintermediatelayertheprivilegedarenaofhistoricalsocialscienceandeconomics.Thelayersbelowandabovethemarketeconomyareinsteadshadowyzones(zonesdbpacite).Thebottomlayerofmateriallifeishardtoseeforlackofadequatehistoricaldocuments.Theupperlayer,incontrast,ishardtoseebecauseoftheactualinvisibilityorthecomplexityoftheactivitiesthatconstituteit

    (Braudel1981:23-4;Wallerstein1991:208-9):

    Atthisexaltedlevel,afewwealthymerchantsineighteenth-centuryAmsterdamorsixteenthcenturyGenoacouldthrowwholesectorsoftheEuropeanorevenworldeconomyintoconfusion,fromadistance.Certaingroupsofprivilegedactorsareengagedincircuitsandcalculationsthatordinarypeopleknewnothingof.Foreignexchange,forexample,whichwastiedtodistanttrademovementsandtothecomplicatedarrangementsforcredit,wasasophisticatedartopenonlytoafewinitiatesatmost.Tome,thissecondshadowyzone,hoveringabovethesunlitworldofthemarketeconomyandconstitutingitsupperlimitsotospeak,representsthefavoreddomainofcapitalism....Withoutthiszone,capitalismisunthinkable:thisiswhereittakesupresidenceandprospers.(Braudel1981:24)

    Systemiccyclesofaccumulationaremeanttothrowsomelightonthisshadowyzonewithoutwhichcapitalismisunthinkable.Theyarenotmeanttotelluswhatgoesoninthelowerlayers,exceptforwhatisdirectlyrelevanttothedynamicofthesystemiccyclesthemselves.This,ofcourse,leavesmuchoutofsightorinthedark,includingtheprivilegedarenasofworldsystemsstudies:core-peripheryandlabor-capitalrelations.Butwecannotdoeverythingatonce.

  • 26THELONGTWENTIETHCENTURY

    Marx(1959:176)invitedustotakeleaveforatimeof[the]noisysphere[ofcirculation],whereeverythingtakesplaceonthesurfaceandinviewofallmen,andfollow[thepossessorofmoneyandthepossessoroflabor-power]intothehiddenabodeofproduction,onwhosethresholdtherestaresusinthefaceNoadmittanceexceptonbusiness.Here,hepromised,[w]eshallatlastforcethesecretofprofitmaking.Braudelalsoinvitedustotakeleaveforatimeofthenoisyandtransparentsphereofthemarketeconomy,andfollowthepossessorofmoneyintoanotherhiddenabode,whereadmittanceisonlyonbusinessbutwhichisonefloorabove,ratherthanonefloorbelowthemarketplace.Here,thepossessorofmoneymeetsthepossessor,notoflabor-power,butofpoliticalpower.Andhere,promisedBraudel,weshallforcethesecretofmakingthoselargeandregularprofitsthathasenabledcapitalismtoprosperandexpandendlesslyoverthelastfivetosixhundredyears,beforeandafteritsventuresintothehiddenabodesofproduction.

    Thesearecomplementaryprojects,notalternativeones.However,wecannotgotothetopandthebottomfloorsatthesametime.GenerationsofhistoriansandsocialscientistshavetakenupMarxsinvitationandhaveextensivelyexploredthebottomfloor.Insodoing,theymaynothavediscoveredthesecretofprofit-makingintheindustrialphaseofcapitalism,buttheyhavecertainlydiscoveredmanyofitssecrets.Thendependencyandworldsystemtheoristsandpractitionershaveinvitedustohaveanotherlookatthemiddlefloorofmarketeconomytoseehowitslawstendtopolarizethehiddenabodesofproductionintocoreandperipherallocales.Inthiswaymoreofthesecretsofprofit-makinghavebeenexposed.Butfewhaveventuredtothetopflooroftheanti-marketwhere,inthewordsofBraudelshyperbole,thegreatpredatorsroamandthelawoftheungleoperatesandwherethesecretsofthelonguedureofhistoricalcapitalismaresaidtobehidden.

    Todaywhenworldcapitalismseemstobeprospering,notbythrustingitsrootsmoredeeplyintothelowerlayersofmateriallifeandmarketeconomy,butbypullingthemoutisasgoodatimeasanytotakeupBraudelsinvitationandexploretherealhomeofcapitalismonthetopfloorofthehouseoftrade.Thatandthatonlyiswhatweareabouttoundertake.

    Itfollowsthatourconstructionisbothpartialandsomewhatindeterminate.Partialbecauseitseekssomeunderstandingofthelogicofthepresentfinancialexpansionabstractingfromthemovementsthatgoonundertheirownsteamandlawsatthelevelsoftheworldsmarketeconomiesandoftheworldsmaterialcivilizations.Itissomewhatindeterminateforthesamereason.Thelogicofthetoplayerisonlyrelativelyautonomousfromthelogicsofthelowerlayersandcanbefullyunderstoodonlyinrelationtotheseotherlogics.

  • INTRODUCTION27

    Certainly,asourconstructionproceeds,whatinitiallymayappeartobemerehistoricalcontingencywillbegintoappeartoreflectastructurallogic.Nevertheless,thetensionbetweenthetwokindsofappearancecannotbefullyresolvedwithinthelimitsofourresearchagenda.Afullresolutionofthetensionifthatispossiblerequiresthatwedescendagaintoexplorethelowerlayersofmarketeconomyandmateriallifewiththeknowledgeandquestionsbroughtbackfromthejourneyintothetoplayerwhichthisbookundertakes.

  • TheThreeHegemoniesofHistoricalCapitalismHegemony,Capitalism,andTerritorialism

    ThedeclineofUSworldpowersinceabout1970hasoccasionedawaveofstudiesontheriseanddeclineofhegemonies(HopkinsandWallerstein1979;Bousquet1979;1980;Wallerstein1984),corehegemonicstates(Chase-Dunn1989),worldorglobalpowers(Modelski1978;1981;1987;ModelskiandThompson1988;Thompson1988;1992),cores(Gilpin1975),andgreatpowers(Kennedy1987).Thesestudiesdifferconsiderablyintheirobjectofstudy,methodology,andconclusionsbuttheyhavetwocharacteristicsincommon.First,ifandwhentheyusethetermhegemony,theymeandominance(cf.Rapkin1990)and,second,theirfocusandemphasisisonanallegedbasicinvarianceofthesystemwithinwhichthepowerofastaterisesanddeclines.

    Mostofthesestudiesrelyonsomenotionofinnovationandleadershipindefiningtherelativecapabilitiesofstates.ForModelski,systemicinnovationsandleadershipincarryingthemoutareassumedtobethemainsourcesofworldpower.Butinallthesestudies,includingModelskis,systemicinnovationsdonotchangethebasicmechanismsthroughwhichpowerintheinterstatesystemrisesanddeclines.Infact,theinvarianceofthesemechanismsisgenerallyheldtobeoneofthecentralfeaturesoftheinterstatesystem.

    Theconceptofworldhegemonyadoptedhere,incontrast,refersspecificallytothepowerofastatetoexercisefunctionsofleadershipandgovernanceoverasystemofsovereignstates.Inprinciple,thispowermayinvolvejusttheordinarymanagementofsuchasystemasinstitutedatagiventime.Historically,however,thegovernmentofasystemofsovereignstateshasalwaysinvolvedsomekindoftransformativeaction,whichchangedthemodeofoperationofthesysteminafundamentalway.

    28

  • THETHREEHEGEMONIESOFHISTORICALCAPITALISM29

    Thispowerissomethingmoreanddifferentfromdominancepureandsimple.Itisthepowerassociatedwithdominanceexpandedbytheexerciseofintellectualandmoralleadership.AsAntonioGramsciemphasized,withreferencetohegemonyatthenationallevel,

    thesupremacyofasocialgroupmanifestsitselfintwoways,asdominationandasintellectualandmoralleadership.Asocialgroupdominatesantagonisticgroups,whichittendstoliquidate,ortosubjugateperhapsevenbyarmedforce;itleadskindredoralliedgroups.Asocialgroupcan,andindeedmust,alreadyexerciseleadershipbeforewinninggovernmentalpower(thisindeedisoneoftheprincipalconditionsforwinningsuchpower);itsubsequentlybecomesdominantwhenitexercisespower,butevenifitholdsitfirmlyinitsgrasp,itmustcontinuetoleadaswell.(Gramsci1971:578)

    ThisisareformulationofMachiavellisconceptionofpowerasacombinationofconsentandcoercion.Coercionimpliestheuseofforce,oracrediblethreatofforce;consentimpliesmoralleadership.Inthisdichotomythereisnoroomforthemostdistinctiveinstrumentofcapitalistpower:controlovermeansofpayment.InGramscisconceptualizationofpowerthegreyareathatliesbetweencoercionandconsentisoccupiedbycorruptionandfraud:

    Betweenconsentandforcestandscorruption/fraud(whichischaracteristicofcertainsituationswhenitishardtoexercisethehegemonicfunction,andwhentheuseofforceistoorisky).Thisconsistsinprocuringthedemoralizationandparalysisoftheantagonist(orantagonists)bybuyingitsleaderseithercovertly,or,incaseofimminentdanger,openlyinordertosowdisarrayandconfusioninitsranks.(Gramsci1971:80n)

    Inourschemeofthings,muchmorethanmerecorruptionandfraudstandsinthegreyareabetweencoercionandconsent.Butuntilweturntoexplorethisareathroughtheconstructionofsystemiccyclesofaccumulation,weshallassumethatnoautonomoussourceofworldpowerliesbetweencoercionandconsent.Whereasdominancewillbeconceivedofasrestingprimarilyoncoercion,hegemonywillbeunderstoodastheadditionalpowerthataccruestoadominantgroupbyvirtueofitscapacitytoplacealltheissuesaroundwhichconflictragesonauniversalplane.

    ItistruethattheStateisseenastheorganofoneparticulargroup,destinedtocreatefavorableconditionsforthelattersmaximumexpansion.Butthedevelopmentandexpansionoftheparticulargroupareconceivedof,andpresented,asbeingthemotorforceofauniversalexpansion,adevelopmentofallthenationalenergies.(Gramsci1971:181-2)

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    Theclaimofthedominantgrouptorepresentthegeneralinterestisalwaysmoreorlessfraudulent.Nevertheless,followingGramsci,weshallspeakofhegemonyonlywhentheclaimisatleastpartlytrueandaddssomethingtothepowerofthedominantgroup.Asituationinwhichtheclaimofthedominantgrouptorepresentthegeneralinterestispurelyfraudulentwillbedefinedasasituationnotofhegemonybutofthefailureofhegemony.

    Sincethewordhegemony,initsetymologicalsenseofleadershipandinitsderivedsenseofdominance,normallyreferstorelationsbetweenstates,itisentirelypossiblethatGramsciwasusingthetermmetaphoricallytoclarifyrelationsbetweensocialgroupsthroughananalogywithrelationsbetweenstates.IntransposingGramscisconceptofsocialhegemonyfromintra-staterelationstointerstaterelationsasArrighi(1982),Cox(1983;1987),Keohane(1984a),Gill(1986;1993),andGillandLaw(1988)amongothersdoexplicitlyorimplicitlywemaysimplyberetracinginreverseGramscismentalprocess.Insodoingwearefacedwithtwoproblems.

    Thefirstconcernsthedoublemeaningofleadership,particularlywhenappliedtorelationsbetweenstates.Adominantstateexercisesahegemonicfunctionifitleadsthesystemofstatesinadesireddirectionand,insodoing,isperceivedaspursuingageneralinterest.Itisthiskindofleadershipthatmakesthedominantstatehegemonic.Butadominantstatemayleadalsointhesensethatitdrawsotherstatesontoitsownpathofdevelopment.BorrowinganexpressionfromJosephSchumpeter(1963:89),thissecondkindofleadershipcanbedesignatedasleadershipagainstonesownwillbecause,overtime,itenhancescompetitionforpowerratherthanthepowerofthehegemon.Thesetwokindsofleadershipmaycoexistatleastforatime.Butitisonlyleadershipinthefirstsensethatdefinesasituationashegemonic.

    Thesecondproblemconcernsthefactthatitismoredifficulttodefineageneralinterestattheleveloftheinterstatesystemthanitisatthelevelofindividualstates.Atthelevelofindividualstates,anincreaseinthepowerofthestatevi:-a-vi:otherstatesisanimportantcomponentandinitselfameasureofthesuccessfulpursuitofageneral(thatis,national)interest.Butpowerinthissensecannotincreaseforthesystemofstatesasawhole,bydefinition.Itcan,ofcourse,increaseforaparticulargroupofstatesattheexpenseofallotherstates,butthehegemonyoftheleaderofthatgroupisatbestregionalorcoalitional,notatrueworldhegemony.

    Worldhegemoniesasunderstoodherecanonlyariseifthepursuitofpowerbystatesinrelationtooneanotherisnottheonlyobjectiveofstateaction.Infact,thepursuitofpowerintheinterstatesystemisonlyonesideofthecointhatjointlydefinesthestrategyandstructureofstates

  • THETHREEI-IEGEMONIESOFHISTORICALCAPITALISM31

    quaorganizations.Theothersideisthemaximizationofpowervi:-4-2/issubjects.Astatemaythereforebecomeworldhegemonicbecauseitcancrediblyclaimtobethemotorforceofageneralexpansionofthecollectivepowerofrulers2/is-4-2/issubjects.Orconversely,astatemaybecomeworldhegemonicbecauseitcancrediblyclaimthattheexpansionofitspowerrelativetosomeorevenallotherstatesisinthegeneralinterestofthesubjectsofallstates.

    Claimsofthiskindaremostlikelytobetruthfulandcredibleinconditionsofsystemicchaos.Chaosisnotthesamethingasanarchy.Althoughthetwotermsareoftenusedinterchangeably,anunderstandingofthesystemicoriginsofworldhegemoniesrequiresthatwedistinguishbetweenthetwo.

    Anarchydesignatesabsenceofcentralrule.Inthissense,themodernsystemofsovereignstatesaswellasthesystemofruleofmedievalEuropeoutofwhichthelatteremerged,qualifyasanarchicsystems.Yet,eachofthesetwosystemshadorhasitsownimplicitandexplicitprinciples,norms,rules,andprocedureswhichjustifyourreferringtothemasorderedanarchiesoranarchicorders.

    Theconceptoforderedanarchywasfirstintroducedbyanthroplogistsseekingtoexplicatetheobservedtendencyoftribalsystemstogenerateorderoutofconflict(Evans-Pritchard1940;Gluckman1963:ch.1).Thistendencyhasbeenatworkinthemedievalandmodernsystemsofruleaswell,becauseinthesesystemstootheabsenceofcentralrulehasnotmeantlackoforganizationand,withinlimits,conflicthastendedtogenerateorder.

    Chaosandsystemicchaos,incontrast,refertoasituationoftotalandapparentlyirremediablelackoforganization.Itisasituationthatarisesbecauseconflictescalatesbeyondthethresholdwithinwhichitcallsforthpowerfulcountervailingtendencies,orbecauseanewsetofrulesandnormsofbehaviorisimposedon,orgrowsfromwithin,anoldersetofrulesandnormswithoutdisplacingit,orbecauseofacombinationofthesetwocircumstances.Assystemicchaosincreases,thedemandforordertheoldorder,aneworder,anyorder!tendstobecomemoreandmoregeneralamongrulers,oramongsubjects,orboth.Whicheverstateorgroupofstatesisinapositiontosatisfythissystem-widedemandfororderisthuspresentedwiththeopportunityofbecomingworldhegemonic.

    Historically,thestatesthathavesuccessfullyseizedthisopportunitydidsobyreconstitutingtheworldsystemonnewandenlargedfoundationstherebyrestoringsomemeasureofinterstatecooperation.Inotherwords,worldhegemonieshavenotrisenanddeclinedinaworldsystemthatexpandedindependentlyonthebasisofaninvariantstructure,howeverdefined.Rather,themodernworldsystemitselfhasbeenformedby,and

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    hasexpandedonthebasisof,recurrentfundamentalrestructuringsledandgovernedbysuccessivehegemonicstates.

    TheserestructuringsareacharacteristicphenomenonofthemodernsystemofrulewhichemergedoutofthedecayandeventualdisintegrationofthemedievalEuropeansystemofrule.AsjohnRuggiehasargued,thereisafundamentaldifferencebetweenthemodernandthemedieval(European)systemsofrule.Bothcanbecharacterizedasanarchic,butanarchy,inthesenseofabsenceofcentralrule,meansdifferentthings,accordingtotheprinciplesonthebasisofwhichtheunitsofthesystemareseparatedfromoneanother:Ifanarchytellsust/mtthepoliticalsystemisasegmentalrealm,differentiationtellsusonw/mtbasisthesegmentsaredetermined(Ruggie1983:274;emphasisintheoriginal).

    Themedievalsystemofruleconsistedofchainsoflord-vassalrelationships,basedonanamalgamofconditionalpropertyandprivateauthority.Asaresult,differentjuridicalinstancesweregeographicallyinterwovenandstratified,andpluralallegiances,asymmetricalsuzeraintiesandanomalousenclavesabounded(Anderson1974:37-8).Inaddition,rulingeliteswereextremelymobileacrossthespaceoftheseoverlappingpoliticaljurisdictions,beingabletotravelandassumegovernancefromoneendofthecontinenttotheotherwithouthesitationordifficulty.Finally,thissystemofrulewaslegitimatedbycommonbodiesoflaw,religion,andcustomthatexpressedinclusivenaturalrightspertainingtothesocialtotalityformedbytheconstituent

    units(Ruggie1983:275):

    Insum,thiswasquintessentiallyasystemofsegmentalrule;itwasanarchy.Butitwasaformofsegmentalterritorialrulethathadnoneoftheconnotationsofpossessivenessandexclusivenessconveyedbythemodernconceptofsovereignty.Itrepresentedaheteronomousorganizationofterritorialrights

    andclaimsofpoliticalspace.(