Giordano Bruno Teaches Aristotle

Studia Classica et Mediaevalia

Band 12

hrsg. von Paolo Fedeli und Hans-Christian Günther

Accademia di studi italo-tedeschi, Merano

Akademie deutsch-italienischer Studien, Meran

Paul Richard Blum

Giordano Bruno Teaches Aristotle

Translated by Peter Henneveld from the German Aristoteles bei Giordano Bruno, Studien zur philosophischen Rezeption. München

(Fink) 1980 (Die Geistesgeschichte und ihre Methoden 9). This publication was made possible by the Czech Science

Foundation, as part of the project GA R 14-37038G “Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context”, and by the

Center for The Humanities at Loyola University Maryland.

Verlag Traugott Bautz

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind

im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

Cover: Illustration of the coincidence of the maximum with the minimum, the straight with the curved line, and the circle with the point. From Giordano Bruno: De

triplici minimo et mensura.Frankfurt 1591, chapter 4, p. 10.

Verlag Traugott Bautz GmbH 99734 Nordhausen 2016 ISBN 978-3-95948-124-3

Table of Contents

Preface to the English Edition 7 Foreword to the German Edition 11

Introduction

a. Topic and task 15 b. Bruno’s teachings on Aristotle 21 c. Overview of the order of presentation 25 d. Preliminaries to Bruno’s method of reception 26

I. Logic

1. Aristotle’s Topics 37 2. Transcendental Logic 42 3. Ars Lulliana and Ars Memoriae 46 4. Syllogisms and Categories 52 5. Ens Rationis and Ens Reale 60

II. Cosmology

6. Location and Space 67 7. Abstraction and Extrapolation 78 8. Multitude of Worlds 90 9. The Infinite 94 10. Distinctions of the Infinite 103 11. Natural and Relative Location 109 12. The Infinite by Division 117 13. The Minimum 122 14. Time and the Atom of Time 131

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III. Principles of Nature 15. Teleology and Reason in Nature 144 16. The Concept of Nature in Bruno’s Philosophy 155 17. Matter as Substratum of Forms 159 18. The Mode of Being of Matter:

Substratum, Substance, Subject 166 19. The Principles Matter and Form 179 20. Matter in the Dialectic Oneness of Being 191 21. The Natural Principles

in the Context of the Method of Reception 199

IV. Unity and Multiplicity

22. Unity as Substance 205 23. The Unmoved Mover 213 24. Physical and Metaphysical Motion 225 25. Immanence and Transcendence

in the Unity of God and Nature 231 26. Absolute Immanence 240 27. Verification 248 28. Thought as Motion 257 29. Outcome and Conclusion 266

Abbreviations 275 Bibliography 279

Index of Names 293

Preface to the English Edition

This is a study of a pivotal moment in the history of modern philosophy: Giordano Bruno teaches how to read Aristotle.1 Bruno’s appropriation of Aristotle is a paradigmatic case of philosophy in the making through challenging past philosophy. Bruno was trained in the late scholastic philosophy and theology, as was the rule among the Dominican friars; however, he acquainted himself also with deviant traditions, for instance Platonism and Epicureanism. What is important for our understanding of philosophy in general is this: Bruno deliberately used the philosophers of the past for the sake of developing his very original positions. As will become clear in this study, he was not a historian of philosophy and, yet, he neither claimed to be solving philosophical problems just so; rather, he was aware that every philosophical problem has its history and that without such history the problem would not even exist.2 Therefore he attacked Aristotle who was the originator of a clear set of philosophical

1 Bruno was born in Nola in 1548, entered the order of the Dominicans, but soon after obtaining a doctorate, he started a journey through Europe in search of material and intellectual support. After appearances, among others, in Paris, London, Prague, Wittenberg, and Padua he was arrested and interrogated by the Inquisition in Venice and Rome; in 1600 he was condemned a heretic and burned at the stake in Rome. For details see Blum 2012 (below note 3) and Ingrid D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008. 2 As Eugenio Canone recently put it: If any paradigm is to count at all then “in making the doctrines of the past live”: “Giordano Bruno – Portrait of a Philosopher Opposed to the Authority Principle,” in Martin McLaughlin et al. (eds), Authority, Innovation and Early Modern Epistemology: Essays in Honour of Hilary Gatti. Cambridge / Leeds: Legenda, 2015, pp. 106-117; 110. Cf. Paul Richard Blum, “How to Think with the Head of Another? The Historical Dimension of Philosophical Problems”, Intellectual History Review 26 (2016), forthcoming.

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problems, as discussed in this book. In waging his anti-Aristotelian campaign Bruno proved that many problems of philosophy, most notably the notions of being and cognition, are latent in Aristotle’s method and conclusions. One successful way of solving philosophical problems, as shown paradigmatically by Bruno, consists in uncovering them at their origin, reformulating them and drawing new conclusions. In other words: the thorough study of the history of philosophy generates philosophy.

The opportunity to republish one’s book after many years in a new translation is humbling. I am grateful to my colleagues who urged me to make my book available to an English reading audience, especially Marco Sgarbi (Venice). Naturally I was tempted to edit and partially rewrite the book, but then I realized that I could not dedicate as much attention and diligence to it as I had when writing it. Hence its coherence and focus could go lost tampering with it. However, updating the book in details would not be necessary because its main message – the paradigm of philosophy in the making – needs no updates.3 Needless to say that

3 As to my own later publications on Bruno I may mention the following: Giordano Bruno: An Introduction. Translated by Peter Henneveld. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012. Early Studies of Giordano Bruno (Series of reprints: Bartholmèss 1846-47; Clemens 1847, Frith 1887; Tocco 1889-1892), 6 vols. with Introductions and Bibliographies, Bristol (Thoemmes Press) 2000. 'Istoriar la figura': Syncretism of Theories as a Model of Philosophy in Frances Yates and Giordano Bruno, in: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2003) 189-212. Franz Jacob Clemens e la lettura ultramontanistica di Bruno, in: Brunus redivivus, Momenti della fortuna di Giordano Bruno nel XIX secolo, ed. E. Canone, Pisa-Roma 1998, 67-103. Giordano Bruno, Matthias Aquarius und die eklektische Scholastik, in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 72 (1990) 275-300. “Heroic Exercises: Giordano Bruno’s De gli eroici furori as a Response to Ignatius of Loyola’s Exercitia spiritualia,” in Brunina & Campanelliana 18 (2012) 359-373. „Giordano Bruno’s Changing of Default Positions,” in Turning Traditions Upside Down: Rethinking Giordano Bruno's Enlightenment. Edited by Henning Hufnagel and Anne Eusterschulte. Budapest / New York: Central European University Press, 2013, pp. 13-18.

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many a study of Bruno – and of Renaissance philosophy in general – has come out since this book appeared in public. However, the main reason why this book merits translation and republishing is the surprising fact that there is little later research on the key topic of this book.4 This is one more reason to leave the book basically unaltered. The original bibliography contained only those works that had influence the book in the process of writing. Therefore, further additions are not needed, while, on the other hand, modern bibliographies are easily accessible.5 Bruno’s works are cited

4 Recently was published Lucia Girelli, Bruno, Aristotele e la materia (Bologna: Archetipo Libri, 2013). Our book is not cited there. For further studies related to Bruno and Aristotle see, for instance, the editions: Giordano Bruno, Acrotismo Cameracense. Le spiegazioni degli articoli di Fisica contro i peripatetici, ed. Barbara Amato, Pisa-Roma: Serra 2009; Centoventi articoli sulla natura e sull’universo contro i peripatetici – Centum et viginti articuli de natura et mundo adversus Peripateticos, ed. Eugenio Canone, Pisa-Roma: Serra 2007. Cf. also Leen Spruit, Natural Science and Human Knowledge in Giordano Bruno’s Comments on Aristotelian Physics, in The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, ed. by Cees Leijenhorst et al. Leiden-Boston: Brill 2002, pp. 349-373; Leen Spruit, “Motivi peripatetici nella gnoseologia bruniana dei Dialoghi italiani,” Verifiche, 18 (1989), 4, pp. 367-399; Rita Sturlese, “Averroe quantumque arabo et ignorante di lingua greca: Note sull’averroismo di Giordano Bruno,” Giornale critico della filolosofia italiana, 71 (1992), 2, pp. 248-275; Maurizio Cambi, “Bruno commentatore di Aristotele: il ‘De progressu et lampade venatoria logicorum,’” in Autobiografia e filosofia: l’esperienza di Giordano Bruno: atti del Convegno Trento, 18-20 maggio 2000, ed. Nestore Pirillo (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2003), 287–319; Eugenio Canone, Il dorso e il grembo dell’eterno. Percorsi della Filosofia di Giordano Bruno, Pisa-Roma: IEPI 2003, chapters III and IV on Averroes and on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Eugenio Canone, Germana Ernst (eds.), Enciclopedia bruniana e campanelliana, 2 vols., Pisa-Roma: IEPI 2006-2010. 5 The periodical Bruniana & Campanelliana publishes new studies and reviews. Additions to the bibliography of Salvestrini are available in Maria Cristina Figorilli and Alain Philippe Segonds, Per una bibliografia di Giordano Bruno: 1800-1999, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2003; Maria Elena Severini, Bibliografia

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according to the editions available when the book was written. Several new editions of the collected and of individual works have been published since. For the purpose of this book there seems to be no need to prefer one or other modern text. The originals as quoted here are easily readable online at “La biblioteca ideale di Giordano Bruno”: http://bibliotecaideale.filosofia.sns.it.

Re-reading one’s own German and observing the translator

struggling with it was an embarrassment at times. My language and style was that of a young man trying to establish himself as a scholar – and a German at that. German prose permits long-winded sentences with complex subordinate clauses, without becoming fuzzy. In the course of translation this virtue turns into a curse. Moreover, German philosophical style allows for subtleties that can be teased out of words with distinct derivatives and nearly synonyms. In interpreting the writings of Bruno – himself a hallmark of linguistic versatility – I did my best to exploit the richness of German philosophical style. It was a pleasure to work with the translator Peter Henneveld who unfailingly detected the linguistic problems, single handedly partitioned impossible sentences, reestablished transitions and coherence, and pointed out ambiguities in the German, finding elegant solutions in English. (It should be noted that all translations from the sources are ours, unless cited otherwise.) If the reader still thinks that this book is not an easy reading, I can only ask for patience and diligence. Philosophy dumbed down dies. The theme of this book is the appropriation of one thinker’s philosophy by another philosopher. That is not easy but it is what philosophers do.

Olomouc/Baltimore, Spring 2016 Paul Richard Blum

di Giordano Bruno: 1951-2000, Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2002. I am indebted to Eugenio Canone for bibliographical information.

Foreword to the German Edition

When one presents a study on Giordano Bruno’s polemics directed against Aristotle, and furthermore, when one presents such a study as part of a series which is dedicated to methodical problems of intellectual history, then the reader should also be provided with a preliminary note that points out the methodology applied – even at the risk of anticipating some points contained in the introduction. It would be presumptuous if the author interpreted his method as being exemplary; nonetheless it seems to have produced results which point beyond the immediate scope of the study.

As is well known, Bruno’s works are inundated with fruits of all kinds of provenance in such a way that almost any one of Bruno’s phrases which are of some philosophical pertinence has already been said by some other author. Reading Bruno’s works critically therefore runs the risk of reducing Bruno’s intellectual work to spheres of influence or of atomizing through in identifying the sources. And it would only be the lesser evil that, in doing so, Bruno’s own work would be obscured; even more fatal would be the fact that a methodological legitimization of comparisons between Bruno and the respective influences would be missing completely inasmuch as any kind of comparison requires a secured instrument with respect to content or methodology.

However, as we will see in the introduction below, the author himself – Bruno – offers such an instrument in claiming that any philosophical critique has to present and justify the opponent until the starting points of the critique are disclosed. Consequently, a new approach has to result from the aporetic contradictions of the philosophy that is being revisited. Without addressing the philosophical problem of eclecticism, we are called to relate Bruno’s way of thinking to the originals and models used by him. Now the perspective is reversed: We are not interested in

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pursuing some particular source; rather, we will focus on Bruno’s critical intention. In order to avoid being overwhelmed by an abundance of influences, the reader has every right to select a specific source as a research object according to personal preferences.

The main focus of this study was Aristotle. We intend to demonstrate that Bruno has indeed a very precise knowledge of Aristotle’s works, and he quotes them in an equally precise and knowledgeable way. Furthermore, we want to demonstrate that Bruno sees through the philosophical intention of the authority and that he demonstrably and consistently revitalizes it in a fruitful way towards his own philosophical questions. In this way, Bruno’s philosophy can be presented as an attempt to overcome Aristotelian aporetic solutions. We anticipate much in saying that Bruno understands the problem of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as an epistemological problem which he intends to solve by means of abolishing the differentiation between subject and object in the reflection of the understanding intellect. The priority of reflecting subjectivity, however, yet again confirms Bruno’s philosophical reception as well as the specific kind of researching the sources as pursued in this study.

The interpretation of how significant Aristotle was for Bruno led to a specific understanding of Bruno’s philosophical intention. This may show the potential of looking for other sources used by Bruno which appear in a very peculiar assimilation. For example, his position regarding the Plotinian or Florentine nuances of Neoplatonism, Thomas Aquinas, or the problem of universals might provide further information regarding Bruno’s philosophical method.

I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Stephan Otto for his encourage-ment, guidance, and supervision of this study and for accepting it as part of the series of publications. Prof. Otto is the Director of the “Institut für Geistesgeschichte des Humanismus” (Institute of Intellectual History of Humanism) which provided the

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organizational and personal framework which allowed for this study to be written. I am grateful to all the members of the Institute for making this possible.

Munich, October 1978

Paul Richard Blum

Introduction

a. Topic and task

More than two centuries have passed since F. H. Jacobi published his “Excerpts from Jordan Bruno” (1789). Since then, Bruno’s works have been studied, and time and again there have been works that intended to present and acknowledge his philosophy in a general view. Simultaneously, however, there have been special studies regarding the particular and individual aspects,1 and indeed it is time, as F. Papi suggested,2 to drive forward in an intensified manner with such exploratory works in order to aid the understanding of Bruno’s significance in terms of historical philosophy. Both the research of individual works and problems and those studies that investigate Bruno’s sources, indispensable for any author, achieve this goal.3

Accordingly, no further justification is needed for us to investigate Bruno’s relationship with Aristotle: on the one hand, several treatises dealing with this subject have been written by Bruno himself and are known (we will indicate these treatises below); on the other hand, a comprehensive study of this subject is still missing. Apart from scattered remarks in almost all general and detailed presentations (which, understandably, never move beyond the conclusion that there seems to be an interplay between adaptation and simultaneous polemics)4 there are only two studies

1 With special emphasis on F. J. Clemens, Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa; regarding the history of reception, see also W. Beierwaltes, “Einleitung,” XXXIV-XL. 2 Papi, Antropologia, p. IX. 3 We will refer to any studies which are connected to our field of study in the respective passages. 4 The following examples are one of the earliest and one of the most recent academic studies: Bartholmèss, Jordano Bruno, vol. 2, 316: “Nous avons

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which have specifically dealt with this problem thus far: a dissertation by Hugo Wernekke, dated 1871, and an essay by John Powell, dated 1935.5 The dissertation meets the need for a structured compilation of Bruno’s theses regarding his cosmology, influenced by Copernicus, and the comparison with the corresponding theorems of Aristotle. Powell’s essay deals with the cosmological topic and is restricted to reflections about the postulate of perfection. Judging on the basis of the research situation, a study of Bruno’s reception of Aristotle ought to be legitimate.

It is imperative to elucidate the subject area and method of our study: it does not claim to bring out Bruno’s position regarding Aristotelianism in general, but rather regarding to the teachings of Aristotle himself. This reservation against the consideration of the historical development of Aristotelianism is made in the awareness of the fact that it must remain an unattainable goal to bring out the Aristotelianism which could be considered valid for Bruno’s adoption and criticism. Bruno has access to theorems of Aristotelians of all stages in the history of the reception of Aristotle;6 therefore, it is illusory trying to determine globally what he understood by “Aristotelian” or “Peripatetic” unless it is being reconstructed which particular trend is being addressed in the individual case. The consequence is that one follows one particular variant of Aristotelian doctrine in Bruno’s work. Bruno himself on

montré bien des fois, que Bruno se présente comme un adversaire d’Aristote; le moment est venu de faire voir qu’il est l’antagoniste des péripatéticiens de son époque, plutôt que d’Aristote même. Bruno s’avoue, dans plus d’un endroit, le disciple du Stagirite.” Beierwaltes, “Einleitung,” IX: Bruno endorsed the basic Aristotelian forms of thought, without which his innovations would be unimaginable and unintelligible. 5 Cf. the bibliography. O. Walzel’s study, Aristotelisches und Plotinisches, deals with Plotinus’ influence on Bruno’s poetology. 6 Cf. the references throughout Tocco, Le fonti. Theoretical statements of Bruno are found in his De l’infinito, III, 467, and V, 499-500.

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the one hand deals in various treatises with the work and teachings of Aristotle; on the other hand, and especially with regard to Bruno’s purposeful mastering of the tradition, there are unambiguous indicators that Bruno knows to differentiate between Aristotelians and Aristotle himself.7 Therefore, it is not only rational but appropriate first of all to examine his position regarding Aristotle.8 It is a truism that Bruno, for example, intended to use his Paris theses to aim at the Peripatetics of his time9 as one can generally suppose that he wrote for a contemporary audience – for our purposes, it is decisive that in order to attain his goal, he did not compose a pamphlet against statements of nameable relevant authors at that time but goes back to the common source and criticizes the physical writings of Aristotle point by point.

This determines the formal method of this study: in all topical areas Bruno’s criticism is always to be compared to the sources so as to raise the diverging points from the confrontation of both authors; finally, they are to be interpretatively evaluated. However, here it is necessary to clarify that there are no indicators whatsoever that Bruno read Greek; on the contrary, it can be verified that he always used Medieval Latin translations. The Latin Aristotle/Averroes edition,10 easily accessible to us in reprint, has proven to be useful and usable because of numerous literal correspondences between the medieval text and Bruno’s

7 See below, beginning of Chapter II, section 8. – Beierwaltes, “Einleitung,” XLIV, note 55: Bruno was aware of the scholastic reception of Aristotle. 8 Therefore, the use of “Aristotelian” throughout this study always refers to Aristotle himself. 9 Cf. Bartholmèss, as quoted in note 4, as well as below, beginning of section (d) of the Introduction. 10 Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, Venice 1562 (reprint: Frankfurt 1962). This edition provides a translation in Medieval Latin and one in Humanistic Latin.

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quotations.11 This study is not concerned with an interpretation of the genuinely Aristotelian way of thinking; rather, it intends to find out how Bruno received and understood Aristotle, what he adopts and what he criticizes. Therefore we will have no recourse to the editions which are substantial for modern research of Aristotle.12

The area of investigation is thus limited regarding the historical difficulty as well as the source material. Nonetheless, the purpose must not be a schematic enumeration of congruencies and divergences of isolated theses of both authors – especially since then immediately the demand of summary completeness would arise, and we do not intend to go there since it is unattainable. Rather, we try to find a method used by Bruno in dealing with his source, and we try to interpret which philosophical intentions manifest themselves in his reception so that the criticism of Aristotle becomes an indicator of his own philosophical achievement. Therefore the investigation needs to detach itself at times from the immediate comparative material in order to determine the systematic role of a theory within Bruno’s thought and the impact of reading Aristotle on his way of thinking.

At this point, however, we must ask whether such an element of his theory should not also be determined with regard to the chronological place within Bruno’s opus. We might ask whether we have the right to use the interpretation of one treatise in order to assess another treatise without prior categorizing it with regard to a possible development in his way of thinking. There have been several attempts to do such periodization. F. Tocco13 for example tried to delimit three phases: a ‘Neoplatonic emanation,’ a ‘Heraclitean monism,’ and finally an ‘atomism according to

11 See the parallels continually quoted throughout Chapters II and III. 12 This should not discourage from occasionally consulting more contemporary literature regarding Aristotle in order to solve individual questions and especially for further reference to similar or corresponding problems. 13 Tocco, Le opere latine, 357.

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Democritus and Leucippus.’ However, he feels forced to assume that Bruno himself did not have the full awareness of this development since to him these ‘philosophical systems’ did not make a substantial difference14 – and this means to admit the inappropriateness of this distinction with regard to Bruno’s own agenda and especially the fundamental continuity of his work. G. Gentile also arrives at the paradoxical conclusion that Bruno’s Neoplatonic (1st phase) pantheism (2nd phase) and monadism (3rd phase) are always interconnected and present in all three phases.15 Bruno refers in his later treatises to the earlier ones as valid discourses;16 this external argument as well contradicts such a division into periods. Therefore, we are dealing with changing topical focuses; however, they have nothing to do with a

14 Ibid.: “Ma, si può chiedere, ha il Bruno piena coscienza di queste trasformazioni, e delle profonde differenze che separano gl’indirizzi da lui successivamente abbracciati? Non certo, e la principal ragione è che egli non vede tra i sistemi filosofici quelle divergenze, che storicamente s’hanno da ammettere.” 15 Gentile, “Le fasi,” 320 and throughout the entire work. Namer, throughout Il problema, also voices agreement with regard to the consistency of Bruno’s work. 16 Bruno quotes from De umbris idearum (1582) in De magia mathematica (1590), 502; and in De imaginum, signorum et idearum compositione (1591), 94 and more Cantus circaeus (1582) in De imaginum, signorum et idearum compositione (1591), 193; De compendiosa architectura (1582) in De progressu et lampade venatoria logicorum (1587), 82; and in De imaginum, signorum et idearum compositione (1591), 115 and more; Triginta sigillorum explicatio (1583) in Lampas triginta statuarum (1591), 218; De la causa (1584) in Acrotismus (1588), 102; for more citations, see Ursache, note 110, 23. De l’infinito (1584) in De rerum principiis et elementis et causis (1590), 510. (This is not a complete and comprehensive list; dates according to Singer, Giordano Bruno, Appendix I. With regard to the references, see the List of Abbreviations.)

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developmental process. Furthermore, his prolific authorship arose between 1582 and 1591, the years from his public appearance in Paris until his incarceration in Venice – an odyssey throughout Europe characterized by changes regarding circumstances and conditions but not by times of foundational refocusing.17 Therefore, if an interior biography of Bruno is to be drawn up, the decisive changes in orientation and establishing need to be transferred to the thirty-four years of Bruno’s life prior to the first publication; there are only indirect documents which deal with this time span. When A. Corsano retraced the “history of Bruno’s mind,”18 he actually showed the objective unfolding of interior consequences of Bruno’s basic concern, which has its basis in the early days, as Corsano continually emphasizes. Accordingly, N. Badaloni discussed especially Corsano’s interpretation of Bruno’s development prior to his first treatises and concluded that there are no more dramatic breaks in the overall picture of Bruno’s publications.19 Therefore, as long as there are no more detailed studies and investigations, we can regard Bruno’s work as an integrated whole.

Of course, no one should conclude that we intend to offer a general view of Bruno’s philosophy. Rather, we restrict ourselves to the greatest possible extent to his reception of Aristotle, excluding the interpretation of his position regarding other sources, such as the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions at large. Our conclusions regarding Bruno’s philosophical method, then, claim to be valid only insofar as they are obtained from his own critical

17 Cf. the biographies: Spampanato, Vita; Aquilecchia, Giordano Bruno. 18 Corsano, Il pensiero; in particular, pp. 265-275. 19 Badaloni, La filosofia, 3-10 (regarding Corsano); p. 112: “Non ci sono fratture in questo quadro […]; dopo la rottura del primitivo materialismo, non ci sono drammatici passaggi da una posizione di pensiero ad un’altra […].” Regarding Badaloni’s own reconstruction of Bruno’s early development, see below (Chapter III, note 141).

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position regarding Aristotle. A comparative examination of the results presented here and other elements of his thinking and other receptions remains open.

After these formal preliminary considerations we need to characterize the main treatises in question, outline the structure of this study, and – finally – present an interpretation of Bruno’s own presentation of his method of reception which shall justify our own methodology.

b. Bruno’s teachings on Aristotle

In many of his works, Bruno comments in different ways on the philosophy of Aristotle. In the Ash Wednesday Supper and in De l’infinito he brings up for discussion theorems on nature, especially cosmology.20 In De la causa he treats in a similar way the terms matter and form, potency and act – crucial terms used by Aristotle. In Acrotism, he formulates polemic theses against the philosophy of nature and the cosmology as found in Physics, as well as De caelo; at the same time, he proposes a plain compendium in the Figuratio physici auditus. In the same sober style, however this time centered on his own doctrine, he treats the same questions in the third part of his Frankfurt trilogy (De minimo, De monade, De immenso).21

Furthermore we possess a treatise in which 52 terms are being explained on three levels: first, regarding their meaning, then

20 Regarding the general characteristics of the treatises mentioned here and in the following sections, we would like to refer to the studies done by Felice Tocco (Le opere latine and Le opere inedite), Augusto Guzzo (Giordano Bruno), as well as Virgilio Salvestrini’s bibliography. 21 Frankfurt, 1591; the dedicatory letter proves that this treatise is in fact designed and intended as a trilogy (Opera I 1, pp. 193-199; here: p. 196); cf. Aquilecchia, Giordano Bruno, 82.

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as applied to “God or Mind” and “intellect or idea.”22 Bruno’s student Raphael Eglin (also Egli; 1559-1622) published this treatise in 1595 under the title “Summa terminorum meta-physicorum”; by this time, Bruno had been a prisoner of the Inquisition for three years.23 In 1609, a second edition was published, and this edition had been enlarged with the part of the mentioned applications as well as two more indices of terms written by other authors.24 This fact is due to the intention of the editor to provide a useful manual for philosophy students – not a manual of the specific terminology used by Bruno, but rather a manual of Aristotelian philosophical terms.25 For the same reason the editor provided the title of the treatise (Summa terminorum),26 which was by no means given by Bruno himself. Rather, Eglin drew his material from a lecture entitled “Lampas de entis descensu,” given in Zurich by his teacher, which he had written

22 Summa terminorum metaphysicorum (Opera I 4), esp. p. 73; the third application with regard to “amor seu anima mundi” is mentioned but not preserved. Due to the interpretative importance of the problems of tradition it is necessary to take a closer look at bibliographical issues. 23 Bruno was arrested on May 23, 1592 (Aquilecchia, Giordano Bruno, 85). Regarding Raphael Eglin, cf. Bartholmèss, Jordano Bruno, vol. 1, 182, note 1; Spampanato, Vita, 449. 24 For a detailed description of both editions, see Salvestrini, Bibliografia, nos. 209 and 210. An excerpt from a treatise by Pseudo-Athanasius and a treatise by Rudolph Goclenius were added to the second edition; cf. Opera I 4, 127-128. 25 Eglin in Summa terminorum metaphysicorum, 5, 11-13: “hunc libellum, non magnopere a doctrina Peripateticorum abhorrentem, et utilem et gratum fore studiosis omnibus spero.” 26 The title “Summa terminorum” runs throughout the entire 1609 edition. The fact that a former reader wrote an alphabetical topical index on the endpaper of the copy held in the Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence (Fondo Guicciardini 2.42.64) proves that the book was perceived as a philosophical dictionary. A comparison of the listed terms shows that there are almost no overlaps of the three topical indices.

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down, as he indicates himself.27 Thus neither do we have the complete treatise, nor do the excerpts give an account of Bruno’s intention.28 However, based on the structure and the original title, we may deduct that it was a similar work as Lampas triginta statuarum; the purpose of this work was to construct an overall presentation of all realms of being and cognition by means of a determined series of categories29 and following a Neoplatonic way of emanational thinking. For the purpose of our study, we are interested in this treatise because Bruno lists a large portion of the terms which are also found in the so-called “Book of Definitions,” the fifth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.30

27 Eglin in Summa terminorum metaphysicorum, 5, 6-8: “Iordani Bruni Nolani reliquias metaphysicas; reliquias inquam, quia de Lampade, quam ille de Entis descensu adornabat integram.” 28 From the title of the 1595 edition: “ex Iordani Bruni Nolani Entis descensu manusc. excerpta”; 1609: “ex manuscripto” (Salvestrini, Bibliografia, nos. 209 and 210). This fact has always been overlooked in the literature concerning Bruno: Felice Tocco seems to suppose that the Summa terminorum metaphysicorum is original and complete in the version at hand (Tocco, Le opere latine, 125-126 and 131-132), as do Christian Bartholmèss, Jordano Bruno, vol. 1, 182, note 1, and Vincenzo Spampanato (Vita, 449: “per intero”), as well as Giovanni Aquilecchia (Giordano Bruno, 76) and Augusto Guzzo (Giordano Bruno, 239: “fra tutte le opere latine del Bruno, la più matura, completa e perfetta”). 29 Regarding this see below, p. 26, cf. Tocco, Le opere latine, 129: “La Summa terminorum è dunque un trattato scolastico, per intenti e per metodo non dissimile dalla lampada venatoria e dall’artificium perorandi.” For reasons stated, we cannot adopt this classification; regarding Lampas venatoria and Artificium perorandi, see below, beginning of subsection 1. 30 Felice Tocco provides a synopsis (Le opere latine, 127, note 2); furthermore, there are clear dependences on Aristotle’s Categories. – Bruno’s lecture could be a version of “Metaphysics” as announced by him, not because of the title but very well because of the contents. This “Metaphysics” was also intended in three stages (anima, Dii, Deus [soul, deities, God]): De minimo II 6, p. 211, 24. The biographers and bibliographers seem to have overlooked the fact that a treatise on metaphysics, as well as a treatise De anima, were in fact announced.

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Bruno’s Libri physicorum Aristotelis explanati assumes a special position among the treatises regarding Aristotle. It is a commentary on the first five books of Physics, on De generatione et corruptione and on the so-called Chemical Treatise, the fourth book of the Meteorologica. The treatise may have originated in the context of Bruno’s teaching position in Wittenberg (1586-1588);31 since it comes down to us only in handwritten form, we cannot be certain regarding the intention of the author. Partly he reports “without batting an eyelash”32 passage after passage of the original, especially as far as Physics is concerned; partly he is very selective and omits entire chapters.33 On the other hand, he often extends the discussion, and finally he often pretends to report, whereas in reality he changes the statement in favor of his own doctrine.34 Accordingly, the commentary gives an insight into Bruno’s objective analysis of Aristotle and offers all three stages of reception which he had suggested in the foreword to Figuratio,35 i.e., the stage of knowledge of matter, the stage of intellectual penetration, and the stage of criticism. In the context of the research done on Bruno, this commentary has been examined only casually and sporadically.36 Therefore, it should be the

31 Tocco/Vitelli in Opera III, p. XLVII. 32 Guzzo, Giordano Bruno, 198: “riferito senza batter ciglio concetti e concetti aristotelici opposti ai suoi.” Concerning the formal aspect, see also Tocco, Le opere inedite, 78-97. 33 For example, the discussion of the concept of vacuum is missing (Physics IV, 6-9; see Libri physicorum Aristotelis explanati, 336-337) as in Acrotismus 33-37, pp. 130-143. 34 Badaloni, La filosofia, 110: “In essa Bruno conclude la sua discussione con Aristotele, riscoprendo definitivamente ciò che di accettabile egli aveva già ritrovato in lui”; 111: Bruno “riduce il pensiero di Aristotele alle esigenze della sua filosofia.” 35 Subsection (d) of the Introduction will deal with this more extensively; see below. 36 Badaloni, La filosofia, 110: “operetta, confinata da interpreti troppo frettolosi ai margini della produzione bruniana.” Apart from a quotation regarding the

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starting point of our presentation of cosmology and philosophy of nature, and we accomplish this by interpreting significant divergences from Physics and by explaining them by means of the material contained in his other works, especially in Acrotism.

Finally, we may analyze a paraphrase of Aristotle’s Topics, published by Bruno under the title Lampas venatoria logicorum.

c. Overview of the order of presentation

Since it is the goal of this study to shed some light upon the philosophical backgrounds of Bruno’s reception of Aristotle, this study must be structured according thematic groups so that it can be demonstrated that there is a uniform thought pattern which forms the basis of all realms of criticism. Thus we will treat consecutively Bruno’s paraphrase of Topics, followed by some basic problems of cosmology, the criticism of the principles of nature and, finally, the relation between uniformity and pluriformity.

Bruno’s compendium of Topics poses the question of a type of logic which forms the basis of science. Since our author does not deal extensively with the remaining parts of Aristotle’s Organon, we may approach this question by means of the interpretation of the fact that he puts his Lampas venatoria in the context of his Lullian and mnemonic treatises. It will then turn out that he is especially interested in the possibility of subjective construction of scientific systems whose coherence with the scientific objects would be guaranteed by an a priori pre-structure of the human intellect. However, it cannot yet be clarified in this context in what way this pre-structure ought to consist.

concept of matter and the statement presented here, Badaloni says nothing with regard to this treatise.

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Bruno’s criticism of Aristotelian cosmology as well as of the principles of the natural being is closely connected to the relevant treatises of Aristotle, especially Physics; therefore, a textual comparison shall be the starting point of each of our interpretations. It is to be demonstrated that Bruno time and again postulates an absolute which does not explain the phenomena or render them describable, but rather, as a principle, is the foundation of their being. Bruno’s critique and transformation of the natural principles will make these absolute terms no longer distinguishable among themselves insofar as they become detached from the correlation and functions they had within their Aristotelian origin. Accordingly, Bruno demands an absolute which, as a principle, justifies both being and cognition and which justifies pluriformity as uniformity. The final chapter will demonstrate the antinomies of being and cognition, immanence and transcendence which are connected to this. It will as well show their solution in Bruno’s approach towards a transcendental foundation of cognition; in this, the tension between subject and object must be stated more precisely as the pre-structure of the human intellect, given in the reflecting subject. It is this pre-structure which postulates the criticism of Topics.

Bruno’s analysis of Aristotle consists in questioning the principles for the sake of the justification of being and cognition; in this, Bruno constantly adopts and radicalizes the epistemological and ontological problems inherent in Aristotle’s writings he is addressing. He does so until a new solution appears which allows the abolishment or replacement of the given concept.

d. Preliminaries to Bruno’s method of reception

In order to legitimate our methodical procedure – both in terms of the restriction to solely Aristotle and the interpretative comparison of the texts – we may have recourse to theoretical

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statements by Bruno in which he himself addresses his method of reception. During his second stay in Paris in 1586 he published the treatise Figuratio Aristotelici Physici auditus (Schema of the Aristotelian Physics, to be Set Forth in Fifteen Images for the Purpose of Understanding and Recollection). As is generally known, and as the author himself indicates,37 it was intended to be a tactical move to document his exact knowledge of Aristotle’s Physics even before he presented for debate to the Parisian scholars his One Hundred and Twenty Articles on Nature and the World Against the Peripatetics (Centum et viginti articuli de natura et mundo adversus Peripateticos). This work had been published in the same year and was supposed to be discussed publicly. The Figuratio is an extremely concise but complete compendium of the eight-volume Physics38 on the basis of

37 Opera I 4, 133: “ne id nihi contigisse videatur, quod literatoribus quibusdam universa crebris observationibus discussionibusque conspurcantibus accidit, qui temeraria ignorantia cum praecipiti quadam arrogantia coniuncta suffulti de hisce rebus, quarum prorsus rationem ullam non haberent, sibi censurae munus usurparunt” (cf. p. 134, 11-15). The choice of words and a comparison with De la causa III, B 62-63 make it clear that this is an obvious allusion to the “Peripatetic discussions” (Discussiones peripateticae) of Francesco Patrizi (1571/1581): Tocco, Le opere latine, 103, note 1. – Bruno commissioned the treatise One Hundred and Twenty Articles on Nature and the World Against the Peripatetics (Centum et viginti articuli de natura et mundo adversus Peripateticos) (Opera II 1; the reference is given as Acrotismus) to be reprinted as Camoeracensis Acrotismus in Wittenberg in 1588; we will have to come back to their contents throughout the course of this study. With regard to the historical events, see Acrotismus, 82: “Articuli de Natura et Mundo / A Nolano in principibus Europae Academiis propositi: quos Joh. Hennequinus nobilis Parisiensis sub ejusdem felicibus auspiciis contra vulgaris et cujuscumque adversariae philosophiae professores triduo Pentecostes in Universitate Parisiorum defendendos evulgavit.” (The reprint on Bruno’s initiative presents the entire contents as individual and sound opinion; cf. ibid., 122, note 2.) See also Fiorentino in Opera I 1, XXIII-XXIV, Spampanato, Vita, 398-399; 657-659 (Doc. parig. X); Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 298-300. 38 Textual comparisons found with Tocco, Le opere latine, 104-107.

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mnemonics as Bruno himself may have applied it personally in order to have its parts and theorems at hand as needed. While under these preconditions the content of this treatise offers only a few interesting things for our understanding Bruno, it is quite remarkable on the formal side that Bruno equips the given text with an organizing system – the system of mnemonics. The elements of mnemonics are basic terms of Aristotelian Physics; however, they are being transformed individually, and their number and arrangement could in no way be taken from the original.39

As we will elaborate in the following first chapter on Bruno’s reception and application of the ars memoriae, at this point we may no longer simply assume that the exercise of memory poses other demands than an objective presentation. Rather, Bruno searches for a possibility of congruence of contents and cognition, accordingly for a form of presentation with the means of the ars memoriae. Although it may not have escaped Bruno’s attention that Physics is not a completely unified and ordered text,40 and although it happens with other authors that compendiums of that kind are being equipped with a more or less new organizing system,41 we may still draw conclusions from the formal aspect of the Figuratio regarding the author’s assessment of the content. Apparently, he does not regard Physics as offering an internal system which could be used for a representation according to the necessities of mnemonics.

Bruno’s dedication to Petrus Dalbenius confirms our reflections. He explains his endeavor using the following arguments:

39 Figuratio Aristotelici physici auditus, 136-139 (tables). 40 Aristotle, Physics (transl. Wagner); Introduction, p. 275. 41 Cf. e.g. Faber Stapulensis, Introductio in Physicam paraphrasim (Argentina, 1514), at the beginning, mentions the eight celestial spheres.

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1. The exact knowledge of Physics, including the smallest line of argumentation, regardless of any linguistic or historic qualms, is necessary and must be proven.42

2. He intends to remedy the incompetence of the Peripatetics and finally to provide an inner meaning to Physics which is missing per se.43

3. This forms the foundation of any basic criticism of the master.44

Accordingly, Bruno wants to 1. list the entire material in a numerical order so that no argument in favor of the text is lost,45

42 Figuratio, 133, 15-19: “consultius esse videtur subtiliter cum Aristotele vel alio de sophistarum principibus errasse (quod ad ingenii conferat acumen), quam infrugalissime cum eiusce generis brutis naturalem emittere posse ruditum.” 43 Ibid., 133, 19 – 134, 11: “Secunda quae huc me adegit ea ratio est, quod de tam copiosa eorum, qui se non modo philosophos, sed et pro maiori dignitate Peripateticos iactant, multitudine perpaucos esse video praeter eos, quibus magis per ignorantiam in fide viri laborantem, quam per sensum ex illius principiis educta ratione distinguentem, admirabilis eiusmodi habeatur disciplina. Quandoquidem (ob innatam multitudini conditionem) vulgo satius esse consuevit obscuriora velutque in tenebris efficta phantasmata prurientem perfricantia phantasiam admirari, excolore, exosculari, quam fulgidos familiarius sese ingerentis veritatis radios excipere velle. Quamobrem prius inopiae sensus (qua notabiles extant in propriis) succurrere aliqua ratione voluimus, quam id efficere ut (quales nostra ferat opinio) divitiae illis obiicerentur alienae.” 44 Ibid., 134, 11-15: “Tertia quae me ad idem compulit intentio est, ne qua iniuria adversum (quam ferunt) rerum profundarum maiestatem cavillator audacior, non autem ingenuus de rebus mihi (ut iure existimare videbor) apertis discussor legitimus appaream.” 45 Ibid., 134, 16-19: “Ubi rem propositam ad numeros revoco, seriatim dispono, nihil quod ad eius veram causam faciat praetermitto, de nulla eius ratione dissimulo, nusquam quod ad eius confirmationem conducat orbiter pertranseo.”