Ghana’s NHIS in brief

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Transcript of Ghana’s NHIS in brief

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In December 2004, Ghana established a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)1 to enhance the performance of its health system, paying particular attention to the poor. The scheme therefore focuses heavily on meeting the needs of the poor and provid-ing social health protection based on the principles of equity, solidarity, risk sharing, cross-subsidization, reinsurance, client and community ownership, value for money, good governance and transparency in the health care delivery. NHIS coverage is thus highest in the most disadvantaged districts, where there is higher incidence of poverty, lower levels of female lit-eracy and lesser health care facilities, and where the needs of pregnant women and the elderly may not be being met. This technical brief discusses known obstacles in the process of establishing and sustain-ing the NHIS drawing lessons from Ghana.

Ghana’s NHIS in brief

Ghana’s health care system was founded on the basis of the ‘free health care’ model. The model, however, could not be sustained for long and a token user fee was first introduced in 1972. A fully-fledged user fee scheme known as ‘Cash and Carry’ came into effect in 1985. Backed by legislation, the scheme aimed to recover 15% of its operating costs but the system was clearly not ideal, given Ghana’s socio-economic-cultural and political context. The NHIS was there-fore developed with a view to extending social health

Technical Brief for Policy-Makers

1 For a detailed discussion, see Background Paper No. 2 for the World Health Report 2010.

Obstacles in the process of establishing sustainable National Health Insurance Scheme: insights from Ghana

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protection to the poor and other disadvantaged pop-ulations by enabling them to afford access to quality health services. The key feature of the NHIS is that it aimed to reach the poor first, and the rest of the population thereafter. Its underlying design princi-ples are ‘equity’ defined as equal access to benefit package irrespective of one’s socio-economic status and ‘risk equalization’ meaning the financial risk of illness is equally shared among all.

NHIS is funded by revenue generated from seven sources - earmarked budgetary allocation through a system of ‘ring-fencing’, a national health insurance levy imposed at the rate of 2.5% on the supply and import of goods and services, social security contri-bution, Ministry of Finance resources for exempted persons, Parliament allocations, investment returns and voluntary contributions such as grants, dona-tions, and gifts. In addition, enrolees pay differential premiums ranging between GH¢ 7.20 and GH¢ 48 depending on their socio-economic status. In fact, only 30.6% of enrolees pay any premium at all.

Impact of the NHIS on health care coverage

By the end of 2005, the scheme was covering 27% of the population. By June 2009, coverage had gone up to 67.5%, with most poor and disadvantaged people finding their way into the system. Population coverage however, varies across geographic regions. Health care coverage has increased mainly because more patients with health insurance have been treat-ed. In response to an increased demand, outpatient care services have grown more than inpatient serv-ices. At the national level, the number of outpatient care visits increased from about 12 million in 2005 to 18 million in 2008. On the other hand, inpatient care admissions have increased from 0.8 million in 2005 to 0.9 million in 2007 before declining to about 0.85 million. Each card holder, on average, visited the health care facility about once a year; each visit costs about GH¢ 13.

A before-and-after study indicated a marked increase in the use of formal care among insured members. In-dependent utilization reviews also suggested a clear shift away from the ‘Cash and Carry’ system in favour of the NHIS, and a modest decline in the share of out-of-pocket spending in private health spending. How-ever, no difference was found between the insured and others in the use of maternal care (ante-natal care, deliveries or caesareans).

Clients, irrespective of their socioeconomic status, seem satisfied with the system and willing to remain insured in the future. More people are able to gain access to formal health care through the NHIS and there is a clear shift away from the ‘Cash and Carry’ system in favour of the NHIS. Most important of all, hospital authorities have indicated a decline in the rate of hospital deaths among the insured. They at-tribute this to early treatment as a result of higher utilization of outpatient care coupled with a modest decline in inpatient admissions.

Obstacles on the way

Although the impact of the NHIS on Ghana’s dis-advantaged populations appears to be positive, the implementation process was not smooth. Countries attempting to establish the NHIS in their own set-tings could learn some lessons from the Ghanaian experience.

First, many practical barriers to entry remain: eco-nomic, geographic, political and cultural. People liv-ing in remote, underserved areas may not perceive the benefits of membership. For instance, data from two Ghanaian districts found that renewal of the NHIS membership was affected by location – 88% of urban members said that they were willing to renew, compared with 57% of rural residents. Similarly, the strict income norm for exempting the poor actually excluded the marginal poor, who are not able to pay the premium; in some cases, an ILO programme and some NGOs stepped in to pay the premium on their behalf. Not all children (under 18 years) could be cov-

Technical Brief for Policy-Makers

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ered because of the condition that their parents have to be insured first. Efforts are now under way to de-link children from their parents. In some areas, people refused to enrol themselves into the scheme due to political differences with the political party in charge of the government. This situation has, however, also changed. Some could not really see potential benefits of the NHIS, but having seen how enrolees are ben-efiting, they are slowly joining up. As in the case of many other countries, identification of indigents for free health care is a difficult task in Ghana. Definition of indigents is itself restrictive. Many districts rely on community groups to identify the poorest, but it is not clear how effective this strategy is.

This all highlights the need for a coordinated effort across different government ministries including the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Welfare (for example, to use their ‘Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)’ strategy) to successfully tar-get the poor.

Second, the potential of a well-designed and well-functioning health financing system can be fully uti-lized only when it is supported by a well-functioning health care delivery system. In Ghana, the health care delivery system including the referral system ap-pears to be functioning sub-optimally. Besides con-straining people’s access to health care, it facilitates frequent patient visits to higher level facilities, which results in higher reimbursement per episode. There are also instances of malpractices in ensuring free care to the insured; informal payments are reported in the form of charging for services provided outside office hours, and asking patients to pay for drugs not in stock and/or not provided under the government’s Essential Drug List. About 40% of insured clients still seem to be making informal payments in Ghana. This all adds up to a major challenge: if the health care delivery system fails to operate optimally, it would be difficult to sustain benefits of a health financing system like the NHIS.

Third, certain past health system structures such as vertical control programmes, which are continued

along with the current NHIS system, present some management challenges. This is in addition to the inadequate technical and managerial capacity of the staff running the scheme.

Fourth, in Ghana, money follows infrastructure. Ar-eas and institutions with better health care infrastruc-ture tend to generate more income than those with poor infrastructure. While the population coverage is higher in areas where the infrastructure is scarce, financial coverage seems to be higher in areas where the infrastructure is relatively stronger. This, in turn, tends to create ‘perverse incentives’ to provide more curative (and more expensive) health care.

Fifth, the financial sustainability of the NHIS in Gha-na is threatened by a number of factors including the following:

• There seem to be provider incentives to over-prescribe

• Very generous benefit package to cover 95% disease burden

• Ineffective referral system due to which patients are able to seek care from higher level facilities

• Under-developed monitoring systems within the NHIS

These concerns are partly addressed by the fact that the NHIS revenue is more stable due to ear-marked tax revenue and that there are potential rich clients left to be covered. The share of paid enrolees has increased along with the decline in the ‘Cash and Carry’ payment in all the regions and the NHIS rev-enue is a dominant contributor to hospital revenues. Discussions are under way to find ways to expand the sources of funding for the NHIS.

Finally, the NHIS in Ghana is still young and subject to many pressures - financial and political. No formal evaluation of the NHIS has been carried out to under-stand its dynamics and impact on access to health care.

Obstacles in the process of establishing sustainable National Health Insurance Scheme: insights from Ghana

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