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rsPerspectives on Advancing Governance& Development from the Global Forumfor Media Development

SECTION 1 WHY MEDIA MATTERS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Integrating approaches to good governance and press freedom in nation-building . . . . . . . . . . .8Shashi Tharoor, Under-Secretary General for Communicationand Public Information, United Nations

Media, Governance, and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14Daniel Kaufmann, Director, Global Programs, World BankInstitute

The role of the Public Sphere and media independence in Deliberative Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17Jürgen Habermas Professor Emeritus, Johann WolfgangGoethe-Universität in Frankfurt, Germany

Why the media matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26James Deane, Managing Director, Communication for SocialChange Consortium

Who makes the news ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37Margaret Gallagher, The Global Media Monitoring Project

Community Radio Perspectives on Media Reach and Audience Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43Marcelo Solervicens, Secretary General, World Association ofCommunity Radio Broadcasters

Access to the lectromagnetic Spectrum is a Foundation for Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48Christian Sandvig University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

SECTION 2

Overview of the evidence base : research on impacts of media on economic, social and political development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

Susan Abbott, Senior Research Coordinator, Programme forGlobal Communication Studies, Annenberg School forCommunication at the University of Pennsylvania.

Moving Media : the case for media as a core strategy in meeting the MDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56Warren Feek , Director , The Communications Initiative

A Road Map for Monitoring & Evaluation in the Media Development Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57Alan Davis, Director of Strategy & Assessment, Institute of Warand Peace Reporting (IWPR)

What do available indicators and integrative approaches to M&E on media and communications tell us? 63

Anthnio Lambiino, Phd Candidate, Programme for GlobalCommunication Studies, Annenberg School forCommunication at the University of Pennsylvania.

SECTION 3

Interventions in media development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65Anne Huddock, DPhil, Assistant Representative, The AsiaFoundation, Vietnam

Financial Independence Sasa Vucinic, Media Development Loan Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

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Staying alive: Media independence in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73Kavi Chongkittavorn, Editor, The Nation, Chairperson,Southeast Asian Press Alliance

Africa : Representative to be nominated by the UNECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

RUSSAI/CIS : Manana Aslamazyan, Internews Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

Holistic Approaches to Media Reform and Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81Dauod Kuttab, Amman Net

Building media capacities to improve disaster response: lessons from Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84Adnan Rehmat, Country Director, Internews Pakistan

Ready the Lifeboats: Media development in Uzbekistan after Andijan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87Andrew Stroehlein, Media Director, International Crisis Group

Why Media Matters and the Enabling Environment For Free and Independent Media . . . . . . . . . .94Monroe E. Price, Director, Project for Global CommunicationsStudies, Annenberg hool of Communication, University ofPenensylvania &Peter Krug, Professor of Law, University ofOklahoma Ciollege of Law

SECTION 4

Participatory Diffusion or Semantic Confusion? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103Adam Rogers, Chief, Communications and Public InformationUnit, United Nations Capital Development Fund 24 February2006

Media Development: An overview of the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113Ellen Hume, Director, Center on Media and Society, Universityof Massachusetts Boston

Media Development: Bibliography P132 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129


Section 1 Why Media Matters: Global Perspectives


Integrating approaches togood governance and pressfreedom in nation-building

Shashi Tharoor, Under-Secretary General forCommunication and Public Information, United Nations

There is a saying in the English speaking world that “what you don’t know won’thurt you.” I trust that there are few amongst this august collection of journalists andexperts and public officials gathered here who would give much credence to thatmaxim. Rather I think we can all accept that we are starting from the sharedassumption that a free and independent media is an essential element of any sta-ble and prosperous society. In the modern globalizing world, information sows theseeds of prosperity, and those without access to information are at a distinct dis-advantage when it comes to building a better future for themselves and for theirchildren. The UN has done some useful work in promoting media development,much of it in the form of partnerships between media organizers and the UNDevelopment Program—UNDP—or the UN Educational, scientific, and CulturalOrganization—UNESCO. Currently, the United Nations Development Program isactively working on independent media development in dozens of developingnations.

When providing advice on constitutional and legal system reforms in developingcountries, UNDP stresses the importance of provisions for safeguarding an inde-pendent media. UNDP’s Governance Unit has a strong “access to information”program whereby governments are encouraged and helped to make publicrecords and data and other information readily available through the internet and


through local media, and journalists are advised how to locate it—and demand it,if necessary. And as part of its work helping to organize elections in emergingdemocracies—UNDP and the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division work on an elec-tion about every week in some part of the world—UNDP country offices organizeworkshops for local journalists on covering elections before, during and after thevote count. In this part of the world, UNDP’s Arab Human Development reporthas cast a harsh spotlight on the restrictions on independent media and stronglyadvocated for press freedom guarantees in the region. And in one of its largest pro-grams, next door in Iraq, UNDP has worked with the Reuters Foundation to helpIraqi journalists create an editorially and financially independent internet-basednews agency which is already used widely by scores of new newspapers andbroadcasters in the country.

Beyond the work done by UN agencies, we at the UN itself have struggled withhow best to aid the development of media, in the Democratic Republic of Congoand in East Timor, to take but two examples. Realizing that, in order to promoteunity and peace and informed decisions-making, we need to provide people withreliable independent sources of information, we built radio networks and trainedlocal people to operate them. In 1999 in East Timor we were forced to watchwhile everything we had created was destroyed. We had to start again, almostfrom scratch, once order was restored. And in the DRC we have struggled to findways to ensure the very successful Radio Okape can be sustained beyond our mis-sion. It is on the basis of our experience that I want to offer you not answers, butseveral parameters that I think could usefully guide your discussions. Let me addanother assumption that I think we can all accept as fact. We live in a globalizingworld.

More than forty years ago, in 1962, the United Nations’ then-Secretary-General UThant warned that an explosion of violence could occur as a result of the sense ofinjustice felt by those living in poverty and despair in a world of plenty. Why do Irecall this today? Because both the risk and the potential for a solution haveincreased. Nowhere is globalization more apparent than in the media. Television,radio, newspapers and magazines bring to our living rooms, and even our break-fast tables, glimpses of events from every corner of the globe. Any doubt I mighthave had about the reach and influence of global mass communications was dis-pelled when I happened to be in St. Petersburg in Russia for a conference and wasapproached by a Tibetan Buddhist monk in his saffron robes, thumping a cymbaland chanting his mantras, who paused to say “I’ve seen you on BBC!” New com-munications technologies have shrunk the world, and—in a real sense—made itall one: one market, one audience, one people. And yet I suspect that no onewould argue with the proposition that information technology is not a magic for-mula that is going to solve all our problems. But we all know that it is a powerfulforce that can—and must—be harnessed if we are to deliver a tolerable standardof living to all people. In the twenty-first century, globalization itself is not a mat-ter of political choice, or even of economics. It is a fact. And in the long term, thenew global economy is only sustainable if it spreads worldwide and responds tothe needs and demands of all people. Whether we like it or not, a new global soci-ety is undoubtedly evolving. However, we do have some choice over how itevolves. Will globalization be a divisive force—one that merely adds to the gapbetween haves and have-nots in this new global society—or a process that actual-ly delivers on the promise made by UN’s founders in the UN charter, that of “bet-ter standards of life in larger freedom”? We must understand that information andcommunication technologies are the nerve system of this new society.

A milestone was reached at the first-ever World Summit on the InformationSociety, a landmark United Nations conference held in Geneva in December2003, and which is going to reconvene in Tunis in November for its second phase.In their declaration of principles, participating countries reaffirmed “as an essentialfoundation of the information society, and as outlined in Article 19 of the Universal


Declaration of Human Rights, that everyone had the right to freedom of opinionand expression; that this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interfer-ence and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any mediaregardless of frontiers.”

But freedom of information is meaningless if people don’t have the means toaccess this information. In our world—a world of satellite television, of cell-phonesand of the internet—universal access to information is not just a highly desirableaim, but is also increasingly achievable. When we speak today about media devel-opment, we do so standing on a platform of technology. I know we won’t havemuch time to discuss technology at this forum, but it is clear that technology is thebridge between the right to information and its realization. And yet this new worldis not yet a safer or a more just world. There are many reasons for this, but oneimportant element is that the information revolution, unlike the FrenchRevolution, is a revaluation with a lot of liberty, some fraternity, and no equality.

What we have at present is an information divide—an enormous gap betweenthose with access to the benefits of this brave new world, and those withoutaccess. This divide has many aspects. There is technological divide—the enormousgap in access that means that seventy percent of the world’s internet users live inthe 24 richest countries, and that 400,000 citizens of Luxemburg can count onmore international bandwidth than Africa’s 800 million citizens. There is a genderdivide: women and girls are yet to gain full advantage from changes that could ulti-mately redress the inequalities of centuries. And there is a governance divide.Many people, companies and even governments in the developing world feel theyhave little control over this new global media that they know could have a power-ful influence on their lives…and they are correct. State-of-the-art media technol-ogy is most effective when the civil, political and governance structures of societyserve as an enabling environment for media. Equally important, there is also a con-tent divide. The global media of the 21st century reflects the interests of its pro-ducers. Whether we are talking about television, radio or the internet, what pass-es for global media is really the media of the developed West. There is an occa-sional Third World voice, but it speaks a First World language. As far back as thefirst Congo civil war in the 1960s, the journalist Edward Behr spotted a TV news-man in a camp of violated Belgian nuns, going around with his camera and callingout, “Anybody here been raped and speak English?” In other words, it is notenough to have suffered: one must have suffered and be able to express one’s suf-fering in the language of the journalist. Inevitably, the globalized media has fewauthentic voices from the developing world. Imagine if the only media to whichyou had access dismissed your most urgent—indeed lifethreatening —concerns asside issues, summed up your culture as barbaric or peripheral, your religiousbeliefs as incomprehensible and threatening, and the fragility of your livelihood asof no great significance to the rest of the world. I suspect that some of you will haveno trouble imagining that. One way to change this is to increase the number andvolume of voices from those parts of the world that are, as yet, recipients, ratherthan producers, of media. And we know that this is possible. The success of AlJazeera alone would serve to prove the point. And indeed Al Jazeera does notstand alone, with the impressive rise of Al Arabiya, Abu Dhabi television, and otherArabic-language networks. A world in which it is easier than ever before to see orhear strangers at our breakfast table, through our daily dose of media, must alsobecome a world in which it is easier than ever before to see strangers as essential-ly no different from ourselves.

For the alternative to the enhanced understanding that comes from media devel-opment may be the terrorism which has so dominated the headlines. If terrorismis to be tackled and ended, we will have to deal with the ignorance that sustainsit. We will have to know each other better, learn to see ourselves as others see us,learn to recognize hatred and deal with its causes, learn to dispel fear, and aboveall just learn about each other. Which leads, almost inevitably, to the key question


we are confronting here. How do we best encourage the growth of the kind ofmedia that adds to the sum of human knowledge and boosts opportunity in soci-eties where such free expression has either never been the norm, or has been lostdue to conflict or to systems of governance that suppress the media? We are meet-ing in a part of the world where there has been a dramatic expansion in media,especially satellite television, and the growth of a huge pan-Arab market with mul-tiple channels available almost everywhere in the Arab world. This has served as aforce for promoting Arab unity, as programmers seek material that enlarges theirmarket share across the Arab world, with more focus on regional and internation-al issues rather than domestic ones. The imperatives of a large viewership, andgenerally low literacy, often means programs pitched at the lowest commondenominator of entertainment; a similar phenomenon occurs in news, where thefamiliar narratives tend to be reinforced. The challenge of media development insuch an environment is to develop media that is attractive, so that viewers in a sat-urated market don’t simply change the channel; credible, so that viewers keepcoming back; authentic, in reflecting the views of the public to which it isaddressed; and empowering, reaffirming a sense of responsible citizenship byreminding viewers of their rights and obligations. These issues have come to thefore recently in discussions about how best to develop a media culture in Iraq. Ifear that some of those discussions did not sufficiently feature the direct participa-tion of Iraqis themselves and others with a genuine affinity to the history, culture,and traditions of the region. But it is equally true that this particular project—thecreation of free and independent media in a country where the head of the jour-nalists’ union had, for some years prior to the war, been the son of the dictator—has lent an urgency and a specificity that has long been lacking in discussions ofthe importance of the role of the media.

At some of these discussions, an interesting conflict emerged between those whowanted a quick and substantial effort to establish a free press, claiming that goodinstitutions of governance would follow, and those who preferred to at beastignore, and at worst inhibit, the freedom of the press until sound mechanisms ofgovernance were established. I believe there is both right and wrong in both posi-tions. Without questioning the role that the media has in promoting governmenttransparency and accountability, we might ask ourselves which comes first—theinstitutions of good governance or a free press. I think this is a valid question. Inmany places not far from here, we have seen how the media can become a sub-stitute for democratic political expression, with media talk shows serving as a fac-simile (some might say a caricature) of genuine political debate in some societies.If journalists are not rewarded for being objective, and are not punished for fan-ning the flames, media can prove a disastrous alternative to responsible politics.

To say this is not to advocate censorship. Let me repeat once again that freedomof expression is an inalienable and immutable human right, set out in article 19 ofthe UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And that an independent andcredible media is essential to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights andessential to development, because I believe that those people and countries withaccess to information have far more chance of enjoying the fruits of developmentthan those without. Freedom to seek, receive, impart, and use information isvital—that’s why we are all here today. But let us also not pretend that a thrivingmedia is always a force for good. A free media can, sadly, sometimes prove to be“hate media.” On 3 December 2003, three Rwandan media figures were sen-tenced to lengthy jail terms by the International Tribunal for Rwanda for their rolein inciting their compatriots to kill Tutsis during the 1994 genocide. The three menwere convicted of genocide, incitement to genocide, conspiracy, crimes againsthumanity, extermination, and persecution. These convictions were the first of theirkind since the Allied Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946 sentenced Nazi publisherJulius Streicher to death for his anti-Semitic publication Der Stürmer. In its judg-ment, that Court affirmed: “The power of the media to create and destroy funda-mental human values comes with great responsibility.” In the case of Streicher, itis possible to argue that this abuse of the power of the media was in the service of


a tyrant. Tyrants and dictators have long known that controlling the informationthat people receive is a very effective way of controlling the people themselves.This was clearly not a free press. But in Rwanda remember that even before thegenocide began—in all its horror—the Rwandan president was assassinated, alongwith other representatives of a government that seemed inclined to seek peace.Radio Mille Collines served a terrible purpose, but it was not that of the govern-ment. I do not mean to imply that it was a truly independent media outlet; it wasindeed the propaganda arm of the Hutu genocidaires.” But non-governmentmedia is not always virtuous. The role played by the media of both sides in fuellingconflict in the Balkans also comes to mind. And, as United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has reported, the political violence that has wracked Côted’Ivoire over the last few years owes something to the irresponsible conduct of“hate media” which, he explained, was “fuelling the tensions, [encouraging] xeno-phobia and inciting violent acts.” Even in countries with a long tradition of ensur-ing press freedom, the work of journalists and writers and commentators is notunfettered. There are laws against slander and libel—we may not like the specificsof some of those laws, but I think few of us doubt that some legal restrictions arereasonable. As a US Supreme Court Justice once so eloquently put it, “Freedom ofexpression does not include the right to falsely cry ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre.”Media professionals have acknowledged that when those laws and restraints don’texist, their establishment must form part of our media development programs. Butwhat about when the very courts themselves don’t exist? What about societiestrembling on the brink of an apocalypse?

So here are my parameters.

First, if our efforts to assist with media development are to genuinely contribute toa better, safer, and more prosperous world, we must accept that there is no “onesize fits all” for media content. Countries and societies struggling to rebuild need amedia that has a local face and a local voice, and reflects a local understanding ofthe world. To be a force for good, the media must be “of the people,” and out-siders—even the most skilled and best-intentioned outsiders—cannot substitute.But they can help. Second, although the establishment of a free and independentmedia will undoubtedly aid the creation of better institutions of governance, it isnot enough to focus only on the media. The survival of a truly free and independ-ent media cannot be divorced from the establishment of the social and politicalinstitutions of good governance. Of course, the simple answer is that the two con-cepts—good governance and press freedom—can and must develop together, aspart of an integrated approach to nationbuilding. But this raises some tricky ques-tions about timing and priorities and allocation of resources that we ignore at ourperil. Does it take the same amount of time to build a legal system and an inde-pendent judiciary as it does to train a journalist or set up a broadcast studio?Arguably not, but if media professionals are to take our responsibilities seriously,we must ask ourselves questions like these.

And finally, in a world where people fear a clash of civilizations, the need for tol-erance and understanding in affirmation of our common humanity has never beenstronger. And I believe that a pluralistic global media will play a significant role infulfilling this need. So it is not in any of our interests to provide support for theestablishment of a second-class media. What assistance is offered must not simplybe sustainable, it must also seek to provide the best possible chance for local voic-es to ultimately be heard across our globalized world. And if we can achieve this,I believe we will be contributing not just to peace in-country, but to global securi-ty. As Socrates taught us, “there is only one good, knowledge; and only one evil,ignorance.” If we can help promote the vital exchange of ideas and informationregardless of frontiers, the media can play its part to make possible not just therenewal of strife-torn countries, but the creation of a global civilization that isdefined by its tolerance of dissent, its celebration of cultural diversity, and its insis-tence on fundamental, universal human rights. But let us also remember that there


cannot be just one standard, one style, one way of doing things. At the global level,the media must recognize that there exist, around us, many societies whose rich-ness lies in their soul and not in their soil, whose past may offer more wealth thantheir present, and whose culture is more valuable than their technology.Recognizing that this might be the case, and affirming that cultural distinctivenessis as central to humanity’s sense of its own worth as the ability to eat and drink andsleep under a roof, is also part of the challenge before the media today.

The only way to meet this challenge is to preserve cultural freedom in all societiesand to guarantee that individual voices find expression, and that all ideas andforms of media are able to flourish and content for their place in the sun. We haveheard in the past that the world must be made safe for democracy. That goal isessential, and is increasingly being realized; but it is also time for all of us to workto make the world safe for diversity. None of us has a monopoly over truth. In addi-tion to my UN work, I am also, when I can find the time, an Indian novelist. So letme end by telling you an Indian story. It is an old Indian story, from our ancientPuranas, about Truth. It seems that in ancient times a brash young warrior soughtthe hand of a beautiful princess. The king, her father, thought the warrior was a bittoo cocksure and callow; he told him he could only marry the princess once hehad found Truth. So the young warrior set out on a quest for Truth. He went totemples and to monasteries, to mountaintops where sages meditated and to forestswhere ascetics scourged themselves, but nowhere could he find Truth. Despairingone day and seeking refuge from a thunderstorm, he found himself in a dank,musty cave. There, in the darkness, was an old hag, with warts on her face andmatted hair, her skin hanging in folds from her bony limbs, her teeth broken, herbreath malodorous. She greeted him; she seemed to know what he was lookingfor. They talked all night, and with each word she spoke, the warrior realized hehad come to the end of his quest. She was Truth. In the morning, when the stormbroke, the warrior prepared to return to claim his bride. “Now that I have foundTruth,” he said, “what shall I tell them at the palace about you?” The wizened oldcrone smiled. “Tell them,” she said, “tell them that I am young and beautiful.” SoTruth is not always true; but that does not mean Truth does not exist. In our questfor it, though, we must always be conscious that there are other ways of finding it,and that what we find might not be what we expect. But the process of getting tothe truth is sometimes its own reward.


Media, Governance, andDevelopmentAn Empirical Perspective that Challenges Convention

Daniel Kaufmann, Director, Global Programs, World BankInstitute

Until the mid-1990s, the World Bank believed that its mandate was limited topurely economic issues such as trade reform, privatization, or financial sector man-agement— reforms that according to the Washington Consensus were essential foreconomic development. The Bank underestimated the importance of governanceand strong institutions; and the word “corruption” was not part of our vocabulary.

By the late 1990s the Bank became aware that poor governance and corruptionwere not only severe impediments to the effective use of development assistance,but that the poor were most affected by these abuses. Gradually the Bank beganraising awareness about the issue, conducting research, developing instruments todiagnose corruption, delivering training programs for government officials and civilsociety, and working directly on governance issues with selected countries uponrequest. Most recently, the Bank has focused on the importance of access to infor-mation and developing a freer media as major components of good governanceand ultimately effective development.

PRONOUNCEMENTS ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE POWER OF DATA AND ANALYTICAL RIGOR

To make a convincing case and develop properly designed initiatives, we need tounderstand the status of press freedom in the world today, including the factorsthat militate for and against an open media. We believe that the same rigorous


analysis and evidence-based policy-making that we have applied to traditionaleconomic and financial decisions should apply to governance issues as well.

We are supporting initiatives to collect and assess the current state of the mediawhich can then be shared with clients around the world. This includes, for exam-ple, the development of country-level and internationally comparable indicators ofmedia freedom and governance. Much of this data is available, but has not beenwidely publicized.

Data on the media industry and at the firm level also need to be collected and dis-closed including accurate information on real ownership structures. Similarly,assessments need to be carried out on the political environment (for example,freedom of expression), the legal and regulatory environment and their effect onthe media, the competitive environment, and a number of other factors that helpdetermine the effectiveness and viability of a free and open media.

More specifically, our evidence-based approach begins by challenging a set of tenmyths (or popular notions) on press freedoms, namely:

1. Freedom of the press ought to be viewed from a strictly political perspec-tive. We reject this view, and instead we suggest the importance of view-ing media development and freedoms from a governance and develop-ment perspective.

2. Press freedom should be seen as an outgrowth (or result) of a country’sindustrialization process and higher incomes, rather than as a contributorin itself to economic development and growth. In fact, a free press is nota luxury that only rich countries can afford.

3. Data on media and governance is scant, and the limited existing data isunreliable and not useful. We challenge this notion as well, indicating theprogress made on governance and media-related indicators, and that thesolid empirical analysis based on this data is important. It yields evidence-based lessons, and helps inform future strategies.

4. The Impact of press restrictions on corruption, poverty, and underdevel-opment is vastly exaggerated. This is not the case. The evidence indicatesthat it matters enormously.

5. The written laws ‘on the books’ are crucial determinant of the existenceor absence of press freedom. Written laws do matter as the ‘de jure’ cod-ification of rules and regulations, but they are far from sufficient. Theapplication of such legal and regulatory frameworks, the effective imple-mentation of Freedom of Information Acts, and the de-monopolization ofthe telecommunication sector, for instance, matter fully as much.

6. Broad press restrictions, including Official Secrecy Acts, and limitations toprivate media ownership, are often justified on the grounds of nationalsecurity considerations. Although there are legitimate concerns aboutconfidentiality and national security, they require rather narrow and spe-cific areas of caution (rather than broad restrictions), and ought not justi-fy restrictions on the type of ownership per se.

7. Significant state ownership of the media, and subsidies to the media, areoften rather beneficial. The evidence suggests the contrary: large-scalestate ownership is usually associated with a more restricted and ineffec-tive media. More generally, high levels of ownership concentration areassociated with less media effectiveness. This also applies within the pri-vate sector where more competition should be encouraged, a process thatcan be aided through new technologies (web, cell, community radio, andso forth).


8. The media is not to be treated as a business undertaking. It is so distinc-tive in its mandate and objectives, that it ought not be viewed as an‘industry.’ Although it is important to recognize some particular character-istics and (among others, social) objectives of the media, it is also impor-tant to view it as a business where financial viability is essential to ensurethat media development objectives are attained.

9. Does holding elections in a country guarantee press freedoms? The evi-dence suggests that elections, while associated with a higher degree ofpress freedom in general terms, do not in themselves guarantee mediadevelopment and press freedoms which require other initiatives and sup-port.

10. The international community and the World Bank can do very little in thefield of media. We suggest that this is not the case. In fact, a number ofongoing initiatives exist; and many others could be contemplated in thefuture.

In particular, the following can be highlighted:

Today the World Bank and other development and donor agencies are “practicingwhat they preach” by increasing public access to information, documents, anddecisionmaking processes.

We are treating the media as an important partner in our governance, anticorrup-tion, and poverty alleviation efforts by including them at the early stages of projectwork in countries and in poverty reduction strategies.

To help develop media capacities we deliver learning programs on topics not cov-ered by other institutions, such as business and economic journalism and mediamanagement.

We are also providing support to nascent media in fragile states, and in countriesimplementing freedom and access to information acts such as Mexico, and we aresharing good policy practices for building competitive media and telecommunica-tion sectors, with more limited state interference.

In collaboration with other organizations, we are deepening our research andanalysis on media development ratings and worldwide indicators.

And finally, the Bank has been commenting publicly on media developments inour partner countries, highlighting achievements and actively discouraging abuses.


The role of the Public Sphereand media independence inDeliberative Politics

Jürgen Habermas Professor Emeritus, Johann WolfgangGoethe-Universität in Frankfurt, Germany

Imagine the public sphere as an intermediary system of communication betweenformally organized and informal face-to-face deliberations in arenas both at thetop and at the bottom of the political system. There is empirical evidence for animpact of deliberation on decision-making processes in national legislatures1 andin other political institutions as there is for the learning effects of ruminating polit-ical conversations among citizens in every-day life.2


The center of the political system consists of the familiar institutions: parliaments,courts, administrative agencies, and government. Each branch can be described asa specialized deliberative arena. The corresponding output – legislative decisionsand political programs, rulings or verdicts, administrative measures and decrees,guidelines and policies – results from different types of institutionalized delibera-tion and negotiation processes. At the periphery of the political system, the publicsphere is rooted in networks for wild flows of messages – news, reports, commen-taries, talks, scenes and images, shows and movies with an informative, polemical,educational or entertaining content. These published opinions originate from var-ious types of actors - politicians and political parties, lobbyists and pressure groups,or actors of civil society.3 They are selected and shaped by mass-media profession-als and received by broad and overlapping audiences, camps, subcultures etc.From the spectrum of published political opinions we can distinguish, as polledopinion, the measured aggregate of pro or con attitudes to controversial publicissues as they tacitly take shape within weak publics. These attitudes are influencedby every-day talk in the informal settings or episodic publics of civil society at leastas much as they are by paying attention to print or electronic media.

Only across the system as a whole can deliberation be expected to operate as acleansing mechanism that filters out the ‘muddy’ elements from a discursivelystructured legitimation process. As an essential element of the democratic process,deliberation is expected to fulfil three functions, namely

• to mobilize and pool relevant issues, required information and to specifyinterpretations,

• to process such contributions discursively by means of proper argumentsfor and against, and

• to generate rationally motivated Yes and No attitudes that areexpected todetermine the outcome of procedurally correct decisions.


Figure 1

In view of the legitimation process as a whole, the facilitating role of the politicalpublic sphere is mainly to fulfill only the first of these functions and thereby to pre-pare the agendas for political institutions. To put it in a nutshell, the deliberativemodel expects the political public sphere to ensure the formation of a plurality ofconsidered public opinions. This is still a quite demanding expectation, but a real-istic scheme of necessary conditions for the generation of considered public opin-ions would yield non-arbitrary standards for the identification of the causes ofcommunication pathologies.

Let me develop such a communication model for democratic legitimation in twosteps and start by reminding you of the larger picture - the interaction between thestate and its social environments.

• professionals of the media system, especially journalists who edit news,reports and commentaries, and

• politicians who occupy the centre of the political system and are both theco-authors and addressees of public opinions. Mediated political commu-nication is carried on by an elite. We can distinguish five more typesamong the actors who make their appearance on the virtual stage of anestablished public sphere:

• lobbyists who represent special interest groups;

• advocates who either represent general interest groups or substitute for alack of representation of marginalized groups that are unable to voicetheir interests effectively,

• experts who are credited with professional or scientific knowledge insome specialized area and are invited to give advice,

• moral entrepreneurs, who generate public attention for supposedly neg-lected issues and, last not least,

• intellectuals who have gained, unlike advocates or moral entrepreneurs, aperceived personal reputation in some field (e.g., as writers or academics)and who engage, unlike experts and lobbyists, spontaneously in publicdiscourse with the declared intention of promoting general interests.

The state faces demands from two sides. In addition to rules and regulations, it hasto provide public goods and services for civil society, as well as subsidies and infra-structure for various functional systems, such as commerce or the labor market,health, social security, traffic, energy, research and development, education, etc.Through lobbies and neo-corporatist negotiations, representatives of the function-al systems confront the administration with what they present as “functionalimperatives”. Representatives of particular systems can threaten with imminentfailures, such as growing inflation or flight of capital, traffic collapse, a shortage ofhousing or energy supplies, a lack of skilled workers, a brain drain towards foreigncountries, etc. The disturbing impact of such strains or crises on citizens in theirrole as clients of the corresponding subsystems is filtered through the distribution-al patterns of class structures. Associational networks of civil society and specialinterest groups translate the strain of pending social problems and conflictingdemands for social justice into political issues. Actors of civil society articulatepolitical interests and confront the state with demands arising from the life-worldsof various groups. With the legal backing of voting rights such demands can bestrengthened by threatening to withdraw legitimation.

However, votes do not “naturally” grow out of the soil of civil society. Before theypass the formal threshold of campaigns and general elections, they are shaped bythe confused din of voices rising from both everyday talk and mediated commu-nication. Depending on democratic legitimation, at its periphery the political sys-tem thus possesses an open flank vis-à-vis civil society, namely the unruly life of the


public sphere.

Organizations for public opinion research continuously monitor and register theattitudes of private citizens. Media professionals produce an elite discourse, fed byactors who struggle for access to and influence on the media. They enter the stagefrom three points: politicians and political parties start from the center of the polit-ical system; lobbyists and special interest groups from the vantage point of thefunctional systems and status groups they represent; and advocates, public inter-est groups, churches, intellectuals, and moral entrepreneurs come from back-grounds in civil society.

Together with journalists, all of them join in the construction of what we call “pub-lic opinion”, though this singular phrase only refers to the prevailing one amongmany public opinions. Such clusters of synthesized issues and contributions at thesame time exhibit the respective weights of the accumulated Yes or No attitudesthat they attract from various audiences. Public opinions exert a kind of soft pres-sure on the malleable shape of minds.

This kind of “political influence” must be distinguished from “political power”,which is attached to offices and authorizes collectively binding decisions. Theinfluence of public opinions spreads in opposite directions, turning both towardsa government busy carefully watching it, and backwards towards the reflectingaudiences from where it first originated. Public opinions are hard to pin down;they are jointly constructed by political elites and diffuse audiences from the per-ceived differences between published opinions and the statistical records of polledopinions.

That both elected governments and voters can take an affirmative, a negative, oran indifferent attitude towards “public opinion” highlights the most important traitof the public sphere, namely its reflexive character. All participants can revisit per-ceived public opinions and respond to them after reconsideration. These respons-es from above as well as from below provide a double test as to how effectivepolitical communication in the public sphere functions as a filtering mechanism. Ifit works, only considered public opinions pass through it. Public opinions makemanifest what large, but conflicting sectors of the population consider in the lightof available information to be the most plausible interpretations of each of the con-troversial issues at hand.

From the viewpoint of responsive governments and political elites, consideredpublic opinions set the frame for the range of what the public of citizens wouldaccept as legitimate decisions in a given case. For responsive voters, who engagein every-day political talk, read newspapers, watch TV and do or do not partici-pate in elections, considered public opinions likewise present plausible alterna-tives for what counts as a reasonable position on public issues. It is the formal voteand the actual opinion and will formation of individual voters that together con-nect the peripheral flows of political communication in civil society and the pub-lic sphere with the deliberative decision-making of political institutions at the cen-ter, thus filtering them into the wider circuitry of deliberative politics.4

Notwithstanding the impersonal and asymmetrical structure of mass communica-tions, the public sphere could, if circumstances were only favorable, generate con-sidered public opinions. I use the conditional here to draw your attention to theother obvious reservation:

The power structure of the public sphere may well distort the dynamics of masscommunications and interfere with the normative requirement that relevantissues, required information and appropriate contributions be mobilized.


Power is not illegitimate per se. Let me distinguish four categories. There is firstpolitical power, which by definition requires legitimation. According to the delib-erative model of democracy, the legitimation process must pass through a publicsphere which has the capacity to foster considered public opinions. Social powerdepends on personal status within a stratified society; such statuses are derivedfrom positions within functional systems.

Therefore, economic power is a special, yet dominant kind of social power. It isnot social power as such, but rather its transformation into pressure on the politi-cal system that needs legitimation:

It must not bypass the channels of the public sphere. The same can be said for thepolitical impact of actors who arise from civil society, e.g., general interest groups,religious communities, or social movements. These actors do not possess “power”in the strict sense, but derive public influence from what Bourdieu termed the“social” and “cultural capital” they have accumulated in terms of visibility, promi-nence, reputation or moral status.

The mass media constitute yet another source of power.5 Media power is basedon the technology of mass communications. Those who work in the politically rel-evant sectors of the media system (i.e., reporters, columnists, editors, directors,producers, and publishers) cannot but exert power, because they select andprocess politically relevant content, and thus intervene in both the formation ofpublic opinions and the distribution of influential interests. The use of mediapower manifests itself in the choice of information and format, in the shape andstyle of programs, and in the effects of its diffusion – in agenda-setting, or the prim-ing and framing of issues.6 From the viewpoint of democratic legitimacy, mediapower nevertheless remains “innocent” to the extent that journalists operate with-in a functionally specific and self-regulating media system. The relative independ-ence of massmedia from the political and the economic systems was a necessaryprecondition for the rise of what is now called “media society”.

This is a quite recent achievement even in the West, and does not reach backmuch further than the end of the Second World War.7 Functional “independence”means the “self-regulation” of the media system in accordance with its own nor-mative code.8

In inter-media agenda-setting, an informal hierarchy accords the national qualitypress the role of opinion leader. There is a spill-over of political news and com-mentaries from prestigious newspapers and political magazines with nation-widecirculation into the other media.9 As far as input from the outside is concerned,politicians and political parties are, of course, by far the most important suppliers.They hold a strong position as regards negotiating privileged access to the media.However, even governments usually have no control over how the media thenpresent and interpret their messages, or over how political elites or wider publicsreceive them, or over how they respond to them.10

Given the high level of organization and material resources, representatives offunctional systems and special interest groups enjoy somewhat privileged access tothe media, too. They are in a position to use professional techniques to transformsocial power into political muscle. Public interest groups and advocates tend like-wise to employ corporate communications management methods. It follows thatcompared with politicians and lobbyists, the actors of civil society are in the weak-est position.

Players on the virtual stage of the public sphere can be classified in terms of forma hierarchy of the power or “capital” they have at their disposal. The stratification


of opportunities to transform power into public influence through the channels ofmediated communication attests to a power structure. This power is constrained,however, by the peculiar reflexivity of a public sphere that allows all participantsto reconsider what they perceive as “public opinion”. The common construct of“public opinion” certainly invites actors to intervene strategically in the publicsphere. However, the unequal distribution of the means for such interventionsdoes not necessarily distort the formation of considered public opinions. Strategicinterventions in the public sphere must, unless they run the risk of inefficiency,play by the rules of the game. Once the established rules constitute the right game– one that promises the generation of considered public opinions – then even thepowerful actors will only contribute to the mobilization of relevant issues, facts andarguments. However, for the rules of the right game to exist two things must firstbe achieved: First, a self-regulating media system must maintain its independencevis-à-vis its environments while linking political communication in the publicsphere with both civil society and the political center; and second an inclusive civilsociety must empower citizens to participate in and respond to a public discoursewhich, in turn, must not degenerate into a colonizing mode of communication.

The latter condition is troubling, to say the least. The literature on “public igno-rance” paints a rather portrait image of the average citizen as a largely uninformedand disinterested person.11 However, this picture has been changed by recentstudies on the cognitive role of heuristics and information shortcuts in the devel-opmentand consolidation of political orientations. They suggest that in the longterm, readers, listeners and viewers can definitely form reasonable attitudestowards public affairs even unconsciously. They can build them by aggregatingtheir often tacit and since forgotten reactions to casually received bits and piecesof information, which they had initially integrated into and evaluated against thebackground of evolving conceptual schemes: thus ”people can be knowledgeablein their reasoning about their political choices without possessing a large body ofknowledge about politics.”12 Pathologies of political communication In the finalanalysis, we are nevertheless confronted with the prima facie evidence that thekind of political communication we know from our so-called media society goesagainst the grain of the normative requirements of deliberative politics. However,the suggested empirical use of the deliberative model has a critical thrust: It enableus to read the contradicting data as indicators of contingent constraints whichdeserve serious inquiry. The afore-mentioned requirements – that is to say, theindependence of a self-regulated media system and the right kind of feedbackbetween mediated political communication and civil society – can serve as divin-ers for the discovery of specific causes for existing lacks of legitimacy.

(1) As to the first condition, we must distinguish between an incomplete differen-tiation of the media system from its environments on the one hand and a tempo-rary interference with the independence of a media system that has alreadyreached the level of selfregulation, on the other. The state monopoly which pub-lic broadcasting enjoyed in Italy during the first three decades of the post-War peri-od is a prime example for the entanglement of electronic media in the political sys-tem. During a period when any change of government between the rulingChristian Democrats and the Communist opposition was blocked, each of themajor parties enjoyed the privilege of recruiting the personnel for one of threepublic TV-channels. This pattern granted a certain degree of pluralism, but certain-ly did not ensure independence of professional programming. One consequenceof this incomplete differentiation of mediated communication from the core of thepolitical system was that public broadcasting indulged in a kind of paternalism, asif immature citizens needed due political instruction from on high.13

Compared with such a lack of differentiation, temporary dedifferentiation wouldseem to be a minor deficiency. Nevertheless, it sometimes has an even graverimpact. A recent case in point is the manipulation of the American public by theWhite House’s surprisingly successful communications management before and


after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. What this case highlights is not the clever moveby the President to frame the event of 9/11 as having triggered a “war on terror-ism”.14 For the more remarkable phenomenon in this context was the totalabsence of any serious counterframing.15 A responsible press would have provid-ed the popular media with more reliable news and alternative interpretationsthrough channels of an inter-media agenda-setting.

The lack of distance between the media and special interest groups is less spectac-ular, but more frequent and “normal” than its transitory entanglement in theclutches of politics. If, for example, ecological or health-insurance policies impacton the substantial interests of major corporations, concentrated efforts to translateeconomic power into political influence can be seen to have ameasurable effect.In this context, the intermediary influence of scholarly communities (such as theChicago school) is also worth mentioning. A special case of damage to editorialindependence occurs when private owners of a media empire develop politicalambitions and use their property based power for acquiring political influence.

The private TV and print media are commercial enterprises like any other.However, here owners can use their economic clout as a switch to immediatelyconvert media power into public influence and political pressure. Alongside mediatycoons such as Rupert Murdoch or Ted Turner, Silvio Berlusconi is an especiallyinfamous example. He first exploited the legal opportunities just described forpolitical self-promotion, and then after taking over the reins of government usedhis media empire to back dubious legislation in support of the consolidation of hisprivate fortunes and political assets. In the course of this adventure, Berlusconieven succeeded in changing the media culture of his country, shifting it from a pre-dominance of political education to an emphasis on marketing of depoliticizedentertainment – “a mixture of films and telefilms, quiz and variety shows, cartoonsand sports, with football preeminent in this latter category”.16

(2) The other condition concerns the feedback between a selfregulating media sys-tem and a responsive civil society. The political public sphere needs input from cit-izens who give voice to society’s problems and respond to the issues articulated inelite discourse. There are two major causes for a systematic lack of this kind offeedback loop. Social deprivation and cultural exclusion of citizens explain theselective access to and uneven participation in mediated communication (a),whereas the colonization of the public sphere by market imperatives leads to a


Figure 2

peculiar paralysis of civil society (b).

(a) It is sociological common-sense that the interest in public affairs and the use ofthe political media largely correlate with social status and cultural background.17

This set of data can be interpreted as indicating the inadequate functional differ-entiation of the political public sphere from the class-structure of civil society. Inthe course of the last few decades, however, the ties to ascriptive social and cul-tural origins have been loosening.18 The shift towards “issue-voting” reveals thegrowing impact of public discourse on voting patterns and, more generally, of pub-lic discourse on the formation of “issue publics”. While a larger number of peopletend to take an interest in a larger number of issues, the overlap of issue publicsmay even serve to counter trends of fragmentation.19

In spite of an inclusion of ever more citizens in the flows of mass communication,a comparison of recent studies arrives at an ambivalent, if not outright pessimisticconclusion about the kind of impact mass –communications has on the involve-ment of citizens in politics.20 Several findings in the United States support the


Figure 3

“video-malaise” hypothesis according to which people who more extensively usethe electronic media, and consider them an important source of information, havea lower level of trust in politics and are more likely to take a cynical attitudetowards politics as a consequence.21 If, however, reliance on radio and TV fostersfeelings of powerlessness, apathy and indifference, we should not seek the expla-nation in the paralyzed state of civil society, but in the content and formats of adegenerating kind of political communication itself. The data I have mentionedsuggest that the very mode of mediated communication contributes independent-ly to a diffuse alienation of citizens from politics. a lower level of trust in politicsand are more likely to take a cynical attitude towards politics as aconsequence. If,however, reliance on radio and TV fosters feelings of powerlessness, apathy andindifference, we should not seek the explanation in the paralyzed state of civilsociety, but in the content and formats of a degenerating kind of political commu-nication itself. The data I have mentioned suggest that the very mode of mediatedcommunication contributes independently to a diffuse alienation of citizens frompolitics.

(b) What I have in mind here is simply the redefinition of politics in market cate-gories. The rise of autonomous art and an independent political press since the late18th century is a case in point as it proves that the commercia l organization anddistribution of intellectual products do not necessarily induce the commodificationof both the content and the modes of reception. Under the pressure of sharehold-ers who thirst for higher revenues, it is the intrusion of the functional imperativesof the market economy into the “internal logic” of the production and presenta-tion of messages that leads to the covert displacement of one category of commu-nication by another: Issues of political discourse become assimilated into andabsorbed by the modes and contents of entertainment. Besides personalization,the dramatization of events, the simplification of complex matters, and the vividpolarization of conflicts promotes civic privatism and a mood of anti-politics.

The growing status of candidate images explains the pattern of candidate-centeredelectoral politics. The trend towards issue voting goes hand in hand with the trendtowards candidate-based voting to the extent that the latter does not already pre-dominate.

The personalization of politics is bolstered by the commodification of programs.Private radio and TV –stations, which operate under the budget constraints ofextensive advertising, are pioneering in this field. Though public broadcasting sta-tions still maintain a different programming structure, they are in the process ofadapting to or adopting the model of their private competitors. Some authors con-sider the political journalism to which we are accustomed as a model that is beingphased out. Its loss would rob us of the centerpiece of deliberative politics.

*

These few examples illustrate how to make use of a communication model ofdeliberative politics for the interpretation of empirical findings. The model directsour attention specifically to those variables that explain failures in the maintenanceof a selfregulating media system and of proper feed-back between public sphereand civil society.


Why the media matters

James Deane, Managing Director, Communication forSocial Change Consortium

Introduction

A rich, complex set of factor provides the background to the Global Forum forMedia development, factors that imply a rapidly developing, starkly different seriesof challenges to the role of the media in development in the 21st Century thanthose that existed in the 20th.

This paper focuses on the role of media in development, rather than simply thedevelopment of the media. The role of media in development – it’s role in provid-ing people with access to information that enables them to make sense of theirlives, its role in covering issues of relevance to those living in poverty and those atthe margins at society, its role in reasonably reflecting the perspectives of such peo-ple in its coverage – have preoccupied development organizations for many years.It has not always been a preoccupation shared by much of the media itself.

The Global Forum provides an opportunity to reflect on why the media matters inthe 21st Century and why the role it plays matters most to the almost 3 billion peo-ple on the planet living on less than $2 a day.

This paper will outline some of the background to the Global Forum, focusing par-ticularly on four sets of issues:

• Why the role of the media will be critical in determining success or fail-ure in halving the number of people living in poverty by 2015;

• Why, perversely, media and communication support features so poorly in


current development strategies;

• How the profound changes in the communication landscape over the lastdecade or so raise profound new questions about the role of the media insociety, questions which media and media support organizations them-selves (rather than governments or even civil society) should be taking thelead in responding to.

• How the debate on the role of media in development can be reframed toovercome old debates and divisions on the issue;

Not message, but voice: why the media matters

In 2000, the World Bank carried out the largest ever survey to find out what peo-ple living in poverty said they wanted and needed most. The most commonresponse was not that people’s first priority was not money. It was that they need-ed a voice –a say in the decisions that affected them.

Most debates over the role of the media in development focus on strategies tosecure media coverage of poverty related issues. This is critical, but the extent ofcoverage is not the only factor. The extent to which the perspectives of those liv-ing in poverty are reflected in the media is becoming equally important. It isimportant because it is what people living in poverty say they need most if theyare to improve their lives. It is important too because nearly all current mainstreamdevelopment strategies depend increasingly on it.

Nearly all current development strategies are rooted in two central assumptions:the first is ownership, the second is accountability. The role of the media is criticalin underpinning both.

A revolution is taking place in development assistance and development strategies.Gone are the days of a thousand flowers blooming in development assistancewhen hundreds of donors, thousands of organizations, and millions of people wereinvolved in a multiplicity of sometimes small, sometimes giant development proj-ects. The global development effort is now increasingly structured around meetingthe Millennium Development Goals (see Box 1). Nearly all governments (the US isa major exception) have committed themselves to meeting eight MillenniumDevelopment Goals, a set of targets adopted in 2000, themselves based on a setof International Development Targets which the OECD had drawn up to create acoherent framework out of the many global conferences on development of the1980s and 1990s.


Box 1: The Millennium Development GoalsThe adoption of the goals – of which halving the number of people living on less

than a dollar a day was the first – was one major milestone in development assis-tance. Another was the methodologies and strategies to achieve those goals.Donors, led principally by the World Bank, have committed themselves to workmuch more closely together according to a set of frameworks developed by devel-oping countries themselves. Originally conceived as Comprehensive DevelopmentFrameworks by former President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn in the late1990s, they evolved into an uglier jargon: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper(PRSP). PRSPs, which are meant to be developed by developing countries them-selves, are designed to form a framework within which all bilateral donors agree towork.

The media have been criticized since the invention of the printing press by differ-ent interests for not covering issues which such interests argue is important. Thosearguing that an issue with an acronym like PRSP – or even the more compelling,life and death stories that lie behind such sterile titles – might be forgiven for sug-gesting we join a long queue of perhaps important, but fundamentally boring,issues which don’t get prominent coverage. The explanation of why such process-es matter, and why the media matters, is similarly prosaic. This is important. It canalso be boring.

Just one example: PRSPs

The central principle underpinning the PRSP is country ownership. “Too manycapacity building efforts have foundered in the past because they have not beenrooted in local ownership”, said Wolfensohn in 1999, referring to the PRSPs.


PRSPs were an essential condition for poor countries to qualify for debt relief, butthey were also designed to be the mechanism which ensured that the perspectivesof poor people, together with those of civil society organizations and the broaderpublic in society, were to be taken into account in the design of developmentstrategies. They were, in other words, conceived as a product both of governmentpolicy and of public debate, a debate which could provide a central pillar onwhich ownership rested. Without such ownership, argued Wolfensohn, PRSPswould fail.

There is increasing agreement that PRSPs have suffered from lack of ownership,and are consequently failing as a result. PRSPs encompass most arenas of govern-ment concerned with poverty – health service provision, education, social servic-es and safety nets, housing and so. It is difficult to imagine a more fundamentalprocess affecting more people on the planet.

They have been subject to criticism on many accounts – that macro-economic pol-icy is not open for discussion, that World Bank advisers continue to shape policyfor governments to give just two examples. But they have been weakened aboveall by a lack of ownership, and lack of public debate has undermined that owner-ship. Such debate cannot happen without an engaged, informed, proactive media.Public debate has, by common consent and even on the World Bank’s own analy-sis, been hopelessly insufficient (this deficiency has led the Bank to respond tomake media and communication an increasing priority).

Analysis of media treatment of PRSPs – the extent to which they have been report-ed in the media, the extent to which media has provided a forum for publicdebate, the extent to which those who have most to win or lose from a publicdebate have had their perspectives aired in the media – has repeatedly shown aludicrously low or poor level of coverage.26

In general, analysis has suggested

• Very low level of awareness of PRSP processes within media of PRSPcountries;

• Reporting when it happens is disengaged and formulaic;

• Lack of technical skills within the journalism corps to report on econom-ic development and sectoral specific issues such as health, education andagriculture

• Poor relationship between government and journalists hindering inves-tigative and strong coverage of PRSP related issues

• Lack of interaction between NGO/CSOs and media which could lead togreater understanding and engagement by media

• Media outlets increasingly demanding payment for coverage of develop-ment related issues

• Urban bias of media

• Strategies to engage media have often not adjusted to new media envi-ronments

PRSP are the central strategic mechanism agreed by the development communityfor meeting the central Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015.They are failing because of a lack of ownership. The media is vital to the kind ofpublic debate that can foster ownership. The media is not and has not played thatrole. Progress towards meeting the MDGs is faltering – or perhaps in more real


terms, millions of people are dying unnecessarily – because this system is simplynot working.

This is how the media matter to meeting just one MDG. Very similar argumentscan be made with many of the other MDGs – on HIV/AIDS, on food security, oneducation and so on. The Bellagio meeting on Communication and the MDGs,held between donor and multilateral organizations in 2004, articulated some ofthese arguments, and these can be found in more detail in Annex 2.

On a wing and a prayer? An assumption of accountability

Later on this paper explores some of the reasons – some good, some not – for thisfailure. Before that, the second assumption underpinning global development pol-icy needs to be explored. That is accountability.

The importance of a government being held to account by its people is a given. Itis at the core of most media debates. It is at the heart of much development poli-cy and has been for many years. Amartya Sen famously wrote that famines don’toccur in democracies, in large part because the media provides an early warningsystem and a mechanism for ensuring pressure for government action. The impor-tance of the media for these and many other reasons is clear.

It is, in development terms however, becoming ever more critical. Most develop-ment strategies are becoming more coherent and organized. They are also rapid-ly and heavily placing spending in the hands of government. One of the centralconclusions of the report of the Commission for Africa was that, because so manyconditions were imposed on development assistance, developing country govern-ments felt more accountable to western donors than they did to their own citizens.

The Africa Commission report, and much of current development policy thinkingand practice is intent on changing this. Development assistance over the next fewyears will, it is proposed, increase substantially. Debt reduction is becoming real.Some progress (many are not optimistic) may even be made in the reforming theterms of trade in favour of developing countries at the Doha round in Hong Kongin December. These steps could transform the prospects of millions living in pover-ty.

All of them make one central assumption – that governments will act in the bestinterests of their citizens.

In essence it is proposed that very substantial increases in development assistanceand other income be made available to developing countries over the nextdecade; and that those countries should be less accountable to donors for expen-diture of that money. They should set their own priorities, as they think best in theinterests of their own people.

While few pretend that this is the end of conditionality, the assumption, the hope,perhaps the prayer is that governments, if they are not to be held to account bydonors, will be held to account by their own citizens.

The importance of an independent, informed, engaged media in fulfilling thatfunction is, once more, a central (if often and strangely unacknowledged) pillar ofthis strategy. If the media fails in holding government to account, perhaps the last,best hope for making a real change to the lives of 3 billion on the planet is lost. Ifthis strategy of what is sometimes termed “the big push” for making poverty histo-ry fails now, the opportunity is likely to be lost for generations.


The stakes could barely be higher.

IF THE MEDIA IS SO IMPORTANT, WHY ISN’T IT A HIGHER PRIORITY?

There is little or no data available on how much development organizations col-lectively spend on support to media institutions and support efforts in developingcountries. There is indeed a panoply of types of media support, including tomedia in conflict and emergency and post emergency situations, media freedomprogrammes, training and capacity building efforts, media in the context of goodgovernance programmes, media as a contribution as a component of strategies tocombat HIV/AIDS and other sectoral issues, public debate initiatives, to commu-nity media and many others. Given this it may appear perverse to criticize devel-opment institutions for a lack of support to the media.

Nevertheless, a meeting of bilateral and multilateral development agencies meet-ing in Bellagio, Italy in 200427 concluded that media and communication supportstrategies “remain a low priority on development agendas, undermining achieve-ment of the MDGs.” In general, support to the sector is incoherent, unstrategic andwoefully short of the level of priority that the analysis presented in this and otherpapers implies is needed.

Most donors are simply not well equipped to support independent media and arearguably becoming less so. There are many reasons for this.

First, most bilateral, and many multilateral donors, have undergone rapid and pro-found decentralisation processes. Decisions on funding are made at the countrylevel on the assumption that decision-making needs to be as close to the problemas possible. This is clearly sensible, but for a sector like the media, with little over-all institutional support, commitment to media support ends up depending heavi-ly on the individual interests of programme officers in donor country desks. Forthis reason, donor support to media is increasingly fragmented, inconsistent andunstrategic.

Second, donors are channelling increasing funds through governments in the formof budget support. It clearly, as previous experience has repeatedly demonstrated,makes no sense to channel support to the media in the interests of promoting pub-lic accountability of governments through the same governments who are meantto become more accountable. No government anywhere could be trusted withsuch a task. Yet most donors are less and less equipped to provide substantialmedia support outside such a government structure.

Third, even when donors are able to provide funds directly to media support agen-cies either internationally or nationally, they are open to accusations that supportto the media sector in any given country is motivated not out of a desire to fostergreater accountability in that country, or greater participation, but to further theirown policy agendas.

Fourth, while most donors work in the name of international cooperation, manyof their donor policies are actively designed to foster competition between like-minded organisations. Particularly in the media and communication sphere, whereco-operation among agencies for a collective and more coherent agenda and setof strategies is badly needed, donor policies ensure that those organisations work-ing in this arena are forced to compete with each other, sometimes unnecessarily.

Fifth, donors have increasingly moved to evaluation mechanisms focused on sys-tems such as results-based management. These have tended to insist that quanti-


tative indicators within short time frames are used to assess impact. Many mediasupport initiatives, particularly those aimed at empowering people living in pover-ty, take time to show results, and the results – while often compelling – are lessamenable to quantitative evaluation. Number crunching does not mix well withmuch media support.

Sixth, development agendas are notorious for going through fads and fashions.Even when donors commit themselves to a support policy in an area like media,interest is often lost as some new crisis or issue emerges. Donors are in generalbecoming more strategic and coherent in their development assistance, but themedia has been particularly prone to a lack of strategic thinking, engagement andfollow through. All the current evidence suggests that such inconsistency is contin-uing. As this paper makes clear, this could have disastrous consequences in thefuture.

Finally, as we discuss toward the end of this paper, donors can find media supportcontentious and difficult, and retain memories of bitter and difficult debates onsupporting media development.

How these and other challenges can be addressed is a subject for discussion at theGlobal Forum, but clearly two priorities are obvious. The first is a much more con-certed, coordinated and effective advocacy strategy aimed at donors by mediasupport organisations. However, while this can be fostered and articulated bymedia support agencies, the needs and agendas need to be developed as much aspossible from within developing countries. A recent and still nascent initiative, thePartnership for Communication in Africa, linking some media support organisationswith organisations in Africa with a view to framing an Africa-driven debate anddonor advocacy strategy on the role of communication and media in Africa is oneexample of such an approach.

Second, the evidence base for the impact of media support needs to be developedboth urgently in the media sector. This issue is to be discussed at the Forum.

CAN THE MEDIA PLAY THIS ROLE?

It is not, however, only the donors who need to examine their policies and prac-tice in this domain. The extent to which the media can or is willing to play a rolethe role outlined in the first part of this paper is perhaps the central question fac-ing the Global Forum for Media Development. This is not the place for a compre-hensive analysis of media trends, but even a superficial trawl of media trends glob-ally suggests there is much to provide hope, and much to suggest despair.

To focus particularly on developing countries, the point of departure is a recogni-tion of a media revolution. The changes in the structure, content and character ofthe media over the last decade or two have had a far more profound effect ininformation terms than the changes in new technologies. This “other informationrevolution” is characterized by rapid liberalization, particularly of print and radio.Trends are inconsistent and obviously vary from country to country, but some areworth highlighting:

Perhaps the most important trends shaping the media landscape over the last fiveyears have been threefold28:

First, a thoroughgoing liberalization and commercialization of media over the lastdecade in many parts of the world has led to a much more democratic, dynamic,crowded and complex media landscape. This is opening up new spaces for pub-


lic debate and civic engagement, particularly in the field of radio; and to a morecommercial, advertising-driven media where information and power divides with-in developing countries between rich and poor, urban and rural are growing.

Second, growing concentration of media ownership—at the global, regional andnational levels—is squeezing out independent media players and threatening toreplace government-controlled concentration of media power with a commercialand political one.

Third, developing countries are increasingly, not decreasingly, reliant on powerfulnorthern news providers, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),Reuters and Cable News Network (CNN), for their international news and infor-mation, particularly on stories of globalization, trade and international politics; andin newly democratic countries in the South, and particularly within civil society,there is a renewed and growing frustration at the Southern media’s dependenceon what are perceived to be partial, biased or at least fundamentally Northern-centric news organizations for international coverage and the setting of news agen-das (there are major exceptions to this trend, of which the emergence of Al Jazeerais just one).

This is a complex, contradictory revolution marking an extraordinary transforma-tion over little more than a decade. New freedoms, a blossoming of public debate,a resurgent community radio movement, a proliferation of channels and titlesacross all media, a dynamic interplay between old and new technologies and thesometimes rapid, sometimes agonizingly slow but still remorseless loosening ofgovernment control over information have all characterized this revolution.

Despite this, when viewed from the perspective of development, a growing crisismay be emerging, a crisis marked by a collapse (or sometimes still birth) of publicinterest media. A new competitive market among media has brought innovation,dynamism and often greatly enhanced democratic debate, and has in a myriad ofcases in many countries brought about a profound social change, much of it pos-itive.

But while the proliferation of media in the wake of liberalization in many coun-tries was initially marked by an upsurge of public debate on a whole range ofissues, evidence is growing that, as competition intensifies, content is increasinglybeing shaped by the demands of advertisers and sponsors who pay for the newlyliberalized media, and an increasingly dominant trend to focus on profitability. Theresult is an increasingly urban biased, consumer oriented media which has dimin-ishing interest in or concern for people living in poverty.

Communication for development organizations and practitioners are beginning toadjust to the new environment. DJs are becoming as important as journalists inbringing development issues to public attention. Indeed, journalism as a professionis dramatically changing and concepts such as “development journalism” arearguably under siege. Journalists who themselves want to explore and investigatedevelopment stories – particularly those from outside the capital, are finding itmore and more difficult to get either resources or attention from their editors.

Never a rewarding and always a difficult profession, investigative journalism isarguably becoming steadily less attractive particularly when such investigationfocuses on the unglamorous poor. There is little incentive and decreasing inclina-tion among many journalists to focus on development issues since this is a poorcareer move. With no paying market for poverty related content, and particularlyfor politically sensitive or awkward reporting, incentives for journalists, editors,publishers and owners to prioritize it are also declining, disincentives growing.


Journalists the world over continue to risk their lives in the pursuit of truth, in theinterests of the public. Very often – increasingly often – they lose their lives in suchan interest. But in an environment which is not only politically hostile, but eco-nomically hostile too, how long and to what extent can journalists be expected toplay this role, let alone do so routinely and as the core of their job description?Such courage and such reporting may continue to survive in pursuit of stories thatmatter, but can it be expected to survive, let alone increase, for stories which intraditional journalistic terms, are often treated as non starters. Poverty and devel-opment related stories clearly fall within this category.

Journalism training is also under pressure, particularly with a public interest remit,and journalism schools in some developing countries are finding that graduates areas often snapped up by the public relations and advertising industries as they areby news organizations.

The former state monopoly broadcasters and media organizations, who retain thegreatest capacity to reach rural and marginalized populations, are facing intensecompetition from commercial organizations as governments reduce budgets. As aconsequence some are in crisis. As well as a shift to more commercial and con-sumer oriented content, there are reports of cutting of language services, particu-larly in minority languages and of transmitter capacity. In this sense, the digitaldivide is being reflected in a much broader, deeper and perhaps more fundamen-tal information divide between urban and rural, rich and poor.

Many development agencies are responding to the new commercialized mediamarket by actively entering it, and some of the most consistent customers for someradio stations are development organizations and donors. Income – in the form ofpayment for spots or sponsorship of programs – from development organizationsis becoming an increasingly critical component of some broadcast organizationsincome, but fears are growing that an artificial market is being created and thatpublic are receiving information determined by the whatever organization – devel-opment or otherwise – has the most money, rather than through any journalistic orpublic interest criteria. ‘

MOVING ON FROM THE PAST: FRAMING THE DEBATE ON MEDIA AND DEVELOPMENT

The issues explored in this paper are not new. Any discussion on the role of themedia in relation to development needs to acknowledge that debates in the pastover this issue have sometimes been bitter, acrimonious and destructive. The roles,responsibilities and, as many interpreted it, obligations of the media in coveringissues of social concern was the focus of the MacBride Report of 1980, This reportushered in a debate which came to be known as the New World Information andCommunication Order, hosted by UNESCO.

The NWICO debate was seen by many in developing countries as the dawn of anera designed to bring about a media that could reflect their own, rather thanWestern, values, priorities and identities. It, and the debate that surrounded thereport, came to be seen by most media organizations, particularly but not only inthe West, as a concerted effort by many governments to muzzle a free press in thename of the poor.

The intense and bitter arguments over the perceived dangers was a powerful spurto advocates of media freedom organizations, and the episode was instrumental inprompting the departure from UNESCO of the US and UK governments. Thelegacy of this debate arguably continues to overshadow more current debates ofthe role of media in development, and there were clear echoes of the debate inthe approach to the World Summit on the Information Society in 2003.


Many analyses have been written of the events and impact of this debate and thisis not the place to outline the full complexity of the arguments involved. However,in acknowledging this debate, this paper also proposes how to move beyond it.

In 2003, a symposium was organized29 in Bellagio, Italy to bring together the dif-ferent sides of this debate, with a range of media freedom organizations and mediaadvocacy organizations coming together to explore how a more constructivedebate on these issues could be framed. While some issues continued to divideparticipants at the meeting, an important degree of agreement was reached. Astatement from this meeting can be found in Annex 1 and while the statementneeds to be read as a totality, one extract may be useful to highlight here:

Freedom of expression, as expressed in Article XIX of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, is a fundamental right which underpins all other humanrights, and enables them to be expressed and ealizat. The eradication of pover-ty is essential to the ealization for all peoples of the aspirations in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights. People living in poverty face particular obsta-cles to achieving freedom of expression and access to the media which areassociated with the conditions of poverty….. The interests and concerns ofpeople living in poverty are not sufficiently exposed in the media.

The rest of this paper has argued that the degree to which the media focus onissues of poverty, and reasonably reflect the perspectives of those living in povertyin their coverage will be a major factor in determining whether real progress ismade in reaching the Millennium Development Goals. But its starting point is thatmedia freedom is the fundamental, non-negotiable starting point of any debate onthe role of the media in development.

THIS IS A PROBLEM: CAN WE TALK ABOUT IT?

This paper has sought to set out a series of problems linking the role of the mediato development policy. At its heart and put simplistically, unless the media is ableto play the role of guardian of the public interest, unless that public is seen as thewhole population of developing countries and not just those who constitute a mar-ket for advertisers; and unless those who have most to win or lose from develop-ment debates – close to half of mankind; unless these things happen, people willdie. They will die, as they are dying now, not in their hundreds or thousands butin their hundreds of millions.

This is a heavy responsibility to place on the media, and is arguably both misplacedand unfair. Is it the responsibility of the media to assume such a grandiose role?Should it be assumed that the media should have to pay any attention, let aloneadapt itself, because of how governments choose to structure their developmentstrategies. Surely the media exists in its own right and has the right to determinewhat its own responsibilities are.

Opinions may differ on these questions but there surely rests, at a minimum, aresponsibility on those in the media to debate these issues. To contest and disagreewith the analysis set out in this paper perhaps; to explore what strategies can bemade; to begin to define a set of steps that recognizes the enormity of the impli-cations of this issue and this debate.

And yet, these issues are barely discussed in the international arena. There aregood reasons for this. There are venues internationally where such issues areraised, such as at UN summits like the World Summit on the Information Society(WSIS) held in 2003 and again in 2005.


These though are not the places for this debate because they are driven and ori-ented around government. The place and the space should be defined by themedia and by those concerned with supporting free, independent and genuinelyplural media. That place may be Jordan, and that space may be the Global Forumfor Media Development. Very few other opportunities currently exist to confront,debate and develop responses to these issues.

This debate is urgent and its outcome could barely be more important. Theseissues need to be confronted. If not us, who? If not here, where? If not now, when?


Who makes the news ?

Margaret Gallagher, The Global Media Monitoring Project

On 16 February 2005 newsroom staff around the globe went about their businessas normal. But for the groups throughout the world who gathered to monitor theirnews media, this was no ordinary day. After months of preparation, the thirdGlobal Media Monitoring Project was underway. An extraordinary internationalcollective effort that has taken place at five-yearly intervals since 1995, the GMMPsystematically monitors the representation of women and men in news content. Itprovides a unique global analysis of who makes news, in what capacity, and withwhat level of authority.

RATIONALE

Why this focus on the news? Because it is the major source of information, facts,ideas and opinion for people throughout the world. In today’s 24-hour news envi-ronment, it matters profoundly who and what is selected to appear in news cov-erage, and how individuals and events are portrayed. Equally, it matters who is leftout and what is not covered. Ten years ago, the first GMMP showed that - wher-ever one looks in the world - news is made by men: only 17% of those in the newswere women. Since 1995 the news media in many countries have been trans-formed. Dedicated news channels, on-line newspapers, transnational news servic-es - these have brought news into the homes of more and more people around theglobe. To what extent have these changes been paralleled by changes in the con-tent of news - the people who appear, the issues that are covered, and the storiesthese tell about who and what is important?

SCALE AND SCOPE

This is the question that underlies the 2005 Global Media Monitoring Project. Theundertaking is impressive in scale and scope. Groups in 76 countries submitted


data that were analysed and compared. In total 12,893 news stories were moni-tored on television, radio and in newspapers. These news items included 25,671news sources - persons who are interviewed or whom the news is about. The sto-ries were reported and (in the case of television and radio) presented by 14,273news personnel. Altogether 39,944 people - including news sources, presentersand reporters - were covered in the 2005 GMMP.

News: A Mirror On the World? Men dominate the news agenda.

• There is not a single major news topic in which women outnumber menas newsmakers. In stories on politics and government only 14% of newssubjects are women; and in economic and business news only 20%. Yetthese are the topics that dominate the news agenda in all countries. Evenin stories that affect women profoundly, such as gender-based violence, itis the male voice (64% of news subjects) that prevails.

When women do make the news it is primarily as ‘stars’ (celebrities,royalty) or as‘ordinary’ people.

• Women make the news not as figures of authority, but as celebrities(42%), royalty (33%) or as ‘ordinary people’. Female newsmakers out-number males in only two occupational categories - homemaker (75%)and student (51 %).

• It is often said that news provides a mirror on the world. But GMMP 2005shows that it does not. The world we see in the news is a world in whichwomen are virtually invisible.

Women are dramatically under-represented in the news.

• Only 21 % of news subjects - the people who are interviewed, or whomthe news is about - are female. Though there has been an increase since1995, when 17% of those heard and seen in the news were women, thesituation in 2005 remains abysmal. For every woman who appears in thenews, there are five men.

Women’s points of view are rarely heard in the topics that feature pro-fessions

• As newsmakers, women are under-represented in professional categoriessuch as law (18%), business (12%) and politics (12%). In reality, women’sshare of these occupations is higher. For instance, in Rwanda - which hasthe highest proportion of female politicians in the world (49%) - only 13%of politicians in the news are women.

As authorities and experts women barely feature in news stories.

• Expert opinion in the news is overwhelmingly male. Men are 83% ofexperts, and 86% of spokespersons. By contrast, women appear in a per-sonal capacity - as eye witnesses (30%), giving personal views (31 %) or asrepresentatives of popular opinion (34%).

For women, age has a crucial bearing on whether they appear in thenews.

• Men go on making news well into their 50s and 60s: nearly half (49%) ofall male news subjects are aged 50 or over. But older women are almostinvisible: nearly three quarters (72%) of female news subjects are under50.

Women are more than twice as likely as men to be portrayed as vic-


tims:

• 19% of female news subjects, compared with 8% of males are portrayedin this way. News disproportionately focuses on female victims in eventsthat actually affect both sexes - accidents, crime, war. Topics that specifi-cally involve women - sexual violence, domestic violence, cultural prac-tice - are given little coverage.

Women are more likely (23%) than men (16%) to appear in photo-graphs.

• In stories on crime, violence or disaster, pictures of women are frequent-ly employed for dramatic effect. In newspapers and on television, thefemale body is often used to titillate. Women - 52% of the world’s popu-lation - are barely present in the faces seen, the voices heard, the opin-ions represented in the news. The ‘mirror’ of the world provided by thenews is like a circus mirror. It distorts reality, inflating the importance ofcertain groups, while pushing others to the margins. When it comes toreflecting women, women’s viewpoints and women’s perspectives on theworld, this mirror has a very large and enduring black spot.

Female news subjects are more than three times as likely as males tobe identified in terms of their family status:

• 17% of women are described as wife, daughter, mother etc.; only 5% ofmen are described as husband, son, father and so on. Even in authorita-tive functions such as spokesperson or expert, women do not escape thisidentification with family. So while men are perceived and valued asautonomous individuals, women’s status is deemed to derive primarilyfrom their relationship to others. It is from these relationships, rather thanfrom her own autonomous being, that a woman draws her authority.

DELIVERING THE NEWS

There has been a steady increase in the percentage of news itemsreported by women

• - from 28% in 1995, to 31 % in 2000, reaching 37% in 2005. Femalereporters have gained more ground in radio and television than in news-papers. The press lags far behind the electronic media, with only 29% ofstories written by female reporters in 2005.

On television, female media professionals disappear from the screenas they get older.

• For women in the profession, a youthful appearance is more highly val-ued than experience. Up to the age of 34 women are in the majority asboth news presenters and reporters. By the age of 50, only 17% ofreporters and 7% of presenters are female.

Female reporters predominate in only two topics

• - weather reports on television and radio (52%) and stories on poverty,housing and welfare (51 %). Sports news is the least likely to be reportedby women, with just 21 % of female reporters.

Overall, male journalists report at the so-called ‘hard’ or ‘serious’ endof the news spectrum such as politics and government

• (where women report only 32% of stories). Female journalists are morelikely to work on the socalled ‘soft’ stories such as social and legal issues(40% reported by women). Although many ‘soft’ news stories are impor-


tant, they are not always perceived as such in the hierarchy of new val-ues. As a result, the work of female journalists is sometimes undervalued,and women reporters are frequently assigned to stories that are downrighttrivial - celebrity news (50% reported by women), or arts and entertain-ment (48%).

There are more female news subjects in stories reported by femalejournalists (25%) than in stories reported by male journalists (20%).

• Irrespective of who reports the news, however, the fundamental questionis: why do so few women make the news at all - and what can be doneto change that?

NEWS CONTENT

Very little news - just 10% of all stories - focuses specifically onwomen.

• North America stands apart from the other regions: here women are cen-tral to the news in 20% of stories (23% in Canada, 19% in the USA). Buteven in this region only one story in five focuses on women - still a verysmall proportion of the total.

Women are rarely central in stories that comprise the bulk of the newsagenda

• - politics (8%), the economy (3%). Even in topics where the percentage offemale news subjects is relatively high - education, child-care, consumerissues, HIV-AIDS - women seldom feature centrally. Apart from crime andviolence, where women are central in 16% of items, women are centralin stories that are at the periphery of the news.

News stories are twice as likely to reinforce (6%) as to challenge (3%)genderstereotypes.

v Three topics contribute greatly to the reinforcement of gende rstereotypesin the news: celebrity news (16% of which reinforces stereotypes), sports(12%) and arts and entertainment stories (11 %).

News on gender (in)equality is almost non-existent.

• Only 4% of stories highlight equality issues, and they are concentrated inareas such as human rights, family relations, or women’s activism - topicswhich are barely visible in the overall output. Stories with a gender equal-ity angle are almost completely absent from the major news topics of pol-itics (3%) and the economy (1 %).

Women journalists report proportionately more stories on genderequality than men do

• Female journalists report 37% of all news stories. However, almost half(47%) of the stories that challenge stereotypes, and of the stories that high-light issues of gender (in)equality, are reported by women. But malereporters also have a responsibility to produce stories that challengestereotypes and highlight (in)equality - and they do. In 2005 men report-ed 53% of such stories. This is something to be welcomed and encour-aged, because both female and male journalists must be concerned if thenews is to become more gender balanced in the future. With so fewwomen central to the news - particularly in stories that dominate the newsagenda - news content reflects male priorities and perspectives. The


absence of a gender angle in stories in the ‘hard’ news topics reflects ablinkered approach to the definition of news and newsworthiness.

• A small ray of light comes from the fact that male journalists do write sto-ries on gender (in)equality. It is important that this should not be per-ceived as a ‘female-only zone’ in journalism, because the development ofa more gender sensitive approach to news selection and productionrequires the commitment of all editorial staff - both female and male.

JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE

Gender portrayal in the news is the result of many aspects of journalistic practice.From the story angle and the choice of interview questions, to the use of languageand the choice of images - all these have a bearing on the messages that emergein the news.

Blatant stereotyping is alive and well in news reporting around theworld.

• Nor is it limited to the gratuitous display of female flesh - although thereare plenty of examples of this. Sexist reporting extends to a very widerange of stories - including sport, crime, violence, and even politics.

Many news reports use language and images that reinforce genderstereotypes in a subtle way.

• These stories usually embody unstated assumptions about the roles ofwomen and men - assumptions that are hidden in the choice of languageand images, and by the emphasis that is placed on certain aspects of maleor female experience

News reports frequently miss the opportunity to analyse issues in away that differentiates between women and men.

• A story about divorce legislation that includes only male sources; a storyabout national unemployment that ignores its differential impact onwomen, men and families - these are missed opportunities to enrich andexpand the news angle by including a wider range of sources and view-points. Many monitors said that their entire news output - or specific sec-tions within it, such as sports reporting - was one gigantic missed oppor-tunity.

Some stories do challenge stereotypes or highlight equality issues inunexpected ways.

• Such news items tend to overturn prevalent assumptions about womenand about men - in relation to attributes, areas of expertise and compe-tence, interests and concerns. Stories that focus directly on aspects of gen-der inequality - the ‘glass ceiling’ in employment, unequal access toresources, and so on - though rare, are a heartening glimpse of gendersensitive journalistic practice.

THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

The 2005 Global Media Monitoring Project demonstrates a glaring democraticdeficit in the news media globally. Women - half of the world’s population - arevirtually absent from the news. The GMMP shows how, when they are unques-tioned, the routines and practices of journalism frequently result in news storiesthat reinforce gender stereotypes. Often these stories are simply the result of lazyjournalism. But the study also found instances of exemplary journalism - stories


that are gender balanced, that give equal weight to female and male voices, or thathighlight the often hidden gender dimensions of topics in the news. It is not, there-fore, impossible to produce news stories that are gender sensitive. It just meansthinking more creatively. This is what all good journalism aspires to. In the finalanalysis, fair gender portrayal must be a professional criterion like any other - bal-ance, diversity, clarity - in the search for high-quality journalism.

Over the next five years, before the next GMMP, concerted action is needed in thefollowing areas:

• Advocacy and lobbying

• Media policies and accountability

• Organisational targets and in-house monitoring

• Sensitisation and training of journalists

• Media analysis skills

• Development of monitoring

Without strategies for change in these areas, most news will continue to be at bestgender blind, at worst gender biased. However with the concerted pursuit of suchstrategies, there is a chance that five years hence both women and men will makethe news.


Community RadioPerspectives on MediaReach and Audience Access

Marcelo Solervicens, Secretary General, World Associationof Community Radio Broadcasters

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally media role is perceived as one of providing information, giving pub-lic service and entertaining audiences. Some with a somewhat wider perspectiveconsider that the two dominant forms of radio, public and commercial also playan important role in rendering governments accountable, thus supporting democ-racy building and good governance. In the last decades, community radio hasbeen evolving a new radio sector worldwide, as a natural result, both, of the evo-lution of civil societies and the breakthroughs in communications technologies

Radio is the most widespread electronic communications device in the world anda unique means of reaching the world’s poorest communities. Community radioin particular puts the tools of communications into the hands of communities forcultural expression, news and information, dialogue and development.

The specificity of community radio is to consider explicitly that radio facilitates theempowerment of local communities, inclusiveness, cultural diversity and othercommunication rights. In that perspective, community radio is closer to what iscalled “new media” that erases the boundary between those who receive and


those who impart the information that has been developing in connection withnew information and communication technologies and the development of theconcept of the new information society.

What follows is a contribution to the debate on the role of media reach and audi-ence access from the perspective of community radio. This perspective comesfrom the experience of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters(AMARC). AMARC counts on more than 5000 members from more than 110countries, and has been supporting, advocating and serving the development ofthe community radio movement since 1983.30

MEDIA LANDSCAPE, INFORMATION SOCIETY & COMMUNITY RADIO

In spite of recent technological developments, radio remains is the most wide-spread and accessible communications technology. It is an oral medium; one thatis low cost and that is already receivable by 90 per cent of the world’s population.For just a few thousand dollars worth of equipment, a community radio station canserve a community of 100,000 people or more.

The ideal model for sharing the radio spectrum is one that reflects the diversity ofcommunication needs of society. In the North as well as in the South democraticsocieties need public (not state), commercial and community radios if they wantto reflect the diversity and needs of their societies. Wherever there is a question ofbuilding democracy as it happens in Nepal, the alliance between community andindependent radios in the Save the independent radio movement (SIRM) showsthey can effectively get together in the struggle for press freedom and freedom ofexpression and democracy building.31 Also in conflict or post-conflict situationsthe media landscape needs to build plurality of voices. This is even more impor-tant when it is question of giving voice to the voiceless and addressing the devel-oping agenda.

Community radio has had to advocate strongly in the past for a place in the radiospectrum but there is increasing recognition on the importance to include commu-nity radio as a specific radio sector. The existence and the practice of communitybroadcasting are an expression of a participatory attitude to democracy and thegrowth of strong and dynamic civil society organisations. It can be considered aform of public service broadcasting, but this is a public service broadcasting notfrom the top-down, but rather from the grassroots-up.

The development of community radio is closely linked to needs of local commu-nities that were not being addressed traditional media in terms of media reach oraudience access to a media. Community radio is characterized by its social objec-tive and community benefit being researched; it should not have a commercial orfor profit objective, it should be owned by and be accountable to the communitydeserved and should encourage participation in its programming and manage-ment; it should also support a strong democratic and dynamic civil societyexpressed in its programming and management. Some may consider communityradio as a good public service broadcasting, the difference being that it is grass-roots-up and inclusive.

The emergency of community radio in the fifties, sixties and seventies in theAmericas and Europe and in the last 20 years in Africa and Asia is linked todemands of audience access to the media and technological breakthroughs.

There has been a legitimacy crisis of the traditional mass media since the 70s bytheir abandoning of minority and local issues in contradiction with global socialtrends that search for increased recognition of minority and local issues. One


important example is that the first community radio, known as peope’s radio, wasbuilt in the fifties by bolivian coal miners, disgusted with traditional media cover-age. Media control by civil society and not only by industry is linked to the needfor community empowerment of the voiceless and marginalised, in a non partisanmanner. The shortcomings of traditional media outlets that consider themselvesneutral or that “journalists are not social agents” are discussed by many when toepysthemological analysis of all media role in society.

There has also been in the eighties and nineties a process of liberalization of theairwaves and the end of state monopolies in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Insome places, these processes have increased media plurality, but in most of thecases they have ended by being absorbed by foreign large conglomerates. In thecontext of dominant neo-liberal globalisation, a few number of multimedia con-glomerates have reorganized commercial mass media leading to a small numberof major groups.32 In that context what has become “digital” information in radio,television. Press or Internet, is just just another piece of merchandise, which circu-lates in accordance with the rules governing the market of supply and demand.The establishment of a few dominating media conglomerates results in the para-dox of having a greater number of media outlets with a reduced diversity ofsources of information. The concentration of media, standardisation and paucityof content, worldwide imbalance in information flows and a lack of cultural diver-sity, and absence of the regulatory role of States, at the national and internationallevel, have created the niche for the development of communitiy media.

The second aspect involved in the development of community radio as a globalsector is the technological breakthroughs in the communications field, like transis-tors, FM transmitters, satellites and finally the Internet.33 All these developmentshave reduced costs and increased inter-activeness of the media facilitating proxim-ity radio. Community Radio has emerged connected to people centered socialmovements that use appropriate technologies to share knowledge and action tocounter the crisis in representation and proposing alternatives to the major meansof communication. They inspired counter-information programmes and interactivesocial communication run by communities from community radio stations, forexample in rural areas.34 These new players multiplied media outlets and creatednational, regional, and finally international networks such as the World Associationof Community Radio Broadcasters, AMARC.

From a wider perspective, the emergence of these new information and commu-nication technologies have contributed to economic growth and economic global-isation and has brought social, cultural and political benefits to a great many peo-ple. But it also threatens to amplify a gross asymmetry, the so-called “digitaldivide”, in poor people’s access to information and communication.35 In that per-spective community radio is at the heart of the possibilities of s “InformationSociety” that is people-centred, inclusive and development oriented, where every-one can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enablingindividuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promotingtheir sustainable development and improving their quality of life.36

COMMUNITY RADIO AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS37

Today community radio is well established in Europe and the Americas. It is wide-spread across Africa; it has become a growing force in Asia and the Pacific; and ithas entered the mainstream discourse of development professionals and agencies.The growth of community radio is a story of people and communities striving tospeak out and to be heard. Community radio has provided a means of empower-ment and of self-reliance. It has enabled people to engage in dialogue about theirconditions and their livelihoods. And it has contributed to the defence of cultural


and linguistic diversity.38 In that perspective community radio is an important fac-tor in achieving millennium development goals.

First, community radio is gaining recognition as the new information technology ofthe poor and marginalized.39 It is an oral medium whose technology is appropri-ate, simple, cheap and easy to use and whose means of reception are available toalmost every household even in remote communities. Furthermore, the combina-tion of community broadcasting with digital production and Internet access hasbrought new opportunities and approaches to community media that have con-tributed to sustainability and enlargement of the services provided.

Second, community media is a key element needed for sustainable development:voicelessness and powerlessness are considered key dimensions of poverty.Democracy, equity and civil rights contribute directly to human security, well-beingand opportunity.40 Community radio contributes to development goals because itreaches local communities facing poverty, exclusion and marginalisation, andencourages them to access media in order to be heard even in vernacular lan-guages. Community radio can also reinforce traditional forms of communicationsuch as storytelling, group discussion and theatre and can enable grassroots partic-ipation in policy-making and democracy.

Third, besides its accessibility and affordability, radio transcends the literacy barri-er, which is a problem in many Southern countries. Radio is also considered a“women’s medium” because it doesn’t require the full, undivided attention of itsaudience the way newspapers or television do. Meaning, women who must workcontinuously at one given time like farmers and labourers, can perform their taskseven as they listen to radio.41 Moreover as an intimacy medium, community radiocan address particularly difficult and untouched themes such as gender violence,health issues, among others.

Fourth, community radio is the media sector that is better placed for developmentgoals. Some public owned broadcasters have independent governance and edito-rial arrangements and a range of public interest programming but fail to ensureaudience access for its top-down approach to information dissemination. Otherstate owned public media tend to remain the instrument of the government inpower. Instead of dialogue with their audience they maintain a one-way mode ofcommunication. Private commercial media can contribute to the plurality ofchoice but they tend to pay little attention to the needs and concerns of the poor-er sections of society and they remain accountable only to their private owners andthe marketplace. Community broadcasting has developed in response to the needsof grassroots social movements and community-based organisations to find anaccessible and affordable means to express their own issues, concerns, culturesand languages, and to create an alternative to the state-owned public broadcasterand the growth of private commercial media.

CHALLENGES TO COMMUNITY RADIO

Even as community broadcasting is gaining legitimacy it is also facing new chal-lenges. How can its social and economic sustainability be assured? How can itinterface with the new media platforms and technologies? How can its contribu-tion to the public good be demonstrated? How can it provide a voice for criticaland alternative perspectives and not be co-opted by government agendas orassimilated into the marketplace?

Community broadcasters must focus single-mindedly on their social purpose – toempower communities to speak by themselves, to give a voice to the voiceless and


to be a force for social and economic good. As community broadcasting gainsmainstream recognition, it must be able to demonstrate its real social impact andsignificance – its contribution to culture, education, good governance and citizens’participation. In doing so, however, it must avoid being turned simply into aninstrument of public service delivery. It must vigorously defend its independence,its right to challenge those in authority and to hold leaders to account.

There remains a need to raise awareness and acceptance of the idea that commu-nities have the right to own and operate their own community media. There is stillmuch to be done in many countries, to establish policies, laws and regulations thatenable and encourage community broadcasting. There needs to be a formalrecognition of community broadcasting as a distinct sector. This should result in atransparent and straightforward process for the allocation of radio spectrum andlicensing for community broadcasters without political interference

Alongside the laws and regulations that should enable community broadcastingthere is a need to build capacity among community-based organisations to devel-op sustainable models of community media that contribute to the social and eco-nomic well-being of communities. This should include capacity building for jour-nalists in issues related to development goals. Furthermore, the regulatory frame-work should consider sustainability and resourcing of community radio, includinga nominal level for licence fees, encouraging support from their communities withproper assistance.


Access to the lectromagneticSpectrum is a Foundation forDevelopment

Christian Sandvig University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

ACCESS TO THE SPECTRUM IS A FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

In 1985, unusual waves began to propagate from Yuendumu township—popula-tion 1,000—on the edge of the Tanami desert in Australia. The waves were a tel-evision signal, an entirely “unauthorized, unfunded, uncommercial, and illegal”effort of the Warlpiri aboriginal nation.42 Over the next years, the Warlpiri MediaAssociation produced local, independent news broadcasts, aired indigenous lan-guage educational programming, and parlayed locally-controlled television expo-sure into political organization, tangible educational reform and other self-devel-opment assistance. In one memorable moment from the earliest days, the entireYuendumu School Council traveled 290 kilometers to confront regional educationofficials with a video camera. As one council member said on tape, “We want thisvideo to prove that we really did come and ask for these things, as the educationdepartment is taking no notice of our letters.” The project has been a celebratedsuccess in media development,43 leading to a larger indigenous broadcastingmovement and popular, award-winning content such as “Bush Mechanics,” theshow where “the nearest mechanic is 300 kilometers away” and “the solution isalways more improbable than the breakdown.”44

Twenty years later, Raghav FM Mansoorpur 1 began illegally broadcasting in Bihar,


India with a related agenda. Raghav FM broadcasts brief, locally-produced news,HIV and polio prevention information, and a mix of Bhojpuri, Bollywood, anddevotional songs.45 Both Raghav FM and the Warlpiri Media Association could beseen as examples of many things: both were locally-initiated, had no outside sup-port, had a development agenda, and were initially illegal.46 In the 1980s and1990s, it was enough to conceptualize these projects as falling within the catego-ry of “media for development” and to discuss them as independent broadcastersor media producers, as described in the other chapters of this book.

However, much has changed in the twenty years between the Warlpiri broadcastsand Raghav FM. Before considering the status of these projects as broadcasters oras producers of content, first step back and witness that these efforts require accessto the electromagnetic spectrum. These transmitters produce invisible radiationthat carries their messages of news, education, and entertainment to their destina-tions. The electromagnetic spectrum (or just “spectrum”) is the range of all possi-ble electromagnetic radiation: the playground on which the waves of Raghav FMintermingle with those of other stations and other services, from cellular phones toradio telescopes, military radios to wireless pacemaker controls, garage door open-ers to aircraft radar. The technical, legal, even notional and conceptual conditionsfor access to this resource—the electromagnetic spectrum—have been whollytransformed since 1985 because of plummeting costs, new digital applications,and new laws allowing transmission without a license in some countries. This andmany other rules of this playground have great significance for media developmentprojects, and may now be in flux. Before discussing these changes in detail, thischapter will first review the physical, technical, and political dimensions of thespectrum.

THE USEFUL SPECTRUM

Discussion of the spectrum is off-putting because it is even more heavily cloakedby jargon than other technology topics. However, the noun “spectrum” simplyindicates a range, as the phrase “the political spectrum” is sometimes used to indi-cate a range of ideas. The spectrum used for communication is the range of elec-tromagnetic radiation—the stuff that the familiar antennas of our cellular tele-phones and radios are designed to send and receive. The concept of “the politicalspectrum” is a range organized by opinion (the “left” and “right” of this spectrumrefers to historical seating arrangements in the French National Assembly). Theelectromagnetic spectrum is a range organized by frequency—in other words,organized by the length of the wave (as in wavelength, shortwave, microwave etc.).Waves as long as atoms or amoeba sit on one end, compared to waves as long asfootball fields and planets on the other. As a physical phenomenon, there are nogaps in this spectrum and a wave could be infinitely long or infinitely short.

The key point to be made here is that human communication systems are notphysical phenomena, they are political and technical phenomena. Radio is asmuch a kind of physical wave as it is also the result of the human capability fortransmitting and receiving waves, combined with political decisions about how todesign, deploy, and organize transmitters and receivers. That portion of the elec-tromagnetic spectrum that can be used for communication is called “useful spec-trum” or the “radio spectrum,” but the definition of which waves are useful hasexpanded with the human ability to manipulate them.

It has been helpful to conceptually divide the useful spectrum into passagesthrough which we can transmit—in everyday life most people know these passagesas the channels of the television and the frequencies on the radio. These passagesrepresent the imposition of human order on the spectrum. The definition of a use-ful passage always depends on the available knowledge and technology of trans-mission and reception.47 At the dawn of this knowledge, separating radio transmis-


sions into different passages by frequency was not well understood, and GuglielmoMarconi began radio with effectively one channel. As knowledge about manipu-lating these waves has been developed, so too the definition of the useful spec-trum has continually changed. For instance, in North America AM radio was suc-ceeded by FM radio, VHF television (channels 2-13) succeeded by UHF (14-83),with each new definition of passages for communication allowing more capacity.48

At the turn of the 21st century, the notion of the useful spectrum continues tochange. The old trick of defining a channel or a passage now appears suddenly lesshelpful, or to have a different meaning, throwing long-held ideas about the organ-ization of broadcasting and the media into question. It is not just that more chan-nels may be available than previously thought, but that channels might not be nec-essary at all. Particularly of interest to scholars of media development, it could bethat everyone can have their own radio station.

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE SPECTRUM

If the above suggests that the human capability to use the spectrum has been ever-expanding, this could easily lead to the conclusion that more channels are neces-sarily a boon to media development and democratization. More capacity couldease entry for new broadcasters and promote pluralism in content and services.More channels must mean more voices, and that must be good. However, thisconclusion should be put off. The Warlpiri Media Association and Raghav FMbegan their transmissions as pirates. That is, despite the fact that capacity in thespectrum was available for them, they were breaking the law because they did nothave permission from their respective governments to transmit on the frequencythey were using. The requirement that those who wish to transmit must first obtaingovernment permission is axiomatic in the regulation of communication. This per-mission, in the form of the broadcast license, is a profound way that the state inter-venes to control media and communication.49 The license limits the entry of newbroadcasters, blocking the unpopular and subversive from having a public voice inrepressive regimes.

This kind of control over spectrum and its danger for the freedom of informationis old news.50 One rationale for government licensing has been the perceivedscarcity of channels. The introduction of channels served in part to meet the limi-tations of early radio technology that could not effectively distinguish between dif-ferent signals. Since it is obvious that there are far fewer channels than citizens,some system of allocation was required. However, this rationale of scarcity is onlyone reason to impose licensing. Licensing was and is expressly political, and limit-ing dissent and controlling speech is often the goal.51 That means that more capac-ity does not necessarily mean more voices.

When the Warlpiri began broadcasting in 1985, they were afraid of new technol-ogy and new capacity. They acted just in advance of the introduction of TV signalsacross the Tanami desert via a new satellite, Aussat. The introduction of main-stream English-language television was a danger to the preservation of Aboriginalculture, language, and way of life. As station founder Kurt Granites said at the time,“the satellite is a threat to Aboriginals.” Here a new wireless service promisedmore, but as it was implemented it promised more uniformity and threatened localpolitical and cultural units: it was seen by the Warlpiri as an oppressive homoge-nizing force. After the introduction of Sesame Street into every home, why wouldchildren still speak Kaytetye and Warlpiri? Of course the planned promulgation ofSesame Street far and wide across the Tanami desert was not the manifest destinyof spectrum expansion, satellites, or new technology generally, it was a politicaldecision.

The Warlpiri responded to the threat by employing another new technology,videotape, to produce local content. The consumer camcorder had been intro-


duced just two years earlier, and when combined with the falling prices of con-sumer-grade videocassette recorders, this promised them the ability to operate atelevision station at a fraction of the cost of professional-grade equipment. In thesetransmissions, piracy in one part of the spectrum (the Warlpiri station) was used tocounteract the threat posed by expanded services in another (Aussat). The role oftechnology in this context is not that newer (or more) was better for all, but thatthe implementation of any new system privileges some over others. Indeed, just afew years later, in 1987, the Aussat system was amended to allow local control ofcontent for Aboriginal and Islander people, and Aussat became a way to sustainAboriginal culture, at least in part. Careful attention need be paid to the politicaland institutional surroundings that determine these choices. In 2006, nations areagain at the brink of an expansion in communication capacity that could meanmany things, depending on political decisions.

NONMONETARY RADIO AND DIGITAL CONVERGENCE

A number of new developments in both technology and regulation have inter-vened in the twenty years between the foundation of the Warlpiri project andRaghav FM. The first is the dramatic improvement in wireless technology and thedissemination of knowledge about it. While the Warlpiri project was noncommer-cial, Raghav FM was almost nonmonetary. Raghav Mahato found out how to buildhis transmitter from parts worth 50 rupees (about US $1). This is more than adecline in price: it turns the typical thinking about the costs of “mass” communi-cation on its head. According to a BBC estimate, the transmission equipment forRaghav FM costs 1/5 as much as the amount that listeners in Mansoorpur pay forthe radio set that receives it (about $5).52 This fall in costs is not limited to old-fash-ioned analog radio. While new digital systems are not free, they have declined dra-matically in price while offering new abilities.

While the Warlpiri station was a story about cheap, new technology (videotape),the features and organization of radio technology at the turn of the 21st Centuryare now fundamentally different. As alluded to earlier, the old trick of defining apassage or a channel in the spectrum now seems to be less necessary. In a 1983experiment, the US FCC allowed the use of devices that spread their transmissionsout over many channels and did not require a license to transmit. New technolo-gy and a short range obviated the need for licensing to prevent collisions and inter-ference when two users wanted the same channel. This unlicensed or “license-exempt” band gave the world cordless phones, garage door openers, baby moni-tors, and generally a wealth of short-range radio stations that did not require per-mission to transmit. In the late 1990s, “Wi-Fi” wireless Internet technology cameon the market and used this regulatory easement in the spectrum.

Around 2000, Wi-Fi allowed cheap, high-speed computer-to-computer commu-nication over short distances (typically up to 150 feet). Wi-Fi technology waslaunched for the unambitious purpose of allowing affluent laptop users to movearound their homes with one less wire tether. Yet it became a demonstration of thenew rules of a transformed spectrum.53 Media development activists and entrepre-neurs the world over quickly took this indoor, short-range equipment out to theirrooftops and started building cheap and unlikely communication systems that pro-mote new voices.

California’s Tribal Digital Village uses solar and gasoline-generator-powered Wi-Fito provide high-speed Internet access on rural, mountainous Indian reservationsthat have no power or telephone service.54 Free2Air patches Wi-Fi networkstogether with wired telephone lines to extend telephone service to artist’s lofts inLondon.55 In India, wireless allowed n-logue to launch an ambitious, sustainablerural Internet kiosk project offering, among other services, agricultural, veterinary,or medical queries to government officials (US$0.23/each), English lessons


($5.74/month), and Internet horoscope matching ($0.69 for 40 pages).56

The happy marriage of computers with cheap wireless equipment has allowedthese groups to supplement and disturb (if not usurp) the monolithic media andcommunication systems that did not serve them well. It is this marriage thatchanges the policy landscape for media development today. Connecting cheapradios to computers has allowed distinctions between applications to disappear:wireless Internet providers offer videoconference, audio and video content, email,telephone, one-to-many or one-to-one communication. More fundamentally,these new wireless systems have the prospect of using the spectrum much moreefficiently than in the past—many more systems can cheaply coexist in with Wi-Fiand related technologies. In some places, good advice for the social entrepreneursof media development is then: go digital. But to launch these services, the way for-ward is not to wait for these unstoppable technological potentials to unfold ontheir own. Those interested in media development must act.

A FIRST QUESTION FOR MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

While these upstarts have potential, the future is not yet theirs to make.Governments the world over are used to imagining telecommunications and thespectrum as a lucrative purse that can be used to extract license fees for the treas-ury. Groups like these operating without licenses are treated “like vermin notableonly for posing a risk to licenseholders.”57 While research and investment inadvanced wireless technology has produced new possibilities for communicationsystems, this has been coupled with laws that allow free access to the spectrumonly in parts of the global north. In contrast, building your own Wi-Fi project islegal and does not require advance government permission in only 4-6% ofAfrica.58 (When this sort of project is legal and free, it is usually because the gov-ernments concerned see only the business potential for new short-range data net-works.) Sometimes new information sources have proven popular enough to sus-tain and protect illegal pirates with popular sentiment, but this sort of security isuncertain. As Indonesian Wi-Fi pioneer Onno Purbo writes, “we run the [equip-ment] without any license from the government. Fortunately, the Indonesianmedia helps keep us from being jailed.”59

If media projects promise to help alleviate social problems in developing countries,a first question for media development is, “What are the conditions for access tothe spectrum?” The politics of spectrum have always underpinned questions aboutthe media, and while spectrum policy is as important as ever for television andradio stations, the 2000s have presented the world with a chance to seize newcapacity through digital systems. This chance is only open to developing countriesif the law permits at least some unlicensed access to spectrum—access without afee and without advance permission. To truly celebrate the communication ofhealth, education, and political information on Onno Purbo’s Jakarta Wi-Fi net-work or Raghav Mahato’s Mansoorpoor 1, projects like these need encourage-ment. Purbo and Mahato are called pirates because they don’t have the govern-ment’s permission to transmit, but they haven’t stolen anything.

SOURCES CITED

Horvitz, Robert. (2005, October 14). Media Licensing, Convergence, andGlobalization. Paper presented to RE:activism: Re-drawing the bound-aries of activism in new media environment. Central European University:Budapest, Hungary.

Michaels, Eric. (1994). Bad Aboriginal Art: Tradition, Media, and TechnologicalHorizons. Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press.

Neto, Isabel, Best, Michael L., & Gillett, Sharon E. (2005). License-Exempt


Wireless Policy: Results of an African Survey. Information Technologiesand International Development 2(3): 73-90.

Slater, Don & Tacchi, Jo. (2004). Research on ICT Innovations for PovertyReduction. New Delhi, India: UNESCO. Available online:http://cirac.qut.edu.au/ictpr/downloads/research.pdf

Pool, Ithiel de Sola. (1983). Technologies of Freedom: On Free Speech in anElectronic Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Proenza, Francisco. (2005). “The Road to Broadband Development in DevelopingCountries is through Competition Driven by Wireless and VoIP.” Paperpresented to the Annenberg Research Network on InternationalCommunication Workshop, Wireless Communication and Development:A Global Perspective. Accessed April 17, 2006.http://www.arnic.info/workshop05/Proenza_Wireless&VoIP_5Oct2005.pdf

Purbo, Onno W. (2003). “An Indonesian Digital Review – Internet Infrastructureand Initiatives.” United Nations Online Network in Public Administrationand Finance (UNPAN) Asia & Pacific Region Analytical Report #7779.Accessed March 15, 2006.http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN007779.pdf

Streeter, Thomas. (1996). Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of CommercialBroadcasting in the United States. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Tewary, Amarnath. (2006, February 24). “The amazing DIY village FM radio sta-tion.” BBC News: South Asia. Accessed on March 15, 2006.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4735642.stm

Warlpiri Media Association. (2003). Fighting Fire With Fire: The Broadcasting toRemote Aboriginal Communities Scheme (BRACS). Accessed on March15, 2006. http://www.warlpiri.com.au/pdf/bracs.pdf

Werbach, Kevin. (2003). “Radio Revolution: The Coming Age of UnlicensedWireless.” A New America Foundation / Public Knowledge WorkingPaper. Washington, DC: New America Foundation. Accessed March 11,2006. http://werbach.com/docs/RadioRevolution.pdf


Section 2 How Media Matters : Measuring its impact


Overview of the evidencebase:research on impacts of media on economic, social and political develop-ment

Susan Abbott, Senior Research Coordinator, Programmefor Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School forCommunication at the University of Pennsylvania.


Moving Media :the case for media as a core strategy in meeting the MDGs

Warren Feek , Director , The Communications Initiative


A Road Map for Monitoring &Evaluation in the MediaDevelopment Sector

Alan Davis, Director of Strategy & Assessment, Institute ofWar and Peace Reporting (IWPR)

There are at least four solid reasons why the media development sector needs tostart prioritising monitoring and evaluation and rooting it as a core competency ofour work: Firstly and most obviously, we have a duty to deliver to those we pro-fess to help and in whose name we seek and secure support: Secondly, this dutyextends to those we ask to trust and fund us and who are in turn responsible toothers: Thirdly, if we are serious not to mention proud of the work we do, we sure-ly owe it to ourselves to develop and apply new learning wherever possible:Fourthly, if it is not already happening, those unwilling or simply unable to demon-strate benefit will find themselves consigned to irrelevancy in an increasingly com-petitive world.

The media development sector was born out of the samizdat era of a generationago when it was identified with the struggle for individual and political rights in theCommunist bloc. Today, whereas the right to free speech remains very much a lit-mus test for democracy and a rallying cry for those working under authoritarianregimes, it no longer generates the kind of unconditional support it once did.Driven by political and public demands for greater effectiveness and accountabil-ity, donors began focusing on those able to demonstrate impact. This has been thetraditional humanitarian aid agency sector which underwent its own rationalisationprocess at the same time to improve and measure effectiveness. These changeshappened moreover in concert with an increasing international awareness of and


public commitment towards addressing the immediate, overwhelming and tangi-ble needs of the world’s poor and chronically ill.

Given it mostly addresses psychological rather than physiological needs, the pro-motion of free expression is unable to compete with the Millennium DevelopmentGoals which are clear, tangible and demonstrably urgent. In contrast, believing thatthe media’s function and role is crucial in term of building sustainable societies isnot the same as proving it. Nor do we yet convincingly demonstrate how weimprove the media’s ability to fulfil this role. Our dilemma meantime is furthercomplicated by a growing ambivalence toward the media and the argument thatjournalists may just as easily incite and inflame as they might support democracyor the rule of law. Our sector is therefore facing a double whammy of sorts: con-fusion over the wisdom of supporting it as well as questions over our actual rele-vance and impact.

Our response should therefore be to launch an overdue process of learning thathelps guide, inform and improve the impact of our work at both the individualproject and the collective sector level. Ultimately it is of course in our clear inter-est to be able to prove the critical value of media development to the ‘world out-side’. These two levels of interest, the micro and the macro, and too the interplaybetween them, provide us with a natural framework structure within which todevelop and employ monitoring and evaluation tools.

It makes most sense to begin with the collective goal and then work back: For thesake of clarity, we might imagine ourselves collectively engaged upon one bigmacro project with a logical framework which shows a goal of good governanceand democratic development (see figure 1). If we were to continue the logicalframework analogy, our project purpose would therefore be to develop media thatis more effective in its support of that goal. Outputs would include building theskills and capacity of the media itself; ensuring the media is fully working to exploitthe skills and capacity we provide –and finally, improving the media’s ability toimpact and effect the governance and development sectors in their widest mean-ing.

Developing Figure 1 into a full log-frame may provides us with a useful debatingand reference point for the sector, as well as prove helpful in testing the validity oflarge-scale projects before they move off the drawing board. It should even provehelpful to individual groups to locate, develop and justify their own work.Completing the log-frame would naturally require us to identify appropriate indi-cators and monitoring processes for each stage, as it would design three separatestrands of activities to feed into and deliver the three separate outcomes. Theactivities themselves would comprise our individual projects that contribute to the


whole. Unfortunately, log frames are traditionally seen as external impositions andhurdles to be overcome at the project submission stage: The level of disciplinerequired usually results in us regarding them as inconveniences rather than as thecritical planning mechanisms they really are. And yet, if we are really serious aboutassessment, we need to rehabilitate the log-frame and acknowledge it is as muchan integral part of our toolkit as a spirit level is to a builder.

ESSENTIAL M&E INTERVENTIONS

Having defined the area of our interest –from the project level through up to the collective impact we seek to have at thelevel of governance and democratic development –we can then determine three primary areas of activity to focus on interms of measuring our effect, (see Fig 2).

M&E Interventions 1: The Benefit TransferredM&E interventions at point 1 in Figure 2 are among the easiest to measure sincethey focus upon the straight-forward provision of skills, equipment, content or reg-ulation at a project level. The transfer either happens or it does not. Skills can bemeasured, equipment tested, information produced and disseminated and regula-tion developed. Of course, even at this most basic of levels, the M&E challengemay require serious baseline research to ensure what is being proposed is whollyrelevant –be it training, equipment or regulation.

As proficiency in languages can be tested, so too can proficiency in media skills:In the UK, career progress within local and regional print media has long beendependent upon success in the National Council for Training of Journalists exams.Subjective assessment in areas where overall standards are lacking means we arewithout clear indicators relating to either the level of skills achieved or the qualityof training provided. There is therefore a strong case to argue to develop standard-ized and inter-linked training modules and objective methods of assessment whichmeasure the impact of the training provided from the point of view of the recipi-ent and not the provider. The comparative nature of objective measuring is alsovaluable in as a diagnostic tool in helping us determine different needs and abili-ties. We should then consider developing and harmonizing courses and gradingaccording to discipline and levels. While course and testing materials will be cul-turally and regionally sensitive, this should not ultimately detract from our abilityto measure progress in skills training in a wholly effective and objective manner.The need for more systematic and qualifiable skills training applies equally to themanagerial side of the business as it does the editorial sector. Similarly, we needacknowledging that skills provision is only one aspect of the direct support our sec-tor provides. Measuring the capacity of rganizations established is also crucial as isthe value of information generated and suitability of regulatory support given.

M&E Interventions 2: The Benefit AppliedIf the strategy to develop practical ways of assessing achievements within the areacovered by M&E 1 is essentially clear, it is less so in M&E 2: Measuring the degreeto which new-found skills or capacity is actually applied is problematic in every-


Fig 2: Media Development Monitoring & Evaluation - 3 Essential Interventions

Governance & Democracy

thing save the use of equipment and even it has to be used correctly in order tomaximize benefits. When the issue is training, regulation, the press centre, thejournalists’ union or the complaints’ commission, we need indicators measuringthe effect they are having in terms of delivering benefit or outcomes. In the caseof training, this might see us measuring the overall quality of material produced bythose trained and perhaps too the effect it has on their non-trained colleagues.With regulation, our focus may be on how it is enforced, independent assessmentsas to its suitability and testimonials from all those affected and interested parties.

M&E Interventions 3: The Benefit BeyondWith M&E intervention 3, we leave our interest in effect we have on the mediasector behind and look to the influence we have on the world outside. This is theconfluence where the interests of many donors start to appear and the greater thebenefit we can deliver in terms of supporting and facilitating better governanceand democracy, the greater the position our sector will find itself in. Governancehas been defined very broadly in Figure 2, to include civil society, given it feedsdirectly into attempts to improve accountability, transparency and the overallbehaviour of authority –be it the government, the judiciary, law enforcement andmilitary agencies, even big business. The stronger civil society and the moreempowered ordinary citizens are, the greater their ability to help determine gov-ernance. We might thus consider trying to develop twin and complimentary strate-gies in M&E 3 – one measuring the role media plays in improving political and eco-nomic ‘governance’, and the other that looks at media’s ability to support greatercivic-driven governance. In so doing, this top down approach could help guide theplanning stages of many individual projects in the future.

A PRACTICAL ROUTE FORWARD

Developing proper assessment systems, standards and mechanisms and ensuringthey root properly and are adopted as best practice, will be a sustained processrequiring proper research, consultation, debate and learning across the sector. Itwill also require the appropriate resources. With the parameters of the challengeand interest now broadly defined, practical work needs to start as a matter ofurgency: Results will neither be immediate, nor will they be the product of any sin-gle organization. Rather, the greater the process of collaboration and consultation,the more legitimate and relevant the process of developing new measures and sys-tems will be.

The next step is to identify and enable key drivers of this process to focus jointenergies upon developing ways to monitor and evaluate work at both the microand macro level. Given the urgent need for tools and mechanisms to measureeach, there is no reason why work should not begin simultaneously upon both.These twin pillars are envisaged as a media and governance index designed to sup-port and inform our work as a group and the development of a wholly practicalguidebook aimed at individual organisations and practitioners working at themicro level. Other key pillars for future focus may include curriculum develop-ment and a training of trainers (TOT) institute to foster quality-controlled interna-tional standards in journalism teaching and development. The key drivers of thisproject, employees of separate organizations representative of the sector and com-prising serious representation from Southern-based organisations, should workjointly upon both pillars and in concert with steering/advisory group comprised ofnominated representatives from all other interested parties, quite possibly includ-ing those beyond our sector.

MEDIA & GOVERNANCE INDEX

The concept of an index which measures media’s ability to impact governance wasdeveloped by IWPR and floated as an idea at the Global Forum for Media devel-


opment meeting in Amman, as part of a possible strategy to improve our collec-tive impact. While there are existing excellent indices which measure media free-doms and sustainability (Freedom House and IREX respectively), we are presentlyunable to objectively measure and determine media’s influence within societies–and specifically its relationship to governance and overall development, countryto country.

The basic concept of a Media-Governance Index envisages a scale of influencethat directly relates and feeds into each of the six dimensions of governance asidentified by the World Bank: i) Voice and Accountability; ii) Political Instabilityand Violence; iii) Government Effectiveness; iv) Regulatory Quality; v) Rule of Law,and, vi) Control of Corruption. Given our stated belief that a stronger civil societyand individual empowerment are key aspects of ensuring good governance, itremains to be seen whether it can be fully incorporated under ‘voice’ or whethera seventh dimension of governance may be necessary. Scoring may be developedand delivered through a full range of aggregate indicators that would themselvesbe based upon a wide range of data sources and variables. These indicators willdraw off existing and new data sources as well as results of substantial, wide-rang-ing and fully-weighted perception-based analysis. It is foreseen that such an indexwill look at the media as a whole – and might also break down scoring betweenstate and non-state media. The index will need to be capable of measuring nega-tive as well as positive impacts of media activity in the target country – producinga negative score where overall media behaviour is found to be working againstgovernance and possibly even promoting conflict.

Most importantly, the index will act as an objective benchmark against which oursector will apply itself –seeking to collectively to improve country scores over time.Equally, the index will act as a valuable diagnostic tool for donors and practition-ers alike, demonstrating whether the media is found to be impacting governanceand if so, in what ways and in which areas. As well as highlighting strategic areasof effectiveness and challenges, it will promote a greater degree of discipline,application and logic in future project proposals. The index will also be designedto ensure it is an important tool for agents of the international community –partic-ularly those international institutions working in the field of governance and devel-opment.

Given that this project is designed as a sectoral initiative, and taking into accountwork already in progress in related areas, it would be preferable if the resultingindex could complement and perhaps even be built on to existing indices, such asthe IREX Media Sustainability Index. A process of development and discussion isneeded to determine the degree to which this is actually possible.

PRACTICAL MONITORING AND EVALUATION HANDBOOK

This is envisaged as the first-ever attempt to provide a practical guide for mediadevelopment practitioners the world over to help ensure they design and deliverthe most relevant and beneficial projects possible. Its ultimate aim is to provide aninterlinked and comprehensive toolkit of activities and indicators designed to pro-vide practitioners with much needed advice and practical support. It will be ofbenefit to those interested in determining the value of projects focusing upon skillstransference, and it will also assist measurement of how newly-learned skills haveactually been applied. The focus will not simply be on training, but also on waysof measuring the effect of content and production-based projects as well as thoseinvolving regulatory and legal systems.

The success of the book will in very large part be determined by its relevance andthe collaboration involved in the production process. As presented by Internews atthe GFMD, it will take as its model the Sphere project which developed best prac-


tice standards and indicators in the humanitarian sector in the 1990s. The authorsof the proposed book will be guided by a steering committee with substantial rep-resentation from Southern-based organizations –and will involve a full participato-ry process of consultation and testing. The authors who themselves offer substan-tial writing, evaluation and project development experience, will be looking to dis-til findings into a concise yet comprehensive book that provides a thoroughgrounding in best practise. Full regard will be paid toward ensuring assessmentmechanisms involve all relevant stakeholders –including the use of participatoryapproaches and audience impact measurement systems wherever relevant. Thebook will be further expanded in year 2, and will provide a basis for serious M&Etraining across the sector.

RISKS

The success of both initiatives detailed above will be heavily dependent upon ourability to incorporate full consultation, participation and learning. Any project tobuild these twin pillars will consequently incorporate know-how and build uponoutside successes and expertise wherever relevant. As well as having to take fullaccount of the interests and opinions of stakeholders, project leaders will consultfully with the donor community. Most importantly, it will also have to pay dueregard to the opinions of those who may fear such a strategy will lead to a whollyprescriptive approach that threatens all innovation and creativity within the sector.The intention behind this proposal and developing M&E know-how is precisely theopposite. Creativity, learning and participation will drive this process and the toolswill themselves evolve and change over time. Ultimately however, by far the great-est risk is ignoring the clear and pressing fact that we need to move forward onthese or similar projects as a matter of urgency if we wish to develop and improveourselves.


What do available indicatorsand integrative approachesto M&E on media and com-munications tell us?

Anthnio Lambiino, Phd Candidate, Programme for GlobalCommunication Studies, Annenberg School forCommunication at the University of Pennsylvania.


Section 3 Challenges in Media Matters : PractitionerExperiences


Interventions in media development

Anne Huddock, DPhil, Assistant Representative, The AsiaFoundation, Vietnam

In 1999, USAID published a strategic framework with the ambitious title “The Roleof Media in Democracy” intended to guide its field staff and development part-ners that were thinking about investing in and carrying out media sector support.The framework drew on the operational experiences of field missions around theworld, and benefited considerably from the expertise of USAID staff and its imple-menting partners which had pioneered the media assistance field.

At the time the document was published, there were pockets of operational expe-rience providing media assistance within USAID but little written work that ana-lyzed how these often piecemeal efforts in a country added up to a media sectorthat supported democracy. There were few published studies or cases withinUSAID that allowed practitioners to learn from experiences across regions or toreflect on international good practice. Perhaps for that reason, the publication isthe most downloaded publication from the public USAID/Democracy andGovernance website.

After reviewing the range of global experiences in media assistance, and consider-ing USAID’s own engagement in that area, key elements of a media sector supportprogram were outlined. These were:

• Shaping the legal enabling environment

• Strengthening constituencies for media sector reform (including media


law and policy organizations, media watchdogs, research institutes, pro-fessional associations, and an educated readership that values vibrantmedia)

• Removing barriers to access

• Training (journalists and media managers)

• Supporting capitalization of media

The framework suggested that answers to three key questions could be used tohelp shape media sector support. These questions were: who holds power to com-municate in a society; who has access to the means of communication; and whois communicated to.60 Almost 10 years later there is a wealth of literature basedon current programs to complement the strategic framework. Notable amongthese newer contributions to the field include Krishna Kumar’s PromotingIndependent Media: Strategies for Democracy Assistance (Lynne RiennerPublishers, 2006); Ellen Hume’s The Media Missionaries: American Support forJournalistic Excellence (Knight Foundation, 2004); Rick Rockwell and NoreeneJanus’ Media Power in Central America (University of Illinois Press, 2003); andMonroe Price and Peter Krug’s “The Enabling Environment for Free andIndependent Media: Contribution to Transparent and Accountable Governance”(USAID, 2002).61 While research and writing have advanced the development ofthe field of media assistance and hopefully sharpened programs on the ground, thekey questions posed in the USAID strategic framework in 1999 remain relevant.The broader context within which the original framework was crafted, however,has changed dramatically.

There are three fundamental and significant ways in which the overall context forproviding media sector support has shifted. First, the democracy and governancefield has matured, and promoting media sector development has emerged as acategory of assistance in its own right. Media assistance has come of age and is nolonger seen solely as a sub-set or on the sidelines of a civil society support programor advocacy efforts. A vibrant and healthy media sector supports broader goodgovernance goals including free and fair elections, anti-corruption and even eco-nomic development.62 Media sector development is now accepted as an integralpart of democracy promotion. Perhaps as a result of this, there is a momentum tomedia sector assistance as evidenced by the convening of the Global Forum forMedia Development (GFMD). Investments in scholarship advance the field, suchas the Annenberg Foundation’s donation of $10 million to the Annenberg Schoolfor Communication endowment to benefit the school’s Project for GlobalCommunication Studies, created in 2004 to promote Penn’s involvement in glob-al communication research.

Second, and perhaps related, as the democracy and governance field has becomemore established, more has been asked of the work carried out under it. Followingthe events of 9/11, the democracy and governance field has been seen increasing-ly as a counterbalance to terrorism. Now more so than ever, democracy and gov-ernance assistance rests on the assumption that promoting democracy abroad iscrucial to ensuring national security interests. Democracy and governance promo-tion work is no longer a question of ideals.

But the danger exists that media sector assistance in this context will focus on themedia as a tool for government’s public diplomacy messages, rather than an inde-pendent institution. In such an environment, global security concerns may trumpfree expression and provide political cover for restrictions on civil liberties.Alongside of this, national security concerns render more information secret andout of the public realm. These developments create new challenges for the media


and for media sector support.

Third, new and emerging technologies break the boundaries of traditional mediasectors and challenge the preeminence of traditional outlets as instruments ofdemocratic development. For example, since early 2001 blogging has become apopular and influential means of shaping public opinion. In 2004, bloggers werecredentialed at the Democratic and Republican parties’ conventions. The exis-tence of blogs has also forced mass media to consider its own role and operations.Dan Rather discovered the power of blogs when he presented documents on 60Minutes that called into question President Bush’s military service. Conservativebloggers, however, produced evidence and arguments that the documents wereforgeries and CBS was forced to apologize for inadequate reporting. This scandalmarked a turning point for blogs’ role alongside the mainstream media and theirpotential ability to report news and exert political pressure. In the wake of 9/11,and in the face of concentration of media ownership and insidious controls ofmedia by governments — some authoritarian others supposedly democratic–channels that are outlets for people’s non-violent expression are essential for sta-bility and the overall health of existing democracies.

But “citizen journalists” as bloggers have been called may not replace the role ofmainstream media, even if they have challenged or even changed the way it oper-ates. Blogs may be more democratic in that they invite fluid and open communi-cation, but not all are responsible, reliable or serving the public interest. The sheernumbers of blogs creates a glut of information and may discourage people fromtrawling through what is there to find what is relevant to them. Bloggers are notconnected to one another, so their ability to usher in an information revolutionmay be limited by their fragmentation in contrast to the mainstream media whichpresents a broader as opposed to an individual view. A recent article in theFinancial Times suggested that blogs might be more powerful in restricted societiessuch as Iran or China where they allow people to present their views and accessinformation not available through official channels.63

While the context has changed since the original USAID framework for mediaassistance was produced, the framework itself also rested on some assumptionsthat should be revisited and updated. Namely, the mapping of media assistanceprograms and recommendations for strategic support rested on the notion that theultimate goal of such programs and assistance was to create “independent” and“sustainable” media. What is needed now, particularly in light of the changes inthe broader context as described above, is some consideration of the limitations of“free” and “independent” media in supporting democracy. Perhaps the most effec-tive way to approach media assistance now as a means of securing democracy isto consider how to democratize the media so that disenfranchised groups can havepeaceful means for their free expression, and there is an increased focus on ensur-ing that media checks government power, fosters debate, and provides citizensinformation (rather than solely entertainment).

Democratizing media“Independent” and “sustainable” media do not necessarily or by definition con-tribute to democracy. Media that is independent of government control often suf-fers from corporate influence. Economically sustainable media may rely heavily onentertainment programming that draws large audience shares and advertising rev-enues while doing little to serve the public interest.

New approaches are required that may look well beyond the media sector to sup-port “mediation” between citizens and government through alternative chan-nels.64 The channels, such as community radio would offer localized content and


programming and give voice to the voiceless through traditional forms of expres-sion such as drama and song. By specifying what kind of media advances democ-racy, it is possible to develop more targeted and meaningful programs that supportthe media specifically and the broader aims more generally, sometimes throughinterventions that reach well beyond the narrow confines of the media sector.

Democratic media systems are ones that provide space for expression of diverseviews, supply relevant and timely information to citizens, and hold government toaccount by serving as a check on elite power. Assessing how democratic a mediasystem is in a particular country requires exploration of three interrelated and fun-damental questions:

• How is information mediated in society?

• Who is mediating information?

• Who is left out of the mediation process?

The answers to these questions can serve as signposts on a roadmap of the medialandscape. They suggest strategic opportunities where external support may havemaximum impact in terms of democratizing the media. Monroe Price and PeterKrug assert, “It is important to know what kind of press in what kind of society willperform the functions necessary for the process of building democratic institutionsto proceed healthily.”65

Absent from the 1999 framework of media support activities are programs thatdeliberately reach the poor and disenfranchised, move beyond the elite andurban-based media consumers, and reflect a broad range of views utilizing chan-nels that are accessible to the greatest numbers of people (appropriate technolo-gy, local languages, etc.). The framework deliberately left aside the issues of pub-lic media and how it interacted with independent media or how it did or did notsupport democracy. In order to truly understand and appreciate how the mediacan contribute to democracy, consideration must be given to the quality of dis-course in the media, the degree of access people have to information through themedia, and the level of oversight the media can have over government functions.

Many times, mainstream media does not fully contribute in these ways, and just asbloggers have proven to be an additional source of mediation in a democratic soci-ety, more attention needs to be given to uncovering and fostering other forms ofmediation and communication within a society in ways that promote and sustaindemocracy, and assistance for these outlets or modes of expression should be seenas integral to media sector support.

Already, examples exist of donors supporting non-traditional mechanisms such ascommunity radio. Some of these provide a powerful indication of what is possibleto accomplish outside the mainstream media, and in some cases, how these cancontribute to democracy more so than the mainstream media. By broadening thefocus of media assistance from supporting only “independent” and “sustainable”media, a new realm of possibilities are opened up for fostering democratic media.

CASE STUDIES

The Gobi Wave Information Center, Mongolia’s first independent regional mediaenterprise, demonstrates the power of connecting previously unreachable popula-tions to relevant economic information. Gobi Wave, as the station is known, was


part of the Gobi Regional Economic Growth Initiative, a five-year rural economicdevelopment project funded by USAID and managed by Mercy Corps in partner-ship with Land O’Lakes and PACT. 66 Established on the initiative of a group ofGobi journalists, the goal of the station is to create an independent, financially sus-tainable media enterprise that can provide herders and other Gobi people withcritical information, giving them tools to improve their lives. The Gobi Initiativeprovided skills training and technical assistance to help the station get underway.Journalists forged relationships with local and international institutions (includinglocal NGOs, businesses, and local government) and solicited support from thesepartners. On the air 12 hours a day, Gobi Wave serves local needs through a com-bination of informative and entertaining programming, all for an annual budget of$8,000.67 In short, Gobi Wave has programming that touches on every aspect oflife in the region where it is broadcast.

Community radio often works where other radio or media does not because itoffers localized programs in local languages, uses inexpensive technology, and is aninstrument that is easily adapted. 68 As such, community radio can be a comple-mentary local form of public service broadcasting. One of the main challengesnow for community radio is the legislative environment, particularly in LatinAmerica and other regions where privatization threatens space for community air-waves.69

The Gyandoot project offers another model of connecting previously underservedpopulations, providing them with information, and enabling them to use this infor-mation to improve their lives in part by pushing for greater government responsive-ness. Established in the rural, impoverished Dhar region of central India, Gyandootis a community-based, government-to-citizen project commissioned by theMadhya Pradesh government in late 1999. Managed by an operational teamcalled the Gyandoot Samiti, the project set its goal to establish a regional Intranetheaded at the district HQ. The Intranet would bring invaluable information, andimproved governance to the isolated Dhar villagers, about 60 percent of whomlive under the poverty line. To accomplish that goal, the government initially estab-lished twenty information kiosks, each equipped with a computer, modem, andsome backup power, in the Dhar villages. Covering nearly half the district popula-tion, the information kiosks were designed to cater to local needs and to be cost-effective and locally sustainable. As a result of its efforts, previously uninformedfarmers now arrive in markets armed with up-to-date knowledge of prevailingmarket prices for their crops. Underserved villagers whose complaints about thedelivery of public services had disappeared into inefficient bureaucratic channelsnow see immediate government responses to emails.70

As Gyandoot grew in popularity, it evolved to meet the changing needs of the com-munities it serves. To that end, village meetings were held regularly to gauge pub-lic opinion about the viability and usefulness of the cyber kiosks, and to track localneeds. Using that input, the Samiti expanded the services offered at the cyberkiosks to include not only information about the market and job availability, butalso opportunities for filing public grievances, registering applications, and increas-ing the transparency and responsiveness of government. In one village of thirty-nine households, a complaint filed through the cyber kiosk regarding the village’slack of drinking water garnered a response within two days, a hand pump mechan-ic promptly arrived to remedy the problem. Before Gyandoot, the village had wait-ed six months without a government response.71

Gyandoot’s success in cultivating and enhancing communication between the gov-ernment and the rural Dhar communities has captured the attention of the inter-national community. For example, the project received the Stockholm ChallengeIT Award 2000 in the Public Service and Democracy category. The judges consid-ered it a “breakthrough in e-government” that has triggered a “paradigm shift


which gives marginalized tribal citizens their first ever chance to access knowledge,with minimum investment.”72 Additionally, in 2000 Gyandoot received the com-puter Society of India’s CSI-TCS National Award for Best IT Usage.

Like many pioneering government-to-citizen projects using IT, however, Gyandoothas encountered several difficulties that the Samiti is currently tackling. Accordingto a World Bank-commissioned study conducted in the summer of 2002 by theCenter for Electronic Governance, the main problems for Gyandoot then involvedpower outages, connectivity, and government response.73

Having addressed power failures and connectivity, the project designers have alsoattempted to solve the trickier problems relating to the government’s ability torespond effectively to the Gyandoot system. A different study conducted by theOverseas Development Institute (ODI) in mid 2001 found that 40 percent of 481respondents who had used the kiosk from three villages in Dhar received immedi-ate government responses to services requested, 25 percent received responseswithin a week, and 10 percent within 15 days.74 But by the time the Center forElectronic Governance conducted its study a year later, those numbers haddropped. The studies showed that, while Gyandoot has substantially improved theflow of information between government and local Dhar communities, the govern-ment’s response time still lagged, though it was generally superior to what it wasbefore Gyandoot took off. Inquiries into the state of affairs on the side of the gov-ernment revealed that the relevant departments were often disorganized, inade-quately equipped, and overwhelmed by the number of requests for services flow-ing in from Gyandoot’s Intranet.75

Commercially oriented media also offer examples of how to serve democraticinterests by providing more than entertainment, and by reflecting a broad range ofviews. The Philadelphia Inquirer began an extensive series of news and featuresarticles, editorials, and outreach to citizens about the development of Penn’sLanding, a historic river front area where over the past 30 years there had beenmore than seven failed attempts to develop it. The Public Engagement Project, asthe larger effort was called, began with a call from Philadelphia Mayor John Streetfor “a wide range of community input” before the city chose a developer to launcha new attempt to make Penn’s Landing into a waterfront centerpiece. This provid-ed space for citizens to participate in opinion polls and electronic discussionsabout how to transform Penn’s Landing. Project events included three publicforums and a one-day planning workshop. The project was designed and organ-ized by Harris Sokoloff, Center for School Study Councils, Graduate School ofEducation, University of Pennsylvania; Harris Steinberg, Penn Praxis, University ofPennsylvania; and Chris Satullo, Philadelphia Inquirer Editorial Page Editor. ThePhiladelphia Inquirer online edition provided space for citizens to participate inopinion polls and electronic discussions about how to transform Penn’s Landing.

The Public Engagement Project convened citizens to talk about the future of Penn’sLanding, and linked the citizens’ work to the work that would be done by expertsand officeholders. For example, in one of the public forums about 150 citizens metin ten small groups to engage in dialogues led by trained moderators. ThePhiladelphia Inquirer described this public forum in a column that reported on thecivic dialogue that took place January 29, 2003.76

Another example of this exercise was the Philadelphia Inquirer Editorial Board’s“Citizens Voices ‘99’” project, which promoted a civic dialogue on the 1999Philadelphia mayoral election.77 The Citizens Voices project gathered hundreds ofcitizens in follow-up forums throughout the year to discuss the issues that the ini-tial forums revealed to be most on people’s minds, including education, jobs,neighborhood quality, safety, and better government. The Philadelphia Inquirerpresented “choice frameworks” on these issues, modeled on the guides used by


the National Issues Forums.78 Each issue is presented as a set of distinct choices,each with its own logic, benefits, costs, and core values. At an Issues Convention,Citizens Voices participants used these frameworks to deliberate on what shouldbe done about the five issues in Philadelphia and to compare their views with whatthe mayoral candidates were saying. A group of Citizen Voices participantsquizzed the mayoral candidates in a televised forum sponsored in part by ThePhiladelphia Inquirer, a TV station, the Greater Philadelphia Chamber ofCommerce, the League of Women Voters, and the Philadelphia Compact.

Citizen forums such as these changed the discourse of the mayoral race andrequired the candidates to reframe their campaigns to respond to citizens’ con-cerns. The broadened dialogue was captured in a variety of ways in the pages andthe Web site of The Philadelphia Inquirer.

Democratizing the media through efforts such as these takes on a greater urgencyas this can give greater voice to disenfranchised groups, and deter them fromresorting to violent means to make themselves heard. Such support takes ongreater significance as it can promote peace and stability as well as vibrant democ-racy. Democratizing the media takes on greater relevance as media faces pressureto promote government messages or find that their access to information limited.As a result, there is a greater need for dynamic, democratic media that can repre-sent a range of voices and provide platforms for free expression. The stakes arenow too high to fail.


Financial Independence SasaVucinic, Media DevelopmentLoan Fund


Staying alive: Media inde-pendence in Southeast Asia

Kavi Chongkittavorn, Editor, The Nation, Chairperson,Southeast Asian Press Alliance

INTRODUCTION

At 9.40 am on Monday, 12 September 2005, an earthquake shook the Thai press.Home entertainment tycoon Paiboon Damrongchaitham, CEO of GMM GrammyPlc, announced that he had acquired 32.43 per cent of Machichon and was plan-ning to completely takeover of the country’s most respected 27-year old Thai-lan-guage newspaper in a few days. His announcement immediately caused publicoutcries and generated instant public support for the beleaguered daily. Internetbulletin boards were jammed with condemnations and SMS among university stu-dents were packed with threatening words to boycott Grammy products and itsartistes if the company did not pull out from the deal. Within hours, civil societyorganizations and consumer advocacy groups marched to Mathichon’s headquar-ters to show support while their colleagues wearing black t-shirts laid wraths infront of Grammy’s building. The next morning, all print media both English andThai published editorials universally condemning the hostile takeover as immoraland politically-motivated. But one newspaper, Daily News, was completely blindto the controversy as Grammy had a huge investment in the paper.

By Tuesday’s noon, hectic renegotiations between representatives of Mathichonand Grammy began amid growing public resentments. Online bulletin boards con-tinued to be jammed throughout the day. Media professional organizations helddiscussion groups and ended their meetings with bouquets of flowers toMathichon’s editorial staffers. By Wednesday’s morning, media activists, intelli-gentsia and journalists stepped up their pressure and jointly issuing statementsquestioning Paiboon’s motive in this hostile bid. Bankers and Mathichon’s share-


holders came forward and pledged to make loans and their shares available for thepublisher to fight the takeover to ensure that the paper’s independence andintegrity. Even Paiboon’s university lecturer, Dr. Darunee Hirunrak, from threedecades ago made a personal appeal to him to pull back all his shares and letMathichon operate freely without any interference. By 5.00 pm of the same day,the high-stake game was over. At the press conference, Paiboon’s brother, SumethDamrongchaitham, announced that Grammy had already struck a compromisewith Mathichon that the company would reduce its shares to 22.43 per cent leveland gave the much needed assurance that the paper will continue to operatefreely as before.

On the same day he announced the hostile takeover of Mathichon, Paiboon alsobrought 23.4 per cent shares of Bangkok Post Plc, publisher of Bangkok Post, thecountry’s oldest English-language newspaper. Although it caused less resentmentand commotion than Mathichon’s share acquisitions, the public and free mediaadvocacy groups expressed serious concerns the takeover would affect the Post’sindependent reporting. With strong outside support, the Post’s editorial staffersthen had the courage to write to their management boards, including RobertKwok, owner of Hong Kong based South China Morning Post, about the need toreaffirm editorial independence. It was a rather unusual step that such a guaran-tee was done out in the open. The Post’s editors and journalists also went to theGovernment House to stage a demonstration and demanded a say in top editori-al appointments in their paper. In response, the Post’s publisher and CEOs madea public pledge in a press conference that the editorial staff would be allowed fullindependence. This development is extremely remarkable considering the Post’ssix-decade history of conservative views as well as the attitude of SuthikiartChirathiwat, the Post’s executive director, who has never been known for promot-ing press freedom and media integrity. He removed two editors in 2004 and 2005,who were critical of the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and hisoverall policies.

STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENT PRESS

Albeit a brief tussle, the attempted hostile takeover of Mathichon was a historicevent that has united the press and public sectors. Combined pressure and solidsupport from the general public and civil society organizations has literally blockedGrammy’s purchase and saved the paper. As such, it set forth a new benchmarkfor Thai journalism. It was the first time the public support served as a catalyst tohalt a hostile bid. The Thai public was not gullible and ignorant as one would havethought. They did care about good and responsible press. After all, they had neverfought for the free press even once until Mathichon’s bid last month. Such unpre-dictable outburst showed that the public, which was rather benign, was willing tofight for independent and free press that can represent their voices and concerns,especially in the time of political uncertainties and increased state control.

But the struggle for independent press in Thailand has just begun. The Thai presscontinues to face mounting pressure from the government and defamation suits.On 3 October 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra filed two defamation suitsagainst a veteran journalist, Sondhi Limthongkul, publisher of Phujadkarn andThaiDay, and demanded 500 million baht or US$12.5 million in damages. Thaksinpointed out that he filed criminal and civil lawsuits against Sondhi and his co-hostSarocha Porn-udomsak because they repeatedly accused him of being disloyal tothe monarchy in their TV current affair program. It was the first time Thaksin fileda lawsuit against a journalist. Several weeks later, he subsequently withdrew thecase in December citing the recommendations by HM the King during his birth-day’s speech urging him to be more open to criticism.

In the past years, Thaksin’s government, Cabinet members and affiliated business


partners filed criminal and civil defamation suits against a number of Thai editorsand newspapers and free media advocates. In August 2005, two governmentagencies sued the Bangkok Post for criminal defamation for one billion baht orUS$25 million for falsely reported about the condition of the new SuvannabhumAirport. In the same month, Yaowaret Shinwatra, Thaksin’s young sister, filed crim-inal and civil lawsuits against the Thai Post for another story related to the airport’sconstruction. In June 2004, Shin Corp Group, which is owned by Thaksin family,sued Supinya Klangnarong, a free media advocate, for 400 million baht or US$10million in damages. On 15 March 2006, the court will deliver the verdict. It isinteresting to note that Shin Corp Group was purchased on 27 January 2006 bySingapore’s Temasak Holdings. Other high-profile defamation suits including the10 billion baht or US$450 million filed by Picnic Corporation, owned by familymembers of former deputy commerce minister Suriya Lapwisuthisin, againstMathichon and a five-billion baht or US$225 million suit against its sister businesspublication, Prachachat Turakij, a business daily.

Mathichon’s dramatic struggle for survival and increased defamation cases inThailand reveals the kind of challenges the Thai media has to confront in thefuture. Each decision of these lawsuits will have direct bearings on freedom ofexpression in the country. In the case of Thaksin’s lawsuits, any favourable rulingfor the prime minister would have dire consequences on future reporting on gov-ernment officials and the country’s press freedom. It is imperative that these devel-opments and their significance must be understood. The paper’s triumph againstthe hostile bid could be short-lived because the Grammy Group can and will inthe future use the tyranny of market mechanism and excess capitals to prey onMathichon again or purchase other media outlets. Indeed, the daily will not be thelast to face a new form of media intimidation and control.

Level of quality and journalistic independence in Southeast Asia Mathichon andBangkok Post are not alone. Throughout Southeast Asia, especially in the countrieswhich have free or semi-free media, press freedom is at risk. Nowadays powerwielders are very skillful in muzzling freedom of expression using sophisticatedmeans including financial measures to control media ownership and anti-press leg-islations to cow media as well as filing defamation lawsuits against journalistsdemanding ridiculously high amount of damages.Southeast Asia is a very diverseregion in terms of politics, economic and religion. It is a miniature of global poli-tics—from absolute to constitutional monarchies, from guided and highly regulat-ed to free for all democracy and from despotic socialism to capitalist autocracy.The region also houses the world’s largest Islamic country—Indonesia—as well asthe world’s largest Buddhist communities combining Thailand, Laos, Cambodiaand Burma. The Philippine is also a major Christian country in Asia. These diver-sities are reflected on the region’s media’s quality and independence either thoseare government-controlled or privately-run. Regional media also varies greatlydepending on media quality and independence in each country. A survey done byNew York-based Freedom House last May in 194 countries showed that SoutheastAsia did not have any free media, except “partly free” and “not free media” cate-gories. The region’s freest media in Thailand and the Philippines were included inthe “partly free” category because of the former’s rapid deterioration of press free-dom and the latter’s tighter control of media ownership and high numbers ofFilipino journalists killed. Thailand’s press freedom fell from 90th in 2004 to 95thin 2005. In 2000, Thailand was ranked 29th in a similar survey.

FREE MEDIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Using local and regional values and norms, the Southeast Asian media can begrouped into four groups: First is the free media country such as the Philippines,Indonesia and Cambodia. The latter two represent the biggest change in the regionas new comers joining the free media world. They have enjoyed free media onlyrecently—Indonesia since 1998 and Cambodia since 1992 due to the UN-sanc-


tioned democratization process there.

The Filipino media remain the region’s freest and most versatile as well as allencompassing. They are not perfect as many Filipino tabloids continue to printrumors as facts and other forms of sensationalism. Electronic media in thePhilippines are the most interactive but could be dangerous and defamatory. Withnearly 50 journalists killed in the past ten years, the Philippines remains one of theworld’s most dangerous places to work for journalists.

In Indonesia, independence media are booming but quality has yet to be caughtup. It is estimated that nearly 2,000 new dailies, 900 new radio stations emergedsince 1998 after the departure of President Suharto with a total of 35,000 journal-ists working for all the media. In the past five years, the Indonesian media are freeto produce almost any kind of political information. Such media freedom hasincreased public awareness about politics and economic conditions of the coun-try. As the world’s largest Islamic country, Indonesia free media has a crucial roleto play in promoting and raise awareness of moderate Islam and democracy. Therewere fears earlier that fundamental Islamic political groups would use the mediaand subsequently polarize the society by reporting on issues related to disenchant-ments with politics, democracy and economic hardship. So far, that did not hap-pen thanked to the conduct of Indonesian journalists. Despite their good works,they still need fundamental media and ethnical training to improve quality andprofessionalism. Soon Indonesia will be the second country in Southeast Asia toadopt an access to information law. The draft has been completed and is current-ly under the vetting of the National

Assembly. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has also reaffirmed hisgovernment policy to promote free press and democratization both in his countryand Asean.

Cambodian press has come a long way. Over the past decade, the Cambodianjournalists have gone through trials and errors in exercising freedom of expression.They have been eager and very serious with the media freedom. The UN playeda key role in administrating the once war-torn country and instilled democraticvalue as well as institutions. Cambodian media are generally very fierce but thegovernment, which has been under Prime Minister Hun Sen since 1992, has suc-cessfully co-opted media and tamed them. Intimidation and killing of journalistshave occurred quite frequently especially during the election time. Professionalmedia associations, six in total, are trying to protect and promote freedom ofexpression. Lack of funding and solidarity among the Cambodian journalists hasweakened their bargaining power to fight against anti-free media legislations andtheir campaign against corruption and other malfeasances.

PARTLY FREE MEDIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Second group is partly free media in Thailand, which used to be the region’s freestpress before the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra came to powerin early 2001. Now it is a different kind of media altogether. More or less, the Thaimedia are still free but they no longer as real watchdogs as they used to be any-more. In the past five years, the Thaksin government has efficiently divided themedia community through stock acquisitions, target advertising allocations andother economic incentives and access to government news and information. Thesestrategies ensure that dissenting views are put down systematically. Thaksin’s pop-ulist policies including the implementation of 41-billion-dollar mega projects,which will start in later 2006, need tamed and controlled media to succeed.

In 1997, Thailand was the first country in Southeast Asia to enact the access to


information law to guarantee public right to know. The Thais were excited andpoured to government offices throughout the country to obtain information relat-ed to their villages or communities. They wanted to be informed citizens and par-ticipated in the country’s decision making process and promote civil participation.At the moment, the exact opposite is happening in Thailand. The access to infor-mation law has been abused and used as an instrument to delay information dis-closure instead of encouraging it.

CONTROLLED MEDIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Third group is the controlled media as in Singapore and Malaysia. The two gov-ernments called their press system as free and responsible. Issues considered sen-sitive to the government must be treated carefully. Self-censorship is the norm.Other non-political issues such economic and trade could be reported quite freely,especially on the positive economic performance by the government sectors. Anynews that increases the legitimacy of the ruling party and strengthens its grips iswelcome. Any news deems detrimental to the ruling party’s reputation and gover-nance must be avoided. Journalists in both countries are well-paid and their edi-tors are political appointees either by the ruling parties or someone closed to theleaders in power.

Most of the comments are sanctioned by the government, with the exception ofMalaysiakini in Kuala Lumpur. As the region’s first online newspaper, it is the onlyindependent news sources in the country. Setting up in 1999 Malaysiakini has suc-cessfully used and exploited the loopholes existing in the government’s informa-tion and communication technologies policies. The government has repeatedlypledged not to censor information in cyber space to lure foreign investors in thishighly competitive area. Within 2006, Malaysiakini plans to launch a broadbandregional TV called 247 TV News.

Fourth group is the media serving as the government’s mouthpieces in Brunei,Burma, Laos and Vietnam. Journalists write and present news following the gov-ernment guidelines and arguments. All views are sanctioned by the government orpropaganda department. Brunei is not a communist country. With its political sys-tem of absolute monarchy, the local media is quite tamed and passive. So, themedia in these countries is pivotal as part of the national-building process.

The saddest media development belongs to Burma as journalists are completelynot free to write or broadcast. Only state media carry day to day news. About 90Burmese journalists, working for various news outlets scattered along the Thai-Burmese border and Chiang Mai, are living in Thailand following developmentsinside their country from the Thai border. Some of them find jobs with internation-al news agencies such as BBC, CNN and Radio Free Asia. To prepare for the futuredemocratization of Burma, journalists in exile have been receiving on-the-jobtraining from various donors and foundations. They are being taught about jour-nalism as well as knowledge of world affairs. Burmese journalists in exile need tonetwork with others in the region for alert, information exchange and solidarity.Each year several dozens of Burmese journalists inside Burma receive media train-ing clandestinely in undisclosed locations funded by Western media advocacygroups.

CONCLUSION

Quality and independence in Southeast Asian media is highly uneven. As freepress proliferates in Indonesia and Cambodia, better trained journalists whounderstand media ethics and good writing are much needed. Better organizedindependent media organizations would strengthen media solidarity and raise thestandard of professionalism in these countries. To sustain the level of independent


press in Thailand and the Philippines, economic viability and better managementis a prerequisite. Ways must be found to prevent independent media from corpo-rate takeovers by vested interest groups, which can usurp a decade-old history offree press in a nick of time. Of late, this trend is highly visible in the region, whichsuffered economic crisis a decade ago. To promote freedom of expression in con-trolled media countries, long-term outreach programs, specific to the unique con-ditions of each individual country, must be carefully mapped out. Using localmedia resources and knowledge are imperative to ensure relevancy and accept-ability.


Africa : Representative to benominated by the UNECA


RUSSAI/CIS : Manana Aslamazyan, Internews Russia Holistic Approaches to Media Reformand Corruption

Dauod Kuttab, Amman Net

In 1989 and following an Arab summit held in Baghdad, public discussion tookplace in Egypt regarding cars donated to journalists by the Iraqi president. Thedebate was not whether receiving cars was morally or professional wrong, but wasfocused on whether the cars are the property of the journalists or the newspaperswhich they work for. In the end the agreement was that journalists could use themso long as they were working for the publication but once they leave, the carwould stay.

In 1996 the television station that I run at Al Quds University was broadcasting livesessions of the Palestinian Legislative Council. We did that with the approval of thespeaker of the PLC. But after broadcasting a rather rowdy session dealing with cor-ruption in the Palestinian Authority, I was jailed for seven days by the PalestinianAuthority.

In 1998 the deputy head of the Jordanian journalists union, Nedal Mansour, wasfired for life from his own union because he dared set up a center for the defenseof journalists with foreign funding. The problem is that in Jordan like all other Arabcountries, membership of the one and only journalists union is mandatory for any-one who wants to be recognized as journalists. It is illegal to claim to be a journal-ist if you are not a member in this closed shop which is largely run by pro govern-ment journalists. The banishment was therefore tantamount to career ending.

In 2003 after the Gulf war documents discovered in Baghdad showed that manyof the individuals who benefited from the oil coupons were journalists and colum-nists. Clearly being bribed for their opinion has done little to discredit many ofthese journalists who are still working in their publications.


In November 2000 I was privileged to have established an internet radio stationin Amman Jordan. And when we sent a reporter to cover the local city council henoticed that mainstream reporters who cover the city council don’t take notes andare given stories (often along with an envelope) at the end of the session. At onetime the PR person told a journalist go home, I will fax you the story. And in thefollowing week, our reporter noticed that different pieces of news were beingreported on over a week even though all were decision made in that one councilsession.

In the fall of 2005 when our internet radio was licensed as an FM station, wewanted to broadcast live the full sessions of the city council. The mayor refusedeven though the speaker of the Jordanian parliament allowed us and we beganbroadcasting the sessions on air. When I told the story to a columnist friend, hetried to write about it but his column was not published because he was told bythe owner of his paper that the city council is a major advertiser with over one mil-lion dollars in ads a year.

In late March 2006, I received the annual report of the Arab Bank. I am normal-ly not very good with numbers, but when I looked at it I discovered an interestingchapter named Corporate Governance. In this section, the salaries, expenses andsize of stock ownership of top bank officials and their spouses were listed as thenames of the major stockholders in the bank. Feeling that this was unique, I post-ed it on our web site and read it on our radio. For days after that I was surprisedthat the local newspapers didn’t see this news as fit to print. Ironically, while thiscorporate transparency seems to be the rule for all companies trading on theAmman stock exchange, the parliament was still dragging its feet on legislation thatwould force senior government officials and members of parliament to reveal theirown financial holdings.

What these anecdotal stories show is that the problems of dealing with corruptionis not restricted to the need for journalists to carry out more investigative report-ing, but what is needed is a holistic media reform which I would suggest requiresat least major change in the following areas:

Media ownership: we need to end the existence of governmental monopolies ofthe media (whether direct or indirect), turn state run radio and television into pub-lic service ones and remove all forms of subsidize in order to allow for an evencompetitive playing field.

Legal reform: media laws and laws affecting the media must explicitly ban arrestand restrictions for journalists for doing their jobs.

Break up professional association’s closed shops: membership in a syndicatemust not be mandatory and media practitioners and owners should have the rightto establish whatever associations they need to organize their profession.

Reform the profession from within: we need to reach the situation in which itbecomes unacceptable that journalists, editors and publishers tolerate the accept-ance of financial rewards, gifts or any other incentives. Codes of ethics are notenough if they are not backed up by a serious effort to hold media practitionersaccountable to their own professional codes.

Media should not be excluded from criticism: journalists and editors have spe-cial respect to their own colleagues, therefore we should not exclude the mediaitself from scrutiny. Media therefore must not only be a watchdog on government,but should not shy away from being a watchdog on other media. The media itselfcan make a contribution to fighting corruption simply by holding itself and the


other media to the standards of professionalism and transparency that even privatecompanies are now holding themselves to.

Investigative journalism is not just training: investigative journalism is oftengiven lip service bur rarely is it included in a comprehensive plan that goes pastsimple training and moves into areas of professional coaching, legal advice, followup eventually until the investigative reports see the air. With support fromInternational Media Support Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) wasset up. In this organization professionals work with the journalists from conceptidea, through coaching, legal review and follow up until training. The web sitewww.arij.net has published investigation, diaries of journalists, notes of coachesand background documents and pictures are also available.

In conclusion fighting corruption requires a holistic approach by society, govern-ment and the media. While media reform is required, we also need to break upthe closed shop syndicates in order to allow for professional unions to play theirrole in the defense of journalists and therefore contributing to freedom of expres-sion. But most importantly, serious effort for getting the media to fight corruptionmust include cleaning up the profession itself from corruption within it and lack ofprofessionalism.


Building media capacities toimprove disaster response:lessons from Pakistan

Adnan Rehmat, Country Director, Internews Pakistan

The 8 October earthquake had a devastating impact on the media in affectedareas. Dozens of journalists were killed or went missing, and newspaper offices,broadcasting facilities and press clubs were destroyed. The capacity of the localmedia was significantly reduced, and local and national outlets struggled torespond adequately to the tragedy with news and information about the natureand scale of the earthquake and the progress of the relief effort.

THE MEDIA RESPONSE

Pakistanis first learnt of the disaster from private television channels and FM radiostations. It took a couple of hours before the state-owned electronic media brokethe news. In the affected regions, there was no private radio or TV, and the onlysource of mass information – the state-run Kashmir Radio and TV – was silencedby the earthquake: 40 of its 160 staff were killed, and its buildings wrecked. Withthe region’s small printing presses and most press clubs also damaged, and withdozens of journalists either dead or losing relatives, the business of local news gen-eration came to a halt. The disaster presented the classic paradox: news about thecalamity and its impact was going out to the world at large, but those affected – atleast 3.5 million people – had no means of finding out what was going, what to door how to get help.

THE INFORMATION GAP

To gauge the state of information access, the Pakistan office of Internews, an inter-


national media development organisation, conducted a snapshot survey twoweeks after the earthquake in Batagram, Balakot and Mansehra in NWFP, andMuzaffarabad, Bagh and Rawalakot in Kashmir. These were generally the worst-hitcities. According to the survey, before the earthquake about 81% of householdshad a radio, and 52% had television sets. Of these, three-quarters of radio sets andvirtually all TV sets were destroyed by the earthquake. When asked about theirsources of information, 68% of respondents said they were dependent on word ofmouth, 28% on the radio, 21% on newspapers, 15% on TV and 11% on the localadministration. At least 8% said they were not getting any information from any-where. No one mentioned the mosque or religious leaders as a source of generalinformation.

In the absence of conventional sources of information, rumours abounded: aboutwhen the next earthquake was due, or that daubing kerosene on your tent will getrid of mosquitoes, or that bottled water was medicinal and only fit for hand-wash-ing, not drinking. Against this background, it was imperative that a cheap andpractical means of information access was established.

REBUILDING THE MEDIA

Radio was the obvious answer: sets were cheap (less than a dollar), informationcould be provided in local languages, and broadcasts could reach large numbersof people. Given the lack of local equipment and expertise, operators elsewherein the country had to be called on; within a month, the Pakistan Electronic MediaRegulatory Authority had issued ten three-month, non-commercial emergencylicences to private FM stations outside of the affected area. The Authority bypassedthe usually lengthy process of security vetting of would-be operators (to clear themof links with India or with jihadi/militant groups), and made available frequenciesusually controlled by the military. The idea was that, since the licences were non-commercial, they would be taken up only by ‘serious’ volunteer broadcasters com-mitted to helping people.

Within weeks of the earthquake, Internews, with funding from the UK andSwitzerland, launched the Pakistan Emergency Information Project(www.internews.org.pk) to rebuild media capacities affected by the disaster inKashmir and NWFP. This work primarily includes developing the emergencybroadcast sector, building radio production facilities, providing small equipmentgrants to emergency FM stations, training journalists in humanitarian reporting andthe production and distribution of a daily one-hour news and information pro-gramme on humanitarian issues, called ‘Jazba-e-Tameer’ (‘The Spirit of Recovery’).The programme was produced by a group of ten journalism students. The volun-teers travelled daily across the earthquake region to report on relief efforts, includ-ing feedback from affected populations, the international and local humanitariancommunity and government authorities.

Four months after the initial information access survey, Internews conducted a fol-low-up. This showed that the new community radio regime had rapidly become amajor source of independent, reliable and useful information. In the initial survey,in late October 2005, 28% of respondents had cited radio as one of their primarysources of information. In the follow-up survey, this had gone up to 70%, andrespondents mentioned at least one of the seven emergency radio stations on airat the time of the survey as their station of choice. The follow-up survey alsorevealed that more people were consuming more media. In the initial survey, 15%of respondents had reported watching TV; in the follow-up survey, this had risento 24%, all of whom said that TV was one of their primary sources of information.Virtually all watched state-run channels. A third of respondents gave newspapersas one of their primary sources of information, up from 21% in October 2005.


LESSONS FROM PAKISTAN

The Pakistan Emergency Information Project shows how an often-neglected aspectof post-disaster relief – the provision of reliable information for survival and recov-ery – can be achieved in little time (100 days), and with little money (about£150,000 of the £300,000 project funding has been spent to date).

The key lessons of the Pakistan experience are that information about relief, recon-struction and rehabilitation is critical for survival and recovery in disaster regions;and that, if the local media lacks the capacity to provide the kind of specialisedinformation that is needed, outside help must be provided, and swiftly. The pri-mary focus of media assistance should be:

• Support to enable specific local private and state outlets to broadcast, sothat they can provide vital news and information to victims. If no FM sta-tions are available, the regular licensing rules should be suspended toenable stations to be established; ‘suitcase’ radio stations are very afford-able, and are easy to set up and operate. Infrastructure needs includetransmitters, antennas, mobile radio studios (these are usually not imme-diately available in-country and need to be imported; all taxes and dutiesshould be waived) and generators.

• Support for production teams and journalists working for and with mediaoutlets in the disaster zone. Production needs include mobile productionequipment such as minidisk recorders, portable computers, satellitephones, transport and technical support.

• Support for the broader journalistic and media community to cover thedisaster and relief efforts with speed and accuracy. Needs include: accessto information sources such as humanitarian relief organisations, the gov-ernment and the military; access to technical assistance in the form ofsatellite telephones, field production equipment and transport; and assis-tance to coordinate, share and update information.

• Distribution of radio sets (preferably one to each family, and preferablysolar-powered or crank radios that require no batteries). In Pakistan,Internews imported 10,000 radio sets for distribution among earthquake-affected people, but they remained stuck in customs for several weeks,despite permission from the government to import them.

The period between a disaster and the arrival of relief is the most crucial time,when lives are saved. Accurate humanitarian information flows to and from affect-ed populations in local languages is critical for survival and faster recovery. Theswift deployment of resources in the aftermath of a humanitarian disaster for localmedia development will improve information within affected populations, therelief community and international media, and must be a priority. This will con-tribute enormously to more effective and accountable local and internationalhumanitarian responses.


Ready the Lifeboats: Mediadevelopment in Uzbekistanafter Andijan

Andrew Stroehlein, Media Director, International CrisisGroup

In the harshest authoritarian states, the scope for media development work isseverely restricted, but it should not be considered entirely impossible. The pointis well illustrated by Uzbekistan, which has joined Burma, North Korea andZimbabwe as one of the world’s most repressive regimes. Though increasingly dif-ficult to implement on the ground, media development and freedom of informa-tion projects are still possible for the Central Asian state. A close look at the oppor-tunities there demonstrates just what might be achievable if the international com-munity makes a well-funded and concerted response to a deteriorating situation.

The two key aspects of media development, infrastructure improvement and jour-nalism training, have both received some attention in Uzbekistan in the past, withinternational media NGOs such as the Institute for War and Peace Reporting(IWPR), Internews and others involved in the region for many years thanks tostrong donor support from a wide variety of international sources. Working insideUzbekistan was never easy: over the last five years in particular, these NGOs andtheir local representatives were finding it increasingly tough. Requirements forstate registration and re-registration were only one small part of the pressure thatthe regime put on these organisations. Indirect and not so indirect threats by secu-rity services against local NGO staff were a regular feature of media developmentefforts in the country. And never far from anyone’s mind was the risk of beingtaken into custody by the security services, where torture has been copiously doc-umented by human rights groups and labelled “systematic” by the UN Special


Rapporteur on Torture.

This dangerous and difficult mix turned extremely toxic following the Andijan mas-sacre of 13 May 2005, when state security forces fired on mostly unarmed civiliandemonstrators killing hundreds, perhaps even one thousand. After that, as theregime’s ongoing paranoia about the media, NGOs and media development inparticular expanded into open denunciations of journalists, both international cor-respondents and local staff of major outlets such as ARD, BBC, CNN, Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Associated Press, Deutsche Welle, andFerghana.ru, as well as local staff of NGOs, such as IWPR.54 Uzbekistan’s GeneralProsecutor’s office has accused staff at these organisations, among others, of abet-ting terrorism simply for reporting truthful accounts of the Andijan massacre to theoutside world.80 The photos of these individuals have been shown on national TVunder the headline “overview of participation of foreign media in the events of 13May 2005”.81 RFE/RL has logged a long chronology of harassment against its staff.82

After continued persecution of its employees by the authorities, the BBCannounced on 26 October 2005 it was suspending its news gathering operationsin Uzbekistan and withdrawing all local staff.83 At the beginning of 2006, thecourts forced Freedom House to suspend its activities.

In such an atmosphere, conventional media development projects are very nearlyimpossible inside the country, and yet the need has clearly never been greater, socreative solutions must be found. What is needed, and what is still possible toimplement, are “lifeboat strategies”, projects that can maintain media skills andjournalistic integrity — not to mention provide independent information to andabout the country — in the expectation of future change to a more reasonablegovernment.

As with other sectors of the economy, media cannot be left to wither and die andthen be expected to somehow resurrect themselves when the regime is gone tocreate professional institutions instantly from scratch. Preparations need to bemade now, so that when society does open up again, skilled, responsible journal-ists and effective media infrastructure can respond quickly to meet the informationneeds of a transforming country.

CREATING STAND-BY NEWSPAPER INFRASTRUCTURE

Developing media technology on the ground to update the country’s decrepitpublishing and distribution capacity seems impossible at this time. The funding ofan independent printing press, which proved effective in disseminating informa-tion in Kyrgyzstan even when official channels were blocked,84 is clearly not feasi-ble in Uzbekistan today. But preparations can and should be made for the rapidestablishment of such a printing press for immediate deployment when the icestarts to break under the regime. Hand in hand with this, a plan should be devel-oped to create new news gathering and distribution networks throughout thecountry as quickly as possible. The goal should be to have a ready-to-roll capabil-ity to take advantage of any new political flux to establish a small daily paper inthe shortest time possible given technical constraints.

BOOSTING JOURNALISM TRAINING BY AND FOR CENTRAL ASIANS

Lifeboat strategies for Uzbek media can include training for Uzbek journalists, butnew approaches are needed. In the past, journalism training in Central Asia hasfocused on classwork and on-the-job training in the west as well as training work-shops in the region led by western journalists. Both have seen their day. Trainingin the west was always complicated by language issues, and, more importantly, bythe fact that it related experiences that were wholly inappropriate and inapplica-


ble in the Central Asian context. Knowing how to gather information and write agood English-language article for a paper in the free societies of New York orLondon was little value to a person upon return to authoritarian Tashkent. Like adoctor from a small town in the developing world going abroad and learning howto use the latest MRI scanner, it was professionally interesting, perhaps, but notpractical back home. Training by westerners in Central Asian capitals also sufferedfrom similar problems, but a dearth of high-quality journalists and journalism train-ers in the region made it necessary.

This is no longer the case. After many years of training journalists and “training thetrainers” projects by western NGOs, the region has a reasonably strong domesticcapacity for journalism training. There are talented journalists from Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (mostly now living outside Uzbekistan), whohave years of reporting behind them and experience as journalism trainers, bothfor on-the-job training and classroom training, and they can provide instruction inlocal languages. In general, young journalists can learn much more from them thanthey would from a Western journalist, because these experienced Central Asianshave dealt with the problems journalists face in the region — oftentimes problemsthat Western journalists find difficult even to imagine. The exchange of experi-ences between journalists from different countries in the region is particularly use-ful: learning how to handle political pressure or obstructive officials, for example.85

International donors should support the establishment of an independent journal-ism training centre for the region. The trainers and lecturers should be experiencedCentral Asian journalists who ideally teach only part-time so their practical skillsaren’t dulled. The centre should develop special efforts to reach out toUzbekistan’s journalists with both short-term training programs and longer-term in-residence possibilities for teachers and students.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION PROJECTS AND A CENTRAL ASIAN NEWS AGENCY

After the Andijan massacre and the crackdown on journalists and media-supportNGOs that followed, news gathering and reporting went from extremely difficultto nearly impossible. The broadcast pillorying and threatened show trial of foreignand domestic journalists demonstrates clearly how the regime will not tolerate thecollection and distribution of information through any channels it does not control.About the only independent sources of news Uzbekistan’s citizens can access arevia the Internet and by shortwave radio broadcast. These outlets need to carry ontheir work, but more avenues to information need to be opened up. The case fora new Central Asian news agency is strong.

There are currently two US-funded projects to establish regional news agencies,one with IWPR and one with Internews. The latter project, called “Newsfactory”,is more agency-like in its extensive reach to small media outlets in towns through-out Kazakhstan. It should be expanded to take in other countries in the region,especially Uzbekistan, though not by working with existing Uzbek media outlets,as it does in Kazakhstan. The Uzbek outlets are simply too closely controlled bythe regime to provide objective reporting or any potential for publishing outsidematerial. A network of anonymous correspondents across Uzbekistan should becreated, with editors in Almaty or Bishkek coordinating their reports and protect-ing their identity. These reports can be entered into the agency system and thusoffer regional media access to independent daily reports from across Uzbekistan.

Getting the reports back into Uzbekistan will be difficult. They could enter exist-ing systems online, on shortwave radio, and on broadcast outlets in neighbouringcountries, which many Uzbekistan citizens can easily access. But more distributionroutes are needed, including the following:


New FM radio stations: FM broadcasts in Uzbek from radio stations just over theborder in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would reach the largest number ofUzbekistan’s citizens. Although it may increase friction between Tashkent and itsneighbours, if political reluctance in Astana and Bishkek can be overcome, thepotential for large audiences and real-time reporting makes FM radio the mosteffective medium.

Small-scale newspapers for Uzbekistan’s migrants and traders: Newspapersprinted abroad and distributed to shuttle traders on the borders and to migrantworkers, in neighbouring countries (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and in Russia,would reach important audiences with information not tightly controlled byTashkent. People may find them too dangerous to bring into Uzbekistan, but theywould be passed around in the chaikhanas (tea houses) and other meeting pointsin border towns outside Uzbekistan, and the stories will be carried into Uzbekistanin the memories of the readers. The target audiences will come to rely on thesenew newspapers more quickly if they report not only news items but also businessinformation professionally useful for these economically active groups.

Expanding online news: There is certainly more scope for online news aimed atUzbekistan. True, Internet access is limited within the country, but online reportsare read by the most influential and best educated — both those in the currentregime and, presumably, anyone likely to play a decision-making role in a futuregovernment. EurasiaNet, IWPR, Transitions Online and others publish excellentweb-based material (the first two with significant Russian-language output), butthey have limited capacity: each can only produce a handful of stories aboutUzbekistan every month. The websites of RFE/RL and BBC World Service delivernews in Uzbek, but again, harassment of both has been fierce, with the latterforced to suspend activities on the ground. Tribune-uz.info has material in Uzbekand Russian, but it tends to cover what the outside world is saying aboutUzbekistan more than report from within the country itself, and it is not a sourceof independent journalism. None of the above provide a dedicated daily newsservice about Uzbekistan for Uzbek citizens. Ferghana.ru has come closest to pro-viding a daily service, but without resources for an expanded network of corre-spondents, it takes much of its information on Uzbekistan from other sources, witha heavy reliance on state news agencies (especially the Russian ITAR-TASS and RIANovosti) and on Kyrgyzstan’s AKIPress. An expanded news agency project, as pro-posed above, could offer its Uzbek material online for free, possibly by having thatparticular material underwritten by international donors.

The Uzbek regime has been very actively engaged in Internet censorship, closingdown and threatening local websites and blocking certain external sites. Thoughtheir ability to block outside websites doesn’t seem to be nearly as comprehensiveas China’s, it would be beneficial for groups that have taken an interest in provid-ing advice on avoiding the censors in China to add Uzbekistan as a focus coun-try.86

UNDERGROUND NEWS GATHERING PROJECTS

Asking journalists to collect information inside Uzbekistan presents serious practi-cal and ethical problems. The risks are great, but there are numerous journalistsand activists who are willing to take that risk, and the value of their reports is irre-placeable. Editors must take all measures possible to protect the identity of theircorrespondents, who essentially work underground with no open office, no legalregistration and no accreditation. Anonymous correspondents must have appropri-ate cover-jobs that help them gain access to useful sources, and they can never beopen about their work as journalists, not even with colleagues or indeed, in manyinstances, with interviewees.


Questioning of official sources as a way of trying to ensure balance and objectivi-ty can be undertaken by other writers, who are located outside the country. Insome cases and for some stories, correspondents on the ground may only act asfixers who identify potential sources and pass phone numbers to their editors, sojournalists working from safety abroad can then ask controversial questions.

To prevent infiltration and destruction of the reporting network by the securityservices, the individual correspondents inside the country should not know eachother, maintaining communication only with the editor, based outside the country.That communication with their editor must be via secure email — never by phone,fax or post — and other electronic precautions must be taken as well.Incriminating files should be kept encrypted on an out-of-country server, never ondiscs or other seizeable hard media such as memory sticks or paper. Payment forarticles must never be sent to named bank accounts or through Western Union, asthese are easily tracked by the security services.

These are extreme measures more associated with spy networks than journalism,but the regime’s excessively heavy hand against professional journalists makes suchprecautions essential. These tactics are already employed with significant successby some news organisations reporting in neighbouring Turkmenistan, where theregime is just as repressive if not more so.

JOURNALIST PROTECTION FUND

Apart from helping to finance the expansion of the news agency and the furtherdevelopment of these other projects, the international community can providesupport in other crucial ways. The Open Society Institute (OSI) has been lookinginto the establishment of a legal defence fund for litigation in support of mediafreedom worldwide. Funding for legal defence itself in the strictest sense, ofcourse, would be of little value for journalists who cross the authorities inUzbekistan, where the executive completely orchestrates high-profile judicialprocesses and where torture to extract confessions is commonplace. But part ofOSI’s project would involve supporting media freedom cases in international fora,which can bring international attention to the crimes of repressive regimes. Thereare, for example, a few cases pending before the UN Human Rights Commissioninvolving the closure of media outlets in Uzbekistan.

What is also sorely needed for Uzbekistan is a journalist protection fund. It isessential that any journalist running into trouble as a result of working with anundercover news gathering project has a retirement option other than torture inan Uzbek prison. Some international journalism groups, such and the Committeeto Protect Journalists (CPJ), are trying to meet these needs, but their human andfinancial resources are extremely limited. In 2005, CPJ worked with eight Uzbekjournalists in exile, but it had to dedicate a substantial portion of its global emer-gency funds to do so. If underground reporting is expanded as it should be, donorswill have to help boost resources for journalist protection.

A dedicated protection fund for Uzbek journalists should be established — in closecoordination with the proposed agency editor and other media-related projectsattempting to work in Uzbekistan — to help journalists in need, with support suchas short-term accommodation abroad, assistance with asylum applications, jobplacement in the new country and so on. The international community shouldlook favourably on asylum applications that result.87 True, this system would beopen to some abuse, but the need for the information gathered and reported tothe country, and to the world, far outweighs the risk that a few individuals maycheat the system to obtain a visa to the West.


SATELLITE TV

A region-wide satellite television station is another project already in the pipelinethat would benefit from expansion, additional outside support and extra attentionto Uzbekistan. With funding from USAID, Internews is hatching a new satellite sta-tion to broadcast primarily in Russian to Central Asia. In addition to broadcastingvia satellite direct to Central Asian homes, this new station would, like the agencyproject, act as a content exchange hub between different existing TV outlets in theregion. It is an ambitious and somewhat costly project, but it has impressive poten-tial for the spread of information.

Unfortunately, while the technical aspects are coming together, the station will facea severe shortage of independent content. The partner stations in the region arecontrolled by state or state-friendly owners, so without independently producedmaterial, there is a danger the new satellite station will look more like a propagan-da exchange. What is needed is funding for the development and production ofmore independent TV content in the freer Central Asian states of Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan, and perhaps elsewhere outside Uzbekistan. Such material could comefrom freelance journalists, activists or production companies, but this will requireadditional finances, which would be best dispersed through a middle-man donorwith both excellent regional knowledge and an ability to handle numerous small-scale grants.

LOWER THE LIFEBOATS

As with too many repressive regimes around the world, the situation in Uzbekistancould all too easily lead to despair and a feeling that it might simply be better towait until political changes present wider scope for democracy support projects.But although the obstacles are many and the dangers to staff are great, theprospects are not as hopeless as it may first appear. What emerges from a carefulanalysis is that limited openings do exist even in a highly authoritarian state, andthere are a number of very real opportunities to promote journalistic professional-ism and freedom of information.

Of course, not all of these projects would be possible for all such states around theworld, and Uzbekistan does have something of an advantage because the countryhas benefited from a small wave of media development projects in the late 1990sand early years of this decade, which have laid the groundwork and produced ablejournalists who are now prepared to carry on that tradition, even if from exile.

In fact, it is thanks to representatives from that initial crop of journalist trainees thatthe world learned the details of the Andijan massacre from first-hand accounts. Ifno one maintains these media development efforts, there is unlikely to be anyoneon the ground to report the next massacre, and the regime, comfortable in theknowledge that no one is watching, will have no second thoughts about commit-ting such crimes again. Further atrocities would have a devastating impact not onlyon the immediate victims, but also on the wider society that, in its growing pover-ty and deepening desperation with the abuses against it, will increasingly look toradical and violent solutions to alleviate its suffering.

Apart from maintaining at least some check on the exercise of power, freedom ofinformation and skilled media professionals can also help cushion the blow whena despotic system finally unravels. A dramatic political upheaval without quick-responding, experienced, balanced reporting on the ground is a recipe both forheightened chaos and violence domestically, and for ill-informed decision-makingamong the international community as they attempt to respond to rapidly chang-ing events. Rather than lament a lack of opportunities, policy makers ought toactively and generously pursue the lifeboat strategies that will help societies ride


out the rough waters toward which they seem inevitably headed.

Andrew Stroehlein is Media Director of the International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org


Why Media Matters and theEnabling Environment ForFree and Independent Media

Monroe E. Price, Director, Project for GlobalCommunications Studies, Annenberg hool ofCommunication, University of Penensylvania &Peter Krug, Professor of Law, University of OklahomaCiollege of Law

This volume seeks to show why media matters. But understanding why media mat-ters depends on the mode of operation of the press and the particular context inwhich the media exist. Shaping an effective democratic society requires manysteps. The formation of media law and media institutions is one of the most impor-tant. Laws are frequently looked at in isolation and as interchangeable parts thatare separately advanced for the creation of effective and democracy-promotingmedia. They are also often analyzed and discussed with attention paid merely totheir wording. However, each society has a cluster of activities, interactions of lawsand the setting in which they exist, that make those laws more or less effective.Different states, at different stages of development, require different strategies forthinking about the role of media and, as a result, for thinking about the design andstructure of the environment in which they operate.

Media can only matter—we would argue—in an environment (an “enabling envi-ronment”) that allows for a vigorous, demanding and informative press. It is signif-icant, then to identify components of the complex legal process that enablesmedia to advance democratic goals.


THE LINK BETWEEN FREE AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

The notion of ‘free’ media relates to ownership: something other than total own-ership by the state. Media ‘independence’ goes beyond this, to indicate an opti-mal degree of editorial discretion, not subject to outside interference whether pub-lic (or even private to some extent), in the production of content Frequently, theessence of transitions to greater democracy is the fragmentation or destruction ofa previous monopoly or oligopoly of power, including the monopoly over informa-tion as a critical element of the monopoly over power. In many societies, reformmeans ensuring that there is access for a group of voices not previously includedin the public marketplace of ideas. The question then is how the market is openedand to whom. Put differently, what new or additional suppliers in the market forloyalties are supported by what sources of power or money and with what objec-tives.

Some may wish free and independent media for their own sake. But most tie theclaim–certainly the geopolitical claim–for unencumbered media to their role inreinforcing or fostering democracy. Because there are democratic societies withdifferent profiles of the media, no specific matrix of press development can beconsidered “essential” as part of the project of democratization. Development of“free and independent” media can, itself take many forms, and freedom and inde-pendence can have many gradations. It is important to know what kind of press inwhat kind of society will perform the functions necessary for the process of build-ing democratic institutions to proceed healthily.

The Study of the late 1940s Hutchins Commission, “A Free and Responsible Press,”identified five possible functions as criteria for the assessment of press perform-ance. The press could do one or more of the following: (1) provide “a truthful,comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context whichgives them meaning,” a commitment evidenced in part by objective reporting; (2)be “a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism,” meaning in part thatpapers should be “common carriers” of public discussion, at least in the limitedsense of carrying views contrary to their own; (3) project “a representative pictureof the constituent groups in the society”; (4) “present and clarify the goals and val-ues of the society”; and (5) provide “full access to the day’s intelligence,” therebyserving the public’s right to be informed. The Commission also identified summa-ry tasks that are central to the press’s political role: to enlighten the public so thatit is capable of self-government, and to serve as a watchdog on government. Itmight be said that there is often an additional function of the press, namely to pro-vide to various segments of the society a sense that they are represented in thepublic sphere.

As Professor C. Edwin Baker has written, different conceptions of democracydemand somewhat different functions of the press. Visions of a democratic socie-ty that emphasize citizen participation, for example, would underscore the needfor media that, as Baker puts it, “aid groups in pursuing their agendas and mobi-lizing for struggle and bargaining.” On the other hand, a more elitist version ofdemocracy requires principally that the media provide sufficient information forthose who participate in the public sphere to function rationally, and, of course,perform a watchdog function. In some models, the media has a responsibility toassist in inculcating and transmitting “proper values.”

Assuring the existence of free and independent media may require providing, inthe marketplace of ideas, instruments for articulating values and summoning pub-lic support that are not wholly dependent on the state. Moving towards free andindependent media early in the process of transition may also provide a buildingblock for the future stable set of democratic institutions. Even if the media do notperform the function of effective watchdog, of engaging in information-providing


and value-transmitting functions in the early days, that may be because of lack ofexperience. Starting the media early on the right road means that when the watch-dog and other functions are necessary, the media will be more prepared. Free andindependent media may organically arise in a mature democracy, but artificialsteps are necessary in many transition contexts.

Finally, one might argue that the emergence of democratic institutions in transitionsocieties will come faster and with greater public support and involvement if thereare free and independent media to develop and inspire public opinion.

THE LIMITS OF FORMAL LAW

Laws that create the structural underpinnings for independent media are necessaryfor the development of civil society, but they alone do not guarantee how mediawill function. For free and independent media to “work,” the community in ques-tion must value the role that the media play.

Law alone, efforts of aid-givers alone, or efforts by the host government alone (bysubsidy, delivery of newsprint, or control over the means of distribution) rarely everdetermine how free, pluralistic, and independent the media can be (though all ofthese structural aspects are important). What is true across the board is that thereis a close interaction between what might be called the legal-institutional and thesocio-cultural, the interaction between law and how it is interpreted and imple-mented, how it is respected and received. In this sense, another important factorfor the enabling environment is the response of the citizenry. For example, read-ership of the serious press declined precipitously in post-Soviet Russia, eventhough newspapers enjoyed greater freedoms. Though this happened in large partbecause of price increases at the newsstand, a socio-cultural factor of note is thatafter a period of euphoria, in some societies, the zest for news about public events,at least in the print media, had declined.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

What is it that makes one society open and tolerant and one not? What is it thatproduces a citizenry that not only has the sources to be informed but also, in fact,avails itself of them? It is easier and clearer to see what negative steps precludesociety from allowing such a culture to develop. The tools of speech repression areeasier to identify than are those that encourage the productivity and use of infor-mation. Good media laws alone do not make a civil society happen, though a legalframework may be helpful. Many are the authoritarian regimes that mastered thelanguage of openness. It may never be known what elements exactly contributemost—or even essentially—to the creation of a culture of democratic values.Perhaps it is the existence of a vibrant non-governmental sector that is vital: organ-izations that are sensitive, at any moment, to infringements of journalistic rights.

Media law reform and other steps that are taken must be evaluated in a specificway. They should be viewed substantially as helping to constitute a media-sensi-tive society and evaluated in the way they contribute to this process. Taking lawsoff the shelf of another society and plugging them into the processes of transitionwill certainly, alone, be insufficient. The public acts of drafting and debating medialaws must be enacted as a drama, a teaching drama that educates the citizenry inthe role that the media can play. The process must encourage a rise in conscious-ness about the value and functioning of free speech and its operation in the soci-ety.

The very idea of an enabling environment for media reform assumes the impor-tance of particular forms of law for free and independent media. It also presumes


the necessity of a certain kind of media structure, sometimes including a prereq-uisite that the media be indigenous, for the development of democratic institu-tions.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the effectiveness of a specific interven-tion designed to render the media more vibrant contributors to a transition towarddemocratic institutions. It is easier to suggest what range of efforts is more appro-priate than another in particular circumstances and at a specific moment in time.

Law can be either an instrument of unbridled public authority, or a mechanismthat impedes the free exercise of arbitrary rule while at the same time providingthe state the tools to pursue legitimate public objectives. As Neil Kritz has written,

The rule of law does not simply provide yet one more vehicle by which govern-ment can wield and abuse its awesome power; to the contrary, it establishes prin-ciples that constrain the power of government, oblige it to conduct itself accord-ing to a series of prescribed and publicly known rules.88

The goals of a legal system committed to the rule of law are predictability and fun-damental fairness. Rule of law is therefore intrinsically linked to values associatedwith democracy and legality, and its focus is very much on process. As such, therule of law, at a minimum, incorporates clarity and accessibility, legal norms, anadministrative process of fairness, impartiality and objectivity, and judicial support.

In an enabling environment, the generally applicable normative acts that governthe conduct of public authorities and private persons must be accessible and trans-parent. Those public bodies to whom legislative powers have been delegated mustbe equipped with the necessary assistance and skills to develop coherent, clearlegal rules. Thus, great attention should be devoted to the development of legisla-tive drafting expertise. There are three main benchmarks for evaluating the lan-guage—and context—of media-related statutes in terms of the rule of law: simplic-ity and clarity, dissemination, and accessibility Laws designed to foster media inde-pendence may hinder it by increasing the possibility of abuse if they are unclear,confusing, or contradictory.

Furthermore, public administration must conform to legal norms and act onlyunder their authority. The administrative acts of public institutions must be ground-ed in a legal basis. The purpose of public administration is to facilitate the achieve-ment of legislative objectives, and therefore it must operate pursuant to this fun-damental principle of “legality.” Perhaps the gravest threat to the exercise of mediafreedoms comes not from bad laws, but from administrative acts that apply thelaws arbitrarily or are completely outside the boundaries of the laws.

To be sure, effective media enterprises are businesses as well as instruments ofspeech, and often quite substantial businesses. They cannot function in an envi-ronment in which it is impossible to operate as an enterprise. All the laws regulat-ing business must operate as smoothly as possible. If a special license is necessaryfor the opening of a foreign bank account, then such a license should be issued ordenied based on the application of transparent and consistent criteria.Broadcasters and press enterprises depend on reliable rules concerning propertyownership and control. And, of course, as they become more successful, theseentities depend on laws relating to the issuance of ownership shares, the develop-ment of credit, and the capacity to have secured interests or to insure that the par-ties with whom they deal are proper financial partners.


ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: FAIRNESS, IMPARTIALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY

The administrative process must be grounded in a commitment to fairness for allparticipants. Rule of law precepts should permeate the fabric of governmentaldecision making. It is of course inherent in the nature of administrative decisionmaking that it involves the exercise of discretion However, this freedom must berestricted along basic tenets of fairness. The process for licensing news media out-lets such as radio or television broadcasters must be open, objective, and fair, withthe authorities acting according to prescribed legal procedural standards and sub-stantive criteria that are applied impartially to all participants in the process. Andan independent, effective judiciary is essential for the oversight required under therule of law.

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR NEWS MEDIA ACTIVITY

Four aspects of the legal environment in which news media operate and wherelaw is a factor either promoting or impeding news media independence and effec-tiveness warrant attention: (1) newsgathering; (2) content-based regulation; (3)content-neutral regulation that has the potential to influence content indirectly;and (4) protection of journalists in their professional activity, including protectionagainst physical attacks.

Newsgathering, a key function of the press in a democratic society, is an essentialcondition of news media effectiveness. Laws concerning newsgathering includethose that recognize and guarantee public access to government-controlled infor-mation and institutions, with limited exceptions for national security, protection ofpersonal privacy, crime prevention, and other goals. Laws concerning the licensingand accreditation of journalists also relate to this question of effectiveness.

Another set of laws deals with content-based regulation, which we view as inter-vention by the public authorities, either through “legal” means (that is, on the basisof legislative acts or judicially-created norms) or through “extra-legal” means (gov-ernmental acts that are not grounded in legislative or judicial norms directly target-ed at content). These laws, which seek to advance a range of state, social, and indi-vidual interests, operate through forms of prior review censorship, conditions ofmarket entry, and regimes of subsequent punishment for perceived abuses of jour-nalistic freedoms. The scope of such content-related concerns and their methodsof enforcement represent a useful yardstick by which to measure whether anenabling environment exists.

The third category comprises laws that are not targeted directly at editorial content(that is, are content-neutral on their face), but which have an incidental impactand therefore create the risk of external manipulation in their application, or elselaws that are intended to shield media from external influence.

Finally, there is an examination of issues related to protection of journalists in theirprofessional activity. There are at least two components of this category. The firstrelates to the matter of journalists’ job security, and focuses on “internal press free-dom” or the relationship between journalists and media owners. The second con-cerns the matter of physical security: journalists often must endure the threat orthe reality of physical attacks upon them from either public or private persons, andthe extent to which the legal system protects them is also a key element in anenabling environment.

Increasingly, access to the information bases of the Internet is a major indicator ofthe openness of a society. One question is whether domestic journalists and edi-tors have sufficient access to inform their publications and make them more attrac-


tive to readers. This is a question of training, availability, and cost. Restrictive stateshave sought ways to ration access to the Internet, through high transmission fees,limited licenses for Internet Service Providers, or specific approval for use of suchfacilities. An enabling environment would promote the use of access to theInternet by the press, as well as by citizens at large. The Internet appears, at leastfor the elite, to be one of the least expensive means of gaining a wide variety ofviews without the intermediation of the state.

Internet cafes can become the new coffeehouses of political discourse. On theother hand, they can, and in some societies do, mask a policy in which access isrestricted to particular physical locations, and the computers have access to a high-ly censored series of websites and servers.

The regulation of access to signals from satellites, including direct broadcast satel-lites, is another “new technology” set of rules with implications for transitions todemocracy. These rules include prohibitions on satellite dishes or policing of dish-es that are pointed to prohibited satellites or a satellite that is carrying undesirablechannels. In modern democratic societies, the process of developing appropriateand stable institutions increasingly relies on associations and groups that are inde-pendent of government. A strong civil society also demands and oversees legalconstraints on state power and the accountability of state actors.

The increased role of civil society marks a shift from “government” to “gover-nance,” with governance involving a far larger group of participants and players.According to the World Bank:

Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy mak-ing, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in furtherance of thepublic good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society par-ticipating in public affairs. Poor governance is characterized by arbitrary policymaking, unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, theabuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespreadcorruption.2 One important element of the enabling environment is continuingattention to public understanding, public perceptions, and public demand thatundergirds a society hospitable to free and independent media. The very function-ing of the rule of law in the media field has its own educational benefits. But asfree speech norms are fragile even in the most stable or democratic systems theiracceptance cannot be taken for granted. In the United States, non-governmentalorganizations like the Freedom Forum are constantly testing the public pulse onattitudes regarding free speech principles. Segments of the press, large newspa-pers, broadcasters, and motion picture companies invest in campaigns to educateand foster tolerance, acceptance, and comprehension of the complexities of livingin a free society.

This is an outermost circle of the enabling environment: a circle in which citizenpreferences are a key to the long-term operability of the rule of law and a systemof laws that facilitate the contribution the media can make to the democratizationprocess.

The character of the citizenry and its capacity to use such elements of the pressthat are available are important when discussing the broader elements of anenabling environment. Indeed, media independence may depend on the capaci-ty of the audience to treat information wisely and critically and draw inferencesfrom it. There is a special kind of literacy that might be demanded, not just litera-cy in the conventional sense, but literacy that encompasses a desire to acquire,interpret, and apply information as part of a civil society.


To the extent that the independence of media depends on advertising or sub-scriber support the state of the economy in general is also significant. Financiallystruggling media have marked transitions worldwide. Without a viable advertisingeconomy or a vigorous economy that provides workers with salaries that allowthem to be potential subscribers—media may become dependent on governmentsubsidy or industry sectors that bias output.

At its broadest, of course, what counts is the development of a custom or attitude,a general notion in the society that information about government is available,important, and trustworthy. It is difficult to sustain excellent free and independentmedia without a public that has a continuous appreciation of the need for its out-put. Education, literacy, tradition, desire, financial capacity, and public demandare all elements that combine to bring about such a situation.

The major resource for enhancing the enabling environment is indigenous talentbecause, ultimately, the answers must almost always be local. One approach is toask what forms of assistance are most useful in strengthening local media and, fol-lowing that, what tools exist to facilitate an enabling environment for effectivemedia reform.

One consequence of the aid pattern is that a number of organizations have devel-oped that specialize in providing technical assistance. To some extent, this special-ization has been along industrial lines. Some organizations foster independentbroadcasters while others are more expert in dealing with newspapers and otherprint publications.

There are entities that specialize, as well, by region. One NGO specializes in estab-lishing emergency radio stations in conflict zones where a neutral and objectivevoice is needed. In a number of countries in central and eastern Europe and theformer Soviet Union, techniques employed include training journalists, buildingassociations, giving attention to media infrastructure, building business skills, andaddressing the law and policy environments in which the media function.

Media programs financed by USAID ordinarily avoid direct payments to mediaoutlets, instead providing mostly non-material assistance (training, advice, andcooperative projects). Those programs providing greater direct material assistanceusually articulate such aid in terms of apolitical professional needs. These precau-tions are taken because of some of the obvious hazards inherent in making directpayments to stations rather than investing in infrastructure. If a donor country orfoundation makes contributions based on the political approach of the print mediaor television station, it may be charged with precisely the kind of content-baseddistinction for which a government would ordinarily be condemned with at home.

CONCLUSION

Our effort has been to identify certain key elements of an enabling environmentfor media law reform. focusing on the enabling environment for media law reform.t objective has been to ask which steps assist in the development of free and inde-pendent media. We have sought to identify the relationship between mediareform and the growth of democratic societies, examining the specific elements ofmedia law that are part of media reform and the larger context in which these lawsare developed.

Thus, we assume that the steps toward an enabling environment are related insome substantial and reciprocal way to the nature of the relevant society’s politi-cal development. Each step in political and legal transitions contributes to the stateof an enabling environment for independent media. At the same time those inde-


pendent media structures may also promote the achievement of the broader polit-ical goals.

In this process, the concept of the enabling environment is central. It is not onlyparticular laws themselves that must be addressed, but the institutional structurewhich administers those laws, including the courts, regulatory agencies, and theculture of censorship or its absence. In some societies there is little effective law.What we mean by “law” may take the form not just of legislation emanating froma parliament, but other forms as well, including orders or actions of the executivebranch.

In any society, there will be those who support and those who oppose the publicpolicy assumptions that underlie this effort. Many persons within and without thestate who favor development of civil society will look for ways to further theprocess of incipient change. They will seek ways to bolster those in power that areinclined to foster openness and reform. They will also seek ways to augment a plu-ralistic society’s access to additional means of communication in order to dissem-inate information, opinions, and views.

NGOs have employed a variety of techniques to assist willing governments in thesetransitions. Institutions like the Independent Journalism Foundation have estab-lished training institutes. Other NGOs, like Internews and the Open SocietyInstitute, directly fostered the development of independent media. More general-ly, Western governments have also encouraged a small but significant effort toaddress more comprehensively the need for legal structures that enable mediareform.

In the specific area of legal norms and institutions, strategies or tools which deserveconsideration include: the analysis of competing legislative media models; theanalysis of how emerging economic legislation will affect the development ofmedia; the assistance of media law specialists in the drafting of legislation; consul-tation with specialists from countries that have undertaken similar efforts; develop-ment of skills in lobbying government effectively for desired legislative solutions;and on-going attention to the developing institutional structure in order to under-stand how it functions.

In addition, economic issues, such as the questions of state subsidies or tax incen-tives for both state-owned and private media should be addressed, with recogni-tion of the fact that reforming economic structures often cannot by itself supportthe development of an economic enabling environment for truly free and inde-pendent media. The inevitable imbalances within institutional and economicstructures will have an important impact on the evolution of media law, and shouldbe addressed as an important element in this process.

Those committed to developing free and independent media have explored howsteps toward change can be specifically related in some substantial way to thenature of the relevant society’s political development. There is not yet a RosettaStone that decodes how distinct elements of the enabling environment can berelated to the stages of a society as it passes, for example, from state control tomore democratic forms.1 Development of one will have to await another day.


Section 4 Sources and Bibliographies


Participatory Diffusion orSemantic Confusion?

Adam Rogers, Chief, Communications and PublicInformation Unit, United Nations Capital DevelopmentFund 24 February 2006

INTRODUCTION

The scholarship and practice of the role of communication in development hashad an enormous impact on efforts to reduce poverty in developing countries.Extensive studies since the mid-1960s have demonstrated the value of the strate-gic use of communication in international development, both at the theory andresearch levels, as well as in policy, planning and implementation. However, deci-sion and policy makers in the development community at large may not under-stand the role of communication and appreciate it to the point that they routine-ly include it in their development budgets and/or planning processes. Less under-stood is the role that the media have in facilitating the process of development,both by providing an opportunity for vulnerable populations to influence policymakers, and by disseminating and diffusing knowledge of best practices.

Many development professionals distinguish between those efforts that seek topersuade target audiences to adopt certain practices or changes in attitude andthose that seek to engage the populations more fully in decision-making process-es that affect their livelihoods. For purposes of simplification, this paper refers tothe first approach as “diffusion devcom,” and the second approach as “participa-tory devcom.” A synchretic approach that combines the two is referred to simplyas “participatory diffusion.” This paper also attempts to clarify and compare thedifferences, and draws some conclusions in terms of their relevance in efforts tosupport the development of efficient, effective and sustainable media in develop-ing countries.


THE ENDLESS DEBATE ON THE ‘WHAT’ AND ‘HOW’ OF DEVCOM

The role of communication in development processes has attracted the attentionof many scholars and development professionals since it was first defined in theearly 1960s. Though it has been studied and practiced for more than 40 years,there remains a lack of consensus over what to call it, and how it should be inter-preted and applied. Both at the theory and research levels, as well as at the levelsof policy and planning/implementation, there are many divergent perspectives.

The terminologies and methodologies used to describe the concept are many andvaried: development communication, development support communication, par-ticipatory development communication, communication and development, infor-mation-education-communication (IEC), communication for empowerment, proj-ect support communication, social marketing, and what currently is the preferredterm at the United Nations: communication for development. Many academicand development professionals would argue ad infinitum that there are distinct dif-ferences between the various terms. Of course there are, but as this essay under-scores, the term “development communication”, or simply devcom, should referto all of the above – to the planned use of communication in any effort to improvethe lives of the poor, be it through engaging them more fully in decision-makingprocesses that affect their lives, giving them a “voice” to influence policy, or per-suading them to adopt new practices that will enhance their livelihood, increasetheir security, advance their education and improve their health.

Two dominant theoretical frameworksThough there are a myriad of terms in use today, each describing a differentapproach or application of communication in support of development, most dis-cussions on the concept fit into one of two theoretical frameworks: those influ-enced by the diffusion theory of the American scholar Everett Rogers (1962); andthose that argue that the diffusion model is too vertical or one-way and that theactive involvement of the population in the process of communication itself willaccelerate more effective and sustainable development (Servaes, 1999). These twotheoretical approaches could be summarized as the Diffusion/Mechanistic modeland the Participatory/Organic model. The two “schools of thought” are not mutu-ally exclusive, though some academics and practitioners have presented them assuch.

The early paradigm of development communication advocated for the transfer(diffusion) of technological and behavioural innovations from development agen-cies to their clients as a panacea for addressing the inequities in developing coun-tries. Articulated by Learner (1958), Schramm (1964), Lasswell (1964), Rogers(1962) et al., this approach was later heavily criticized by Freire (1970, 1973),Servaes (1997, 2002) and Melkote & Steeves (2001), among others, who advocat-ed for a more participatory approach that involves development beneficiaries aspartners in the communication and decision-making processes.

In the beginning…The concept of development communication (or the link between developmentand communication) first emerged with the publication of Daniel Lerner’s classicbook, The Passing of the Traditional Society (1958). Lerner conducted research inthe Middle East and North Africa, and was able to trace correlations betweenexpanded economic activity and other modernization variables such as urbaniza-tion, high literacy levels, media consumption and political development. Lernerargued that the media could serve as a great multiplier of development by com-municating development messages to the undeveloped.

Drawing on Lerner’s research, the United Nations Education, Scientific and


Cultural Organization (UNESCO) commissioned Wilbur Schramm to determinethe precise role that the mass media played in development. Schramm believed inthe concept of an all-powerful media that could be used by development agentsto communicate messages about technological innovations. The result ofSchramm’s work was published as Mass Media and National Development (1964),and provided the theoretical foundation for development communication for thenext 10 to 15 years.

Lasswell (1964) further defined this contextual framework for development com-munication with his 5-point question of “Who says what in what channel to whomand with what effect?” Around the same time, Everett Rogers put forth his land-mark theoretical framework, which he called Diffusion of Innovations (1962).Rogers identified a pattern in the way innovations were adopted and accepted insocieties. Grounding much of his research in agricultural development, Rogersasserted that, using his theoretical model, development communication scholarscould introduce innovations such as high yield seeds, fertilizers and new farmingmethods to developing societies.

The diffusion model assumes that a proper combination of mass-mediated andinterpersonal communication strategies can move individuals from poor to not-poor via a process starting with awareness (of a new technology or practice)through interest, evaluation, trial and finally to adoption of the technology or prac-tice that is assumed to lead to improved livelihoods.

In support of this hypothesis, diffusion studies proliferated in Latin America, Asiaand Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. The World Bank and UNDP embraced the the-ory wholeheartedly and funded thousands of projects in rural areas of developingcountries, where trained agricultural officers would use media such as radio toexpose farmers to new innovations – most of which were imported from devel-oped countries (Mwangi, 2002).

Opposing the diffusion of the diffusion theoryIn the early 1970s an intellectual shift occurred in the basic concept of develop-ment communication. Critics of the diffusion model were unsettled by its “pro-innovation,” “pro-persuasion,” and “top-down” nature – that is, its concentrationon adoption and lack of emphasis on recipient input into development decisionsand processes (Colle, 1989). These scholars argued that development efforts todate were ideologically and materially linked to “neo-colonialism” and a “form ofdomination and manipulation by the elite” (Freire, 1973). A group of scholars coa-lesced around this theme at the First Latin American Seminar on ParticipatoryCommunication, sponsored in 1978 by CIESPAL (Centro Internacional de EstudiosSuperiores de Comunicación para América Latina), concluding that uses of massmedia in development imposed the interests of dominant classes on the majorityof marginalized people. This thinking was in tune with dependency theory, popu-lar at the time in Latin America, which sought to explain underdevelopment as theresult, or by-product, of capitalist expansion (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). It also res-onated with many researchers who called for an abandonment of the “vertical”approach in favour of more “horizontal” methodologies emphasizing access, dia-logue and participation (Beltran, 1980).

Jan Servaes, professor and head of the School of Journalism and Communicationat the University of Queensland and editor-in-chief of Communication forDevelopment and Social Change: A Global Journal, defines the participatorymodel as that which views ordinary people as the key agents of change, or partic-ipants for development. He has said the lack of attention to the horizontal dimen-sion has led to failure in many development programmes (Servaes, 1997 & 1999).

Srinivas Melkote is another critical theorist who views Rogers’ diffusion approach-


es as a tool to expand the hegemony of the western world. He considers the dif-fusion approach to be a “message delivery system” that “facilitates the process ofmodernization via the delivery and insertion of new technologies, and/or inculcat-ing certain values, attitudes, and behaviours in the population” (Melkote &Steeves, 2002 p. 38). According to Melkote, such “persuasive campaigns” are“manipulative and potentially harmful” and are somehow tied up with expatriateextravagance and political corruption.

In Defence of DiffusionMuch of the early criticism of diffusion may have been well placed, consideringthe fact that the theory was a product of a time when development professionalsbelieved that what worked for the industrialized countries would work in develop-ing countries. However, the relevance of Rogers’ theoretical framework may havegotten caught up in the backlash against the “modernization paradigm of develop-ment,” which promoted economic growth through industrialization, urbanization,specialization, adoption of a capitalist economic system, formation of formal infra-structure and the acquisition of technologies (Servaes, 2002, p. 4).

Unlike some theoretical approaches to devcom that have been presented as faitsaccomplis, Rogers continuously revised and updated his framework up until thedays before his death in October 2004. While earlier editions of his work empha-sized the top-down diffusion of technology (1962, 1971), in later editions (1983,1995, 2003), he began advocating for the principles of “bottom-up” participatoryplanning and the role of communications therein.

As far back as 1976, Rogers suggested that the passing of the “dominant paradigm”of top-down planning would signal a shift toward a form of support that engagedthe local population in the planning, implementation and execution of develop-ment (Rogers, 1976).

In the fifth edition of Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers (2003, p. 376) acknowl-edged that a development project’s degree of sustainability is determined in largemeasure by the extent of buy-in by the local population, and that buy-in is deter-mined for the most part by the extent of participation involved. “Unless an inno-vation is highly compatible with clients’ needs and resources,” he writes, “andunless clients feel so involved with the innovation that they regard it as ‘theirs,’ itwill not be continued over the long term.”

In further clarifying the role of diffusion in participatory planning, Rogers differen-tiates between “centralized” and “decentralized” diffusion systems. Decentralizeddiffusion systems are those in which innovations originate from local sources andthen evolve as they diffuse via horizontal networks. “Instead of coming out of for-mal R&D networks,” he writes, “innovations often bubble up from the operationallevels of a system, with the inventing done by certain lead users” (2003, p. 375).

In other words, the concepts communicated to a public in a persuasion exercisedo not always originate externally – they often come from the people themselves.However, a good idea is a good idea, whether it surfaces through a participatoryprocess in an underdeveloped society, or emerges from an academic project at aEuropean university. How it is introduced, however, should be through participa-tory channels, or it will never be accepted, modified and embraced.

The middle road to the tipping pointThe thinking advanced by the Latin American critics and those that followeddefined development as a widely participatory process of social change that isintended to bring about both social and material advancement for the majority ofpeople through their gaining greater control over their environment (Singhal &


Rogers, 2001). In the decades that followed this call for more popular participa-tion in development communication, a wide range of theoretical responsesemerged. At one end of the spectrum, scholars from the “modernistic”, diffusioninvisible colleges63 began to incorporate participatory dimensions into theirresearch. At the other end, scholars critical of traditional development communi-cation embraced participatory development as a utopian panacea. In other words,participation was conceptualized either as a means to an end, or as an end in andof itself (Huesca, 2002).

Some scholars from the “participation as an end” group, with an orientation root-ed deeply in studying class conflict, saw any attempt to merge the two approach-es as passive collaboration, or manipulative consultation done only to helpadvance a predetermined objective (Dudley, 1993). White (1994) argued that anyuse of participation by those espousing diffusion will evolve into an “insidiousdomination tactic” if incorporated into the dominant development discourse, dueto its historical association with “Western political hegemony.”

Not everyone agreed with this resistance to the harmonization of approaches.Einsiedel (2000) notes that the participatory approach is particularly importantwhen questions on development issues are much more complex and with greaterhistorical specificities than that addressed by Lasswell’s (1964) linear questioningof who says what to whom with what effects. “We might ask whose voices areheard, what values are articulated, what representations are foregrounded, orwhat discursive practices are framed,” she says. However, Einsiedel speculatesthere may sometimes be a need for both approaches. The most viable solutions tothe world’s development challenges may indeed come from “viewing boundariesnot as impermeable walls, but as sites for exchange and developing the vigour thatcan arise from hybridity.” This approach to research, she says, pursues multipleapproaches to development, using each approach to both inform and critique theothers, questioning what they derive from each other, and respecting the differ-ences between perspectives.

An example of this syncretic approach to development communication is found inmore recent editions of Rogers’ classic, Diffusion of Innovations. Rogers argues thatboth approaches are necessary. He maintains that mass media diffusion and readyaccess to information are needed to raise awareness of an issue, while participato-ry communication is needed to mobilize action towards a development objective,be it HIV prevention or community participation in local government. A combina-tion of the two can lead to what Rogers calls the “critical mass” in the diffusion ofan innovation or to what Malcolm Galdwell (2000) refers to as the “tipping point”:when a small change, such as a few more individuals practicing safe sex to avoidHIV transmission, triggers a big change in the rate of adoption.

Cecilia Cabañero-Verzosa, a senior communications officer at the World Bank andauthor of Strategic Communication for Development Projects (2003) believes thatall development projects are essentially about behavioural change. She alsobelieves in an approach that incorporates both dominant development communi-cation paradigms. She says that in order for a communication strategy to take anempowering approach, one should look not only at employing top-down methodssuch as mass media through newspaper or television, but also bottom-up or inter-active methods such as town hall meetings. Both media plans and interpersonalcommunications should play a complementary role in the process. Cabañero-Verzosa refers to this as a “dialogical process” which implies integrating upstreamand downstream communications.

If ever the twain shall meetMany development practitioners are avoiding the semantic debates outlinedabove in order to harness the benefits of both approaches. For them, what is most


important is not what an approach is called, the origins of an idea or how it is com-municated. What is critical is that we find the most effective and efficient tools toachieve the noble objectives outlined in the Millennium Declaration.

Let us turn now to a brief consideration of the application of the three primarydimensions of devcom in efforts to support the development of an effective media,which can in turn support the efforts of effective development.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The media play a central role in promoting and supporting devcom efforts. Assuch, media support is increasingly becoming an important part of developmentprogramming, especially in the area of governance, where issues of transparencyand accountability are paramount. Development agencies could do much more,however, to strengthen and support the growth of independent media in develop-ing countries and to enhance their abilities to contribute effectively to the realiza-tion of the Millennium Development Goals. These areas of support could be cen-tred on any or all of the conceptual approaches outlined above: participation, dif-fusion, or participatory diffusion.

The role of the media in diffusionAs discussed above, diffusion involves the practice of disseminating messages inorder to order to inform and persuade a target audience to adopt or abandon apractice or attitude (such as adopting safe sex practices, or abandoning riskybehaviour that could lead to the transmission of HIV/AIDS). Though there aremany channels through which to diffuse messages, such as billboards, street the-atre and music, the media often play a central and catalytic role because of theircoverage, availability and the public’s perception of their legitimacy.

The role of the media in participationThough the media primarily engage in the diffusion of information, they provide avaluable channel through which vulnerable populations can share experiences,communicate needs, and influence policy makers. In order for this to happen,access is needed, such as through talk shows, discussion programmes and phone-ins that encourage people to participate and contribute their perspectives. Thisrole of the media is considered a necessary dimension of “communication forempowerment” (Deane, 2005), and is critical in providing a “voice to the voice-less” (Hudock, 2003).

Though not everyone in poor societies will have direct access to the mediabecause of issues of literacy and access to telephony, the media and their repre-sentatives can directly contact vulnerable populations and ensure that their viewsare represented accurately in their reportage. However, while most journalists feela need to report on news wherever it be found, there is mounting evidence that,as competition amongst various media outlets intensifies, content is being increas-ingly shaped by the demands of advertisers and sponsors (UNDP, 2005; Deane,2003), often leaving out any coverage of issues affecting the rural and urban poor.

The role of the media in participatory diffusionThe logical extension of the first two areas involves the diffusion of best practicesthat are either discovered within the community itself, or imported from withoutand then validated or improved locally to make them more relevant. In addition,in regards to democratic governance, citizens and their representatives need time-ly, relevant, and clear information as well as an analysis of political and economicissues (diffusion) in order to participate effectively in policy formation (participa-tion) (Hudock, 2003).


Looking ahead: DevCom efforts at the United NationsThough the United Nations was active in devcom in the 1960s and 1970s, itdropped the ball in the 1980s. In 1994, the UN commissioned a study on the roleof communication in the successful implementation of development programmesin the UN system (Mezzalama, 1994; United Nations 2004b, 1995 & 1996),which concluded that the level of inter-agency coordination was not keeping upwith the evolution of the discipline, and that most UN organizations attach insuf-ficient importance to communication in operational activities. Mezzalama’s reportmade a number of recommendations aimed at raising awareness and concernamong UN organizations, multilateral agencies, academic circles and non-govern-mental organizations as to the need for effective communication structures forattaining the desired objectives of development and humanitarian assistance pro-grammes. Foremost among these recommendations was a call for devcom to be acritical part of any development programme, with budgets that contain a specificprovision for communication activities.

In August 2004, Mezzalama’s report provided the foundation for UN resolutionA/59/207 (United Nations, 2004b) which requested a report on developmentcommunications to be presented every two years, and set out a list of four conclu-sions and recommendations:

Communication for development is instrumental in the success of any endeavourto achieve human development and, consequently, greater integration in the eco-nomic and social planning process is called for;

This, in turn, calls for increased resources redirected towards more effective com-munication programmes, including increased investment in capacity-building,training and research at the country level;

The United Nations system, working through a number of mechanisms, such ascommunication for development round tables, has achieved a certain degree ofcohesion in its approach and action in this field. This success calls for enhancedsynergy among all partners, at both the international and country levels, includinggovernments, NGOs, donors, the private sector and community leaders;

Information and communication technologies have become an integral part of thedevelopment process. Developing countries and their partners should intensifyefforts to address the current digital divide in a more innovative and effective way,based on the enhancement of national ownership and the effectiveness and sus-tainability of the related initiatives and strategies.

In response to UN resolution A/59/207 a number of initiatives are being organizedwithin the UN system to promote and support devcom efforts, be they diffusion,participatory, or participatory diffusion. The annual Inter-Agency Roundtables onCommunication for Development and the upcoming World Congress onCommunication for Development are two notable examples, as are efforts to sup-port media development, such as through the Global Forum for MediaDevelopment, held in Amman in October 2005.

As yet, however, most development programmes have not allocated sufficientfunds for development communication, and have often considered it as an after-thought, or an add-on to the work of external relations. This, however, may changeas the Organization and its extended family search for new and innovative ways tobecome more efficient in addressing the Millennium Development Goals, and asit prepares to report on its devcom activities on a biennial basis.


References

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Cardoso, F.H. & Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and Development in LatinAmerica (M. Mattingly Urquidi, Trans.). Berkley, CA: University of California.

Colle, R. (1989). Communicating Scientific Knowledge. In J. L. Compton (Ed.) TheTransformation of International Agricultural Research and Development. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner. Pp. 59 - 83.

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Deane, J. (2003). The Other Information Revolution: Media and empowerment indeveloping countries. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for SocialDevelopment.

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Huesca, R. (2002). Tracing the History of Participatory CommunicationApproaches to Development: A Critical Appraisal. In Servaes, J. (Ed.), Approachesto Development Communication (pp. 140-175). Paris: UNESCO.

Lasswell, H.D. (1964). The Structure and Function of Communication in Society.In Bryson, L. (Ed.), The Communication of Ideas (pp. 37-51). New York: CooperSquare Publishers.

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Melkote, S. & Steeves, H. L. (2001). Communication for Development in the Thirdworld. Theory and Practice for Empowerment (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage.

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Media Development: Anoverview of the Literature

Ellen Hume, Director, Center on Media and Society,University of Massachusetts Boston

When the Knight Foundation began in 2001 its effort to survey the internationalmedia development landscape, there was scant literature to draw on.

The U.S. government, George Soros’ Open Society Institute, German foundations,Danish and Swedish agencies, the World Bank, the Ford Foundation and othershad engaged for years in helping countries develop an independent media sector,but neither they nor the academic community had identified this work yet as a dis-tinct category of development. The major donors generally included such fundingwithin “democracy-building” budgets. In some cases, efforts to build the capacityof local journalists were incidental to a developer’s drive to gain publicity for spe-cific projects.

The failure to line-item media development continues to hobble any effort toassess progress in the field. With the Global Forum on Media Development inAmman in October 2005 the funding and development community acknowl-edged that the media sector has emerged as a distinct area of development. Thefocused effort to build an independent media in every region, with journalism thatserves the public interest, has finally come into its own as a subject worthy of aca-demic study and systematic assessment. It is time for the budget gnomes at eachmedia developer and funder to catch up with this and keep more delineatedrecords.

Many informed evaluations of media development are reports that are not avail-able on any publisher’s database, and some have circulated only to the interested


parties. For example, The Knight Foundation assessed its Knight Fellows programwith the International Center for Journalists in a 2002 report, “Assessing the impactof press freedom seminars in 2002,” (Washington, D.C.: Philliber ResearchAssociates). But more published books, reports and articles now are starting toemerge as helpful resources for anyone wishing to understand best practice stan-dards, lessons learned, and progress to date in this field.

I. OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENTS

The Knight Foundation in 2001 commissioned a report, Media Missionaries (EllenHume, 2004) which was the first attempt to create a narrative history and currentoverview of the entire field, from an American perspective, with some analysis ofWestern efforts to promote independent media around the world. Divided intoregional sections, the report became essentially a first draft of an encyclopedia ofmedia development practice.

Due to the enormous complexity of recreating a history and map of media devel-opment around the world, when such data was not kept methodically, MediaMissionaries was limited in scope. It focused largely on efforts by American gov-ernmental agencies, newspaper and broadcast groups, foundations and other non-profits from the early 1980s to 2001. The report analyzed how they supported anddeveloped independent journalism first in Latin America, and then in the formerCommunist countries after 1989, moving geographically to the same regions thatattracted U.S. foreign policy interest. The Africa section of the report was writtenby Joan Mower, formerly of the Freedom Forum and currently with theInternational Board of Broadcasters. The report also contained summaries ofmedia development in Asia and the Middle East.

Media Missionaries included advice for would-be media developers. The “FifteenCommandments of Media Development” best practice section was based on theexperience of practitioners from USAID, Internews, IREX, the Knight Fellowships,SEAPA, the International Center for Journalists, OSI, and others. USAID also con-tributed a related report in 2003, Media Assistance: Best Practices and Priorities(PN-ACR-754) (Washington, DC: Hume, E.) reflecting a meeting convened atUSAID of key U.S. government and ngo media developers.

The American ngo and US government contributions were estimated in MediaMissionaries to have been about$600 million cumulatively since 1989, but thatestimate was conservative due to the lack of specific data from the developmentorganizations and funders. The U.S. developers’ contributions to date may actual-ly be significantly higher. As a general rule, U.S. media development efforts, par-ticularly by the U.S. government, continue to shadow U.S. foreign policy priorities.Thus there is more U.S., government and non-governmental funding for mediadevelopment now in the post-9/11 Middle East and Asia, for example, than therewas when Media Missionaries was written.

Media Missionaries is available as a pdf on the author’s website(www.ellenhume.com) and includes an appendix of selected media developmentorganizations and individuals, with contact information.

Fortunately, the Knight Foundation followed with a complementary survey of Non-U.S. Funders of Media Assistance Projects by Lee B. Becker and Tudor Vlad at theJames M. Cox Jr. Center for International Mass Communication Training andResearch at the Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication at theUniversity of Georgia (December, 2005). The report is available athttp://www.grady.uga.edu/coxcenter/knight.htm.


This valuable roadmap found that at least 70 organizations in 25 donor countriesoutside the United States were involved in media assistance projects totaling anestimated $1 billion annually.

The Non-U.S. Funders report included an updatable database that should proveinvaluable to those assessing the field. Media Missionaries should also be revisedand converted into an updatable online database of current development projectsand contacts.

Another resource that continually provides new information is a website producedby the International Center for Journalists, featuring breaking news about mediatraining events and other aspects of international journalism development. It isIJNet.org at http://www.ijnet.org/FE_Article/home.asp.

Both Knight Foundation reports relied heavily on work by Monroe Price, togetherwith various colleagues at Yeshiva University and the Oxford Programme inComparative Media Law and Policy. Price’s report, Mapping Media Assistance,analyzed how international media development work was structured. It is avail-able as a pdf at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/archive/MappingMediaAssistance.pdf

Krishna Kumar, a USAID official who has personally evaluated many of USAID’smedia development projects, recently published Promoting Independent Media:Strategies for Democracy Promotion. (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2006), which is an important scholarly contribution to the field. In addition to dis-cussing the evolution of the media development sector, the nature and significanceof media assistance, and the possible impact of various intervention strategies,Kumar’s book includes case studies of media development in Latin America, theformer USSR, Serbia, Bosnia (including lessons learned from the failed OpenBroadcasting Network created after the Dayton peace accords), assistance toAfghanistan after the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, and Sierra Leone.

The book includes Kumar’s field research and his useful theoretical overview.Kumar makes the vital distinction between the development of media capacityand the work of public diplomacy, which usually is more focused on persuadingmedia to publish favorable articles about one’s policies. Confusion about whetherone is helping create capacity—or seeking publicity—is rampant in discussions ofmedia development. Kumar correctly notes that this confusion can cripple truemedia development by refusing to recognize good journalism’s necessary inde-pendence from even the governments and others who may have nurtured andfunded it.

While Kumar’s book has summarized many of the findings, USAID issued a seriesof reports at the turn of the century which were useful because they illuminatedthe best and worst experiences of media development by the American govern-ment. Those reports, available through USAID in Washington, D.C., include: TheRole of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach (June, 1999, USAID Center forDemocracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support andResearch), USAID’s Media Assistance: Policy and Programmatic Lessons, (January,2004, Kumar, K. PN-ACU-777), Assessment of USAID Media Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-2002 (September, 2003, PN-ACR-756), Journalism Trainingand Institution Building in Central American Countries (Rockwell, R. & Kumar, K,August, 2003, PN-ACR-755), Promoting Independent Media in Russia: AnAssessment of USAID’s Media Assistance (Kumar, K. & Cooper, L.R., November2003, PN-ACR-757), and U.S. Media Assistance in Serbia: July 1997-June 2002(McClear, R. McLear, S. & Graves, P., November 2003, PN ACT-553).

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. also has


published useful assessments of democracy assistance, which hold some lessonsfor the more specific field of media assistance. The reports include: AssessingDemocracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Carothers, T. 1996), AidingDemocracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Carothers, T., 1999), Funding Virtue:Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Ottaway, M. and Carothers, T. eds,2000), Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, M.,2003), Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Carothers, T., 2004), andUncharted journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, (Carothers, T. &Ottaway, M., eds, 2005).

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports onthe media development of its member states in its International DevelopmentStatistics (IDS) online database. That is available athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm

Media Development by OSCE Field Missions, by Y. Manro, P. Palmer and M.Thompson was published in Amsterdam by Press Now in 2004. It surveys mediadevelopment by the OSCE’s member countries.

Bill Siemering, a key figure in radio development globally and in U.S. public radio,is currently with Jean Faiirborn writing up case studies about radio development inTanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa for the Open Society instituteNetwork Media Program website. An update of his radio development work canbe seen on www.developingradiopartners.org. His effort to develop communityradio in Mongolia for the World Bank is mentioned on the World Bank website ifyou type in “community radio initiative.”

The Committee to Protect Journalists’ Dangerous Assignments magazine andannual assessment of the world media are must reading for media developers.Other helpful essays by American journalists serving as Knight Fellows around theworld also appear in the Knight Foundation’s periodicals. The websites ofInternews, IREX, the International Center for Journalists, IFEX, government agen-cies, and individual media development organizations also are an invaluableresource.

II. MAKING THE CASE FOR MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

David Hoffman, the founder and president of Internews, wrote an influential arti-cle in Foreign Affairs magazine (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,March/April 2002) entitled “Beyond Public Diplomacy,” which also makes the casefor a distinction between independent media development and public relations.“Freedom of the Press” by Ellen Hume in the State Department’s ejournal Issuesof Democracy (http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm, vol. 10 no. 2,December 2005) outlines four essential roles that a free press serves in a democ-racy: holding government leaders accountable to the people, publicizing issuesthat need attention, educating citizens so they can make informed decisions, andconnecting people with each other in civil society. The article draws on examplesincluding China’s SARS epidemic, a bank failure in Uruguay, Hurricane Katrina inNew Orleans, and elsewhere.

II. ECONOMICS AND MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

The World Bank studied 97 countries and concluded that those with privatelyowned, local independent media had better education and health, less corruption,and more transparent economies. A full analysis of this phenomenon is capturedin The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media In Economic Development, edited byRoumeen Islam, Simeon Djankov and Caralee McLeish, which was published by


the World Bank Institute in 2002. This book outlines the importance of independ-ent media development to the economic and political advancement in anydemocracy. Chapters include analyses of how the media support markets byJoseph Stiglitz, the importance of economic support for media in transition, by TimCarrington and Mark Nelson; case studies of media development in Thailand,Bangladesh, Cairo Zimbabwe, and Poland, and other topics.

The World Bank also published “Building Institutions for Markets” in 2001, whichillustrates the importance of financial viability for news organizations. As WorldBank official Tim Carrington observed recently, “Increasingly in Africa, journalismis compromised less by state control and low skills (though both are real problems)than by the cash-strapped condition of the news organizations which as fed a pan-demic of for-pay journalism.”

III. THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

Monroe Price is one of the most prolific writers in the field of reforming interna-tional media policy and law. He has published studies of broadcast reform and pol-icy in the former Communist countries, in India, Bosnia, and elsewhere.

Monroe Price and Peter Krug’s The Enabling Environment for a Free andIndependent Media (USAID, 2001) is an influential book which illuminates theconditions necessary for independent media to succeed in any country.

Price also edited the valuable “Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies:Four Perspectives: The Experience of Intergovernmental and Non-governmentalOrganizations,” published by UNESCO in May 2000.

Other Price resources include: A Communications Cornucopia ( edited with R.Noll, Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Democratizing Media, Democratizing theState, (edited with Beata Rozumilowicz and Stefan G. Verhulst, London;Routledge, 2001); Media and Sovereignty: Global Information Revolution and ItsChallenge to State Power (MIT Press, 2002); “Seizing Transmitters: National iden-tity in Bosnia,” chapter in J. Muller (ed), Memory and Power, Cambridge UniversityPress (2002), “Ownership in Russia,” (with P. Krug,) in IIC Media Ownership andControl in the Age of Convergence, 1996. “The Market for Loyalties and a GlobalCommunications Commission,” Intermedia (1994); and numerous other scholarlyarticles about broadcasting and regulation in transitional societies.

Ellen Mickiewicz of Duke University is another expert whose writing about broad-casting policy reform and other aspects of media development in post-Communistsocieties is worth examining. Mickiewicz, who has served on the board of IREX,currently is writing a chapter on “Transition and Democratization: The ManyDimensions of the Impact and Roles of Journalists,” in a forthcoming new editionof the 1998 book, The Politics of News, the News of Politics (Graber, D., Norris,P., and McQuail, D., eds, Congressional Quarterly press). Her original chapter intheir 1998 edition was “Transition and Democracy: The Role of Journalists inEastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” She also wrote “Media, Transitionand Democracy: Television and the Transformation of Russia,” in ACommunications Cornucopia, (Noll, R. and Price, M., 1998.)

IV. MEDIA AND CONFLICT

A useful resource is Monroe Price’s Forging Peace: International Conflict:Peacekeeping, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space (edited withMark Thompson), Edinburgh University Press, 1992.


Internews and the Search for Common Ground, two U.S.-based ngos, have exten-sive information on their websites about efforts to train media to handle conflictresolution. Kumar’s 1999 USAID report, The Role of Media in Democracy: AStrategic Approach (June, 1999, USAID Center for Democracy and Governance,Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research), discusses how this sub-set of media development differs from other capacity-building.Becker and Vladalso wrote a report to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Developing and EvaluatingAlternative Approaches to Media Coverage of Conflict, (Washington, D.C., 2005).

V. REGIONAL ANALYSES

There are some strong regional specialists.

Thai journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn is a founder of the Southeast Asian PressAssociation (SEAPA) who has monitored media development in the region withnumerous articles in foreign affairs journals. He recently assessed the present stateof Asian media in: “Degree of Freedom: the Southeast Asian Media,” a chapter inMedia and Media Power, edited by Kurt Almqvist and Alexander Linklater, (Axeland Margaret Axson Johnson Foundation, Sweden, 2005.)

Lin A. Neumann is another astute observer of Asian media development. Workingon behalf of the Committee to Protect Journalists in the 1990s, he documented thethreats and violence against journalists and news organizations across Asia. Herecently became editor of The Standard newspaper in Hong Kong. His valuablemonographs and articles include:

A section of Price’s UNESCO volume (see above)

“ “Press, Power and Politics in Indonesia” (Arlington, Va.: Freedom Forum booklet,2000)

“Media and Political Change in Thailand” (Arlington, Va.: Freedom Forum book-let, 2001)

“The Survival of Burmese Journalism,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Winter 2002

Numerous reports for the Committee to Protect Journalists about press freedomchallenges in Hong Kong, China, Cambodia, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

In Pakistan, Owais Aslam Ali, head of the Pakistan Press Foundation, has publishedreports on the state of the media in his country available through their website,www.oneworld.org/ppf

British writer Mark Thompson evaluated efforts by the Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the former Yugoslavia, in Slovenia, Croatia,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo InternationalAssistance to Media, (Vienna: OSCE, 2000.)

Harvard University’s Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy haspublished a number of helpful reports which are available through their website.Most recently, David Anable, former U.S. newspaper editor and head of theInternational Center for Journalists, wrote “The Role of Georgia’s Media—andWestern Aid—in the Rose Revolution (December 2005). Other reports include:David Rhode, “All Successful Democracies Need Freedom of Speech: AmericanEfforts to Create a Vibrant Free Press in Iraq and Afghanistan,” (2005); Tomas P.


Lvana, “New Europe’s Civil Society, Democracy and the Media Thirteen YearsAfter: The Story of the Czech Republic,” (2004); Ziguang Li, “Great Sound MakesNo Noise—Creeping Freedoms in Chinese Press,” (2000); Alina Mungui-Pippidi,“State into Public: The Failed Reform of State TV in East Central Europe,” (2000);Stephen J. Hutcheon, “Pressing Concerns: Hong Kong’s Media in an Era ofTransition,” (1998); Jeff Trimble, “Spreading the Word: The KGB’s Image-BuildingUnder Gorbachev,” (1997); Bernard Margueritte, “Post-Communist EasternEurope: The Difficult Birth of a Free Press,” (1995); Alexander Merkushev, “TheRussian and Soviet Press, A Long Journey from Suppression to Freedom viaSuppression and Glasnost,” (1991); Dieter Buhl, “Window to the West: HowTelevision from the Federal Republic Influenced Events in East Germany,” (1990);Sean Jacobs, “Tensions of a Free Press: South Africa After Apartheid,”(1999); andGadi Wolfsfeld, “The Role of the News Media in Unequal Political Conflicts: Fromthe Intifada to the Gulf War and Back Again.” (1993).

Before it cancelled most of its foreign media development, the Freedom Forum inArlington, Va. published the Media Studies Journal magazine which offered manyarticles about ongoing media development. One, for example, is “Lessons for theMedia from Foreign Aid,” by John Maxwell Hamilton, in the fall, 1999 issue. And“Until Old Cats Learn How to Bark,” by Czech journalist Jan Urban in the sameedition. Urban’s article recounts the missteps made by some well-intentionedAmerican journalists shortly after the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia whenthey tried to impose Western “objectivity” standards on a freshly post-Communistsociety.

CONCLUSION:

The field is now starting to get the literature it deserves. But consistent data andassessment of media development efforts are lacking. As Becker and Vlad conclud-ed in their 2005 Knight Foundation report, “Getting detailed records from fundingorganizations is not easy…Lengthy visits with a variety of parties within organiza-tions is going to be needed. In fact, UNESCO estimated it ’would need one per-son working full time for 12 months to put together detailed information about allour media projects in the last 10 years.’”

As they warned, the history of media development, and evaluation of its merits, isbased on data that is not being preserved. Organizations engaged in this work con-tinue to fold media development in with other democracy-building. It is importantthat a systematic method of evaluation be established so that lessons and belearned and funding can be targeted most effectively. Becker and Vlad proposelinking the investments made to measures of media performance established bysuch organizations as Freedom House, Reporters Sans Frontieres, and IREX. A firststep would be to establish a “best practice” criterion that funders will line-itemtheir specific efforts to develop journalism capacity. Further, the measures of mediaperformance need to be examined to determine a consistent index that wouldbecome the standard for the field. This should be included, as Becker and Vladsuggest, in an online database created for each country for which media assistancespending is available. The Cox report’s database has been designed to accommo-date this goal, the earlier Media Missionaries database should be moved to aneditable online format as well.


Media Development:Bibliography P132

Lerner, David. 1958, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing theMiddle East, New York: Free Press.

The concept of development communication first emerged with the pub-lication of this classic book. Lerner conducted research in the Middle Eastand North Africa, and was able to trace correlations between expandedeconomic activity and other modernization variables such as urbaniza-tion, high literacy levels, media consumption and political development.Lerner argued that the media could serve as a great multiplier of develop-ment by communicating development messages to the undeveloped.

Pye, Lucian. 1963, Communication and Political Development, New Jersey:Princeton University Press.

Pye linked modernization with Westernization and “the diffusion of aworld culture,” what we might today call globalization. He identifiedpolitical development with: A world culture based on advanced technol-ogy and the spirit of science, on a rational view of life, a secular approachto social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs, and, above all else,on the acceptance in the political realm that the prime unit of the polityshould be the nation-state.

Schramm, Wlbur. 1964, Mass Media and National Development: The Role ofInformation in the Developing Countries, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

UNESCO commissioned Schramm to determine the precise role that the massmedia played in development. Schramm believed in the concept of an all-power-ful media that could be used by development agents to communicate messagesabout technological innovations. The result of Schramm’s work was published asMass Media and National Development, and provided the theoretical foundationfor development communication for the next 10 to 15 years.

Golding. “Media professionalism in the third world: the transfer of ideology,” inCurran, J., Gurevitch M. and Woolacott J. (Eds.) 1977, Mass Communication andSociety, London: The Open University/Edward Arnold.

Golding, who regards the transfer of a media ideology as an aspect of the profes-sionalization process has pointed out three mechanisms of transfer: institutionaltransfer, education and training, and occupational ideologies.


Casmir F.L. (Ed.) 1991, Communication in Development, Norwood: AblexPublishing.

The book illustrates the wide variety of thinking and practice that focuses on cul-ture and human beings in culture. It documents development communicationexperiences around the world. The contributions are organised in five parts: con-ceptual bases for the use of communication in development; communication inthe development of contemporary states; Central and South America: RegionalDevelopment and Communication Policies; Dealing with the need of CulturalMinorities: Communication and Development within States; The Role ofCommunication in the Development of Nations and States. Included in Part Oneis a contribution by Jan Servaes on new perspectives for communication anddevelopment. The tables provided in this chapter serve to clearly outline theimportant component parts and implications of various new paradigms on devel-opment and communication.

Mayo, J. & Servaes, J. 1994, Approaches to Development Communication. Paris/ New York: UNESCO/UNFPA.

This is a toolkit which is modular in design with six components: Introduction;Concepts; Profiles; Case Studies, Extracts from audio-visual sources and ReferenceMaterials. The core module on Concepts outlines the conceptual context andframework for different approaches to development communication. It focuses onthe ways in which the main theories related to development communication havebeen put into practice. The module on Profiles provides brief descriptions of agen-cies concerned with development communication programs and projects. CaseStudies highlight a range of development communication strategies in differentworld regions. The module in videocassette provides ex tracts from audio-visualsources demonstrating the various ways in which development communicationtheories have been put into practice. Reference Materials include a select bibliog-raphy and a database on diskette containing short descriptions of some 300 devel-opment communication projects around the world.

Nwoso, Peter, Onwumechili, Chucka and M’Bayo, Ritchard (Eds.) 1995,Communication and the Transformation of Society A Developing Region’sPerspectives, Lanham, University Press of America.

A text-reference on development communication in general, and in particular onthe African experience in communication and development over the last 50 years.The 23 essays, by African and Africanist scholars and practitioners, are organizedin nine individually introduced sections: theoretical issues and critical considera-tions; development and communication policies; history and development role ofmedia in Africa; audience uses of communication channels; communication tech-nologies for development; critical areas of development; planning, evaluation,training, and development; methodological considerations; and new directions forcommunication and development in Africa.

The Center for Democracy and Governance. Bureau for Global Programs, FieldSupport, and Research. 1999, The Role of Media in Democracy: A StrategicApproach, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development.

This paper develops the rationales USAID uses to determine support for mediafreedom around the world. USAID works from the principle that access to infor-mation is essential to democracy because it ensures that citizens make informedchoices and serves as a check on elected representatives. In providing media sec-


tor support, USAID defines five types of media support activities that addressweaknesses in media sectors: reforming media law, strengthening constituenciesfor reform, removing barriers to access, training and supporting the capitalizationof media. The goal of media development, according to USAID, “generally shouldbe to move the media from one that is directed or even overtly controlled by gov-ernment or private interests to one that is more open and has a degree of editori-al independence that serves the public interest” (5). The ultimate goal of mediaassistance should be “to develop a range of diverse mediums and voices that arecredible, and to create and strengthen a sector that promotes such outlets” (5).

Besley, Timothy and Burgess, Robin. 2000, The Political Economy ofGovernment Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India, The SuntoryCenter, London School of Economics.

This paper seeks to answer what institutions can enhance government responsive-ness to citizens’ needs. Government responsiveness is particularly important inlow-income countries, where vulnerable populations, in absence of market oppor-tunities, rely heavily on the state. The authors find that information flows aboutpolicy actions are particularly important to increasing government responsiveness,and that the mass media in particular can create incentives for governments torespond to citizens’ needs.

Stapenhurst, Frederick. 2000, The Media’s Role in Curbing Corruption, WorldBank Institute Departmental Working Paper. World Bank, Washington D.C.http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37158.pdf

This paper illustrates connection between the media and reduction in corruption,both tangibly (heads of state or other public officials brought down due to revela-tions in the press of corruption) and intangibly (by reporting on the work of anti-corruption bodies, the media maintains public interest and scrutiny of their work).Many case studies are developed, with examples from developing and developedcountries. Stapenhurst quotes the World Bank in stating that “civil society and themedia are crucial to creating and maintaining an atmosphere in public life that dis-courages fraud and corruption. Indeed, they are arguably the two most importantfactors in eliminating systemic corruption in public institutions”.

Price, Monroe E, Rozumilowicz, Beata, and Verhulst, Stefaan (Eds.) 2001, MediaReform: Democratizing Media, Democratizing the State, London: Routledge.

Changes in the political and institutional structures in those countries undergoinga transition toward democracy deeply affect the relationships between the domes-tic media and the public, the state, and their counterparts abroad. This volumefocuses on several countries that are emerging from extended periods underauthoritarian governments and examines the pursuit and the impact of democra-tization in regard to the media.

The Media (Chapter 10), 2002. World Development Report 2002: BuildingInstitutions for Markets. The World Bank.

This chapter of the World Bank’s 2002 World Development Report establishes thevariety of roles the media serves: carrying information and encouraging commercein geographically isolated markets; providing information on political markets;informing and giving voice to poor and marginalized people; supplementing tradi-tional education; making public services more responsive to the poor; improvingpublic health efforts; providing civic education; and supporting institutionalchange and market development. Factors that make media effective in these roles


are independence, quality and reach.

Owen, Bruce M. “Media as Industry: Economic Foundations of MassCommunications,” in Djankov, Simeon, Islam, Roumeen, and McLiesh, Caralee(Eds.) 2002, The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in EconomicDevelopment, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Institute.

Owen states that in market economies, none of the political, cultural or econom-ic benefits of mass media can exist if the media are not successful businesses.Owen finds that many economic models of competing advertiser-supported mediaindicate that such media will tend to cater to mass interests, duplicating program-ming and neglecting minority tastes. According to Owen, in developing countries,there are fewer audience niches that can command advertiser attention and thusattention from the media. In developing countries, profit-oriented, advertising-supported mass media may have little incentive to produce content that reflectsspecific or minority local interests, needs and culture.

Stiglitz, Joseph, “Transparency in Government,” in Djankov, Simeon, Islam,Roumeen, and McLiesh, Caralee (Eds.) 2002, The Right to Tell: The Role of MassMedia in Economic Development, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Institute.

Stiglitz argues that a free, investigative press reduces asymmetrical informationbetween the government and the public. State-controlled media are assumed tohave a bias towards the incumbent leadership, limiting the leadership’s willingnessto offer information that could be damaging to those in power. Stiglitz argues thatsecrets and asymmetries of information between the state and its people are cost-ly for the economic growth of a nation. If information about government action isnot fully available to citizens, voters may make choices in electing leaders that arenot aligned with their own – or the country’s – best economic interests

Djankov, Simeon, McLiesh, Caralee, Nenova, Tatiana and Shleifer, Andrei, “MediaOwnership and Prosperity,” in Djankov, Simeon, Islam, Roumeen, and McLiesh,Caralee (Eds.) 2002, The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in EconomicDevelopment, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Institute.

This chapter examines the correlation between state ownership of the media andeconomic, political and social development factors. The authors constructedmeasures of state ownership of newspapers and terrestrial television stations in 97countries and found that state ownership of the media was consistently correlatedwith ‘bad’ outcomes in political and economic rights, and social factors such aspress freedoms, education attainment, and life expectancy. The explanation forthis correlation is two-fold. First, the state is assumed to have a vested interest incontrolling the information available to the public, thus limiting the public’s abili-ty to make rational political and economic choices in their own self-interest.Second, state-owned systems are considered to typically face little competition,making them less responsive to consumer demands for information. State owner-ship of newspapers was most highly correlated with negative indicators of politicaland economic rights, media freedom and social outcomes, much more so than tel-evision ownership. State ownership of television results in very few statistically sig-nificant correlations with negative indicators of political and economic rights andmedia freedom, and only slightly more correlation with social indicators. The studystate ownership of the media indicates that there may be powerful correlationsbetween the way ownership of the media is structured and the political and eco-nomic development of a nation.


Carrington, Tim and Nelson, Mark. “Media in Transition: The Hegemony ofEconomics,” in Djankov, Simeon, Islam, Roumeen, and McLiesh, Caralee (Eds.)2002, The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development,Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Institute.

This chapter argues that the media’s ability to contribute to improved governmentaccountability, more efficient markets and more information-rich societiesdepends on the ability of the media to operate as financially self-sufficient entities.In turn, this ability is closely linked to the local economy and the ability of individ-ual media outlets to survive and prosper financially.

Strömberg, David. “Distributing News and Political Influence,” in Djankov,Simeon, Islam, Roumeen, and McLiesh, Caralee (Eds.) 2002, The Right to Tell:The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, Washington, D.C.: TheWorld Bank Institute.

Stromberg’s research considers the impact of the media on public opinion, and theresulting impact of public opinion on actions by politicians. He argues that indemocracies, politicians are more responsive to the opinions of well-informed seg-ments of the population. Who will be well-informed depends largely on the adver-tiser-supported economic model of the media. Stromberg argues that those whosegments of the population that are most attractive to advertisers will receive themost comprehensive coverage from the media.

Islam, Roumeen. “Into the Looking Glass: What the Media Tell and Why – AnOverview,” in Djankov, Simeon, Islam, Roumeen, and McLiesh, Caralee (Eds.)2002, The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development,Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Institute.

Islam introduces The Right to Tell in this chapter, which argues that the independ-ence, quality and reach of a nation’s media can have significant influence on thecountry’s economic development. Independence and quality are coupled, andaccording to Islam are affected by the ownership, economic/financing, and legalstructures that determine how and how freely the media operate. Reach refers tothe level of audience penetration of the media, and includes the influence andavailability of foreign media in some cases. Islam notes the positive relationshipbetween levels of democracy and levels of press freedom, but questions the direc-tion of the relationship and notes that press freedom usually, though not always, ispositively correlated with the economic prosperity of a country. He also points outthat the degree to which laws and policy have an actual effect on the practicaloperation of the media varies from country to country – i.e., some countries mayhave laws on the books that guarantee press freedoms, but very different policiesin practice.

Krug, Peter and Price, Monroe. “The Legal Environment for News Media,” inDjankov, Simeon, Islam, Roumeen, and McLiesh, Caralee (Eds.) 2002, The Rightto Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, Washington, D.C.:The World Bank Institute.

This chapter identifies legal components that contribute or detract from an envi-ronment that enables media to advance democracy. The chapter reviews the legalparameters of news gathering, content-based regulation, content-neutral regula-tion, and protection of journalists. News gathering issues concern the rights of jour-nalists to access information from government and non-governmental sources,protection of sources, and licensing of journalists. Content regulation concernsissues of prior review, censorship and libel laws. Content-neutral regulation, that


nevertheless may influence content indirectly, includes tax laws, subsidies, andcopyright regulation. Journalist protection includes job security/dispute resolutionissues and legal protection from physical attacks on journalists.

Ahrend, Rudiger. 2002, Press Freedom, Human Capital, and Corruption. DeltaWorking Paper 2002-11. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=620102

Ahrend argues that exposure of corruption is a key function of a watchdog press.Corruption matters for development – there is a high inverse correlation betweencorruption levels and variables that indicate a country’s development level. At thesame time, studies have shown strong empirical evidence that a high levels of pressfreedom lead to lower levels of corruption in government.

Rogers, Everett. 2003, The Diffusion of Innovations (5th ed.), New York: FreePress.

Diffusion of Innovations is a theory that analyzes, as well as helps explain, theadaptation of a new innovation. In other words it helps to explain the process ofsocial change. An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as newby an individual or other unit of adoption. The perceived newness of the idea forthe individual determines his/her reaction to it. In addition, diffusion is the processby which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over timeamong the members of a social system. Thus, the four main elements of the theo-ry are the innovation, communication channels, time, and the social system.

Peters, Bettina. 2003, The media’s role: covering or covering up corruption?Global Corruption Report 2003. Transparency International.

The role of journalists in the public’s right to scrutinize hold informed debate ongovernment activity is “providing the public with timely and accurate informationon the affairs of government, business and special interests, [to] shape the climateof democratic debate and help the establishment and maintenance of good gov-ernance. In order to fulfill that role, the media must have access to public informa-tion, a right which is widely accepted and provided for in open, democratic soci-eties. However, journalists around the world continue to face obstacles in report-ing. The obstacles include: censorship, blocked access to official information,defamation laws and other legal restriction, abuse of media services such as print-ing presses, lack of training, and lack of investment in investigative reporting. Thetendency of political manipulation of news and public debate exists in all societies,yet restrictions on media are more profound and pronounced in countries wheredemocratic culture is not well established. Yet the government is not the only fac-tor that negatively affects journalism – ownership concentration, the role of adver-tising and corrupt journalistic practices also undermine the media’s ability toachieve international standards of quality and effectiveness. Additionally, securityconcerns since 9/11 have led to new measures which block or slow the flow ofinformation while increasing surveillance of private information access all aroundthe world. In the Middle East, laws have been enacted which punish journalists forpublishing information that can be interpreted as damaging to state interests orsecurity, and all around the world the government has renewed power to monitordigital communication such as e-mail and Internet traffic.

Pope, Jeremy. 2003, Access to Information: whose right and whose information?Global Corruption Report 2003. Transparency International.

Pope establishes that countries transitioning from colonial, communist, dictator-ship or feudalist governments will be especially challenged in efforts to open infor-


mation access. Information access here refers to government information – trans-parency in operations and release of information. He cites obsessions with secre-cy and lack of trust between the government and the people. Perceived secrecyand lack of trust are also issues with multinational corporations, aid donors andinternational financial institutions. Pope says the media, whose role should be toprotect citizens from abuses of secrecy and the power it provides, often fail in thismission. Competition in media is one way of ensuring, however, that more infor-mation reaches the public – large monopolistic media networks are more likely goalong with government or corporate concealment if it benefits their financial bot-tom line. Bribery of individual journalists, and the close relationships betweenmedia tycoons and powerful political leaders also weaken the media’s ability andwillingness to report on corruption. Trust has eroded in all societies, and peoplerequire access to information in order to have confidence in public institutions. Yetinformation overload is also a problem – for example, information on politicalcampaign contributions is readily available, yet insight into the significance of thecontributions is limited. The media should serve as a filter for the public – findingthe needle in the haystack – yet the media often falls short in this task. The authorbelieves citizens must ultimately be the holders of information, however. He devel-ops the case of a workers’ association in India, MKSS, that led a radical campaignfor increased access to information. There are certain key aspects of access toinformation that must be present for the information to be of real use to citizens.1) The information must not be aggregated, but made available in detail – i.e., par-ents must be able to find the budget for their local school, not just the total stateeducation budget. 2) Information must be accessible – in rural areas the right toinformation has little impact if citizens must travel hundreds of miles to the capi-tal city to access it. The author states that Article 19 of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, which provides the universal right of all “to seek, receive andimpart information…”, is a starting point, but is aimed more at curtailing censor-ship than promoting transparency.

Frohardt, Mark and Temin, Jonathan. October 2003, Use and Abuse of Media inVulnerable Societies: Special Report 110. Washington, DC: United StatesInstitute of Peace.

This article documents the ways in which media can be manipulated to instigateviolent conflict. There are clues which can be used to evaluate whether the mediais particularly susceptible to this kind of manipulation, both structural and contentindicators. Structural indicators include media variety and plurality, degree of jour-nalist isolation, and the legal environment for media. Content indicators concerncontent designed to create fear or resignation. The article recommends monitor-ing of media for these indicators, and reviews potential methods for intervention,preferably early intervention, to avoid manipulation of the media.

Bessette, Guy. 2004, Involving the Community: A Guide to ParticipatoryDevelopment Communication, Ottawa: Southbound/IDRC. http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-52226-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html

This guide is intended for people working in research and development. It intro-duces participatory development communication concepts, discusses the effectivetwo-way communication approaches, and presents a methodology to plan, devel-op, and evaluate communication strategies to address the following questions:How can researchers and practitioners improve communication with local com-munities and other stakeholders? How can two-way communication enhancecommunity participation in research and development initiatives and improve thecapacity of communities to participate in the management of their naturalresources? How can researchers, community members, and development practi-tioners improve their ability to effectively reach policymakers and promotechange?


Coyne, Christopher and Leeson, Peter. 2004, Read All About It! Understandingthe Role of Media in Economic Development, Kyklos, Vol. 57, pp. 21-44.

Coyne and Leeson argue that media is integral to economic reform, mainly due tothe fact that it can build consensus and understanding of economic reforms. Theyemploy models of Game Theory to show that “economic development is achievedwhen potential games of conflict are turned into games of coordination, and a freemedia is one such means for achieving this.” And that “free media, operating in afavorable legal environment and providing quality information, is one mechanismfor coordinating the activities of politicians with the demands of the populace.”They also use historical examples to illustrate successful coordination (Poland,Hungary), continued prevalence of conflict (Ukraine) and coordination aroundbad beliefs and norms (Bulgaria).Deane, James. 2004, The Context ofCommunication for Development. Prepared for the 9th United NationsRoundtable on Communication for Development. Rome: FAO, the Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Rogers, Adam. 2005, The state of communications in international develop-ment and its relevance to the work of the United Nations.http://www.uncdf.org/english/local_development/devcom/index.php

Extensive studies since the mid-1960s have demonstrated the value of the strate-gic use of communication in international development, both at the theory andresearch levels, as well as at the levels of policy, planning and implementation.Because a significant percentage of the world’s population lives in extreme pover-ty, any effort to improve the impact of development efforts is seen by many as astep in the right direction. However, decision and policy makers in the develop-ment community at large may not understand the role of communication andappreciate it to the point that they routinely include it in their development budg-ets and/or planning processes. In this study, the researcher examined the develop-ment of the various theoretical frameworks that define the practice of develop-ment communication, and then reached out to the international developmentcommunity through a survey to discover: a) whether an assumption that develop-ment communication is not sufficiently appreciated by decision and policy mak-ers in development organizations is correct; and b) if it is, what possible reasonsthere could be for this. The researcher found that where this assumption is correct,possible reasons for it could be a) a deficiency of empirical indicators on whichpolicy makers can base their budgeting decisions; and/or b) a lack of effectivecommunication between those that advocate for development communicationand those at the top of the organizational hierarchies.


Endnotes1 J. Steiner, A. Bächtiger, M. Spörndli, & M.R. Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in

Action, (Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2004) and my comments: J. H., “ConcludingComments on Empirical Approaches to Deliberative Politics,” in: am-Acta Politica, 40,no.3 (2005), 384-392, here 389f.

2 P. Johnston Canover & D.D. Searing, “Studying ‘Everyday Talk’ in the DeliberativeSystem,” in: Acta Politica, 40, no.3 (2005), 269-283

3 There are two types of actors without whom no political public sphere could be put towork:

- professionals of the media system, especially journalists who edit news, reports and commen-taries, and

- politicians who occupy the centre of the political system and are both the co-authors andaddressees of public opinions. Mediated political communication is carried on by an elite.We can distinguish five more types among the actors who make their appearance on thevirtual stage of an established public sphere:

- lobbyists who represent special interest groups;- advocates who either represent general interest groups or substitute for a lack of representa-

tion of marginalized groups that are unable to voice their interests effectively,- experts who are credited with professional or scientific knowledge in some specialized area and

are invited to give advice,- moral entrepreneurs, who generate public attention for supposedly neglected issues and, last

not least,- intellectuals who have gained, unlike advocates or moral entrepreneurs, a perceived personal

reputation in some field (e.g., as writers or academics) and who engage, unlike expertsand lobbyists, spontaneously in public discourse with the declared intention of promotinggeneral interests.

4 J. Gerhards, Neue Konfliktlinien in der Mobilisierung öffentlicher Meinung, (Opladen, 1993),26: “The relevance of the public opinion both for the public and for the decision-makers…is secured in competitive democracies in the final instance by the institution of voting.”

5O. Jarren & P. Donges, Politische Kommunikation in der Mediengesellschaft, (Wiesbaden,2006), 119 ff. and 329 ff..

6 K. Callaghan & F. Schnell, Framing American Politics, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005),1-20

7 Jarren & Donges (2006), 26 ff.; B. Weisbrod, “Öffentlichkeit als politischer Prozess.Dimensionen der politischen Medialisierung in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik,” in:Weisbrod (ed.), Die Politik der Öffentlichkeit – die Öffentlichkeit der Politik, (Göttingen,2003), 11-28

8 J.B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995), 258 ff.

9 Jarren & Donges (2006), 180-195

10 Jarren & Donges (2006), 360: “In the very moment of publication they lose control over theissues and interpretations, because even if an issue is completely adopted, the responseand follow-up communication cannot be safely predicted.”

11 I. Somin, “Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal,” in: Critical Review, vol. 12 (1998), 413-458; M. Weinshall, “Means, Ends, and Public Ignorance in Habermas’ Theory ofDemocracy,” in: Critical Review, vol. 15 (2003), 23-58; J. Friedman, “Public Opinion:Bringing the Media back in,” in: Critical Review, vol. 15 (2003), 239-260

12 M.X. Delli Carpini, “Mediating Democratic Engagement: The Impact of Communications onCitizens’ Involvement in Political and Civic Life,” in: L. Lee Kaid (ed.), Handbook ofPolitical Communication Research, (LEA Publishers, London, 2004), 395-434, here p.412; see also Dalton (2006), 26 ff.


13 C. Padovani: A Fatal Attraction. Public Television and Politics in Italy, (Rowman &Littlefield, 2005), 1-12

14 R.M. Entman, Projections of Power, (Chicago UP, 2004), 1-2215 L. Artz & Y.R. Kamalipour (eds.), Bring ‘em On. Media and Politics in the Iraq War,

(Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)

16 P. Ginsborg, Silvio Berlusconi .- Television, Power and Patrimony, (Verso), London, 2004, 4017 S. Verba et al., Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics, (Harvard UP),

Cambridge, 1995; Delli Carpini (2004), 404 ff.

18 Dalton (2006), 172 ff., 150 ff., 219ff.19 Dalton (2006), 121f., 206 ff.20 Delli Carpini (2004) , 420 ff.21 T.-T. Lee, “Media effects on political disengagement revisited,” in: J&MC Quarterly, vol. 82

(Summer, 2005), 416-433, here 421 ff.22 C. Boggs, “The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America,”

in: Theory and Society, 26 (1997), 741-78023 Dalton (2006), 215: “Candidates’ images can be seen as commodities packaged by image mak-

ers who sway the public by emphasizing traits with special appeal to the voters.”24 Jarren & Donges (2006), 163, 348 ff.25 K. Hickethier, “Der politische Blick im Dispositiv Fernsehen,” in: Weisbrod (2003), 79-9626 See Is the World Bank;s strategy on poverty working, Panos, and With the support of multi-

tudes MORE27 See Annex 2 for a full declaration from this meeting.28 These arguments have been substantially expanded by this author and others in the Global

Civil Society Yearbook 2002 published by the London School of Economics(www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Yearbook) and updated more recently in The other informa-tion revolution: media and empowerment in developing countries, by James Deane withFackson Banda, Kunda Dixit, Njonjo Mue and Silvio Waisbord in Communicating in theInformation Society, Ed Bruce Girard and Sean O’Siochru, UNRISD, 2003, full textavailable at www.unrisd.org. Some of this section is drawn directly from previous arti-cles published by the author.

29 The Bellagio Symposium on Media, Freedom and Poverty was organised by the PanosInstitute, London and the Communication for Social Change Consortium, and was host-ed by the Rockefeller Foundation.

30 For more information on the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters, visitwww.amarc.org

31 See: International Mission on Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression in Nepal inwww.nepal.asiapacific.amarc.org

32 Vivendi Universal, AOL Time Warner, Disney, News Corporation, Viacom and Bertelsmann,General Electric, Microsoft, Telefonica, France Télécom.

33 Bruce Girard, The one to watch: Radio, new ICTs and interactivity (2003) Fao, Roma.34 Manuel Castels, La era de la información, economía, sociedad y cultura, 1999, México, Siglo

XXI. 35 Alfonso Gumucio-Dragón, Right to Communicate. From the Summit to the People, I4d, in

http://www.i4donline.net/july05/rightcomm.asp 36 Declaration of Principles (World Summit on the Information Society, 12 December 2003,

Geneva.37 See millennium Development Goals http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals 38 Steve Buckley, Giving Voice to Local Communities. CR and related policies, UNESCO.

March, 200639 See, for example, Declaration of the Ninth United Nations Round Table on Communications

for Development (2004) Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation40 Chapter 6, World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking Poverty, New York: Oxford

University Press http://www.worldbank.org/wdr41 Women and Community Radio: Opportunities, Challenges, and Responses* By Mavic

Cabrera-Balleza, AMARC Women’s International Vice President 42 This quote is from Michaels (1994, p. 98).43 For example, leading to the Australian Broadcasting to Remote Aboriginal Communities

Scheme (Warlpiri Media Association, 2003).44 See http://www.bushmechanics.com/


45 For news coverage, see Tewary (2006). For an overview of recent similar efforts across media,see Slater & Tacchi (2004).

46 The Warlpiri Media Association later received a license.47 Channels are also not the only way to divide the spectrum—it can also be divided by units of

time (one show airs at noon, a different show at 1), by location (a frequency in Londondoes not carry the same signal as one in Paris), and by other means.

48 AM refers to amplitude modulation. FM refers to frequency modulation. VHF stands for veryhigh frequency. UHF stands for ultra high frequency.

49 For a review of the US case, see Streeter (1996).50 see, e.g., Pool (1984). 51 for a review, see Horvitz (2005).52 This phenomenon is global. Radio pirate Stephen Dunifer has recently distributed a trans-

mitter kit for $300-700 that allows an audio broadcast radius between 5 and 15 miles.These kits have been used for new stations across the United States, in Haiti, and inChiapas, Mexico.

53 see Werbach (2003).54 see http://www.sctdv.net/55 see http://www.free2air.org/56 see http://www.n-logue.com/ and for a review, see Proenza (2005, p. 19-20).57 Horvitz (2005, p. 12).58 depending on the frequency used (Neto, Best, & Gillett, 2005, p. 76).59 from Purbo (2003, p. 24).60 Hudock, Ann, “The Role of Media in Democracy” (Washington, DC: USAID, 1999). P. 2.61 Rick Rockwell and Noreene Janus served as consultants to USAID and assisted with the

research that informed the 1999 strategic framework. Their 2003 book is an outgrowthof that work with USAID.

62 Some of the most important contributions include Chapter 10 of the World DevelopmentReport 2002, “Building Institutions for Markets” and the subsequent book based on thatmaterial entitled The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development,edited by Roumeen Islam and published by the World Bank in 2002.

63Trevor Butterworth, “Blogged Off” Financial Times, February 18/19, 2006, W1-W2.64 Research on the case studies presented here, and sections of this text, were initially prepared

for the Ford Foundation and the Aspen Institute for the 2003 Stone Soup Project. Theauthor is grateful to both for their financial support and their comments on the originaldraft.

65Monroe Price and Peter Krug, The Enabling Environment for Free and Independent Media(Washington, DC: USAID, 2000).

66 The following section is adapted from Layton Croft, “Oasis in the Desert: Partnership BreedsPartnership,” The Bridge Mercy Corps Civil Society Newsletter 3 (Second Quarter,2001): 7.

67 This information on Gobi Wave programming is adapted from Bill Siemering, independentmedia consultant.

68 There are 4,000 community radio stations in Latin America. Mali and South Africa have beenat the forefront of community radio in Africa. Asia has not seen such a proliferation ofcommunity radios, but Nepal and Sri Lanka have been the pioneers.

69 Alfonso Gumucio Dagron, interview with the author, August 4, 2003.70 Soutik Biswas, “Digital Empowerment: Seeds of E-Volution” (2000),

http://www.gyandoot.nic.in/gyandoot/outlook.html. For many personal examples, seeGyandoot’s home page, http://www.gyandoot.nic.in.

71 Ibid. 72 http://www.challenge.stockholm.se/feature_right.asp?IdNr=9.73 Center for Electronic Governance, Indian Institute of Management, “An Evaluation of

Gyandoot” (Ahmedabad, India: 2002), 8-10. The World Bank Group points to this 2002study for information about how the project is faring, but the study itself is somewhatlimited. At the start, the Center admits that the lack of public awareness aboutGyandoot meant that a very small sample of users in the villages could be surveyed todetermine public opinion. The conclusions in the study relying on just those surveys,therefore, are not statistically valid, and should only be considered a useful glimpse intohow Gyandoot is generally viewed. Seewww1.worldbank.org/publicsector/bnpp/Gyandoot.PDF.

74 Anwar Jafri, et al., “Information Communication Technologies and Governance: The


Gyandoot Experiment in Dhar District of Madhya Pradesh, India.” (London: OverseasDevelopment Institute, 2002), 20. Seehttp://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp160.pdf.

75 Center for Electronic Governance, Indian Institute of Management, “An Evaluation ofGyandoot” (Ahmedabad, India: 2002), 7-8.

76 See http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/special_packages/penns_landing/.77 Details of this project were taken from the Philadelphia Inquirer “Citizen Voices ‘99” reprint

of the Philadelphia Inquirer’s civic dialogue on the 1999 mayoral election, sponsored bythe Editorial Board and the Philadelphia Compact.

78 For more information on these issue frameworks see http://www.nifi.org.79 The regime’s campaign against NGOs post-Andijan extends beyond media development

NGOs as well. See “Uzbek Government Exerting Pressure on Local NGOs to Close‘Voluntarily’“, EurasiaNet, 4 October 2005 at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav100405.shtml. Also, “HardTimes for Uzbek Charities”, Reporting Central Asia (IWPR), 1 October 2005, at:http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca2/rca2_413_2_eng.txt

80 At a 15 September 2005 press conference announcing the start of legal proceedings againstthe first 15 people accused of involvement in the Andijan uprising, Deputy GeneralProsecutor Anvar Nabiev called journalists from these media outlets “hyenas and jackalssearching for carrion” and accused them of having known about the uprising plot before-hand and launching an “information war against Uzbekistan... simultaneously with [the]terrorist aggression”. See “Journalists feel the heat as Uzbekistan tries 15 over mas-sacre”, Agence France Presse, 24 September 2005; and “General Prosecutor’s Office ofUzbekistan presents statement to journalists”, Uzbekistan National Press Agency, 15September 2005. For a view from one of the accused, see Galima Bukharbaeva, “Wherejournalism is branded terrorism”, International Herald Tribune, 21 September 2005.Additional background: Committee to Protect Journalists News Alert, “CPJ demandsend to Uzbek government’s crackdown on media”, 22 September 2005.

81 The main evening news program on state television, “Akhbarot”, on 15 September 2005reported that some journalists working for foreign media were involved in planning theAndijan uprising and the program showed photographs of some 12 journalists with theirnames and supposed details of their part in the alleged plot. The photos includedMonica Whitlock, Matluba Azamatova and Valery Pankrashin (all working for the BBC);Alexei Volosevich of Ferghana.ru; Andrei Babitski working for RFE/RL; and GalimaBukharbaeva, who reported on Andijan for CNN, IWPR and The Wall Street Journal.

82 Updated chronology at: http://www.rferl.org/specials/uzbek_unrest/Uzbek-harass-chron.pdf83 “‘Harassed’ BBC shuts Uzbek office”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4380166.stm84 The democracy-promotion NGO Freedom House was responsible for the independent printing

press, set up in Bishkek in November 2003 with funding from the U.S. StateDepartment’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor. The US Embassy inBishkek also provided generators when public electricity supplies proved inconsistent.

85 For further discussion of the benefits of involving locals as journalism trainers in the regionsee Kuban Mambetaliev, “Donor Policies in Support of the Mass Media in Central Asia”,a paper delivered at the International Donors Policy Forum on Media Development inLondon, UK, 13-14 October 2005.

86 The openNet Initiative should soon complete its extensive report on the Internet inUzbekistan.

87 Unfortunately, this was not always the case after the Andijan massacre, when many Westernembassies refused to help individual Uzbek journalists who found themselves pursuedby the authorities because of their reporting of events.

88 an “informal network of researchers who form around an intellectual paradigm to study acommon topic.”


The Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD)

GFMD aims to bring greater linkages and sustainable impact tothe work of the media assistance sector as a whole. It seeks to dothis through:

Collaboration: Creating a practitioner-led platform for the media support sector to advocate with donors, governments, opinion leaders and the wider public.

Substantiation: Promoting and disseminating research and analysis on the effects of media development assistance on governance, civic participation, poverty alleviation, emergent crises, and markets worldwide; making the case for media development as a primary pillar for advancing social, economic, and political development.

Professionalization: Establishing agreed-upon standards and ethics for media development work that encouragecross-sector cooperation.

Shared Learning: Evaluating the media development sector to identify and advance good practice in media support.

www.gfmd.info

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