Getting Down to Cases: Enforcing Security Council ...Enforcing Security Council Resolutions Topnotch...

The Stanley Foundation’s Thirty-Third United Nations

of the Next Decade Conference

Getting Down to Cases: Enforcing Security Council

Resolutions

Topnotch at Stowe Resort and SpaStowe, VermontJune 7-12, 1998

http://www.topnotch-resort.com

http://www.stanleyfdn.org

2

power vacuum, creating conditions for massivehuman rights atrocities. Many participants said theUnited Nations has not satisfactorily addressed thepressing question of the priority of the rights of peo-ples versus the rights of states. These participantsargued for a new norm that tempers the existingUN presumption that the right of states to noninter-vention into domestic affairs preempts internalhuman rights concerns.

This case was also marked by poor crisis manage-ment. The mandate of the first UN mission in Rwan-da was blurred between peacekeeping and enforce-ment. Attempts to strengthen the mission, once themagnitude of human suffering was clear, wereblocked by US foot-dragging and delays in deliver-ies of promised supplies. Poor advanced planning,poor intelligence analysis in New York, and gaps inthe communications network between the field andthe Security Council also compromised the mission.

The Former YugoslaviaThe primary cause for ineffectiveness of UN peaceenforcement actions in the former Yugoslavia hasbeen persistent confusion and ambiguity aboutwhether the mission is peacekeeping or peaceenforcement. Participants observed that there wasconfusion from the start because the mission toBosnia was initially a peacekeeping force sent tomonitor a cease-fire. However, despite cease-fireviolations and the resumption of active conflict, themission was never overhauled.

In the wider region, the United Nations continues toplay a smaller but important role. Especially, inKosovo, which participants agreed is the situationto watch, the United Nations has no presence on theground but has imposed a Chapter VII arms embar-go. Events in Kosovo to date reminded participantsof the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia, and theywarned of the danger that the entire horribleepisode might reoccur.

In this decade, the UN Security Council has fre-quently used its authority under Chapter VII ofthe Charter to decide issues involved in interna-

tional conflicts. However, it has often lacked the willor resources to enforce its decisions. At this confer-ence, participants discussed the council’s role inthree 1990s conflicts and drew some lessons aboutwhat is necessary to strengthen enforcement ofcouncil resolutions.

IraqIraq presents a useful window through which tocompare and contrast successful enforcement,which occurred in the Gulf War, with later difficultyin controlling Iraq’s threat to the region. It alsohighlights one of the Security Council’s recurringproblems—inconsistency and the subordination ofprinciple to the shifting interests of the permanentmembers.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the Security Councildeclined to condemn or act to redress Iraq’s incur-sions into Iran. Nor did the Security Council actagainst Iraq when Hussein used chemical weaponsagainst the Iranians and Kurdish people living inIraq. Some participants contrasted actions againstIraq in the 1990s with the council’s treatment ofIsrael. The United Nations rolled back the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait but has never countered Israeliincursions into southern Lebanon and the WestBank and Gaza Strip.

The case of Iraq also presents an opportunity to com-pare the relative efficacy of military intervention andsanctions. Military intervention was effective inrolling back Kuwait’s invasion. The application ofsanctions in phase two has been more difficult.

The African Great Lakes RegionThe African Great Lakes case demonstrates thecouncil’s inability to act in situations where the fail-ure of a state has resulted in an institutional and

Executive Summary

3

ing.” However, this stratagem has three risks. First,it is problematic for the United Nations to delegatemissions to regional organizations without someprovision for payment for those who lack the capac-ity. Second, delegation might be used by rich statesas a way to further withdraw from some regions.Third, some regional organizations to which theUnited Nations might delegate authority do notrepresent all interests in the region.

Economic, Military, Diplomatic, and FinancialSanctionsThe imposition of economic, military, financial, anddiplomatic sanctions poses fewer operational prob-lems for the Security Council; however, their effec-tiveness is challenged. As is seen in the cases of Iraqand the former Yugoslavia, sanctions can take avery long time to work and can cause collateraldamage to civilians and other states. Participantsadvocated a situation-specific approach to all casesin order to take into consideration potential collater-al damage, the chance of success, and the chancethat the sanctions might backfire.

Additionally, participants argued that UN sanctionscommittees should increase the transparency oftheir working procedures, make information aboutthe details of the sanctions being imposed and theireffects more available, and expand their consulta-tion with affected states and states possessing usefulinformation about the sanctioned regime.

Security Council ReformMany participants saw the current composition andpractices of the Security Council as major sources ofits legitimacy crisis. Some participants contendedthat the number of permanent members should beincreased to include both more regions (especiallyAfrica and Latin America) and more great powers(i.e., Germany and Japan).

Many participants criticized the Security Council’sworking procedures. Working committees andinformal meetings are used to craft resolutionsbehind the scenes. Only after an action has the sup-port of the permanent members and is almost fully

Enforcing Security Council Resolutions

Learning From the Cases Participants concluded that the current system ofcollective security is effective only under a very spe-cific set of conditions which do not often exist. Themost frequently used and still viable security opera-tion is traditional peacekeeping in situations wherethere is a preexisting cease-fire, mobilized militaryforces are available, and the objective is peace main-tenance. The more robust peace enforcement opera-tions require consensus on the identity of theaggressor and on a well-defined plan of action tohalt aggression and restore peace and security.Finally, the whole collective security system worksonly when there is sufficient and sufficientlydurable political will among concerned countries tocommit to and carry out an intervention.

Improving ClarityEnforcement is easier in cases where it is clear to theinternational community that a commonly acceptedinternational norm has been breached. It is easierwhen the international community feels a common,unambiguous, and immediate threat to peace andsecurity. And, it is more effective in cases where theobjectives of the action are clear and specific. In con-trast, enforcement has failed when Security Councilaction was seen as illegitimate, ambiguous, bad pol-itics, or not in the interest of the major powers.

Military Planning and PreparationIn cases where only force makes an impression onan aggressor the Security Council needs outsideassistance for effective action. Participants encour-aged the Security Council to improve its commandand control structures and advance planning sys-tems. Mobilization practices and standard operatingprocedures within military units during enforce-ment action should also be improved. Participantsalso looked at ways of standardizing commandstructures and operating procedures within UNmissions.

DelegationMany participants recommended that militaryenforcement missions be subcontracted or delegatedto regional organizations or “coalitions of the will-

4

Getting Down to Cases

elaborated, does the Security Council hold a formal,open session to collect comments and recommenda-tions. The lack of transparency in this system allowsfor under-the-table agreements and the inclusion ofulterior motives in council actions. Regarding theveto, many argued that the scope of this powershould be narrowed.

Help From Other Actors Some participants proposed that members shouldchange their perception of the Security Council asthe dispute resolution mechanism of last resort. Oneparticipant argued for a whole new approach tosecurity built conceptually on trying to develop aconsensus for peace among the developed coun-tries. The framework would rely on regional organi-zations being responsible for security in their areas.Less comprehensively, participants suggestedNATO, OSCE, the Arab League, ASEAN (Associa-tion of Southeast Asian Nations), and the OAUcould be potential regional partners in managingconflicts, possibly including carrying out somepeace enforcement.

However, participants considered several potentialdrawbacks to delegated missions. Clear lines ofauthority, responsibility, and communication mustbe established between the United Nations and theregional organization. Second, financial and materi-al support may have to be provided to regionalorganizations which lack resources.

ConclusionA number of principles have to be balanced as theSecurity Council works to enforce peace and securi-ty legitimately in the next decade. These includeselectivity, efficiency, pragmatism, democracy (indecision-making and peace-building), consensus,clarity, and international responsibility. Participantsalso identified a number of specific factors demon-strated by the cases of Iraq, the former Yugoslavia,and the African Great Lakes region which should beincorporated into effective future enforcement. Forfuture success, the United Nations must combinepower, results, legitimacy, intelligence, and skills inthe most efficient and effective manner that nationalinterests and moral concerns allow.

5


ChairRichard H. Stanley, President, The Stanley Founda-tion

RapporteurElizabeth Anne Bloodgood, Ph.D. Candidate,Princeton University

ParticipantsMaurice Bertrand, Former Member, UN JointInspection Unit

John Crighton, Deputy Permanent Representativeof Australia to the United Nations

Francis M. Deng, Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, UnitedNations; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, TheBrookings Institution

Nabil A. Elaraby, Permanent Representative of theArab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations

Felice D. Gaer, Director, The Jacob Blaustein Insti-tute for the Advancement of Human Rights, TheAmerican Jewish Committee

Ibrahim A. Karawan, Professor of Middle East Poli-tics, University of Utah

Farhad Kazemi, Professor of Politics and MiddleEastern Studies, New York University

Edward C. Luck, Executive Director, Center for theStudy of International Organization, New York Uni-versity School of Law

Jeffrey G. Martin, Vice President, The Stanley Foun-dation

Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago, Permanent Repre-sentative of the United Republic of Tanzania to theUnited Nations

Olga Pellicer, General Coordinator, Matias RomeroInstitute of Diplomatic and Prospective Studies,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico

Sergey Mikhailovich Rogov, Director, Institute ofUSA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sci-ences

Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Envoy of the Secre-tary-General in Africa, United Nations

Gary G. Sick, Executive Director, Gulf/2000; SeniorResearch Scholar and Adjunct Professor of Interna-tional Affairs, Columbia University

Mark Sidel, Vice President, The Stanley Foundation

Molly K. Williamson, Principal Deputy AssistantSecretary of State for International OrganizationAffairs, United States

Howard E. Wolpe, Presidential Special Envoy toAfrica’s Great Lakes Region, Department of State,United States

Stanley Foundation StaffMary Gray Davidson, Senior Producer, CommonGroundCarol Matthews, Conference Management DirectorSusan Moore, Conference Management Associate

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Partici-pants attended as individuals rather than as representatives oftheir governments or organizations.

PARTICIPANTS

6

Richard H. StanleyPresident, The Stanley Foundation

Welcome to thet h i r t y - t h i r dannual United

Nations of the NextDecade Conference. Weare gathered this week tolook at the question ofenforcing Security Councilresolutions. And we willinform our discussions bylooking closely at threesituations that have

claimed the attention of the council for most of thispast decade.

The BasicsThe framers of the UN Charter set down clear, basicprinciples for dealing with threats to internationalpeace and security. The first precept was that pre-vention of conflicts is the best option, and everyeffort should be made to identify potential sourcesof conflict and deal with them forthrightly. Second,the parties to a conflict should try to resolve it them-selves, perhaps drawing help from neighbors orother interested parties. Third, if the matter cannotbe resolved at that level, then regional assistanceshould be sought.

Finally, the framers held that if a conflict reached alevel where it became an international concern, itshould come before the Security Council. They rea-soned that collective action by the council would bemore likely to produce a durable and just outcomethan would unilateral action. Once the council tookup a matter, it should first try a variety of peacefulremedies. Only if and after those approaches failedwould the council invoke its authority under Chap-ter VII to decide an issue and back up its decisionwith enforcement measures.

Clearly, the framers believed that the Security Coun-cil would be the central actor in this graduatedapproach to collective security. But they did notanticipate some of the difficulties that would ariseand, in the more than half century since the signingof the Charter, the scheme has worked only rarely.

The major allies of World War II, who became thefive permanent members of the council, did not con-tinue as an effective alliance. Almost immediatelythe Cold War emerged, hobbling Security Councilconsensus and action. Changing times altered rela-tive national stature and recent years have producedmuch debate on the composition and procedures ofthe Security Council, including size, permanentmembers, decision processes, and use of the veto.Mobilizing peacekeeping and enforcement actionsexpeditiously has proven difficult. Funding has pre-sented problems. The nature of threats to securityhas changed from the traditional conflicts betweenstates to internal conflicts, self-determination strug-gles, and nonmilitary issues. For these and manyother reasons, the Security Council has not consis-tently demonstrated the crisp and wise decisionmaking and the prompt and effective execution ofthese decisions that the Charter framers surelyexpected.

Today, many question whether collective securitycan be made to work, no matter what measures aretaken to strengthen the United Nations’ perfor-mance. Many others reply that we must be preparedto enforce Security Council decisions, because pre-vention and pacific means of dispute resolution can-not work all the time.

The 1990sThe decade of the 1990s started on an optimisticnote. The United Nations was freed from the con-straints of the Cold War which had marginalized itas an actor on security issues. And then the worldwas challenged by an old-style aggression—Iraq’sinvasion of Kuwait.

Opening Remarks

7


Still smarting from Somalia, still struggling withIraq, and still enmeshed in Bosnia, the world com-munity was then faced with a vicious, genocidalcivil war in Rwanda. This time the reaction wasuncertainty and indecisiveness. Eventually, thecouncil did act, but not until after there had beenmurder on an incomprehensibly large scale and ini-tiation of a massive refugee problem that still threat-ens the entire region.

These are not the only security situations withwhich the council has struggled this decade. It hashad success in some places and difficulty in others.But each of these three is still very much with us,and we will focus on them as case studies in thenext few days. One thing seems clear: if we startedthe 1990s with a heady experience in rolling backIraq’s aggression against Kuwait, subsequent expe-riences in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and EastAfrica have been much more sobering.

LessonsOur purpose in examining these cases is to drawlessons that can inform future actions. With eachcase we will review the major developments, partic-ularly emphasizing the role of the Security Council.We will explore what worked and what was a dis-appointment. What factors contributed to the out-come? A key advantage in looking at specific casesis that it is possible to study the factors and eventsthat shaped the situation in some detail. What wasanticipated? What was not? What happened whenthe theory of collective enforcement encounteredthe reality of a given situation?

One major area that needs to be explored is that ofdefining the mission. Are there general guidelinesfor what kinds of situations are prone to effectiveenforcement action—a sense of what the council canand cannot do? For example, to what extent, if at all,can the United Nations fill a vacuum when legiti-mate state authority has dissolved? Or—for exam-ple, Iraq—are enforcement measures appropriate tothe task of checking the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction?

The Security Council responded, following theframers’ prescribed course almost perfectly. Ulti-mately it invoked its Chapter VII authority, orderingIraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait and backingup that decision with the authorization of a coali-tion military force. Operation Desert Storm pushedout the Iraqi troops and effectively enforced thecouncil’s decision. But, enforcing subsequent resolu-tions intended to limit Iraq’s military power and todeny it weapons of mass destruction has provedmuch more difficult.

Then, still flush with the success of its initialenforcement action in Iraq, the council was con-fronted with a difficult situation in Somalia. Thecombination of civil war and drought had createda desperate humanitarian situation. The worldcommunity felt compelled to react—to restoreorder so that relief supplies could be delivered anddistributed. But what seemed at first a clear andstraightforward mission quickly took a bad turn asit confronted the complexities of the situation onthe ground. The United States, which had led thecoalition against Iraq and then led the way intoSomalia, was especially surprised and recoiledwhen it suffered unexpected losses.

At the same time, Yugoslavia—the nation-state puttogether by Marshall Tito—was disintegrating. And,except for Slovenia’s relatively unchallenged seces-sion, the breakup was not occurring peacefully. Theformer Yugoslavia introduced us to the term “ethniccleansing”— a euphemism for mass killings and tor-ture intended to eliminate or displace large portionsof the population. That practice and a wildly out-of-control refugee situation presented the SecurityCouncil with another grave humanitarian crisis.

As in Somalia, the council acted to address thehumanitarian situation. But when the troops sent inwere not caught in the crossfire of warring factions,they were used as pawns in the complexity ofBalkan politics. Ultimately, the United Nations gaveway to a NATO enforcement action after the DaytonAccords were negotiated and signed.

the very least, more robust communications capabil-ity between military planners and commanders andthe political personnel on the Security Council whomake the ultimate decisions about missions? Inthese cases, could more timely and effective militaryplanning and execution have made a difference?

ChallengeIt seems to me that the framers of the Charter got alot right. Conflict prevention is the first option, andthe international community should be building itscapabilities to deal with the causes of conflict. Theygot it right too when they said that the parties them-selves should first try to solve their problems andthat there is an appropriate role for regional efforts.And they were also right that peaceful meansshould be used first, and enforcement should be alast resort. But even as a last resort, it seems evidentthat the world community will need the capabilityto enforce collective decisions from time to time.

Our goal this week is to explore ways to close thegap between the need for and the effectiveness ofenforcement actions. For nearly a decade, we haveno longer been able to use the excuse that the Unit-ed Nations could not act because of the Cold War.The three cases we will use as the basis for our dis-cussions this week have unfolded in the post-ColdWar time frame. Perhaps they will offer insights thatcan help us strengthen the rule of law and achieveour goal of a secure peace with freedom and justice.

We have an ambitious agenda, and a talented andexperienced group of participants. I look forward toour discussions.

8


Did the enforcement actions in these cases haveclear, achievable goals? Did they change after themission started? I would venture one lesson thatshould be learned from these cases is that situationsthat seem straightforward and clear from the out-side are usually much more complex when you getinto them. That places a premium on good intelli-gence and effective information flow so that deci-sions are made from as informed a position as isreasonably possible.

Once a goal has been decided, achieving it requires,among other things, effective strategy, careful plan-ning, and the availability of resources. This involvesmuch more than the Security Council. Coordinationwith the Secretariat is essential, and reliable supportfrom member states is paramount. Neither has beenconsistently present in recent enforcement actions.How did poor coordination or inconsistent supportmanifest themselves in these three cases? Is there anongoing problem? Can we identify ways of address-ing it? In what ways should our institutions bestrengthened so that we are not so prone to repeat-ing our mistakes?

In some parts of the world there is a significantamount of interest in regional approaches for deal-ing with security problems. This is certainly true inEurope, and also in Africa. The difference is thatmost African nations have limited resources to carryout extended operations and need internationalsupport. How effectively is the United Nationsmanaging this situation? Are there criteria for judg-ing when a regional or subregional action shoulddraw support from the world body? In the GreatLakes region of Africa, for example, are there stepsthat should be taken now that would have a posi-tive effect? And do those, in turn, suggest institu-tional adjustments that would make UN support forregional security efforts more effective and reliable?

In carrying out its enforcement actions, the UnitedNations has relied on ad hoc arrangements for mili-tary support, sometimes raising serious commandand control questions. There is little support for astanding army for the United Nations, but is this thebest we can do? What about standby forces? Or, at

9

Security Council Legitimacy and CredibilityThe end of the Cold War and the increasing saliencebut ambiguity of the role of the United Nations inglobal politics has heightened the legitimacy crisisof the organization, and especially the SecurityCouncil. The composition of the Security Coun-cil—more reflective of the 1940s than the1990s—and the manner in which decisions are madehamper the ability of the Security Council to enforceits resolutions. Some participants saw the SecurityCouncil as a voluntary dictatorship controlled byfive permanent members granted special privilegesand powers by the rather arbitrary fact that theywere the victors of World War II. Although mem-bers are free to leave the United Nations, and thusabandon the obligation to obey resolutions, this isan increasingly impractical option in an interdepen-dent world. The “right” of such a few elect states tomanage international affairs, which at times necessi-tates administering the internal affairs of sovereignstates, is increasingly challenged. Member statesnow demand transparency and consultation in theinformal closed-door decision-making process usedby the Security Council to decide most substantiveissues.

Not only is the council unrepresentative and non-participatory, it is criticized as being inconsistent inits treatment of issues and states. While condemna-tions are issued and enforcement actions orderedagainst some states, others that violate the samelaws and principles are allowed to act with impuni-ty. Further, not all crises are, or for that matter canbe, addressed by the Security Council. But SecurityCouncil selectivity is not based on principles or offi-cial regulations. Instead national interests and themagnitude of the humanitarian atrocity are weight-ed by the proximity of the conflict to the security ofthe great powers.

The Security Council’s legitimacy is also under-mined when having resolved to act on an issue, the

Introduction

The United Nations is suffering from a loss ofcredibility and a crisis of legitimacy that ham-pers its ability and willingness to intervene

effectively in conflicts throughout the world and toreliably enforce its resolutions. In the 1990s the Secu-rity Council has frequently invoked its authorityunder Chapter VII of the UN Charter to intervene inconflicts deemed to be a threat to peace and security.But it has often lacked the will or resources toenforce its decisions. The Stanley Foundation con-vened academics, practitioners, and policymakersfrom diverse fields of expertise to address this issueat its Thirty-third United Nations of the Next DecadeConference. Participants met in Stowe, Vermont, todiscuss means of enforcing Security Council resolu-tions. The enforcement mechanisms discussedincluded economic, military, diplomatic, and finan-cial sanctions and military intervention to prevent,deter, or restore the status quo ex ante. Examinationof three recent cases—Iraq, the African Great Lakesregion, and the former Yugoslavia—helped partici-pants to focus on concrete examples of enforcementsuccess and failure and to suggest specific recom-mendations for the future.

The inability or unwillingness of the Security Coun-cil to credibly and reliably enforce its decisionsraised three important questions at the conference.First, is collective security, as elucidated in the cur-rent UN Charter, a viable methodology or institu-tion? This question is especially pertinent now thatthe concept of security has broadened beyond mili-tary and national security to include social, econom-ic, environmental, and personal elements. Second,how can the Security Council be reformed to bettermeet the responsibilities detailed in the Chartergiven the present geopolitical context and expecta-tions of continuing change in the future? Finally, isthe Security Council the best instrument to achievelong-term peace and security? Should other organi-zations or bodies share this burden?

Conference Report

10

The rapporteur prepared this report following the con-ference. It contains her interpretation of the proceedingsand is not merely a descriptive, chronological account.Participants neither reviewed nor approved the report.Therefore, it should not be assumed that every partici-pant subscribes to all recommendations, observations,and conclusions.

Rapporteur Elizabeth Anne Bloodgood.

council is unable to recruit sufficient materialresources and personnel to enforce its decision.Again, there is tension between the Charter princi-ple of equality of states and the reality that states donot have equal capacities. Enforcement problemsalso stem from a lack of political will on the part ofstates with the requisite capacity to risk personnelor resources in a situation. Although participantsexpressed a fervent desire for the development of aglobal sense of responsibility, they acknowledgedpragmatically that the United Nations is an inter-governmental organization and, as such, it cannotdefine its responsibilities separate from the nationalinterests of states.

These abstract principles and the ideas of legitima-cy, credibility, and enforcement were explored moreconcretely and in greater depth in the three casestudies.

IraqIraq presents a useful window through which tocompare and contrast successful enforcement,which occurred in the Gulf War, and failures in thelatter part of the 1990s. It also highlights one of theSecurity Council’s recurring problems—inconsisten-cy and the subordination of principle to the shiftinginterests of the permanent members. Although theUnited Nations’ initial reaction to Iraqi aggressionagainst Kuwait in 1990 was immediate, decisive,and effective, the present period of lingering sanc-tions with ambiguous compliance compounded byintense human suffering has cast a pallor over theinitial success.

Participants divided UN actions in Iraq into twophases. Phase one was a successful case of enforce-ment action. Military intervention by a coalition offorces led by the United States drove the Iraqi armyout of Kuwait and reaffirmed the sanctity of states’borders in what was commonly called the Gulf War.UN action in phase two, following the war, has cen-tered on attempts to curb Iraq’s production of chem-ical, biological, and nuclear weapons using militaryand economic sanctions, authorized under ChapterVII, to reduce the ability of the regime to pose athreat to the region.

Participants felt that the United Nations’ mainobjectives in Iraq were achieved by the first mis-sion, including the containment of the Iraqi threat,rectification of aggression, and restoration of thestatus quo. Furthermore, the early actions of theUnited Nations were greeted by overwhelmingpublic support, and the success of Operation DesertStorm garnered political capital and legitimacy.These successes deteriorated in phase two, due todisagreements over the future course of UN action.As have UN members, participants debatedwhether Hussein has reformed his behavior suffi-ciently for sanctions to be lifted and, even if thiscondition has not been met, whether the sanctionsare doing more harm than good.

Inconsistency—Reality and PerceptionsRecent history in the region highlights the council’s


11


Kuwait and continues to punish the country for itsprogram on weapons of mass destruction. But it hasnever acted to counter Israeli incursions into south-ern Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Italso ignores Israel’s nuclear weapons program. Thisapparent double standard decreases the legitimacyof the UN stance against Iraq within Iraq, reinforcesthe poor reputation of the United Nations in thewider Arab community, and is winning supportersfor Iraq’s cause despite the disgust felt for Hussein’sactions against his own people. Some participantsnoted that Hussein, as he has become a more savvypolitician, has used these inconsistencies and thechanging tide of international public opinion to hisadvantage. He alleges that the United Nations’ selec-tivity is because the United States is the benefactorof Israel but the enemy of Iraq.

Other participants assigned the duplicity to Hus-sein. They note one important distinction betweenIraq and Israel: Iraq has used its weapons of mass

inconsistency and the role that shifting major powerinterests play. In 1980 the United States supportedIraq in the Iran-Iraq war, including providingweapons to Iraq. The tenor of the relationshipbetween the United States and Iraq, or at least soSaddam Hussein believed, was set during this con-flict. Led by the United States, the Security Councildeclined to condemn or act to redress Iraq’s incur-sions into Iran, despite petitions submitted by Iran.Nor did the Security Council act against Iraq whenHussein used chemical weapons against the Irani-ans and Kurdish people living in Iraq (who hebelieved supported Iran). Continued attempts byHussein to destroy Kurdish civilization and social-political organizations spurred refugee flows to Iranand Turkey, broadening this conflict and threateningregional security. Still the council did not act.

Some participants contrasted actions against Iraq inthe 1990s with the council’s treatment of Israel. TheUnited Nations rolled back the Iraqi invasion of

AP

/WID

E W

OR

LD P

HO

TO

US forces on the ground in Iraq led the effort to enforce the Security Council’s decision that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait.

The application of sanctions in phase two has beenmore difficult. First, the goals—dismantling Iraq’sweapons-of-mass-destruction programs and reduc-ing its threat to the region—are more amorphous.There has also been some unofficial shifting ofgoals. The United States wishes to remove Husseinfrom power, but this is not a legitimate goal sup-ported by the other permanent members. Further-more, it is uncertain if sanctions are an effective toolto enforce nonproliferation. In this case, they onlyseem to have driven the weapons program furtherinto the shadows. Participants also debated the dis-tinction between having weapons and using them.While nonuse is a legitimate objective to enforce, itis hard to justify the complete obliteration of Iraq’ssecurity system. If the latter is the objective of sanc-tions, it is uncertain that they will ever be lifted.

Although targeted rather than blanket sanctionswere applied, the difficulties of targeting are appar-ent. Participants noted that the “dual-use” principleadopted by the sanctions committee to judgerequests for humanitarian exceptions isfaulty—almost all goods necessary for human sur-vival have some military use, from truck tires tomedical supplies. Furthermore, because militaryand economic sanctions were imposed as a packagedeal, it is now politically difficult for the SecurityCouncil to lift economic sanctions while maintain-ing military sanctions. And the humanitarian dam-age has been severe; the Iraqi economy has beendestroyed, very few civilians receive their full,required daily allowance of food, and disease runsrampant without proper medical supplies. Theamount of oil that Iraq can sell under the Oil-for-Food program has increased, but some participantsnoted that this is an empty action since Iraq isunable to pump enough oil per day with its dilapi-dated equipment.

The coalition politics that meshed so effectively tocreate the military operation to roll back aggressionhas also limited more recent enforcement of SecurityCouncil resolutions. Enforcement proved easy aslong as consensus within the coalition was notdoubted, but when differences of interpretation ofthe mandate and competing goals emerged, enforce-

12


destruction; Israel has not. Hussein has maneuveredwithin the sanctions regime to increase his personalwealth and stock his military arsenal while not tak-ing advantage of all the humanitarian exceptionsallowed him. That has increased the suffering of hispeople and generated their resentment of the UnitedNations and the United States.

Hussein appears to be scoring public relationspoints. The Iraqi press shows that domestic senti-ment increasingly favors Hussein’s hard line againstthe United Nations as humanitarian suffering relat-ed to the sanctions becomes more severe and thesanctions appear to be more open-ended. There isalso a notable boost in international support for thelifting of economic sanctions. The result is loss ofUN credibility.

Sanctions Versus Military Force The case of Iraq also presents an opportunity tocompare the relative efficacy of military interven-tion and sanctions. Military intervention was effec-tive in rolling back Kuwait’s invasion. However,participants also noted that this is a rare case of “by-the-book” enforcement. It was a classic case of inter-national aggression across an accepted internationalboundary violating commonly held international

norms. It had a readily iden-tifiable aggressor and vic-tim. This created interna-tional consensus on whatshould be done. The nation-al security interests of thoseable to enforce peace werealso engaged by the threatthat Hussein might cut oilsupplies. That helped gener-ate the political will foreffective enforcement. Themission was delegated to amultinational “coalition ofthe willing” led by the Unit-

ed States. Hence, the United Nations did not have toconcern itself with funding, mobilization, or com-mand and control problems.

Enforcementproved easy

as long as consensus within the

coalition wasnot doubted....

13


paramount, despite theCharter preamble’s refer-ence to “We the Peoples.”Yet in failed or failingstates, countries where thelegitimacy and perhaps thevery existence of the stateare in doubt, those at thehead of the state (or thosewho are ambitious to placethemselves there) frequent-ly victimize the inhabitantsof the state in an effort tograb power and position.Many participants said theUnited Nations has not sat-isfactorily addressed thepressing question of the pri-ority of the rights of peoples

ment was hampered. The national interests of theUnited States, Great Britain, France, and Russiabegan to diverge. France wanted to normalize rela-tions as rapidly as possible in order to activate exist-ing oil contracts, while the United States wished toremove what it perceived to be a persistent threat tostability in the region and a rogue regime whichwould only grow stronger over time.

The African Great Lakes RegionParticipants generally agreed that the SecurityCouncil’s response to the 1994 Rwandan genocideand subsequent refugee crisis was shortsighted,halfhearted, ineffective, and underambitious. Thiscase demonstrates the council’s inability to act incases where the failure of a state has resulted in aninstitutional and power vacuum, creating condi-tions for massive human rights atrocities. The Unit-ed Nations has always placed the rights of states

At the heart ofthe...problems in the AfricanGreat Lakesregion is theinherent difficulty of coping withfailed or failingstates.

AP

/WID

E WO

RLD

PH

OTO

Rwanda refugees at the Zaire border in 1994 were turned away when the border was closed. The refugee flow came in the wake of around of genocide.

from those administrations feeding the conflicts inBurundi and Rwanda.

Responding to GenocideOn April 6, 1994, Rwanda’s President Habyariminaand Burundi’s President Ntaryamira were killedwhen their plane was shot down as they flew fromArusha to Kigali. Their deaths shattered the August1993 Arusha Peace Accords between the Tutsi-ledRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Habyarimina’sHutu regime. The United Nations had a presence inthe country in the form of the United Nations Assis-tance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) which was tooversee the implementation of a transitional govern-ment and the eventual holding of legislative elec-tions.

In the wake of the plane crash, Hutu extremists, longopposed to the Arusha Accords, stirred up an anti-Tutsi frenzy that resulted in the massacre of betweenfive-hundred thousand and one million people. TheRPF then unleashed a military campaign that seizedcontrol of the country on July 4, 1994. That spurred amass exodus of seven-hundred thousand Hutus intoZaire/Congo. The Hutu refugees were driven byHutu extremist leaders who convinced them thatthey would face retribution for the genocide inwhich many participated.

Between April and July, just as organized genocidewas picking up momentum and speed, UNAMIR’stroop strength was reduced following the deaths ofnine Belgian peacekeepers. Operation Turquoise, aFrench-led multinational force, then moved in.However, the French force was perceived withinRwanda as an attempt to “win” the conflict for theTutsis, and it became a target of aggression ratherthan an effective enforcement mechanism. Eventual-ly, after US foot-dragging, UNAMIR II wasdeployed, but far too late.

In Burundi, the United Nations attempted to fore-stall violence by negotiating the return of Tutsis topower, despite the previous elections which gavepower to the proportionately more numerousHutus. This began an armed rebellion by extremistsin both camps. Attempts by the secretary-general to

14


versus the rights of states, much less who shoulddefend human rights and how best to do thisagainst states set on violating the rights of their citi-zens.

Zaire/Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi share histori-cal, cultural, and regional characteristics whichmake it convenient and useful to study them as aunit. Colonialism has left a lasting impact on Burun-di and Rwanda and formed the background againstwhich the conflicts in both countries are set. TheBelgian colonial administration manipulated minordifferences of physiology and social class betweenTutsis and Hutus in both countries, creating a classof elites to assist them in ruling the colony. The Tut-sis, the taller and more “regal” group, were selectedto be the dominant group. They were given accessto education and employment, administrative bene-fits, and political authority, creating an artificialsocio-ethnic conflict and a dangerous resentmentamong Hutus.

Regional demographics complicate and link the con-flicts in Burundi and Rwanda to events inZaire/Congo. All three of these countries have fragilestate structures with little more than juridical sover-eignty and limited control over the events and peoplewithin their borders. Burundi and Rwanda are small,densely populated states that place enormous

demands on agricultural sus-tainability and pressure forland. They are next to twomuch larger and less denselypopulated states—Ugandaand Zaire/Congo—to andfrom which there have beencyclical population flows.The boundaries separatingthese states are artificial andextremely porous. Over theyears people have flowed towhichever political and eco-

nomic environment seemed the most favorable. As aresult, many of the Tutsis and Hutus involved in thegenocides and political struggles in the 1990s wereraised as Ugandan or Zairian citizens with support

...the possessionof sovereignty carries with itresponsibility

for human welfare.

15


right of states to nonintervention into domesticaffairs preempts internal human rights concerns.Participants presented several possible justificationsfor intervention to protectpeople. First, under currentinternational law, obser-vance of genocide carrieswith it an obligation tointervene. Second, regionaldynamics may lead to theexternalization of the con-flict, as was the case inRwanda where refugeeflows created the justifica-tion for intervention. Third,the Security Council mayresolve that the magnitudeof human suffering in a con-flict poses an internationalsecurity threat.

Some participants proposeda three-level allocation ofresponsibility to help theSecurity Council managehuman rights concerns inmarginal and failing states.The proposed scheme issimilar to that found in theCharter. First, states bearprimary responsibility for protecting citizen rightseven in the midst of a conflict. In the face of a large-scale failure of a state to carry out that responsibili-ty, a neighboring state or regional organizationmight provide assistance. In cases where they areinvolved in the conflict, and are thus partial, orwhere they lack the capacity to resolve the conflict,the international community has the responsibilityto intervene. However, a careful balance must bestruck between the responsibility of powerful statesto get involved and old imperialist patterns ofbehavior. In this scheme the possession of sover-eignty carries with it responsibility for human wel-fare. Further, the possession of capacity within theinternational system also brings the responsibility toguard and assist actors and people who need, butlack, these same capacities.

mobilize support for a Chapter VII intervention intoBurundi, to prevent the large-scale massacres whichoccurred in Rwanda, failed. The United Nationsthen granted initiative for conflict resolution to theAfrican Conflict Resolution Initiative (ACRI), withinthe Organization of African Unity (OAU), which hasmaintained a political dialog between Hutus andTutsis. However, there has been only limitedprogress toward a lasting settlement.

The United Nations has also struggled with manag-ing the refugee situation. Hutu extremists in easternZaire have used the bases for incursions into Rwan-da and have terrorized refugees to prevent themfrom returning to Rwanda. Regional ethnic divi-sions were also exploited in the struggle withinZaire/Congo between the late Mobuteu Sese Sekoand the ultimately victorious Laurent Kabila. In themidst of the civil strife, massive human rights viola-tions were alleged to have occurred.

Failed StatesAt the heart of the United Nations’ problems in theAfrican Great Lakes region is the inherent difficultyof coping with failed or failing states. A second fac-tor is the lack of political will by developed countriesto concern themselves with humanitarian disastersnot perceived to be a direct threat to their nationalinterests. Failed states are those in which the institu-tional machinery of the state is illegitimate, rup-tured, and unused while the country is governed bypower brokers who may stoop to any tactics, includ-ing genocide. Failed states force the Security Councilto confront the international norm of sovereignty, theprinciple of nonintervention into states’ internalaffairs, which assumes that states will protect therights and lives of their inhabitants. Dealing withfailed states stretches the capacity of UN institutionsthat are organized to work with states and theirinstitutions, rather than supplant or function inde-pendently of them. Participants expressed little sur-prise that the United Nations is having a difficulttime addressing these complex and novel circum-stances.

However, many participants argued for a new normthat tempers the existing UN presumption that the

The primarycause for theineffectivenessof UN peaceenforcementactions in the formerYugoslavia hasbeen...ambiguityabout whetherthe mission is peacekeeping or peace enforcement.

16


tancy and the resistance of states to field operationsnot strictly contained in the mandate as manifesta-tions of the Somalia syndrome. (Rwanda’s genocideoccurred shortly after the troubled UN operation inSomalia.) Until the genocide was obvious to theinternational community, states did not see the fail-ure of a state as sufficient grounds for interventionand resisted labeling events as genocide to avoidinvolvement. Poor advanced planning, poor intelli-gence analysis in New York, and gaps in the commu-nications network between the field and the SecurityCouncil also compromised the mission.

At present, both Rwanda and Burundi need logisti-cal assistance with reconciliation, refugee repatria-tion, and power-sharing. Participants suggested theSecurity Council continue to build the capacity ofthe OAU as a potential partner in peace enforce-ment. And in order to combat the Somalia syn-drome, private groups should work to increasemajor power interest and responsibility in the futureof Africa.

The Former YugoslaviaIf the Security Council did too little too late in theGreat Lakes region of Africa, it was very involved inthe former Yugoslavia as that state broke apart. Oneparticipant noted that this conflict has been the sub-ject of one-hundred eleven council resolutions. Itwas the site of the largest and most complex opera-tion the United Nations has ever attempted. But theUnited Nations failed to bring peace to the region,and it has been almost completely left out since the1994 Dayton Accords which ended the fighting.

Although UNPROFOR (United Nations ProtectionForce), the UN-delegated peace enforcement mis-sion, was originally intended to enforce a cease-fire,it rapidly became entangled in the war for indepen-dence/ethnic civil war. At various times the militarymission involved protecting civilians by establish-ing safe areas, guarding humanitarian convoys, andattempting to force parties to the negotiating tablethrough a series of bombing campaigns. While theseoperations were intended to complement the UnitedNations’ mediation efforts, the parties to the conflictoften saw the United Nations as partial and ineffec-

If major powers are to find the political will to act inthese situations, participants observed that theymust define their interests accordingly. First, theyargued that the protection of human rights is andshould be within the national interests of all states,especially in today’s era of globalization. Second,participants urged that states should develop, andprivate actors should help promote, the strengthen-ing of an international ethic of responsibility. Someparticipants also noted that nonstate actors areunable to appeal to the Security Council, exceptindirectly through ECOSOC or the secretary-gener-al, and this may allow powerful states to ignorehuman suffering and avoid potential opportunitiesfor prevention. Some suggested that public interestgroups, humanitarian and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and regionalorganizations should have a more direct and institu-tionalized access to the Security Council.

Mismanagement of a CrisisBeyond the Security Council’s uncertainty overdealing with a failed state situation, the AfricanGreat Lakes case was marked by poor crisis man-agement. First, the mandate of UNAMIR wasblurred between peacekeeping and enforcement. Itwas close enough to enforcement to frighten poten-tial troop contributors wary of the slippery and dan-gerous slope into which they might be headed.However, the mandate was not strong enough torespond positively to requests by the field comman-der, General Dallaire, to engage actively in the sepa-ration of the parties. Furthermore, at the first sign ofadversity and the critical turning point in theregime's plans for genocide, the mission was

decreased rather thanincreased, allowing thegenocide to proceed.

Attempts to strengthenUNAMIR, once the magni-tude of human sufferingwas clear, were blocked byUS foot-dragging anddelays in deliveries ofpromised supplies. Partici-pants attributed this hesi-

...the UnitedNations is abody with apredilectionagainst the

use of force.

17


ground. At times, these twoactors could not even agreeon the basic analysis of thesituation—who should berewarded and who shouldbe punished—a prerequisitefor any chance of successfulpeace enforcement.

As an independent institu-tion, the United Nations is abody with a predilectionagainst the use of force. Theinstitution is more comfort-able with Chapter VI-typeoperations, while it seemsless able to conduct forcefulinterventions and enforce-ment. It does not have theinternal capacity to raise, fund, organize, command,or control a military force. However, some partici-pants argued that the United Nations is fully able,both institutionally and legally, to use force but ishampered by member’s unwillingness to meet theirobligations to provide capacity to the world body.Were that to happen, the culture of the institutioncould be quite different.

Post-Dayton AccordsWhile the United Nations was the primary interna-tional actor responsible for policy in the formerYugoslavia prior to the Dayton Accords, the framersof that agreement intentionally circumscribed itsrole in the post-Dayton era. The United Nations hasbeen assigned only nonmilitary tasks which noother actor wished to undertake. The coordinationand policy-setting powers of the United Nationshave been assigned to NATO. Despite this, severalparticipants argued that the United Nations still hasimportant technical, humanitarian, and symbolicroles to play as the embodiment of the internationalcommunity.

In the wider region, the United Nations continuesto play a smaller but important role. UNPREDEP(United Nations Preventive Deployment Force) inMacedonia includes preventive diplomacy, border

tive in trying to resolve the dispute. For example,when Bosnian soldiers took refuge in safe areas, theSerbs charged that the United Nations harboredthem, while the Bosnians, seeing themselves as thevictims, believed that UN attempts to treat bothsides equally signaled favoritism toward the aggres-sor.

Confusion The primary cause for the ineffectiveness of UNpeace enforcement actions in the former Yugoslaviahas been persistent confusion and ambiguity aboutwhether the mission is peacekeeping or peaceenforcement. Indeed, participants noted that manyresolutions seemed to have implicit or explicit ele-ments of both Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chap-ter VII peace enforcement. Resolutions issued underChapter VII have been dealt with using the tools ofChapter VI, such that UN commanders refused toact without the consent of all parties to use force,except in self-defense, or to follow aggressive rulesof engagement. There was also tension betweenthose with the means to implement Chapter VII res-olutions, but who preferred Chapter VI actionsbecause they are less costly and risky, and amongthose who pushed for Chapter VII action, but lackedthe capacity to back up their resolution. In severalcases, the Security Council passed a resolution—forexample the creation of safe havens—to please thegeneral membership, but did not endow the missionwith the means to carry out the job.

Participants observed that there was confusionfrom the start because the mission to Bosnia wasinitially a peacekeeping force sent to monitor acease-fire. However, despite violations of the cease-fire and the resumption of active conflict, the mis-sion was never overhauled. The United Nationstried to maintain a smooth political process ofdiplomatic negotiations between the parties whiletrying to forcefully make peace on the ground—aparadox that lead to inconsistencies and tensionbetween and within the political and military oper-ations. This tension was exacerbated by the fact thatone set of actors, the European Union, was givencontrol of the diplomatic initiative while another,the Security Council, tried to win peace on the

...the currentsystem of collective security is effective onlyunder a veryspecific set ofconditionswhich do notoften exist.

18


ipants of the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia, andthey warned of the danger that the entire horribleepisode might reoccur. Concern was also expressedthat NATO might undertake a unilateral action inKosovo that would stretch its UN mandate too farand risk both its own and the United Nations’ legiti-macy.

Learning From the Cases After careful analysis of the three cases, participantsconcluded that the current system of collective secu-rity is effective only under a very specific set of con-ditions which do not often exist. The most frequent-ly used and still viable security operation istraditional peacekeeping in situations where there isa preexisting cease-fire, mobilized military forcesare available, and the objective is peace mainte-nance. The more robust peace enforcement opera-tions require consensus on the identity of theaggressor and on a well-defined plan of action tohalt aggression and restore peace and security.

monitoring, and an arms embargo. This mission,which mixes traditional peacekeeping functionswith more innovative prevention measures, wasregarded hopefully. UNTAES (United Nations Tran-sitional Administration for Eastern Savonia, Baran-ja, and Western Sirmium) in eastern Slavonia, amission which has been delegated to the Organiza-tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), mandates a civilian police force to governthe area while strengthening the existing civilianauthority, demobilizing paramilitary groups, andending the use of oil revenues for civil war. Partici-pants attributed its success to a clear mandate, uni-fied and consistent Security Council support, politi-cal will, the capacity of the OSCE to implement themandate, and the availability of resources.

In Kosovo, which participants agreed is the situa-tion to watch, the United Nations has no presenceon the ground but has imposed a Chapter VII armsembargo. Events in Kosovo to date reminded partic-

A Danish soldier serving with the UN peacekeeping force in the former Yugosalvia in 1992. There was little peace to keep.

UN

/DP

I PH

OTO

19


use a consistent and compa-rable standard to judgebehavior and progresstoward meeting the enforce-ment objectives. As theUnited Nations learned inthe former Yugoslavia,enforcement also requires aclear and specific mandateunder Chapter VII with suf-ficient flexibility for fieldofficers to take responsibili-ty and to allow for alter-ations in the mission to meetchanging conditions on theground. Peace enforcementis also easier in political con-texts free from regional poli-tics, as was learned in theGreat Lakes.

In contrast, enforcement has failed when SecurityCouncil action was seen as illegitimate, ambiguous,bad politics, or not in the interest of the major pow-ers. Enforcement has appeared illegitimate in caseswhere Security Council action seemed to be ad hocor biased toward a pet country. Enforcement actionhas also been questioned in cases where the deci-sion-making process of the Security Council prevent-ed relevant actors from expressing their preferencesor suggestions. Enforcement has failed when themandate granted by the Security Council is contra-dictory, ambiguous, or based on unclear objectives,as was the case in the former Yugoslavia. In Iraq,enforcement failed when Security Council politicsundermined its unanimity and lead to a politicalstruggle which gave the “aggressor” political allies.Enforcement has also fallen flat when resolutionswere passed as “window dressing” to demonstratethat the Security Council was active but had nointention of backing these statements with action.This was amply demonstrated in the formerYugoslavia and the Great Lakes. Enforcement hasalso failed in cases like Rwanda when a crisis was ina country too far from the vital interests of the per-manent five or when atrocities and human sufferingwere not perceived to constitute a threat to interna-tional peace and security.

Finally, the whole collective security system worksonly when there is sufficient and sufficientlydurable political will among concerned countries tocommit to and carry out an intervention.

Participants argued that narrowing the criteriaunder which the Security Council took action couldboost its legitimacy, credibility, and efficacy in sever-al ways. First, by establishing specific conditions,intervention would be more automatic, eliminatingopportunities for subjective selection among crises.Second, narrowing the types of situations in whichthe United Nations is expected to intervene wouldprobably decrease the number of cases of interven-tion and reduce the strain on UN resources. Third,unity and cohesion within the Security Councilwould prevent situations in which different factionsact to undermine one another, destroying anychance of effective enforcement.

Improving ClarityThrough discussion, a set of conditions emergedwhich participants believed made enforcement easi-er and thus more likely to succeed. (And by corol-lary, it seemed that more participants were morelikely to support Security Council attempts at peaceenforcement in situations which possessed thesecharacteristics.) Enforcement is easier in cases whereit is clear to the international community that a com-monly accepted international norm has beenbreached; this factor changed between the early andthe late phases of the UN confrontation with Iraq.Enforcement is easier when the international com-munity feels a common, unambiguous, and immedi-ate threat to peace and security. Furthermore,enforcement is more effective in cases where theobjectives of the action are clear and specific, andwhere it is possible to observe measurable changesin behavior either toward or away from this objec-tive. Again, the two phases of Iraq provide an excel-lent illustration of this principle. Enforcement actionshould also be bounded in time, not by a specificdate of exit—which would encourage aggressors towait out the intervention—but by the accomplish-ment of a specific goal, such as withdrawal fromKuwait or the cessation of the production ofweapons of mass destruction. In a similar vein, par-ticipants argued that all enforcement actions should

...sanctions

...can causeenormous collateral damage to civilians andother statesbefore theyachieve theirobjectives.

20


advance knowledge of potentially available troops,although states would not be committed to sendingthem. “Fire brigades” would be small voluntaryforces already equipped, trained, and ready to serveas a rapid-reaction force to contain conflict until alarger monitoring or peacekeeping force could beorganized. However, participants cautioned that theidea of a fire brigade runs directly into the familiarissues of political will and the problem of recruitingand financing. Many states have expressed anunwillingness to allow a standing UN military unitof any type.

Participants also looked at ways of standardizingcommand structures and operating procedureswithin UN missions and the need to develop expe-rience in UN mission force cooperation and coordi-nation without establishing a standing army. Themost immediate problem identified was that offield control and the unwillingness of some coun-tries to place their troops under the command ofnonnationals. Enforcement has been jeopardizedwithin some missions, UNOSOM (United NationsOperation in Somalia) for example, by commanderslistening to home government orders rather thanthose of the UN commanding officer in the field.

DelegationAfter studying the United Nations’ record of mili-tary enforcement, many participants recommendedthat military enforcement missions be subcontractedor delegated to regional organizations or “coalitionsof the willing.” Within the cases examined, the con-cept of a lead nation proved relatively effective, asin the case of the United States in Iraq. The UnitedNations has also effectively delegated enforcementactions to other organizations; e.g., ECOMOG (Eco-nomic Community of West African States Cease-FireMonitoring Group) in Liberia. Participants pointedto two provisions in the Charter that support thispractice. First, under Chapter VIII the UnitedNations may delegate missions to regional organiza-tions such as the OAU. To make use of this provi-sion, the OAU has developed an African rapid-response force to react to regional crises. Second, theCharter provides for collective self-defense underArticle 51, which allows a coalition of regional states

Military Planning and Preparation In some cases only force makes an impression on anaggressor; in these instances the Security Councilneeds outside assistance for effective action. Toimprove its use of military force and its delegationpractices, participants encouraged the SecurityCouncil to improve its command and control struc-tures and advance planning systems. It was suggest-ed that the special representatives and envoys of thesecretary-general be provided with military liaisonofficers to assist in the accumulation of informationpertinent to the planning and deployment of a mili-tary intervention. A few participants advocated therevival of the Military Staff Committee to assist theSecurity Council in organizing, planning, and com-manding military enforcement missions. Othersargued that this was an untenable proposition thatwould be blocked by states afraid of creating aninternational army. However, many participantscommended the Canadian initiative that wouldestablish a rapidly deployable military headquartersas a step toward improving both the quality andspeed of mission planning and deployment. It wassuggested that even more progress could be madeon this front by establishing a core office in the Unit-ed Nations which could coordinate action with the

headquarters deployed inthe field.

Mobilization practices andstandard operating proce-dures within military unitsduring enforcement actionwere two other categoriestargeted by participants forimprovement. The speedwith which military forcescan be recruited, equipped,and deployed has been a

major stumbling block in past missions, including inthe Great Lakes. Delays in deployment allow cease-fires to deteriorate and conflicts to worsen. Partici-pants suggested standing Article 43 troop arrange-ments and a small “fire-brigade” type of force asmeans to speed up the recruitment and mobilizationof forces. The first proposal would facilitate forcetraining and provide the United Nations with

...the practices of

sanctions committees

should bereformed.

21


lems for the Security Council; however, their effec-tiveness is challenged. As is seen in the cases of Iraqand the former Yugoslavia, sanctions can take avery long time to work. They can cause enormouscollateral damage to civilians and other states beforethey achieve their objectives. They can be used bythose in power to demonize the United Nations andthose supporting the sanctions, thus strengtheningrather than eroding support for the regime. Partici-pants focused on four areas with room for improve-ment: the conditions fortriggering and ending sanc-tions, the principles behindsanctions, the need to targetand monitor their effects,and ways to reduce collat-eral damage.

Changes were proposed forthe way in which sanctionsare imposed and lifted.First, most participants feltthe Security Council shouldcease open-ended sanction-ing. This can be done byestablishing a time frameand a set of terminationconditions before sanctions are imposed. Second,participants argued for mechanisms to assess andrevise sanctions during their implementation. With-out this capability, the Security Council risks sanc-tions backfiring and creating both domestic andinternational sentiment in favor of the regime beingsanctioned while reducing the legitimacy of thesanctions regime; e.g., Iraq. Open-ended sanctionsalso risk noncompliance by states required by theCharter to enforce them as is now the case with theOAU and Libyan sanctions.

Participants argued that the principles behind sanc-tions must be clearly articulated. They distin-guished between two types of sanctions—thosewhich target internal governance and those whichtarget international behavior—with different expect-ed outcomes. If sanctions are imposed with theintention of changing internal behavior, there mustbe domestic support for sanctions within the sanc-

to defend against aggression within their region.The practice of delegation could be useful to theSecurity Council both on grounds of efficacy and asa way to increase UN enforcement capacity withoutadditional resources.

However, this stratagem has three risks. First, it isproblematic for the United Nations to delegate mis-sions to regional organizations without some provi-sion for payment for those who lack the capacity.This shortfall has been dealt with in the OAUthrough bilateral assistance from the United Statesand Great Britain. Second, delegation might be usedby rich states as a way to further withdraw fromsome regions and thus impairing the developmentof an ethic of global responsibility. Third, someregional organizations to which the United Nationsmight delegate authority do not represent all inter-ests in the region or are not seen as the legitimaterepresentative of the region. For example, the ArabLeague, which has the capacity to accept delegatedmissions from the United Nations, does not includeIsrael and thus would be a problematic representa-tive of the Middle East. Likewise, NATO, to whichthe United Nations has delegated missions in theformer Yugoslavia, is barely tolerated by Russia,which is wary of expansion of its activities inEurope.

Participants also expressed concern about UN han-dling of the transition period following a militaryintervention. The success of past peace enforcementmissions has been jeopardized by the withdrawal ofmilitary forces without adequate programs to con-tinue peace-building or civilian police follow-onmissions. For example, participants juxtaposed thesuccess of UN enforcement in eastern Slavonia,which has a transition force, against Croatia, whichhas not. The United Nations needs to devise mecha-nisms to transfer these missions to other UN organsthat could provide technical assistance once peace isestablished.

Economic, Military, Diplomatic, and FinancialSanctions The imposition of economic, military, financial, anddiplomatic sanctions poses fewer operational prob-

Changes in thecomposition ofthe SecurityCouncil weresuggested tomodernize anddemocratize the body.

22


These committees should not use sanctions for thepetty punishment of unrelated offenses and shouldavoid arbitrary decision-making practices. To rein-force these reforms, participants advised placingindependent experts on sanctions committees andestablishing reporting mechanisms between sanc-tions committees and the Security Council. Partici-pants also advocated that sanctioned states beallowed to appeal to sanctions committees toincrease humanitarian exceptions and to questionthe grounds of the sanctions.

Sanctions committees, participants argued, shouldalso give more consideration to the humanitariandamage caused by sanctions. Humanitarian excep-tions are not always well designed or implemented;they are subject to abuse, as has happened with thedual-use principle in Iraq. Participants also dis-cussed the problem of economic collateral damagedone to states that enforce sanctions against a tar-geted state. This issue is especially thorny in thecase of Iraq, as the Oil-for-Food program affects theprice of oil with serious ramifications for oil-pro-ducing and consuming states.

Security Council ReformMany participants saw the current composition andpractices of the Security Council as major sources ofits legitimacy crisis. Council reform has been on theagenda for several years with little sign of progress.However, participants said the geopolitical situationis changing dramatically, increasing the pressure forchange. One participant suggested that the Indianand Pakistani nuclear tests and subsequent declara-tion of themselves as nuclear powers is evidence ofdramatic change. This participant worried that nearnuclear powers (e.g., Germany and Japan) who arenot seated on the council might decide that explod-ing a device would be a ticket to permanent mem-bership.

Membership Changes in the composition of the Security Councilwere suggested to modernize and democratize thebody. Some participants contended that the numberof permanent members should be increased to

tioned states if they are to be effective. Sanctionsimposed to change international behavior must becarefully targeted. Otherwise, they can causedomestic hardships and run the risk of creating adomestic backlash. The Security Council lacks away to deal with this counterproductive situationshould it arise, and many participants thought itshould seek alternative mechanisms for enforcinginternational norms of behavior on states ratherthan indiscriminately punishing their civilians.

Participants advocated a situation-specific approachto all cases in which sanctions might be applied inorder to take into consideration potential collateraldamage, the chance of success, and the chance thatthe sanctions might backfire. Financial and diplo-matic sanctions were advocated as the two easiesttypes to target toward offenders and away fromcivilians. However, participants argued that moreresearch is needed on the effects of different types ofselective and comprehensive sanctions and theexperience of past attempts to target them against

transgressors of internation-al norms. Financial sanc-tions, a relatively new butvery promising innovation,especially merit research. Tofacilitate the targeting ofsanctions, participantsadvocated increased consul-tation among sanctionscommittees, affected states,and experts. Sanctions com-

mittees should improve their access to informationand analysis of the facts of a particular case in orderto target the initial sanctions and also to revise sanc-tions and to remain informed of collateral damage.

In order to improve the targeting and implementa-tion of sanctions, participants argued that the prac-tices of sanctions committees should be reformed.These committees should increase the transparencyof their working procedures, make informationabout the details of the sanctions being imposedand their effects more available, and expand theirconsultation with affected states and states possess-ing useful information about the sanctioned regime.

The SecurityCouncil typically

receives thehardest cases

to solve....

23


Regarding the veto, many argued that the scope ofthis power should be narrowed to prevent singlestates from preventing Security Council action.Another possible veto restriction would ban its useon procedural matters and limit its use to votes onsubstantive resolutions.

UN information and intelligence also elicited anumber of useful and innovative suggestions forreform. Participants proposed that the UnitedNations in general, and specifically the SecurityCouncil, should actively seek and utilize informa-tion from a more diverse set of sources. Along withintelligence from states and the Secretariat, it shouldalso look to human rights and humanitarian organi-zations both within the UN system and privateorganizations. Participants also advocated increaseduse of academic and policy experts and UN moni-toring of “public intelligence” on the Internet, list-servs, and in local and global media. Not only mightthese new sources increase the stock of availableinformation, and potentially aid the United Nationsin identifying trouble spots sooner, they could alsohelp to provide balance and perspective to “official”sources of information.

However, several participants pointedly observedthat increased information does the Security Coun-cil little good without improved means of analyzingand using the new information. To increase infor-mation-processing capacity, participants suggestedreviving the Office of Research and Collection ofInformation within the Secretariat. Participants alsoadvised that the Security Council update and regu-larize information channels within the UnitedNations and between the United Nations and out-side sources. The Security Council, General Assem-bly, field offices, states’ intelligence organs, and theSecretariat need to be connected in a two-way net-work.

Help From Other ActorsSome participants proposed that members shouldchange their perception of the Security Council asthe dispute resolution mechanism of last resort. TheSecurity Council typically receives the hardest casesto solve, leading to a predictably poor success rate.

include both more regions (especially Africa andLatin America) and more great powers (i.e., Ger-many and Japan). These changes would be an openacknowledgment by the United Nations that itsglobal political context has changed. Participantsalso argued that if Security Council actions are dri-ven by national interests, an idea not endorsed asright but accepted as reality, then the only way toeven out attention across the globe is to include agreater range of national interests in the mix.

Expanding representation would also increase thedegree to which UN members feel a truly globalresponsibility and would widen the perspective ofthe Security Council. There was a feeling that theSecurity Council should balance capacity (i.e., mem-bers with the most capacity) and representativeness.Although no concrete proposal for change of thecomposition of the Security Council has theapproval of all the permanent five, these states haveat least begun to consider potential advantages anddisadvantages of different configurations.

To open itself even further to different views, someparticipants advocated that the United Nationsestablish a system of regularized communicationnetworks connecting nonstate actors to the SecurityCouncil. Nongovernmental and regional organiza-tions could help to balance interests, provide usefulinformation, and assist in implementing resolutions.

Procedures and IntelligenceMany participants criticized the Security Council’sworking procedures. Using a system of workingcommittees and informal meetings, members of theSecurity Council hammer out the details of potentialresolutions behind the scenes. Only after an actionhas the support of the permanent members and isalmost fully elaborated, does the Security Councilhold a formal, open session to collect comments andrecommendations. The lack of transparency in thissystem allows for under-the-table agreements andthe inclusion of ulterior motives in council actions.Many participants said that opening up the informalconsultations would increase the perceived honestyof the process and enhance credibility.

24


of the willing”) does not hijack the mission to attainends which are not consistent with the UnitedNations’ purposes. Second, financial and materialsupport may have to be provided to regional orga-nizations which lack resources by other organiza-tions or benefactors. However, this could raise ques-tions about the motives of these benefactors. Third,the constitutions of some regional organizations donot allow for their participation in certain kinds ofenforcement actions. For example, the OAS cannotundertake military interventions because it is notpermitted to mobilize and organize forces. Fourth,not all regions have only one regional organization,and regional organizations may not include all theimportant states in a region. There may be competi-tion between organizations to represent the regionin the first case. And in the latter instance, actionsby the regional organization may be biased againstthe unrepresented states. Fifth, the norms and objec-tives of regional organizations may diverge fromthose of the United Nations. Nevertheless, delega-tion could be an ideal solution to improve UN credi-bility and legitimacy if there is a self-reinforcing,complementary division of labor, and sharing ofexpenses to avoid replication and overlappingexpenses.

Increased reliance on private organizations, such ashuman rights groups, humanitarian NGOs, and themedia, was also discussed by participants. Domes-tic lobbying organizations can help to mobilizepopular support for enforcement actions in placesthat are not in the vital interests of a state. NGOshelp to build global consciousness as well as edu-cate governments and populations about the con-nection between human suffering in foreign placesand national interests at home. NGOs also providethe United Nations with information and analysis,and they help to focus the attention of states andthe United Nations on the most pressing issues,separating them from background noise. The mediaperforms the last two functions as well. The CNNfactor, as it was called, also helps to link global ethi-cal concerns and domestic interests by bringinghuman suffering in far-away places close to homein a very graphic and poignant way. However, non-governmental actors offer both advantages and dis-

One participant argued for a whole new approachto security, saying that the model envisioned in theCharter is obsolete. This participant said that thenew arrangement should be built conceptually ontrying to develop a consensus for peace among thedeveloped countries. The framework would be builton regional organizations responsible for security intheir areas. The OSCE was offered as a beginningmodel. Emphasis would be placed on prevention ofconflicts and peaceful resolution of disputes. At theworld level, it was suggested that the UnitedNations focus on developing a common analysis ofthe threats to peace and the ways to alleviate them.It should also focus on disarmament and the devel-opment of an intelligence system.

Other participants said there was merit in consider-ing a new international security arrangement, butthat such a dramatic change would require a “con-stitutional convention” which seems unlikely in theforeseeable future. While the idea might be keptalive, the world has to work with the mechanismsalready in place.

Less comprehensively, participants suggestedNATO, OSCE, the Arab League, ASEAN (Associa-tion of Southeast Asian Nations), and the OAUcould be potential regional partners in managingconflicts, possibly including carrying out somepeace enforcement. The OAU has had some successin building the ACRI and in organizing a rapidresponse force. The OSCE has been active in conflictprevention and resolution in the former Yugoslavia.The advantages of delegation to regional organiza-tions mentioned by participants included: addition-al resources, improved enforcement, lower risk tothe United Nations, situation-specific knowledgeand skills, and increased commitment to the opera-tion motivated by self-interest as well as altruism.

However, participants considered several potentialdrawbacks to delegated missions. Clear lines ofauthority, responsibility, and communication mustbe established in order to smooth transitionsbetween UN and regional authority, to prevent theUnited Nations from becoming the fall guy, and toensure that the regional organization (or “coalition

25

advantages. Although they may perform somefunctions more efficiently and effectively than theUnited Nations, and they bring in additionalresources and talents, they also have their owninterests and objectives and may use the UnitedNations as a means to achieve these without con-cern for the effect on the legitimacy of the worldbody or outcome of the enforcement action.

General RecommendationsAs the conference concluded, participants highlight-ed recommendations for reforms of the UN systemand its approach to peace enforcement. The follow-ing proposals were made by different individuals,with the important caveat that the group as a wholedid not universally agree with or endorse theseideas.

States• Develop a baseline norm for acceptable state

behavior toward its citizens and strengthen aninternational ethic to take action to protect peoplefrom the state when these principles are violated.

• Acknowledge that membership and participationin the United Nations is not a free good andrequire member states meet their resource obliga-tions to allow the United Nations to budget itsactivities accordingly.

• Reallocate the financial burden for the UnitedNations across member states to reduce its depen-dence on any one state.

• Bring disputes to the Security Council or anotherUN organ before they have exploded intointractable conflicts.

Security Council and General Assembly• Analyze the agendas of the Security Council and

the General Assembly to reduce the degree towhich UN organs deal with past issues andincrease their responsiveness to current matters.

• Improve the education and public relations pro-gram of the United Nations to better communicateits essential mission and to build an international-ist ethic of responsibility.

• Modernize and democratize the Security Council.• Think creatively about ways of orchestrating a

“velvet revolution” against the current benign dic-

tators—i.e., the permanent five—who govern theinternational system. This may be necessary toachieve substantial reforms and to repair growingfaults in the collective security system.

• Stimulate debate about the type of United Nationsthe international community wants in the futureand consider what kinds of organizations are pos-sible given expectations about the future geopolit-ical environment and trends toward globalization.

Secretariat and Secretary-General • Develop a think-tank style intelligence unit in the

Secretariat separate from but complementary toits existing administrative unit.

• Free the secretary-general from regulations andnational lobbying that limit his/her ability to hirethe best and brightest applicants and place themin the positions which best utilize their skills.

• Encourage increased activism on the part of thesecretary-general especially in preventing conflictand resolving disputes peacefully.

• Establish a small unit within the Secretariat thatwould identify information-rich Internet sites thatcover key regions of the world, and that includeinsights on developing events as well as expertanalysis. This unit could condense and distributethis “people’s intelligence” throughout the institu-tion.

ConclusionThroughout the week-long conference, participantsgrappled with a number of thorny and extraordi-narily complex issues, but seemed to make head-way both in terms of understanding the conditionsfor effective Security Council enforcement and howthis knowledge might be applied in the future. Par-ticipants proposed ways for the imperfect institu-tions established in 1945 to cope with today’s rapid-ly changing political context that poorly fits theintentions, principles, and structures devised by theframers of the United Nations. They also discussedways in which regional organizations, private citi-zens groups, and the media could help fill in thegaps and extend the capabilities of the UnitedNations as a collective security system.


26


A number of principles have to be balanced as theSecurity Council works to enforce peace and securi-ty legitimately in the next decade. These includeselectivity, efficiency, pragmatism, democracy (indecision-making and peace-building), consensus,clarity, and international responsibility. Participantsalso identified a number of specific factors demon-strated by the cases of Iraq, the former Yugoslavia,and the African Great Lakes region which must beincorporated into effective future enforcement,including: a clearly defined mission and mandate,clear principles supporting action, a hierarchicallyunified command and control, the distribution ofauthority to commanders on the ground to allowflexibility to keep pace with ground realities,

improved mechanisms tomonitor and analyze fieldintelligence, institutions toconstantly reevaluate themission’s progress towardits objectives, and clearplans for exit and post-con-flict peace-building.

Because underlying causesof conflict are often cultural,regional, and economic,there are more reasons toinvolve new actors in themaintenance of peace andsecurity in order to increasethe resources, information,skills, and experience avail-able to the Security Councilfaced with an increasingly

complex world. For future success, the UnitedNations needs to combine power, results, legitimacy,intelligence, and skills in the most efficient andeffective manner that national interests and moralconcerns allow.

...the UnitedNations needs

to combinepower, results,

legitimacy, intelligence,

and skills in themost efficientand effective

manner....

27

1998 United Nations of the Next Decade participants


PH

OTO

BY M

ARY

BALL

28

Among possible remedies for the Security Council’s credibilityproblem are opening up and democratizing its operation, clarifying its mandates, and garnering more consistent support.


29

rights of its citizens. What should be the role andresponsibility of the international communitywhen there is a collapse or implosion of a nation-al government? What should be the role in thecase of a dictatorial, oppressive, and non-democ-ratic state regime?

3. Intervention decision processes should be refined.Intervention should occur only when there is aclear breach of a broadly accepted internationalnorm. Decisions on intervention should be madeconsistently, not selectively. Blatant inconsistencydestroys credibility. The objectives of the inter-vention should be clearly defined. They shouldbe specific, measurable, consistent with interna-tional norms, and able to be accomplished in arelatively short time frame. Intervention shouldoccur only when there is a clear and present dan-ger or threat to peace and security. The politicalcontext for any intervention should be acceptable,not one that will enflame or exacerbate the threatto the peace. There should be no separate conflict-ing major power national agendas.

4. The means and methods for intervention must bewisely and carefully crafted. The conferencereport contains useful recommendations on this.

5. A workable hierarchy of responsibility for main-taining peace, security, freedom, and justice forthe citizens of a state is needed. The first level ofresponsibility is clearly with the state itself. Whenstate actions violate norms, resulting in threats topeace and security, immediate neighbors andregional organizations should be next in responsi-bility. Finally, the international community mustact, working through the Security Council. Forthis hierarchy of responsibility to be effective,each level must work in complementarity withthe others, helping to build both capability at thevarious levels and a global ethic of responsibilityfor neighbors, the region, and the world commu-nity.

In its sixth decade, the Security Council of theUnited Nations grapples with credibility andsupport. Charged with primary responsibility

for maintaining international peace and security, itis being called upon to deal with situations andconflicts not anticipated by its founders. Changingcircumstances challenge its structure and method-ology.

In an increasingly globalized world, global solutionsfor maintaining peace and security are essential.Only global approaches can have the credibility,legitimacy, and burden-sharing needed to be effec-tive. To this end, conference participants exploredhow the Security Council’s performance andenforcement of its actions can be improved.

Participants found the case study approach useful.The three cases explored clearly illustrate both suc-cessful and unsuccessful aspects of the SecurityCouncil’s work. They demonstrate the need foraction on several points:

1. High priority should be given to reform of theSecurity Council to make it more credible andrepresentative. Without reform in both composi-tion and methodology, the Security Council is indanger of becoming an anachronism, neitherrespected nor accepted on matters of peace andsecurity.

2. The international community must continuedevelopment of broadly accepted norms thatanswer the key question of when it is appropriatefor the international community to intervene inthe affairs of a nation-state. A norm exists thatintervention is justified when a state commitsaggression against another. There is growingacceptance that egregious violations of humanrights also warrant intervention. More work isneeded to define the expected responsibility ofnational governments in protecting the human

Chairman’s Observations

6. The legitimate concerns about the validity andefficacy of collective security should continue tobe explored. Clearly, it is better to prevent conflictthan to deal with it. Increasing globalization ofhuman activity should permit the strengtheningof international law, freedom, and justice. Howcan this be accomplished?

Finally, reform of the Security Council and improve-ments in its role in maintaining international peaceand security will occur only if there is statesmanlikeleadership from its permanent members, particular-ly the United States. So long as the United Statesfails to exercise leadership and meet its legal obliga-tions to the United Nations, its own credibility andinfluence in the international community are beingseriously jeopardized and progress on SecurityCouncil effectiveness in maintaining peace andsecurity is hampered.

30

31

The Stanley Foundation is a private operating foundation that conducts varied programs and activitiesdesigned to provoke thought and encourage dialogue on world affairs and directed toward achieving asecure peace with freedom and justice.

Programs engage policymakers, opinion leaders, and citizens interested in solving problems and finding oppor-tunities that present themselves in an increasingly interdependent world. Areas of particular interest are: globalpeace and security, US international relations, sustainable development, human rights, the United Nations, globaleducation, and the expansion of policy deliberations to include wider public representation.

Activities include:• Round-table, off-the-record conferences and meetings for policymakers and other experts• Congressional programs• Citizen programs for educators, young people, churches, professional associations, civic groups, and education-

al institutions—often held in collaboration with other nonprofit organizations• Production of Common Ground, a weekly public radio program on world affairs• Publication of the monthly magazine World Press Review• Publication of conference reports

The Stanley Foundation welcomes gifts from supportive friends. The foundation is not a grant-making institution.

Related PublicationsUS-European Policy in the Persian Gulf: Beyond the Friction. The Persian Gulf Project, September 1997, 27 pp.

Beyond Reform: The United Nations in a New Era. Report of the Thirty-Second United Nations of the NextDecade Conference, June 1997, 32 pp.

The United Nations and the Twenty-First Century: The Imperative for Change. Report of the Thirty-First Unit-ed Nations of the Next Decade Conference, June 1996, 44 pp.

Single copies are available free. There is a small postage and handling charge for multiple copies or bulk orders.For more information contact the publications manager.

The Stanley Foundation216 Sycamore Street, Suite 500Muscatine, IA 52761 USATelephone: (319) 264-1500Fax: (319) 264-0864E-mail: [email protected]

The Stanley Foundation

http://commongroundradio.org

http://www.worldpress.org

http://reports.stanleyfdn.org

http://reports.stanleyfdn.org/PG97.pdf

http://reports.stanleyfdn.org/UNND97.pdf

http://reports.stanleyfdn.org/UNND96.pdf

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.stanleyfdn.org

Getting Down to Cases: Enforcing Security Council ...Enforcing Security Council Resolutions Topnotch...

Documents

Transcript of Getting Down to Cases: Enforcing Security Council ...Enforcing Security Council Resolutions Topnotch...