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German Foreign Policy and theLibya CrisisAlister MiskimmonPublished online: 19 Nov 2012.

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German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis

ALISTER MISKIMMON

German foreign policy has come under scrutiny due to its decision to abstain in

the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in March 2011 on the Libyan

no fly zone. Germany’s decision not to support France, the UK and the USA

ensured that no common EU position emerged and NATO’s response to the

crisis proved difficult. German foreign policy was caught between enlarging

its influence and role in crisis management and reserving the right to reject

involvement in operations that do not fit with its national interest. Drawing on

the work of Robert Gilpin, the article argues that Germany’s decision to

abstain on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 can be explained

by understanding the cost/benefit calculations of the German government,

pressured by the protracted Eurozone crisis.

INTRODUCTION

On 17 March 2011 Peter Wittig, Germany’s Ambassador to the United Nations made

the following statement:

Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely difficult to take. We

have carefully considered the options of using military force, its implications as

well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of

life should not be underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective,

we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would

affect the wider region. We should not enter a military confrontation on the opti-

mistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved.

Germany, therefore, has decided not to support a military option as foreseen par-

ticularly in OP 4 and OP 8 of the resolution. Furthermore, Germany will not con-

tribute to such a military effort with its own forces.1

With this pronouncement Peter Wittig declared Germany’s decision to abstain in the

vote on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The result of the abstention

was that Germany found itself taking a different position to its main allies, France,

the UK and the USA and found itself alongside Russia, China, India and Brazil.

This article seeks to explain the reasons behind Germany’s abstention on UN1973.

The decision to abstain on UN1973 presents us with a microcosm of German

foreign and security policy under the Merkel government. Domestic pressures

related to the Eurozone crisis and a desire to reduce Germany’s involvement in multi-

national crisis management operations lay at the heart of the decision to abstain on the

Libya no fly zone. Despite accruing significant experience in the former-Yugoslavia,

Afghanistan and elsewhere, Germany still struggles with deploying aggressive military

German Politics, Vol.21, No.4, December 2012, pp.392–410ISSN 0964-4008 print/1743-8993 onlinehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2012.739610 # 2012 Association for the Study of German Politics

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force.2 Germany’s involvement in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 was for

some a seminal moment in Germany’s involvement in military crisis management in

which Germany cast off former reservations concerning the aggressive use of military

force.3 The decision not to take part in the Libya operation suggests that Germany will

continue to assess each military operation on its own terms, rather than mirror British

and French policy.

This article argues that domestic considerations reinforce a trajectory in German

foreign policy which suggests that its traditional foreign policy alignments are becom-

ing more fluid and adaptable in the face of new challenges and calculations.4

Germany’s decision to abstain in the vote on United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1973 (UN1973) in March 2011 signalled Berlin’s distancing from the

position of London, Paris and Washington, Germany’s traditional allies. While this

may not be a sign of shifting alignment, divergence in foreign policy from the UK,

France and the USA raises a number of important implications. Rather than signalling

acquiescence to the resolution, Germany was very vocal in stating its concerns with the

decision to deploy military power, making the decision to abstain more interesting in

understanding the current state of German foreign policy.5 Currently Germany appears

unable to commit to a greater leadership role in military crisis management. This will

impact on the future of the emerging Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of

the EU.

There are several plausible explanations for Germany’s behaviour regarding the

Libyan no fly zone; German political culture continues to demonstrate significant

reluctance when it comes to the aggressive use of military force. Second, Germany

did not consider involvement in a military operation to be in its national interest. Dom-

estic political calculations forced the governing coalition to privilege domestic priori-

ties over foreign policy. Germany’s growing self-confidence in foreign policy means

that it will only commit to multinational operations that are in its direct national inter-

est.6 Third, Germany’s foreign policy lacks coherence and foreign minister Guido

Westerwelle did not fully consider the implications of the abstention. This article

will examine these explanations for German foreign policy, highlighting a German

foreign policy characterised by increasing cost–benefit calculations driven by econ-

omic pressures facing Berlin. These explanations correspond to the logic of state

foreign policy behaviour expressed in Gilpinian realism, principally, that the direction

of a state’s foreign policy can be explained by examining the interaction of security and

economic interests and their articulation through domestic political pressures. There

are three implications of German foreign policy following this Gilpinian logic. First,

German strategic culture has been more resistant to adaptation as a result of socialisa-

tion effects of CSDP and NATO than suggested. Second, today’s generational cohort

of German leaders is willing to privilege short-term calculations ahead of traditional

multilateral commitments. Third and finally, this willingness to find greater room

for manoeuvre has the danger of undervaluing existing partners and creating a more

overt sense of German foreign policy interests.

These explanations and conclusions, and inferences about the understandings,

expectations and motives of foreign policy makers presented here, are based upon

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 393

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primary interviews conducted in Berlin in 2011 with officials at the Federal Ministry of

Defence, Foreign Ministry, Chancellory, British Embassy, political parties and several

think tanks. The identity of interview participants has been anonymised. Further

support and triangulation of interview data was generated by analysis of policy state-

ments and documents and by examination of domestic party politics prior to, during

and in the months after the Libya crisis.

THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Since unification, considerable attention has been given over to the development of

German foreign policy.7 Freed from the formal constraints of division and the Cold

War, foreign policy was an area in which Germany was expected to play a more

active role.8 Germany has displayed significant caution in the speed and scope of its

post-unification foreign policy, particularly in the deployment of military force.

Germany participated in Operation Allied Force in 1999 only after a protracted dom-

estic political debate throughout the second half of 1998 and early 1999.9 German poli-

ticians, notably Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens) argued that Germany had a

responsibility to prevent acts of genocide due to its history. However, examples of Ger-

many’s judgement not to participate in the invasion of Iraq in 200310 and the challenge

of deploying troops in Afghanistan11 are pointed to as instances which suggest that sig-

nificant adaptation on the basic principles guiding the deployment of military force

have not substantially changed in the years since 1990. According to Berenskoetter

and Giegerich,12 Germany’s foreign policy cannot outstrip its ontological security –

what they define as the norms defining Germany’s security and defence identity.

Debates within German foreign policy have been characterised by divergence over

whether Germany should feel compelled to participate more actively in military

crisis management due to historical responsibility; or Germany’s past actions should

mean the privileging of non-military solutions to international crises and a reluctance

to consider the deployment of military forces. This tension is summed up by Hellmann

who states,

The Bonn Republic had a clear idea of what they wanted to avoid. ‘Never again

Weimar’ was their credo in the beginning. Achieving this came comparatively

easy. For the ‘self-confident’ Berlin Republic, it is considerably more difficult

to contrast a new, positive foreign policy with the past.13

The Libya crisis presents evidence of a protracted adjustment to an altered inter-

national environment characterised by increasing challenges to the German state. Hell-

mann compellingly argues that Germany’s growing self-confidence stems from a

greater awareness of its power.14 But the lack of sure-footedness of German foreign

policy on the Libya crisis suggests that despite Germany’s more self-assured position,

it is still reconciling questions of power, interests and identity. Chafetz, Spirtas and

Frankel suggest this when they assert, ‘We can not know what we want if we do not

know who we are. This insight holds for foreign policy as much as it does for personal

preferences.’15

394 GERMAN POLITICS

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Germany’s struggle to reconcile these competing demands figures strongly in the

narrative of German foreign policy makers. German politicians stress that Germany

is a dependable and predictable partner for its allies and a positive contributor to inter-

national peace. In a major foreign policy speech in October 2010 Foreign Minister

Guido Westerwelle outlined the core aspects of German foreign policy stating,

German foreign policy is based on the continuity of the previous decades. It is

dependable and predictable, orientated by our values and interests and it is a

motor for political openness and economic development. German foreign

policy stands for equality and fair reconciliation of interests.16

Germany has developed a reputation as the multilateral partner par excellence.

Taking a position which differed from its major allies without a coherent explanation

for doing so called German policy into question.17 As the Libya crisis developed, con-

cerns grew within Germany at how Germany’s position has been perceived and the

impact of Germany’s abstention on its future foreign policy.18 With uncertainty over

the future of NATO after its Afghanistan operation winds down, lack of unity on

Libya suggests that Germany’s role in European security co-operation will continue

to show hesitancy. The decision to abstain on the Libya no fly zone raises comparisons

with Germany’s decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 ahead of EU part-

ners and the decision to oppose the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Crawford argues that the

decision to break ranks from EU partners and prematurely recognise Croatia and Slo-

venia was the result of domestic political priorities.19 On the Iraq issue, Dettke argues

that normative principles of German foreign policy trumped external pressure to act as

a partner to the USA.20 We assert that Germany’s decision not to participate in

NATO’s Libya no fly zone operation was not primarily the result of normative disso-

nance with London, Paris and Washington, DC. Rather the decision was driven by

domestic political pressures facing the coalition government, pressures which out-

weighed traditional tenets of German foreign policy.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE LIBYA CRISIS

The crisis in Libya gained momentum during February 2011. Taking inspiration from

events in Tahrir Square in Cairo, calls for greater freedoms in Libya were met with pro-

posals from Guido Westerwelle for a ‘transformation partnership’ with the Middle East

to encourage education and business links between Europe and the Middle East.21 A

series of protests by Libyan civilians in four cities on 17 February were quickly sup-

pressed by Colonel Gaddafi leading to widespread unrest across the country. The

unrest quickly escalated to the point that EU member states put in place measures to

repatriate citizens. In the run up to the commencement of the no fly zone, on the 26

February 2011 the German air force rescued 134 employees of Wintershall AG,

twenty-two of which were German citizens and flew them to the island of Crete.22

The decision to rescue the employees of Wintershall AG is interesting in the context

of the crisis as it demonstrates swift and decisive action on the part of the German gov-

ernment to intervene. Looking at the reasons behind the decision to abstain raises a

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 395

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number of interesting points. Merkel’s involvement in the lead-up to the UN vote was to

stress the importance of a regional approach to the crisis and to call for a UN resolution to

legitimise any action taken. France and the UK provided what chancellor Merkel was

asking for – a regional approach which brought in Arab League support and a UN res-

olution. Despite this, what is overwhelming in the justifications given by the majority of

the main players in the decision is the centrality of German domestic considerations.

These considerations focused on the risk of German forces becoming embroiled in an

extended conflict and German political assertions in German domestic politics that

the crisis could be resolved through diplomatic and economic tools. Guido Westerwelle

became a central figure in the decision to abstain on UN1973. As the crisis developed,

however, Westerwelle’s handling of the crisis and its wider implications for German

foreign policy drew in the government as a whole for criticism, raising question

marks over Angela Merkel’s handling of foreign policy.

WESTERWELLE’S REPONSE TO CRITICISM OF GERMANY’S ABSTENTION

Merkel stated her sadness at the criticism the German government received within

Germany and from EU and NATO partners in abstaining on UN1973.23 However, it

was Guido Westerwelle’s handling of the Libya crisis which came under most criti-

cism, despite the government’s public support for his actions. Criticism was directed

at Westerwelle for a number of reasons. First, the decision to abstain marked a diver-

gence in opinion between Germany and France, the UK and the USA. Second, due to

Germany’s abstention Westerwelle was criticised for effectively isolating German

influence on Libya. Westerwelle was criticised in Berlin for a lack of thought explained

by what was perceived as a lack of foreign policy expertise.24 Finally, former foreign

minister Joschka Fischer’s vocal criticism of Westerwelle asserted that the decision to

abstain marked a low point of German foreign policy influence and threatened to

damage future German foreign policy and the EU’s attempts to forge a more influential

role in international affairs. Fischer claimed that, ‘Germany has lost its credibility in

the United Nations and in the Middle East . . . German hopes for a permanent seat

on the Security Council have been permanently dashed and one is now fearful of

Europe’s future.’25

Westerwelle’s defence of the decision to abstain on UN1973 focused on the risks to

the German armed forces if they participated in the no fly zone and his disagreement

with France, the UK and the USA of a military solution to the Libya crisis:

We calculated the risk. If we see that three days after this intervention began, the

Arab League already criticises (it), I think we had good reasons . . . This does not

mean that we are neutral, it does not mean that we have any sympathy with

Colonel Gaddafi, but it means that we see the risks.26

Westerwelle claimed that Germany would not have been able to avoid involvement in

the enforcement of the no fly zone if it had voted yes on the UN resolution:

If we had have voted yes, Germany would have come under severe pressure as

the largest European member of NATO to participate militarily. We would no

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longer be debating whether we send soldiers to Libya. Rather we would be

dealing with the question: how many soldiers do we send?27

A further justification which Westerwelle drew on in defence of the decision to abstain

focused on concerns that there should be no assumption of military involvement to

support the aspirations of citizens involved in the Arab Spring. Speaking on German

radio, Westerwelle stated,

I warn against having a discussion in Europe about a military intervention every

time there is injustice in north Africa or in Arabia . . . I am convinced that there

can only be a political solution in Libya . . . At the end of the day it is important

that we clearly stand by the democrats . . . But it is also clear that we cannot threa-

ten military action against every country in north Africa where there is

injustice.28

Westerwelle’s defence of his position stressed the risks of involvement in any mili-

tary operation, with clear allusions to the NATO experience in Afghanistan: ‘It is not

because we have some sort of lingering soft spot for Gaddafi’s system that we decided

not to send German troops to Libya, but because we also have to see the risks of a

lengthy mission.’29 In arguing that using non-military means was the correct strategy

to depose Gaddafi Westerwelle was arguing a key tenet of Genscherism by attempting

to find a peaceful diplomatic solution and to limit German military involvement in the

NATO operation.30 When the Libyan rebels entered Tripoli in late August 2011 signal-

ling the beginning of the end of the Gaddafi regime Westerwelle claimed that sanctions

and political pressure driven by Germany had undermined the Libyan leader and had

played a major role in his downfall.31

GERMANY IS SIDELINED

There are important additional factors which shaped Germany’s response to the Libya

crisis. There was considerable unease within Berlin based on perceptions of being

excluded from the Franco-British diplomacy to acquire UN support for a robust poli-

cing of the no fly zone and the protection of civilians in Libya.32 Berlin considered the

mission had not been thought through and that a lack of planning and clear sense of

what the mission’s aims were would perpetuate NATO’s role in Libya.33 German gov-

ernment criticism at what they conceived as the poorly prepared resolution festered in

the German government’s justification for not participating in the NATO mission. In a

thinly veiled attack on Franco-British planning, Defence Minister de Maiziere stated,

‘Our decision not to participate in the military part of the Libya mission was based on

carefully considered reasons. It remains correct.’34 As well as this criticism of the plan-

ning of the NATO mission and France’s sidelining of Germany, de Maiziere supported

Westerwelle’s reservation on the policy of military intervention by stating,

The responsibility to protect a country’s civilian population if its government

violates human rights is firmly anchored in international law. But does that

mean we are allowed to intervene? Or does that mean we’re actually required

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIBYA CRISIS 397

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to? I believe that each military operation must be analysed to determine whether

its goals can be achieved with appropriate means and within an appropriate time

frame as well as how one gets out at the end. Every one.35

De Maiziere’s caution on the military intervention in Libya was most pithily expressed

in the following manner: ‘Although the heart says yes (to a military mission), the cool

head says: leave it alone.’36

Another factor in Germany’s decision was that policy makers in Berlin were caught

somewhat by surprise by the USA’s decision to support the Franco-British plan.37

Because of the reservations on the no fly zone coming out of Washington, policy

makers in Berlin calculated that Germany would not be exposed diplomatically in its

opposition to the mission, if the USA failed to support London and Paris.38 When on 16

March 2011 it became clear that the USA would support France, the UK, the Lebanon

and the Arab League’s draft resolution, the German government was put under intense

pressure to decide on its position within a very short period of time. In the late hours of

16 March and early 17 March Guido Westerwelle, Angela Merkel and Thomas de

Maiziere discussed Germany’s position on the UN resolution. On the eve of the vote in

the UN Security Council the UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign Minister

William Hague telephoned Berlin to urge support of the resolution.39 Despite the external

pressure on Germany to vote yes on the resolution, Germany’s abstention was not exces-

sively criticised by London and Paris, with Cameron and Sarkozy more focused on leading

the mission than negotiating its remit with Germany.40

Germany’s sidelining was also in evidence with the Franco-British agreement of

November 2010. Despite often very public differences, London and Paris have

sought greater co-operation bilaterally rather than including Germany. While there

remain strong ties between the German, French and British armed forces it is on the

question of rapid deployability in moments of crisis that the cracks in relations

between the EU’s big three become pronounced. Once German forces are in place

they demonstrate themselves to be able contributors to multinational forces.41 The

‘cost’ of Germany’s abstention was the reinforcement of Germany troops in Afghani-

stan.42 Germany sent 300 personnel to man AWACS flights in Afghanistan to free up

NATO forces for the Libya no fly zone operation.

PARTY POLITICS

Despite external pressure from London, Paris and Washington to support the resol-

ution, there was no cohesive domestic constituency pushing the government to

support it. Parties were split on the response to the abstention on UN1973. Special

party meetings were held on the evening of 17 March 2011 to discuss the UN vote

and prepare positions for the debate on 18 March in the Bundestag. Despite Paterson’s

assertion that foreign policy has become a more contested area of politics in Germany

in recent years since the CDU/ CSU– SPD Grand coalition (2005–09),43 political

parties in the Bundestag, with the exception of the Left, were divided over the UN res-

olution – no clear party political lines were drawn.44 The speed of the diplomacy

moving to the resolution also caught the parties by surprise.45

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Paradoxically, although foreign policy may have become more of a contested

political topic, at the same time it has slipped down the scale of importance in

German politics. The abstention on UN1973 was partly an FDP electoral tactic in

light of the upcoming state elections in Baden-Wurttemberg on 27 March 2011.

With concerns that the FDP might not pass the 5 per cent electoral threshold,

Westerwelle calculated that an abstention would prove helpful. In a poll by Emnid

for Bild am Sonntag on 20 March 2011, 62 per cent of respondents were for a mili-

tary mission in Libya with 31 per cent against. But, when asked whether the German

armed forces should participate, 65 per cent of respondents answered ‘no’ with 29

per cent responding ‘yes’.46

Members of the Green Party were most forceful in their criticism of the govern-

ment’s position. The Green Party’s co-leader, Cem Ozdemir, criticised the govern-

ment’s abstention in an interview with Der Spiegel:

Despite the risks associated with a no-fly zone, Germany should have voted on

the side of its European partners like France and Great Britain . . . The core of our

actions must be the prevention of Gaddafi’s war against his own people as well as

providing aid for the refugees using proportionate means . . . I am pleased by the

decision and I sincerely hope that it hasn’t come too late.47

Green Party member, Jurgen Trittin, added: ‘It is good that the abstention did not block

the resolution.’48 The SPD’s leader Sigmar Gabriel was initially more sympathetic to

the government’s decision stating that, ‘I can understand the skepticism, and for that

reason the abstention was the right move.’49 However, as pressure grew on

Germany, Gabriel’s position shifted to criticism of the government’s position. In

light of the abstention, Gabriel argued that ‘it looks as if Germany is knuckling

down under the power of this oil Mafioso (Gaddafi)’.50 In a marked difference to

the debate in London, the question of the principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’

(R2P) did not feature prominently in German discussions on the pros and cons of sup-

porting the UN resolution.51 In the Bundestag debate on UN1973 on 18 March Renate

Kunast (Greens) and Heide Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) were the only members of parlia-

ment to raise R2P as a factor.52 Another Green Party member, Tom Koenigs, argued

that it was ‘not worthy of Germany’ – to ignore human rights in their decision on

UNSC Resolution 1973.53 Instead, the parliamentary debate in Berlin focused on the

impact of German abstention on German foreign policy and its standing in the

world and the reasons behind the abstention.

The Left Party’s position on the Libya decision was consistent with its long-

standing criticism of NATO and the alliance’s growing role in crisis management

operations.54 The decision to increase Germany’s commitment in Afghanistan to

ease the burden on NATO’s operation in Libya was viewed as deeply problematic

and inconsistent. Wolfgang Gehrcke, the experienced foreign policy specialist from

the Left Party stressed what he saw as the inherent contradiction of the German pos-

ition in his criticisms of Westerwelle and Merkel’s Libya policy. Gehrcke complained

that, ‘It’s a perverse logic to exacerbate the war in Afghanistan because one doesn’t

want to get involved in a war in Libya.’55 Criticism of Westerwelle’s position was

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not confined to opposition parties. Ruprecht Polenz of the CDU, Chairman of the

Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag suggested that rather than abstention,

‘You can show solidarity with the alliance without being right up at the front

line.’56 This policy of political and economic support of NATO without frontline

support of its operations has been a means of avoiding being forced into the aggressive

use of military force.57 Berlin decided not to exercise the option of supporting the aims

of the Libya mission by not providing aggressive military support.

With no clear party political lines on the Libya case, pressure on the government

to consider its position was limited. Merkel, who was concentrating on the Eurozone

crisis and managing the domestic political fall-out of any German support of a rescue

package for ailing Eurozone members, failed to make the issue a top priority. Chan-

cellor Merkel has overseen an increase in German personnel in Afghanistan but has

been conservative over other military deployments. The Red/Green government of

1998–2005 was more revolutionary in breaking down some of the barriers to Ger-

many’s increased role in military crisis management. Under the current government

there has been a scaling back of ambition in security and defence policy stemming

from the CDU/CSU–FDP Coalition Treaty of 2009. On page 124 of the treaty the

government committed itself to the establishment of a Bundeswehr Commission on

cutting the costs of defence and for the streamlining of the leadership and adminis-

tration of the Bundeswehr.58 The Bundeswehr Commission which emerged – the

Structure Commission chaired by Frank-Jurgen Weise, head of the Federal Labour

Agency – was primarily driven by aims for financial cuts rather than strategic use

of the Bundeswehr.59 Consequently there was little sense of what the German

armed forces should be used for, despite the external pressures on Germany.

While some attention was given to examples of reforms in the UK and France, dom-

estic solutions prevailed.60 The focus has been on maintaining the status-quo in a

period of fiscal consolidation, rather than the development of new capabilities and

objectives. This was in contrast to the von Weizsacker Commission in 2000 which

had a much more strategic outlook on Germany’s growing role in crisis management

in the wake of Operation Allied Force.61 Interviews in the Federal Ministry of

Defence suggest that the main aim of the reforms is to concentrate on building multi-

lateral territorial defence capabilities with smaller partners in Europe.62 The main

drive behind the ‘Ghent initiative’ – focused on pooling and sharing capabilities,

initially in the EU but now within NATO as well – which was sparked by former

Defence Minster zu Guttenberg is to maintain a status quo in what the Bundeswehr

can offer, rather than revolutionising defence in Europe. Through this Germany

hopes to retain as broad a spectrum of defence capabilities as possible in the face

of fiscal challenges. The Libya decision and recent developments in Franco-British

defence co-operation reinforce a preference in Berlin for focusing on territorial

defence with London and Paris leading on expeditionary warfare.63 Under the

recent reforms and recommendations of the Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr,

Germany’s ‘level of ambition’ has been reduced to 10,000 from 16,000 personnel

– but this is in keeping with UK and French moves and is a sign of the new budget-

ary limitations which all EU states face in defence policy.64

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EXPLAINING GERMANY’S ABSTENTION

Explaining why Germany decided to abstain on the Libya vote presents a number of

puzzles. In another example of Germany going its own way, Crawford’s analysis of

Germany’s early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia highlights four possible

factors: realist explanations focusing on material power; cultural explanations high-

lighting Germany’s social context; pluralist understandings of domestic political

debates; and finally, institutional accounts examining European decision-making struc-

tures and their limitations.65 Institutionalist arguments point to a breakdown in EU

foreign policy machinery which resulted in no unified position and accentuated the

roles of London and Paris in pushing for a UN resolution. Le Monde castigated the

EU for its failure to reach a common policy:

The European Union, for its part, has failed miserably. ‘Institutional’ Europe has

not faced up to the challenge. In the North African saga it does not exist. It is

incapable of agreeing on how to act, on whether to recognise the Libyan opposi-

tion and most, of all, on the legitimacy of the use of force. The disunity is total

and particularly striking when it is a question of deciding on war – that is to say

when history becomes tragedy and it is necessary to move from frothy rhetoric

about the rights of man.66

Failure to reinforce the fledgling foreign policy institutions outlined in the Lisbon

Treaty ensured that fault lines re-emerged between member states. This is not solely

Germany’s fault. Yet, Gunther Hellmann et al.67 argue that Germany is failing to

live up to the expectations it established in the EU in the post-Amsterdam Treaty

period – this applies for developments in crisis management, where Germany picks

and chooses rather than plays a dependable and predictable role. The Franco-British

defence agreement of November 2010 excluded Germany because of concerns that

Germany could not be relied upon and as a way to profile Franco-British defence dom-

inance.68 The ‘pooling and sharing’ initiative also suggests that Germany is more com-

fortable with bilateral or small multilateral groupings within the EU, rather than

working through the EU at 27. Germany’s position could be interpreted as ‘free-

riding’ at a time of immense pressure on the government. The robust defence of

Germany’s decision from Westerwelle and de Maiziere, in particular, suggest that

while ‘free-riding’ cannot be ruled out, the German government displayed divergent

policy preferences than France and the UK which indicate a proactive opposition to

the Libya decision, rather than a passive acceptance of the resolution.

Insights from Foreign Policy Analysis have been dominated by the bureaucratic

politics model to explain government decision making in foreign policy crises.69

Despite tensions between the foreign policy-related ministries, there was no substantial

conflict within Berlin concerning what course of action Germany should take on the

UN vote.70 Westerwelle, Merkel and de Maiziere all agreed that German involvement

was out of the question. Traditionally, the leader of the junior coalition partner takes

the position of Foreign Minister which can lead to competition between the Chancel-

lery and the Foreign Ministry over who directs German foreign policy. Foreign Min-

ister Westerwelle has been criticised for his handling of his brief, but on the issue of

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Libya there was widespread support within the government for his decision.71 The

bureaucratic model approach, therefore has limited explanatory value in the case of

the Libya crisis.

Explaining Germany’s decision to diverge from France, the UK and the USA from

a realist standpoint also presents a mixed picture. Realism has often been dismissed as

lacking explanatory power when it comes to German foreign policy. (West) Germany’s

multilateral instincts have often contradicted realist expectations of Berlin pursuing

more national interest driven foreign policy objectives.72 Realist scholars expect that

powerful states will pursue ‘security first’ foreign policies, even if economic interests

are affected.73 Westerwelle’s abstention was met with consternation by Joschka

Fischer and former General Inspector of the Bundeswehr Klaus Naumann for jeopar-

dising Germany’s attempt to get a permanent seat on the United Nations Security

Council, an objective that has united recent German governments.74 Involvement in

the operation could have increased Germany’s influence within the NATO operation

and in the post-conflict environment. Economic indicators suggest that Libya is not

of vital importance to the German economy. In 2010 Libya was ranked sixty-sixth

in countries receiving German exports and thirty-eighth in terms of imports to

Germany.75 Prior to the crisis 14 per cent of Libya’s oil went to Germany, with 32

per cent of oil exports to Italy and 10 per cent to France.76 By abstaining alongside

Russia, China, India and Brazil, Germany could be positioning itself with emerging

economies. In contrast the UK and France have targeted Libya in recent years for

crude oil supplies as a result of declining North Sea supplies.77 This explanation high-

lights a German grand strategy which has favoured economic success of military dom-

inance in the international system mirroring a recent description of Germany as a geo-

economic power.78 In abstaining, realism would suggest that Germany is avoiding

multilateral constraints on its foreign policy and avoiding any unnecessary commit-

ments in order to pursue relative gains.

Robert Gilpin’s realism suggests that economic interests and security first foreign

policy strategies need not be in opposition.79 Gilpin asserts than states follow several

objectives at any given time. Rather than following a policy of power maximisation,

states consider the costs and opportunities of a given strategy. Germany’s decision

to abstain was, according to realist views, driven by material incentives which

would not have been best served by involvement in enforcing the Libya no fly zone.

Taking Gilpin’s assumptions and applying them more broadly to German foreign

policy, the decision to reduce spending on defence and a clear preference for avoiding

military intervention signals a state not driven by security concerns, but one which is

attempting to reinforce its economic strength in the face of mounting challenges to the

German economic model. Gilpin’s realism has explanatory power for Germany, in that

Germany did not view the Libya crisis of such importance that it considered it a direct

threat to its security – thus lowering the probability of involvement in the no fly zone.

In light of the economic pressures associated with the Eurozone crisis, a volatile pol-

itical climate within Germany, and an energy strategy privileging relations with Russia

and the former Soviet republics, rather that the Middle East, Germany saw no clear

interest in becoming involved in the NATO operation. The UK and France’s

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growing dependence on Libyan oil suggests that for London and Paris security and

economic interests coincided, making their attempts to stabilise Libya in their national

interests.80 Germany’s strategic interests have focused on Eastern Europe to secure

energy supplies for the future, with concerns about the impact of peak oil becoming

increasingly important in German foreign policy making.81

Constructivist explanations have consistently stressed Germany’s social context as

a defining factor of its foreign policy, leading Germany to pursue different preferences

than are to be expected from a major power.82 In the case of Libya constructivist analy-

sis could explain Germany’s decision as a consistent reticence to deploy military force

and the primacy of multilateral diplomatic solutions to crises.83 In this regard,

Germany had a different conception of appropriate action than France, the UK and

the USA which led it to consider an alternative strategy.84 Westerwelle’s understand-

ing of what was an appropriate response to the crisis was shared by Merkel and de

Maiziere, who considered the risks of military intervention too great and the strategy

of sanctions more effective. German diplomacy therefore had to try and walk a tight-

rope of disagreeing with its allies’ strategy while supporting the aims of Operation

Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector. This would have been made easier

if Germany had voted yes to UN1973 and took a back seat in the military operation.

As Stelzenmuller puts it, Germany was caught up in a classic foreign policy

dilemma; having a choice between two high-risk options with little sense of clarity

on either course of action.85

Debates on the decision to abstain in the Bundestag suggest that there was disagree-

ment over the normative principles underlying the decision to abstain. SPD and Green

Party members of parliament argued that the government was in fact going against nor-

mative principles of German foreign policy established in the former Yugoslavia,

which should have compelled Germany to participate.86 Germany’s actions during

Operation Unified Protector suggest, therefore, that normative explanations for

Germany’s abstention do not tell the whole story. Germany’s reason for abstention

was driven by an assessment of the case before it, rather than a normatively grounded

opposition to the use of military force. Germany’s main criticisms of the resolution

were lack of planning, the risk of becoming involved in a protracted campaign and con-

cerns over pressure to intervene as a matter of course without exhausting non-military

options. The electoral incentives for abstention to position the FDP in regional elec-

tions were a motivating factor as well as a sense in Berlin that they were being

harried into participation in the no fly zone by London and Paris, without due

consultation.87

Rather than an outward looking strategy, Jurgen Habermas has suggested that

Germany’s reluctant foreign policy is the result of domestic concerns taking

precedence over ambitious foreign policy objectives:

The new German intransigence has deeper roots. In the wake of reunification,

Germany’s perspective had already changed in an enlarged country preoccupied

with its own problems. But there was a more sweeping change in the mentalities

after Helmut Kohl. With the exception of a too quickly exhausted Joschka

Fischer, since Gerhard Schroder took office a normatively unambitious

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generation has been in power that has become preoccupied with a short-winded

approach to the day-to-day problems of an increasingly complex society. Con-

scious of the diminishing room for political manoeuvre, these people shy

away from farsighted goals and constructive political projects, let alone an

undertaking like European unification.88

These domestic concerns which have sharpened in the past decade have made the

German government focus on the details of addressing the Eurozone crisis to the exclu-

sion of a foreign policy strategy with a more ambitious scope. The CDU/CSU–FDP

government took the decision to abstain on UN1973 because it was not seen as a pri-

ority and Westerwelle firmly believed that the goals of France, the UK and the USA

could be achieved with sanctions.89

CONCLUSION: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF GERMANY’S ABSTENTION

Germany’s response to the Libya crisis challenges us to consider its impact on the

development of German foreign policy. Gilpinian realism, which addresses both secur-

ity and economic factors, suggests that German policy makers did not consider the

Libya crisis to be a security threat which Germany needed to respond to. In addition,

economic challenges from the Eurozone spilling over into electoral pressure on the

government provided the government with incentives not to become involved in

unpopular crisis management commitments. Germany’s reluctance to intervene is

further evidence of what Laidi views as the wider conception that the EU is risk

averse.90 Concerns over domestic political instability in Germany caused by a pro-

tracted campaign and the implications of the Eurozone crisis, coupled with an

energy security strategy focused on Russia ensured that Germany did not calculate

involvement in the NATO operation to be in its interest. The first main implication

of this study is to outline that the failure of the EU’s big three to agree on a

common position indicates that German strategic culture has been more resistant to

adaptation as a result of the socialisation effects of CSDP and NATO than suggested.91

Westerwelle and de Maiziere’s scepticism of British and French stressing of R2P on

the surface indicates normative dissonance between the EU’s leading military states.

An alternative explanation to this is, however, that German policy makers, faced

with being sidelined from Franco-British diplomacy took an opposing view in

protest at their exclusion.

Germany’s behaviour appears to have been motivated by national interests which

diverged from France and the UK. Giplin’s realist interpretation of German behaviour

is useful in assessing the motivations of the German government concerning the

material incentives for abstention. However, it remains to be seen whether Libya

signals a longer-term trend in German foreign policy which is defined by similar be-

haviour, or whether short-term calculations, as Steltzenmuller suggests, resulted in

Germany taking the worst of the two decisions before it. Elite interviews and an analy-

sis of the domestic political context facing the German government make clear that

Germany’s stance on Libya was more of an aberration than a statement of a new

self-interested German foreign policy. The constant cycle of electoral competition

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coupled with pressures from the Eurozone and the legacy of the Energiewende after the

Fukushima nuclear disaster appear to have overwhelmed German foreign policy

makers, who privileged short-term calculations over traditional multilateral commit-

ments, without fully assessing the implications of this course of action. This second

implication of the analysis presented here suggests that German foreign policy is

going through a period of transition to address new challenges to Germany. The

coalition was already stretched by crisis managing EU policy and minimising the elec-

toral fall-out of rescuing the Euro. Cameron and Sarkozy’s understanding of the

German government position was in part an acceptance of the pressures Merkel was

under domestically – although French and British leadership on the issue was a

useful way to profile Cameron and Sarkozy in the face of a perceived increase in

German political influence in the EU.92

Timothy Garton Ash criticised Germany for its, ‘leave me alone attitude and desire

to be a greater Switzerland’, themes which hark back to the years immediately after

German unification when Germany’s future foreign policy orientation was being

debated.93 Germany is on the one hand a forceful negotiator aware of its power and

national interests within the EU94 – particularly when demanding fiscal responsibility

from Eurozone partners, and it has incrementally increased its role in Afghanistan as

part of NATO’s operations. If the case of Libya demonstrates that ‘made in Berlin’ sol-

utions will be more prevalent in German foreign policy, this would mark a break from

the Bonn republic and the consolidation of the Berlin republic. Former Federal Presi-

dent Roman Herzog argued that with Germany’s involvement in Bosnia in the 1990s

the united Germany had undertaken new responsibility in international affairs. He

suggested that,

Germany belongs to the concert of the great democracies whether it likes it or

not, and if one of these democracies stands aside she inevitably damages not

only the others, but in the analysis herself as well . . . We see ever more

clearly that risk-averse inaction can in the long run be more risky than potentially

risky action . . . If we do not confront risks locally, they will come to us.95

Germany’s decision to abstain on UN1973 highlights tensions within Germany’s

traditional partners. Foreign Minister Westerwelle has attempted to address this

through a policy to, ‘reinforce old partnerships and establish new partnerships’.96 A

third implication of this study for German foreign policy is that this attempt to establish

greater room to manoeuvre has the danger of undervaluing existing partners and creat-

ing the perception that German foreign policy is re-aligning according to a more overt

sense of German foreign policy interests. Germany has not deepened its involvement in

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Germany is more comfortable with

intergovernmental co-operation with smaller partners in the EU focusing on territorial

defence, than transforming its armed forces. The Swedish-German Ghent process of

‘pooling and sharing’ suggests that co-operation within smaller EU partners is envi-

saged as an attempt to reinforce German capabilities in a difficult financial environ-

ment, rather than considering building new and improved capabilities to meet future

needs.97 Germany’s stress on the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland) to

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attempt to reinvigorate discussions on a joint civ–mil operations headquarters is

another example of Germany’s preference for small group co-operation in security

and defence. 98

Maull argues that in contrast to the Eurozone crisis, Germany’s room for

manoeuvre in the Libya crisis was considerably greater, but suggests that domestic pol-

itical pressure within the governing coalition and embedded scepticism within policy

elites of the utility of military force shaped Germany’s decision to abstain.99

Germany’s role in the Libya crisis suggests that German policy makers faced with

the financial crisis and its potential ramifications for Germany’s role in Europe

sought to limit Germany’s international commitments and declined to become

involved in enforcing the no fly zone.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank the journal editors, Prof Ben O’Loughlin, Dr Luis

Simon and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their helpful comments in

improving this article.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Alister Miskimmon is Senior Lecturer in European Politics and International Relations

at Royal Holloway, University of London. His research interests include German and

EU foreign and security policy and strategic narratives in international affairs.

NOTES

1. P. Wittig, ‘Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Wittig on the Security Council Resolution on Libya’, 17March 2011, available from http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/__pr/Speeches/PM__2011/20110317_20Explanation_20of_20vote_20-_20Libya.html?archive=2984642(accessed 1 September 2011).

2. C. Schwegmann (ed.), Bewahrungsproben einer Nation: die Entsendung der Bundeswehr ins Ausland(Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2011).

3. A. Miskimmon, ‘Falling into Line: The Legacy of Operation Allied Force on German Foreign Policy’,International Affairs 85/3 (2009), pp.561–73.

4. New York Times columnist Roger Cohen suggests that, ‘Germany has entered a new era of foreignpolicy ambivalence and nationalist calculation.’ R. Cohen, ‘France Flies, Germany Flops’, New YorkTimes, 17 April 2011, p.10.

5. B.D. Jones, ‘Libya and the Responsibilities of Power’, Survival 53/3 (2011), pp.51–60.6. D. Dettke, Germany Says No: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy

(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2009); G. Hellmann, ‘Normatively Disarmed, ButSelf-Confident’, Internationale Politik Global Edition 3/2011 (2011), pp.45–51.

7. J. Duffield, World Power Forsaken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); S. Harnisch andH. W. Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2001).

8. T. Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe (Basingstoke: PalgraveMacMillan, 2010); T. Noetzel and B. Schreer, ‘All the Way? The Evolution of German Military Power’,International Affairs 84/2 (2008), pp.211–21.

9. A. Miskimmon, Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Miskimmon, ‘Falling into Line’.

10. Dettke, Germany Says No.

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11. Noetzel and Schreer, ‘All the Way?’.12. F. Berenskoetter and B. Giegerich, ‘From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German

Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War’, International Security 19/3 (2010), pp.407–52.13. Hellmann, ‘Normatively Disarmed, But Self-Confident’, p.46.14. Ibid.15. G. Chafetz, M. Spirtas and B. Frankel, ‘Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign

Policy’, in G. Chafetz, M. Spirtas and B. Frankel (eds), The Origins of National Interests (London:Frank Cass, 1999), p.xvi.

16. G. Westerwelle, ‘Speech to the German Council on Foreign Relations’, 21 October 2010, availablefrom http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/101021-BM-dgap-grundsatzrede.html (accessed 1 September 2011).

17. C. Stelzenmuller, ‘Germany’s Unhappy Abstention from Leadership’, Financial Times, 28 March 2011,available from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2490ab8c-5982-11e0-baa8-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=73adc504-2ffa-11da-ba9f-00000e2511c8,print=yes.htm (accessed 3 September 2011).

18. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Kohl geisselt deutsche Aussenpolitik’, 24 August 2011, available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kritik-vom-altkanzler-kohl-geisselt-deutsche- aussenpolitik-1.1134478(accessed 24 August 2011).

19. B. Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognitionof Croatia’, World Politics 48/4 (1996), pp.482–521.

20. Dettke, Germany Says No.21. The Times, ‘West Urged to Seize the Chance to Boost Arab Democracy with Huge Aid Plan; Arab

Spring’, 21 February 2011, pp.8–9.22. Financial Times Deutschland, ‘Geheimflug in Gaddafis Hinterland’, 28 February 2011, p.12.23. Der Spiegel, ‘Merkel Cabinet Agrees AWACS for Afghanistan’, 23 March 2011, available from http://

www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,752709,00.html (accessed 21 August 2011).24. Interviews with representatives of foreign policy think tanks in Berlin, July 2011.25. Der Spiegel, ‘Fischer Joins Criticism of German Security Council Abstention’, 22 March 2011, avail-

able from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,752542,00.html (accessed 21 August2011).

26. S. Tisdall, ‘Libya: Reaction: Britain and France Appear Ever More Isolated as World Opinion TurnsHostile: China, Russia, Germany, Brazil Voice Objections NATO Also Divided as Turkey BlocksAgreement’, Guardian, 22 March 2011, p.6.

27. Frankfurter Rundschau, ‘Wir sind nicht isoliert’, interview with Guido Westerwelle, 14 April 2011,available from http://www.fr-online.de/politik/-wir-sind-nicht-isoliert-/-/1472596/8341026/-/index.html (accessed 21 August 2011).

28. European Voice, ‘French German Libya Rift Deepens’, 25 March 2011, available from http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/march/french-german-libya-rift-deepens/70661.aspx (accessed 21August 2011).

29. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’, 21 March 2011,available from http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14926360,00.html (accessed 21 August 2011).

30. For a detailed account of Genscher’s time as foreign minister see H.-D. Genscher, Rebuilding a HouseDivided (New York: Broadway Books, 1998).

31. Die Welt, ‘Gaddafis Sturz und Deutschlands beitrag’, 22 August 2011, available from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13559302/Gaddafis-Sturz-und-Deutschlands-Beitrag.html (accessed 22August 2011).

32. Interviews in the Federal Chancellery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministry, July2011.

33. Ibid.34. Der Spiegel, ‘Merkel Cabinet Agrees AWACS for Afghanistan’.35. Ibid.36. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’.37. Ibid.38. For a good summation of the debate in the USA on whether to support UN1973 see A.-M. Slaughter,

‘Op Ed: Fiddling While Libya Burns’, New York Times, 14 March 2011, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14slaughter.html?_r=2 (accessed 29 August 2011); see alsoA. Applebaum, ‘The New Alliance: For the First Time since Suez, America Is Taking a Back Seatto Britain and France in a Military Operation’, Spectator 315 (26 March 2011), p.12.

39. Interviews, British Embassy, Berlin, July 2011.40. Interviews in Berlin, July 2011.

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41. J. Vollmer, ‘Im Einsatz mit Partner’, in C. Schwegmann (ed.), Bewahrungsproben einer Nation,pp.185–96.

42. Der Spiegel, ‘Merkel Cabinet Agrees AWACS for Afghanistan’.43. W.E. Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon: Germany Moves Centre Stage in the EU’, Journal of

Common Market Studies 49/S1 (2011), pp.57–75.44. Interviews with policy advisers of German political parties, July 2011.45. Ibid.46. Bild am Sonntag, ‘Krieg in Libyen: Uber 60 Prozent der Deutschen befurworten den Angriff’, 20 March

2011, available from http://www.bild.de/politik/2011/libyen-krise/aber-mehrheit-lehnt-beteiligung-ab-16933388.bild.html (accessed 21 August 2011).

47. Der Spiegel, ‘Germany Hesitates as UN Authorises Action against Libya’, 18 March 2011, availablefrom http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,751763,00.html (accessed 21 August 2011).

48. Ibid.49. Ibid.50. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’.51. For a transcript of the House of Commons Debate on UN1973 on 21 March 2011, see http://www.

publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110321/debtext/110321-0001.htm#1103219000001 (accessed 4 August 2011).

52. Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/97, 18 March 2011, available from http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17097.pdf (accessed 1 August 2011). See pp.1149C–1159C for Renate Kunast’s (Bundnis ’90/DieGrunen) contribution to the debate and pp.11145B and 11145C for Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul’s(SPD) contribution.

53. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’.54. P. Schafer, ‘Die Parlamentsbeteiligung in Regierung und Opposition: Die Linke’, in Schwegmann (ed.),

Bewahrungsproben einer Nation, pp.155–60.55. New York Times, ‘Germany Steps Away from European Unity’, 23 March 2011, available from http://

www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/europe/24germany.html?_r=1 (accessed 21 August 2011).56. Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany Defends Cautious Approach to Libya, Denies Isolation’.57. G. Hellmann, ‘Goodbye to Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany’, Mershon Inter-

national Studies Review 40/1 (1996), pp.1–39.58. CDU, CSU, FDP, Wachstum, Bildung, Zusammenhalt: Der Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und

FDP, 17 (2009). Legislaturperiode, available from http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091026-koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-fdp.pdf (accessed 1 September 2011).

59. Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, October 2011,available from http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NzA3NTc1MzU2NjM0NjYyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Bericht%20der%20Strukturkommission%20der%20Bundeswehr.pdf (accessed 21 August 2011).

60. Interviews, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, July 2011.61. Von Weizsacker Kommission der Bundeswehr, ‘Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der

Bundeswehr’, (2000), available from http://www.spdfraktion.de/rs_datei/0,,1663,00.pdf (accessed 1September 2011).

62. Interviews, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, July 2011.63. Interviews in Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry and Chancellery, Berlin, July 2011. Such a division of

labour would call in to question commitments to greater burden sharing in military crisis management,both within NATO and the EU and is likely to be resisted by France and the UK.

64. For an in-depth examination of recent German defence reforms, see T. Dyson, ‘Condemned Forever toBecoming but Never to Being? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism’, GermanPolitics 20/4 (2011), pp.545–67; and T. Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrineand Capabilities in the 21st Century’, Defence Studies 11/2 (2011), pp.244–70.

65. Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation’.66. A. Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival 53/3 (2011), pp.75–90, p.76.67. G. Hellmann, R. Baumann, M. Bosche and B. Herborth, ‘De-Europeanization by Default? Germany’s

EU Policy in Defence and Asylum’, Foreign Policy Analysis 1/1 (2005), pp.143–64.68. B. Gomis, ‘Franco-British Defence and Security Treaties: Entente While it Lasts?’, Royal Institute for

International Affairs/Chatham House, Programme Paper: ISP PP 2001/01 (March 2011); B. Jones,‘Franco-British Defence Co-operation: A New Engine for European Defence?’, Occasional PaperNo. 88, European Union Institute for Security Studies (2011), available from http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op88-Franco-British_military_cooperation-a_new_engine_for_European_defence.pdf (accessed 1 September 2011); C. Taylor ‘Franco-British Defence Co-operation’, House of

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Commons Standard Note, SN/IA/5750 (8 November 2010), available from http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05750.pdf (accessed 10 November 2010).

69. G. T. Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn(New York: Longman, 1999).

70. Interviews in Chancellery, Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry, July 2011.71. Ibid.72. J. Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’, Inter-

national Organization 54/4 (1999), pp.765–803.73. J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); K. Waltz,

Theory of International Politics (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979).74. Handelsblatt, ‘Deutschland hat sich selbst isoliert’, 20 March 2011, available from http://www.

handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/deutschland-hat-sich-international-selbst-isoliert/3969114.html(accessed 21 August 2011).

75. Statistisches Bundesamt, ‘Foreign Trade 2010’, available from http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/Aussenhandel/Handelspartner/Tabellen/Content100/RangfolgeHandelspartner,property=file.pdf (accessed 21 August 2011).

76. Reuters, ‘Factbox: Libya Oil Production, Outage, Exports, Customers’, 15 March 2011, available fromhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/15/libya-oil-idUSLDE72E23I20110315 (accessed 1 Septem-ber 2011).

77. Thank you to the anonymous review for this important point.78. H. Kundnani, ‘Germany as a Geo-Economic Power’, Washington Quarterly 34/3 (2011), pp.31–45.79. R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); see also

S.G. Brooks, ‘Deuling Realisms’, International Organization 51/3 (1997), pp.445–77.80. Thank you to the anonymous reviewers for this point.81. Bundeswehr Transformation Centre, ‘Armed Forces, Capabilities and Technologies in the 21st

Century Environmental Dimensions of Security – Sub-Study 1: Peak Oil: Security Policy Impli-cations of Scarce Resources’, Strausberg (2010), available from www.zentrum-transformation.bundeswehr.de (accessed 1 June 2012).

82. P.J. Katzenstein, ‘Same War – Different Views: Germany, Japan and Counterterrorism’, InternationalOrganization 57/4 (2003), pp.731–60; M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: ThePolitics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

83. Studies by Longhurst and Dalgaard Nielsen have highlighted the durability of a distinctive German stra-tegic culture which is resistant to change. See Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: TheEvolution of German Security Policy 1989–2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003);Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacificism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 2006).

84. C. Wagnsson, ‘Divided Power Europe: Normative Divergences among the EU “Big Three”’, Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 17/8 (2010), pp.1089–105.

85. C. Stelzenmuller, ‘Libyen, eine Deutschstunde’, Sueddeutsche Zeitung (15 April 2011), p.2.86. Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/97.87. Interviews, Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry and Chancellery, Berlin, July 2011.88. J. Habermas, ‘Germany and the Euro Crisis’, The Nation (9 June 2010), available from http://www.

thenation.com/article/germany-and-euro-crisis (accessed 1 September 2011).89. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ‘Libyen braucht keine militarische Hilfe: Alain Juppe im Gesprach mit

der F.A.Z.’, 31 August 2011, available from http://www.faz.net/artikel/C32315/alain-juppe-im-gespraech-mit-der-f-a-z-libyen-braucht-keine-militaerische-hilfe-30494349.html (accessed 31August 2011).

90. Z. Laidi, ‘Is Europe a Risk Averse Actor?’, European Foreign Affairs Review 15/4 (2010), pp.411–26.91. P. Cornish and G. Edwards, ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European

Strategic Culture’, International Affairs 77/3 (2001), pp.587–603; P. Cornish and G. Edwards, ‘TheStrategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report’, International Affairs 81/4 (2005),pp.801–20.

92. The Libya operation is also significant as the USA appeared happy to let France and the UK leadpolitically. See Applebaum, ‘The New Alliance’, p.12.

93. T. Garton Ash, ‘France Plays Hawk, Germany Demurs: Libya Has Exposed Europe’s Fault Lines’,Guardian, 24 March 2011, available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/france-hawk-germany-demurs-libya-europe (accessed 21 August 2011).

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94. S. Bulmer and W.E. Paterson, ‘Germany and the EU: From “Tamed Power” to Normalized Power?’,International Affairs 86/5 (2010), pp.1051–73; Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon’; M. Wolf, ‘TheRiddle of German Self-Interest’, Financial Times, 30 May 2012, p.13.

95. B. Simms, ‘Review Article: From the Kohl to the Fischer Doctrine: Germany and the Wars of theYugoslav Succession, 1991–1999’, German History 21/3 (2003), pp.394–414.

96. Westerwelle, ‘Speech to the German Council on Foreign Relations’.97. Interviews, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, July 2011.98. Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’.99. H. Maull (2012) ‘Aussenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozesse in Krisenzeiten’, Aus Politik und Zeit-

geschichte 10 (2012), pp.34–40.

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