1nc1

They read the resolution not the plan- must specify beyond legalize

Vote Neg

a. Makes the plan void for vagueness- undermines policy analysis Kleiman and Saiger 90 lecturer public policy Harvard, consultant drug policy Rand, 1990, A SYMPOSIUM ON DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: DRUG LEGALIZATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 527

Defining Legalization Legalization, like prohibition, does not name a unique strategy. Perhaps the most prominent inadequacy of current legalization arguments is their failure to specify what is meant by "legalization." Current drug policy provides an illustration of this diversity. Heroin and marijuana are completely prohibited, 74 and cocaine can only be used in rigidly specified medical contexts, not including any where the drug's psychoactive properties are exercised. 75 On the other hand, a wide range of pain-killers, sleep-inducers, stimulants, tranquilizers and sedatives can be obtained with a doctor's prescription. 76 Alcohol is available for recreational use, but is subject to an array of controls including excise taxation, 77 limits on drinking ages, 78 limits on TV and radio advertising, 79 and retail licensing. 80 Nicotine is subject to age minimums, warning label requirements, 81 taxation, 82 and bans on smoking in some public places. 83 [*541] Drug legalization can therefore be thought of as moving drugs along a spectrum of regulated statuses in the direction of increased availability. However, while legalization advocates do not deny that some sort of controls will be required, their proposals rarely address the question of how far on the spectrum a given drug should be moved, or how to accomplish such a movement. Instead, such details are dismissed as easily determined, or postponed as a problem requiring future thought. 84 But the consequences of legalization depend almost entirely on the details of the remaining regulatory regime. The price and conditions of the availability of a newly legal drug will be more powerful in shaping its consumption than the fact that the drug is "legal." Rules about advertising, place and time of sale, and availability to minors help determine whether important aspects of the drug problem get better or worse. The amount of regulatory apparatus required and the way in which it is organized and enforced will determine how much budget reduction can be realized from dismantling current enforcement efforts. 85 Moreover, currently illicit drugs, because they are so varied pharmacologically, would not all pose the same range of the problems if they were to be made legally available for non-medical use. They would therefore require different control regimes. These regimes might need to be as diverse as the drugs themselves.

b. Neg ground- makes the 2AC a moving target.

2

The means all partsWebsters 8 Merriam-Webster's Online Collegiate Dictionary, 08, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole

United States means all of the statesEPA 6 EPA, US Environmental Protection Agency Terminology Reference System, 2-1-2006, http://iaspub.epa.gov/trs/trs_proc_qry.alphabet?p_term_nm=U

United States When used in the geographic sense, means all of the States. Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics : Commercial Chemical Control Rules Term DetailNevada, New Jersey, and Delaware have legal online gamblingNew Jersey Online, 14(Experts: Online gambling slowed by illegal action, 5-20-14, http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2014/05/experts_online_gambling_slowed_by_illegal_action.html)

Internet gambling in the United States is off to a slower start than many had imagined, but regulators and industry observers expect it will flourish in time. Speaking yesterday at the East Coast Gaming Congress in Atlantic City, a panel of experts said illegal offshore gambling sites continue to operate, and thats hurting the fledgling online gambling industries in the three states that have legalized it. New Jersey saw its first decline in internet gambling revenue in April, falling to $11.4 million from $11.9 million in March. It began in late November as a way to help Atlantic Citys casinos gain new revenue and customers. Nevada and Delaware also offer it. Internet gambling exists in all 50 states today, said David Rebuck, director of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement. Its just not regulated. He said New Jersey recently sent cease-and-desist letters to gambling companies from out of state that are marketing to New Jersey residents. Internet gambling can only be conducted within New Jerseys borders, according to state law.Means the aff doesnt meet the or US vote neg they explode limits and skirt the point of the topic by legalizing things that arent illegal now

3

UIGEA prevents remittancesGutierrez, Chair of the House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology, Committee on Financial Services, 8(Luis, PROPOSED UIGEA REGULATIONS: BURDEN WITHOUT BENEFIT?, 4-2-8, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42714/html/CHRG-110hhrg42714.htm, accessed 10-4-14) PMIn October of 2007, the draft regulations were issued and more than 200 comments were filed in response. As proposed, the regulations would require most companies involved in the payment systems, from banks and credit card companies, to many transmitters and payment processors, to develop and implement policies and procedures designed to identify and block unlawful Internet gambling transactions. The regulations have been widely criticized as being vague and costly for financial institutions to implement. One of the most common complaints is that the proposed rules fail to sufficiently define key terms, leaving financial institutions with significant compliance difficulties. For example, the regulation fails to adequately define what constitutes ``unlawful Internet gambling'' or ``restricted transaction,'' yet requires the financial institutions to make a determination on their own about what is lawful or unlawful. If the rule is adopted in its current form, the response by many financial institutions may likely be to overblock transactions to protect themselves from legal liability. Although the regulation does provide a safe harbor for financial institutions that block transactions that are in fact legal, it does nothing to ensure that legal transactions are not blocked. As a result, consumers may be placed at risk of having lawful transactions blocked. It is easy to see how these regulations, if implemented in their current form, could wreak havoc on electronic commerce in the United States. With that in mind, I want to take a moment to question the priorities reflected by the underlying law, which was passed while my party was in the minority, and which seeks to eliminate Internet gambling by adults. In my opinion, if Congress is going to impose additional regulations on financial institutions, our time would be better spent restricting payday lending or curbing unfair and deceptive practices associated with credit card accounts and other types of predatory lending. But the reality is, we have a law that requires the regulators to develop rules that ban Internet gambling, and I have several concerns with the proposed rules. First, I am concerned about the effect these regulations will have on the remittances system that immigrants use to send billions of dollars home each year. Money transmitter companies are already having problems maintaining accounts with some banks, and I fear that this rule could exacerbate that problem. I am also troubled that these regulations could impose significant compliance burdens on financial institutions during a time of economic and financial turmoil.Remittances strengthen MS-13Rosser, Assistant Law Professor at American, 8(Ezra, Immigrant Remittances, Connecticut Law Review 41.1, November 2008, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1, accessed 3-2-11, Lexis) PMFor receiving families, by making work less necessary and distorting the perceived return from work, remittance income can and does diminish the attractiveness of work. As the Economist observed, "[t]here may also be economic costs associated with reliance on remittances. Like any unearned wealth, they may foster idleness among those who benefit." n118 For Latin American countries, where the effect of work incentive data is available, "remittances have the effect of reducing the number of hours worked per week." n119 Income and substitution effects drive remittance- [*25] based work reductions: Remittances may tend to reduce the supply of labor provided by remaining household members, who may take a portion of the remittance gain as leisure. This income effect is generally not a concern, because it represents part of the welfare gain from remittances. By contrast, remittances may change the return to supplying labor,for example, if the migrant conditions the remittance on low household income. Such a substitution effect will reduce the welfare gain from remittances by distorting household labor decisions. n120 While the income effect is a welfare gain to remittance-receiving families, the income effect is a concern from a national and community development concern. Remittance recipient "supplemental" leisure lowers national production (subject to offset by increased spending made possible by the remittances) and, by reducing the demand for employment, can lead to elevated wages-relative to the wage-rate absent remittances-that narrow the range of business types that can earn a profit. Suppose a remittance recipient family is fortunate and receives $ 500 monthly from their hermano lejano. Family members quite rationally might decide it is not worth working for a mere $ 185 per month-their standard of living without accounting for leisure would be better if they worked, but once leisure is taken into account, for some it can make sense to rely solely on the remittances. n121 The disincentive to work can be exacerbated where the remittance sender is motivated to make sure basic needs are met for family members back home. In turn, this would reduce remittance sending were remittance-recipients able to meet some of their needs through their own labor. Seen negatively, the substitution effect is a case of recipient family members free-riding off the work of the remittance sender. But such "free-riding" arguably reflects shared family values. If a remittance sender is in a country where $ 185 can be earned through a few days work and receivers would have to work all month for the same amount of money, though the hermano lejano ultimately becomes the burdened family member, this household labor distortion might be the optimal ex ante, pre-emigration, allocation of labor. Even though the hermano lejano conditions remittance sending on family need and would lower the amount sent if need fell, the remittance sender may support the decision of family members not to work in the home country's lower [*26] paying labor market. Yet worthy of note, the intangible consequences of remittance-driven work disincentives are hard to capture quantitatively. Work disincentives do not simply lower the amount produced by recipient countries; reduced need to work can alter the social fabric in countries where a large percentage of people receive remittances. "[A] number of development practitioners have noted the negative social implications associated with the fact of important segments of the younger generation becoming used to receiving steady flows of remittances without any effort on their part," a trend which can impact work incentives and life choices. n122 The Salvadoran government faces a youth gang problem that not only is a destabilizing force in the country but also is another connection between El Salvador and the Salvadoran expatriate community. n123 Mara Salvatrucha, "The Most Dangerous Gang in America" according to Newsweek, operates across the United States and Central America, with a strong connection to El Salvador. n124 While MS-13, as it is also known, is more a byproduct of limited opportunities and ripple effects from the Salvadoran civil war, remittances may play a role in acculturating youth to not working traditional jobs to earn a living. While gang membership undoubtedly reflects much more than an effect of remittances, an exaggerated culture of consumerism is a likely offshoot of high remittance receipts.

Theyll attack the Panama Canal tanks global econ turn their advantageDaniels-Ruff, professor at American Military University, 10(Kimberly, Security of the Panama Canal: One Decade After US Departure, most recent date cited, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2010/2010-2/2010_2_05_dannelsruff_eng_wats.pdf, accessed 2-17-11) PMThe threat of terrorism has been a concern throughout the history of the Canal. An awareness of the potential for a terrorist assault on the Canal predates the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, which so graphically demonstrated the patience, determination, creativity and unpredictability of al Qaeda. In a 1989 article outlining the history of security at the Canal, Charlie Morris, then chief of the Canal Protection Division, wrote: Perhaps all that has not changed is the Canal's vulnerability to sabotage and terrorism. Combating these threats requires the vigilance of a trained proprietary security force and the dynamic and intertwining associations of the international community, in whose interest it is to keep the Canal an open and neutral avenue for world commerce.29 A decade later, months before the Canal was transferred to Panama, Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, in charge of United States Southern Command (hereafter referred to as SOUTHCOM) cautioned the Senate Armed Services Committee that The Canal must always be regarded as a potential target for both conventional and unconventional forces, given its importance to global commerce and for military transits.30 It would be relatively easy for al-Qaeda terrorists to cripple one of the locks or to sink a ship in the still-narrow Gaillard Cut, closing the Canal. Although such an attack would be aimed at the United States, its effect According to Dr. Robert Buckman, author of a series of textbooks on Latin America, It would be relatively easy for al-Qaeda terrorists to cripple one of the locks or to sink a ship in the still-narrow Gaillard Cut, closing the Canal. Although such an attack would be aimed at the United States, its effect on the Panamanian economyand world commercewould be devastating. 31 These threats are what Dr. Manwaring refers to as Gray Area Phenomenon or GAP. GAP includes challenges from an array of non state actors, such as trans-national criminal organizations and militant fundamentalist movements.32 U.S. government analysts are very concerned about the dangers these groups represent. An analyst from SOUTHCOM commented that Any insertion of de-stabilizing groups: Islamic Radical Groups (IRG), gangs (MS 13, M18, Los Zetas & Drug Trafficking Organizations), Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)like the FARC or ELN, or other Illegal Armed Groups (IAG), will threaten the operation of the Panama Canalhence, threaten US interests. 33

Panama Canal Key to Heg Sanchez 7 associate professor of political science at Loyola University, 2007 (Panama Lost? U.S. Hegemony, Democracy, and the Canal, 2007, page 3)

Panama's importance in the world community belies its small size. This small republic has been a prominent nation-state for two basic reasons. First, its strategic geographic location and size-a narrow isthmus linking North America and South America-has attracted the attention of strong nation-states for five hundred years. 'These Great Powers have used the territory that is now Panama as a vital location for the movement of people, goods, and resources. Spain's wealth in the 1500s was amassed to a large extent by the quick transport of gold through the narrow isthmus over the camino real. Hundreds of years later, in the mid- to late 1800s, the transfer of gold from California and the transfer of people to the American West via the Panama Railroad helped to forge the United States as a continental Great Power. Panama's geography has thus assisted and continues to assist influential nations in developing and enhancing their power. This unique location has also attracted global interest because of its value to world trade, which is increasingly important in the post - World War II world. Second, more recently Panama has been visible internationally because of its importance to the United States, the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. In the twentieth century, the Panama Canal served vital U.S. commercial and military interests. More than any independent country in the region, Panama represented a symbol for and source of U.S. power and influence. The United States would undoubtedly have become a Great Power without the Isthmus of Panama. But tiny Panama, more than any other country in the hemisphere, has served as a critical outpost for U.S. power and as a vehicle for U.S. military and economic might. The security of Panama and its canal did and will continue to preoccupy policy makers in Washington who are concerned about vital U.S. interests.

Heg solves extinctionBrooks et al 13 Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement, Foreign Affairs, January 2013, Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth, G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, http://mcfr.wildapricot.org/Resources/Documents/2013-05 20%20Brooks%20Ikenberry%20FA%20Stay%20Engaged%201301.pdfSince the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order. Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to assert their commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order. Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy wastes money by subsidizing the defense of well-off allies and generates resentment among foreign populations and governments. A more modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment. Even if allies did not take over every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make the United States more secure. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear. They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars. The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential. AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement -- numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad. The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies. Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs. UNBALANCED One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own -- or that they will do so in the future. Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback -- especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft- balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms. Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes -- infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on -- that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would. The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them -- a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense -- a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance. LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts -- a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake. History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment. If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes. Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the un, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations. Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing. KEEPING THE PEACE Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington -- notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -- might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East -- but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony -- China -- and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred -- convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence- sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes -- a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self- defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

4

WTO cred forces US to export LNG hurts competitivenessSnow, Oil and Gas Journal Editor, 13(Nick, Delaying US energy exports may run afoul of WTO, report warns, 12-3-13, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/12/delaying-us-energy-exports-may-run-afoul-of-wto-report-warns.html, accessed 9-23-14) PMUnnecessary delays in US LNG and coal export applications review processes may conflict with international treaty obligations under World Treaty Organization agreements, a study commissioned by the National Association of Manufacturers warned. The Greenberg Traurig LLP report by James Bacchus, who formerly chaired WTOs appellate body, and Rosa Jeong examined two main questions: whether delays at the US Department of Energy in issuing LNG export licenses violate US international obligations as a WTO member, and whether state and local authorities efforts in the Pacific Northwest to broaden their environmental review authorities beyond federal requirements violate US international obligations under the WTO. The United States has always been a strong advocate of rules that forbid export restrictions and has been forceful in challenging export restrictions imposed by other countries, said Bacchus, who also is a former US trade negotiator and US House member (D-Fla.). In short, the tables may be turned on the US directly in the WTO, but also through other countries walking away from core principles that have long been critical to US success in the global economy. Ongoing energy export delays and licensing requirements and processes are starting to raise questions about the United States own commitment to key principles of the WTO that bind not only the US, but also 158 other countries, the Dec. 3 report said. US actionor inaction as the current situation appearsraises important questions about the nations implementation of these WTO rules, it continued. It also raises the specter that other WTO members may follow suit in ways that would undermine US global competitiveness, the report said.

Great power warBaru, Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore, 9 (Sanjaya, January, Year of the power shift?, http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/593/593_sanjaya_baru.htm, accessed 11-5-12)The management of the economy, and of the treasury, has been a vital aspect of statecraft from time immemorial. Kautilyas Arthashastra says, From the strength of the treasury the army is born. men without wealth do not attain their objectives even after hundreds of trials Only through wealth can material gains be acquired, as elephants (wild) can be captured only by elephants (tamed) A state with depleted resources, even if acquired, becomes only a liability.4 Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.5 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'.3 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power.

5

GOP will likely to win---both polls and fundamentalsLarry J. Sabato 10/29 is university professor of politics and director of the University of Virginia Center for Politics, which publishes the online, free Crystal Ball politics newsletter every Thursday, and a regular columnist for Politico Magazine. His most recent book is The Kennedy Half-Century: The Presidency, Assassination, and Lasting Legacy of John F. Kennedy. Kyle Kondik is managing editor of Sabatos Crystal Ball, a nonpartisan political newsletter produced by the University of Virginia Center for Politics. He also directs the centers Washington, D.C., office. Geoffrey Skelley is associate editor at Sabatos Crystal Ball. Bet on a GOP Senate Majority, 10-29-14, http://www.politico.com/magazine/sto-ry/2014/10/bet-on-a-gop-senate-majority-112329.html#ixzz3He3dsWMz, DOA: 10-30-14, y2kWhile many races remain close, its just getting harder and harder to envision a plausible path for the Democrats to retain control of the Senate. Ultimately, with just a few days to go before the election, the safe bet would be on Republicans eventually taking control of the upper chamber. We say eventually because theres a decent chance we wont know who wins the Senate on Election Night. Louisiana is guaranteed to go to a runoff, and Georgia seems likelier than not to do the same. The Georgia runoff would be Jan. 6, 2015, three days after the 114th Congress is scheduled to open. Vote-counting in some states, like Alaska, will take days, and other races are close enough to trigger a recount. Generally speaking, candidates who have leads of three points or more in polling averages are in solid shape to win, but in this election five statesRepublican-held Georgia and Kansas, and Democratic-held Iowa, New Hampshire and North Carolinafeature a Senate race where both of the two major polling averages (RealClearPolitics and HuffPost Pollster) show the leading candidate with an edge of smaller than three points. What makes the Democrats situation so precarious is that Republicans have polling leads of more than three points in five other states, all of which are currently held by Democrats: Arkansas, Louisiana, Montana, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Two others, Democratic-held Alaska and Colorado, show Republicans leading in both averages, but by more than three points in just one. (These averages are as of the afternoon of Oct. 29.) The wealth of GOP targets is a reflection of the structural advantages that have favored Republicans in this election, some of which dont have anything to do with a specific campaign. The Plan Increases voter turn-out which benefits DemsSusan Davis 14, Staff Writer @ USA Today, "Marijuana ballot initiatives may motivate voters," 3-26-2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/25/marijuana-poll-turnout/6867389/, DOA: 8-17-2014, y2k Warning: Increased voter turnout could be a political side effect of marijuana. The latest George Washington University Battleground poll, a national survey of likely voters, reveals that nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be "much more likely" to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot. An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them "somewhat" more likely to vote. The numbers are encouraging to Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years. The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections: 64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year, compared with 57% of Democrats. Among young voters, who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote. "Which is why you can imagine we're very excited about our marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election, but in terms of turnout," Lake quipped. Support for legalizing medical marijuana use has grown steadily with 73% in favor, while a majority, 53%, also back decriminalizing marijuana possession, according to the survey. "What's really interesting and, I think, a totally unwritten story is that everyone talks about marriage equality hitting a tipping point (of acceptance). Marijuana is hitting the tipping point. It's really astounding about how fast it's moved," Lake said. The issue is also motivating beyond traditional political lines. For example, in the successful push for a 2012 Colorado ballot initiative to legalize recreational marijuana use, supporters mobilized libertarian-leaning Republicans by running ads on country-music radio stations that reached the state's rural areas. Lake says the data show that the most ardent opponents to legalizing medicinal marijuana use are seniors, while suburban moms are reluctant to support the decriminalization of possession. Both groups historically turn out in midterm elections in higher frequency than young adults.

Senate control leads to passage of Comprehensive Immigration ReformAlexander Bolton 14, The Hill Staff, GOP: Well move immigration reform if we take back Senate, 5-15-14, http://thehill.com/home-news/senate/206177-gop-well-move-immigration-reform-if-we-take-back-senate#ixzz3ADiAzi00, DOA: 8-12-14, y2kSenate Republicans say they'll try to pass immigration reform legislation in the next two years if they take back the Senate in November. The Republicans say winning back the Senate will allow them to pass a series of bills on their own terms that have a better chance of winning approval in the House. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a central member of the coalition that passed a comprehensive reform bill in the Senate last year, said he would craft a better legislative approach if Republicans control the upper chamber in 2015. That would give his party a chance to pass immigration legislation before the presidential election, when Hispanic voters will be crucial to winning the White House. But Democrats are threatening that if the House does not pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill this year the issue will be dead in 2015 and 2016, sinking the GOP brand among Hispanics ahead of the 2016 election. I certainly think we can make progress on immigration particularly on topics like modernizing our legal immigration system, improving our mechanisms for enforcing the law and I think if you did those things you could actually make some progress on addressing those who are illegally, Rubio said Wednesday evening of the prospects of passing immigration reform in 2015. He said the Senate next year should pass immigration reform through a series of sequential bills that build upon each other to enact comprehensive reform. This approach would be more palatable in the House, he said. Rubio said he was not fully satisfied with the comprehensive bill that passed the Senate last year, adding Republicans would absolutely pass better legislation if they pick up six or more seats in the midterm election. Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), who is poised to take over as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said he will vote to pass immigration legislation in the next Congress if Republicans ascend to the majority. Wed start over again next year, Grassley said, when asked about the next steps if Congress does not pass immigration reform by September. Id make a decision about whether you could get more done by separate bills or a comprehensive bill, he said. Grassley said he may have supported the 2013 Senate immigration bill if it had tougher border security and interior enforcement provisions. For that reason, not for the legal immigration stuff thats in it, he said, explaining why he voted against it. Some Republicans, such as Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), strongly oppose increasing legal immigration. Washington cant rewrite the law of supply and demand: we cant rebuild our middle class if we continue to bring in record numbers of new workers for companies to hire at the lowest available wage, he said. Only 14 Republicans voted for the Senate bill, which conservative critics panned for giving too much discretion to the Obama administration in deciding how its border security requirements would be met. Senate Republicans believe that House Republicans would be more likely to pass immigration reform if the midterm election shifts control of the upper chamber because it would be easier to negotiate a Senate-House compromise. House conservatives have opposed bringing immigration legislation to the House floor because they fear even a narrow bill could be used as a vehicle to jam the sprawling Senate bill through the House. That threat would be less dire if the Senate passed a series of smaller immigration reform bills. It could pass if we break it down into smaller pieces, said Senate Republican Whip John Cornyn (Texas). [The House] has always been amenable to passing smaller bills on a step-by-step basis. Once Congress passes legislation to tighten border security and interior enforcement, it could pave the way for a deal legalizing an estimated 11 million illegal immigrants, expanding work visas and enlarging the flow of legal immigration, Senate Republicans argue. Democrats, however, would balk at reforming the nations immigration laws through a variety of separate bills. Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the lead author of the comprehensive Senate immigration bill, signaled Wednesday that Democrats would not be willing to join in such an effort. He threatened to force Republicans to pay the price in the presidential election if they do not agree to pass a reform by years end. He said House Republicans have a narrow window between early June and the August recess to act. I am saying that if Speaker [John] Boehner [Ohio], [House Majority] Leader [Eric] Cantor [Va.], and other Republican leaders refuse to schedule a vote on immigration reform during this window, it will not pass until 2017 at the earliest, he said on the Senate floor Wednesday. I believe it would then pass in 2017 after Republicans take a shellacking in the Presidential election, he added. Schumer said in a subsequent interview that the reform effort would be dead because the conservative political dynamics of the 2016 presidential primary would pull the GOP too far to the right to pass legislation in 2015 or 2016. Rubio, who is mulling a White House bid, disputed Schumers analysis. I dont agree with that, he said. I understand theres some conventional wisdom out there in that regard but I dont believe that to be true. He said he does not plan to walk away from immigration reform in the next Congress, even if he pursues a presidential bid. Rubio said he would support an immigration reform push in 2015 as a piecemeal process, the same approach endorsed by Cornyn and House Republican leaders. What I do think is possible is to make progress on it in a sequential way that builds on each bill that we pass, he said. But Rubio said he doesnt see himself supporting a bill that tries to overhaul the entire immigration system in one swoop. I dont think a comprehensive bill can pass. I dont want to us to waste another two years on an approach that has no chance of passing, he said. This idea that immigration reform means you have to all do it in one bill is ridiculous. Its the reason why they havent succeeded doing anything on it.Ag industrys collapsing now---immigrations keySerrano 12 (Alfonso Serrano 12, Bitter Harvest: U.S. Farmers Blame Billion-Dollar Losses on Immigration Laws, Time, 9-21-12, http://business.time.com/2012/09/21/bitter-harvest-u-s-farmers-blame-billion-dollar-losses-on-immigration-laws/ fate accessed: 2/21/13) TM

The Broetjes and an increasing number of farmers across the country say that a complex web of local and state anti-immigration laws account for acute labor shortages. With the harvest season in full bloom, stringent immigration laws have forced waves of undocumented immigrants to flee certain states for more-hospitable areas. In their wake, thousands of acres of crops have been left to rot in the fields, as farmers have struggled to compensate for labor shortages with domestic help. The enforcement of immigration policy has devastated the skilled-labor source that weve depended on for 20 or 30 years, said Ralph Broetje during a recent teleconference organized by the National Immigration Forum, adding that last year Washington farmers part of an $8 billion agriculture industry were forced to leave 10% of their crops rotting on vines and trees. Its getting worse each year, says Broetje, and its going to end up putting some growers out of business if Congress doesnt step up and do immigration reform. (MORE: Why Undocumented Workers Are Good for the Economy) Roughly 70% of the 1.2 million people employed by the agriculture industry are undocumented. No U.S. industry is more dependent on undocumented immigrants. But acute labor shortages brought on by anti-immigration measures threaten to heap record losses on an industry emerging from years of stiff foreign competition. Nationwide, labor shortages will result in losses of up to $9 billion, according to the American Farm Bureau Federation.

Key to small farmsGual 10 (Frank Gual 1, Farm job, anyone?, Associated Content, 10/17/2010 http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/5877166/farm_job_anyone.html date accessed: 2/21/13) TM

Those calling for tougher immigration laws and the UFW claim that farmers have become accustomed to hiring undocumented workers who are willing to work for little, and now make up half the farm labor force. Legal immigrants make up a quarter of the farm labor. Those Americans who do get hired to do farm work often disappear quickly. Farm work is often offered in remote locations which city dwellers find difficult to get to, and one solution would be to provide transportation from central cities with high unemployment to outlying farms. Another possibility would be to use prisoners incarcerated for minor offenses. A shortage of farm labor will cause food prices to rise at a time when many people are out of work and may be receiving government assistance. It will also increase our dependence on imported food, which may not be up to FDA standards and could cause health problems, as has already happened. Another effect of the farm labor shortage will be the continued disappearance of small family farms, which will either be abandoned or bought by large conglomerates whose management is far removed from the local community.

ExtinctionBoyce 4 [James K., Director, Program on Development, Peacebuilding, and the Environment, Political Economy Research Institute, and Professor, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. A Future for Small Farms? http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Boyce_paper_griffin_conference.pdf]japThere is a future for small farms. Or more precisely, there can be and should be a future for them. Given the dependence of modern low-diversity agriculture on traditional high-diversity agriculture, the long-term food security of humankind will depend on small farms and their continued provision of the environmental service of in situ conservation of crop genetic diversity. Policies to support small farms can be advocated, therefore, not merely as a matter of sympathy, or nostalgia, or equity. Such policies are also a matter of human survival. The diversity that underpins the sustainability of world agriculture did not fall from the sky. It was bequeathed to us by the 400 generations of farmers who have carried on the process of artificial selection since plants were first domesticated. Until recently, we took this diversity for granted. The ancient reservoirs of crop genetic diversity, plant geneticist Jack Harlan (1975, p. 619) wrote three decades ago, seemed to most people as inexhaustible as oil in Arabia. Yet, Harlan warned, the speed which enormous crop diversity can be essentially wiped out is astonishing. The central thesis of this essay is that efforts to conserve in situ diversity must go hand-in-hand with efforts to support the small farmers around the world who sustain this diversity. Economists and environmentalists alike by and large have neglected this issue. In thrall to a myopic notion of efficiency, many economists fail to appreciate that diversity is the sine qua non of resilience and sustainability. In thrall to a romantic notionof wilderness, many environmentalists fail to appreciate that agricultural biodiversity is just as valuable indeed, arguably more valuable from the standpoint of human wellbeing as the diversity found in tropical rainforests or the spotted owls found in the ancient forests of the northwestern United States.

WTO

The WTO is no longer relevant to trade liberalization multiple warrants Bradford 10 [Anu Bradford, Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School, "When the WTO Works, and How It Fails", 51 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, lexis]cdFor instance, Great Power consensus is becoming increasingly difficult to establish and sustain. The formerly tight U.S.-EU alliance has gradually weakened since the end of the Cold War. n215 This has had an impact on all areas of cooperation, including trade. n216 The United States' and the EU's capacity to exercise leadership has also declined due to a growing domestic resistance to the WTO's agenda in both [*53] countries. Consequently, the United States' and the EU's increasingly limited abilities to secure domestic ratification for WTO agreements have forced them to retract from their active roles as drivers of WTO cooperation. n217 Achieving consensus among the Great Powers has also become more complicated, as China and other emerging economies have begun to challenge the United States' and the EU's economic dominance. A U.S.-EU accord is likely to remain a necessary, but no longer sufficient, precondition for a WTO agreement. Instead, a greater number of increasingly heterogeneous states must reach a consensus as the emerging trade powers weigh in more forcefully when setting the negotiation agenda and bargaining over the terms of the specific agreements. China and India, for instance, have already been able to block progress in WTO negotiations where proposed agreements fail to incorporate their interests and priorities. At the same time, they have shown little willingness to step in and assume a genuine leadership role in moving WTO negotiations forward. n218 Future negotiations within the WTO may face an additional challenge if powerful interest groups that benefit from trade liberalization shift their lobbying activity to other venues. Given the recent difficulties in moving forward with the Doha Round of trade talks, pressure groups might increasingly perceive the WTO as no longer apt to open global markets. Instead, they may urge their governments to negotiate bilateral and regional agreements, which are faster, more certain, and more manageable to negotiate. During the past eight years - while the Doha negotiations have been hobbling along fruitlessly - bilateral and regional trade agreements have continued to proliferate. n219 These agreements have further lowered the opportunity costs of non-WTO agreements, reinforcing the shift from global trade deals to regional and bilateral ones. Another reason behind United States and EU multinational corporations' vanishing support for the WTO process is that these companies [*54] have already managed to reap the most important benefits of trade liberalization. The past success of the WTO has delivered essentially all of the market opening that these powers need. n220 These stakeholders were once the most vocal supporters of the WTO's agenda; today, the loudest domestic voices are exercised by consumers and interest groups critical of the recent advances the WTO has made in intervening with domestic regulatory policies such as IP protection and public health. n221 Issue linkages are also likely to become riskier and more difficult in the subsequent WTO rounds. The "single undertaking" approach to WTO negotiations with multiple issue linkages has been a creative and, at times, effective way of bringing controversial issues within the WTO. Insistence on package deals has ensured that states have signed on to agreements that fail to deliver direct benefits for them so long as they have been compensated in another area. As the number of players and complexity of negotiation agendas increases, however, so does the possibility of compromises unraveling. Thus, as an even greater number of increasingly heterogeneous players seek compromises, the single undertaking approach is becoming a questionable strategy for success.

No impact to collapse Legal Frontiers 10 (International law blog hosted by the McGill University of Law in Quebec, Regional trade agreements, neither building blocks nor stumbling blocks: dismantling a tired dichotomy, 4-2-10, http://www.legalfrontiers.ca/2010/04/regional-trade-agreements-neither-building-blocks-nor-stumbling-blocks-dismantling-a-tired-dichotomy/, accessed 10-4-14) PMSince the establishment of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) in 1996, the WTO has scrambled to find ways to effectively control the impact of RTAs. This futile mission to tighten RTA regulation has been driven by a persistent fear of trade diversion, as well as by the assumption that regionalismand the agreements springing from itis subordinate to the multilateral regime. WTO regulation of RTAs has evolved since 1947, notably with the introduction of the 1994 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the creation of the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs in 2006. These regulations remain however, narrow and ambiguous. Article XXIV thus continues its long history of being systematically flouted by member states with the WTO as little more than an innocent bystander to the overwhelming spread of regionalism. Under the GATT 1947, regionalism was permitted as an exception. RTAs were accepted, but only to the extent that they complied with the terms of GATT Art. XXIV. It is this exception ethos that reinforces the conceptual primacy of multilateralism, which undermines the legitimacy of RTAs. In many respects, this attitude has contributed to the disregard of GATT Art. XXIV.

New regionalism isnt like WW2Brkic, economics professor at University of Sarajevo, 13(Snjeana, Regional Trading Arrangements Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?, 3-25-13, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275, accessed 10-2-14) PMForces driving the contemporary regionalism development differ from those that used to drive earlier regionalism periods in the 20th century. The present regionalism emerged in the period characterized by the increasing economic inter-dependence between different world economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional initiatives represent attempts to make the members' participation in the world economy easier, rather than make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new initiatives are less frequently motivated exclusively by political interests, and are less frequently being used for mercantilist purposes. After the Second World War, more powerful countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen their political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders. The examples include CMEA and European Community arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new regionalism, mostly driven by common economic interests, yielded less trade diversion than previous one, and has also contributed to the prevention of military conflicts of greater proportions. Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and between socialist countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional integrations primarily seem to lead to trade creation. Contrary to the beggarthy- neighbor model of former international economic integrations, the integrations now offer certain advantages to outsiders as well, by stimulating growth and spurring the role of market forces.27

Their impacts are empirically denied 30 years of data goes negBrkic, economics professor at University of Sarajevo, 13(Snjeana, Regional Trading Arrangements Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?, 3-25-13, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275, accessed 10-2-14) PMIn the years-long period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were becoming particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market. Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism". The next two waves of regionalism occurred in the years following the world wars. Since the disintegration processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war regionalisms were marked by discriminatory international economic integrations, primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with expressedly beggar-thy-neighbor policies that resulted in considerable trade deviations. This particularly refers to the regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis. The current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world to a far greater extent than any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China. Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200 RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years.25

Trade blocs conflict empirically denied interdependence between blocs actually DECREASES the risk of protectionismBrkic, economics professor at University of Sarajevo, 13(Snjeana, Regional Trading Arrangements Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?, 3-25-13, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275, accessed 10-2-14) PMContemporary research shows that intra-regional trade is growing, however, same as interdependence between North America and East Asia and between the EU and East Asia. It can also be seen that the biggest and the most powerful countries, i.e. blocs, are extremely dependent on the rest of the world in terms of trade. For the EU, besides the intra-European trade, which is ranked first, foreign trade has the vital importance since it accounts for 10% of European GDP. In early 1990s, EU exchanged 40% of its foreign trade with non-members, 16% out of which with North America and East Asia together. EU therefore must keep in mind the rest of the world as well. The growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing "The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides, the past few years witnessed a series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America, the ratio between intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55. Any attempt to move towards significantly closed blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the significant inter-dependence between major trading blocs.

BUT sequencing is key RTAs spill up to global trade, which solves the case, BUT gradual increases in trade avoid overestimation which collapses global markets and turns the caseBrkic, economics professor at University of Sarajevo, 13(Snjeana, Regional Trading Arrangements Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?, 3-25-13, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275, accessed 10-2-14) PMThere are over 180 independent states in the modern world, most of which differ enormously in economic development and power. World economy is therefore a battlefield of varied interests expressed in the action of different national economic policies. In such conditions, attempts to integrate world economy by global liberalization of international trade cannot yield significant results overnight. Global free trade is considered the first best solution, but is not feasible immediately and at once, since too many people believe that they would lose with global liberalization. According to the view believed to be optimistic, creation of international economic integrations could be a distinctive inter-step in the process of free world market creation. Lester Thurow points out: "In the long run, regionalism development could be favorable for the world. Free trade within regions and regulated trade between regions could be the proper road to free world trade in a long term. The shift from national to world economy at once would be too big a jump. One should first make a few smaller inter-steps, and pseudo-trading blocs coupled with regulated trade could be such a necessary inter-step."4 The essential rationale of this view is actually the speed of reforms - the gradual versus big bang approach. Many contemporary economists, in their analyses of world economy trends, conclude that political forces behind regional integration show signs of consistency with those acting towards global world trade.5 According to the optimistic view, the multilateralization process is slowed down by different standpoints on the free trade usefulness, by economic nationalisms, even by varying political interests, and therefore another way had to be found in order to achieve the world market integration a slower one, but more effective in the existing constellation of international economic relations. This view denies the opposition between regionalism and multilateralism, and explains it as follows: Since integration improves economic relations between members through removing trading and other barriers, and since all these integrated regions are part of the world territory, the advancement of economic relations within regions can be understood as the advancement of global economic relations. Regional trading, i.e. economic blocs would in this case be only a bypass towards the creation of unified world market. "... What could not be achieved in global relations was achieved within regions, through multilateralization of the European economic area. These achievements were later followed by many countries in other world regions, in their mutual relations practice. Practically, we thus got regional multilateralisms."6 Regionalism advocates also point out that the formation of economic integrations could facilitate the pending WTO negotiation rounds. Actually, the Uruguay round was partly protracted due to a great number of participants and the "free riders" issue. Viewed in broader context, one could say that regionalism contributes to overall globalization as well, since these are processes motivated from the same source. Both regionalism and globalization are driven by big capital interests, and that these two phenomena are actually ways to make the centuries-long capitalism aspiration unified world market - come true. According to this view, the globalization process as a process of world economy functional integration under the circumstances of imperfect market and hegemony weakening early in the 20th century has to be supported by the institutional component, either on a multilateral basis through international organizations and institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO, or on regional scale through regional trading arrangements.

Internet

Turn online gambling devastates the global economy Kindt, University of Illinois Economics Professor, and Brynn, Trust & Estates Lawyer, 2002, (John Warren and Anne E.C., "ARTICLE: DESTRUCTIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM: GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED GAMBLING AS ENCOURAGING TRANSBOUNDARY ECONOMIC RAIDING AND DESTABILIZING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES*," Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 16 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 243, Fall, PAS) Accessed on LexisNexis 6-23-14If not prohibited by U.N.-sponsored and general multilateral treaties, Internet gambling will eventually destroy global economic stability. Addiction rates associated with gambling exist in proportion to the speed of [*273] the gambling activity. n196 The faster the gambling activity, the more highly addictive it is, and the more addictive the gambling activity is, the more revenue it will generate for the industry. n197 Again, this is because as Associate Professor Howard Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions reported: "Gambling ... changes the neurochemistry of the brain." n198 Reflecting on the potential impact of Internet gambling, Shaffer stated, "As smoking crack cocaine changed the cocaine experience, I think electronics is going to change the way gambling is experienced." n199 This is reinforced by studies showing that twenty-seven to fifty-five percent of casino revenues come from pathological and problem gamblers, n200 and eighty percent of casino revenues come from video gambling. n201 The ubiquitous nature of Internet gambling places it in every home and with access to every demographic group - especially children. Internet gambling has all the characteristics of video gambling, but its reach is far more sweeping and the potential consequences much more dire. Estimates concluded that approximately nine million people had online investing accounts by 1999 n202 and that by 2003, online brokerage accounts would be valued at $ 3.3 trillion. n203 The implications were obvious. In very little time, any person with instant online access to credit card, bank, and investment accounts could incur sizable credit card debt to overseas gambling companies and lose all of their assets almost instantaneously. The addictive nature of the activity and its built-in mega-profits create a substantial market for online gambling. Industry analysts valued the market at approximately $ 7 billion in 1999, and it was projected to rise to $ 10 billion in the year 2000. n204 By 1999, there was already a significant market for online gambling, but the newness, size, and scope of the market was luring many other potential operators. At the time the Final Report of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission was published, a significant number of jurisdictions already had laws in place to issue Internet gambling licenses. n205 Thereafter, this number continued to increase. n206 [*274] The absence of geographical restrictions on the Internet posed an enormous problem for gambling providers as competitors. Many of the online gambling sites in operation during the 1990s were based in offshore casinos and were subject to minimal, if any, tax obligations, regulation, or security. n207 While many online gamblers could question the integrity of these sites and be hesitant to frequent them, these sites could also offer the best returns in the industry because their profit margins would be significantly greater than those market participants subject to more rigorous taxation. New entrants into the field needed to compete with the offshore casinos, as must the prior existing land-based (and primarily U.S.) casino industry. This intensified the competition for one country to economically cannibalize another country via Internet gambling as, for example, Canada had cannibalized the U.S. economy by locating casinos along the Canada-U.S. border. The U.S. response by the cannibalized states was to propose and/or build their own casinos to recapture the gambling dollars going to Canada - a situation emphasizing the U.S. State Department's need to negotiate amendments to its FCN bilateral and multilateral treaties to prohibit "transboundary economic raiding" via gambling activities.

Economic decline doesnt cause warMiller 00 (Morris, Economi