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Transcript of GENERAL PRACTITIONER’S UPDATE 2012 CUSTODY … · GENERAL PRACTITIONER’S UPDATE 2012 CUSTODY...
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McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC GENERAL PRACTITIONER’S UPDATE 2012
CUSTODY UPDATEI. PennsylvaniaLegislativeChanges:
A. AmendmentstoConsiderationofCriminalConvictions.EffectiveJune11,2012,23Pa.C.S.A.§5329willbeamendedtoaddressthefactthatmanyPennsylvaniacountiesarerequiringpartiestoacustodyaction,whohavecommittedanenumeratedoffense,toreceivecounselingfromamentalhealthprofessionalpriortobeingpermittedtoexerciseanycustodyrights.
Section5329entitled“ConsiderationofCriminalConviction”identifiesseveralPennsylvaniacriminaloffenses,andifapartytoacustodyaction,oramemberofthatperson’shousehold,hascommittedoneoftheseoffenses,thecourtshallconsiderwhetherthepartyoramemberoftheparty’shouseholdposesathreatofharmtothechildbeforemakinganorderofcustody.Section5329(c)statesthatthecourtshallprovideforaninitialevaluationtodeterminewhetherthepartyorhouseholdmemberwhocommittedtheoffense(a)posesathreattothechild,and(b)whethercounselingisnecessaryforthepartyorhouseholdmember.
AtleastafewPennsylvaniacountieswereinterpretingthisstatutetomeanthatifaparty,oramemberoftheparty’shousehold,hascommittedoneoftheseoffenses,theparty,orthememberoftheparty’shousehold,wasrequiredtoreceiveanevaluationbyamentalhealthprofessionalpriortothecourtawardingthatpartyanyrightsofcustody’.Forexample,ifapartyhadbeenexercisingprimaryphysicalcustodyofachildfortenyearsandthatpartyhada20yearolddrivingunderinfluenceoffense,thecourtwouldnotawardcustodytothatpartyuntilthatpartyreceivedanevaluationfromamentalhealthprofessional.
Inanefforttoaddressthisconcern,Pennsylvanialegislatureaddedlanguagetosection5329thatstates,“Attheinitialin-personcontactwiththecourt,thejudge,conferenceofficerorotherappointedindividualshallperformaninitialevaluationtodeterminewhetherthepartyorthehouseholdmemberwhocommittedanoffenseunderSubsection(A)posesathreattothechildandwhethercounselingisnecessary.The initial evaluation shall not be conducted by a mental health professional.”TheadditionclearlygivesJudgesandconferenceofficerstheauthoritytograntcustodialrightstoindividualswhohavebeenconvictedofoneoftheenumeratedoffenseswithoutfirsthavingamentalhealthprofessionalconductanevaluation.Additionally,thenewlanguageprovidesabroadgroupofpersonswhomayconducttheinitialevaluation.Therefore,nomatterwhatprocessacountyhasadoptedforacustodylitigant’sinitialcontactwiththecourt,thecourt,conferenceofficerorotherappointedindividualisauthorizedtodeterminewhetherapartyoramemberofaparty’shouseholdposesathreatofharmtothechild.AttachedheretoasExhibit AisacopyofSenateBillNo.1167settingforththeamendmentstosection5329.
B. CustodyProceedingsDuringMilitaryDeployment.
EffectiveJune11,2012,thePennsylvanialegislatureamendedsection5338(modificationofexistingorder)tolimitthecourt’sauthoritytomodifythecustodyrightsofcertaineligiblemembersofthearmedforcesbycrossreferencing51Pa.C.S.A.§4109relatingtochildcustodyproceedingsduringmilitarydeployment.Priortotherecentamendments,Section4109(a)hadprovidedthatnocourtmayenteranordermodifyingoramendingapreviouscustodyorderwhileaneligibleservicememberisdeployed,exceptthatacourtmayenteratemporarycustodyorder.Thenewamendmentsaddedsection4109(a.1),relatingtoaservicemember’sabilitytoassignhisorhercustodialrightstoafamilymember,andsection4110relatingtoanexpeditedhearing,wherethecourtispermittedtoconductan“electronichearing.”
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CUSTODY UPDATE
Section4109(a.1)providesthatifaneligibleservicemember“hasreceivednoticeofdeploymentinsupportofacontingencyoperation,acourtmayissueatemporaryordertoaneligibleservicemember…includingatemporaryordertotemporarilyassigncustodyrightstofamilymembersoftheservicemember.”Toassignthecustodyrights,theservicemembershalljointhefamilymembertothepetitionandincludeaproposedcustodyscheduleforcareofthechildbythefamilymember.Thestatutelimitstheextentofthefamilymember’srightstocustodytotherightsgrantedtotheservicememberineffectatthetimeofthefilingofthepetition.
Section4110providesfor“anexpeditedhearing”anduponmotion,permittheeligibleservicemembertopresenttestimonyandevidencebyelectronicmeanswherethemilitarydutiesoftheeligibleservicememberhaveamaterialeffectonhisorherabilitytoappearinpersonataregularlyscheduledhearing.
Theeffectofthisstatuteincreasestheclassofpersonswhohavetherighttoseekcustody,andevidencesourculture’srecognitionofanexpandedfamilyunit.Asgrandparentsweregrantedstandingtoseekcustodialrights,nowany“familymember”ofadeployed’sfamilyisgrantedstandingtojoinwiththeservicemembertofileapetitionforcustody.“Familymember”isdefinedas“spouses,parentsandchildrenorotherpersonsrelatedbyconsanguinityoraffinity.”
Duringthetimeinwhichthefamilyofaservicememberisassignedcustodialrights,andpotentiallyprovidingsignificantcareforachild,thatfamilymembermaybegainingstandingnotasa“familymember”,butstandingthrough“in loco parentis.”Pursuanttosection5324oftheCustodyAct,apersonwhostands“in loco parentis”hasstandingtofileforanyformofphysicalorlegalcustody.Therefore,anadditionalpartymayhaverightstoseekcustodyofthechildevenaftertheservicemembercompleteshisorherdeployment.
Theimmediateeffectofthisstatuteensuresthataparty’schildisgiventheopportunitytomaintainarelationshipwiththeservicememberthroughhisorherfamily.However,theremaybealonglastingeffectofthecustodyscheduleafterdeploymentifthefamilymemberisabletoestablishin loco parentis.AttachedasExhibitAisacopyofSenateBillNo.1167thatsetsforththeadditionalrightsforaservicememberandhisorherfamilymembers.
II. Case Law Updates:
A. PennsylvaniaSupremeCourt.
CUSTODY–COUNSELINGREQUIREMENT–PRISONER’SREQUESTFORVISITATIOND.R.C.v.J.A.Z.,31A.3d677(Pa.November23,2011).
Issue: Under the old custody statute, was theDepartmentofCorrectionsrequiredtoprovidecounselingtoincarceratedindividualswhohavebeenconvictedofoneoftheoffensesenumeratedinthecustodystatutesothattheycanexercisetherighttoprisonvisitationofaminorchild?
Holding:No.ThelawdidnotrequiretheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovidecounseling,andthestatute,ineffectatthetimethiscasewasinitiated,doesnotrequirecounselingasaprerequisitetoacourtengaginginanevaluationastowhetheritisinthechild’sbestintereststoparticipateinprisonvisitation.
Facts:OnFebruary19,2004,D.R.C.,Sr.(“Father”)filedacustodycomplaintinYorkCountyCourtofCommonPleasseekingvisitationofhisminorsonatthestatecorrectionalinstitutioninHuntington,Pennsylvania,whereFatherwasservingalifesentenceforfirstdegreemurder.J.A.Z.(“Mother”)opposed
prisonvisitsfortheminorchild.
OnJuly6,2005,thetrialcourtdeniedFather’srequestforvisitationandFatherappealed.TheSuperiorCourtvacatedthisorderandremandedtoholdahearingconcerningFather’srequestforvisitation.Onremand,thetrialcourtissuedapre-trialorderdirectingFathertopresentevidencethathenolongerposesathreatofharmtothechild.FathersubmittedtherequestedevidencetothecourtconsistingofFather’sswornaffidavitandpagesoftestimonyandcharacterwitnessesfromhisfirstdegreemurdertrial.
OnJune26,2008,thetrialcourtheldatelephonehearing,whichMotherandFatherappeared,aswellasalicensedpsychologistmanageratSCIHuntingtonandacorrectionscounselorattheprison,whotestifiedregardingtypesofcounselingFatherreceived,orwaseligibletoreceiveattheprison.Uponreceiptofhistestimony,thetrialcourtdismissedFather’spetitionforvisitationbecauseFather“neverreceivedthecounselingmandatedbythecustodystatute.”ThetrialreasonedthatitdidnothaveauthoritytoordertheDepartmentofCorrectionsto“design,construct,andadminister”aprogramofcounselingthatwouldmeettherequirementsofthecustodystatute.ThetrialcourtalsoreasonedthatitdoubtedithadtheauthoritytoappointanoutsideprivateindividualandtoordertheDepartmentofCorrectionstocooperatebyprovidingaccesstoboththecorrectionalinstitutionandtheinmate.
FatheragainappealedthisorderandtheSuperiorCourtfoundthetrialcourterredbynotappointingaqualifiedprofessional.TheSuperiorCourt,inthis2009Opinion,foundthattheDepartmentofCorrectionsandtheindividualprisonsemploythetypesofqualifiedprofessionalsthatthelegislatorintendedtoprovidecounselingevaluationsasdirectedbythecustodystatute.
Onsubsequentremand,thetrialcourtdirectedtheDepartmentofCorrectionstochooseaqualifiedprofessionalandevaluateFather,andonMay7,2009,theDepartmentofCorrectionsfiledapetitiontointervene,amotiontostay,andamotionforreconsideration.ThetrialcourtgrantedtheDepartmentofCorrections’petitiontointerveneanddeniedtheDepartmentofCorrections’motiontostay.
TheDepartmentofCorrectionsfiledanoticeofappealtotheSuperiorCourtastoitsmotionforreconsiderationandthetrialcourtstayedtheproceedingsuntiltheresolutionoftheDepartmentofCorrections’appeal.TheSuperiorCourtaffirmedandtheDepartmentofCorrectionsappealedtothePennsylvaniaSupremeCourtforconsiderationofwhethertheDomesticRelationsCoderequirestheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovidecounselingtocurrentlyincarceratedfelonssothattheymayobtainrightsofcustody,partialcustody,andvisitationandwhetheracustodycourtcanordertheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovideandpayforcustodyrelatedcounselingforastateinmate.
Conclusion:ThemajorityopinionexaminedthestatuteanddeterminedthateveniftheGeneralAssemblyintendedanevaluationofaparty,whocommittedanenumeratedoffense,priortoprovidingrightsofcustody,thestatutewasnotclearastowhethertheGeneralAssemblyintendedthissectiontoapplytooffendingparentswhoremainincarcerated.TheMajorityopinionstatedthatitappliestopersonswhohave“beenconvicted”butdoesnotidentifywhetheritappliestopartieswhoareincarcerated.
Asthestatuteisambiguous,themajorityopinionlookedtolegislativehistorytodeterminelegislativeintent.Inreview,“Thepurposeof[thisprovision]wastomakecertainthatwhereaparenthadbeenconvictedofaseriouscrime,theconductunderlyingthatcrimewillbeevaluatedasanadditionalfactoralongwithmanyotherfactors.”Thelegislature“soughttoremedythereintroductionofanoffendingparentintothechild’slifewithoutanassessmentofthatparent’spotentialthreattothechildincustodyandvisitationarrangements.”The
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CUSTODY UPDATE
courtstatedthatthecustodystatuteregardingcriminaloffenses“couldbeappliedtocurrentlyincarceratedfelons,butsuchaninterpretationwouldbeunreasonable.”Thecourtfoundthatthelegislativehistoryintendedtoprevent“theplacementofachildinto the homeofanoffendingparentwithoutfirsthavingengagedinariskofharmassessment.”
InrelianceontheDepartmentofCorrections’argumentsthatapersonwhoisincarceratedisconstantlysupervisedandprisonpoliciesprecludeanyonefromhavingunsupervisedvisitationandprohibitcertainsexoffendersfromhavinganyphysicalvisitswithminors,theGeneralAssembly’sintentfortheseprovisionsofthecustodystatutedonotapplyforprisonvisitation.Thecourtstatedthat,“Duetothestricturesoftheirconfinementandtherulesofthepenalinstitution,incarceratedparentsareunabletoengageinthetypeofphysicalinteractionfearedbythedraftersofthislegislation.”
Concurring and Dissenting (Justice Saylor, in which Justice Todd joins):Dissentingopiniondisagreeswiththemajority’sholdingthatthereisanyambiguitywiththestatuteanddisagreeswiththemajority’sapplicationsofthestatute.TheDissentingopinionfindsthatcounselingisappropriateforaprisonertoobtainvisitationwithaminorchild.Thisopiniondoesaddresstheissueof“whomustpayfortheservices”ofprisoncounseling.TheopiniondoesnotidentifywhoshouldpayforthecounselingbutthisopinionstatesthatthereisnobasistorequiretheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovidethecounseling.
Legislative Update:Theversionofthestatuteanalyzedinthisopinionhasbeenamended.TheissuesraisedbythisprovisionareaddressedinthenewCustodyAct,andamendedasecondtimewiththeadditionoflanguageeffectiveJune11,2012.Inlightofthenewlanguageaddedtothecriminalconvictionprovisionwherebytheinitialevaluationisconductedattheinitialin-personcontactwiththecourtincludingajudge,conferenceofficerorotherappointedindividual,apartywouldonlyberequiredtoobtaincounselingifdeterminedattheinitialin-personcontact.
TERMINATIONOFPARENTALRIGHTS-INCARCERATION
InRe:R.I.S.andA.I.S.,36A.3d567(Pa.November23,2011).
Issue:Whetherincarcerationcanserveasgroundsfortheinvoluntaryterminationofparentalrightswhenanincarceratedparentmakesfulluseoftheopportunitiesthatareavailabletohiminprisonandcomplieswiththereunificationplan?
Holding: No.Aparent’sabsenceorfailuretosupporthisorherchildduetoincarcerationisnot,initself,abasisforadeterminationofabandonment.
Facts: InJune2008,C.S.(“Father”)wassentencedsuchthathisearliestreleasedatewasJune2012andhislatestreleasedatewasinJune2016.FatherservedhissentenceinastatecorrectionalinstitutioninErieCounty.InJanuary2009,YorkCountyChildrenandYouthServicesfiledadependencyactionandthechildrenwereplacedinatemporaryfosterhome.
OnMarch2,2010,ahearingwasheldwherebyafamilyserviceplanidentifiedagoalforFatherofreunification.Father’sgoalsincludedcooperatingwiththeserviceplan,signingnecessaryreleases,remainingincontactwithChildrenandYouthServices,andprovidingdocumentationregardinghisinvolvementintherapeuticprisonprogramsandmaintaininggoodprisonconduct.EvidencewaspresentedthatFathermeteachofthesegoalsandcooperatedwiththeserviceplan.Fatherhadmaintainedwrittenandtelephonecontact
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CUSTODY UPDATE
withChildrenandcommittednoincidentsofmisconduct.Fatherrequestedvisitationwiththechildren,butwasdeniedduetothedistancebetweenYorkandErie,Pennsylvania.Fatherrequested“virtualvisitation”,butwasdeniedbecauseChildrenandYouthServicesdidnothavevideoconferencingcapability.Fatherpurchasedapre-paidphonecardandmadeseveralattemptstocallthechildren,butthefosterparentsrefusedthecallsfromFather.
WhenthecourtsummarizedFather’sprogress,itstatedthat“therewasnothingthathedidn’tdoorthattherewasn’tsomesatisfactoryreasonforhimnotbeingabletodoit.”
ChildrenandYouthServicesfiledapetitionforgoalchange,fromreunificationtoadoption,andfiledapetitiontoterminateFather’srights.Followingthehearing,thetrialcourtdeniedthegoalchangepetitionanddeniedinvoluntarytermination.ThetrialcourtconcludedthattheChildrenandYouthServices’petitionseekingterminationwasbasedsolelyonthelengthofFather’sincarceration.Withrespecttothepetitionforgoalchange,thetrialcourtconcludedthatreunificationshouldremainthegoalandthetrialcourtstatedthatthepetitiontochangethegoalwassimplyanotherwaytomakeanargumentregardingtheirpetitionfortermination,therefore,thecourtneednotprovidefurtherresponse.
ChildrenandYouthServicesappealedtotheSuperiorCourtandtheSuperiorCourtreversedthetrialcourtandheldthatFather’sincarcerationisevidenceofhisincapacitytoparentinthathis“failuretocomplywiththelawsoftheCommonwealthcreatedasituationandenvironmentthathasleftChildrenwithoutproperparentalcare.”TheSuperiorCourtalsostatedthat,“ThelengthofFather’sprisonsentencesupportstheconclusionthathecannotremedytheparentaldeficienciesthatledtothechildren’splacement.”TheCourtnotedthatwhenFatherwasinprison,thefirstchildwasnotyetbornandtheotheronewaslessthanoneyearold.UponFather’srelease,thechildrenwouldbe5and6yearsoldattheyoungest,or9and10yearsoldattheoldest.
Conclusion: “Therighttoconceiveandraiseone’schildrenhaslongbeenrecognizedasoneofourbasiccivilrights.”AsnotedbytheSupremeCourt,“Aparent’sabsenceorfailuretosupporthisorherchildduetoincarcerationisnot,initself,conclusivelydeterminativeoftheissueofparentalabandonment.”TheCourtmustinquirewhethertheparenthadutilizedthoseresourcesathisorhercommandwhileinprisontocontinueandpursueacloserelationship.
TheSupremeCourtfoundthattheSuperiorCourtimproperlysubstituteditsjudgmentforthatofthetrierfactandthus,shouldbeoverturned.TheCourtreiteratedthestandardandstatedthat,“incarcerationaloneisnotpersayevidenceofparentalincapacityorthatitrepresentssufficientgroundsforinvoluntaryterminationofparentalrights.”TheSupremeCourtfoundthatthetrialcourtimproperlydismissedthepetitionforgoalchangeinthatanorderrequireddiscreetinquirieswithananalysisofinterestsseparatefromthosereviewedrelevanttoinvoluntarytermination.Therefore,theSupremeCourtremandstothetrialcourtforanexaminationofthepetitionforgoalchangefromreunificationtoadoption.Concurring (Justice Saylor, in which Chief Justice Castille joins): JusticeSaylor’sconcurringopinion,althoughinsupportofthemajority’sfinding,makesitclearthatthereareinstanceswherethelengthoftheparent’sincarcerationwillpreclude“thecourtfromunifyingtheformerprisonerandthechildonatimelybasis,”andthatachildisentitledtoapermanenthome.Therearecaseswherethelengthofasentence,standingalone,“shouldanddoesmeetthelegalcriteriaforinvoluntarytermination.”Theconcurringopinionnotedthatitisincumbentuponthejudicialsystemtobechildfocused.“Regardlessoftheheartbreaktoaparent,childrenare
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CUSTODY UPDATE
entitledtoeveryopportunityforasuccessfullife,andapermanent,lovingparentalrelationshipgenerallyfostersthatopportunity.”
Dissenting Opinion (Justice Orie Melvin): TheopinionwrittenbyJusticeOrieMelvinagreeswiththeSuperiorCourtandnotesthatnotonlymustFather’sprisonsentenceend,Fathermustovercomeadditionalhurdlesbeforebeingabletocareforthechildren,includingobtainingappropriatehousing,employmentandfulfillingtheconditionsofparole.
Thedissentingopinionconcurswiththegeneralpremisethatincarcerationalonedoesnotprovidegroundsfortermination,however,thelengthofFather’sprisonsentencedoessupporttheconclusionthathecannotremedytheparentaldeficienciesthatledtothechildren’splacement.Thedissentingopinionstatesthatthemajorityimproperlyappliesthelawthatifanincarceratedparentmakeseveryefforttomaintainaparent/childrelationship,thecourtmaynotterminatehisrights.Thedissentingopinionstatesthatalthough“anincarceratedparentmaybedoingeverythingrequiredofhimwhileinprison,thechild’sneedsforconsistentparentalcarecannotbecastasideorputonhold.”ThedissentingopinionagreedwiththeSuperiorCourt’sopinionthatFather’suncertainprospectsregardinghisabilitytoparentcombinedwithalackofbondwiththechildrenoutweighFather’seffortstomaintainapresenceinthechildren’slives.Thedissentnotestherealitythatthereisadifferencebetween“incapacity”toparentanda“desire”todoso.
B. PennsylvaniaSuperiorCourtCases.
CUSTODY–FAILURETOCONSIDERCUSTODYFACTORSINSECTION5328–RESTRICTIONSONVISITATIONRIGHTS
J.R.M.v.J.E.A.,33A.3d647(Pa.Super.December5,2011).
Issue: Doesatrialcourterrwhenitdoesnotengageinafactspecific,casespecific,analysisofthebestinterestsfactors?
Holding: Atrialcourtisrequiredtoengageinaspecificanalysisofthebestinterestsfactorsandshallconsiderallofthefactorslistedin§5328(a)whenenteringacustodyorder.TheSuperiorCourtalsoaddressedthetrialcourt’sauthoritytoplacerestrictionsonaparty’speriodsofphysicalcustodyandstatedthatarestrictionwillbeimposedonlyifthepartiesagree,orifthephysicalcustodywouldhaveadetrimentalimpactonthechildintheabsenceoftherestrictions.
Facts: AfterMotherandFatherweredatingforapproximatelyonemonth,MotherandFatherbecameengagedtobemarried.Twomonthsaftertheirengagement,Motherwaspregnant,butbythattime,MotherandFatherwereexperiencingtroubleintheirrelationshipandtheyseparated.Aftertheirseparation,FatherlivedapproximatelytwohoursawayformMother,andFatherbeganarelationshipwithhisex-wife,whowasnowhisfiancé.Aftertheirbreakup,thepartieshaddifficultycommunicating,andasaresult,MotherdidnotinformFatherwhenthechildwasborn.
UponFatherlearningthatthechildwasborn,MotherhadarrangedforFathertocontactMother’semployertoarrangeforvisitationwiththechild.Father,“grudgingly”arrangedvisitsthroughMother’semployerandbegantovisitwiththechildatvariouslocationswithMother’semployeroranotherindividualpresent.Inanticipationofreceivingovernightcustody,FathersetuparoominhishomefortheChildtoexerciseovernightcustodyvisit.
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CUSTODY UPDATEMotherfiledacustodycomplaintonDecember10,2010,andFatherfiledacustodycomplaintonDecember14,2010.Thepartiesattendacustodyconciliationconference,whichdidnotresolvethedispute,andthepartiesagreedintheinterimthatFatherwouldhavepartialcustodythreedaysperweek,foratwohourtimeperiod.FatherexercisedtheseperiodsofcustodyinMother’schurch.AlthoughFatherwasaloneintheroomwiththechild,MotherwaspresentinthechurchduringFather’speriodsofcustody.
OnMarch25,2011,thetrialcourtenteredanorderandfindingsoffact,wherebyMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedpartialphysicalcustodythreedaysperweek,forthree,threehourperiods.Duringtheseperiodsofcustody,Motheroranyothersuitablecaregiverwastobeinthearea.Inthecourt’sfindingoffact,thecourtdoesnotaddresseachofthesection5328factors,ratheritaddressesthecommunicationbreakdown,thedistancebetweentheparties,andMother’sbreastfeeding.
Fatherfiledatimelyappealraisingtwoissues,(1)Didthetrialcourterrinfailingtoengageina“fact-specific,case-specific”analysisofthebestinterestfactssetforthinsection5328,and(2)didthetrialcourterrinplacingrestrictionsonFather’speriodsofcustody,suchthatMotherorasuitablecaregiverwasrequiredtobepresent.Conclusion:TheSuperiorCourtheldthatthattrialdiderrin“failingtoconsiderthefactorsitwasrequiredtoconsiderinrenderingitscustodydecision.”Thetrialcourtmerelymentionedthreeissues,andfailedtoaddressanyotherfactor.“All ofthefactorslistedinsection5328(a)arerequiredtobeconsideredbythetrialcourtwhenenteringacustodyorder.”WithrespecttotherestrictionsonFather’scustody,theSuperiorCourtheldthat“anawardofcustodygenerallydoesnotcontainanyrestrictions...[andwillonly]beimposedifthepartieshaveagreedtoarestrictionorifthepartyrequestingarestrictionshowsthatwithoutit,partialcustodywillhaveadetrimentalimpactonthechild.”AsthetrialcourtmadenofindingoffactthatFatherwasunfitorunabletocarefortheChildonhisown,andinfact,Fatherandhisfiancéwerepreparedtoexerciseovernightswiththechild,thetrialcourtshouldnothaverestrictedFather’speriodofphysicalcustody.
CUSTODY–FALSECLAIMSOFABUSE
M.O.v.F.W.,___A.3d___,2012PASuper49(Pa.Super.February28,2012).
Issue:(1)Mayatrialcourtenterintoevidenceapriorcustodyevaluationreport,whenthepreparingexpertdoesnottestify?(2)DidthetrialcourterrinenteringatemporarycustodyorderwhichawardedMothersolelegalandphysicalcustodyoftheChild?Holding:(1)Yes.Eventhoughthepreparingexpertdidnottestify,whenapriorcustodyevaluationwasmadepartoftherecordinapriorproceeding,andthepartywhoobjectstothepriorcustodyevaluationisthepartytoaddresstheconclusionsofthepriorcustodyevaluation,atrialcourtmayenterapriorcustodyevaluationreportintoevidence.(2)No.ThetrialcourtdidnoterrinenteringatemporaryawardofsolelegalandphysicalcustodytoMotherwherethetrialcourtfoundthatFatherexhibitedrecentpoorjudgmentthatcreatedariskofharmtothechild.
Facts:ThechildwasbornonJune13,2007,andcustodylitigationbeganbeforethechildwasborn.InSeptember2008,thepartiesreceivedaprivatecustodyevaluationfromDr.StevenCohen.OnNovember2,009,byagreement,anorderwasenteredgrantingthepartiessharedlegalcustodyandMotherprimaryphysicalcustodysubjecttoFather’speriodofphysicalcustody6outof14overnightsinatwoweekcycle.
OnJanuary7,2011,FatherfiledaPFApetitionallegingMotherandherboyfriendwerephysically,emotionally,andpsychologicallyandsexuallyabusingtheChild,andFatherfiledanemergencypetitiontomodifycustody
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CUSTODY UPDATEonJanuary20,2011.Father’spetitionrequestedthatthecourtgranthimsolephysicalandlegalcustody“untilsuchtimeastheChildiscapableofevadingphysicallyandemotionallyabusivesituationswithMotherandherParamour.”MotherfiledacontemptpetitionallegingthatFather’sallegationsofabusewerefalseandthatFatherhadsubjectedtheChildtoevaluationswithoutMother’sknowledgeandconsent.
ThetrialcourtheldahearingoversevendaysinAprilandMay2011.OnJune9,2011,thetrialcourtenteredatemporarycustodyordergivingMothersolelegalandphysicalcustodyoftheChild.ThetemporaryorderrequiredFather’svisitstobesupervisedtopreventFatherfromsubjectingtheChildtoadditionaldoctorsvisitsorphysicalexaminations.Thecourtnoted“Iamnotgoingtohavethischildstrippedeverytimeshecomesfrommother’shouseandexamined...Ijustdon’twantemergencytripstothedoctor.Idon’ttrustFather’sjudgmentonthisanymore.”
Afterhearingextensivetestimonyandreviewingnumerousexhibits,thetrialcourtenteredanorderwherebyMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedtwo,two-hoursupervisedvisitswiththeChildeachweek.ThecourtfoundthatallevidenceofabusewhiletheChildwasinMother’scustodywascompletelyunfounded,andtherewasnoevidencetosubstantiateFather’sclaims.Father’s“heinousattempttowrestcustodyfromMotherand,ineffect,terminateherrelationshipwithherdaughter,issodetrimentaltothechild’swelfarethatthecourtwasleftnooptionbuttolimithiscontactwithhisdaughtersoastopreventanyfurtherattempttopoisonhermind.”
Onappeal,Fatherraisedfiveissues(1)DidthetrialcourterrbyawardingMothersolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustodyoftheChild,(2)whetherthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionbydenyingFather’sMotiontoRemovecounsel,(3)whetherthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionbydenyingFather’sAmendedMotionforrecusalandmistrialbasedonbiasandprejudice,(4)whetherthetrialcourterredbyadmittingintoevidenceapriorcustodyevaluationreport,withouttestimonyfromthepreparingexpert,and(5)whetherthetrialcourterredbygrantingatemporaryorder,priortoenteringthefinalorder,whichawardedMothersolelegalandphysicalcustody.
Conclusion:TheSuperiorCourtaddressedissues(1)-(3).Inrelianceonthetrialcourt’sopinion,thetrialcourt“thoroughlyandcogentlyaddressedtheissuesregardingwhythecustodyorderisinthebestinterestoftheChild...[i]nfact,wecommend[thetrialcourt]forrefusaltoallowsuchablatantattemptofforumshoppingtooccurduringahotlycontestedcustodybattle.”
Withrespecttoadmittingthe2009custodyevaluationreport,thecourtnotedthatexpertreportsmaynotbeusedincustodyactionsunlesstheauthorofthereporttestifiesandissubjecttocrossexaminationbythepartyadverselyaffected.Therightofalitiganttoin-courtpresentationofevidenceisessentialtodueprocess.Eventhoughtheexpertdidnottestifyregardingthe2009custodyevaluation,thecourtreliedonseveralreasonswhytheadmissionwasnotaviolationofdueprocess:(1)anumberofwitnesses,includingFather’switnesses,hadtestifiedaboutthereport’sconclusions,andtheexpert’sallegedbias,(2)Fatherhiredanexperttorebutthe2009report’sconclusions,(3)Fatherreferencedthe2009reportinhistestimony,(4)Fatherhiredtheexpertwhopreformedthe2009Report,and(5)thecustodyreportclarifiedtherolethattheexpertplayedintheinthehistoryoftheparties’custodydispute.Underthesecircumstances,Fatherwasnotdenieddueprocesswiththeadmissionofthe2009report.
Withrespecttothelastissue,whetherthecourterredinenteringthetemporaryorderwhileittookthetimetoreviewtherecordinenteringacustodyorder,thetrialcourtdidnoterr.BasedonFather’sactionsofsubjectingthechildtonumerousinvasiveanddegradingphysicalexaminations,inadditiontohavingherstripeverytime
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CUSTODY UPDATEhereceivedcustodyofherfromMother,thetrialcourt’sordersaremorethanreasonable.
CUSTODY-RELOCATION–SIGNIFICANTIMPAIRMENTOFCUSTODIALRIGHTS
C.M.K.v.K.E.M.,___A.3d___,2012PASuper76(Pa.Super.March27,2012).
Issue:(1)Doesapartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocation“tacitlyconcede”thataparties’proposedmoveisa“relocation”?(2)Wastheproposedmove,approximately68milesfromwhereFatherresides,inthechild’sbestinterest,whenFatherhasmaintainedarelationshipwiththechildandFatherexercisescustodyalternatingweekends,withamidweekvisit.
Holding:(1)No.Apartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocationpursuanttosection5337doesnot“tacitlyconcede”thataparties’proposedmoveisa“relocation”asdefinedinthestatute.Apartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocationisentitledtoahearingtolitigateallissues,includingwhetherthemoveitselfconstitutes“relocation.”(2)No.AlthoughFatherexercisedpartialcustodyonalternatingweekends,withamidweekvisit,theproposedmovewasnotinthebestinterestofthechildwhenthemovewouldimpairFather’sabilitytoparticipateinweekdayeventswiththechild,includingattendingschoolandsportingevents,andtheChild’sbondwithFather’sfamilywouldbeaffected.
Facts:MotherlivesinGroveCity,MercerCounty,Pennsylvania,withthechild.FatherlivesinGroveCity,MercerCounty,Pennsylvaniawithhisgirlfriendandher13year-oldchild.MotherandFatherwerenevermarried,butresidedtogetherfromJanuary2004toJuly2008,inGroveCity.WhenMotherandFatherlivedtogether,theybothwereactiveinthecareofthechild.
InNovember2008andMay2010,Motherfiledcustodycomplaints,bothofwhichresultedinagreementswhereMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedpartialphysicalcustody.CommencinginMay2010,Fatherexercisedcustodyonalternatingweekends,withamidweekvisit.ThecourtnotedthatinadditiontoFather’spartialcustody,Fatherwasinvolvedinthechild’sschoolandsportactivities.Additionally,theChildhadestablishedagoodfamilialsupportnetworkwithFather’sfamilyintheGroveCityarea.
OnJune2,2011,MothersentanoticetoFatherwithaproposedrelocationtoAlbion,Pennsylvania(68milesfromFather’sresidence).Motherstatedthatshepreviouslyresidedinthisarea,herfamilywaslocatedthere,shehadtheopportunityforimprovedhousing,andshehadjobprospectswiththepossibilityofbecomingapartownerinabusiness.
Aftertherelocationhearing,thetrialcourtfoundthatMother’sproposedmovemetthedefinitionof“relocation”becauseshe“tacitlyconceded”themovewasarelocationduetoherNoticeofProposedrelocation.Inthealternative,thetrialcourtheldthatMother’smovewouldsignificantlyimpairFather’srighttoexercisecustody.Inreviewofthefactorsrelevanttoaparties’abilitytomove,thetrialcourtdeniedMother’spetition.Conclusion:TheSuperiorCourtheldthataNoticeofProposedRelocationwasnot,initself,sufficienttoprovidethatMother’sproposedmovewasa“relocation”pursuanttothestatute.Thecourtnotedthatapartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocationisentitledtoahearingtolitigateallissues,includingwhetherthemoveitselfconstitutes“relocation,”andnor“diditraiseapresumptionthat[a]proposedmoveconstitutedrelocation.”
Relocationoccurswhenaproposedmovewouldsignificantlyimpairaparties’abilitytoexercisecustodialrights.AlthoughtheSuperiorCourtrejectedthetrialcourt’sfindingthatMother’sNoticeofProposed
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CUSTODY UPDATErelocationequatedtoanadmissionthatMother’smovewasa“relocation,”theSuperiorCourtupheldthetrialcourt’salternativefindingthatthemovesignificantlyimpairedFather’sabilitytoparent.TheSuperiorCourtreliedonFather’scontinuedmidweekinvolvementintheChild’slife.
Inreviewingthetrial’sanalysisofthefactorsinsection5337(h),theSuperiorCourtnotedseveralfactorsinsupportofthetrialcourt’sorderdenyingMother’sabilitytorelocate,including:(1)ChildandFatherhaveastrongsupportsysteminGroveCity,(2)theChildhasdinnerwithFatherandpaternalgrandparentseveryWednesdaynight,(3)Motherhascontinuedtohavecontactwithpaternalgrandparents,(4)thechilddoesnothaveanequallystrongsupportsystemwithMother’sfamily,(5)the“advantagesoftheproposedmoveareminor,atbest,”includingMotherearningapproximatelythesameamountathernewemploymentandonlyaminimallylesserrent.Additionally,thetrialcourtfoundthattheChildwouldhavelittletogainwiththerelocation.Combiningallofthesefacts,andfindingthatMother’sclaimsthatFatherhadabusedherwerelessenedbythefactthatMotherhadreconciledwithFatheraftertheincidentsofabuse,supportedthetrialcourt’sdenialofMother’sPetitiontoRelocate.
TERMINATIONOFPARENTALRIGHTS–INABILITYTOUNDERSTANDENGLISHLANGUAGE
InreP.S.S.C.andP.D.S.C.,32A.3d1281(Pa.Super.November29,2011).
Issue: WastheresufficientevidencetoterminateFather’sparentalrightsconsideringthatFather’sinabilitytospeakorreadEnglishmadeitimpossibleforhimtounderstandandactuponhisparentalrights,andhefailedtohavecounseluntilimmediatelypriortotheterminationhearing?
Holding:No.WhenFather’s“languagebarrierandlackofcounselmadeitimpossibleforhimtounderstandandactuponhisparentrightsandresponsibilitiesregardingtheterminationprocess,”therewasinsufficientevidenceontherecordtosupportterminationofFather’sparentalrights.
Facts:FatherisSpanish-speaking,andhischildrenwereborninPuertoRicoin1999and2001,andlivedtherewithFatherandMother.WhenFatherwasincarceratedinaPuertoRicoprisonin2005,MothertookthechildrentoLebanon,Pa.,andinDecember2006,MotherabandonedthechildreninLebanontoreturntoPuertoRico.LebanonCountyChildrenandYouthServicestookcustodyofthechildren.Atthistime,LCCYShadcontactwithMother,butMotherdidnotprovideFather’saddress.
InMay2007,LCCYSobtainedFather’sprisonaddressandsentcopiesofgoalsandnoticeofreviewhearings,writteninEnglishonly.NoattemptwasmadebyLCCYStodetermineifFatherspokeorreadtheEnglishlanguageorifhereceivedthenotices.FatherdidattempttocontactLCCYS,butdespiteFather’sefforts,thegoalwaschangedtoadoptionin2008.
InDecember2009,Fatherwasreleasedfromprisonandrefusedtosigntheterminationpapers.InMarch2010,FathermovedtoTexas,andcontinuedtocallLCCYStospeakwiththeChildren.FatherfinallyobtainedalegalaidapplicationnearlyfouryearsafterLCCYStookthechildrenintocustody.
FathertraveledtwicetoLebanonCountytoattendterminationhearings,andonMay10,2011,thetrialcourtheldthefinalterminationhearing,whereaninterpreterappearedandtranslatedthetestimony.FathertestifiedthatallpapershereceivedfromLCCYSwereservedinEnglishandthatFatherwasundertheimpressionthathewasnotallowedtohaveanycontactwiththeChildren.ThetrialcourtterminatedFather’sparentalrights,andalthoughthecourtsetforththereasonsforterminatingMother’srights,therewerenosuchreasonsidentifiedforFather.
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CUSTODY UPDATE
Conclusion:Thecourtnotesthatitiswellestablishedunder23Pa.C.S.A.2511(a)(1),“incarcerationalonecannotsupportterminationduetoaparent’sfailuretoperformparentalduties...[and]aparent’sabsenceandfailuretosupportachildduetoincarcerationisnotconclusiveontheissueofwhethertheparenthasabandonedthechild.”Acourtmustdeterminewhethertheparentutilizedthoseresourcesavailableinprisontocontinuearelationshipwiththechild.
FatherattemptedtousetheresourcesavailablethroughLCCYS,buttonoavail.TheresourcesandaidetoFatherwhilehewasincarceratedwere“completelyinadequateforanunrepresentedSpanish-speakingindividualwithoutaccesstoaninterpreter.Inessence,theservicesorassistancereasonablyavailabletoFatherbyLCCYSweresimplynotavailableinlightofthelanguagebarrier.”
Thecourtdistinguishedthiscasefromthe1986case:AdoptionofBabyBoyAv.CatholicSocialServices,wherethecourtterminatedtheparentalrightsofanilliterateandincarceratedindividual.InAdoptionofBabyBoyAv.CatholicSocialServices,althoughfatherwasilliterateandthishinderedhisparticipationinthechild’slife,theparentmadeessentiallynoefforttofindoutinformationregardingthechild.Inthiscase,Fatherhadmadeseveralattemptstospeakwiththechildren.
Thecourtheldthatalthoughthisisa“closecase,”“thereisinsufficientevidenceintherecordtoconcludethatFathercouldactuallyreadthevariousnotices,plans,andpetitionsregardingterminationofhisparentalrights[andthis]tipsthescaleinfavorofFather.”ItisnotclearfromtherecordthatFatherevidenceda“settledpurposetorelinquishhisparentalrightsorwasunable,unwilling,orincapableofperforminghisparentaldutiesbaseduponhisapparentlimitation—notunderstandingtheEnglishLanguage.”
C. PennsylvaniaTrialCourtCases.
CUSTODY–GRANDPARENTS--ORALAGREEMENTBEFOREOPENCOURT–DURESS/COERCION
Morgantiv.Morganti,104BerksCo.L.J.40(C.C.P.September27,2011).
Issue: Doesaparty,representedbycounsel,havearighttorecantanoralagreementthatwasagreedunderoathbasedontheassertionthatthepartywas“inanunfitstateofmind”andthattheparty“panicked”?
Holding:No.Whenthereisnothingintherecordtoshowduress,coercionorunderinfluence,aparty,representedbycounsel,doesnothavetherighttorecantanoralagreementthatwasagreedunderoathandmadepartoftherecord.
Facts:OnDecember16,2006,theplaintiffs,MaternalGrandparents,commencedacustodyactionagainstMotherandFather.Followingahearing,MaternalGrandparentsweregrantedsolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustody,andMotherwasgrantedextensiveaccesstoMaternalGrandparentshomestoaccesstheChild.OnMay24,2009,FatherdiedinanATVaccident.
Throughaseriesofotherfilings,MaternalGrandparentsmaintainedprimaryphysicalcustodyuntilMarch14,2011,whenMotherfiledapetitionforprimaryphysicalcustody.OnMay11,2011,theCustodyMasterfiledhisreportgrantingMothersolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustody.MaternalGrandparentsfiledexceptions,bothpartiesfiledpre-trialmemoranda,andthepartiesattendapretrialconference.
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CUSTODY UPDATE
OnAugust5,2011,“inopencourtwiththebenefitofcounsel,thepartieswereswornandenteredintoanoralcustodyagreementontherecord”forMothertohaveprimaryphysicalcustody.ThecourtacceptedtheAgreementofthepartiesandenteredtheagreementasacourtorder.
Fourdayslater,onAugust9,2011,MaternalGrandparentsfiledaPetitiontoRecantOralAgreement,statingthattheywere“blindsided”byMother’spretrialmemorandumandthatthey“panicked.”MaternalGrandparentsstatedthattheywere“emotionallyupset,stunned,confused,andtotallydisillusionedbecauseMaternalGrandparentshadneverheardtheseallegationsinthepast.”
Conclusion:DespiteMaternalGrandparentsarguments,thetrialcourtnotedthattheMaternalGrandparentswererepresentedbycounsel.Allpartieswereswornandstoodbeforethecourtwheretheattorneyspresentedtheagreement.Thecourtdeniedthepetition,statingthat“thereissimplynothingtosuggestthatthisAgreementwastheproductofduress,coercionorundueduress,andtothecontrarytherecordindicatesthatMaternalGrandparentsfreelyadoptedtheAgreement.”CUSTODY–BESTINTERESTOFCHILDREN–SLEEPDISORDER
Hopperv.Hopper,61CumberlandCo.Leg.J.14(C.C.P.December1,2011).Issue: Whetherfatherwaspermittedtoexerciseinterimperiodsofpartialcustody,afterthefirstdayofhearing,despiteMother’sassertionthatFatherwasunfittoreceiveunsupervisedcustodyduetoreasonsthatincludeanallegedsleepdisorder.
Holding:Yes.Asthecourt,duringthefirstdayofhearing,heardtestimonyfrombothpartiesandFatherofferedtestimonyofapsychologistthathewasnotadangertohimselfandtothechild,Fatherwasentitledtoperiodsofunsupervisedphysicalcustody.
Facts:ThepartiesweremarriedonAugust21,2004andseparatedonMay23,2011.FatherfoundthatMotherhadtakenthechildrenandwasmovingoutofthemaritalresidence.Afterseparation,MotherrefusedtoallowFathertoseethechildren.FatherfiledacustodycomplaintonJune10,2011.
Followingpre-trialmemorandafiledbybothparties,thecourtidentifiedthatthehearingwouldtakeseveraldays,andinordertoallowthecourttofashionaninterimorder,thepartiesagreedthatthecourtwouldhearevidencefromMotherandFatheronthefirstday.MothertestifiedthatFatherhadasleepdisorderthatmadeitdifficulttowakeFather.Fatherstatedthathissleepdisorderdidnotdisrupthisemploymentasapharmacistandheofferedtheopinionofapsychologistthathewasnotadangertohimselforothers.
Afterthefirstdayofhearing,thecourtenteredatemporaryorderwherebyMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedalternatingweekendsfromFridayuntilSunday.Motherfiledanappeal,arguing,amongotherpositions,thatthecourtshouldhaveacceptedherpositionthattheChildrencannotbeleftalonewithFatherduetohissleepdisorder.
Conclusion:Thecourtstatedthatitanticipatedthehearingtotakeseveraldays,andtoreachaninterimorder,thecourtwouldhearfrombothpartiesonthefirstdayofhearing.Afterthefirstday,thecourtstated“thecourtisnotobligedtoacceptthemostalarmistpositionofeitherparty.”TheminimalperiodsoftemporaryorpartialphysicalcustodygrantedtoFatherdonotrepresentathreatofharmtothechildren.
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CUSTODY UPDATE
CUSTODY–COURTREJECTSHOMESCHOOLING–SPECIALNEEDS
SKv.TO,C.P.NorthumberlandCounty,No.98-1793(C.C.P.November21,2011).
Issue: ShouldaChildwithspecialneedsattendpublicschool,whichpossessesindividualstrainedtoworkwithchildrenwithspecialneedsandbehavioralissues,inlightofMother’salternativetohomeschoolthechild?Holding:Yes.Althoughthecourtstatedthatitisnotagainsttheoptionofhomeschooling,theChild,withspecialneeds,shouldattendpublicschoolwhenthepublicschoolhasindividualstrainedtoworkwiththeChild,andMother’speriodofhomeschoolingcausedconcernfortheschoolandthecourt.
Facts:ThecustodyactionwascommencedinJuly9,2009,andMotherandFatherdidnotagreeonschooling.MotherbelievedthatsheshouldcontinuetohomeschooltheChild,whohadlearningandbehavioralissues.FatherbelievedtheChildshouldattendpublicschool.OnJuly26,2011andSeptember12,2011,thecourtheardtheissueofschooling.
Motherpresentedahomeschoolingportfoliofortheprioracademicyear.Inresponse,theShamokinAreaSchoolDistricthadconcernsabouttheportfolioandrequestedthechildtoundergoare-evaluation.Thecourtnotedthatachildwithspecialneedsshouldbeevaluatedeverytwoyears,andthechildhadnotbeenevaluatedsince2006.WhileunderMother’sdirectionofhomeschooling,theChilddidnotreceiveservicesforherspecialneedssince2007.AttheShamokinAreaSchoolDistrict,therewereindividualstrainedtoworkwithchildrenwithspecialneedsandbehavioralissues.
Conclusion:ThecourtfoundthatpublicschoolwasintheChild’sbestinterest,andtherewasnothingintherecordthatshowsMotherhadobtainedspecialneedsservicesinthehomeschoolsetting.Thecourtheardtestimonythat“thechildisautistic...andinsteadofgettingtheChildtheservicesthatarespecializedforherneeds,Motherremainsinactive.”Thecourtstatedthatitwas“notagainsttheoptionofhomeschooling,andlooksateverysituationonacasebycasebasis.”TheShamokinAreaSchoolDistricthastrainedprofessionalsandservices,andsinceMotherisnotprovidingfortheseservices,itisintheChild’sbestinteresttoattendpublicschool.
Motherarguedthattheminor’sbehaviorimpededtheChild’seducationalprocessandwasadangertotheChildandothers.Inresponse,thecourtheardtestimonyfromtheChild’spriorpublicschoolteacher,andtheteacherindicatedthattheissuesraisedbyMotherarenotuncommonforchildreninpublicschoolwithbehavioralissues.Therefore,consideringMother’sinactionandtheservicesavailableatpublicschool,publicschoolisintheChild’sbestinterest.
J. PAUL HELVY 717.237.5343 n [email protected]
ANTHONY M. HOOVER 717.237.5477 n [email protected]
HOUSE AMENDED
PRIOR PRINTER’S NOS. 1399, 1604 PRINTER’S NO. 1947
THEGENERALASSEMBLYOFPENNSYLVANIA
SENATE BILL
No. 1167 Session of2011
INTRODUCED BY BAKER, SOLOBAY, BRUBAKER, RAFFERTY, FOLMER, GORDNER, GREENLEAF, HUGHES, COSTA, MENSCH, ERICKSON, ORIE, SCHWANK, TARTAGLIONE, TOMLINSON, WAUGH, WILLIAMS, YUDICHAK, FONTANA, BOSCOLA, FARNESE, BROWNE, FERLO AND ROBBINS, JUNE 21, 2011
AS AMENDED ON SECOND CONSIDERATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 7, 2012
AN ACT
Amending Titles 23 (Domestic Relations) and 51 (Military Affairs) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, further providing for CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, FOR modification of existing orders and for child custody proceeding during military deployment; and providing for assignment of custody rights during military deployment and expedited or electronic hearing.
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts
as follows:
Section 1. Section 5338 of Title 23 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes, is amended to read:
SECTION 1. SECTIONS 5329(C) AND 5338 OF TITLE 23 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSOLIDATED STATUTES ARE AMENDED TO READ:
§ 5329. CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION.
* * *
(C) INITIAL EVALUATION.‑‑[THE COURT SHALL PROVIDE FOR AN EVALUATION TO
EXHIBIT A
DETERMINE WHETHER:
(1) THE PARTY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER WHO COMMITTED AN OFFENSE UNDER
SUBSECTION (A) POSES A THREAT TO THE CHILD; AND
(2) COUNSELING IS NECESSARY FOR THAT PARTY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER.]
AT THE INITIAL IN‑PERSON CONTACT WITH THE COURT, THE JUDGE, CONFERENCE
OFFICER OR OTHER APPOINTED INDIVIDUAL SHALL PERFORM AN INITIAL
EVALUATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PARTY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER WHO
COMMITTED AN OFFENSE UNDER SUBSECTION (A) POSES A THREAT TO THE CHILD
AND WHETHER COUNSELING IS NECESSARY. THE INITIAL EVALUATION SHALL NOT BE
CONDUCTED BY A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL. AFTER THE INITIAL EVALUATION,
THE COURT MAY ORDER FURTHER EVALUATION OR COUNSELING BY A MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONAL IF THE COURT DETERMINES IT IS NECESSARY.
* * *
§ 5338. Modification of existing order.
(a) Best interest of the child.‑‑Upon petition, a court may modify a
custody order to serve the best interest of the child.
(b) Applicability.‑‑[This] Except as provided in 51 Pa.C.S. §§ 4109
(relating to child custody proceedings during military deployment) and 4110
(relating to assignment of custody rights during military deployment) §
4109 (RELATING TO CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS DURING MILITARY DEPLOYMENT),
this section shall apply to any custody order entered by a court of this
Commonwealth or any other state subject to the jurisdictional requirements
set forth in Chapter 54 (relating to uniform child custody jurisdiction and
enforcement).
Section 2. Section 4109(d) 4109 of Title 51 is amended to read:
§ 4109. Child custody proceedings during military deployment.
* * *
(A) RESTRICTION ON CHANGE OF CUSTODY.‑‑IF A PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
CUSTODY OF A CHILD OF AN ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER IS FILED WITH ANY COURT IN
THIS COMMONWEALTH WHILE THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER IS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT
OF A CONTINGENCY OPERATION, NO COURT MAY ENTER AN ORDER MODIFYING OR
AMENDING ANY PREVIOUS JUDGMENT OR ORDER, OR ISSUE A NEW ORDER, THAT CHANGES
THE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT FOR THAT CHILD THAT EXISTED AS OF THE DATE OF THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER, EXCEPT THAT A COURT MAY ENTER A
TEMPORARY CUSTODY ORDER IF IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD.
(a.1) Temporary assignment to family members.‑‑If an eligible servicemember has received
notice of deployment in support of a contingency operation, a court may issue a temporary order to
an eligible servicemember who has rights to a child under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323 (relating to award of
custody) or former 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 53 Subch. A (relating to general provisions), including a temporary
order to temporarily assign custody rights to family members of the servicemember. In the case of
temporary assignment of rights to family members of the servicemember, the following shall apply:
(1) THE SERVICEMEMBER MAY PETITION THE COURT FOR A TEMPORARY
ORDER TO TEMPORARILY ASSIGN CUSTODY RIGHTS TO FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE
SERVICEMEMBER. THE SERVICEMEMBER SHALL BE JOINED IN THE PETITION BY THE
FAMILY MEMBERS TO WHOM THE SERVICEMEMBER IS SEEKING TO ASSIGN TEMPORARY
CUSTODY RIGHTS. THE PETITION SHALL INCLUDE A PROPOSED REVISED CUSTODY
SCHEDULE FOR CARE OF THE CHILD BY THE FAMILY MEMBERS. THE PROPOSED
REVISED CUSTODY SCHEDULE MAY NOT INCLUDE CUSTODY RIGHTS WHICH EXCEED
THE RIGHTS GRANTED TO A SERVICEMEMBER SET FORTH IN THE ORDER IN EFFECT
AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION TO GRANT TEMPORARY CUSTODY
RIGHTS TO FAMILY MEMBERS.
(2) THE COURT MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER WITH A REVISED CUSTODY
SCHEDULE AS PROPOSED BY THE SERVICEMEMBER AND THE FAMILY MEMBERS OR
ANOTHER REVISED CUSTODY SCHEDULE AS THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE, IF THE
COURT FINDS THAT A TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF CUSTODY RIGHTS TO FAMILY
MEMBERS OF THE SERVICEMEMBER IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD. IN
NO CASE SHALL A TEMPORARY ORDER GRANTING CUSTODY RIGHTS TO THE FAMILY
MEMBERS OF A SERVICEMEMBER EXCEED THE CUSTODY RIGHTS GRANTED TO THE
SERVICEMEMBER SET FORTH IN THE ORDER IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE FILING
OF THE PETITION TO ASSIGN TEMPORARY CUSTODY RIGHTS TO FAMILY MEMBERS.
IN THE CASE OF ANY OTHER TEMPORARY ORDER ISSUED UNDER THIS SUBSECTION, THE
COURT MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER IF IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD.
(B) COMPLETION OF DEPLOYMENT.‑‑IN ANY TEMPORARY CUSTODY ORDER ENTERED
UNDER SUBSECTION (A) OR (A.1), A COURT SHALL REQUIRE THAT, UPON THE RETURN
OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER FROM DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF A CONTINGENCY
OPERATION, THE CUSTODY ORDER THAT WAS IN EFFECT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
DATE OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER IS REINSTATED.
(C) EXCLUSION OF MILITARY SERVICE FROM DETERMINATION OF CHILD’S
BEST INTEREST.‑‑IF A PETITION FOR THE CHANGE OF CUSTODY OF THE CHILD OF
AN ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER WHO WAS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF A CONTINGENCY
OPERATION IS FILED AFTER THE END OF THE DEPLOYMENT, NO COURT MAY CONSIDER
THE ABSENCE OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER BY REASON OF THAT DEPLOYMENT IN
DETERMINING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD.
(d) Failure to appear due to military deployment.‑‑The failure of an
eligible servicemember to appear in court due to deployment in support of a
contingency operation shall not, in and of itself, be sufficient to justify
a modification of a custody [or visitation] order if the reason for the
failure to appear is the eligible servicemember’s active duty in support of
a contingency operation.
* * *
(E) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.‑‑NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF
LAW, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE APPLIED WITH REGARD TO CHILD
CUSTODY ISSUES RELATED TO ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBERS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.
(F) DEFINITIONS.‑‑AS USED IN THIS SECTION, THE FOLLOWING WORDS AND
PHRASES SHALL HAVE THE MEANINGS GIVEN TO THEM IN THIS SUBSECTION:
“CONTINGENCY OPERATION.” A MILITARY OPERATION THAT:
(1) IS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AS AN OPERATION IN
WHICH MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ARE OR MAY BECOME INVOLVED IN MILITARY
ACTIONS, OPERATIONS OR HOSTILITIES AGAINST AN ENEMY OF THE UNITED STATES
OR AGAINST AN OPPOSING MILITARY FORCE; OR
(2) RESULTS IN THE CALL OR ORDER TO, OR RETENTION ON, ACTIVE DUTY
OF MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES UNDER 10 U.S.C. § 688 (RELATING TO
RETIRED MEMBERS: AUTHORITY TO ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY; DUTIES), 12301(A)
(RELATING TO RESERVE COMPONENTS GENERALLY), 12302 (RELATING TO READY
RESERVE), 12304 (RELATING TO SELECTED RESERVE AND CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL
READY RESERVE MEMBERS; ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY OTHER THAN DURING WAR OR
NATIONAL EMERGENCY), 12305 (RELATING TO AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT TO
SUSPEND CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO PROMOTION, RETIREMENT, AND SEPARATION)
OR 12406 (RELATING TO NATIONAL GUARD IN FEDERAL SERVICE: CALL) OR ANY
OTHER PROVISION OF 10 U.S.C. DURING A WAR OR DURING A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS.
“ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER.” A MEMBER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL GUARD
OR A MEMBER OF AN ACTIVE OR RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES WHO IS SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY, OTHER THAN ACTIVE DUTY FOR
TRAINING, FOR A PERIOD OF 30 OR MORE CONSECUTIVE DAYS, IN SUPPORT OF A
CONTINGENCY OPERATION.
“Family members.” As defined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303 (relating to definitions).
Section 3. Title 51 is amended by adding sections A SECTION to read:
§ 4110. Assignment of custody rights during military deployment.
(a) Petition.‑‑If an eligible servicemember has received notice
of deployment in support of a contingency operation, the servicemember
may petition the court for a modification to an order granting the
servicemember custody with a child under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323 (relating to
award of custody). The modification may include a temporary assignment of
the eligible servicemember’s custody rights to one or more family members
as defined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303 (relating to definitions). The eligible
servicemember shall be joined in the petition by the relatives to whom the
servicemember is seeking to assign these rights. The petition shall include
a proposed custody schedule with the family members and the schedule shall
not exceed the time granted to the eligible servicemember prior to the time
of filing the petition.
(b) Order.‑‑The court may grant the eligible servicemember’s request
for assignment of custody rights if the court finds that custody on terms as
the court deems appropriate would be in the best interest of the child. An
order granting assignment of custody rights pursuant to this section shall
terminate immediately upon the termination of the eligible servicemember’s
deployment.
(c) Definitions.‑‑As used in this section, the terms “contingency
operation” and “eligible servicemember” shall have the same meanings given
to them under section 4109 (relating to child custody proceedings during
military deployment).
§ 4111. Expedited or electronic hearing.
(a) Expedited hearing.‑‑Upon motion of a parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER
who has received notice of deployment in support of a contingency
operation, the court shall, for good cause shown, hold an expedited hearing
in custody matters instituted under sections SECTION 4109 (relating to
child custody proceedings during military deployment) and 4110 (relating to
assignment of custody rights during military deployment) when the military
duties of the parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER have a material effect on the
parent’s ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER’S ability, or anticipated ability, to
appear in person at a regularly scheduled hearing.
(b) Electronic hearing.‑‑Upon motion of a parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER
who has received military temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders
NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF A CONTINGENCY OPERATION, the court
shall, upon reasonable advance notice and for good cause shown, allow
the parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER to present testimony and evidence by
electronic means in custody matters instituted under sections SECTION 4109
and 4110 when the military duties of the parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER
have a material effect on the parent’s ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER’S ability to
appear in person at a regularly scheduled hearing. The term “electronic
means” includes communication by telephone, video teleconference or the
Internet.
(C) DEFINITIONS.‑‑AS USED IN THIS SECTION, THE FOLLOWING WORDS AND PHRASES
SHALL HAVE THE MEANINGS GIVEN TO THEM IN THIS SUBSECTION UNLESS THE CONTEXT
CLEARLY INDICATES OTHERWISE:
“CONTINGENCY OPERATION.” AS DEFINED IN SECTION 4109 (RELATING TO CHILD
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS DURING MILITARY DEPLOYMENT).
“ELECTRONIC MEANS.” INCLUDES COMMUNICATION BY TELEPHONE, VIDEO
CONFERENCE OR THE INTERNET.
“ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER.” AS DEFINED IN SECTION 4109 (RELATING TO CHILD
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS DURING MILITARY DEPLOYMENT).
“MATTER.” AS DEFINED IN 42 PA.C.S. § 102 (RELATING TO DEFINITIONS).
Section 4. This act shall take effect in 60 days.