NOTES

NEGTwo important things1. Gender v. Sex Sex is biological. Gender is a social construction, often masculine and feminine. This kritik discusses how the characteristics of masculinity are enacted in international politics power, control, domination, rationality, realism. The feminine other not just women but those who are otherized or outside the norm are irradiated by those hegemonic forces. 2. But you say, a lot of the cards are about women. Yes, very true. Think about it logically. These are feminist writers; of course they would use examples of gender that reference womens relationship to men. Also, it is important to understand that women are not submissive and/or peaceful by nature/biologics; rather, power (masculinity) has defined women as submissive and peaceful.AFF

The generics are here: realism, cede the political, no root cause, perm. I think there are some good Latin America specific arguments about the ALT. Ill explain those here.

1. Essentialism The ALTs gendered focus assumes a homogenized understanding of women. Examples: victims, passive, submissive. This reifies traditional notions of femininity and masculinity. Example: women are constantly seen as helpless = they become helpless. This links to their cards about machismo and Latin America more so than the security portion of the debate. 2. Intersectionality this argues that the ALT does not take into account other identity categories like race, class and ethnicity. This is particularly important for Latin Americans given their history of colonization. The ALT is very single-issue and cannot solve for power when it only focuses on one type. 1NC International politics are in need of an overhaul because of gendered relations between the United States and Latin America. The AFFs economic engagement is locked into an unquestioned system of machismo that inevitably failsDe Oliveira in 2000

Jose Batista Loureiro De Oliveira. PhD Psychology Department, University of Bologna, Italy. Deconstructing Machismo: Victims of Machismo Ideology Dominating in Brazil. Prepared for delivery at the 2000 meeting of Latin American Studies Association. March 2000.

As I have said at the beginning, the visions in this paper are very persona l and empirical. I have stressed the main characteristics of machismo in the patriarchal context. Machismo cannot be understood outside gender, and gender relations evoke class, race, and ethnicity (see Connell, 1985 and Kimmel, 1987, 2000) as gender is much more than XX and XY genetic combinations: it has its own roots in the historical and societal constructions of relations. To understand gender, then, we must constantly go beyond gender. The same applies in reverse. We cannot understand class, race or global inequality without constantly moving towards gender. Gender relations are a major component of social structure as a whole, and gender politics are among the main determinants of our collective fate . (Connell 1995:48) Gender and gendered things in the Latin world are almost inflexible: men should be a macho and women should be a passive otherwise, it can be very suspicious and can become a motive for inquisition (at personal level and/or institutional control). It seems that the borders between m en and women are not very flexible, but all the worse they are a biological code of distinction (concerned primarily with external phenotypes as the genotype is a code of biological redu c tionism). In sex role theory, action (the role enactment) is linked to a structure defined by biological difference, the dichotomy of male and female not to a structure defined by social relations. This leads to categoricalism, the reduction of gender to two homogenous categories, betrayed by the persistent blurring of s ex differences with sex roles. Sex roles are defined as reciprocal; polarization is a necessary part of the concept. This leads to a misperception of social reality, exaggerating differences between men and women, while obscuring the structures of race, cl ass and sexuality. It is telling that discussions of the male sex role have mostly ignored gay men and have little to say about race and ethnicity.(Connell 1985:27) Historical background can define a very wide range of effects and facts in any cultural social economic context. I refer, in particular in the Brazilian context to the studies of masculinity which is not open, not concerned. Worse, it seems that we have become ashamed of speaking about men, gender relations, and machismo (or at least view thes e discussions as offensive). For Latinos, men who are interested in studying men sound quite suspicious, as real men should not take into consi d eration other men. We study men as scientists, as authors, as presidents or the other government officials, as soldiers or kings. But rarely, if ever, do we study men as men; rarely do we make masculinity the object of inquiry as we examine mens lives. If men have been traditionally the benchmark gender (and women the other), then studies of men and masculini ty have never made masculinity itself the object of inquiry. Mens studies akes masculinity as its problematic, and seeks to explore mens experiences as men not in some social roles. While our experience is structured by its social structural location social roles define individual enactments of them it is also equally true that gender structures the dimensions of those roles. Other factors such as race, class, ethnicity, and age will mediate the generalizability of our explanations, but masculinity as problematic opens up entirely new areas for social scientific study. (Kimmel 1987:11) I do not want to make of gender a flag, but it is a very important social element and has influence in so many important decisions from schools to family setting. It i s important to stress that gender is practice at an individual and institutional level. The institutions are not neutral. The gender goes through institutional ideologies and power, and it all plays an important role in constructing social configurations. Machismo is not an isolated fact: it is constructed in so many different fields of society such as media, family, school, army, university, and politics and so on. It is quite difficult for the Latin world to consider machismo. The institutional power is huge and different religious backgrounds occupy in a large scale the collective conceptions of gender (see Central do Brasil, Salles 1999). It is difficult to pass from sex role approach to social construction of gender, especially when the democr acy is under construction, because of militarism domination and low recognition of national culture (throughout history, many white and black people shared a lack of appreciation for Brazilian culture in general, looking towards Europe, particularly Franc e and Great Britain, for valid a tion. Davis 1999:6) If men are changing at all, however, it is not because they have stumbled upon the limits of traditional masculinity all by themselves. For at least two decades, the womens movements (and also, sinc e 1969, the gay liberation movement) has suggested that the traditional enactments of masculinities were in desperate need of overhaul. For some me, these critiques have prompted a terrified retreat to traditional constructions; to other it has inspired a serious reevaluation of traditional worldviews, and offers of support for the social, political, and economic struggles of women and gays. (Kimmel 1987:10)And the AFFs gendered security discourse causes inevitable violence. Regardless of PLANs purpose their masculine epistemology relies on a logic of conflict that ignores structural violence. The feminization of the Other through security causes all future policy making to fail. Shepherd 2007 [Laura J., Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Victims, Perpetrators and Actors Revisited:1 Exploring the Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence, BJPIR: 2007 VOL 9, 239256]

As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True comment, our sense of self-identity and security may seem disproportionately threatened by societal challenge to gender ordering (Peterson and True 1998, 17). That is, the performance of gender is immanent in the performance of security and vice versa, both concern issues of ontological cohesion (as illustrated in Table 2). Taking this on board leads me to the conclusion that perhaps security is best conceived of as referring to ontological rather than existential identity effects. Security, if seen as performative of particular configura- tions of social/political order, is inherently gendered and inherently related to violence. Violence, on this view, performs an ordering functionnot only in the theory/practice of security and the reproduction of the international, but also in the reproduction of gendered subjects. Butler acknowledges that violence is done in the name of preserving western values (Butler 2004, 231); that is, the ordering function that is performed through the violences investigated here, as discussed above, organises political authority and subjectivity in an image that is in keeping with the values of the powerful, often at the expense of the marginalised. Clearly, the west does not author all violence, but it does, upon suffering or anticipating injury, marshal violence to preserve its borders, real or imaginary (ibid.). While Butler refers to the violences undertaken in the protection of the sovereign stateviolence in the name of securitythe preservation of borders is also recognisable in the conceptual domain of the inter- national and in the adherence to a binary materiality of gender. This adherence is evidenced in the desire to fix the meaning of concepts in ways that are not challenging to the current configuration of social/political order and subjectivity, and is product/productive of the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject (Hanssen 2000, 215). However, the terms used to describe political action and plan future policy could be otherwise imagined. They could remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes (Butler 1993, 228). The concepts both produced by and productive of policy could reflect an aversion to essentialism, while recognising that strategic gains can be made through the temporary binding of identities to bodies and constraining of authority within the confines of the territorial state. This is, in short, an appeal to a politics of both/and rather than either/or. Both the state (produced through representations of security and vio- lence) and the subject (produced through representations of gender and violence) rely on a logic of sovereignty and ontological cohesion that must be problematised if alternative visions of authority and subjectivity are to become imaginable. International Relations as a discipline could seek to embrace the investigation of the multiple modalities of power, from the economic to the bureaucratic, from neo- liberal capitalism to the juridical. Rather than defending the sovereign boundaries of the discipline from the unruly outside constituted by critical studies of develop- ment, political structures, economy and law, not to mention the analysis of social/ political phenomena like those undertaken by always-already interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, IR could refuse to fix its own boundaries, and refuse to exercise sovereign power, in terms of authority, over the meanings of its objects of analysis. Future research on global politics could look very different if it were not for the inscription of ultimately arbitrary disciplinary borderlines that function to constrain rather than facilitate understanding. It may seem that there is a tension between espousing a feminist poststructural politics and undertaking research that seeks to detail, through deconstruction, the ways in which particular discourses have failed to manifest the reforms needed to address security and violence in the context of gendered subjectivity and the constitution of political community. In keeping with the ontological position I hold, I argue that there is nothing inherent in the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence that necessitated their being made meaningful in the way they have been. Those working on policy and advocacy in the area of security and violence can use the reconceptualisation I offer to enable people to imagine how their being-in-the-world is not only changeable, but perhaps, ought to be changed (Milliken 1999, 244). As a researcher, the question I have grown most used to hearing is not What? or How? but Why?. At every level of the research process, from securing funding to relating to the academic community, it is necessary to be able to construct a convincing and coherent argument as to why this research is valuable, indeed vital, to the field in which I situate myself. A discursive approach acknowledges that my legitimacy as a knowing subject is constructed through discursive practices that privilege some forms of being over others. In the study of security, because of the discursive power of the concept, and of violence, which can quite literally be an issue of life and death, these considerations are particularly important. Further- more, as a result of the invigorating and investigative research conducted by exemplary feminist scholars in the field of IR,17 I felt encouraged to reclaim the space to conduct research at the margins of a discipline that itself functions under a misnomer, being concerned as it is with relations inter-state rather than inter- national. As Cynthia Enloe has expressed it, To study the powerful is not autocratic, it is simply reasonable. Really? ... It presumes a priori that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so natu- rally marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are kept there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer (Enloe 1996, 188, emphasis in original). If this is the case, I am more than happy to be unreasonable, and I am in excellent company.

The ALT is to reject the AFF and endorse a method of gendered policy making. This act places epistemology first and foremost in order to challenge hegemonic masculinity in our international policies. Beland 2009

Daniel Beland. Gender, Ideational Analysis, and Social Policy Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society. Vol 16 Num 4. Pp 558-581. Winter 2009

As far as the policy stream is concerned (Kingdon 1995), one of the main roles of ideational processes is to provide experts and politicians with policy alternatives that frequently reect shared assumptions about how to solve the problems of the day (Hall 1993). According to Blyth (2002), during times of stability, existing insti- tutional settings help actors dene their goals and their interests in order to design relevant policy alternatives to address the problems they face. In periods of acute uncertainty, however, prevailing institutional frameworks are weakened and actors frequently turn to new policy ideas in order to master this uncertainty and put forward new policy alternatives and blueprints. Once embedded in particular institutional settings, these ideas can serve as cognitive locks that are instrumental in reproducing policy institutions over time (Blyth, 2002). Overall, even beyond episodes of perceived crisis, ideational processes help actors and make sense of their interests (e.g. Blyth 2002; Hay forthcoming; Jenson 1989; King 1973; Schmidt forthcoming; Steensland 2006; Stone 1997; Weir 1992; for a different perspective on this issue: Padamsee 2009). This remark is important because it is typically in the mirror of their perceived interests that actors design and/or select specic policy alternatives (Blyth 2002). The scholarship on paradigmsgendered and otherwisehas been inuential in regard to the analysis of policy alternatives. According to political scientist Peter Hall (Hall 1993, 279), policy paradigms are cognitive belief systems that articulate the goals of political actors with policy alternatives and instruments aimed at addressing concrete social and economic problems. For Hall (1993), paradigm shifts occur only when the hierarchy of policy goals held by key policy actors is transformed. In other words, a paradigm shift is a change in the actors goals that can strongly inuence policy development. In his 1993 article, Hall builds on Thomas Kuhns work on scientic revolutions (Kuhn 1962) to dene paradigm shifts. Such a scientic analogy is problematic because the policy- making process is a political rather than a purely technocratic affair (Muller, 2005).4 Furthermore, beyond its scientic overtone, the concept of paradigm may suggest that the policy ideas held by experts and political actors are truly coherent philosophical constructions. This is a major issue because policymakers typically borrow from various sources in order to construct specic policy alternatives. More generally, the policy assumptions they share do not necessarily take the form of a coherent paradigm (Wincott forth- coming). In fact, some scholars argue that the concept of policy paradigm is typically more adapted to the study of economic ideas than to the analysis of social policy debates, which do not always involve the explicit clash between broad and well-dened theories, as is often the case in economics (Palier 2008). is often the case in economics (Palier 2008). Despite these cautionary remarks, the concept of policy paradigm is a useful analytical tool for students of gender and social policy (e.g., Jenson, 1989; Lewis 2002; OSullivan 1999). For example, these scholars have drawn on the concept of policy paradigm to uncover the changing status of gender equality as a policy goal in contemporary societies. The idea that policy actors can share relatively stable assumptions and goal hierarchies over time is a key insight that can improve our understanding of the relationship between gender and policy change. Ito Pengs analysis of the 1990s paradigm shift in Japanese social policy provides ground to this claim. According to Peng (2003), organizations like the Womens Committee for the Improvement of Ageing Society successfully mobilized to change the traditional vision of social care, which, in turn, helped trigger a paradigm shift that altered the social policy goals and priorities of Japanese state actors (Peng 2003). In this special issue of Social Politics, Knijn and Smit (2009) refer to the concept of policy paradigm to compare and contrast three distinct contemporary discourses about the reconciliation of work and family life. As they suggest, each of these three paradigms features specic assumptions about social risks, the relationship between the state and society, and the public private dichotomy. Jenson (2009) studies the convergence of policy ideas surrounding the concept of social investment, which has become increasingly inuential across the advanced industrial world since the 1980s. For her, the shift from social protection to social investment points to a recon- guration of contemporary citizenship regimes. Jensons analysis (Jenson 2009) contributes to the contemporary debate about the transnational diffusion of ideas and its impact on policy change, an issue also discussed in the recent literature on gender and social care (Mahon 2006; White 2008). Perhaps one of the most systematic uses of the concept of para- digm in the literature on gender and social policy is Jane Jensons earlier work on protective legislation in France and the United States before 1914 (Jenson 1989). In contrast with Hall (1993), who expli- citly draws on her contribution in his 1993 article, Jenson does not focus exclusively on economic ideas, and she uses the term societal paradigm, which refers to a shared set of interconnected premises which make sense of many social relations. Every paradigm contains a view of human nature, a denition of basic and proper forms of social relations among equals and among those in relationship of hierarchy, and specication of relations among institutions as well as a stipulation of the role of such institutions. (Jenson 1989, 239) For Jenson, these assumptions help political actors choose between possible policy alternatives. More similar to George Steinmetzs (1993) social-regulation para- digms than to Halls policy paradigms (Hall 1993), societal para- digms are explicitly related to the formation of group identities and the reproduction of categorical inequalities. Jensons idea of societal paradigm has perhaps even more in common with the non-Marxist concept of ideology formulated by British political theorist Freeden (1978, 2003). Moreover, the concept of universe of political dis- course formulated by Jenson and Mahon (1993, 79) in their work on Swedish social democracy has a very similar meaning to the one of societal paradigm: The terrain on which actors struggle over representation is the universe of political discourse, a space in which identities are socially constructed. The universe of political discourse encodes an accepted set of meanings about who the legitimate actors are, the place they hold in politics, the appropriate site of political struggle, and the form of social relations ought to take. (For a more systematic discussion on the concept of universe of social dis- course, see Padamsee 2009). Overall, Jensons concept of societal paradigm is especially useful for the analysis of the gender-social policy nexus, which is largely about the interactions among con- structed, gendered identities, categorical inequalities, and relations of power and hierarchy.5 Interestingly, the concept of societal paradigm illustrates a key contribution of the scholarship on gender to the ideational literature: the emphasis on the relationship between ideational processes and categorical inequalities. Such social inequalities refer to dichotomous categories like black/white and female/male (Tilly 1998). Although some ideational researchers like Lieberman (2002) pay direct atten- tion to categorical inequalities, most of the non-feminist policy lit- erature on ideas remains largely silent about such inequalities. By pointing to the interaction between ideational processes, categorical inequalities, and policy change, students of gender relations such as Jenson could push non-feminist ideational scholars to pay closer attention to categorical inequalities, including gendered ones.

OverviewVote negative to reject the AFFs reliance on traditional masculine policy making. Gender becomes footnoted in international relations and as a result the United States enacts paternal policies with Latin America through security discourse. Voting negative endorses a method of Gendered Policy Making that starts from a question of epistemology when debating policy change. Extend the BELAND evidence the classroom is a key starting point in training future students of gender relations. Economic engagement with Latin America is framed through security measures that ignore structural violence. Impact is inevitable war and conflict. Structural violence feeds the instability of the international system resulting in extinction. We must start with the AFF - their security politics are detrimental to our understanding

Moylan in 2013

Tom Moylan. Gender, Security, and Making it as a Category of Analysis in International Politics. e-International Relations. March 12 2003.

Cynthia Enloe, in her interview with Theory Talks, talks about how there are all kinds of health professionals, all kinds of educators and environmentalists, climate change, sea level rise experts and so onand they are providing security (Schouten and Dunham 2012, p.10). So why do we not think of them in that context? Mainstream IR theorists, prominently realists, consider security solely in terms of state security one that can protect itself and its citizens from an anarchic international system, despite the fact that most wars since 1945 have been fought within states and not across international boundaries (Tickner and Sjoberg 2010, p.203). IR feminists define security more broadly, as the diminution of all forms of violence including domestic violence, rape, poverty, gender subordination, economic, and ecological destruction (Tickner and Sjoberg 2010, p.203-204). This redefinition of security provides us with very different view of the world and the effects of what are considered security policies. Several prominent feminist studies have exposed how security of the state can be a direct cause of insecurity for the more vulnerable in society.One such study is Moons Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations in which she shows how the Korean government actively promoted prostitution in areas surrounding US military bases in Korea to encourage the presence of US troops there (Blanchard 2003, p.1295). Another such study is Christine Chins In Service and Servitude that shows how the Malaysian government used the provision of cheap foreign domestic labor, mainly Filipina and Indonesian women working in terrible conditions, to ease ethnic tensions and garner the support of the middle class (Tickner and Sjoberg 2010, p.200). We can see here that by putting on our gendered lenses and looking directly at womens issues, there is a lot more than simple diplomacy or economics going on in these cases. One criticism of these studies is that they are domestic issues that do not fall within the realm of international politics that deals purely with military and interstate matters. Feminists would disagree with this due to their belief that the international and the domestic are inextricably linked, and this separation is detrimental to our understanding; and that their separation could be equated to the public/private dichotomy that allows domestic abuse to carry on without intervention (Blanchard 2003, p.1296). A further reason for mainstream scholars not accepting this definition of security can be read when Tickner cites Walts 1991 paper in her explanation for the persistence of the traditional view of security and power: Security specialists believe that military power remains a central element of international politics and that the traditional agenda of security studies is, therefore, expanding rather than shrinking (Tickner 1997, p.624).LINKS

Security War

The AFFs focus on the high politics of war ignores the structural violence feminine others suffer. Security analysis fails because International Relations is only discussed through masculinized concepts of war and peace

Sylvester in 2012

Christine Sylvester. War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory. Millennium Journal of International Studies.

What if International Relations (IR) were to turn its usual view of war around and start not with states, fundamentalist organisations, strategies, conventional security issues and a weapons system, and not with the aim of establishing the causes of war, as has so often been the case? What if we think of war as experience, as something ordinary people observe and suffer physically and emotionally depending on their locations? To date, much of IR has been operating comfortably in a world of theoretical abstractions states, systems, power, balances, stakeholders, decision-makers, peace, war tacitly leaving people and war to journalists, novelists, memoirists, relief workers, anthropologists, womens studies and social history to flesh out. 1 This means that IR is not addressing one of the key elements of war: its actual mission of injuring human bodies and destroying normal patterns of social relations. Neglecting the human elements for strategic and interest politics renders the injurious nature of war a consequence rather than the actual focal point of war. 2 It also makes it more difficult to appreciate the decentralised aspects of many contemporary wars, which is to say the dispersal of authority to people who are routinely off IRs grid like the Liberian peace women who forced Charles Taylor into peace talks and the kidnapped war women led by Black Diamond, who simultaneously gained notoriety as fierce combatants in the bush. 3 As well, IR knows about the political economies and security mercenaries of war, 4 but often finds the individuals who sustain and benefit from war less pertinent than the international web of interactions they create, thus potentially missing links in chains that start and end with people. Much of IR actually seems unprepared for the presence, let alone the power, of ordinary people in international relations, whether those people walk through the Berlin Wall and help shift Cold War polarity, or toss out autocrats in the Arab Spring revolutions. Ordinary people are overwhelmingly absent in IR because they are not seen as key stakeholders in IRs versions of international relations. My challenge to the field is to pay more attention to war as experience, on two grounds: war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people and not only studied down from places that sweep blood, tears and laughter away, or assign those things to some other field to look into; and people demonstrate time and again that they too comprise international relations, especially the relations of war, and cannot therefore be ignored or relegated to a collateral status. IRs feminist wing of war studies, which is still taking shape, has implicitly made those kinds of propositions the touchstones of its war research. As well, scholars from a number of IRs many camps work the boundaries of IR theories in ways that can reveal the people of war. Even IR traditions that make a point of operating above people (neorealism) can briefly mention people in war situations, albeit without elaborating their experiences or building them into IR theories.Security Proliferation

Rhetoric of proliferation is part of the security paradigm that justifies masculine violence on those perceived as threats.

Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) Proliferation is not a mere description or mirror of a phenomenon that is out there, but rather a very specific way of identifying and constructing a problem. Proliferation, as used in Western political discourse, does not simply refer to the multiplication of weapons of mass destruction on the planet. Rather, it constructs some WMD as a problem, and others as unproblematic. It does so by assuming pre-existing, legitimate possessors of the weapons, implicitly not only entitled to those weapons, but to modernize and develop new generations of them as well. The problematic WMD are only those that spread into the arsenals of other, formerly non-possessor states. This is presumably the basis for the licit/illicit distinction in the question; it does not refer to the nature of the weapons themselves, nor even to the purposes for which they are intended only, in the case of nuclear weapons, to who the possessor is, where licitness is based on the treaty-enshrined we got there first. Thus, use of the term proliferation tends to locate the person who uses it within a possessor state, and aligns him or her with the political stance favoring the hierarchy of state power enshrined in the current distribution of WMD. The framing of Question Four. ... is it proper to deny [WMD] possession to others for the same purposes?, seems similarly based in a possessor state perspective, as it is presumably the possessor states who must decide whether it is proper to deny possession to others. As we have already stated, we find WMD themselves intrinsically morally indefensible, no matter who possesses them, and we are concerned about the wide array of costs to any state of development and deployment. We therefore reject the discourses implicit division of good and bad, safe and unsafe WMD, (defined as good or bad depending on who possesses them). Our concern is to understand how some WMD are rendered invisible (o urs) and some visible (theirs); some rendered malignant and others benign. Here, we join others in noting that the language in which the case against proliferation is made is ethno-racist and contemptuous. Generally, in Western proliferation discourse as a whole, a distinction is drawn between the Self(seen as responsible) vs the non-Western Unruly Other.36 The US represents itself as a rational actor, while representing the Unruly Other as emotional, unpredictable, irrational, immature, misbehaving. Not only does this draw on and reconstruct an Orientalist portrayal of third world actors37; it does so through the medium of gendered terminology. By drawing the relations between possessors and non-possessors in gendered terms the prudential, rational, advanced, mature, restrained, technologically- and bureaucratically- competent (and thus masculine) Self, versus the emotional, irrational, unpredictable, uncontrolled, immature, primitive, undisciplined, technologically-incompetent (and thus feminine) Unruly Other the discourse naturalizes and legitimates the Self/possessor states having weapons which the Other does not. By drawing on and evoking gendered imagery and resonances, the discourse naturalizes the idea that We / the US / the responsible father must protect, must control and limit her, the emotional, out-of-control state, for her own good, as well as for ours. This Western proliferation discourse has had a function in the wider context of US national security politics. With the end of the Evil Empire in the late 1980s, until the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the US appeared to be without an enemy of grand enough proportions to justify maintaining its sprawling military- industrial establishment. This difficulty was forestalled by the construction of the category of rogue states states seen as uncontrollable, irresponsible, irrational, malevolent, and antagonistic to the West.38 Their unruliness and antagonism was represented as intrinsic to their irrational nature; if it were not in their nature, the US would have needed to ask more seriously if actions on the part of the West had had any role in producing that hostility and disorder. The discourse of WMD proliferation has been one of the principal means of producing these states as major threats. To say this is neither to back away from our position opposing weapons of mass destruction, nor to assess the degree to which WMD in the hands of Other states actually do threaten the US, the Other states regional opponents, or their own population. But it is an assessment of the role of WMD proliferation discourse in naturalizing and legitimating otherwise-difficult-to-make-appear-rational programs and expenditures such as National Missile Defense.39Security Otherization/TerrorismTheir use of security is articulated through gendered binariesthat requires domination and elimination of those who threaten the dominant masculine body politic

Wilcox 3

[Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus, RCB]Post-structuralists emphasize not only the discursive process of securitization, but the ways in which issues of identity factor into this process. Practicing security entails specific state actions not just in external policies, but in internal politics as well. By labeling external threats, the state constructs a regime of identity by demarcating who and what is to be feared by us. Security implies not only specific actions, but specific implications for the identity of what is being secured. David Campbell argues in Writing Security: American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, that security is the raison dtre of the state. He further notes hatthe state requires discourses of danger to provide a new theology about who and what we are by highlighting who or what we are not, and what we have to fear.10 Thus, the process of securitizing can also be a process to define a nations identity by drawing boundaries between who and what is acceptable (on the inside) and what is unacceptable (on the outside). Security is implicated in the production of dichotomies that structure the discipline and the way we think about international relations, such as inside/outside, self/other, us/them and sovereignty/anarchy. Much of this type of language was used in reference to terrorist and immigration, including the creation of a hierarchy between us and them, the criminalization and militarized responses, fears of internal subversion, and the discursive location of threats being outside the territory of the US.My understanding of security and gender is rooted in feminist contributions to international relations and security studies as well. Feminist scholarship informs my work in many ways, as feminist theorists, like critical theorists, attempt to, make strange what has previously appeared familiar [and] to challenge us to question what has hitherto appeared as natural. 11 Of key importance to this specific study are feminist scholars of IR who take the post-structuralist analysis further, and note how the dichotomies that constitute the field of international relations are so readily mapped onto gender. Feminist scholar Charlotte Hoopers analysis of the gendered nature of the field of international relations is similar to Campbells, noting how dichotomies such as active/passive, war/peace, and order/anarchy are assigned masculine and feminine traits, with the first being valued over the second. This use of the concept of gender is consistent with how gender is used in this paper. The insights feminist post-structuralists provide into the gendered nature of the process of drawing borders between us and them and domestic and foreign are particularly relevant in the context of my research into the securitization of immigration and terrorism, as the discourses used in this context have clearly made these distinctions. They are also gendered discourses, as they rely on gendered dichotomies. My analysis of the gendered discourses of terrorism and immigration is based on this type of post-structuralist feminist analysis.Because of the prevalence of gendered dichotomies in IR and their role in constructing identities and boundaries, the practice of international relations and security is inextricably linked to identity formation. Feminist scholars of international relations have noted the extensive association of masculinity and war, and have analyzed how war and IR and masculinities have been mutually constructed though military service, 12 and by several different kinds of hegemonic masculinities that serve as the prototypical behavior for men indifferent contexts.13When writing of gender, I want to make clear I do not equate this term to men and women (or just women for that matter) but, as a system of asymmetrical social constructs of masculinity and femininity.14 While employing a gender analysis of issues such as militarization, war, and terrorism, I will not be addressing such issues as whether or not men or women are inherently violent or peaceful, or, in response to Francis Fukuyama, what would happen if women were our political leaders.15 Rather, I use to concept of gender as a symbolic system organizes many cultural discourses, and is mapped on to certain dichotomies, such as hard/soft, inside/outside, sovereignty/anarchy, active/passive, as I briefly explained above. As gender is a normative system in which the concept associated with masculinity in the dichotomy is considered more desirable, gender in International Relations also serves as a prescriptive formulation. This is not say that actual men and women are irrelevant to gender, but that gender as a discursive system represents men and women differently, and constructs different social spaces and functions for them. Race, class, and other variables are also part of a gender discourse that represents a feminine other that deviates from the masculine norm. The concept of hegemonic masculinity is also related to the concept of gender. This term, which is discussed at length in chapter three, indicates the prevailing definition of masculinity, driven by social and political trends and defined against subordinate masculinities, such as racial minorities and non-heterosexual orientations.Security Terrorism

Preventing terrorism through economic engagement benevolently masculinizes the state the threatening other is violently killed off in promotion of a neoliberal orderBleiker in 2005

Bleiker, Professor of IR @ Queensland University, 2005 p. 189-190

(Roland, International Society and Its Critics Ed. Bellamy)

Let us come back to contemporary world politics in an attempt to illuminate the intertwinement of order and disorder. Look at what happened after the collapse of the cold war order: once the danger of communism had vanished, security had to be articulated with reference to a new Peindbild, a new threatening other that could provide a sense of order, safety, and identity at home. Rogue states were among the new threat images that rose to prominence when cold war ideological schism gave way to a more blurred picture of global politics (Derrida 2003). This tendency to order the world intensified after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of September 2001. The compulsion to extract the eternal out of an ever-more transient world-to use Baudelairean language-increased dramatically. US foreign and domestic policy sought to re-establish the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the cold war: an inside/outside world in which, according to the words of president George W. Bush (2001), 'you are either with us or against us'. Much like Ronald Reagan's depiction of the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire', the current US reaction to terror is couched in a rhetoric of 'good' versus 'evil'. 'Evil is real', stressed George W. Bush (2002) in his presidential State of the Union address. 'It must be opposed'. What must be stressed as well, though, is that evil here means more than merely 'doing harm or inflicting pain on innocents' (Katznelson 2002: 7). Terrorists are evil because they attack, as did the Soviet Empire, the very foundations of Western (and meanwhile quasi-globalized) order: a form of life based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism. Few would, of course, question the need and desirability of defending order and democracy from the threat of terrorism. . But things are more complex.. The relationship between order and disorder is provocatively explored in a recent monograph by Alain Joxe. By sketching out changes in international politics over the last dozen years, Joxe offers an alternative characterization of the present global system. The picture he paints is grim: it is a world of increasing disorder, of constant conflict, rising inequalities, and lacking ethics. The key for Joxe is that .the United States has become an increasingly powerful global hegemon that refuses to take on socio-political responsibility. Traditionally, rulers exchanged obedience for protection. But the United States today, Joxe argues, demands the former without offering the latter. It represses the symptoms of despair while refusing to attack its (causes. We thus witness the emergence of a fundamentally new form of empire, one that does not occupy territories, but merely regulates them in two key domains: military and finance. An unprecedented level of military superiority gives the United States the ability to imprint its vision on the world. And this vision includes the promoition of a neoliberal economic order which, accordmg to Joxe, operates without any democratic control or accountability. The result, he stresses, is an empire of disorder: the generation of chaos that cannot be controlled, not even by the hegemon. The hegemon merely regulates disorder by imposing global norms of behaviour. Disorder itself is not new, but to day's chaotic world is different, Joxe (2002: 7-94) argues, insofar as disorder is not a transition period to a new order: it is the order itself.

HegemonyHegemony makes great power wars more likely Transition war and stabilization theory are wrong and rationalizes aggression that causes structural violence that outweigh the AFFSjoberg 10 (Laura, Assoc. Prof of Poli Sci @ U of Florida, Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, p 85-90)***[PTT = Power Transition Theory]

A feminist approach suggests several critiques of the PTT research agenda which question the accuracy of its causal explanations, the normative value of its definitions, and the appropriateness of its empirical predictions. Feminists argue that gender expectations and assumptions are a constitutive and causal force in global politics. 35 PTTs failure to acknowledge gender in global politics is reflected in its definition of power, its normative commitment to elitist assumptions about the relevant actors in global politics, and the variables used to explain empirical phenomena. Power in power transition theory Power transition theorists see power as the ability to impose one states will on another. 36 Feminists identify this interpretation as power-over 37 and critique its conceptual narrowness and gendered content. 38 Power-over means that ideologies suit the changing interests of those in power, and not those whose lives are controlled by them. 38 This is particularly evident in PTTs explanation of how a state obtains power(-over). PTT explains the acquisition of power as having three dimensions: population, productivity, and political efficiency. 40 As Tammen et al. explain, population is the sine qua non for great power status because it is the potential resource pool that a nation can begin to mobilize for its economic development and ultimately determines in the long run which nations will remain major powers. 41 Power transition theorists seem unaware that womens rights vary inversely with population increases. 42 The same is true of labor productivity. States that increase labor productivity do so by augmenting the export sector. Women fill these new jobs, which are underpaid and risky. Women who had previously been in the household are often still expected to fulfill their household functions. 43 PTTs view of power also sets up future conflicts. Power-over means that the accumulation of power is necessarily competitive and zero-sum, making conflict likely if not necessary. Viewing power as zero-sum also presumes a stark distinction between self (state) and other(state) where the advantages of accumulated power can be confined to its accumulator. Some states (even great states) are not primarily or even secondarily concerned with the competitive acquisition of power. 44 In a globalized world, not all power acquisitions are zero-sum. Presuming the necessity of competition puts global politics on a path towards conflict, and assuming that power acquisitions can be contained misrepresents the distribution of gains. Feminists argue that people and states without power-over are not powerless. As Allen argues, To think about power solely in terms of domination neglects the power that women do have ... empowerment. 45 In fact, the need to theorize power that women retain in spite of masculine domination has led feminists to explore different sources and manifestations of power. Two important results are understandings of power which Allen categorizes as power-to and power with. 46 Power-to is the capacity of an agent to act in spite of or in response to power wielded over her by others (i.e., rebellion or revolt). 47 Power-with is the ability to act in concert with other weak actors to match the strength of the dominant power. 48 In this interpretation, by emphasizing plurality and community ... [feminist theory] consciously seeks to distance power from domination and understands power collaboratively. 49 PTT focuses on great states to explain the dynamics of international security. Power transition theorists explain that PTT attacks the central issue of world politics great power stability. 54 Great power stability matters because the dominant state defines the structure of the international system. Feminist perspectives question both the state-centrism of PTT and its focus on big states. First, feminists interrogate the state-centrism of PTT. PTT assumes that the state is unitary with definable interests. Feminists define security in broad terms. In these terms, a secure world would be one without physical, structural, 55 or ecological violence. 56 Security threats are also found in threats to individual lives at the margins of global politics, such as hunger, disease, sexual violence, and small arms. 57 Feminist research has shown how those at the political margins can become insecure even while states are becoming more secure. Women s bodies have been considered the means to an end in debates over the US security force in South Korea, the prevalence of and possible solutions to AIDS, and debates about refugee camp composition, to name a few. 58 These threats are often more vicious than the threat of great power war. 59 Because many feminists see individual security as central, they critique the hierarchy that PTT values. Feminist theorizing, as a commitment to under- standing the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated, recognizes that the least fortunate are the people who are excluded from the consideration of decision-makers and grand theorists. 60 Feminist theorists have been critical of hierarchy for the pressure that it puts on the bottom. PTT does not share this interest. In PTT, the international system is viewed as a pyramid-shaped hierarchy where at the very top tier is the system s dominant power. The next tier contains the great powers, followed by the medium and small powers. 61 PTTs policy prescriptions demonstrate that power transition theorists not only see the model as accurate, they believe it is beneficial. Tammen et al. characterize small powers as irrelevant because they pose no threat to the dominant nations leadership in the international system. 62 PTT suggests that a dominant nation should convince challengers to live in a world stacked against their interest, because a dominant nation that successfully co-opts potential challengers ensures that the international status quo will be preserved. 63 In other words, PTT has a normative investment in a hierarchical international system. Rather than endorse domination, some feminist theorists argue that empathy and care should be seen as alternatives to domination. Christine Sylvester explains that empathy rests on the ability and willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully. It is to hear ... and be transformed in part by our appreciation. 64 An empathetic approach enables respectful negotiations with contentious others because we can recognize involuntary similarities across difference as well as differences that mark independent identity. 65 As such, there is no arrogance of uniqueness and precious little committed defensiveness. 66 Instead of an international structure which excludes most citizens of the world, some feminists suggest connectedness as an alternative structure. 67 Explanatory variables in great power politics Gender dynamics also act on the empirical phenomena PTT studies. Even taking the subject matter of PTT (great power competition) on its own merits, feminist analyses question the causal mechanisms that PTT uses. PTT considers power parity and dissatisfaction. These variables cannot explain the events of interest to PTT for two major reasons. First, while the power transition scenario envisions a possibility that a peaceful power transition takes place where the challenger is satisfied, the internal logic of PTT makes that a contradiction in terms. Elsewhere, PTT explains that other states are dissatisfied with the status quo international order because it was put in place by the hegemon for its own benefit. 68 Challengers are, by definition, dissatisfied. Second, parity of material power- over can be very different depending on the influence of power-to and power-with. Additional forces may be acting on the propensity of great powers to come into conflict. One such force is international system patriarchy. Patriarchy is the structural and ideological system that perpetuates the privileging of masculinity. 69 Feminists have identified patriarchy as a principal cause for so many of the world s processes [such as] empire-building, globalization, modernization. 70 Enloe details: Patriarchal systems are notable for marginalizing the feminine. That is, insofar as any society or group is patriarchal, it is there that it is comfortable unquestioned to infantilize, ignore, trivialize, or even actively cast scorn upon what is thought to be feminized. 71 In an international system of patriarchy, one would expect that dominance would be the ultimate place of honor, and states would strive to approximate that position. Feminist work suggests that international system patriarchy could be a key explanatory component of great power (and other) conflict in the international arena. 72 PTTs research question might be rephrased to ask why, at the moment of equality, great powers are most likely to engage in conflict. Feminists might suggest that relatively equal great powers come to blows because of state masculinity. States compete to prove their masculinity, irrespective of power parity. For example, as Ann Tickner explains, The 1991 Persian Gulf War was frequently depicted as a personal contest between Saddam Hussein and George H. W. Bush and described in appropriate locker-room or football language. 73 In states competitions, the winner s masculinity is affirmed, while the loser s masculinity is subordinated. In the dominant narrative of the First Gulf War, the US tough but tender ideal-typical masculinity saved Kuwait s helpless femininity from Iraq s hypermasculinity. 74 The masculinity of the US was affirmed and valorized while Iraqs masculinity was called into doubt. 75 Feminist theorists have used the term hegemonic masculinity as an analytical tool to understand this competition. According to Charlotte Hooper, Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to a range of subordinated masculinities in opposition to femininity. 76 In describing a states hegemonic masculinity, feminists argue that the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena. 77 An ideal-typical masculinity establishes cultural hegemony through moral persuasion and consent, entrenched ideological ascendency, and an ethos of coercion. 78 Hegemonic masculinity consists of the attributes that are most widely subscribed to and least questioned in a given social formation: the common sense of gender as subscribed to by all men save those whose masculinity is oppositional or deviant. 79 Each hegemonic masculinity is the set of standards to which men are expected to aspire. Hegemonic or ideal-typical masculinities have been linked to states contextual understandings of heroism on the battle field. Feminists have argued that some men fight wars while other men could fight wars; war-fighting is always tied to the image of masculinity. 80 Judith Gardam has explained that, often, the social construct of what it is to be male ... is represented by the male warrior, the defender of the security of the state. 81 In these models, masculinity, virility, and violence have been linked together. 82 Feminists have long argued that hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in ordering the international system. 83 For example, Steve Niva describes the hegemonic tough but tender US masculinity during the First Gulf War as valuing bravery on the battle field and sympathy and care for civilians. 84 A number of feminist scholars have noted that, some- times, a states hegemonic masculinity becomes reactionary or hypermasculine in response to threat. 85 Feminists have identified elements of state hypermasculinity in the US in the post-9/11 era, as well as in the Spanish-American War and the beginning of the Cold War. 86 Feminists argue that variations in the characteristics and salience of a states hegemonic masculinity over time influence state behavior. Feminist research suggests that the question of whether two powerful states come into conflict as they reach power parity might result from the characteristics of the ideal-typical masculinity in that state at the time. In such a scenario, conflict becomes more likely when states hegemonic understandings of masculinity involve conquest, war heroism, competition, aggressiveness, or fighting; or some sense of racial or cultural superiority vis--vis a challenger. On the other hand, conflict would be less likely when states hegemonic understandings of masculinity involved tenderness, stoicism, restraint, or responsibility.ChinaDiscussions of a rising china threat are inherently gendered presumes the passive femininity of China any strategies under this lens makes great power conflict more likely Rejection opens space for new approaches to China that avoid war

Sjoberg 10 (Laura, Assoc. Prof of Poli Sci @ U of Florida, Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, p 95-97)***[PTT = Power Transition Theory]

In PTTs scenario of potential conflict between the US and China, then, the US should not fear a dissatisfied China or attempt co-option. Instead, it should attempt to understand the interests, values, and needs of those challengers. If challengers took a similar approach, they would not have to choose between unattainable satisfaction and perpetual dissatisfaction. Along these lines, feminists suggest that the US should include China in deliberative dialogues, treat the Chinese government and people with empathy and under- standing, and show China and other potential challengers by example that the strong can defy international system patriarchy unilaterally and stop the cycle of violence. 121 Feminists have argued that inclusive understanding is key to peaceful coexistence. Spike Peterson clarifies that feminists argue that the domination of women, nature, and all who are constructed as other is not a matter of essential, atemporal qualities but of socially constructed, historically contingent. 122 In other words, the voices of marginalization could serve as a bridge between hostile and masculinized states. In these terms, a dialogue which promoted understanding between the US and China (and their differentiated citizens) would go a long way towards decreasing the potential for conflict between the two great states. Analyzing the Chinese overtaking through gendered lenses These feminist reformulations of PTTs key hypotheses provide both alter- native understandings of the potential for conflict between the US and China and alternative futures. PTT suggests that the question of whether or not that rising will cause conflict between the two states depends on China s satisfaction or dissatisfaction as it approaches parity with the US. A feminist approach suggests that a good deal of the possibility for conflict between the US and China might be explained by gender-related variables. The patriarchal nature of the international system provides an incentive for the US to attempt to maintain dominance. Such a system also gives China a motivation to seek not parity but supremacy. In addition, the cultural salience of masculinity in each society is manifested in each states desire to compete with the other. This alternative explanation for the potential competition between the US and China suggests alternative solutions. Realists like Mearsheimer suggest a combined strategy of economic containment and military presence, 123 and power transition theorists suggest attempts to co-opt China into satisfaction with the existing order. Some International Relations scholars outside of the realist paradigm have suggested strategies like GRIT (graduated reciprocation of tension reduction) in order to establish trust between the US and China. 124 If gendered competition and international system patriarchy underlie the competition between the two states, however, none of these strategies will be successful. Mearsheimers containment strategy will incite more competition; power transition theorists co-optation strategy is misdirected since dissatisfaction is endemic and would not be China s main motive for making war; and trust-building solutions without the deconstruction of the masculine competition for superiority would just be read as weakness. Seeing gender-as- power both helps explain the potential for conflict between the US and China and provides a theoretical and practical alternative to that competition in recasting the genderings of the state and the international system. Some feminists prescribe the strong need to unilaterally deconstruct the cycle of violence and masculinized competition between great powers in the international arena. States would need to recognize conflicts basis in competition, posturing, and subordination under patriarchy and deconstruct that in order to head o ff violence. Feminist theorists suggest that the US and China could come to terms with the gendered nature of their competition by dealing with each other in empathy and in dialogue to try to find a deeper sense of understanding if not common ground. The path to an empathetic reconstruction of the relationship between the US and China could begin with the rejection of PTTs claim that hegemonic domination is empirically and normatively valuable. Domination and the resulting subordination, at the international level as well as at the personal level, are normatively problematic. Therefore, even if hegemonic dominance did decrease great power warfare, a feminist approach asks if that would be a sort of peace that the international arena would truly thrive under. Feminist work has consistently read more content into peace than the cessation of great power hot wars. As discussed above, a feminist approach to the rise of China recognizes the contingencies of the entities of the US and China and the limits of focusing on those two states where others out- number them several times over and where their competition makes people within their borders insecure even as the state becomes more secure. A feminist perspective therefore suggests that the US and China (along with other actors traditionally marginalized in global politics) engage in dialogue about what a peaceful and just international system might be, and that the US begin to reshape the international arena not to co-opt China but to decrease the pressure of consolidated power in the international arena on those least powerful against it. In doing so, the US and China would need to come to understand themselves and each other as imperfect, non-omnipotent, gendered actors in an imperfect, gendered world without more right to decide than anyone else simply because they have more power-over. If the gendered concept of power-over was replaced both in theory and in practice with a more inclusive understanding of power including power-to and power-with, different resources could be drawn upon both in the comparative measuring of state power and in redressing the consequences of international hierarchy and subordination at the political margins. A feminist engagement with PTT suggests that great states, small states, and non-states look for places in the complicated scaffolding of international power where non-zero sum, anti-systemic, and even emancipatory uses of power could benefit those at the margins of global politics. Employing a feminist under- standing of security could lead the way to creative solutions of resistance and empowerment in the face of a competitive and hierarchical international system. Feminist complex and multilayered understandings of power could not only provide explanatory leverage for great power conflicts, but also for conflicts that defy the logic of PTT. 12

IR Environment

The AFF attempts to solve environmental problems through IR and failsit uses an inherently gendered understanding of state interaction to problem solvingTickner 92 [Ann, Professor @ the School of International Relations USC, B.A. in History, U London, M.A. in IR, Yale, PhD in pol science, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSFEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY]

Social ecologists such as William Leiss explicitly link man's domination of nature with certain men's domination over other human beings. Defending the original goals of the scientific revolution as an attempt to liberate human beings from the constraints of their natural environment and increase their material well-being, Leiss claims that the rationalism of modern science became caught in a web of social contradictions. The instruments through which human beings have transformed the resources of nature into means for the satisfaction of material desires have increasingly come to be regarded as objects of political conflict both domestically and internationally.61 According to Leiss's class analysis, the real object of domination has not been nature but human beings: through enhanced technological capabilities certain people have appropriated nature's resources and thereby dominated others. A more rational science would understand the world in a way that would produce harmony with the environment. But this can be realized only when the struggle for domination ends, along with disparities in power among groups and nations.62 Social ecologist Murray Bookchin, one of the few ecologists who raises the issue of gender relations, also points to the hierarchical structuring of the contemporary world embodied in man's domination over man, woman, and nature. Bookchin believes that these modes of domination are historically constructed and can therefore be transcended. He stresses the emancipatory potential of ecology, a science that recognizes no hierarchy and is therefore in a position to combat domination at all levels.63 Bookchin claims that this Western hierarchical thinking, which valorizes male power, devalues women by associating them with its devalued image of nature. It is this essentialist connection between women and nature, made both by some ecologists and certain feminists, that contributes to many other feminists' reluctance to espouse an ecological perspective.64 The immanent connection between women and nature, linked to women's biological functions, has been criticized by many feminists as demeaning, deterministically excluding women from the male domain of culture and transcendence. Yet recent work in feminist cultural anthropology disputes claims that this connection is innate and suggests instead that it is historically contingent: rooted in Western cultural traditions, it has been imposed on other cultures as part of the Western project of domination.65 If, as these anthropologists and social constructionist ecofeminists believe, Western civilization has reinforced the subjugation of women through its assertion that they are closer to nature than men, then the nature/culture dualism must be challenged rather than ignored. If, as these authors claim, the woman/nature connection is historically contingent, then there are possibilities for transcending this hierarchical dualism in ways that offer the promise of liberation for both women and nature. Since the liberation of nature is also the goal of ecology, ecofeminist Ynestra King suggests that feminism and ecology can usefully form an alliance. According to King, ecology is not necessarily feminist, but its beliefs are quite compatible with those of these social constructionist ecofeminists since both make their chief goal the radical undermining of hierarchical dualisms. King argues that, since ecofeminists believe that misogyny is at the root of the dualism between nature and culture that ecologists deplore, ecology is incomplete without feminism.66 While ecologists such as Leiss have connected the exploitation of nature to class domination, social constructionist ecofeminists make more explicit an interlocking pattern of dominance relationships that include sexism and racism as well as classism and that, they claim, are historically tied to the domination of nature. Joan Griscom believes that only when conceptual connections between all these forms of repressions are made can the emancipatory potential of ecology be fully realized.67 According to ecofeminist Ynestra King, feminism challenges the male-based values of our culture: when coupled with an ecological perspective, it insists that all human beings, both women and men, remember and accept their origins in nature. King claims that ecofeminism is in a position to heal the splits in a world divided against itself and built on a fundamental lie: the defining of culture in opposition to nature. Only by seeking to overcome such hierarchical dualisms can we move toward a more harmonious relationship with our natural environment.68 Since women have been associated with a devalued nature through these hierarchical dualisms, women have a particular are often the worst victims of environmental degradation. But just as I have argued against perceiving women as victims in the protector/protected discourse of national security, so women must not be seen solely as victims of environmental degradation but also as agents who must participate equally in the solution of these problems. Since women have not been well represented in national and international institutions dealing with the environment, their contribution to working for ecological security has been largely at the grassroots level. For example, the Chipko movement, which began with women hugging trees as a protest against cutting them down in the Chamoli district of Uttar Pradesh in 1973, met with some success when Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi issued a fifteen-year ban on the commercial felling of the forests of Uttar Pradesh. Women are also taking part in projects of reforestation; Kenya's Green Belt Movement, started in 1977 by the National Council of Women, involves women in the establishment of "Green Belt communities" and small tree nurseries.69 The kind of knowledge that women bring to these various environmental movements is gained from experience as producers and providers for daily household needs. However, the belief that this type of knowledge cannot be "scientific" has kept it from being recognized by development and environmental "experts" as well as foreign policymakers. As long as metaphors such as "global housekeeping" associate ecological security with the devalued realm of women, it will not become an issue of priority on the foreign policy agendas of states or in the mainstream discipline of international relations. While it has paid little direct attention to environmental issues, the conventional discipline of international relations has relied to a great extent on modernity's mechanistic view of nature in framing its assumptions about the behavior of states in the international system. Feminist perspectives on ecology reveal not only the hierarchical relationship between humans and nature that has grown out of this worldview but also the extent to which this unequal relationship interacts with other forms of domination and subordination, including gender relations. The hierarchical dualisms discussed in this chapter, such as culture/nature, civilized/wild, North/South, rich/poor, public/private, and international/local, have been characteristic of the way in which we describe world politics and the interaction of states with their natural environment. A feminist perspective would argue that not until the boundaries of inequality and domination these dualisms represent are transcended can true ecological security be achieved. Only through the emergence of a system of values that simultaneously respects nature, women, and adversity of cultures-- norms that have been missing from the historical practices of international statecraft-- can models that promise an ecologically secure future be devised.Energy Constant usage and consumption of nature depletes nature culminating in extinction.

Nhanenge 07 [Jytte: Master of Arts at the development studies at the University of South Africa Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the concerns of women,, poor people and nature into development http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1].

Nature is by the economic individual perceived as being a heap of dead parts laying idle for his profit making. It is therefore rational to make nature productive by exploitation. However, due to lack of holistic awareness and his ever-increasing greed the maximizing individual overlooks the reproductive necessities of nature and the natural limits this brings to his profit making. Hence economic man's greedy and limitless resource exploitation results in increased scarcity of natural resources and degradation of the environment. Since people need food, shelter, clothing, medicine and other necessities provided by nature, increased scarcity means that less resources are available to sustain the lives of women, Others and nature. Thus, when the political system and its economic market direct natural resources to profit-maximization of rational man, women and Others cannot produce food, clothing and shelter for themselves and their families. This gives a vicious circle of hunger, malnutrition, ill health and poverty that ends in death. Thus, the crises of poverty suffered by women and Others are mainly caused by economic man's greed for natural resources. Economic man also makes nature poor. The continuous exploitation and pollution of the environment will eventually lead to nature becoming as dead as science perceives it to be. That may then be called a self-fulfilling prophecy, however, with one logical blunder: when nature dies, also humanity will perish. Oil

Rise in oil production trades off with womens participation and visibility in the public sphere study proves

Ross in 2006

Michael Ross. PhD UCLA Dept of Political Science. Oil and Patriarchy.

http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/ross.pdfPetroleum perpetuates patriarchy: oil production tends to reduce the number of women who enter the work force, and hence reduces the likelihood they will gain political influence. Without large numbers of women participating in the economic and political life of the country, traditional patriarchal institutions will go unchallenged. This dynamic can help explain the surprisingly low influence of women in mineral-rich states in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Om an, Alge ria, Libya), Latin America (Chile), Africa (Botswana, Gabon, Mauritania, Nige ria), and the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Russia). Skeptics m a y argue that oil production cannot be socially harmful if it m e rely causes wom e n to stay at hom e and consume m o re leis ure. But while an individual m a y prefer leisure to work, the failure of women to enter the formal labor market can have profound social costs: a reduced incentive to lower fertility rates, a reduced incentive to invest in female education, reduced opportunities for women to influence household decision m a king, reduced opportunities to develop new, non-familial social networks, and reduced opportunities to organize politically.

Oil production affects gender relations study proves that growth based on oil causes inequalities, resource depletion, authoritarian rule, and civil war

Ross in 2008

Michael L. Ross. Oil, Islam, and Women. American Political Science Review. 102:1. Feb 2008.

Oil production affects gender relations by reducing the presence of women in the labor force. The failure of women to join the nonagricultural labor force has profound social consequences: it leads to higher fertility rates, less education for girls, and less female influence within the family. It also has far-reaching political consequences: when fewer women work outside the home, they are less likely to exchange information and overcome collective action problems; less likely to mobilize politically, and to lobby for expanded rights; and less likely to gain representation in government. This leaves oil-producing states with atypically strong patriarchal cultures and political institutions. 1 This argument challenges a common belief about economic development: that growth promotes gender equality (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003b; Lerner 1958). Development institutions like the World Bank often echo this theme, and it is widely accepted among development experts (World Bank 2001). This paper instead suggests that different types of economic growth have different consequences for gender relations: when growth encourages women to join the formal labor market, it ultimately brings about greater gender equality; when growth is based on oil and mineral extraction, it discourages women from entering the labor force and tends to exaggerate gender inequalities. It also casts new light on the resource curse. Oil and mineral production has previously been tied to slow economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995), authoritarian rule (Ross 2001a), and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This paper suggests that oil extraction has even broader consequences than previously recognized: it not only affects a countrys government and economy but also its core social structures.Cuba

Resetting US-Cuban ties will lock Cuba into a new masculine regime where the United States still acts as the paternal father figureDufrechou 10 [Stephen, Editor of Opinion and Analysis at News Junkie Post, US-Cuba Relations Doomed To Future Exploitation, http://newsjunkiepost.com/2010/04/30/us-cuba-relations-doomed-to-future-exploitation/]

Indeed, given Cubas already faltering economythat any (hypothetical) new government on the island will have to inheritsuch a debt as Brady wishes impose will only further cripple an already handicapped Cuba unfairly. A blank slate, instead, should be extended to a new and democratic Cuba. But perhaps being fair and diplomatic is not the course Washington wishes to take with a future Cuba. After all, since the end of WWII, the US-led First World nations have benefited immensely by keeping the so-called Third World economically and politically dependant on the developed West. This tactic has been a general rule of thumb, as historian T. E. Vadney has observed: [T]he West wanted to protect its economic stake in the Third World after 1945. That it intended to do so was abundantly clear from its foreign-aid strategies. These were designed mainly to develop infrastructures such as transportation and communication links, vocational and technical schools, hospitals and clinics, or hydroelectric and irrigation projects. Such public investments were needed to create an economic environment in which private enterprise might thrive. Indeed, private enterprise in the Third World has always meant foreign enterprises in the form of Western businesses, which parasitically exploit the labor and resources of the already-vulnerable, post-colonial Third World, leaving the host country powerless to counter the continued Western dominance. Third World debt has always played a large role in these scenarios, since the Wests answer to Third World development has always been the transparently-exploitative push to simply privatize more of the host countrys economy, via structural adjustment loans from the US-dominated World Bank. And this seems to be what Washington has in mind by placing a six-billion dollar debt on any future, post-Castro government in Cuba. If Washington can impose this massive debt on a future Cuban government, the World Bank can then step in and lay yet another structural adjustment loan onto the Third World, which willagainbenifit only Western business. Only in this case, the exploited country will be Cuba. Thus Obamas call for a new beginning with Cuba becomes clear; it is a new beginning to impose foreign aid into the island. And as Vadney notes, Western aid is always tied: In other words, [aid is] granted on the condition that it be spent on (or tied to) goods and services purchased in the donor country. Foreign aid thus amounted to an indirect subsidy to Western businesses and labour. Indeed, if this reading of Washingtons consensus on Cuba is correctand if the US has its waythe Cuban people will only (and tragically) go from living under a non-democratic communist regime to a non-democratic neo-colonial republic, just like they had lived under before the events of 1959.

Mexico

US-Mexico relations are inherently gendered the U.S. acts as the paternal father figure over Mexico. The Chicana feminist is constantly ignored in these discussions and remain invisible in international politics. Flores in 2000

Lisa A. Flores. PhD. Univ of Utah Department of Communication. Reclaiming the Other: toward a Chicana Feminist critical perspective. International Journal of Intercultural Relations. 24:5, Sept 2000.

Narratives are a central part of Chicana feminism and Chicana feminists, across disciplines and methods, turn to narratives as sources of knowledge and insight. Given the importance of narratives, I offer a Chicana feminist critical perspective that outlines both general principles and critical practices that can guide the Chicana feminist scholar. Each of these critical practices highlights ways of thinking about, identifying, and assessing narratives. Recognizing that what I offer is not complete, I maintain that two general principles inform a Chicana feminist critical perspective. The first principle, decolonization, includes the goal of using academic and personal writings to challenge the neo-colonial practices which shape the lives of Chicanas/os. Working in tandem with decolonization is intersectionality, or a practice of recognizing the interconnectedness of gender, race, class, and heterosexuality. While there are numerous possible ways of advancing these two principles, I identify three critical practices: voice(s), personal experience, and naming. These three critical practices are among the many that advance a Chicana feminist critical perspective aimed at decolonization and intersectionality. Because the two main principles inform and shape each other, I discuss them together throughout my explanation of voice(s), personal experience, and naming. In doing so, I hope to model the practices as I review them. The lives of Chicanas are marked by a history of colonization. Beginning with the Spanish conquest of the Americas, to the forced inclusion in the US after the US Mexican war, people of Indian and Mexican descent have seen their land, their culture, and their lives controlled by others (Elenes, 1997, Gutirrez, 1995 and Meier & Ribera, 1997). Citizenship within the US did not bring the end of colonization, as Mexican Americans and Chicanas/os have been denied their language and their histories and have been segregated through economic deprivation. Existing often as los olvidados or the invisible people, Chicanas/os and Mexican Americans have been situated at the margins of society (Perea, 1995). Chicana feminism responds to this history through a principle I label decolonization. One important practice of decolonization is replacing silence with voice. Because Chicana feminists have had few traditional outlets in which to be heard, central of focus to a Chicana feminist critical perspective is creating and maintaining voice. As hooks (1989) notes, Oppressed people resist by identifying themselves as subjects, by defining their reality, shaping their new identity, naming their history, telling their story (p. 43). Thus, the subjects of Chicana feminist critical analyses are often the voices of Chicanas. For instance, Rebolledo (1988) argues that the Chicana feminist critic is a facilitator: reproducing and making known the texts of our authors (p. 132). For Rebolledo, this function is carried out by including large sections of the work she is analyzing in her writing, thus creating a dialogue between herself and the writer she is studying. Rebolledo is not alone in her desire to allow the voice of Chicana authors to speak through her work. Indeed much of Chicana feminism is designed to assert Chicana identities, in part by recognizing and sharing the voices of Chicanas (Alarcn, 1988, Chabram-Dernersesian, 1992, Herrera-Sobek, 1988 and Snchez, 1985). These voices and stories are often used as a means to create a sense of community with other Chicanas and other women of color. Moraga (1981) says to her sister writers in This Bridge Called My Back, We are a family who first knew each other only in our dreams, who have come together on these pages to make family a reality (p. 19). The Chicana identities that are expressed and built in their writings are often formed in part through relationships with other Chicanas. These writings reflect a deep sense of love for other Chicanas that provides a feeling of stability and community ( Alarcn, 1988, Anzalda, 1981, Anzalda, 1987, Anzalda, 1990a, Littlebear, 1981, Viramontes, 1989 and Yarbro-Bejarano, 1988). Roses (1984) argues, The legacy of [Chicana and Latina authors] can be said to constitute a counter cultural voice which offers a testimony that the critical literature must validate. That voice deserves to be heard by an audience as numerous as that commanded by men (p. 103). For Ochoa (1999), this goal can be met by turning to the everyday strategies of resistance among Mexican American women. Including the testimony of a number of Mexican American women living in a small suburb of Los Angeles, Ochoa centers the voices and lives of Mexican American women as they describe the ways in which they create life amidst racism and economic struggle. This sharing of voice reveals the commitment of Chicana feminists to profess their identity through their eyes. It places Chicana feminists, marginalized by dominant and Chicano societies, at their own center, and thus disrupts the colonial practices which have erased Chicanas (Chabram-Dernersesian, 1993). When Chicana feminists share voice with each other in their works, they bring more Chicana feminist perspectives into the public domain, thus enhancing societal awareness of Chicana culture. Claiming and offering multiple voices, English, Spanish, personal, academic, poetic, provide not only instances of the diversity among Chicanas, but also of the ability of Chicanas to share their own narratives (Davalos, 1998 and Rebolledo & Rivera, 1993). In telling stories, whether their own or other Chicanas, Chicanas become speaking subjects. The Indian woman can wail, the Chicana activist can march, the Anglicized woman can speak theory. As Chicana feminism works to embrace the mestizaje heritage, it calls out for an accounting of all cultures ( Anzalda, 1987 and Saldvar-Hull, 1991). This fluctuation can be seen in the common Chicana feminist practice of speaking in multiple tongues. Segura and Pesquera (1999) offer examples of the diversity that comprises Chicanisma. Introducing us to three women they interviewed, Segura and Pesquera (1999) highlight the overlap and the differences in these womens lives and beliefs. Arguing for the importance of what she calls sitios y lenguas (sites and discourses), Prez (1998) calls for cultural specificity and multiplicity as survival strategies that mark Chicanas as Chicanas while still noting the problematics of essentialism. By shifting languages, from English to Spanish to Spanglish and dialects of Indian, and tones, from prose to poetry to academic discourse, the different selves that comprise Chicanas surface and speak. These voices and stories come forth as acts of political resistance that further the larger process of decolonization (Chabram-Dernersesian, 1993). The inclusion of multiple voices in the conversation serves to disrupt essentialist ideas of Chicana. Garcia (1990) notes that the label Chicana feminist incorporates a number of different beliefs. As Chicana feminism grew out of the constraints of a monolithic cultural identity defined by the Chicano nationalist movement and an overly Anglo representation of women by the womens movement, the need to recognize diversity and differences among Chicana feminists has remained (Fregoso & Chabram, 1990). The Chicana feminist scholar can become one voice among many. Her position and her analysis may ring true for some Chicana feminists, but each study is one possible study and one possible interpretation. For instance, in the anthology Chicana Creativity and Criticism, Rebolledo, 1988 and Yarbro-Bejarano, 1988 argue with Alarcn (1988) over the extent to which Chicana feminism should draw on nonChicana/o theory. Their debate, and other similar ones, become a part of the growth of Chicana