Geismann_Spinoza-Beyond Hobbes and Rousseau

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Spinoza--Beyond Hobbes and RousseauAuthor(s): Georg GeismannSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1991), pp. 35-53Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709581

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Spinoza-beyondo b b e s a n dRousseau

GeorgGeismann

I. Spinoza2is again and again placed as a "political philosopher" onan intellectual line with Hobbes and Rousseau, in most cases closer to thelatter.3This manner of classifyingthese three philosophers,however, doesnot do justice to the specific achievements of Spinoza nor to those of theother two, and it arises ratherfrom an incorrectjudgment of the work ofHobbes and Rousseau.For both criticism and help in the translation I am especially indebted to M. P.

Lycett (Canterbury),N. E. Boulting (Rochester, Kent), and R. H. Dumke (Munich). Ihope that their fierce sense of English usage has saved the text from too many "Teu-tonisms."

2 The references to Spinoza refer to the following editions: Tractatusde IntellectusEmendatione (TdIE) = Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Ethica (E) =Ethics: Edwin Curley(ed.), The Collected WorksofSpinoza, tr. Edwin Curley,I (Princeton,1985); TractatusTheologico-Politicus TTP) = A Theologico-PoliticalTreatise:R. H. M.Elwes (ed.), The Chief Worksof Benedict de Spinoza, tr. R. H. M. Elwes (2 vols., NewYork, 1951-55), I; TractatusPoliticus (TP) = A Political Treatise:A. G. Wernham(ed.),Benedict de Spinoza,ThePolitical Works, r. by A. G. Wernham(Oxford, 19652);Epistulae(Ep) = Letters:A. Wolf (ed.), TheCorrespondencef Spinoza,tr. A. Wolf (London, 1966).For TdIE and TTP, I refer to the respectivepagination.Additions in squarebrackets aremine.

3 See, e.g., Ch. E. Vaughan, Studies in the History of Political Philosophybeforeandafter Rousseau (2 vols.; Manchester, 1925), I, 125: "Spinoza, with his speedy (if notsimultaneous) transfer of the 'common will' from the whole body of citizens to theirauthorisedGovernment, supplies the connecting link between Hobbes and Rousseau. Buthe standsmuch nearer to the latter than to the former." RobertA. Duff, Spinoza'sPoliticaland Ethical Philosophy (Glasgow, 1903), 11: ". .. on the basis of Hobbes' absolutism hebuilds a superstructureof popularliberties better than that of either Locke or Rousseau."Kuno Fischer, Spinozas Leben, Werke und Lehre (Heidelberg, 18984),461; FriederichJodl, Geschichte der Ethik als philosophischerWissenschaft 2 vols.; Stuttgart, 1930), I,481; cf. also Introduction to A. G. Wernham (ed.), Benedict de Spinoza, The PoliticalWorks(Oxford, 1965), 1-47;Robert J. McShea, The Political Philosophyof Spinoza(NewYork, 1968), 203; Walter Eckstein, "Rousseauand Spinoza. Their Political Theories andtheir Conception of Ethical Freedom," JHI, 5 (1944), 259-91; Wolfgang Rod, "Van denHoves 'Politische Waage' und die Modifikation der Hobbesschen StaatsphilosophiebeiSpinoza," Journal of the History of Philosophy,8 (1970), 29-48; Wolfgang H. Schrader,"Naturrecht und Selbsterhaltung: Spinoza und Hobbes," Zeitschriftfir philosophischeForschung, 31 (1977), 574-583; Douglas J. Den Uyl, Power, State and Freedom. An

35Copyright 1991 by JOURNALOFTHE HISTORYOF IDEAS, INC.


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36 GeorgGeismannThere are certainly elements in Spinoza's work which make us thinkof Hobbes4 and others which make us think of Rousseau.5 Yet suchelements only conceal the fundamentallydifferent characterof Spinoza'spolitical philosophy. In brief, Spinoza is not a philosopher of Right6;certainly not on the order of Hobbes in De Civeor, though less evidently,in Leviathan,7or of Rousseau in his Du ContratSocial. Spinoza does noteven try to legitimize, on the basis of the law of reason, the domination

Interpretationof Spinoza'sPolitical Philosophy Assen, 1983), esp. 146-68;Douglas J. DenUyl, "Sociality and Social Contract: A Spinozistic Perspective," Studia Spinozana, 1(1985), 19-51;ManfredWalther,"Die Transformationdes Naturrechtsin derRechtsphilo-sophie Spinozas,"Studia Spinozana, 1 (1985), 73-104; Emilia Giancotti, "La teoria dell'assolutismo in Hobbes e Spinoza,"Studia Spinozana, 1 (1985), 231-58; Alexandre Math-eron, Anthropologieetpolitiqueau XVIIe siecle (Etudessur Spinoza) (Paris, 1986), 49-79;81-101; Franck Tinland, "Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau et la formation de l'idee de demo-cratie comme mesure de la legitimite du pouvoir politique," Revue philosophiquede laFranceet de l'Etranger,110(1985), 195-222;AlexandreMatheron,"La fonction theoriquede la democratiechez Spinozaet Hobbes,"Studia Spinozana, 1 (1985), 259-73; AlexandreMatheron, "Le 'droit du plus fort': Hobbes contre Spinoza," Revuephilosophiquede laFrance et de l'Etranger, 110 (1985), 149-76; Simone Goyard-Fabre, "Hobbes et Spinozaou la differencedes concepts. L'ampleurd'une litote," Studia Spinozana,3 (1987), 229-59;Douglas J. Den Uyl and StuartD. Warner,"Liberalismand Hobbes and Spinoza,"StudiaSpinozana, 3 (1987), 261-318.4 Cf., e.g., TTP, 205: "The sovereign power is not restrainedby any laws ... ;" TTP,208: "Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can it ever accure tosubjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to do what he likes;" furtherTTP, 10; TTP, 118; TTP, 249 f.; TTP, 258; TP, III, 4.5 Cf., e.g., TTP, 74: "From these considerations it follows firstly, that authorityshouldbe vested in the hands of the whole state in common, so that everyone should be boundto serve, and yet not be in subjectionto his equals. .. ;" TP, III, 5: "since the body of thestate must be guided as if by one mind, and, in consequence,the will of the commonwealthbe taken for the will of all"; further TTP, 207; TTP, 259.

6 WheneverI speakof "philosophyof Right" (insteadof "philosophyof law") respect-ing "legalphilosophy,"I refer to the continental traditionaccordingto which "jus,Recht,droit, diritto" respecting "philosophiajuridica, Rechtsphilosophie, philosophie du droit,filosofia del diritto" refer,at the same time, to "right"(as a subjective itle) and to "law"(as an objectivecorpusof rules). "Right"(with a capital R), therefore,means both "right"(in the subjectivesense) and (legal) "law"(in the objectivesense). See also Spinoza'susageof the term "jus,"translatedby Wernham as "law" (i.e., TP, II, 18; II, 19;VII, 1; TTP,IV [Wernham-editionof the Political Works (see note 2), 66/7]; TTP, XVI [134-35; p.138-39];TTP,XIX [204-5]and of the terms "jusnaturae" and "juscivile, civitatis, imperii,commune, publicum," translatedby Wernham as "... law" (TP, I, 3; II, 18; II, 19; II,23; IV, 5; VII, 1; VII, 25; TTP, IV [66-67]; TTP, XVI [134-35; 138-39; 146-47]; TTP,XVII [158-59]; TTP, XVIII [198-99]; TTP, XIX [204-5]) and as "right"(TP, II, 4; II, 8;III, 1;III, 5; IV, 5; V, 1;VII, 2; VII, 25; VII, 30; TTP, VII [108-9]; TTP, XVI [138-39]).In some cases, I cannot agree with Wernham'stranslation,as when he translates"exjurecivile" into "by civil right"(TP, III, 1) instead of into "by civil law" as he does elsewhere(TTP, XVI [138-39]);cf. further TP, II, 4; II, 8; IV, 5; VII, 25; VII, 30; TTP, VII [108-9].See also for comparison Hobbes, Leviathan, XIV, 3.7See Georg Geismann and KarlfriedrichHerb, Hobbes iber die Freiheit (Wiirzburg,1988), scholium 156.


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Spinoza 37of the State, as does Hobbes, or certain rules of domination, as doesRousseau.8Even more to the point, Spinoza's political thought precludesany attempts to establish the principles of legal philosophy. Spinoza asksdifferent questions, employs different methods, and offers different an-swers.In contrast to Hobbes, who was able to formulate a theory of thecitizen (De Cive, 1642) without having to base it on a theory of man (DeHomine, 1658), let alone on a theory of the body (De Corpore, 1655),9Spinoza systematically connects his "ethico-political" thinking to hismetaphysics and the resultant anthropology?1and cannot therefore beunderstood apart from them.

II. For Spinoza, reality is, "with respect to our imagination,"1 onesingle system which is made coherentby laws.12This "universe" s knownto us in two ways-as extension and as thought.13Each part of this onereality is determined by laws,14 n the field of extension by laws of thecorporeal world and in the field of thought by laws of thinking.15Man differsfrom all other naturalobjectsknown to us by his capacityto think,16and indeed this is what makes him human. But man, with hisbody as well as with his mind, is an integral part of nature17and therebycompletely subject to its laws. Like the body, the intellect belongs tonatura naturata,18 and in all its appearances it is completely subject tonatural laws. In short, in his entire thought, volition, and action man isnecessarily and completely determinedby the laws of his specific nature.The modes of human thought always correspondto a respectivemodeof extension, since both thought and extension, are an attribute of oneand the same substance, of natura naturans:"[T]he Mind and the Bodyare one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attributeof Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. The result is that the

8 See Georg Geismann, "Kant als Vollender von Hobbes und Rousseau," Der Staat,21 (1982), 161-89.9See Georg Geismann and KarlfriedrichHerb, loc. cit., 16 ff, and the scholia passim.'1 See Wolfgang Bartuschat, "Metaphysik als Ethik. Zu einem Buchtitel Spinozas,"Zeitschrift r philosophischeForschung,28 (1974), 132-45.1 Ep. 32.12 See E, I, P (= propositio) 14; P 15; P 29; P 33.13 See E, II, ax. 5; also Ep. 64.14See TdIE, 10;E, I, P 29; E, I, P 33; Ep., 75; TTP, 44; TTP, 83.15 See Ep., 32;E, V, P. 40, schol.; McShea, loc. cit., 49: "Whatgoes on in a man's headis doubly determined.The chain of sensations, passions, and images is determinedby thechain of events in the world of extension andby the psychological laws of association,butwhen man enters into the world of the understanding, he is subject to the laws of

thought... ;" furtherIbid., 37. Cf. also E, I, P 10.16 See E, II, ax. 2; also E, II, P 13, cor.17 See Ep., 30, Ep., 32; E, III (pref.);E, IV, P 4; TP, II, 5; TP, II, 8.18 See Ep., 9.


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38 GeorgGeismannorder, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived underthis attribute or that."19This, however, means at the same time that the"Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannotdeterminethe Body to motion, to rest...."20 According to this theory, aphenomenal world orderedby laws of reason is impossible, "for nature isnot bounded by the laws of human reason."21Consequently, Spinozadisputes the possibility of an "absolute dominion" (imperium absolutum)of reasonover the affects.22For him man is not a being whose reason, "bythe mere representing of the fitness of its maxims to be laid down asuniversal laws, is thereby rendered capable of determining the will[Willkir] unconditionally,so as to be 'practical'of itself." On the contraryman always stands "in need of certain incentives, originatingin objectsofdesire, to determine his choice [Willkir]. He might, indeed, bestow themost rational reflection on all that concerns not only the greatest sum ofthese incentives in him but also the means of attaining the end therebydetermined." There is, however, no "possibility of such a thing as theabsolutely imperativemoral law which proclaimsthat it is itself an incen-tive, and, indeed, the highest."23Like everythingin nature, man through his body and his mind strivesto persevere in his being,24and the mind is conscious of this striving.25With regard to the mind alone Spinoza calls the striving for self-preservation"will" (voluntas)but, with regardto the mind and the bodyat the same time, "appetite" (appetitus) or, especially as a consciousappetite, "desire"(cupiditas).26The desire is, with joy and sadness, one ofthe primaryaffects of man.27Affects are the "affections of the Body bywhich the Body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided orrestrained,and at the same time the ideas of these affections."28 f we areourselves the sufficient cause of these affections, the affect is called an"action" (actio); if, on the other hand, we are only the partial cause, theaffect is called a "passion"(passio).29Man is necessarily always subjectto

19E, III, P 2, schol.; cf. also E, I, ax. 6; E, I, P 32; E, II, P 7, and schol.; E, II, P 19;E, II, P 21 and dem. and schol.; E, II, P 35, schol.; E, II, P 48 and dem.; Ep., 2; Ep., 58.20E, III, P 2.21 TTP, 202.22 See E, V, pref.; furtherE, III, P 2, schol.23 ImmanuelKant, Religion within theLimits of ReasonAlone, tr. Theodore M. Greeneand Hoyt H. Hudson (New York, 1960), 21, note.24 See E, III P 6; E, III P 9; TP, II, 8; TP, III, 18.25 See E, III, P 9.26 See E, III, P 9, schol.; E, III, P 37, dem.; E, III, P 57, dem.27 By joy and sadness the mind passes to a higher resp. lower degree of perfection,insofar as its power of acting is either increased or decreased. See E, III, P 11, schol; E,III, P 59, dem. and schol.28

E, III, def. III (my italics).29 See E, III, def. I-III.


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Spinoza 39passions,30which should be thought of not as vices but only as propertiesof human nature.31

According to Spinoza, an "affect cannot be restrained or taken awayexcept by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be re-strained."32 nsofar as the affect is an affection of the body, it can only berestrainedor removedby a corporealcause;and insofar as the affect is anidea of an affection, it can only be restrainedor removedby anotheridea.33Therefore,it is not the truth in the "knowledgeof good and evil"by whichan affect is restrained or removed but only the fact that this knowledgeitself is an affect.34Thus, for Spinoza there exists a causal nexus of affections of the body

within the field of the attribute"extension,"togetherwith a correspondingcausal nexus of affects as ideas of those affections within the field of theattribute "thought."III. Accordingly, the "ethical" problem with which Spinoza is con-fronted should not be thought of as concerning the possibility (and neces-sity) for man to have his volition and action determinedby pure reason.Indeed, since such an "absolute dominion" is, as has already been men-

tioned, unthinkable under the given premises,affects must be considered.The point is rather to draw up "actively" an enlightened calculation ofbenefit with respect to self-preservation(which determines all thought,volition, and action) on the basis of nomological cognition of one's ownhumannatureand also of the non-humannaturecontributingto it, insteadof being "passively"determinedby "blind"35desire.36It is exactly here that Spinoza raises the question of the possibilityof human "freedom," a question which determines his entire "ethical"thought. For him a thing is free "which exists from the necessity of itsnature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone."37Accordingly,man as a sensuous-rationalbeing is "completelyfreeinsofar as he is guidedby reason, for then he is determined to act by causes which can beunderstoodadequatelythroughhis own naturealone. But he is necessarilydetermined to act by them, for freedom ... does not remove the necessityof acting, but imposes it."38The point is not determinationby reason asopposed to determinationby affects, but rather determinationby affects

30See E, IV, P 4, cor.; TP, I, 5.31See TP, I, 4.32E, IV, P 7.33 See E, IV, P 7, dem.34 See E, IV, P 14. E, IV, P 8: "The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but anaffect of Joy or Sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it."35TP, II, 5.36 Cf. also Vaughan, loc. cit., 96.37 E, I, def. 7.38TP, II, 11.


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40 GeorgGeismannunder the direction of reason:not to be simply at the mercy of the affects,but to be determinedby them "actively."39This requiresknowledge. Thebetter we know an affect, the more it is under our control and the less themind is acted on by it.40Hence, the "strivingfor understanding... is thefirst and only foundation of virtue,"41 virtue being in the case of man42existing and acting according to the laws of man's own sensuous-rationalnature43-in short, living only "according to the guidance of reason."44

Intentionallyand with systematicallygood reasons,Spinoza called hisprincipal work "Ethics,"45although it is also cosmology and theology,epistomology and psychology, and even "politics." His entire thinking ischaracterizedby a deeply practical interest.46 t is an interest in moderat-ing the affects by reason,47which means for him an interest in freedomor, in effect, in what makes man human.His formal definitionof real virtue as living accordingto the guidanceof reason48places Spinoza at first sight completely in the line of tradition.Even the incorporationof the striving for self-preservation nto Spinoza's"ethical"thinking does not alter this because, for him it is not only aboutthe striving for self-preservation hroughreason, but even more about thestriving for self-preservationof reason itself.49Yet for Spinoza actingaccording to the guidance of reason does not mean to be determined byreason as such but means to be determined by affects perceived to bereasonable, .e., by affects which "agreewith the rules of human reason."50Reason as seen by Spinoza is not reason as imposing laws (of freedom)but reason as recognizing laws (of nature). When Spinoza states thatethics, "as everyone knows, must be based upon Metaphysics and Phys-ics,"51he undoubtedlymeant a metaphysicsof naturebut not a metaphys-ics of morals as differing from it. For Spinoza, Kant's famous statementabout "what ought to happen, even if it never does happen,"52would bea meaningless statement. In Spinoza's opinion reason acts as a sort ofstage director in the play of the affects by leading the play with the help

39See also Duff, loc. cit., 67 ff.; 107 ff.40 See E, V, P 3, cor.; furtherE, V, P 3; E, V, P 6.41 E, IV, P 26, dem.42 Generally, virtue is nothing but the ability to preserveoneself accordingto the lawsof one's own nature. See E, IV, P 18, schol.43See TP, II, 7.44E, IV, P 37, schol. 1.45Cf. also Bartuschat, loc. cit.46Cf. TdIE, 11; further Duff, loc. cit., 234.47 See E, IV, P 17, schol.48 Cf. also E, IV, P 24.49 See E, III, P 9; E, IV, P 26, dem.50E, IV, P 18, schol.5 Ep., 27; cf. TTP, 46: "reason and experience."52 Kant, Groundwork f the Metaphysicsof Morals, tr. H. J. Paton (New York, 1964),94.


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Spinoza 41of the knowledge of the parallelogramof the affects in the direction it hasperceived to be "good." The more reason succeeds in this, the greater isthe power of a man's intellect, his freedom,53his virtue, or his happiness.54

Spinoza's "moral philosophy," in spite of its metaphysical loadingand its bend towards rationalism,5 has a deeply naturalistic character.According to Spinoza, man's actions out of volition can and must alwaysbe thought of as being completely conditioned by the striving for self-preservationwhich determines all natural objects. For a "virtuous" lifeonly a knowledge of nature in general and of human nature in particularis necessary in order to assess human capacity and subsequentlyto makereasonableuse of it.56

In a certain sense one can altogether agree with Duff when he states"that he [man] has his moral happiness and religious and social fate inhis own hands,"57 n that man's "fate," or at least his way on earth,depends on if and how he strives to gain the understanding possible forhim and if andhow he uses the understandinggainedto control his affects.But the specific "talent"and the "motivation"to strive for understandingand to use it in practice have been bestowed upon him by nature withoutbeing due to him.58

Spinoza's "moral philosophy" is a theory of praxis but not a theoryof duties. Since he has "the course of nature alone in view," the ought "hasno meaningwhatsoever"59or him, and rightly so. He is only interestedinnorms as motives which determine actions, that is, in norms as efficientand not as valid norms. Spinoza's teachings are both a theory of praxis,since they deal with man as an acting being, and a theory of nature, sinceman is also as an acting (rational)being an integral partof nature.If thereis an authority which "demands"and "commands," it is not reason butnature. Reason only enlightens it. "What Spinoza really has in mind isthe highest viewpoint of purely theoretical contemplation of theworld,"60-but, one has to add, with a practical intention. Since for Spi-noza each normativestatementis pointless and consequently meaningless,he can and must avoid any judgment in his theory. What he aims at isnot justification and assessment but analysis and causal explanation;hewants to observe and understand human nature as it necessarily is in

53 See the head of E, V.54 See E, II, P 49, schol.55 See Friederich Jodl, loc. cit., 477.56 See TdIE, 15; TdlE, 19;E, IV, P 17, schol.57 Duff, loc. cit., 174.58 With respect to the relationshipbetween "human freedom" and "necessityof fate"see particularlyEp., 23; Ep., 58; Ep., 75; Ep., 78; TTP, 68; E, II, P 36; Duff, loc. cit., ch.XIV.59 Immanuel Kant's Critiqueof PureReason,tr. Norman Kemp Smith(London, 1978),

473; cf. also McShea, loc. cit., 163 ff.60FriederichJodl, loc. cit., 473; my translation.


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42 GeorgGeismannreality,withoutderiding rdeploring,evilingordenouncing.61venwithrespectto human affectssuch as love, hate,anger,envy,ambition,andcompassion,"a trueunderstandingf themgivesthe mind as much satis-factionas the apprehensionf thingspleasing o the senses."62

IV. The "naturalism"n moralphilosophythat has come to lightalsocompletelypervadesSpinoza's"politicalhought,"and it isjust this"naturalism" hichdeemsSpinoza undamentallyifferent romHobbesand Rousseau.We knowfromexperiencehat manusuallycannotescapecommunitywith his ownkind andthat,as a finiterationalbeing,he evendepends nmany ways on this communityin order to reach the goal of self-perfection.63t the same imethiscommunitys not"bynature" ecessar-ilybeneficialo thatgoal.So thequestionarises andrightly,withinwhatSpinozacomprehensivelyalls "Ethics")4as to how the communityofmen must be organizedso that the powerof man's intellectover hisaffects,andtherebyhumanfreedom,65s advanced o the highestdegreepossible. n particularhe State,as thepoliticalcommunity f men,is animportantmeansto reachthat goal.66If menlivedaccording o the guidanceof reason, heywouldalwaysnecessarily greebynature.67nreality heyaremuchmoreundercontrolof blind desire.68 his is exactly why they do not by natureagree69 utratherare"bynatureenemies."70n order o "restrain ndrepressmen'sdesiresandimmoderatempulses,"71he authorityof the Stateis neces-sary. The State must imposelaws and enforce them by threatsor, ifnecessary, y coercion.72hismeans hat theStateaddsanother actor otheplayof the affectsof its subjectsn order o change heparallelogram

of those affects. For Spinozaas well as for Kant morethan a centurylater,the problemof establishingpeace"mustbe solvable.For it is notthe moral mprovementf men butonlythe mechanism f naturewhich61 See TP, I, 1; TP, I, 4; Ep., 30; E, I, P 33; E, II, P 49, schol. (end);E, III (pref.);E,IV, P 50, schol.; E, IV, P 57, schol.62 TP, I, 4.63 TTP, 73: "The formation of society ... is also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely

necessary."64 Cf. E, IV, P 37, schol. 1, schol. 2.65 See E, V, title and pref.; Spinoza uses in this context the concepts of reason (ratio)and intellect (intellectus) synonymously.66 TdE, 11 Spinozamentions as other means: moral philosophy, education, and med-icine.67 See E, IV, P 35.68 See TP, II, 5; further TTP, 73.69 See E, IV, P 32.70 TP, II, 14.71TTP,74.72 See E, IV, P 37, schol. 2.


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Spinoza 43the task requires to know, how one can use it in men."73According toSpinoza, "when the safety [salus] of the state depends on any men's goodfaith, and its affairs cannot be administered properly unless its rulerschoose to act from good faith, it will be very unstable; if a state is to becapableof lasting, its administrationmust be so organizedthat it does notmatter whether its rulers are led by reason or passion [affectus]-theycannot be induced to break faith or act badly."74Within these considerationsSpinoza also discusses right and law. It isthis fact which has led to the misunderstandingthat the political philoso-phy of Spinoza is something similar to Hobbes's De Cive and Leviathanand Rousseau's Du ContratSocial.

Spinoza does not think of right as something inherent in man, theviolation of which by another man would accordingly be a wrong, butonly as possessing a purely factual meaning, namely, that of ability orpower (potentia)or virtue (virtus).75n this meaning right is not restrictedto man, but equally applies to all things of nature, even to God as thecause of all things of nature.76With respect to the use of ability as right,Spinoza does not again raise the question of right, that is, as to what useone may make of ability, but only the question of benefit, that is, as tothe consequences of a possible use.77According to Spinoza, "the [R]ightof nature"is "the actual laws or rules of nature in accordance with whichall things come to be; ... Hence everything a man does in accordancewith the laws of his nature, he does by the sovereign [R]ight of nature."78Accordingly, "each thing in nature has as much right from nature as ithas power to exist and act."79As such power only appearswhen it is used(and for Spinoza such use is always determinedby natural laws), right isnothing else but what one (necessarily) does: consequently, the law ofnature "forbidsabsolutely nothing that is within human power."80Thislast statement in particularshows the entire superfluousnessof Spinoza'sconcept of Right (in both senses). What one cannot do, need not beforbidden. Again, when something could be forbidden because one cando it, Spinoza's "law of nature" really forbids absolutely nothing.It would be quite wrong, however, to consider Spinoza as an advocateof the so-called "right of the strongest," asserting that everything is per-mitted which one is able to do and to enforce. It would be wrong for the

73 Immanuel Kant, Principlesof Lawful Politics. Immanuel Kant'sPhilosophicalDraftToward Eternal Peace, tr. Wolfgang Schwarz (Aalen, 1988), 100 (my italics).74 TP, I, 6; cf. also TP, VI, 3.75 See E, IV, P 37, schol. 1.76 See TTP, 200 ff.; Ep., 64.77 See E, IV, P 37, schol. 2. With regardto utility as principle of virtue see E, IV, P18, schol. (end).78TP, II, 4.79 TP, II, 3.80 TP, II, 18; see also TTP, 202.


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44 GeorgGeismannsimplereason hatSpinozadoesnot talkat all aboutright nits traditionalmeaning.He doesnot intend(noris he able)to justify anything.Whenconsidering ightas a naturalability, ncluding he abilityof reasoning,Spinozanever eaves o any degree he "naturalistic"evel.Whatever nedoesis "right"n hisconceptof right,becauseonecan do it andonemustdo it. And yet nobodycan (or need) excusehimselfby invokingthisconceptof right,becauseSpinoza'sdentification f rightwithabilityorpowerexcludesthe very possibilityof guilt:"everyone,by the highest[R]ightof nature,doesthosethingsthat follow fromthe necessityof hisown nature,"81whethermanis led by reasonor by desirealone."82

Spinoza eesanelementary ifference etween he"wiseman" intelli-gens)andthe "fool" stultus),83incethe firstfollowsreasonandthe latterdoesnot.But thisdistinction,oo, is factualand notjuridical.Thenaturalrightof the "fool"is the rightof desireas ability,whereas he naturalrightof the "wiseman" s therightof reasonas ability.Now whether he"fool"(necessarily) cts "falsely"dueto his "foolishness," r the "wiseman"(just as necessarily)acts "correctly"due to his "wisdom" sci-entia),84othact "rightly" r, to be moreexact,by the "Right"of theirspecificnature.85Sincemen do notagreeby nature,because heynaturallyollowtheirpassionsrather hantheirreason,86eason tself derives he necessity oleavethis naturalstate of disagreement nd to join a civil statein order"to live togetheras securelyand well as possible."87hat is why "menmustnecessarily ometo anagreement... if theyare to enjoyasa wholethe rightswhichnaturallybelongto them as individuals,and their lifeshouldbeno moreconditioned y theforce anddesireof individuals, utby the powerand will of the wholebody."88Spinoza'swordsmustnot betakento mean(at least as a hypotheticalconstruct)hatmenin thenatural tate wouldmakea contractwith eachotheras legalsubjectsby whichthey wouldabandon heir naturalrightto everythingn favorof thelegalcommunity. t is trueSpinoza aysthat"in order ... that men may be able to live harmoniously and be ofassistanceo oneanother,t is necessaryor themto giveuptheirnaturalright."89utwhat s renounced ere s onlya certainuse of therespectivenaturalability.By the contractmenmutuallydeclare heirwillingnesso81E, IV, P 37, schol. 2.82 TP, II, 5.83 See E, IV, P 17, schol.84Ibid.85See TTP, 201 ff.86 See E, IV, P 32.87 TTP, 202; cf. also TP, V, 2.88 TTP, 202 f.89E, IV, P 37, schol. 2; cf. also TP, III, 3.


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Spinoza 45acceptpositive aws,imposedby thecommunityandin conjunctionwithsanctions, o restrain heir behavior.90The "wiseman"whoobeysthe ordersof the Stateout of reason, he"fool"whoopposes hem out of merepassion,andthe State whichpun-ishes the "fool"areall "right"n their actions.Thatdoesnot mean thatthe "wiseman"wouldalsohave a "right" o bedisobedient utonlythathe cannotbe disobedient s he provesby his obedience.ThisonceagainshowsthatSpinoza's onceptof Righthas no powerat all to differentiateandis thereforeotallyuseless.91The universal ontract,also,hasa completelya-juridicalharacter.92It consistsof nonbinding tatementsof intent with respect o the futureuse of one's own abilityto act. The reasonfor all thoseconcerned, he"fool"as wellas the "wiseman,"to make such a statementandpossiblyto be willingto observe t is the respectivebenefitresulting rom it withregard o theirself-preservations they perceive t: "a contract s onlymadevalidbyitsutility,withoutwhich tbecomesnullandvoid."93 Thushe is still his ownjudgeby the [R]ightof nature; o if hejudgesthat hispledgeis causinghim more loss than gain-and it makesno differencewhetherhejudgestrulyor falsely,for to erris human-then, sinceit isthe verdictof his ownjudgment hat he should break t, he will break tby the [R]ightof nature."94It has been heldthat,in comparisono Hobbes,Spinozahasstronglymodifiedand moderated he absolutismof Stateauthority,95 hich hesupportsby reservingo it a naturalright.In a letterhe himselfwrote:"Withregard o Politics,the differencebetweenHobbesandme, aboutwhichyouinquire, onsists n this thatI everpreservehe natural R]ightintactso that the SupremePowerin a Statehas no morerightover asubject han is proportionateo the powerby whichit is superior o thesubject."96t firstsightSpinoza'swritings eem to confirm his view:"asproper onsiderationf thepointwillshow,the individual'sightofnaturedoesnotcease nthepoliticalorder.The fact sthatmanacts naccordancewith the laws of his own natureandpursueshis own advantagen boththe naturaland the politicalorder."97There s, however,no contradiction etween"absolutism"nd "reser-vation,"becauseboth termsare conceivednot juridically,but empiri-

90See E, IV, P 37, schol. 2.91Cf. Rousseau, The Social Contract,I, 3.92 See however Walther Eckstein, "Zur Lehre vom Staatsvertragbei Spinoza," Zeit-schriftfir 6ffentlichesRecht, 13 (1933), 356-68.

93 TTP, 204.94 TP, II, 12;see also TP, III, 14; TP, III, 17; TP, IV, 6. Cf. however Hobbes,De Cive,II, 11; III, 2; and Geismann and Herb, loc. cit., scholia 286 ff.; 303 ff.; 337.95 See above note 3.96Ep., 50.97 TP, III, 3; see also TTP, 10; TTP, 214.


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46 GeorgGeismanncally.98Beingthe unitedpowerof all, the State s usuallysuperior o theindividualand, with this very "superiority,"t is in the "right."Butwhereverandwhenever his superiorpowerends andanotherpower(ofoneormany ndividuals) egins, his otherpoweragain s in the "right."In terms of "right" he relationship etween he State andits subjectssidentical o theirbalanceof powerandchangesaccordingly.99owever,thispowerrelationships as such nota possibleobjectof practical eason.It is theoretical easonwhichempiricallyindsthat a certainuseof Statepowerand,withit, of State"right"restrictinghe freedomof thesubjectsor obstructingheir strivingfor self-preservation)an lead in the longrun10?o a decreaseor even a destruction f thispowerandthis "right."WhenSpinozasays,a "commonwealth,hen, doeswrongwhen it does,orallowsto be done,thingsthat canbe the causeof its owndownfall,"101this"wrong-doing"s forhim not an offenceagainsta moral aw,but thenonobservancef natural aws. "When t acts in this way, I say that itdoeswrong nthe sense nwhichscientistsor doctors aythat naturedoeswrong;and in this sensewe can say that a commonwealth oes wrongwhen t doessomething ontraryothedictateofreason."'02hus, ndeed,for Spinoza he State has the "right o rulein the most violentmanner,andto putcitizens o deathforverytrivialcauses,but no onesupposestcan do this with the approvalof soundjudgment";103or all experienceshowsthatthe State n this waymostlikelycreates he causeof its owndownfall.For Spinozathe best life is a life led completelyaccording o theguidanceof reason;andthe best State also is a State directedaccordingto the dictatesof reason.Thesedictates,however,are not "preceptsofreason, but ... deduced from the common nature or constitution ofmen."'04Anda Statedirectedaccordingo these dictates s the best Statenotinthe senseofamoralvalue udgment,butinthe senseof anempiricalqualificationor theself-preservationf man as a sensuous-rationaleing.Now, for a reasonableState the universal ree use of reasonis anempiricallynecessarycondition.Therefore, n a State constitutedac-cordingto reason,105hilosophy, he "operator" f an adequateuse of

98 Cf. also J. W. Gough, The Social Contract(Oxford, 19572), 115; McShea, loc. cit.,170; Vaughan, loc. cit., 67.99 TP, III, 9: "and since the right of the commonwealth is determinedby the collectivepower of a people, the greater the number of the subjects who are given cause by acommonwealth to join in conspiracy against it, the more must its power and right bediminished ... the greatercause for fear it has, the less is it possessed of its own right";see also TTP, 214.100See e.g., TTP, 10.101TP, IV, 4.102TP, IV, 4.103 TTP, 258.104TP, I, 7.105 TTP, 11 (title!): "... demonstrating that not only can such freedom be granted


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Spinoza 47reason,is necessarily ree. For its part the reasonableStateprovidesanecessary ondition or the freedevelopment f philosophy.Sincethis isalsoa necessary ondition or manto perfecthis specificnature,"infact,the trueaim of governments liberty."106

V. Thefundamentalifference etweenSpinoza's ndHobbes'spoliti-cal thinkinghasbeenalreadymentioned: pinoza s not a philosopher fRight;Hobbes,however, s one in an epochalway.I shallrestrictmyselfto pointingout this differenceby indicating he pioneerachievement fHobbes n the field of philosophyof Right, in whichhe establishes heapriorireasons for the necessity of the State.ForHobbes, oo, man hasa naturalrightto self-preservation107nd,following rom hat andapparentlymatchingSpinoza's osition,a naturalrightto everything.108orHobbes,however, he latter s a merely ogicalconsequenceof the formeras a juridicalpremise,109hereasSpinoza's"jus summum ... ad omnia, quae potest"110 esults ontologically fromthenecessitywithwhichthe entire"potentia" f man is directed owardsself-preservation.And forHobbes, oo, the natural tate of menis a state of discord, obemoreexact,a state of warof all againstall. Butit is so because n thisstatethe naturalrightis in principle andif this state is not abolished,forever)111nsecureand thereforeneffective ndconsequentlydentical oa rightfornothing.112his state of discord sjuridically notempirically)contradictoryhroughout;t is a stateof universal ndcontinuous ossiblelitigation.It is just withrespect o the naturalrightthat this state turnsout to be a rightlessstate.That naturalrightcan only be preservedbyleaving henatural tatealtogether ndbyjoininga civil state.Thus,it isthe insecurityof the naturalrightin the naturalstatewhich makes theStatenecessary.Hobbesarrivesat thejuridicalnecessityof the Statethrougha merelyrationalanalysisof the natural tateas a state of naturalRight,withthefactorof self-preservationn his conceptof naturalrightplayingno rolein this analysis,and withoutany specialanthropological remises.TheState is necessaryby reason because ts contradictory ounterpart,henatural tate,turnsoutto be againstreason.If one conceives his stateinpurelyuridicalerms, tproves obe affectedbyan intrinsic ontradiction.without prejudiceto the public peace, but also, that without such freedom, piety cannotflourish nor the public peace be secure"; see also TTP, 6; TTP, 264 f.106TTP, 259.

107 See De Cive, I, 7.108 See De Cive, I, 10.109See Geismann and Herb, loc. cit., scholia 190-215.110TTP, 200.11'See De Cive, I, 13.112 See De Cive, I, 11.


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48 GeorgGeismannThus,the natural ightof manis firstof all a natural ightto a State.ForHobbes he State snecessaryor reasonsofRight.Inthis State henaturalrightto everythings abandonedn orderto securethe naturalrighttoself-preservation,hich is actually he onlypurposeof the State.Spinoza's easons orthe necessityof the State areentirelydifferent,they are empirical hroughout.13Experience hows that men are moreunderthe control of blind desire than under the guidanceof reason.Experienceurther hows that this makesmenmutualenemiesand thatwithoutany furtherprecautionshe strivingfor self-preservation,spe-cially the strivingguidedby reason,can be satisfiedonly inadequately.And experience, inally,showsthat such a satisfaction an be achievedmoreeasily,morecertainly,andbetterwithina State.Thus,theoreticalreasontells man that in view of such experiencet is morereasonable,becausemoreuseful, o abandonhe natural tateandtojoina civilstatetogetherwith one's own kind.Spinoza ouldhavearrived t this resultwithoutanyuse of hisconceptof Right.In hispolitical hinking here s notonly(andherehe is possiblysimilar o Hobbes)114o dimensionof unconditional bligation,but also(nowfundamentallyifferentromHobbes)nogenuinelyuridicaldimen-sion.WhatSpinoza trives or are maxims or actionsbasedon empiricalknowledge.For Hobbesthe deficiencyof the naturalstate resultsfrom the factthat mencan act according o their own will;for Spinoza his is due tothe fact that menin this stateareprimarilydetermined y passions.115InSpinoza's pinion he natural tate s conceivable s a stateofpeace:if all men lived only according o the guidanceof reason,they wouldalwaysnecessarily greeby nature.116n a certainwaythis puts Spinozainto the traditionof Christian houghtfromPaul throughAugustine oLuther.According o thisthought, henecessityof the Stateresults romthe sinfulnessof humannature.117he State is necessarybecauseof thesinners in Spinoza he "fool")and not becauseof the goodandthejust(the "wiseman").Thismaybe the reasonwhy Spinoza'sarguments reethicalandpolitical,rather han uridical.Thestateof men as theyreallyare,118 hich is not by nature n preestablished armony,can be madeadequateor manasa rationalbeing ntwoways:eithermenbehavemoreand moreas rationalbeings,119r theircommunitys organizedn sucha

113 See TP, II, 14; TP, II, 15; TTP, 73; E, IV, P 32; E, IV, app., ? 10, ? 12.114 Cf. Geismann and Herb, loc. cit., scholium 441.115 See E, IV, P 4, cor.; E, IV, P 37, schol. 2; TTP, 73; TP, II, 5.116 See E, IV, P 35.117 In the case of Spinoza one must of course not think of moral badness and "Fall"but only, in a totally value neutral sense, of being naturallydeterminedof man by affectsnot guided by reason.118Cf. TP, I, 1.119See E. V.


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Spinoza 49way that they, eithervoluntarilyor by compulsion,act as if they wererationalbeings;120hat is, men become,if not virtuous,at least goodcitizens.For Hobbes,however(andthis obviouslyshows his epochal mpor-tancein completelybreakingwithtradition),menin naturalcommunitywitheach other areunconditionallyn a state of war. This state of warisliterallynatural to them, regardlessof whetherthey are "foolish"or"wise,"sinners or just, determinedby their affects in bondageor infreedom.121The reason or this is thatevenstrictobservancefthedictatesof reasonnthe determinationfone'sownrespective olitionsandactionscannot establishany harmonyamongthe individuals.An individualassuchcan onlyestablish or himselfa reasonable armonyn his volitionandin his action,but never for a community.Ethicalprinciples,whichas suchservetheregulation f personalpurpose onflicts,arecompletelyunsuitedto serve also as legal principles or the regulationof actionconflictsamongdifferent ndividuals.Thus,contrary o Spinoza'sopin-ion,122hepossibilityof an individual'sprivate)peace s neithera neces-sarynor a sufficientconditionfor the realizationof mankind'spublic)peace.For this veryreasonthe naturalstate of mankind s, by aprioricnecessity,a peaceless tate,and the Stateis not, as the Greeks maginedthe polls, the place of virtue but "only"the place of (subjectiveandobjective)Right.That meanseven a community f menguidedbyreasonis, by nature, n a state of preestablished iscord and must first of allestablish (non-natural)armony:he Stateas the(artificial) nityof thevolition of all. For Hobbes, therefore, he State is not graduallybutprincipally ifferent romthe natural tate; t is notbetter,moresuitable,more usefulbut uniquelygood, suitable,useful,and aboveall not saferandmorepeaceful,but the firstandonly creatorand guarantof safetyandpeace.It would,however,be completely nappropriateo play off HobbesagainstSpinozaby meansof the comparisondrawnabove.It is just thiscomparison hat has shown the incommensurabilityf both positions.Spinoza'shoughtandHobbes'shoughtmoveonentirelydifferentevels;it is, therefore,not possible o use one to criticize he other.

VI. A comparisonbetweenSpinozaand Rousseaualso shows theobvious abstinence rom legal philosophyof the first and the evidentepochal mportanceorlegal philosophyof the latter.Thisdifference anbe pointedout againby indicatinghe pioneerachievement f Rousseauin thefieldof philosophy f Right, n whichhe establishes hefoundationof the Rightof the State.20Cf. TP, I, 6; VI, 3.121 See E, IV, title; E, V, title.122See E, IV, P 35; TTP, 73.


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50 GeorgGeismannHobbeshadgreatdifficultiesn determining priori,on the basisofhis empirically onditionednaturalright(to self-preservation),he legallimitsfor the executionof the powerof the State. He did not overcomethesedifficulties;ndeed,they are insurmountable. or Spinoza,havingshowntheempirical ecessityof the Stateas related o themerelyempiri-callydetermined"Right"of nature, he task is easier.He can now raisethefurther mpirical uestionof whichone of thosepossible ypesof Stateaccording o experiences the more or even most suitable "best")one,againwithrespect o the "Right"of nature.Becausehis answer emindsus of Rousseaun manyrespects,Spinozamay (at leastto the readernot interestedn principalquestionsof legalphilosophy) eemto bethe "connectingink"betweenHobbesand Rous-seau. But here, too, Spinoza s interested n the empiricaland not, asRousseau,n thelegal imitsof Stateauthority.Rousseau ounds heRightof the Statea priorion the idea of an originalcontract(contrat ocial)emcompassinghe entirespatio-temporal umanity.In this contractavolition sexpressedhat snecessarily niversalvolonteenerale) ecauseit is the reasonable olitionof all:necessarily ot, in exercising ne'sownfreedomRousseau's atural ight), o besubject o coercionbyanyotherwill, thatis, to be freeaccordingo laws,regardless f whetherone is oris not guidedby reasonwith respect o the use of that freedom.As theoriginalone, that contract s the onlyone legallypossible.Eachexerciseof Statepower s legallybasedon this contractand drawsall its legitimacyandbinding orce fromagreementwith this contract.123On the basis of his conceptof naturalright, Spinoza,in contrast,couldnot, nor did he wantto, presentsuch a contract.First,a righttoself-preservationrto everything necan doisnotimaginables a natural

or universal ightwithoutcontradiction.Thus no contract s possible nwhichanagreed, easonableolitionof all materializeswithregardojustthis intrinsically ontradictoryight.Second,Rousseau'squestionaboutthe conditionsregardinghe possibilityof legal (legitimateandbinding)authority f theState,which s answered y the ideaof the contrat ocial,wouldbe aquestionwithoutanysenseon the basisof thespecificprecondi-tions of Spinoza.124Just as Spinozaconceivesthe naturalstate empiricallyand not, asHobbes, uridically, o the contractestablishinghe Statefor Spinoza snot a juridicaldea,as it is forRousseau,but a fact to be comprehendedempirically. hroughhiscontract,whichactuallyplaysonlyaveryminorrolein Spinoza'spolitical hought,all menobligethemselves"tacitlyorexpressly"o obeythehighestauthority"inall things."25"Sincemen...are led morebypassion affectus]hanbyreason, heirnaturalmotive or

123 See Rousseau, The Social Contract, I, 6-9; II, 1-4.124 Cf. above par. III.125 TTP, 205.


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Spinoza 51unitingandbeingguidedasifbyone mind s notreasonbutsomecommonpassion [affectus]."126Depending on the "agreement," he highest author-ity will be monarchic,aristocratic,or democratic.Spinoza prefersthedemocratic overnment, forI believe t to be of all formsof governmentthe mostnatural,andthemost consonantwithindividualiberty.... Thisis the onlyform of governmentwhichI have treatedof at length, or it isthe onemost akin to mypurposeof showing hebenefitsof freedomn astate."127So the will of the empiricalmultitudewhich comestogetherheretoform a Stateunityof volition s at the most a volontede tous(if it be allmen),butprobablyt is onlythe will of a majorityor even of a minority.Now, as everybodyknows,the volontede tous can deviatemore or lessfromthe volonte enerale;andin anycase,as suchit hasno legitimizingpower.ButthisisjustnotSpinoza's oncern.ForhimtherearethevariousempiricallypossibleState constitutionsandsubsequentlyorrespondinggovernmentswhichcan be comprehendeds "justified" y the implicitor explicitagreement f all.128The different onstitutions nd the corres-pondingexerciseof poweralso resultin differentconsequences effects)for those subdued.The assessmentof a politicalsystemas the cause ofsuchconsequences ependson the assessmentof the consequences.t isimportantorSpinozahatmendevelopas muchaspossiblenaccordancewith theirspecificnature,that is, as sensuous-rationaleings.Externalconditionsmustcorrespondo this nature.So he is looking orthat Statewhichis of mostutilityto freedomas being guidedby reason.For him,thisis democracy s "libera espublica,"n whichthe lawsare mostlikely"foundedon sound reason."129

Onlyin a sense that is farfrom Rousseau'sapologetic hinkingcouldone say that Spinozahas givena "justification"f democracyor, moreadequately, theoreticalpleadingn its favor.Incidentally,hispleadingis put forwardnot only with regard o the subjects insofaras in a freeState"everymemberof it may, if he will, be free,that is, live with fullconsentunder he entireguidanceof reason")130ut also withrespect othe State itself and the holdersof the Stateauthority insofaras the freeState s leastsubject o thedangerof destruction rom nside).That Statewill have mostpowerand,therefore,be "right,"whichis "basedon anddirectedby reason.... For the rightof a commonwealths determined

126 TP, VI, 1.127 TTP, 207.128 TP, III, 5: "and,in consequence,the will of the commonwealth [must]be taken forthe will of all; what the commonwealth decides to be just and good must be regardedashaving been so decided by every citizen." For Rousseau, it would read totally different:only if, what the commonwealth decides, can necessarilybe taken, as if every citizen hasso decided, it is just and good.129 TTP, 206.130 TTP, 206.


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52 GeorgGeismannbythepowerof a peopleguidedasif byonemind,but thisunionof mindsis quiteinconceivable nlessthe commonwealth oes its best to achievethose conditionswhichsound reason declares o be for the good of allmen."131pinoza's"ideal"Statecontainsn its constitution hemeans oritsself-preservations wellas the means or thepreservationf its citizensas sensuous-rationaleings.Heretoo, in this reasonablenessf the State,the basic cosmiclaw is effective,according o which "eachthing,as faras it canby its ownpower,strives o perseveren its being."132hus,onecouldsayaboutSpinoza's"freestState"133hatit is the mostnaturalandat the sametimethe most reasonablehingof the politicalworld.

VII. Spinoza's olitical houghtcanbe takenasfittingonlyminimallyinto the philosophicaline of Hobbes,Rousseau,andKant;but it seemseminentlysuitedto another, ust as valuable, ine of empiricalanalystsand theoristsof politics,namely, hatof Aristotle,134 achiavelli,135on-tesquieu,Tocqueville,andMax Weber.Spinoza'sTractatusTheologico-Politicusnd TractatusPoliticusarereally"political"andnot "juridical"reatises,politicalscienceand notlegalphilosophyof the State. To put it in moder terms, n his politicalthinkingSpinoza s a social scientist, nterested n causalanalyses.His"social heory" s partof his general heoryof nature.He is interestedncertainsocialtechnologies.Largepartsof the two political reatisesreadlike a programmeof what has been achieved,almost 300 years later,in the fieldsof "government," comparative olitics,""civicculture,""politicalpsychology," nd"critique f ideology." n particular pinozaanticipates, s Machiavellidid beforehim,the idea of what HaroldLass-well paraphrasedwith the famous book title Politics: Who GetsWhat,When,How(1936).Muchmore mportant, owever,and morevaluable han thecontentsof whatSpinozahasputforward ordiscussion,are thehighstandards fmethodhe has achieved. One has to read two other "freethinkers,"Tocquevilleand Max Weber,in order to find other such examplesofunerringness f view, of abstinence rom valuejudgment,of powerofcausalanalysisand ogicalconclusion, nd, fnotof richnessof theempiri-cal basis,then of a clear awareness f its necessity.

Spinoza'spleading or a State of freedom,especiallyn the TractatusTheologico-Politicus,136howsgreatbrilliance ndkeenperception.t can131TP, III, 7.132E, III, P 6.133 See TTP, 206.134 A special similarity to Aristotle lies in the attempt to develop an empirical theoryof politics (as generally of "ethics") on the basis of a "metaphysics of nature." Cf. Ep.,27; also Vaughan, loc. cit., 62.135Cf. TP, V, 7; X, 1.136 See e.g., TTP, 6; TTP, 264 f.


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Spinoza 53easilystandcomparisonwith what was writtenmore than one hundredyears ater, irstbyWilhelmvonHumboldtand thenbyJohnStuartMill,the literary athersof political iberalism.137umboldtandMill,at theirbest, are descendants f the Enlightenment. pinoza,at his best, is notonlya forerunnerf theEnlightenmentut also an excellent epresentativeof it. As such, he has indicated, to every man with the ability (potentia)to let himselfbe guidedby reason n the development nd the use of allhis talents,the way he must take to achieve the goal which this veryreason(andonly it) has pointedout to him to be within his power.Hehasshownthat the StateandonlytheState, f it is adequately rganized,can create hesafety orman's reedom hat is intendedbya reasonwhichitselfis conditionedby the striving or self-preservation.

Universitatder BundeswehrMiinchen.

137With regardto taking this position as a normativeprogramof political philosophysee my criticism in: Georg Geismann, Ethik und Herrschaftsordnung Tiibingen, 1974),39 ff.

Geismann_Spinoza-Beyond Hobbes and Rousseau

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