Gadfly Fall 2008

GADFLYTHE

the undergraduate philosophy magazine of Columbia University

FALL 2008

Prophets for a Profit Drawing the Line between Faith and Gullibility

The Problem of Pseudoscience

Jeff Helzner on Using Philosophy

GADFLYTHE

FALL 2008

ShortsProfessor Questionnaires

Philosophy Hi-Tech A review of the Philosopher’s Zone podcast

Supersuits The myth of the superheroic politician

FeaturesProphets for a Profit

Blurring the line between faith and gullibility

The Undead Burying the discomfirmed and unsubstantiated

Talking Music Symphony Philosophique

Fashion Attack Reporting from the belly of the beast

CriticismPhilosophy of...

An interview with Jeff Helzner

Discriminating Open-mindednessNomy Arpaly’s colloquium talk

Little Philosophy BookPhilosophy and Theology

Bart Pielaillustrated by Michael Roberto

Masood Manoochehriillustrated by Meredith Perry

Catherine Carberryillustrated by Mara Kravitz

Edmund Zagorinillustrated by Sonia Tycko

Yurina Koillustrated by Claire Bullen

Khadeeja Safdarillustrated by Channa Bao

Brittany Allisonillustrated by Aryeh Hillman and Michael Roberto

Shana Crandellillustrated by Madeline Low

Alan Daboin

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Cover Mara Kravitz, Logo Sonia Tycko

From the Editor

The Gadfly welcomes article proposals from all undergraduates. Please find proposal forms at gadflymagazine.com.

Undergraduates of any major at Columbia and Barnard may apply for staff positions by visiting our website.

For more information, please e-mail [email protected].

The Gadfly is sponsored in part by the Arts Initiative at Columbia University. This funding is made possible through a generous gift from The Gatsby Charitable Foundation.

STAFF

Editor-in-Chief Michael Roberto

Managing Editor Sonia Tycko

Shorts and Information Editors

Sumedha ChablaniAdam Waksman

Features EditorsAlan Daboin

Adam Flomenbaum

Deputy Features Editor Adam Dubrow

Criticism EditorsBrittany AllisonShana Crandell

Bart Piela

Copy EditorsMichael Klein

Tao Zeng

Arts EditorSonia Tycko

Deputy Arts EditorKhadeeja Safdar

Layout EditorsAryeh HillmanMara Kravitz

Michael RobertoSonia Tycko

Technology DirectorMichael Klein

Business and Finance Manager

Tao Zeng

Thanks to the Columbia and Barnard Philosophy Departments for their support and assistance.

ast summer a ten-year-old asked me a question I couldn’t answer. What’s Philosophy? I bought time by remarking on what a good

and indeed philosophical question it was. He parried with a blank stare. I returned it, but then broke under the pressure. Philosophy is one way of understanding how the world works. My vague response may not have been satisfying, but he seemed to have had enough and walked away to find his dad.

Philosophy can be characterized by its traditional subjects: epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics, etc. But this bottom-up definition doesn’t really do it. It doesn’t tell you why I list these and not others. How about a more general approach? Philosophy is conceptual analysis with the aid of logic. This may do, but it doesn’t work for a good number of cases.

Let’s slow down. How about naming a salient characteristic? Here’s one of the subject’s more endearing traits: a wonderful obsession with clarity. Clarity in concepts, clarity in terminology, clarity in methodology and arguments. Clarity that allows for complexity, but doesn’t prefer it. Philosophy turns the passion for the unambiguous that one finds in science and mathematics onto a host of other disciplines. Indeed, philosophy’s affinity for application may account for its Jell-O-like refusal to be nailed down.

This is where I find The Gadfly. Our issue doesn’t have much epistemology, metaphysics or ethics. But it does (I hope) have clear analyses of problems in fields our readers may find especially relevant: religion, the arts, science and politics.

In the professor questionnaire, Jeff Helzner shares the following tip: “Combine your study of philosophy with a serious study of some other subject.” This is apt advice—for majors and for magazines.

Michael Roberto

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THE GADFLY fall 20082

Isaac LeviI was a pre-theological student at the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1948 when I took an intro to philosophy course offered by Ralph Edwards at NYU. I became convinced that belief in God, which I (foolishly) thought to be the cornerstone of a rationally grounded morality, was untenable. It took me a couple of emotionally turbulent years to quit the Seminary but I lost my religion in Edwards’ class. My subsequent interest in Philosophy has been too intellectual for me to react in any intelligent manner to the questions you ask. Although it took me a long time to articulate, the focus of my philosophical attention has been on conditions under which points of view are justifiably modified. I have a great many friends whose interests overlap mine. In recent years, I have lost two friends, Sidney Morgenbesser and Henry Kyburg, who had great influences on my thinking. I had great personal respect for Richard Braithwaite. At one time, I was an admirer of Bertrand Russell (whom I have seen giving a public lecture); but I have long since lost this admiration. And I would have been very interested to have made the acquaintance of Charles Peirce and John Dewey. Many of my acquaintances will testify to the passionate and even vitriolic expression of my animus towards some of the famous heroes of twentieth-century analytic philosophy—e.g., Popper, Carnap, Wittgenstein and Kripke. I would like to say that this passion is not really directed at their persons or, indeed, even their ideas but to the unseemly worship of their persons or ideas that so many people have practiced. I have a distaste for the cult-like aspects of the philosophical community.

Jeff HelznerHow did you become interested in philosophy?I came to philosophy from mathematics.What’s your favorite story about something that’s happened in the department, in class, or in the field?I don’t have any stories that would be appropriate for this forum.What did your parents say when you told them you wanted to be a professional philosopher?I never told them such a thing.Philosopher, dead or alive, you would most like to meet?C.S. PeircePhilosopher, dead or alive, you would least like to meet?J.L. AustinWhat is your advice to aspiring philosophy majors?Combine your study of philosophy with a serious study of some other subject.Which philosophy publications (magazines, websites, blogs) do you recommend reading?There are philosophy magazines?Which philosopher do you read to help go to sleep at night?I can’t read serious philosophy when I’m trying to go to sleep.

You’re PreciselyMy Cup of TeaGetting to Know Our Professors

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Carol RovaneHow did you become interested in philosophy?I was always prone to philosophical reflection even before I knew that that was what I was doing. When I entered university, I read the entire Bulletin of Courses before registering for classes the first time round, and I knew just from the course descriptions alone that I was interested in philosophy. What did your parents say when you told them you wanted to be a professional philosopher?I had the good fortune to have a mother who thought it was fine to pursue anything so long as you put your whole self into it. However, my other relatives, most of whom were in what could be called “business,” thought it was ridiculous —I recall even being called a “parasite” on the ground that philosophers are not productive in the economic sense. Philosopher, dead or alive, you would least like to meet?Immanuel KantWhat is your advice to aspiring philosophy majors?Don’t be shy about making appointments to see faculty when things are on your mind—whether it be to seek advice about what courses to take, or what to do after graduation, or just to talk philosophy. Which philosophy publications do you recommend reading?It depends on your interests. The two journals with the widest circulation are the Journal of Philosophy (which is edited and published here at Columbia) and Philosophical Review. Other good journals include Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Synthese, Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs. It is also worth visiting the webpages of individual philosophers whose work you’ve read with interest —for they often post their recent work. Which philosopher do you read to help go to sleep at night?It never helps me to go to sleep to read philosophy.

Taylor CarmanHow did you become interested in philosophy?Militant atheism led me to Sartre, which led me to Heidegger, which led me away from militant atheism toward something more like terminal ontological perplexity.What’s your favorite story about something that’s happened in the department, in class, or in the field?I once nodded and smiled indulgently, perhaps patronizingly, to a student who said that she learned in Sunday school that “atonement” meant at-one-ment, i.e. being at one (with God). Cute, I thought, but a bit silly. After class I looked it up in the OED and discovered that she was right: that is indeed the etymology of the word.What did your parents say when you told them you wanted to be a professional philosopher?“Good for you.”Philosopher, dead or alive, you would most like to meet?Socrates. Philosopher, dead or alive, you would least like to meet?Ayn Rand.What is your advice to aspiring philosophy majors?Try to keep philosophy fun as well as serious. Don’t let yourself be intimidated by academic competitiveness and hyperprofessionalism.Which philosophy publications do you recommend reading?TLS and The London Review of Books.Which philosopher do you read to help go to sleep at night?None of the above. (Philosophy should not be sleep-inducing.)


hilosophy: no subject produces more monotonous lectures. No field engenders more impossible jargon. Nothing is more

akin to a heavy dose of Ambien. Alan Saunders would have a thing or two to

say about all this. Saunders hosts Philosopher’s Zone, a weekly radio show broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Company Radio National. It purports to be “your guide through the strange thickets of logic, metaphysics and ethics” as well as a “look at the world through philosophy.” For international listeners, the show is serialized in podcast form, available every Saturday through iTunes or the show’s Web site.

Few stations broadcast philosophy online. Of the handful of note-worthy philosophy podcasts out there, Philosopher’s Zone produces the best show, especially in terms of content and sound quality. Saunders seems to have a wide network of contacts in the field, and the show attracts high caliber guests from universities around the world. Each week, Saunders interviews a guest or two on a specific

topic. Each show runs about twenty-five minutes, without any commercial interruptions. This format makes for easy listening.

October’s first show, titled “Music and the Enlightenment,” asked the question: “How did the Enlightenment thinkers reflect on music and how does their belief in progress relate to our views of art today?” The discussion ranged from how Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s music (yes, he was also a composer) influenced his philosophy to how the

standards of art have evolved (or devolved) over time. Saunders introduced the show by recalling a conversation he had some years ago with Columbia Professor Emeritus Arthur C. Danto. Danto had discussed the artistic implications of Andy Warhol’s famous 1960s Brillo cartons, positing that something unempirical (unobservable) makes art art. Saunders’ main interviewee, Professor Jonathan Le Cocq of the University of Canterbury (New Zealand) made the most interesting argument of the podcast. He proposed that art has two features: technique and concept. Today’s art has moved toward concept and has abandoned technique. He implied that deficient technical skills explain why most of contemporary art cannot be called “great.”

Like the content, the show has great style. For example, the producers interlaced the conversation in the above episode with musical excerpts—an entertaining touch. More generally, each show runs like a philosophical conversation and Saunders pays considerable attention to his audience.

When interviewees use philosophical jargon he takes a few seconds to define or identify possibly unfamiliar terms. His clarity and enthusiasm make the show at its worst enjoyable and at its best enlightening.

For Saunders, irrelevant philosophy is sacrilege. The show always balances its time between the history of philosophical ideas and the application of these ideas today. In other words: don’t talk about Plato if you can’t apply Plato’s ideas—you’d

Philosophical Hi-TechPhilosopher’s Zone

For Saunders, irrelevant philosophy is sacrilege. The show always balances its time between the history of philosophical ideas and the application of these ideas today.

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Theater and PhilosophyEnglish (Comp Lit)G6300 Brent H EdwardsW 2:10 - 4:00

Aesthetics Under Siege Frankfurt SchoolGerman (Comp Lit)W4207 Andreas HuyssenTR 2:40 - 3:55

Montaigne, Descartes, PascalFrench and Roman PhilologyW3517 Pierre ForceTR 1:10 - 2:25

Nietzsche (in English)Germanic LanguagesG4650 Harro MuellerW 4:10 - 6:00

Plato’s TheaetetusClassicsG8205 Wolfgang MannF 11:00 - 12:50

Philosophy and History of Evolutionary BiologyHistory and Philosophy of ScienceW3201 Walter BockMWF 11:00 - 11:50

History and Philosophy of Religion: Hegel and KierkegaardReligionG9710 Mark C TaylorT 2:10 - 4:00

Majors and concentrators should check with department DUS Philip Kitcher to see if one of the following might count towards their degree.

Branching OutPhilosophy-related courses outside of the Department.

be talking into a vacuum. To achieve relevancy, guests on the show come from diverse

disciplines such as law, medicine and literature. Sometimes they are not philosophers per se but the ideas they interact with are certainly philosophical.

Saunders achieves a good breadth in subject matter by exploring the lesser-known worlds of Chinese and Islamic philosophy. Some of the show’s most intriguing episodes have focused on non-Western material. Such episodes recognize that many listeners have only had exposure to Western culture and have had little opportunity to consider Eastern thought.

Each week, Saunders leaves me thinking about what I’ve heard and wanting more. He’s been doing so for quite some time now.

Philosopher’s Zone can be found at: http://www.abc.net.au/rn/philosopherszone/ and through the iTunes Store.

—Bart Piela


his past July, I found myself wondering, “Is George W. Bush really Batman?”Novelist Andrew Klavan first made this weird comparison in his Wall Street

Journal editorial after the highly successful debut of The Dark Knight. He was convinced that the film celebrated the “extraordinary fortitude and moral courage” shown by George W. Bush and his administration. Klavan’s basic argument was this: just as Batman realizes that he must violate his own values in order to ultimately preserve them, Bush knows that in the transcendent struggle against terrorism, traditional norms and laws must courageously be left behind.

His article left me unconvinced, but it did get me thinking: how many of us actually look at politicians in a “superheroic” light? Evidence from

the past few decades suggests that this perception of our elected officials is not uncommon. Witness the election of Hollywood movie star Ronald Reagan, who had famously played the hero in multiple Westerns, or Jesse “The Body” Ventura, the wrestler-turned-governor of Minnesota. And in the most populous state, the Terminator was elected governor by a landslide.

The perception of politicians as superheroes is more common than we’d like to think. But why?

Perhaps the rhetoric of our politicians has something to do with it. Politicians are obliged to

promise their constituents just about everything. With high-flying language, they often offer a utopian future in which they will provide free health care, create jobs, cut taxes, and balance the budget all at the same time. They pledge to eradicate poverty, drugs, and obesity. They even commit to fight greedy corporations and irrational foreign enemies.

Even if some of these goals are laudable, the gulf between these ambitious plans and the actual power of elected officials is repeatedly ignored. Government officials are not simple, good superheroes who can fight simple, bad villains and use their superpowers to save the world from

both natural calamities and morally straight-forward crimes. They are limited in their time, energy, and judgment just like everybody else. Furthermore, politicians cannot act as heroic individuals in the way superheroes can; even to pass basic legislation, they have no choice but to work closely with other officials with

different agendas.Does the occasional cooperation of many

elected officials at least allow us to see the government as a whole as a kind of super superhero? While the actions of superheroes always lead to the ultimate restoration of order and the opportunity for prosperity in society, this hardly seems to be a general truth about government. From various interferences in the market economy to the failed war on drugs to misguided foreign adventures, it seems unrealistic that governmental structures could ever bring ultimate order and prosperity.

Supersuits

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The Myth of the SuperheroicPolitician

In the most populous state, the Terminator was elected governor by a landslide.

Illustrations by Meredith Perry

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The world is complicated and ever-changing, and problems will arise—even if you have enough power to make the Justice League of America envious.

If you still believe that your favorite politicians are superheroes, consider this. The character of the superhero is usually depicted as having spot-on judgment. And even if he is a bit egoistic or flawed, he is never guided by petty ends or wrong motives. How do we usually come to know all this? With fictional characters, creative elements like thought bubbles and soliloquies provide a unique insight into their judgments and motives. On the other hand, we have no way of discerning the real

motives of government officials or knowing the information that influenced their decisions. In the unlikely case that any of their behavior is indeed super, we would never know.

Comparing politicians to superheroes is not only wrong but dangerously misleading. The problems they face can’t be seen through the lens of good and evil. The solutions they seek must come through subtlety, not stubbornness and force. As much as we may dislike it, we live in a world where strength and advanced gadgetry just don’t do the trick.

—Masood Manoochehri


od is in the miracle business! Whatever you need from God, it’s yours for the asking! The

testimonies are pouring in! You could be next! Call now!”

Televangelists like Don Stewart and Peter Popoff—both of whom earn millions of dollars a year in “obedience offerings”—turn a profit

from the downside of faith: gullibility. Peddling everything from miracle manna to Dead Sea salt, these self-described anointed vessels of Christ guarantee that their followers will experience miracles if they follow instructions they receive in the mail. Instructions range from drinking spring water to performing rituals

Prophets for a ProfitCatherine Carberry

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Blurring the Line between Faith and Gullibility

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with blessed oil and cloths, and they all emphasize that miracles come at a price. What leads people to give thousands of dollars to such frauds, and why do so many seem willing to attribute all good fortune to the miracle work of a man with a megaphone? Televangelists exploit the socially-bred belief that a monetary exchange guarantees certain services, and profit especially from the doubt-filled and the desperate. But their real genius lies in profiting from the tenuous boundary between faith and gullibility.

The religion promoted by televangelists is, in fact, a business—a holy contract that requires a down payment. While prayer cloths and blessed stones are free, the Reverend Don Stewart requests “vows of tithe,” explaining that such payments represent “a sacred promise to give God a special offering in advance, based on what we believe God will give us in the future.” To most Christians, such a request would seem absurd. Paying for miracles contradicts the Christian notion of a spiritual rather than physical covenant, and furthermore, these tithes are checks payable to late-night infomercial prophets with dubious credentials and low-budget programs. Most people instantly react to these programs with an almost visceral disgust at the theatrics of a monumental swindle, yet crooks have profited from similar tactics for centuries, exploiting the blurry intersection of faith and gullibility by cloaking fraud in religious terminology.

any religious people have faith that God is omnipresent and has the

power to intervene in our lives and

perform miracles. How can these views lead to hundreds of dollars spent on trinkets and prayer cards? Faith is multifaceted and complex— it melds experiences and reason with awe and passion. Faith can imbue daily life with a sense of the divine, letting emotion and gut feeling underlie all knowing, and bolstering beliefs that would otherwise crumble due to empirical evidence to the contrary. Popoff and Stewart rely on nudging faith and its loose requirements for belief towards gullibility.

The faith that Popoff and Stewart advocate seems a far cry from that encouraged in the New Testament. Faith as reckoned by these televangelists seems not to be the basis for serious, well-grounded belief, but rather a series of superstitious actions and payment—carefully

filtered through “apostles” Popoff and Stewart—in exchange for God’s services. But what exactly accounts for the difference? Stewart subverts biblical language to cast himself into Jesus’ position, capable of channeling God’s word and mediating divine orders to the masses: “Don Stewart believes that you can get direction from God through [Don’s] prophetic gift. Don wants to send you a word from God ... a vision of what God wants you to do.” But so do many legitimized priests and pastors. The televangelists use belief to raise money through mediation of prayer and the sale of trinkets—but the Catholic Church has done this for centuries. The difference between faith we have and gullibility we see may be a matter of perspective.

Popoff and Stewart rely on nudging faith and its loose requirements for belief

towards gullibility.

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Popoff and Stewart rely on unquestioning faith in religious leaders because once they establish themselves as trustworthy God-sent preachers, they too are infallible. Catholics have faith in the infallibility of religious leaders—the Pope is preserved from error, and the Holy Spirit works within the Church to ensure that the Pope’s decrees are followed. Cunning crooks subvert this culture of awe, presenting themselves as clergy and prophets and instantly gaining the trust of people who are accustomed to believing that God speaks through their religious leaders. While the reasoning employed by televangelists may be thin, they need only a tenuous connection to traditional religious values from which to work. After establishing their divinely granted authority, televangelists impress their viewers with wild theatrics—canes hurled in the air while their owners

do cartwheels, and ecstatic audience members recounting tales of receiving anonymous checks for thousands of dollars. Popoff and Stewart have found that by cloaking the appeal of a “get-rich-quick” scheme with religious terminology, millions can be made and culpability eschewed—if the miracle manna isn’t working, you clearly aren’t praying—or paying—enough!

f course, religious faith is not the only reason people buy into these kinds of

frauds. The jubilant testimonies given on the televangelists’ programs come from people in desperate—verging on hyperbolic—financial and medical situations. A kind of Pascal’s Wager takes effect, and the actions of viewers often reveal a last resort, “well, it can’t hurt” approach. On top of this, most people believe that

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Illustrations by Mara Kravitz

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they’ll get what they pay for. We are accustomed to monetary exchange for the things we want, to the extent that getting something for free almost seems like a cop-out. Christians believe that God loves his people unconditionally, and in his Letter to the Romans, Paul emphasizes that if God gave his son to mankind, then surely all of his other gifts are free to those who have faith. This, to many, is too good to be true. In a culture of consumerism and infomercials, is it so unreasonable, then, to expect that God might want some compensation for curing our cancer or paying our

bills? When a late night prophet tells us that God requires an “obedience offering,” how are we to know that he’s a crook?

Desperation and expectations for economic exchanges explain the success of many swindles, but it’s the exploitation of religious faith that allows televangalists to give their businesses a legitimacy and potency that other sideshow acts could never achieve. But while many see the gullibility in writing a check to Popoff or Stewart, can they be sure that their own faith doesn’t leave them open to a similar fate? n


The Undead

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ince the very beginning, science has been nothing if not error-prone. According

to Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, anomalies within a scientific theory (or other knowledge-construction) are a crucial irritation in motivating bold innovators as they probe the limits of their historically situated conceptual space for a more elegant paradigm to shift towards. We learn from our compounded mistakes the same way that we would bleed to death from paper cuts; when our theories have too many cuts to explain away, some of us attempt a different concept. However, these epistemic carcasses do not evaporate into some conceptual ether, but continue to haunt the social order long after they have been scientifically discredited. Correct or not, sciences do not exist as unified paradigms that we can simply escape or shift away from, but rather operate within ideological-historical constructions that are built to endure. Only by attending to these pseudosciences may we glean lessons for our own haphazard shuffles in pursuit of an understanding of the

world, and perhaps begin questioning our society’s own unrevealed pseudosciences, lurking beneath the veneer of neutrality.

We have, to some degree, learned to be wary of agglomerated power where a search for truth is concerned. Religious orthodoxy has variously consisted of theologies of a geocentric universe, a 6,000-10,000 year-old universe, the “naturalness” of exclusively reproductive, heterosexual sex and the creation of humans without the aid of natuaral selection. Political ideology doesn’t fair much

better; we can tally the equally fanciful tales of “Soviet biology,” which attempted massively complex genetic engineering projects using scientific elbow grease and a double-dose of wishful thinking, oriented against the so-called “bourgeois” theories of Gregor Mendel and his successors. These grand schemes of

Edmund Zagorin

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Correct or not, sciences do not exist as unified paradigms that we can simply escape or shift away from, but rather operate within ideological-historical constructions that are built to endure.

Burying the Disconfirmed and Unsubstantiated

University of Michigan


social ordering have used science as a “neutral structure” to objectively substantiate their guiding principles, while the scientists themselves are left compounding errors into amusingly inaccurate constructions of reality.

While such edifices of power may not always be as obvious as a crucifix or portrait of Stalin on every wall, non-empirical motivations are in play at many levels in scientific research. And while it does not follow from such an observation that “nothing is true,” it does follow that most knowledge-claims are situated in some way relative to the social orders in which they are made.

e might focus on the well-known example of phrenology to investigate

further. Phrenology sought to determine the inner structure or persona of an individual through an elaborate (and entirely arbitrary) scrutiny of the bumps on that individual’s head. Certain bumps of certain sizes in certain places were thought to correspond with certain faculties that represented the individual’s supposed biological proclivity towards certain actions or dispositions; kindness or anger, honesty or deception, work ethic or criminality and so on. These identifications became so trusted that

in the nineteenth century they were sanctioned as evidence in court, relied upon by jurists to determine the guilt (or perhaps merely the propensity for wrongdoing) of defendants.

Eventually, in the early twentieth century, empirical observation began to disconfirm many of the findings of earlier phrenologists. As a result, phrenology began to lose a great deal of its credibility and has since become somewhat infamous in

the annals of collective misstep as a misappropriation of the scientific method. However, phrenology continued to be used in social administration and was an assumed element in many of the racist practices used by colonial administrators and the newly ascendant fascist regimes of the 1930s. This social history does not seem to correspond well with our Kuhnian paradigm-shift. Shouldn’t enlightened society, with its emphasis on empirical justification, simply have been able to move on? What were we not able to unlearn from the phrenologists?

Phrenology as a scientific project fit well with numerous brands of various social science theories that sought to create an objective basis for the sort of social ordering (through colonialism, and so on) in which many elites had a large stake. We can thus see phrenology as not a single entity, but a confluence of overlapping observations and ideologies that are not encapsulated within a paradigm that can be described in unified terms. One of the great proponents of this theory in the twentieth century, the

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As long as this purpose of phrenology was deemed legitimate, the actual mechanics or technique were always secondary, collecting data that was, in a sense, already interpreted within a hierarchical schema which itself had no prior rational or empirical basis.

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Belgian professor Paul Bouts, used phrenology to substantiate his theory of a “perfecting evolution,” wherein the skulls of prehistoric humans were used to signify savagery, evolving into the more refined skulls of modern, “civilized” individuals. Here we can

explain with greater force why the principles of phrenology survived the empirical refutation of the scientific community, and indeed why phrenology continued to be widely and seriously practiced for a good portion of the twentieth century.


Phrenology was about the biological predisposition that could be used to identify the relative superiority of individuals as well as the superiority within and between other groups comprised of different head-bump patterns. As long as this purpose of phrenology was deemed legitimate, the actual mechanics or technique were always secondary, collecting data that was, in a sense, already interpreted within a hierarchical schema which itself had no prior rational or

empirical basis. Phrenology continued in the early twentieth century not as the fascination of urban intellectuals that it had once been, since many already considered it anachronistic by empirical standards, but maintained its sway with managerial elites in the peripheral zones of colonial administration. Apparently, losing its empirical chops did not diminish the purpose that phrenology was decidedly put to: providing an objective and scientific veneer to the nasty business of colonialism.

he society-structuring project of rational homogeneity, in which phrenology was but a

minor component, is largely based on an understanding of a biological and social ideal (organism, society, society-as-organism) that persisted long after the popular demise of phrenology. This historical theme continues to feature in various justifications for

racist policies of discrimination and extermination. Many proponents of these campaigns and promulgators of the intellectually bankrupt notions of the “survival of the fittest” (as if fitness could remain static through changing environments) spread their approach to different domains of academia, creating cycles of positive feedback which support one another and reformulate the superstructure within different disciplinary contexts. In such a fluid formation, the paradigm

eludes the Kuhnian shift by migrating between disciplines and replicating new sub- and super- theories. Each of these contain the biological progress towards ultimate fitness within an

arc of social, psychological, chemical and physical progress towards parallel ideals.

We are prevented from the moment of realization, the moment of shift, over and over again not, as Kuhn suggested, by inelegant modifications that accommodate anomalies within the existing parameters, but by a changing set of contexts that make the prevailing paradigm appear newly vibrant against the backdrop of some monumental struggle in which science is called to play a part. Such was the case for the original heliocentric heresies against the Church; the clery believed that the scientists were wrong not on their facts but because they were weapons for the forces of the Devil. So too with the Soviet biologists practicing outside of established genetics, not because of any complications with that paradigm on its facts but because the coordinates of that methodology

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Modern pseudoscience is not lurking in a dark corner waiting to be disproved by some dashing young genius coming to the rescue in a billowing white lab coat.

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were seen to be too capitalistic. The history of pseudoscience is not a history of paradigm-shift, but of the same ideological coordinates coalescing around different practices.

Modern pseudoscience is not lurking in a dark corner waiting to be disproved by some dashing young genius coming to the rescue in a billowing white lab coat, but rather is contained within our understanding of modern scientific practice, which falsely juxtaposes ideology against idealized neutrality. The prevalence and dominance of scientific ideas is

not an organized structure of ideas according to a “survival of the fittest” principle. It is merely an aggregation of those ideas that, for what ever reason, survived. Luckily for us, many of those enduring ideas that are empirically verifiable have been subjected to impeccable scrutiny and testing. Unluckily for us, many other ideas, which frame the direction and context of scientific inquiry, are simply presented as givens, driven by the shadows of a history we too often fail to remember until it has already repeated itself. n


Symphony Philosophique

Yurina Ko

wish I could start this article by playing four musical notes in 2/4 time, C minor, tempo in

Allegro con brio: G, G, G, E-flat. A simple sequence of two notes has the power to communicate as many complex emotions as a thousand-page book. People all over the world can listen and learn from the emotions expressed through music, despite differences in interpretation. No single language expresses everything, nor is it used by everyone. Music is subject to similar limits. It provides us with a distinctive dimension in communication, one that breaks from conventional languages so as to vastly expand the possibilities of our interactions.

I

Talking Music

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will never get to experience writing an essay using music. Why? Take my four musical

notes, G, G, G, E-flat. Non-musicians are not going to have any idea what I’m trying to convey or what I’m referring to. I wouldn’t be positive that my readers would be able to interpret my idea, whatever it might be, in order for real communication to happen.

But if we are concerned with the objectivity and universality of our thoughts, we should consider music as a supplement to and counterpart of conventional language. Conventional language has its limitations. As a tool for human beings to communicate with each other, language functions like a machine where you input real

emotions and end up with subjective substitutes for them. A spoken sentence describing how you feel means nothing to people of different nations and cultures, creating a sometimes lonely and confusing world.

anguages form invisible barriers between people from different societies. They even

form barriers within a person. For example, if you don’t know a word for an object, it is almost as though the object does not exist for you. In that case, how can you communicate when you have to use a concept that cannot be translated fluidly, or an object that has no name in another conventional language? Conventional language has these inevitable limits. There are only

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so many words and combinations of them to fully convey what we mean.

Music remedies some of these shortcomings. Anyone who can hear can absorb the melodies, so that the music has a chance at overcoming social barriers. Music has a wider range of expressive possibilities. There are twenty-four different keys, or major and minor chords, that music can use to express very distinct emotions. For example, Johann Sebastian Bach wrote six cello suites, each in a different key (G major, D minor, C major, E-flat major, C

minor, and D major). The suites, consisting of six pieces representing six different dances, exhibit different stages in a person’s emotional life: felicity, yearning, triumph, skepticism,

despair, and contentment. Not everyone may understand or agree upon the full meaning of these suites, but elements like changing tempo and contrasts of harmony and dissonance convey different emotions.

Music also has its alphabets, grammar, idioms, and almost everything else that comes with a conventional language. In fact, the pitch range used in classical music covers a substantially broader range than the human voice normally covers during casual conversations, lectures, even passionate political speeches. The normal voice range is about 500 Hz to 2,000 Hz. Most instruments cover from 60 Hz to 2,000 Hz, and the really high-pitched instruments like the violin, flute and piccolo can go up to 4,000 Hz. This pitch range offers more possibilities for composing melodies, exploring the depths of the deepest sounds, and exposing the kinds of emotions that people could feel in their hearts but unable to express with their voices.

ot all writers are as eloquent as William Shakespeare and not all political theorists can

convey their ideas like John Stuart Mill. Although educated people have the ability to write and speak at an average level, only the top few stand out in their fields. Similarly, only a limited number of talented individuals can use music as a comprehensive language, speak it fluently and speak it for many to hear. As readers analyze and criticize the works of the great authors, anyone outside of the music virtuosi crowd can act as an interpreter. There are only a restricted number of music-communicators, given the scarcity of musical education compared to language education in

Communication through music may be difficult to achieve, but it offers a different avenue for imparting ideas than any conventional language.

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the world. Some may wonder whether or not music can still be an effective supplement to language if the majority of users can only listen to it.

In the words of Socrates, a citizen who receives musical education can approve “all that is lovely… welcome it home with joy into his soul and, nourished thereby, grow into a man of noble spirit.” Regardless of the person’s ability to communicate by making music, the people receiving the music have the advantage of enjoying the act of listening, interpreting the ideas, relating them to their own thoughts and events in their lives, and finally applying their interpretations of music to their actions. This type of communication may be difficult to achieve, but it offers a different avenue for imparting ideas than any conventional language. Listeners not only receive the musicians’ melodies, but also exhibit their identities, thoughts, and maybe even actions. Musicians communicate past the bounds of conventional languages because they can play the same music with and for anyone, regardless of the other languages they might share.

I made it to the end of this article, and was able discuss the strengths and weaknesses of music as a language using only English to express my thoughts. But I still feel a barrier preventing me from fully communicating my ideas to you, the reader. Perhaps the only way to solve this problem would be to listen to some music together, and see whether we both react with tears to the last scene of Verdi’s opera, La Traviata, or feel our heartbeats accelerating as Bolero marches to its climax. n


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Khadeeja Safdar

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he sleek and chic contours of cosmos-inspired dresses graced the models in the New York Winter 2009

Fashion Week. A perfectly tied bow defined the slinky smooth texture of the dresses, endowing them with an element of ingenuous surprise. Marc Jacobs, Michael Kors, and Vera Wang all seemed to have received invites to a luxury flapper-themed party. This winter, every girl should have an ultramodern metallic pea coat to fight the cold in ultimate style, and a strawberry ice-colored plastic headband to push back those tousled locks in the chilly airstream. In the spirit of Fashion Week, the modish pea coat and pretty-in-pink headband would be lovely to own, if only any of this was true.

Most people take style and fashion to mean the same thing. The implications of this distinction warrant more attention. The fashion industry diminishes individuality by marketing exclusive trends as if they suited everyone. By bombarding people with rhetoric about newness and beauty, the industry fools consumers into forgoing cost-effectiveness and functionality. With the simple label of “in” or “out,” fashion groups each of our complex identities into one of two categories.

Our consumption habits reflect the pervasion of fashion and its significant role in how people view themselves. Perhaps we try to keep up with trends and buy brand names to tap into a human

aesthetic imperative. Sometimes, fashion influences us because of the pleasure that comes from wearing items deemed beautiful. From this pleasure, we have come to believe that articles of clothing can enhance our own beauty. Through fashion, consumerism allows us to choose

our identities instead of accepting otherwise established social images. This control of perception through fashion has many meaningful outlets. Organizations like Dress for Success recognize this power when they provide professional attire to disadvantaged women for career interviews.

But more often, fashion rules us. Whether you spent Thanksgiving weekend in Henri Bendel or wear the same jeans and t-shirts your mother bought for you in high school, your appearance weighs heavily on how everyone perceives you.

he complexity of your identity is subject to the changing seasons of fashion. This

industry relies on one staple: the new. Oscar Wilde’s observation, “Fashion is a form of ugliness so intolerable that we have to alter it every six months,” holds true. While we may not see harm in molding an identity

The complexity of your identity is subject to the

changing seasons of fashion.

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Reporting from the Belly of the Beast


based on aesthetic whims and changing consumer phenomenon, the pervasion of fashion does not end there.

It is often without any rational aesthetic justification that the winner of Project Runway is chosen. One quick look at the non-functional and unattractive nature of some of the creations that designers regard as genius confirms the manner in which the fashion industry promotes distrust of personal taste and style. Replications of designer creations appear in stores. Consumers spot the big names on the label and spend their money. In this way, unattractive fashion fads spread to average people.

The cutting-edge trends are not as befitting to the general public as the term “trend” implies. In 1966, seventeen-year-old ninety-pound British model Leslie Hornby, a.k.a. Twiggy, created the rage for the waif-like figure, making the ideal body type exclusive to a small segment

of women. Clothing, like shape, takes on a sense of exclusivity when following the dictates of fashion. For example, in the 1970s hot pants were “in” fashion. Ironically, they gained more popularity during the winter months, perhaps for the sake of showing leg in the cold. After all, the idea of freezing in the winter just radiates originality. Many clothing fashions do not make sense in retrospect. Maybe they never made sense in the first place.

The larger problem is that “in” items are marketed as ideal for a very diverse consumer population. However, fashion is not universally suitable, contrary to the must-have rhetoric that spews out of magazines and blogs. Giving certain types of clothes preference as the months

Ironically, hot pants gained more popularity during the winter months, perhaps for the sake of showing leg in the cold. After all, the idea of freezing in the winter just radiates originality.

Illustrations by Channa Bao

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change is, in some sense, a seasonally changing prejudice. In another sense, it is a ruse. Those that venture to follow the look that matches their own style risk being out of fashion.

eep in mind that fashion is not equivalent to personal style. A man in bellbottoms

and a Hawaiian shirt dresses out of fashion but according to his personal style. To confuse personal style with fashionableness is to fall for the ruse that “in” clothes are aesthetically superior to the out. It simply does not make sense that skinny jeans are supposed to look good in 2006, but not in 2007, when Marc Jacobs says so. If something looks good, a year shouldn’t change that.

Consider, as well, the expense of catering to the changing seasons and wearing the “in” clothing. Choosing to follow fashion risks individual pride, even if a designer label might offer smug contentment as it grazes the back of your neck. The choice to follow the fashion industry becomes dismal when designers themselves criticize those that fall victim to their hoax. Oscar de la Renta allegedly coined the term “fashion victim” and, according to Giorgio Armani, “When a woman alters her look too much from season to season, she becomes a fashion victim.”

Choosing clothes based on function and individual preference without the influence of fashion allows for an individually-created sense of self. This is style. By buying clothes without checking the label or watching models in runway shows, you risk not knowing what everyone else is doing, but this ignorance will make it easier to wear clothing that reflects your identity, instead of the fluctuations of fashion.

Designers dupe us into spending money on changing fashion. But like my runway show, a justifiable division of clothing into “in” and “out” does not exist. A metallic slinky dress with a large bow in the front would be a rather awkward piece of clothing anyway. n

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Philosophy of _______Jeff Helzner on Using Philosophy

hile contemplating the pursuit of a double major, I noticed the prevalence of philosophy majors who were in

fact double majors and major-concentrators. The appreciation of multidisciplinary study is mirrored in the department itself. Consider the breadth of topics covered in the course offerings this year. For example, the “philosophy of ” courses: Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Psychology, and Philosophy of Mathematics. The Columbia Philosophy Department has both traditional

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philosophers and academics who have combined study in philosophy with study in other fields. In exploring many of the questions of philosophy you can begin to see where philosophy intersects with empirical disciplines, including mathematics and physics, and with those disciplines that concern the questions of ancient and moral philosophy, such as political science and religion.

Professor Jeff Helzner’s interests place him in circles of philosophy, mathematics, and economics. This semester, Professor Helzner is teaching Epistemology and Mathematical Logic, and in the past semesters he has taught the Economics and Philosophy Seminar and Symbolic Logic. If you thought Principles of Economics was hard, or decided to study philosophy out of a fear of mathematics, think again.

Q. On your website, you emphasize rational choice and decision making as your area of specialization. These concepts are also economic, why did you decide to focus on philosophy or philosophy of economics rather than economics itself ?

A. Rationality is a traditional topic of interest for philosophers. Of course, it is also a central topic in economics. Herb Simon put it well in The Sciences of the Artificial: “Because scarcity is a central fact of life—land, money, fuel, time, attention, and many other things are scarce—it is a task of rationality to allocate scarce things. Performing that task is the focal concern of economics.” One can also consider rationality in the context of theoretical decision making, e.g. choosing among rival scientific hypotheses. These are the sorts of questions that interest me, and I regard them as central to certain areas of philosophy (e.g. philosophy of science and epistemology).

My earlier interests in mathematics provides another explanation of why I decided to pursue these areas through philosophy rather

than economics. I started graduate school with a focus on logic and the philosophy of mathematics. Eventually I convinced myself that philosophical work in these areas places too much emphasis on language, at least for my tastes. Roughly around that same period I started learning about the work of C.S. Peirce and other classical pragmatists. This was complemented by a study of contemporary work on the foundations of decision theory. It was in these topics that I found the agent-centered perspective that I sought. Since that time I have been focused on a variety of topics concerning the study of rationality.

Q. Would you elaborate on your specializations, and what these areas include?

A. Most of my current research interests concern methodology. Questions about explanation, decision making, uncertainty, utility, and measurement more generally are of central importance in certain branches of the philosophy of science and epistemology. Here are a few of my current projects:

[Normative revisions] There are systematic violations of expected utility theory that have served as a point of departure for much of the work in behavioral decision theory and related applications of psychology to economics. According the standard interpretation, these violations offer a substantial refutation of the “rational man” hypothesis in economics. Horacio Arlo-Costa (Carnegie Mellon) and I have been investigating the extent to which certain normative alternatives to expected utility theory can be used to explain these systematic violations that have been observed by behavioral decision theorists. Most recently our efforts in this direction have focused on the explanatory power of indeterminate probabilities as an alternative to the psychological effects paradigm that continues to occupy a dominant position in the formulation of


descriptive models of decision making. [Ordering assumptions in descriptive theories of decision making] One important critique of the standard formulation of expected utility theory has focused on that theory’s demand for determinate probabilities. These arguments have led Isaac Levi and others to reevaluate the fundamental ordering assumptions of rational choice, e.g. that choice is reducible to a complete preference relation on the set of alternatives. While Levi’s critique has focused on the normative side of decision theory, my own work in this area has focused on extending this line of attack to psychological models of decision making. [Rational choice as a substitute for logic in the foundations of analytic philosophy] Logic has long played a central role within some schools of analytic philosophy. As suggested above, I have some doubts about the emphasis on language that seems to emerge from this picture. For the past couple of years I have wondered what it would mean if concepts from rational choice, rather than logic, could be used to supply a normative benchmark for philosophical analysis.

Q. How do the fields of philosophy and economics interact and inform one another? Do the two overlap?

A. There are many ways in which these fields interact beyond what I described in response to Question 1. For example, there is the philosophy of economics, which, like the philosophy of physics or the philosophy of

mathematics, is concerned with philosophical issues that are raised by a particular field. Another example is provided by the traditional connections between economics and social/political philosophy. One can imagine an economic perspective on any question that concerns values.

Q. In your Epistemology class, many of your examples are mathematic/logic in form. What is the relationship between philosophy and math? How can each discipline inform each other?

A. Mathematics is a traditional source of inspiration for philosophers. Many of the most important philosophers were trained as mathematicians, e.g. Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Russell, Frege, and Peirce, just to name a few. As a subject, mathematics is of great philosophical interest. What are numbers? What is a proof? The methods of the mathematician are also an inspiration to some philosophers who seek a comparable level of precision within philosophy. Finally, there are highly developed branches of mathematics that grew out of philosophical inquiry, e.g. various branches of mathematical logic.

Q. What part does logic play in a theory of knowledge?

A. If one thinks of a logic as system of prescriptions, e.g. as what Ramsey called a “logic of consistency,” then there is an obvious role for logic

Illustrations by Aryeh Hillman and Michael Roberto

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in such a theory: the prescriptions are meant to secure epistemic health.

Q. Given that much of philosophy is tied to other fields of study, such as philosophy of economics, political philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, to what extent is philosophy’s value in its ability to inform other disciplines?

A. Philosophy depends on other fields for nourishment, for ideas that deserve careful analysis. I am not sure how much informing of other disciplines really takes place, at least if you are talking about changing practice in these disciplines. There is plenty of work in areas like the

foundations of statistics and the foundations of mathematics that has not had much of an influence on working statisticians or working mathematicians. This is not necessarily an indication of the value of such work.

Q. Where would you like to see philosophical discourse go?

A. I do think that it is important for philosophy to maintain significant contact with other fields. I think that this is something we do very well at Columbia.

—Brittany Allison


Discriminating Open MindednessA Colloquium Review

ow many Kantians does it take to change a light bulb?” Thus, Professor Nomy Arpaly began her lecture—without looking up

from inside her coffee cup.Professor Arpaly of Brown University

is a moral psychologist, action theorist, ethicist, and metaethicist, with particular interest in free will. She most recently published a book entitled Merit, Meaning and Human Bondage. Arpaly is quite a character and a very convincing lecturer. At the Columbia Philosophy Department colloquium on October 9th she spoke about open-mindedness as a moral virtue—as opposed to a character trait that some have and some don’t.

It’s easy to dismiss Kantians as too dull-witted to be able to change a light bulb, because we all like to think that our beliefs

are the right ones. Arpaly claims that the ordinary conception of open-mindedness challenges exactly this outlook: it is the acceptance of even the most ridiculous beliefs. In other words, she claims, it is the absence of strong opinions. So far open-mindedness isn’t too interesting, nor is it moral: Is there another sense of open-mindedness that is a moral virtue?

Open-mindedness involves beliefs. If we posit open-mindedness as moral, we must first establish that morality can in fact affect belief development. Arpaly

takes for granted that the latter is not voluntary: we do not will ourselves to have certain beliefs. Hence, if morality is only concerned with what we may or may not will, how can open-mindedness be moral?

Even though belief development is a cognitive process, and morality (our moral concerns and what they impel us to do) is not, the latter can still affect the former. If, say, I have an exceptional fondness for owls, I will more easily remember fifty species of owls for an exam. I will notice more owl-related things (Did you notice there’s an owl in knowledge?). My concern (concern for owls as opposed to moral or emotional concern) affects my mental state: I remember and notice more because I care more about owls. Similarly, when the moral or emotional stakes of holding a certain belief are high, one is more cautious in developing that belief. Concern affects the cognitive process of belief development. An example: a group of friends sits around a table of sushi for the first time. Someone asks, “What is this green stuff?” Her friend responds: “Avocado!” Fond of avocado, she pops it into her unexpectant mouth and, needless to say, no longer trusts her friend the incautious believer. Would her friend have been more cautious in coming to believe

that the green stuff was avocado had the wasabi been on her plate instead of her friend’s? Perhaps she would have at least smelled it: when the stakes are high, belief development is more attentive.

A final example brings us to a definition of open-mindedness. When a recently divorced woman phones her mother to tell her the news, she is surprised to discover that her mother is upset. But, what really concerns her mother is not the daughter’s supposed selfishness, but that she spent the last thirty years in her own terrible marriage. In other words, the mother suffers cognitive dissonance, for she is confronted with the prospect of entertaining two contradictory beliefs: that she was justified in persevering through her terrible marriage, but that

Open-mindedness is the ability to live with cognitive dissonance and receive counterevidence to one’s own beliefs thoughtfully.

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her daughter is justified in divorcing. Her mother, Arpaly concludes, is closed-minded. Open-mindedness, on this analysis, is the ability to live with cognitive dissonance and receive counterevidence to one’s own beliefs thoughtfully. The moral person—the open-minded person—does not immediately reject ideas that undermine her own beliefs—even if she has emotional stakes in them.

Professor Arpaly offered a philosophically refreshing analysis of a common (and commonly misused) concept. Ultimately, her analysis of open-mindedness is not unprecedented: you can find a similar account of it in Mill, and I would argue that her analysis is much nearer to the common conception than she claims. While most basic accounts include the absence of strong opinion, the consideration of clashing opinions also plays a role, even if not commonly called

the acceptance of cognitive dissonance. Her analysis of cognitive dissonance and her incisive examples were the strongest features of her lecture.

I was surprised that the politically savvy Arpaly didn’t mention the pre-election state of affairs. Open-mindedness in its most unexamined conception—respecting even the most dull-witted of beliefs—is, in hockey-mom politics, valued over her more considered sense. Some beliefs are just plain better than others, and if you encounter one, you should give it the thought it deserves. Open-mindedness must include thoughtful discrimination. Here’s to moral elitism.

—Shana Crandell

Visit the philsophy department website for information about future colloquia.


ind some time to read John D. Caputo’s highly accessible Philosophy and

Theology. This work, with a subject matter as evident as that of Snakes on a Plane, can be read in two ways, either as an outline of philosophy and theology’s sometimes testy relationship or as a general history of ideas. It’s an academic thrill ride—you’re really going to want to get yourself a copy.

Caputo, an eminent scholar of religion and Jacques Derrida, writes in clear and no-nonsense prose. He wishes

to prove the bold assertion that modernity was the time for a battle between philosophy and theology to break out.

Caputo has a unique historical outlook. He sees theology and philosophy united at first, then separated, then reunited. We can crudely break these up into the pre-modern era, the modern era, and the postmodern era. The pre-modern era includes thinkers like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, whose ideas Caputo delineates. He then moves on to modernism, represented by figures like René Descartes and his Enlightenment successors. Caputo identifies this long period as an era of rebellion, one in which reason was gradually freed from the tutelage of faith and progressively became more independent

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Strange Fellowsa review of Philosophy and Theology

Philosophy and Theology, John D. Caputo. Published by Abingdon Press, 2006. $13.00. Image used with permission.

F and authoritative. Recall the phrase attributed to Horace that came to be an Enlightenment motto: Sapere Aude! (Dare to know!). For Caputo this break between faith and reason was a break between theology and philosophy. After that, thinkers like G.W.F. Hegel did the dirty work left unfinished by the Enlightenment. You know, the work that led to the declaration “God is dead.”

However, in a strange reversal, two very different “subverters” of reason, the Christian Søren Kierkegaard and the rebel Friedrich Nietzsche (credited with the quote above), opened up the gates of postmodernism. These two, along with later figures such as Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Thomas Kuhn led to the demise of the view that reason is purely authoritative. This idea allowed theology to re-enter the scene. Caputo wraps the book up discussing the similarities between the postmodern and the pre-modern by looking at St. Augustine and Jacques Derrida, two Algerian thinkers with intertwined but different conceptions of prayer. Such a reflection supports his rather full-circle view of philosophical history.

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Is the work perfect? Not at all. In general, any time someone makes a cross-century connection of such range, he is bound to make some mistake in the sweeping conclusions that follow. Systematizing in such a way can be particularly problematic in philosophy, where exceptions abound in the different eras due to the diversity of traditions present at a given moment in time.

For example, I find a problem with Caputo’s interpretation of Kant’s God in relation to the history of philosophy and theology. Caputo seems to imply that God is a rather weak force for Kant, an almost unnecessary hypothesis. That point is debatable, especially as Kant does not mean to

undermine the concept of God as much as the theoretical knowledge of God. If anything, Kant opened up the doors for faith in God and ensured that if atheism was to remain, it would have to be an atheism based on suspicion as opposed to certainty. That’s just one objection worth noting.

As a whole, the book is ripe with ideas and great moments of insight. Of course, because it’s short, the book suffers from a lack of depth at times, but don’t let that faze you. Caputo writes an absolute page-turner, shedding light on the close interplay between both fields and their history of separation and reconciliation.

—Alan Daboin

2895 Broadway, New York, New York 10025Phone: 212.666.7653 Fax: 212.865.3590

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