Future Convergences: Technical Communication as Cognitive Science
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Transcript of Future Convergences: Technical Communication as Cognitive Science
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FUTURE CONVERGENCES: TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AS COGNITIVE
SCIENCE
ABSTRACTCognitive scientistAndyClark(2008)has argued, the studyofmindmight[]needtoembrace
avarietyofdifferentexplanatoryparadigms whosepointofconvergencelies intheproduction
ofintelligentbehavior (p. 95). This articleoffers uptechnical communicationresearch as just
such aparadigm. Itdescribes technical communicationresearch pastandpresenttoarguethat
ourdisciplinaryknowledgeoftools,workenvironments,andperformanceassessmentis a
necessary complementtoamorerobustscienceofthemind.
INTRODUCTION
InSupersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, cognitive scientistAndy
Clark(2008) arguedthatthe studyofmindmight[] needtoembraceavarietyofdifferent
explanatoryparadigms whosepointofconvergencelies intheproductionofintelligent
behavior (p. 95). I wouldliketotakeClarkathis wordandofferuptechnical communication
research as justsuch aparadigm. As a cognitive scientist,Clarkwants totreatexternal,
nonbiologicalelements as partofthe humanmind. AsClarkacknowledged,though, cognitive
scientists typicallytreatthe brainastheirprimaryobjectofstudy,and sotheyoftenlacka
theoreticalandresearch methodologyforunderstandingmanyofthenonbiologicalelements
thatarepartandparcelofthe humanmind.Clarkhas spentnearlytwodecades developing,
defending,andrefining his extendedmindmodel.Describingtheactofwritinginrelationto
thinking,forexample,Clarkargued, I wouldliketogofurtherand suggestthat[theindividual]
was actuallythinkingonthepaper (p.xxv). Thephysicaltaskofwritingthepencilandthe
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paperreliablyandrobustlyprovides afunctionalitywhich,wereitprovided bygoings-onin
the headalone,wewould haveno hesitationindesignatingas partofthe cognitive circuitry (p.
xxv).Movingfurtherindeveloping his modelofthemindas extended,Clarkconcluded, the
localmechanisms ofmind,ifthis is correct,arenotallinthe head (p.xxviii). Additionally,
Menary (2010) wrotethatintheextendedmindmodel some cognitiveprocessingis
constitutedbyactivefeatures oftheenvironment (p. 2),which Clarksees as comprisedof
brains, bodies, cultures,andtools. Theextendedmindmodel (Clark& Chalmers, 1998; Clark,
2003; Hurly, 2010; Logan, 2008; Menary, 2006, 2007, 2010; Ross & Ladyman, 2010; Sutton,
2010; Wheeler, 2010; Wilson, 2010) stands in starkcontrasttoavisionofhuman cognitionas
brainbound. Ratherthan seeingus as brainbound,Clark(2003) posits humans as creatures
whose minds are special precisely because they are tailored-made for multiple mergers and
coalitions (p. 7).
Clarks modelnecessarily challenges how a scienceofmindoughttolookandwhich
disciplines areallowedtoparticipateinit. I positiontechnical communicationresearch as a
necessary complementto cognitive science sothatourdisciplinemightimaginefuture,
mutually beneficialpoints ofconvergencewith cognitive science,andto seewhatthis
relationshipdoes forus and how itdraws onourmethodological strengths andtheoretical
sophistication.Clarks workconfronts the historical,theoretical,andempiricalobstacles to his
model: Technical communicationresearch provides arich understandingofthatmodelin
practicalandrhetoricalterms. Thatis,technical communicationresearch helps us ask, how can
wedescribeandexplainparticularextensions ofmind,and,mostimportantly, cultivateand
assess theseextendedminds?
After briefly summarizingthekeyelements ofClarks extendedmindmodelandthe
historyoftechnical communicationresearch from which thesepoints ofconvergenceemerge, I
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markthreepoints offuture convergencetodemonstrate how technical communication
researchers describe,explain, cultivate,andassess extendedminds. Thefirstpointof
convergenceaddresses theroleoftools intheextendedmindmodel.Clarkpersuasively
demonstrates how tools areoftenpartandparcelofthe humanmind; however, his modellacks
theparadigmatic powerto saywhythis orthattoolandnotanother. Researchers focusedon
usability (Van Ittersum, 2009; Whittemore, 2008) providetherequisiteexplanations for
particular,tool-drivenextensions ofminds. The secondpointofconvergencedeals with
environmentandtheroleitplays in scaffoldingand cultivatingextendedminds. Ifminds are
necessarilyextendedacross cultures andenvironments,thentheabilityoftechnical
communicationresearchers todocument,describe,anddiscerntheoperationandimpactof
environments (Winsor, 2001) as wellas theorizeandenactinstitutional change (Porteretal.,
2001) withinthoseenvironments is crucial.
Thethirdandfinalpointofconvergence centers onthethornyquestionofperformance
assessment. Oneofthe common concerns raisedinresponsetoClarks modelis thatof
evaluationorattributions ofresponsibility. Becausethe humanmindand, byextension,
humanmotivationand behaviorareextendedacross, bodies, brains, cultures,environments,
andtools,theargumentgoes,itwill becomedifficulttoassess or holdindividualpersons
accountablefortheiractions. Researchers exploringalternativemethods of
workplace/performanceassessments (Henry, 2010) andrhetorics ofdecisionmaking (Miller,
1990) provideways ofaddressingthese concerns.
I conclude bypointingtowardways thatwe canfacilitate such convergences through
interdisciplinaryendeavors. Interdisciplinary convergenceis notwithoutits difficulties and
pitfalls, however. Tolocatetheinterdisciplinarityofthis projectwithintechnical
communication scholarship, I relyon Johnsons (2004/1998) readingofKleins (1990) caveats
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aboutinterdisciplinarywork. I do so both todemonstratemyawareness ofsuch complications
andtoexplicate how thepresentprojectavoids thepitfalls identified by Klein,which often
hauntwhatJohnson called, thepracticeofinterdisciplinary borrowing (p. 27):
1. distortionandmisunderstandingofborrowedmaterial;2. useofdata,methods, concepts,andtheories outofcontext;3. useofborrowingoutoffavorintheoriginal context(includinganoverrelianceon
old chestnuts);
4. illusions ofcertaintyaboutphenomenatreatedwith cautionor skepticism intheiroriginaldisciplines;
5. overrelianceononeparticulartheoryorperspective; and6. atendencytodismiss contradictorytests,evidence,orexplanations. (p. 88)MeetingwhatKlein (1990), borrowingfrom Lauer, has called the burden of
comprehension (p. 88),and confrontingifnotexorcising such demons, I havefollowed several
courses ofaction. I have correspondedwith AndyClarkandMaarten Derksentoinsurethe
validityofmy claims andto cultivatepreciselytheinterdisciplinaryrelationships I suggest
here. Although I draw primarilyfrom Clarkhere,ourfields useofHutchinss workas wellas
thetraces ofHutchins inthis workareinsuranceenough from overrelianceononeparticular
theoryorperspective (p. 88). Additionally,ourfields comfortandfamiliaritywith Hutchins
means wearenotdeaftoothervoices in cognitive science. I wouldargue,as well,thatClarks
workitselfis a constantcontextualizationofitself. He builds his arguments around challenges
totheextendedmindmodel.
Inovercoming such hurdles, however,therewardis morethanmerelymeetingthe
burdenofcomprehension. Like Johnson (2004/1998), I likewiseaspiretothepromiseof
interdisciplinaryresearch thatinits bestofcircumstances leads towhatKlein calls an
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inductiveopenendedness (p. 93):thatinteresting spaceintheworldofresearch whenweend
upwith moreandevenmoreinterestingquestions (p. 28). A convergence between
technical communicationresearchers and cognitive scientists,alongthelines I suggesthere,
willasknew questions andexpandthelistofthosequalifiedtoanswerthem.
ACCEPTING CLARKS INVITATION
Distinguishing Clarks Project
Fornearlytwodecades,Clark(pastdirectoroftheCognitive Scienceprogram atIndiana
Universityandthe Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychologyprogram atWashington
Universityand currentlya ProfessorofPhilosophyandChairin Logic andMetaphysics atthe
UniversityofEdinburgh in Scotland) has wrestledwith the humanmindataskmadeallthe
moredifficultgiven his positionthatthe humanmindexists beyondthe confines ofskinand
skull.Moving beyondthe homunculus visionofcognitionwherea tinymaninthe brain
controls anddirects humanthinkingandacting,Clark(2003) sees the brainemergingas a
new-style business managerwhoseroleis nottomicromanage somuch as setgoals andto
actively createandmaintainthekinds ofconditions inwhich various contributingelements can
perform best" (p. 135). This,forClark,defines thedistinctiveness ofhumanintelligence.
Extendedminds explain how we humans can beso very specialwhileatthe sametime being
notsoverydifferent, biologically speaking,from otheranimals with whom we share both the
planetandmostofourgenes (p.10). Itis notjustthatwecanusetools to solveproblems outin
theworld, butthatthosetools andthatworldarealways part and parceloftheminditself.
Tothoseintechnical communication cognizantofHutchinss(1993, 1995) work,this
modelofthemindmightsoundfamiliar. InCognition in the Wild,Hutchins (1995) argued, in
watchingpeoplethinkinthewild,wemay belearningmoreabouttheirenvironmentfor
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thinkingthanaboutwhatis insidethem (p. 169). Thereare,then,many commonalities across
theirwork. However,we should seeClarks modelas moreambitious thanHutchinss inthe
boundaries itimagines forwhatcounts as mind. InClarks words,
Distributed cognitionoftennames aless ambitious thesis,thatcognitioninvolves many
neuralareas workinginparallel,oritcannameworkthatshows how tasks are spread
aroundwithingroups etc,as in Hutchinsworkon shipnavigation.Manyfans of
cognitionas (inthose senses) distributed stillthinkallofanindividuals mental
equipmentis inthe head. (Clark,personal communication, April 14, 2010)
Describingtheemploymentofnavigation charts, Hutchins wrote, Nonavigator has ever had,
norwilloneever have,alltheknowledgethatis inthe chart (p. 111). Goingfurtherthanthe
distributed cognitionmodel,Clarks (2003) extendedmindmodel holds that, Thereis no
informationally constituteduserrelativetowhom alltherestis justtools. Itis [] tools all the
way down (p. 192).Clarkargued, wemustneverunderestimatetheextenttowhich ourown
abilities as artists,poets,mathematicians,andthelike can beinformed byouruseofexternal
props andmedia (p. 77). Usingeven strongerlanguagethan inform,which suggests the
possibilityofart,poetry,andmath withoutprops andmedia,Clarkwrote, the sketch padis not
justa conveniencefortheartist[] Instead,theiteratedprocess ofexternalizingandre-
perceivingturns outto beintegraltotheprocess ofartistic cognitionitself(p. 77).
This is nottoargue,atleastinthe contextofthis article,thatonemodelis more
accuratethantheother.We shouldavoid both illusions ofcertaintyandthe tendencyto
dismiss contradictory [] explanations (Klein, 1990,p. 88). I argueonlythatClarks model
draws ourattentiontotheways inwhich externalelements such as tools andenvironments are
notsimplyemployed byourminds butactivelyconstitute ourminds. This raises the stakes for
both cognitive scientists andtechnical communicationresearchers.
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Converging with Clarks Project
Beginningwith his earlierworkBeing There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again,
Clark(1998) has tacitlyunderstoodthe (inter)disciplinaryimplications ofhis work. First,Clark
himselfdraws onvarious scientific disciplines as wellas social sciences, science studies,and
philosophy (pp.xvii-xix). Second, his modelofthemind creates challenges forthose scientists
studying cognitionandthe brain.Clark(2008) explicitly confrontedtheproblem inthis way:
Forthewiderapplicabilityofthe [extendedmindmodel] [] requires us to beopentotreating
moretransientexternalprops andaids,assumingtheyareatleasttypicallyavailablein some
problem-solving contexts,as aspects ofhuman cognitiveprocessing (p. 113).Moreover, the
neuralinnovations andthe structured cognitiveniches arebothdifferences thatmakea
difference. Theproperfociofour cognitive scientific attentionarethus multipleand
nonexclusive (p. 149). Sutton (2010),alsoin cognitive science, has explicitly calledfor
interdisciplinaryefforts inmuch the samevein. Firstasking, whatwould cognitive science be
like, how coulditcontinue,ifits objects includenotebooks, sketchpads,andtattoos as wellas
embodied brains (p. 214), Sutton concluded byarguingthat[extendedmind] canthus tapand
inturninfluencetheenormous anddiverse scholarshiponmemory,perception,emotion,and
soonin humanities disciplines,to seewhatmighthappenifwetryto study cognition
scientificallyand culturallyatonce (p. 215).
Clark(2008) and Sutton have both acknowledgedthatthis requirementopens upa
huge canofmethodologicalanddisciplinaryworms,inparticular,forthose cognitive scientists
whotakethe brainas their soleobjectofstudy.Addressing justsuch aresistantaudience,Clark
wrote, the sciences ofthemind,itthus seems, simply cannotaffordtoidentify human
cognitiveprocessingwith theactivityofvarious short-lived coupled systems comprising
neural, bodily,andworldlyelements (p. 113). Inrespondingto such resistance,Clark
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createdpoints ofconvergence betweentheworkthattechnical communicationresearchers do
with externalprops andaids.
Additionally,Clark(2008) arguedthatnoteveryexternalproporaidworks toforge
larger hybridwholes (p. 115),andthatsuch nonbiologicalelements are sometimes integrated
and sometimes not. This also creates a spaceforthosewho studypreciselythosemoments
whenandwherenonbiologicalelements transitthe boundaryofskinand skulltoextendthe
humanmind. Framedthis way,technical communicationresearchers domorethandraw on
models ofdistributed cognition; they contributetotheongoing studyofhuman cognitionitself.
In seekingtounderstand,forinstance,whyandwhenand how somegraduate studentwriters
employ EndNoteorWordPad, Van Ittersum (2009) (discussedinthefollowing section) adds
notjusttothefields bodyofknowledge but,inClarks words,toa nascentscience both ofthe
recruitment(ofsets ofneuralandextraneuralresources) andofthefine-tunedunfoldingof
activityin justsuch heterogeneous ensembles (p. 121). Inmyown collaborativeefforts with a
colleagueinpsychology (describedlater),ithas becomeincreasingly clearto both ofus that
technical communicationresearchers both canand should contributetothis understanding.
Technical communicationresearch thatseeks todescribeandproduce (more) intelligent
behavioronthepartofindividuals andorganizations is informed byas it informs cognitive
science. This articleis thus stronglyfocusedoninterdisciplinarityandtheworkwe (can) dofor
others andourselves.
A Brief History of ConvergencesThepoints ofconvergence I hereidentifyareneitherwithoutprecedentintheliteratureof
technical communicationresearch norare such research projects theonlyways we converge
with cognitive science. Thereis arich historyofemploying cognitive scienceintechnical
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communicationresearch,andtheresearch I treathere haveemergedfrom several corners of
technical communicationresearch andfrom relatedfields such as composition.
Technical communicationresearchers andresearchers inrelateddisciplines havea
longstandingrelationshipwith cognitive science. FlowerandHayes (1980) suggestedthatthe
process ofdiscoveryis notfinding some hidden stores ofinsightandready-madeideas but
is instead a complicatedintellectualprocess (p. 21). Such language has morethanfaint
echoes ofthe cognitive scienceperspectiverepresented byClarkandHutchins. Flowerand
Hayes (1977, 1980, 1981, 1994) and Flower (1989) haveexploredwritingand cognitionas
complexactivities. Itis this focus onactivitythatresonates with Clarks andothersarguments
thatcognitionis notsome biologicalobjectorpossession butis insteada complexinteraction
among brain, body,andworld. Subsequentcritiques ofFlowerandHayes (Bizzell, 1982; Brand,
1987; Faigley, 1986) haveaddednuancetotheapplicationofcognitive sciencetothe studyof
communication.
Advances in cognitive science have continuedto bearticulatedwithintechnical
communicationresearch (Geisler, 1994; Freedman& Smart, 1997; Medway, 1996; Mirel, 1992,
1998; MirelandOlsen, 1998; Prior, 1998; Richardson, 2005; Witte, 1992). Haas (1996)
addressedwritingandtechnology,arguingthattheyare inextricablylinked (p.
xii).Theevidencethatshemarshaledmarks a strongpointofconvergencefortechnical
communicationresearchers and cognitive scientists. Equallyvaluableis herassertionthat
culturaltools and cognitiveactivity constituteoneanotherina symbiotic relationship (p.xiii).
Intunewith this assertionis therobustsetofresearch methods Haas employed,which would
beequallyvaluablefor cognitive scientists toadoptandadapt: videotapedwriting sessions,
textualanalysis ofwrittenartifacts producedwith penandpaperandwith computers,
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interviews with computerwriters,and longitudinalparticipant-observer studies (p.xiv). In
the contextofClarks extendedmindmodel,all such methods aredesirable.
Although nottreated hereas apointofconvergence,activitytheoryis yetanother
strength thattechnical communicationresearchers bringtothetable. Spinuzzi (2003); Russell
(1997a, 1997b); Haas (1996); Mirel (1992, 1998); Winsor (1996); Medway (1996); Prior
(2004);Berkenkotter,Huckin,andAckerman (1991); andBazermanand Prior (2004) haveall
incorporatedactivitytheory (orits antecedents) andoftenin concertwith cognitive scienceto
describeliterateactivity,its development,operation,andassessmentacross arangeofcontexts
including both the classroom andtheworkplace. Russell (1997a, 1997b),inparticular,
provides a comprehensive surveyofhow activitytheory has beenemployed bytechnical
communicationresearchers.
Spinuzzi (2003),inlightoftheresearch projects I describe here,provides atreatmentof
activitytheoryparticularlyemployableinthis workofconvergence. Spinuzzis genretracing
marks how workers innovatewithintheirworkenvironments toimprovetheirworklives. Any
cognitive scientistembarkingupona studyofintelligentbehaviorwoulddowelltotracewhat
Spinuzzi called ephemeral,invisible,ubiquitous innovations (p.x). Soundinglikea cognitive
scientisthimself, Spinuzziwrote, genretracing seeks toforefront[theseinnovations] as
organic andnecessaryways thatworkers adaptinformationto supporttheirownefforts (p.
x).Clarks interestin cognitivenicheslikewiseresonates with Spinuzzis claim thatGenre
tracingprovides awayto highlightusersexperiences with officialandunofficialgenres andto
comparethem across communities orworkplaces (p. 22). This methodology, Spinuzziargued,
allows us toproducemore completeandnuancedunderstandings ofhumanactivity (p. 57). It
is easyto see how a cognitive scientistinterestedin how particularnonbiologicalelements
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extend cognitionwould beinterestedin how differentgenres,officialandunofficial,extendthe
minds ofusers.
I will continuetoforeground both Clarks projectandtechnical communicationresearch
methodologythroughoutthis article. Ourmethodologywhich Sullivanand Porter (1997)
definedas anexplicitorimplicittheoryofhumanrelations which guides theoperationof
methods (p. 11)ofcountingas equallyvaluabletheoften-disparateelements (e.g.,tools,
environments,documentdesign,discursivepractices,andmethods ofassessment) that
cultivateintelligentbehavioris applicableandpossiblygenerativeofnew research methods. In
suggestingpoints ofinterdisciplinary convergence, I necessarilyadmitthatalthough technical
communicationresearch provides anecessary complementtothe studyofintelligentbehavior,
itcertainlywillnotbethewhole show.Clarks workwill continuetoappearinthearticle side-
by-sidewith technical communicationresearch ratherthanpurelypriortoorafterit.My hope
is thatthis structureallows us toimaginewhattechnical communicationresearchers and
cognitive scientists workingtogethermightactuallylooklike.
CONVERGENCE #1: TOOLSInanearlyformulationoftheextendedmindmodel,ClarkandChalmers (1998) proposed
criteriaforwhen someartifactwould countas apartofthemind. Oneoftheseis whetherthe
artifacthas been consciouslyendorsedatsomepointinthepast (p. 17). How this
endorsementproceeds, however,is notquiteexplained.Mostofthe studies Clarkhas drawnon
areofindividuals usingtools selectedforthem bytheexperiment, soitis oftendifficultto
understandthis process ofendorsementas itworks outsideofthelab. Evenanimportant
exception,the studyofTetris players andtheiruseofthe controls ofthegameitselftothink
aboutthegame,is silentonwhyindividuals play Tetris inthefirstplace.Whatgoes
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unexplored,then,is why someonewould,forinstance,endorsea smallnotebookoraniPhone?
This section surveys tworecentstudies ofmemorytools andpractices to sketch how such
questions couldto beaskedandanswered.
Likethefieldoftechnical communication,Clarkhas aflexibledefinitionoftools,which
for him canincludelanguage,pencils,notebooks,virtualworlds,andtheinternet. Infocusing
this firstconvergenceon toolsratherthan technologies, I am followingHaass (1996)
definitionoftechnology as a complexofobjects,actions,people,motives,anduses. A
technologyis notanobject, butratheravital system thatis boundtotheworldoftimeand
space (p.xii).Clarks projectis aparticularly strongpointofconvergence betweentechnical
communicationresearch and cognitive science because his understandingoftools and
environments is similartoourown. I thinkweare betteredattunedtotherhetoric (andthus
ethics) oftechnology, butClarknevertheless sees tools andenvironments as integralto human
activityandintelligentbehavior.
Van Ittersum (2009) preciselyarticulatedwhattechnical communicationresearchers
bringtoanincreasinglyinterdisciplinaryunderstandingofhuman cognitionatthelevelof
tools. Ratherthanfocusingon whetherawriterknows how tousediscretefeatures specific to
a softwareprogram, Van Ittersum claimeditis moreprofitableto askabouttheproperties of
functional systems thatallow writers toflexiblymeetthedemands oftheirliterateactivity (p.
259). This distinctionis importantgiventhat, notallphysicalgoings-on [] areplausibly cast
as parts ofthemachineryofmind (Clark, 2008,p.xxviii). Ifnoteverytool canoris castin such
away,thenitis necessarytoaskwhynotand how mightthey bealteredto bemaderightfor
thepart.
Van Ittersum (2009) investigated theways writers madeuseofcomputertechnology
fortheirmemorywork (p. 263). Forinstance,participants wereobservedas theyusedvarious
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notetaking software (p. 264).Clarknecessarilytreats such interactions,once started,as
relatively seamless,which theyoftenare. Van Ittersum is interestedinthe seams,thetradeoffs:
writers seekingtointegratethesetools intotheirexistingwritingpractices oftenrequire
significantcosts notmentionedalongwith thetouted benefits (p. 264).Whatarethereasons
behindanddrivingparticularendorsements and,thus,potentialextensions ofmind?
Drawingonresearch indistributedmemoryand softwaredesign, Van Ittersum (2009)
pointedto
the conscious effortand commitmentthatwriters and computerusers mustmakewhen
theydelegate someoftheirmemorytasks to softwareprograms. Ratherthanaknack
(havinga goodmemory) orautomatic recall (the encyclopediainthe sky),a
computer-supportedmemory [] constitutes a complexactivityrequiring careful
analysis inordertotracewhat,exactly,is done bypeopleandartifacts engagedin
memorywork. (pp. 260-261)
Manyfactors influencetheendorsementoftools andthe complexactivityofmemorythatthey
enable. Positioningmemorythis way, Van Ittersum echoes much ofClarks arguments about
theextendedmind. Theonly caveatwemightaddis thatsomethingmorethan delegation
could beatworkhere.Clarksuggests thatratherthan delegation,wearediscussing
potentiallyintimate mergers,anextensionofthemind beyondthe confines ofthe skull.
Whatwealreadyare,Clark(2003) argued,is creatures whose minds are special precisely
because they are tailored made for multiple mergers and coalitions (p. 7). Andwith mergers,the
influence cuts both ways. We createthese supportiveenvironments, butthey createus too
(Clark,p. 11).Regardless ofthelevelofintimacywearewillingtogranttoany such mergeror
delegation,itis imperativetounderstandwhyand how such choices orendorsements are
madeinorderto create bettertools.
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Van Ittersums (2009) discussionoftheworkofMaryusingEndNoteis instructivein
tworegards. First,thereis thetimeandenergy shedevotedtousingEndNoteusefully. Second,
thereis Marys desiretousefullyincorporate EndNoteinto hermemorypractice. Trade-offs,
time,anddesire,Marys story suggests,impacttheendorsementoftools as partoftheextended
mind.Mary,whotooktwomonths tolearn EndNote,now uses theprogram withouthavingto
thinkaboutit(Van Ittersum,p. 267). Van Ittersum arguedthatthis outcomeis predicted by
Hutchinss modelofdistributed cognition. I wouldadd,drawingonClark(1998, 2003, 2008),
thatitis notsomuch thatMaryis notthinking butratherthathermind has beenextended
through thetoolandthattoolis now wherepartofherthinkingtakes place. Theresults of
Marys worklikewise sync with Clarks extendedmindmodel,which accounts forthe skilland
activityinvolvedin such extensions. LikeVan Ittersum,Clark(1998) suggestedthatsuch
extensions arenotautomatic andthatwork,practice,and skillareimportantfactors: [The
brain] mustlearntointerfacewith theexternalmediainways thatmaximallyexploittheir
peculiarvirtues (p. 220).
Van Ittersum (2009), however,treatingtools as rhetoricaland contestable,exploredthe
interaction betweenuserandtoolinterms ofboth theusabilityofthetoolandthe skillofthe
user.Whereas Clarkstudies onlytheworkoftheuser,the cognitiveagent,technical
communicationresearchers likewiseaddress thetools themselvestheextraneural
resourcesdescribed byClark(2008,p. 121). Inthis vein, Van Ittersum identifiedfeatures of
theusers experienceandtheirgoals thatdesigners shouldaccountforinassessingthe
constraints andaffordances oftools. Thesedifferentgoals, hewrote, ledthem torespond
differentlytoits affordances andtothe constraints thatarisewhen coordinatingtheirwriting
activityto EndNote (p. 269).Inaddressingthegoals ofthewriterinrelationtothe constraints
andaffordances ofthetoolitself, Van Ittersum productivelyaugments Clarks owntreatmentof
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themergers minds make: Thesewriters wereallawarethatcoordinatingtheir citationwork
with EndNoterequiredthatthey committoworkingwithintheaffordances oftheprogram
(Van Ittersum,p. 274). [Staceys] commitmentto EndNote, Van Ittersum
observed,constrained hertofiguringoutafixintheprogram,ratherthan simplyabandoningit
andreturningtoworkinginWordalone (p. 274). Thus, Van Ittersum complicates Clarks
assertionthathumans,as canny cognizers, [tend] to recruit, on the spot, whatever mix of
problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result with a minimum of effort (Clark, 2008,
p. 13). Humans oftenworkquite hardtoendorseandincorporateatool. Theminimizingof
usereffortis oftentheendresultofmuch effortonthepartoftheuser.
Whatis importanthereis thatendorsingtools is difficultandoftendriven bydesire,
goals,andtheaffordances ofthetools themselves.Wearedrawnas canny cognizers,inany
particularinstance, bya complexmixofusabilityanddesire,and,even,as oneofVan Ittersums
participants indicated, the colors,andthedesignoftheprograms interface (p. 270). As
Clarks useofendorsement,as aplaceholderofsorts, canonlyimply,thereis rhetoric afootin
such extensions ofmind.Canny cognizers areusers,audiences,anddesiringindividuals with
worktodo.
FleshingoutClarkandChalmerss(1998) flatnotionofendorsement, Van Ittersum
(2009) argued, writers face severalquestions as theyinteractwith new rhetorical situations:
whenand how shouldnew technologies be created, selectedoradopted (p. 276)? Following
his lead, I wouldarguethatanymomentofmindextension,ofaugmenting human cognition
artifactuallyandenvironmentally,is arhetoricalsituation. Extensions ofmindarenecessary
butnotautomatic: This means thatarguments are beingmade byusers anddesigners about
how ourminds oughtto beextended. Van Ittersum likewise concludedthatsuch situations,as
rhetorical,arenotirrevocableordeterministic. Hethus gives tools theirduewithoutmaking
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users merely subjecttothem. Moreresearch intotheways writers worktointegratenew tools
intotheirprocesses (acting with thesetechnologies ratherthan simplyacting on them or being
acted upon bythem) will helpdispelfears thatnew tools requireall-or-nothingirrevocable
commitments (Van Ittersum,pp. 277-278). Such research also serves amorepragmatic
function: itcouldeventually bedevelopedintoa heuristic thatwould suggestfruitful
questions toaskbeforeadoptingnew tools (Van Ittersum,p. 278).
Whittemores (2008) treatmentofhow visualizations canimprovememoryinorderto
aidwriters workingin contentmanagementsystems (CMS) likewisedemonstrates technical
communicationresearchersabilitytonotonlydescribeandexplainparticularextensions of
theminds butto cultivateandassess them as well.Connectingtherhetorical canonofmemory
to studies inmemory,Whittemore has enactedthegenerativearticulationoftechnical
communicationresearch and cognitive sciencethatI herepropose. Alongwith Van Ittersum,
Whittemores rhetoricallygroundedunderstandingoftechnical communicationas itrelates to
memoryallows us toargue justhow thetools with which weextendoutminds oughtto be
designedinordertoproduceintelligentbehavior. Toreturntothequestionofwhypeople
choosewhich tools,Whittemore suggested how CMSs mightbedesignedtoaccountfor
extendedminds inmoregenerativeways. Specifically,Whittemorewasconcernedwith the
ways inwhich memory can beenhancedtoaidthetacticalretrievalofstoredknowledgeduring
acts ofcomposing (p. 95). This system ofartificialmemory,towhich Cicero ascribes the
poweroftheorator (Whittemore,p. 95), comes quite closetotheedificial, scaffolded cognition
described byClark.
As we seefrom thetreatmentofendorsement,notjustanytoolor scaffoldwilldothe
job.Whittemores (2008) ownemploymentofcognitive science (manyofhis sources are
likewiseClarks sources) demonstrates how the brainboundmodels Clarkrejects areexactly
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thosemodels thatundergirdtheCMSs thatplaguemanytechnical communicators.Whittemore
addressedthephenomenonofsingle sourcingwhere writers composegranular chunks of
text,which are storedina contentdatabase before beingrepurposedandreassembledto
createavarietyofinformationproducts by someoneotherthanthetechnicalwriter (p. 89)
as [sources] ofdifficultyin contentdatabases (p. 89).Whittemorearguedthatmetadata
(dataaboutdata) is crucialtotheworkofatechnicalwriter: Forinstance, whattypeof
informationthetextconstitutes, how largeor smalleach chunkofthetextshould be,
dependingonits potentialforreuse,and how thepotentialaudiences mightinterpretthis
text (p. 93).
This metadatais importantforinvention, butaccess toitis hampered byCMSs thatare
predicatedupon single sourcing(Whittemore, 2008). Havingaccess toonlyone chunkoftextat
atimeimpairs acts ofcomposingbecauseitdivorces thewriterfrom themetadatanecessary
forinvention.Whittemoreframes this as aproblem ofmemory. Ratherthanretrievingthe
necessarymetadata (from thetextin context) as they compose,writers areassumedto be (or
forcedto be) ableto havememorized (intheir head) such metadata. Eitherthat,oritis
assumedthatsuch metadatais notstrictlynecessary. Thetechnicalwritermustthen struggle
justtokeeptrackofherowngoals andpurposes for hertext-in-progress inanessentially
decontextualizedwritinginterface (p. 94).
Indecontextualizingthe composingprocess, single sourcingpresumes memoryand
cognitionto be brainbound,with negative consequences formanytechnicalwriters. Inthis
way,Whittemores (2008) research notonlyadds valuetotheextendedmindmodel,itadds
weightto critiques ofcompetingmodels bydemonstratingtheirpernicious effects onusers.
CMSs ofthe stripeWhittemorewouldliketo changeverymuch assumethe humanmind,and
thus the composingprocess andmemory,aretrappedwithin human skinand skull.
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Whittemorethus bolsters Clarks argumentbydemonstratingthenegative consequences ofthe
brainboundview ofcognition.
Whittemore (2008)inquiredwhatsorts ofvisualizationtools shouldfutureCMSs offer
inorderto helpwriters make connections among contentandengageintrulyinventional
activities (p. 101). Theimportantthingis thatany such method should leverage human
visual-spatial sense-making capabilities (p. 101). Insteadofbrowsingfolders and searching
through filenames (See Figure 1),awriter couldtakeadvantageofthekinds ofvisualizations
availablein,forinstance,Second Life,which wouldallow herto seetheimage,inthe caseofan
arrow icon,alongwith other collectedicons (See Figure2). Additionally,the spatialaspects of
Second Life wouldallow herto narrow the scopeofsearch basedon her placelearning (p.
102),a conceptWhittemore borrows from Barres andMcNaughtonandwhich indicates the
location where sheencounteredtheicons. Additionallyimportant,thewriter should beable to
interactandreorganizethosevisualizations as needed (p. 103).
Insert Figure 1 here.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Drawingon Quintilians argument, Forapersons memorywillalways beassisted by
certain circumstances upontheveryfaceofthepaperitself (as citedis Quintilian, 11.31,p.
439),Whittemore (2008) arguedthatmemoryis continuallyaided bythewriting surface.
Writers refer backtotheirowntexts as theywritetotrackmetadataabout[their] own
immediategoals andpurposes (p. 104).Whittemoreadditionallydraws on Flowers andHayes
(1981) inmakingthis argument: Writers needto begivenlargerdesignviews oftheirtexts-in-
progress sothatthey cankeeptrackoftheirlargerdiscursivegoals through explorationand
consolidationand sothatthey canmeettheneeds ofrealusers inreal situations ofuse (p.
106).Whittemore,as amodeltechnical communicationresearcher,follows this lineofthought
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andthenproposes enactmentbasedontheworkofparticularindividuals engagedin cognition
with andthrough tools.
Whittemores (2008) recommendations demonstrate how technical communication
research complements Clarks model.Notonly his recommendations for butalso his
orientationto cognition strikemeas necessaryadditions to currentcognitive science
endeavors.Whatis itaboutextended cognitivenetworks thathelpus actintelligentlyinthe
world? As Clark(2003) argued,nothingpurelyon boardand brainbound canexplainthis
ability. Weexist,as thethinkingthings weare,Clarkargued, onlythanks toa bafflingdance
ofbrains, bodies,and culturalandtechnological scaffolding (p. 11). Itis,as Whittemore
remindedus inthe contextofcomposing, ad-hoc structures [] thatenablewriters to
interactwith thetexts-in-progress inflexibleyettemporaryways (p. 106).
CONVERGENCE #2: ENVIRONMENTS
Whittemores (2008) workobviously blurs anyneatboundary betweentoolandenvironment:
Tools can becomeenvironments andenvironments canworkas tools. Additionally,tools often
work(ordonot) withinanenvironmentaland cultural context. Thatis,environments and
cultures canworktoenabletheeffectiveuseoftools.Winsors (2001) studyofnewcomers at
AgriCorp,apseudonym forthe companyWinsor studied,adds nuancetoClarks treatmentof
environmentaland cultural scaffoldsaterm Clark(2008),drawingonVygotsky, has usedto
describeexternal structures weexploitinextendingourminds (pp 43-47)as vitalelements
ofanecessarilyextendedmind.Winsors workalsodemonstrates thatcombiningworkplace
ethnographies anddistributed cognitionprovides apowerful conceptualtoolfor studying
intelligentbehavior.Workplaceethnographies ontechnical communicationandliteracyin
general (Doheny-Farina, 1986, 1989, 1992; Lutz, 1989; Rose, 1989, 2004; Smart, 2000; Winsor,
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1996) addvaluetoClarks extendedmindmodelintheirattentiontothelocations and
activities thatconstitute,inpart, human cognitionand behavior. This sectionlikewisepositions
Porter, Sullivan, Blythe, Grabill,andMiless (2001) methodologyofinstitutional critiqueas a
practiceofthis modelofmind. Givenwhatweknow ofthe humanmindas extendedandofthe
environments itis extendedthrough, how mightwetreatenvironments practicallyand
rhetoricallyas partandparcelofourminds?
Winsor (2001) investigated someofthe specific means bywhich [newcomers at
AgriCorp] gainedaccess toknowledgeinthis workplace (p. 6). As Van Ittersum (2009)
exploredwhyindividuals chose certaintools with which toextendtheirminds as writers,
Winsorexplored how individuals integratethemselves intolarger culturalandenvironmental
scaffolds to successfullydotheir job. If,then,as Clarkhas argued, humanminds aremade
possible bya bafflingdanceoftools,environments,and cultures,then how aretheprocesses by
which peopleareincorporated,managed,andorganized? How dowegainorfacilitateaccess to
theenvironmentaland cultural scaffolds thatmakeminds as weknow orneedthem to be
possible? Workplaceethnographies such as Winsors address justthesequestions.
Winsors (2001) findings suggestthatthereareafew primaryways thatnewcomers
gainnecessaryaccess toworkplace scaffolds. Formaltrainingis notoneofthese.Workplace
knowledge cannotsimply beloadedintothe brains ofnewcomers as data. As with theCMSs
critiqued byWhittemore, such aneducationalmodelpresupposes amind bounded bythe
brain. Knowledge,instead,is outintheworkplaceitself. Indeed, AgriCorpseemedtorecognize
this andofferedformaltraining onlywhennomoreexperientialwayoflearningwas
available (p. 12). Mentoring, hands-onlearning,and fiddlingaround,allendorsed bythe
company,proved betteraccess points fornewcomers.
Hands-onlearningis allowingnewcomers tounderstand somethingby literally
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touchingandmanipulatingthetechnicalobjects theyworkedwith (p. 14). As Winsor (2001)
argued, Theextenttowhich both interns andregularemployees value hands-onlearningis a
signofhow cognitionwas distributedintotheirphysical surroundings ratherthantakingplace
solelyintheir heads (p. 15). Justas important,placingvalueon such learningpromotes its
enactment,which,inturn,develops cognitioninmeaningfulandwork-directed/required ways.
Fiddlingaround,though very similarto hands-onlearning,marks notthemasteringofan
objectbutofexperimentingwith it. Although Winsordidnotmentionitexplicitly,fiddling
aroundis moreinventionthandiscoveryoriented.
Whatis importantabouttheseaspects ofonthe job learningis thattheyarenotsimply
aboutmasteringworkonceandforallofstoringitallonboardthe biological brainas a
complete catalogueandrepresentationoftheworkenvironmentandthetasks to be completed
there.Winsor (2001) arguedthatnewcomers areinstead learningtolearn,aprocess thatlead
totheir havingaccess tothedistributed cognitionineffectatthe AgriCorpengineering center
(pp. 16-17). Everything cannotand shouldnotbe broughton boardifminds areextended.
Environments andtools arepartandparcelofcognition,andwhatbecomes importantis
learningtoaccess andmanipulate scaffolds inordertothinkandworkthrough them. As
Winsorobserved, Pluggingintothis system is adifficulttaskbecausethe system is in constant
flux sothatevenmore-experiencedemployees spendagreatdealoftimelearning (p. 25).
Again,themindis necessarily butnotautomaticallyextended.With minds madeformergers
and coalitions,wemuststillactivelyfoster such extensions.
Winsor (2001) offeredapractical,rhetoricalfleshingoutofthetheoreticalimplications
ofClarks model.Clark(1999) has movedinthis direction,forexample,ina chapter he
contributedtothe collectionThe Biology ofBusiness,where hewrote, theimmediatetaskin
such new knowledge-intensiveandinformation-drivenventures is to createtheinternal
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conditions thatallow the creationandmaintenanceofmultiple collaborativeendeavors (pp.
58-59). Although focusedon collaborativeworkintechnology-drivenentrepreneurialefforts,
ClarkclearlyenvisionedwhatWinsoris abletodeliver:a setofpractices thatmakemanifest
the scaffoldingpotentialofworkenvironments.
AgriCorpis engaged,as allorganizations necessarilyare,in building (better) people.We
can byallmeans questionand subsequently challengetowhatendandwhois buildingpeople
inanygivenorganizational context, butweneednotignorethe challengeandresponsibilityto
do so.Clark(2003) arguedthatwe resistthetemptationtodefineourselvesin brutal
oppositiontotheveryworlds inwhich manyofus now live,love,andwork (p.142). This focus
onaccess becomes anecessaryarticulationoftechnical communicationresearch andthose
scientific disciplines thatconfrontquestions ofworkplaceethics andassessment,which is the
thirdpointofconvergence.
Buildingtowards adiscussionofworkplaceassessmentwithinthepresentdiscussionof
environments,theworkofinstitutional critiqueprovides yetanotherpointofthe convergence
betweentechnical communicationresearch and cognitive science. Institutional critique,
described below,asks us to considerwhatwemightdo with Clarks modelandits implication
thatweare,moreorless, building thekinds ofpeople we chooseto be (Clark, 2003,p. 195).
ForClark,thereis nowayaroundthis question: wewerealways hybrid beings, jointproducts
ofour biologicalnatureandmultilayeredlinguistic, cultural,andtechnologicalwebs (p. 195).
Scaffolds necessarilyworktoenable cognition; however,itis vitaltotreatthem as contestable,
negotiable,and changeable. Ifweareindeed buildingpeopleas Clarksuggests,andifwe hold
the basic tenets ofdemocracyas valuable,thenwemusthave complementaryrhetorical
strategies notjustfordiscerninganddescribingenvironments butfor changingthem as well.
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InstitutionalCritique: A RhetoricalMethodologyforChangeprovides justsuch an
understandingofhumanenvironments as contestable. Porteretal., (2000) statedtheir core
argumentthis way:
Though institutions are certainlypowerful,theyarenotmonoliths; theyarerhetorically
constructed humandesigns (whosepoweris reinforced by buildings,laws,traditions,
andknowledge-makingpractices) and soare changeable. Inotherwords,wemade em,
we canfix em. Institutions R Us. (p. 611)
Theplayfulexpression Institutions R Usresonates stronglywith Clarks caseforthevital
importanceofscaffolds in human cognition.ComplicatingClarks model, however, Porteretal.,
implicitlyweaveintoitquestions ofrhetoricaleffectiveness andpower bytreatinginstitutions
as rhetorical systems ofdecisionmakingthatexercisepowerthrough thedesignofspace
(both materialanddiscursive) (p. 621). Humandecision-makingalways occurs inthe context
ofdesigned space,which, Porteretal.,remindus,is alsoalways anexerciseofpower.Whois
choosingthekinds ofpeopleoremployees to buildandwhy?
Itis through theirformulationofinstitutional critiquethatwe seerhetoricalactionas
the waythattheinstitutions and scaffolds withinandwith which weare cultivated can be
changed. As Porteretal., (2000) argued, institutional critiqueis unabashedlyrhetorical
practicemediatingmacro-level structures andmicro-levelactions rootedinaparticular space
andtime (p. 612). Themacrofocus is onewaytodiscuss how ourpublic lives areorganized
and conducted (both forus and byus) (p. 620). Themacrofocus thus corresponds nicelyto
Clarks useofscaffoldingtodescribeexternal supportsystems. Porteretal.,addedthemicro
focus topreventaview ofinstitutions as static,glacial,orevenunchangeable (p. 621). The
macroview couldfosterthe beliefthatchangerequires large-scaleactionthatfew canenact
(p. 621). Themicrofocus allows us to seeinstitutions andClarks scaffolds, as alsooperating
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locally (p. 621). Themediationofmacroandmicroas awayofcritiquinginstitutions provides
animportantconceptualtoolforunderstanding scaffolds. Itallows us toenvision how
particular scaffolds operatelocally,which furtherallows forlocalactors toworktowards
changingthem.
Clark(1999) argued, Thegoalofmanagementis nottodraw updetailed blueprints for
performanceor change buttofosterdecentralizedadaptationand createthe broad conditions
necessaryforderivingmaximum benefitfrom multiple sources ofenvironmentalorderand
opportunity (p. 59).Clarks approach tomanagementmakes senseinthe contextofhis work:
createanenvironmentthatscaffolds creativeactivities anorganizationdesires. Developingthe
rhetoricalwherewithaltomakemanifestthesegoals inthemacro-level structures andmicro-
levelactions oftheorganizationis anotherquestionentirely.WhatPorteretal., (2000)
proposedis amethodofinterventionintothe scaffolds thatpromoteorundermineparticular
modes ofthinkingandacting. Forinstance, Porteretal.,toldofMaryDieli,theusability
manageratMicrosoftwho successfullyintegratedtheterm usabilityintothedesignprocess
(p. 610). Although a simple graphic revision,this changewas animportantpoliticalmove,
establishingusers andusertestingas amoreintegralpartofthe softwaredevelopment
process (p. 611). This rhetoricalworkconsists ofexploitingthe spaces,withininstitutions,for
reflection,resistance,revision,andproductiveaction (p. 613).With this methodologyfor
institutional change, Porteretal.,implicitlypointedtoavisionoftechnical communication
researchers informed byanawareness oftheextendedandemergentqualities ofthe human
mind.
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CONVERGENCE #3: PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Inthe conclusionofNatural-Born Cyborgs,Clark(2003) presentedalistofpotentially serious
concerns highlighted by his argument. Namely,thatwith extendedminds therearisequestions
of,forinstance,inequality,intrusion,uncontrollability,overload,alienation,deceit,
degradation,anddisembodiment(p. 167). These specters thathaunt,"manyofwhich revolve
aroundthethornyissueofjudgment,arenotchallenges to his thesis butquestions Clarkargues
areraised byit(p. 167).How dowe holdoneanotheraccountable? How doweattribute
responsibility? How dowediscernorassignmotive? How doweassess,inotherwords,minds
extendedacross brains, bodies, cultures,environments,andtools? Inthis thirdandfinalpoint
ofconvergence, I arguethattechnical communicationresearchers,whilenotoffering solutions,
provideways ofacting,deciding,andadjudicatingwithintheworldofextendedminds.I resist
thelanguageofsolutions becauseforthequestions raised byClarks modelthereareno
definitiveanswers,only strategies andtechniques fornegotiatingthe complexityofhuman
cognition. As Rivers andTirrell (inpress) havearguedinarecentattempttoarticulatethe
extendedmindmodelandrhetoricaltheorymoregenerally,
Wedonotclaim thatrhetoric solves theseproblems.Whatrhetoric offers is themeans
toreinterpretsuch strife [awordused heretodesignatetheextendednatureofthe
humanmind] as aproductiveelementofagenerativeagonism,allowingus tonavigate
through theworldthatmoves through us,inandoutofthe bodyandmind.
Tothis indefiniteend I forwardHenrys (2010) repurposingofperformanceappraisals.
Henrys posthuman critiqueandrefiguringofperformanceappraisals generates aform of
assessmentless focusedonobjective,afterthefactanalyses ofdiscreteandautonomous
agents,andonemoreinvestedingenerating supportive,improvableworkenvironments.
Henryarguedthatassessmentshould beongoingandorientedtowardimprovingthe scaffolds
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andtools through andwith which individuals dotheirwork. Henrytooktechnical
communicationresearchersestablishedrelationshipwith distributed cognitionfurther,using
ittoaddress notonly theinteractions thatdistribute cognition butalso theevaluationof
workaccomplishedquaorganizationalperformance (p. 12). Henrythus tacitlyaddressed
concerns abouttheextendedmindtowhich Clarkonlygavevoice. ToHenrys treatmentof
performanceappraisals I addMillers (1990) critiqueofdecision science. I incorporateMiller
because herearlyinterventionintodecision scienceproblematizedanyattempttoresolve
issues ofjudgmentorassessmentfrom withinthe bounds ofscienceandits discourseof
objectivity.Millerimplicitlyrevealedextensions ofthemindas always value-ladenprocesses
byreintroducingrhetoric tothe scienceofdecision-making.
Beforedeploying Henry (2010) andMiller (1990),itis worthwhiletoexamine justhow
Clarkhimselfhas addressed such concerns inorderto seewhereexactlywithin his workthe
possibilities for convergences lie.Clarks treatmentoftheskinbagas atenuous andproblematic
boundaryforwhatoughtto countas partofthemindis notwithoutits critics (Adams &Aizawa,
2001; Preston, 2010; Rupert, 2004). Ostensibly critiquingClarks argumentfrom the
standpointofethics, SelingerandEngstrm (2007) argued thatwhenagencynolongerends
atthe skinbag,thenneitherdoattributions ofresponsibilityandirresponsibility (p. 579). To
drivethepointhometheyimagine A futureClarence Darrow mightbeabletomitigatethe
sentenceofaguilty clientbyarguing his or herpathologicalprofileis theresultofher
dispositions being shaped byfaultyormaliciouslyuseddataminers,the conditions ofwhich
theagentwas unawareatthetimeofinfluence (p. 579).
Clark(2007) respondedfrankly: I agree (p. 586).Clarkpersuasivelyacknowledged
whatshould beobvious: Such attributions arealready contested. Itis surelynomore
problematic to holdanextended cognitiveagentresponsiblefortheiractions, choices and
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desires thanitis to holda skinboundone (p. 586). Accountability has always been hard.Clark
continued, And justas a bare biologicalagent(ifthereeverwas such athing) can be coarsely
manipulated byexternalinterests oragencies inways thatabsolve herofblamefor some
specific act,goal,ordesire, somighttheaugmentedorotherwiseextendedone (p. 586).
IncorporatingClarks persuasivepointaboutthedifficultyofany such attribution,we could
easilyarguethatanydefenseattorneytodayworth his or her saltcouldmakethis defensewith
noknowledgeofClark(andwould be justifiedinzealouslyrepresenting his or her client). Allof
which is toarguethatClarks modelofthemindonlymakes salientproblems as oldas the
human species itself.
WhatI findproblematic is thatClark(2007) himselfseems to begthequestion.Clark
rightlyarguedthatsuch attributions arealways already contested. However,inacknowledging
thathis modelmakes itdifficulttoimagineattributions ofresponsibilityinthe contextofthe
extendedmind, he still countedas giventhatwe haveonlyapost hoc mechanism fordoing so.
Ratherthanreimaginingordevelopingamethodofassessmentbetterintunewith the
extendedmindmodel,Clarkmaintainedtheextendedmindina system ofadjudication
predicateduponthe bare biologicalagent.
Henrys (2010) appraisal system,which does notwaituntiltheendtoadjudicatewho
didwhatandunderwhoseinfluence,does notbegthequestion: Itexamines theworkof
embodimentandextendedmindinprocess soas tointervene beforetherapacious dataminer
shapes individualdispositions for criminalends.Theproblem with Selingerand Engstrms
(2007) argumentbyanalogyis thatitenvisions alegal system stillworkingwith an
understandingofthe humanagentas discreteandautonomous inthewaythatTaylorist
managementscience,towhich Henrytracedmany contemporaryworkappraisals,alsodoes.
Withinthese systems theextendedmindis atough nutto crack: A system thatwaits untilthe
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endtopass judgment(pseudo)objectivelyonthe bare biologicalagentwillnecessarily havea
hardtimewith agents thatarefarfrom bare. Ifwewere, however,to confrontSelingerand
Engstrm with Henrys modelofperformanceappraisalas alooseanalogueforthelegal
system,Clarks (2007) limitedresponseis now persuasivelyaugmented.
Henrys (2010) system ofcontinuous feedbackis betterattunedtotheperformances of
anindividualas anelementoflarger,more complex setofrelations (p. 22). Inthemodelof
assessmentSelingerandEngstrm (2007) assume, such relations mustbetreatedas noise
ratherthanas integral, constitutive components ofagents themselves.Nothavingwaiteduntil
theendoftheyearto sortthrough whois responsibleforwhatandwhy, such a system would
beinplacethroughouttheperformanceofwork.Henrys posthumanperformanceappraisal
wouldnotputthe caseinthe hands ofClarence Darrow afterthefact; itwouldentail
representationandrecoursethroughouttheprocess.Workers andmanagers alikewould
continually beattuned,viafeedbackloops,tothe conditions ofthemergers and coalitions from
which workactivelyemerges.Clarks treatmentofthe skinbag shifts thefocus from objective,
afterthefactassessmentto continualfeedbackandefforts topromote bettermergers and
coalitions inmedia res.
Equallyimportant,theappraisals Henry (2010) critiques assumewhatClark(2003) has
calledthe bare biologicalagent. As with Whittemores (2008) critiqueofsingle sourcingCMSs
andWinsors (2001) evidenceoftheineffectiveness offormalworkplacetraining, Henrys
critiqueofworkplaceappraisals bolsters Clarks efforts bydemonstratingthetroublewith the
brainboundmodelmademanifest. InHenry,assessmentbecomes notaproblematic toolfor
measuringagency butaproductive (and,perhaps, still contested) toolforgenerating (new
forms of) intelligentbehavior.Byallmeans holdnefarious agents accountablefortheiractions,
butbyallothermeans acknowledgeandaddress the conditions thatcultivate such activity.
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Having confrontedthe humanistsubjectand how the Tayloristmodel soughttoassess
its performance, Henry (2010) makes anargumentfor justhow,inthe contextofthework
environment,wemightachieveamorefeedback-oriented,posthumanappraisal system.
Instructivelyfollowingkeytenets ofposthumanism, Henrysets outtoremaketheappraisalin
the spiritnotjustofreflectinguponautonomous agents butofactivelyimproving technical
communicatorsworklives (p. 13). Thefirstmove concerns embodimentoverandagainstthe
traditionalview ofthe body as a supportsystem forthemind (p. 19). Ratherthantreatingthe
bodyas mere container, Henryarguedthatwe shouldacknowledgethatembodimentimplies
a humanwith a history,agender,anethnicity,anage,and sofortha culturally shapedagent
whoperforms indifficultsites andfrom varying statuses indiscursiveformations (p. 19).
Henry calledonembodimentsothatwemightattend,inassessment,tothe educational
systems [inplaceatanyorganization] shaping human bodies andminds (p. 19).Whenwe
ignorethe bodyoftheworkerwe counterproductivelyleaveun-appraisedthe culturaland
technological scaffoldingthatcultivates thatworkers embodiment,and, hence,their
performance. Henrys repurposedappraisalwouldthus acknowledgeandgenerate continual
feedbackfor bodies as integraltotheworkofextendedminds.
Henry (2010) arguedthattechnical communicators should monitorperformances
whileinthemidstofthem ratherthanaccountingforthem afterthefact (p. 19). The benefitof
acknowledging human cognitionas distributedorthemindas extendedis thatfirstit
acknowledges the complexityofwork,agency,andproducts. Second,andmoreimportantly,
Henryargued, this new accountabilitywouldenhancethedistributionofcognition
significantly byincorporationor buildingfeedbackmechanisms throughoutthe system (p.
20). Such feedbackwouldworkto continuallyassess theactivities oftheseloops themselves
ratherthanwaitingtoexaminetheendresults ofsuch looping.
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Thereis anopportunity heretoextend cognitionotherways giventhatthe humanmind
is necessarilyextendedandthe human subjectis aless secure,discrete,andautonomous
startingpoint. Ratherthan shunningthe complexityofassessing such a cognitiveagent, Henry
(2010) runs with it,followingimplicitlytheleads created butnotdeveloped byClark.
Addressingfears thathis modelwillleadto,forinstance,disembodiment(thatthe bodywillno
longermatter) or socialisolation (fears thatonlineenvironments moveus fartherandfarther
apart),Clark(2003) wrotethathe anticipates multiple embodimentand socialcomplexity (p.
194).Clarkarguedthatratherthanrejectingoutrightthe conditions ofhumanityas he
describedthem,which is,quitefrankly,difficulttoimagine, thetaskis tomergegracefully,to
mergeinways thatarevirtuous,thatbringus closertooneanother,makeus moretolerant,
enhanceunderstanding, celebrateembodiment,andencouragemutualrespect (p. 194)we
can actively structurethekindofworld,technology,and culturethatwill buildthekinds of
people we choseto be (p. 195). Although soundingpie-in-the-skyto someanddownright
terrifyingtoothers,thesearepreciselytheissues wealways already have beforeus (hencethe
persuasiveandpervasiveprophylactic aroundthe humanistself). IfClarkis rightand human
cognitionandembodimentarenecessarilyextendedand cultivated,thenwe simply cannot
avoid buildingpeople.
This necessarily changes thegoals andvalueofperformanceappraisals. Ratherthan
whatHenry (2010) called the (pseudo)objectivism oftheperformanceappraisal, his
repurposedversionwouldenacta reflexiveepistemology (p. 21). This epistemologywould
aim tooperate from theperspectiveofany systems imbalanceintheways inwhich it
distributesand collects,filters,andarchivescognition (p. 21). Individualagents arenot
measuredagainstan (pseudo)objective standard butwithinareflexiveepistemological
appraisalthatwouldlocateagency (and hereHenry borrows from HerndlandLicona [2007])
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as, the conjunctionofa setofsocialand subjectiverelations thatconstitutethepossibilityof
action (as citedinHerndland Licona,p. 135). Performanceappraisals from such a
perspectivewouldentailongoingmonitoring bytechnical communicators andtheirallied
agents ofthis (remarkably complex) setofrelations toperceivemorepossibilities foraction
andtoquestion constraints onagency (p. 22).
Oncetheneedforareflexiveepistemologyis recognized,as I thinkitverymuch is in
technical communicationresearch,thenwe can begintoflesh outtheimplications ofClarks
arguments:todescribe how humans inhabitandnavigatemergers and coalitions thatextend
themind. Ourfields attentionandorientationto communication,organizations,andtools as
wellas ourgroundinginrhetoricaltheory, situates us to contributeintheseways. Henry
(2010) arguedthattechnical communicators atworkinthesemergers and coalitions style
themselves as ethnographers who canleverage theirembodiedexperiences andtheir histories
as culturally shapedagentsand collaboratewith technical communication specialists from the
academytoenhanceanorganizations performance (p. 23). Henryargued, as the sole
academic disciplineprobingorganizationalperformances, culturalperformances,and
technologicalperformances simultaneously,we can begintomarshalourknowledge [] to
revealvitalpowers (andperils) ofdiscourseinforums thatperhaps onlywe, collectively, can
discern (pp. 23-24).
From his placewithinthedisciplineofcognitive science,Clark(2003)ends his
generativeandprovocativeworks with arguments like, Thepossibilitythus exists foranopen-
endedvarietyofnew andpotentforms ofswarm intelligence [adramatic metaphorfor
extendedmind],with meta-feedbackreconfiguringourfilteringroutines to suitthedifferent
types,ofmoods,ofusers (p. 189). Technical communicationresearcherscanwriteand
generatewhatcomes next:namely,repurposinggenres and shapingperformances toensure
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thatsuch forms ofswarm intelligencearemademanifest. Theextendedqualities ofthe
humanmind surelyraisethe stakes ofrhetoricalperformances ofanykind.
Speakinginterms ofstakes brings us squarelytoMillers (1990) criticalresponseto
decision science.Miller confrontedthosewhowouldofferthefirm groundofscienceto
adjudicatedecision-making byrevealingtheassumptionofpre-existingvalues thatoperatein
such approaches. Millerrespondedtoamove,which continues tothis day, by some social
sciences to conceive ofdecisionmakingas a scienceratherthananart,as apodictic procedure
thatimports theforceofnecessityintotherealm oftheuncertain (p. 163). Anexampleofthis
would beonlydebatingtheeconomic feasibilityofa corporatemoveandeschewinga
discussionofwhetherthemoveoughtto bemadeatall. This move,Miller claimed, reversesthe
rhetoricalturn (p. 163), bywhich Millermeanttheextensionofuncertaintytomatters other
than Athenian civic affairsbeyondethics andpolitics tophilosophy, science,andtheacademic
disciplines ingeneral (p. 162).
Decision science,likethoseunsettledresponses toClark,presumes a certainorientation
tovalues (inasmuch as itassumes atranscendentsetofvalues) thatis problematic both for
Clarks brandofcognitive scienceandfortechnical communicationresearch.Miller (1990) first
applied Booths chargeofmotivismaninabilitytoreasonaboutvaluesquitepersuasively
here. Indiscussingtheextendedmind,giventhe consequences or stakes oftools and
environments ithighlights,wemustbefullypreparedtoreasonaboutvalues,which are
implicitinthetools we build,theenvironments we construct,andthemodes ofassessmentwe
create.MillernextappliedPerelmans claim thatproblems ofaction [are] sometimes reduced
toproblems ofknowledge (as citedin Perelman, 1982,p. 7). Interms ofextendedminds,this
means askingifthis orthattoolworks toextendthemindratherthanasking shouldthis orthat
tool beincorporatedgiventhepossibleoutcomes ofsuch anendorsement? Whereas Porteret
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al. (2000),underscoredtherhetorically constructedand contestedfeatures ofinstitutions,
Millerdrove homethe stilllargerargumentaboutthevalues thatunderscoreanyenvironment
ortool,andthus anyextensionofthe humanmind. Itis inthis veinthatMiller,quotingGarver,
remindedus thatitis rhetoric thatis concernedwith the essentially contestable (p. 162).
Oneofthereasons Henrys (2010) pieceis sopersuasiveis thathis proposed system of
accountability seems designedtoavoidmotivism. Towaittotheendtoassess apresumably
discreteandautonomous individualis to both ignore how thatindividual works through the
organizationandtheresources itmakes available,anditis topassupopportunities toimprove
how this reciprocalandemergentrelationshipfunctions. This is notsimplyaboutrecognizing
theposthumanintheworkoftechnical communication; itis aboutreorganizing workinways
thatimproveit.Clark(2003) wrote, As feedbacklinks becomericherandmorevaried,our
experiencewillrather becomeoneofmultiple ways of being embodied (p.194). Towaituntil
afterthefactofactivityis likewisetoleaveunexaminedthevalues thatmotivateit: Itis to
replacethequestionis this how we ought to have worked? withdid you accomplish this or that
task?
Thelongand shortofit,then,inresponsetothe challenges Clarks brandofcognitive
science confronts,is thatwemustmakearguments,andwemustmakethem persuasivelyand
continually. Ifthe humanmindis nolonger brainbound,thenitcanlonger bearhetoricaleither.
Oncethemindis morethanneurons andgraymatterandis instead comprisedofneuronaland
extraneuronal,nonbiological,and culturalelements,decisions mustbeassessedinterms of
values andeffects andmadeinways thatpromoteandprovide constantfeedbackdesignedto
continually (re)assess and (re)cultivate.With no biological-cognitive coretoappealto,we have
toassess continuallyand constantly: Itis such activitythatproduces theverythings that(will)
mattertous. This is whatClarkgrapples with andwhatMiller, Henry,andmanyothertechnical
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communicationresearchers arewillingandableto supply:themeans torhetoricallyand
productivelyengageuncertaintythrough theoryandpracticeandwith research methodologies
groundedinthelivedexperienceofbeings possessedofextendedminds.
CONCLUSION: MOMENTS OF CONVERGENCE
Thesethreepoints ofconvergence suggestthattheworkI proposefortechnical
communicationresearchers is alreadyunderway.Thefieldoftechnical communication,with
its robustresearch agendaand sophisticatedarrayoftheoreticalperspectives, cannothelp but
contributetorelatedand complementarydisciplines. Theframeworkforinterdisciplinary
workcreated by Klein (1990) andadvocatedfor by Johnson (1998/2004)is morethanarubric
forassessinginterdisciplinaryefforts afterthefact. Itisanactionplanforgeneratingparticular
kinds ofinterdisciplinaryprojectsspots ofinductiveopenness (Klein,p. 93). Additionally,
theworkI describe hereis nottheonlywayforwardfortechnical communicationresearchers;
itis alsonolongerthe casethatweneedalways speakofways forward. Thefield,as I
experienceitin journals,onlitservs,andatconferences,is healthyandrobust(eveninthe
agonism wefindinallthree). Neitherdo I wish to suggestthatourlegitimacymustcome
through articulatingourselves with other,apparentlymoreprestigious disciplines. I offerup
this argumentas partofour continualtweakingoftechnical communicationas adisciplineand
as afield,andto suggestthatalldisciplines oweittooneanothertotalktoeach other. The
future I proposeis oneofcontinuingourtraditionalworkbutdoing soinnew places andwith
new people,andwith anunderstandingthatsuch work,whileambitious,mustalso be cautious
andpatient.
First, several conferences existaroundintersections ofthe humanities and cognitive
scienceandprovidenew places forourwork.Clarkwas aplenary speakerataneuroscience
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and humanities conferenceatBucknell Universityinthe springof2007. Duringmanyofthe
Q&A sessions itbecameincreasingly clearthatneither sidewas fullyprepared (evenwhile
being committed) totalktooneanother. Theylackedaperspectivethatmighthaveallowed
them tomorefruitfullyengageeach other. Technical communicationresearchers,existingas
theydoinaliminal space betweentechnology, science,andthe humanities,areuniquely
positionedtomediate such paradigmatic differences. Indeed,arecenttechrhetdiscussion
centeredpreciselyaround how thefieldoftechnical communication sees itselfin such
intersections as the humanities anddigitaltechnologies andnew media.Whatbettervenueto
shareouruniquepositionthan conferences dedicatedto constructing such bridges? As Knievel
(2006) has argued,technical communications uniquerelationshipto both technologyandthe
humanities affords theopportunitytomakethe casefor takinganticipatory,developmental
responsibilityfortools,aview thatoften seems incongruous with the humanitiesnotionof
self (p. 77).
Second, several journals existaroundtheseissues,forinstanceJanus Head. These
outlets,oftendealingwith anareaofscholarshipknownas philosophyofmind,makeitclear
thattherearepublishingvenues friendlyto scholars interestedinaskingquestions about
cognitionandthe humanmindfrom withinparadigms previouslyignored bythe sciences of
mind (Rivers & Tirrell,inpress).
Finally, such convergences canproductivelyengageindividual scholars from
complementarydisciplines. As I mentionedintheintroduction, I am currently collaborating
with thepsychologistMaarten Derksenin creatingatheoreticalframeworkforunderstanding
experimentalpsychology, cognitive science,and communicationas allimplicatedin complex
rhetoricalecologies ratherthanas securedindiscrete, bounded situations. This is relevantin
psychology,forinstance,forthoseinterestedinunderstandingthedynamics andethical
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implications oftheplaceboeffectandtheuseofpriminginexperimental conditions, both of
which requiredeceptiononthepartoftheexperimenter. Itis alsoofvalueforthosein
cognitive scienceexploring how beliefs cometo subtly (re)constitute human cognition. In
terms oftechnical communicationresearch,this projectnecessarily confronts issues of
usabilityandthepersuasiveworkofsecuringendorsements onthepartofusers. Itis alsowork
thatdraws equallyonallthreedisciplines. Such collaborations bringtechnical communication
research tootherdisciplines inmutually beneficialways.
Clarks workimplicitlyandexplicitly calls forthekindofbroad convergence I have
sketched here.Motivatedandmarshaledintheways I describe,technical communication
researchers areuniquelypositionedtoparticipateina still-emergingandlargelyunsettledarea
ofthe studyofintelligentbehavior.Cognitive science,which fordecades treatedminds ina
vacuum, has turnedtotreatcognitioninthewild. Oncethemindis recognizedas necessarily
extendedintoamessyand complexworld,paradigms alreadyengagedin such environs must
beincluded:Clarkmakes this callexplicit. I arguethatourdisciplineoffers justsuch a
paradigm,andthatinthe spiritofinterdisciplinarydiscourseand committedtothegoalof
improvingtools,environments,andmethods ofassessment,we shouldmakeitavailableto
others inthefutureto come.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThankyouto both AndyClarkandMaarten Derksenfortheirgenerous feedbackthroughout
this project. They helpedmythinkingaboutspecific aspects ofmyargument,and,more
importantly,they convincedmewith their collegialitythatsuch convergences areindeed
possible.
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Nathaniel A. Rivers is anassistantprofessorofEnglish atGeorgetown University. His current
research is intheareaofmaterialrhetorics. His workhas appearedintheJournal of Technical
Writing and Communication,Kairos,andJanus Head.