fulltext cases ( tooorts).docx

7/24/2019 fulltext cases ( tooorts).docx

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G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO,petitioners,

vs.

ON. COURT O! A""EALS, TE ON. ARISTON L. RU#IO, RTC Jud$e, #%an&' 20,

()$an, I*o&o+ Su% (ICTOR #UN-OC and CLARA #UN-OC, respondents.

!ELICIANO, J.:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot ennifer !amargo

"ith an air rifle causing in#uries "hich resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for

damages "as filed "ith the $egional !rial %ourt, Branch 20, &igan, 'locos (ur, doc)eted as

%ivil %ase *o. +-/&, by petitioner acario !amargo, ennifers adopting parent, and

petitioner spouses %elso and Aurelia !amargo, ennifers natural parents against respondent

spouses &ictor and %lara Bundoc, Adelbertos natural parents "ith "hom he "as living at the

time of the tragic incident. 'n addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or

omicide through $ec)less 'mprudence "as filed 3%riminal %ase *o. 122/&4 against

Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, ho"ever, "as ac5uitted and e6empted from criminal liability on

the ground that he bad acted "ithout discernment.

7rior to the incident, or on 10 ecember 1981, the spouses (abas and elisa $apisura had filed a

petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in (pecial 7roceedings *o. 0++/! before the then

%ourt of irst 'nstance of 'locos (ur. !his petition for adoption "as grunted on, 18 *ovember

1982, that is, afterAdelberto had shot and )illed ennifer.

'n their Ans"er, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelbertos natural parents, reciting the result of

the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents,

namely the spouses (abas and elisa $apisura, "ere indispensable parties to the action since

parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition

for adoption "as filed.

7etitioners in their $eply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc "as then actually living "ithhis natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relin5uished by the mere filing

and granting of a petition for adoption.

!he trial court on + ecember 198 dismissed petitioners complaint, ruling that respondent

natural parents of Adelberto indeed "ere not indispensable parties to the action.

7etitioners received a copy of the trial courts ecision on ecember 198. :ithin the 1-/day

reglementary period, or on 1 ecember 198, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

follo"ed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 1- anuary 1988. 't appearing,

ho"ever, that the motions failed to comply "ith (ections and - of $ule 1- of the $evised

$ules of %ourt ; that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three and that said notice shall state the time and place of

hearing ; both motions "ere denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28

April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. 'n its Order dated ? une 1988, the trial court

dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 1-/day

reglementary period ending 22 ecember 198.

7etitioners "ent to the %ourt of Appeals on a petition formandamus andcertiorari 5uestioning

the trial courts ecision dated + ecember 198 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and ? une

1988, !he %ourt of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to

appeal.

'n the present 7etition for $evie", petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses

Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor

child, Adelberto Bundoc. $esolution of this 7etition hinges on the follo"ing issues@

conversely, "hether the %ourt may still ta)e cogniance of the case even through petitioners

appeal had been filed out of t ime> and


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:hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. (uch fault or negligence,

if there is no pre/e6isting contractual relation bet"een the parties, is called

a quasi-delict. . .

pon the other hand, the la" imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or

incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child"ho lives "ith

them. Article 2180 of the %ivil %ode reads@

!he obligation imposed by article 21? is demandable not only for ones

o"n acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for "hom one is

responsible.

!he father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible

for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

666 666 666

!he responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease "hen the person

herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father

of a family to prevent damage.


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in any case, actual custody of Adelberto "as then "ith his

natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, "e conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, "ere

indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the

trial court of petitioners complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,

constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac) or e6cess of #urisdiction.

:C$CO$C, premises considered, the 7etition for $evie" is hereby G$A*!C C

%O$(C and the ecision of the %ourt of Appeals dated ? (eptember 1988, in %.A./G.$. *o.

(7/1-01? is hereby $C&C$(C and (C! A('C. 7etitioners complaint filed before the trial

court is hereby $C'*(!A!C and this case is $CA*C to that court for further

proceedings consistent "ith this ecision. %osts against respondent Bundoc spouses. !his

ecision is immediately e6ecutory.

(O O$C$C.

3G.$. *o. 0890. (eptember 18, 1992.4

CRESENCIO LI#I and AMELIA A" LI#I, "e))one%+, . ON. INTERME-IATE

A""ELLATE COURT, !ELI"E GOTIONG and SIRLE GOTIONG, Re+onden+.

Ale6 F. !an, for 7etitioners.

ario . Orti and anilo &. Orti for 7rivate $espondents.

(FEEAB(

1. %'&'E EA:> HA(' CE'%!> E'AB'E'!F O 7A$C*!( O$ %'&'E E'AB'E'!FA$'('*G $O %$''*AE OC*(C( %O'!!C BF !C'$ '*O$ %'E$C*>

$EC. ; !he parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from


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criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or"ho live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted "ith the diligence of a good

father of a family to prevent such damages. !hat primary liability is premised on the provisionsof Article 101 of the $evised 7enal %ode "ith respect to damages e6 delicto caused by theirchildren 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 1- years of age "ho acted "ithoutdiscernment> and, "ith regard to their children over 9 but under 1- years of age "ho acted "ithdiscernment, or 1- years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be

imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the %ivil %ode. nder said Article 2180, the enforcement ofsuch liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, themother. !his "as amplified by the %hild and Fouth :elfare %ode "hich provides that the same

shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in caseof her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed

by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. o"ever, under the amily %ode, thiscivil liability is no", "ithout such alternative 5ualification, the responsibility of the parents andthose "ho e6ercise parental authority over the minor offender. or civil liability arising from5uasi/delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance "ith Articles 2180

and 2182 of the %ivil %ode, as so modified.

C % ' ( ' O *

$CGAEAO, .@

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorro" is sometimes a touchstone oflove. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, "herein t"o lovers died "hile still inthe prime of their years, a bitter episode for those "hose lives they have touched. :hile "ecannot e6pect to a"ard complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal

verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an e6tended#udicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.

'n this final denouement of the #udicial recourse the stages "hereof "ere alternately initiated bythe parties, petitioners are no" before us see)ing the reversal of the #udgment of respondent

court promulgated on anuary 2, 198- in A%/G.$. %& *o. ?90?0 "ith the follo"ing decretalportion@#[email protected]

D:C$CO$C, the decision of the lo"er court dismissing plaintiffIs complaint is herebyreversed> and instead, #udgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, #ointly and solidarily,to pay to plaintiffs the follo"ing [email protected] @ virtual la" library

1. oral damages, 7+0,000.000>

2. C6emplary damages, 710,000.00>

+. AttorneyIs fees, 720,000.00, and costs.

o"ever, denial of defendants/appelleesI counterclaims is affirmed.D 1

(ynthesied from the findings of the lo"er courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the

legitimate parents of ulie Ann Gotiong "ho, at the time of the deplorable incident "hich too)place and from "hich she died on anuary 1, 199, "as an 18/year old first year commerce

student of the niversity of (an %arlos, %ebu %ity> "hile petitioners are the parents of :endell

Eibi, then a minor bet"een 18 and 19 years of age living "ith his aforesaid parents, and "hoalso died in the same event on the same date.

or more than t"o and

2. :hether or not Article 2180 of the %ivil %ode "as correctly interpreted by respondent court

to ma)e petitioners liable for vicarious liability. +

'n the proceedings before the trial court, r. esus 7. %erna, 7olice edico/Eegal Officer of

%ebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining "hether or not thegunshot "ound "as inflicted on :endell Eibi by his o"n suicidal act. o"ever, undue emphasis

"as placed by the lo"er court on the absence of gunpo"der or tattooing around the "ound at the


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point of entry of the bullet. 't should be emphasied, ho"ever, that this is not the onlycircumstance to be ta)en into account in the determination of "hether it "as suicide or not.

't is true that said "itness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close/contact of ane6plosive discharge in the entrance "ound. o"ever, as pointed out by private respondents, the

body of deceased :endell Eibi must have been "ashed at the funeral parlor, considering thehasty interment thereof a little after eight


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o"ever, ames Cnri5ue !an testified that he sa" a Dshado"D on top of the gate of the Gotiongs,but denied having tal)ed "ith anyone regarding "hat he sa". e e6plained that he lives in a

duple6 house "ith a garden in front of it> that his house is ne6t to elipe GotiongIs house> and hefurther gave the follo"ing ans"ers to these [email protected] @ virtual la" library

DA!!F. O$!'L@

A rom upstairs in my living room.

A!!F. O$!'L

Analying the foregoing testimonies, "e agree "ith respondent court that the same do notinspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the "itnessesI observations, since the visual

perceptions of both "ere obstructed by high "alls in their respective houses in relation to thehouse of herein private respondents. On the other hand, "itness anolo Alfonso, testifying onrebuttal, attested "ithout contradiction that he and his sister, alou Alfonso, "ere "aiting for

ulie Ann Gotiong "hen they heard her scream> that "hen anolo climbed the fence to see "hat"as going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot> and, not more than five


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mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability "ouldattach if the damage is caused "ith criminal intent.I


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'n C6conde, "here the 1-/year old minor "as convicted of double homicide through rec)less

imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father "ere held#ointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of afamily. !he same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability "as imposed in a separatecivil action in Araneta on the parents and their 1/year old son "ho "as found guilty offrustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 219 of the %ivil %ode providing for solidary

responsibility of t"o or more persons "ho are liable for a 5uasi/delict.

o"ever, in (alen, the father "as declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the

conviction of his son, "ho "as over 1- but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180but, this time, disregarding Article 219 of the %ivil %ode. 'n the present case, as alreadye6plained, the petitioners herein "ere also held liable but supposedly in line "ith uellas "hich

purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physicalin#uries committed by their 1+/year old son. On the other hand, in 7aleyan, the mother and her19/year old son "ere ad#udged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for

homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the %ivil %ode since this is li)e"ise not coveredby Article 101 of the $evised 7enal %ode. inally, in Clcano, although the son "as ac5uitted in ahomicide charge due to Dlac) of intent, coupled "ith mista)e,D it "as ruled that "hile underArticle 2180 of the %ivil %ode there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son,

Dalthough married, "as living "ith his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of theoccurrence,D but Dis no" of age, as a matter of e5uityD the father "as only held subsidiarilyliable.

't bears stressing, ho"ever, that the $evised 7enal %ode provides for subsidiary liability only for

persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of anuncontrollable fear> 2 inn)eepers, tavern)eepers and proprietors of establishments> 28employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry> 29 and principals,accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co/accused in the other classes.

+0

Also, coming bac) to respondent courtIs reliance on uellas in its decision in the present case, itis not e6actly accurate to say that uellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein.A careful scrutiny sho"s that "hat respondent court 5uoted verbatim in its decision no" on

appeal in the present case, and "hich it attributed to uellas, "as the syllabus on the la" reportof said case "hich spo)e of DsubsidiaryD liability. o"ever, such categoriation does notspecifically appear in the te6t of the decision in uellas. 'n fact, after revie"ing therein the cases

of C6conde, Araneta and (alen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the $evised7enal %ode in relation to Article 2180 of the %ivil %ode, this %ourt concluded its decision in this"ise@#[email protected]

Doreover, the case at bar "as decided by the %ourt of Appeals on the basis of evidencesubmitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault

or negligence under Article 21? upon "hich the present action "as instituted, is entirelyseparate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the 7enal%ode


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!he %A held that ayor iguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of arvinayme. (aid the appellate court@

oreover, plaintiffs/appellees admitted that ayor iguel "as not the employer of Eoano.

!hus, paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the unicipality of oronadal "as the employerof both ayor iguel and Eoano. *ot being the employer of Eoano, ayor iguel could notthus be held liable for the damages caused by the former. ayor iguel "as a mere passengerin the 'suu pic)/up at the time of the accident.314 O$CO&C$, !C %O*%E('O*( $A:* BF !CO*O$ABEC %O$! O A77CAE( A$C AEE BA(C O* %O*C%!$C( A*

($'(C( A* AGA'*(! A%%C7!C %O$(C O '%'AE 7$O%CC'*G( :'%$GC*!EF %AEE O$ A* CMC$%'(C O !'( O*O$ABEC %O$!( (7C$&'('O*.31-4

Our $uling

!he doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case.

(pouses ayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability attaches to ayor iguel. e "as nota mere passenger, but instead one "ho had direct control and supervision over Eoano during

the time of the accident. According to petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated bythe fact that Eoanos employer "as the unicipality of oronadal. ayor iguel, beingEoanos superior, still had control over the manner the vehicle "as operated.

Article 218031?4 of the %ivil %ode provides that a person is not only liable for ones o"n 5uasi/delictual acts, but also for those persons for "hom one is responsible for. !his liability is

popularly )no"n as vicarious or imputed liability. !o sustain claims against employers for theacts of their employees, the follo"ing re5uisites must be established@


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(ignificantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fello" employee although the person mayhave the right to control the manner of the vehicles operation.32?4'n the absence of an employer/

employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the drivers negligence should not beattributed to a fello" employee "ho only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.324:hatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to

#ustify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability. andley v. Eombardi3284 isinstructive on this e6ception to the rule on vicarious liability@

7laintiff "as not the master or principal of the driver of the truc), but only an intermediate andsuperior employee or agent. !his being so, the doctrine of respondeat superior or 5ui facit per

alium is not properly applicable to him. is po"er to direct and control the driver "as not asmaster, but only by virtue of the fact that they "ere both employed by ruse, and the further factthat as ruses agent he "as delegated ruses authority over the driver. 6 6 6

'n the case of actionable negligence, the rule is "ell settled both in this state and else"here thatthe negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be imputed to a superioremployee or agent, but only to the master or principal. Guild v. Bro"n, 11- %al. App. + 31 7ac. Cllis v. (outhern$y. %o., 2 (. %. ? 32 E. $. A. !hurman v. 7ittsburg Q . %opper

%o., 1 ont. 11 3108 7ac. -884> 2 %or. ur., p. 829> and see the elaborate note in ?1 A. E. $.2, and particularly that part commencing at p. 290.= :e can see no logical reason for dra"ingany distinction in this regard bet"een actionable negligence and contributory negligence. 6 663294

!he rule "as reiterated in Bryant v. 7acific Clec. $y. %o.3+04 and again in (ichterman v.

ollingshead %o.3+14

'n ("anson v. cHuo"n,3+24 a case involving a military officer "ho happened to be riding in acar driven by a subordinate later involved in an accident, the %olorado (upreme %ourt adheredto the general rule that a public official is not liable for the "rongful acts of his subordinates ona vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master/servant situation.3++4 !he court "ent

on to rule that the only e6ception is "hen they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct orencourage it.3+4

'n the case at bar, ayor iguel "as neither Eoanos employer nor the vehicles registeredo"ner. !here e6isted no causal relationship bet"een him and Eoano or the vehicle used that

"ill ma)e him accountable for arvins death. ayor iguel "as a mere passenger at the timeof the accident.

7arenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providinghim "arnings or by serving as loo)out does not ma)e the passenger liable for the lattersnegligent acts.3+-4 !he drivers duty is not one that may be delegated to others.3+?4

As correctly held by the trial court, the true and la"ful employer of Eoano is the unicipality

of oronadal. nfortunately for (pouses ayme, the municipality may not be sued because it isan agency of the (tate engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. !hisimmunity is illustrated in unicipality of (an ernando, Ea nion v. irme,3+4 "here this%ourt held@

't has already been remar)ed that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant

them the competence to sue and be sued. *evertheless, they are generally not liable for torts

committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held ans"erableonly if it can be sho"n that they "ere acting in proprietary capacity. 'n permitting such entities

to be sued, the (tate merely gives the claimant the right to sho" that the defendant "as notacting in governmental capacity "hen the in#ury "as committed or that the case comes under thee6ceptions recognied by la". ailing this, the claimant cannot recover.3+84

&erily, liability attaches to the registered o"ner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.!he %A observation along this line are "orth restating@

(ettled is the rule that the registered o"ner of a vehicle is #ointly and severally liable "ith the

driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a conse5uence of in#uries ordeath sustained in the operation of said vehicles. $egardless of "ho the actual o"ner of thevehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the publicand third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the conse5uences incident

31, 200/

NATI(I-A- :Su=+)ued => 'e% &')*d%en MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIUE

AGANA, JR., EMMA AGANA AN-AA, JESUS AGANA, and RAMUN- AGANA< and

ENRIUE AGANA, 7etitioners,vs.

JUAN !UENTES,$espondent.

6/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / / 6

G.R. No. 12/590 Janua%> 31, 200/

MIGUEL AM"IL, 7etitioner,vs.NATI(I-A- AGANA and ENRIUE AGANA,$espondents.


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C % ' ( ' O *

SAN-O(AL6GUTIERRE7,J.:

ospitals, having underta)en one of man)indIs most important and delicate endeavors, mustassume the grave responsibility of pursuing it "ith appropriate care. !he care and servicedispensed through this high trust, ho"ever technical, comple6 and esoteric its character may be,

must meet standards of responsibility commensurate "ith the underta)ing to preserve andprotect the health, and indeed, the very lives of those placed in the hospitalIs )eeping.1

Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for revie" on certiorari is the %ourt of AppealsIecision2dated (eptember ?, 199? in %A/G.$. %& *o. 20?2 and %A/G.$. (7 *o. +2198affirming "ith modification the ecision+dated arch 1, 199+ of the $egional !rial %ourt
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html#fnt1


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b. !he sum of 7,800.00 as travel ta6es of plaintiffs and their physiciandaughter>

c. !he total sum of 7-,802.-0, representing the cost of hospitaliation at

7olymedic ospital, medical fees, and cost of the saline solution>

2. As moral damages, the sum of 72,000,000.00>

+. As e6emplary damages, the sum of 7+00,000.00>

. As attorneyIs fees, the sum of 72-0,000.00>

-. Eegal interest on items 1 and

?. %osts of suit.

(O O$C$C.

Aggrieved, 7(', r. uentes and r. Ampil interposed an appeal to the %ourt of Appeals,

doc)eted as %A/G.$. %& *o. 20?2.

'ncidentally, on April +, 199+, the Aganas filed "ith the $!% a motion for a partial e6ecution ofits ecision, "hich "as granted in an Order dated ay 11, 199+. !hereafter, the sheriff leviedupon certain properties of r. Ampil and sold them for 7-1,2-.00 and delivered the amount tothe Aganas.

ollo"ing their receipt of the money, the Aganas entered into an agreement "ith 7(' and r.uentes to indefinitely suspend any further e6ecution of the $!% ecision. o"ever, not long

thereafter, the Aganas again filed a motion for an alias "rit of e6ecution against the properties of7(' and r. uentes. On (eptember 21, 199+, the $!% granted the motion and issued thecorresponding "rit, prompting r. uentes to file "ith the %ourt of Appeals a petition forcertiorari and prohibition, "ith prayer for preliminary in#unction, doc)eted as %A/G.$. (7 *o.+2198. uring its pendency, the %ourt of Appeals issued a $esolution-dated October 29, 199+

granting r. uentesI prayer for in#unctive relief.

On anuary 2, 199, %A/G.$. (7 *o. +2198 "as consolidated "ith %A/G.$. %& *o. 20?2.

ean"hile, on anuary 2+, 199-, the 7$% Board o f edicine rendered its ecision?inAdministrative %ase *o. 1?90 dismissing the case against r. uentes. !he Board held that the

prosecution failed to sho" that r. uentes "as the one "ho left the t"o pieces of gaue inside*atividadIs body> and that he concealed such fact from *atividad.

On (eptember ?, 199?, the %ourt of Appeals rendered its ecision #ointly disposing of %A/G.$.%& *o. 20?2 and %A/G.$. (7 *o. +2198, thus@

:C$CO$C, e6cept for the modification that the case against defendant/appellant r. uan

uentes is hereby '('((C, and "ith the pronouncement that defendant/appellant r.

iguel Ampil is liable to reimburse defendant/appellant 7rofessional (ervices, 'nc., "hateveramount the latter "ill pay or had paid to the plaintiffs/appellees, the decision appealed from is

hereby A'$C and the instant appeal '('((C.

%oncomitant "ith the above, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein defendant/appellant r. uan uentes in %A/G.$. (7 *o. +2198 is hereby G$A*!C and the challengedorder of the respondent #udge dated (eptember 21, 199+, as "ell as the alias "rit of e6ecutionissued pursuant thereto are hereby *EE''C and (C! A('C. !he bond posted by the

petitioner in connection "ith the "rit of preliminary in#unction issued by this %ourt on

*ovember 29, 199+ is hereby cancelled.

%osts against defendants/appellants r. iguel Ampil and 7rofessional (ervices, 'nc.

(O O$C$C.

Only r. Ampil filed a motion for reconsideration, but it "as denied in a $esolution dated

ecember 19, 199?.

ence, the instant consolidated petitions.

'n G.$. *o. 12?29, 7(' alleged in its petition that the %ourt of Appeals erred in holding that@


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r. Ampil, in an attempt to absolve himself, gears the %ourtIs attention to other possible causesof *atividadIs detriment. e argues that the %ourt should not discount either of the follo"ing

possibilities@ first, r. uentes left the gaues in *atividadIs body after performinghysterectomy> second, the attending nurses erred in counting the gaues> and third, the Americandoctors "ere the ones "ho placed the gaues in *atividadIs body.

r. AmpilIs arguments are purely con#ectural and "ithout basis. $ecords sho" that he did notpresent any evidence to prove that the American doctors "ere the ones "ho put or left thegaues in *atividadIs body. *either did he submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the record

of operation, particularly the number of gaues used. As to the alleged negligence of r.

uentes, "e are mindful that r. Ampil e6amined his and


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re5uisites, the most instrumental is the Dcontrol and management of the thing "hich caused thein#ury.D1-

:e find the element of Dcontrol and management of the thing "hich caused the in#uryD to be

"anting. ence, the doctrine of res ipsa lo5uitur "ill not lie.

't "as duly established that r. Ampil "as the lead surgeon during the operation of *atividad.

e re5uested the assistance of r. uentes only to perform hysterectomy "hen he


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!he case of (chloendorff v. (ociety of *e" For) ospital2?"as then considered an authority forthis vie". !he D(chloendorff doctrineD regards a physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an

independent contractor because of the s)ill he e6ercises and the lac) of control e6erted over his"or). nder this doctrine, hospitals are e6empt from the application of the respondeat superior

principle for fault or negligence committed by physicians in the discharge of their profession.

o"ever, the efficacy of the foregoing doctrine has "ea)ened "ith the significant developmentsin medical care. %ourts came to realie that modern hospitals are increasingly ta)ing active rolein supplying and regulating medical care to patients. *o longer "ere a hospitalIs functions

limited to furnishing room, food, facilities for treatment and operation, and attendants for its

patients. !hus, in Bing v. !hunig,2the *e" For) %ourt of Appeals deviated from the(chloendorff doctrine, noting that modern hospitals actually do far more than provide facilitiesfor treatment. $ather, they regularly employ, on a salaried basis, a large staff of physicians,

interns, nurses, administrative and manual "or)ers. !hey charge patients for medical care andtreatment, even collecting for such services through legal action, if necessary. !he court thenconcluded that there is no reason to e6empt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeatsuperior.

'n our shores, the nature of the relationship bet"een the hospital and the physicians is renderedinconse5uential in vie" of our categorical pronouncement in $amos v. %ourt of Appeals28that

for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer/employeerelationship in effect e6ists bet"een hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. !his%ourt held@

D:e no" discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. !he uni5ue practice


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patients, *atividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such"ere being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants. !he trial court

correctly pointed out@

6 6 6 regardless of the education and status in life of the patient, he ought not be burdened "iththe defense of absence of employer/employee relationship bet"een the hospital and theindependent physician "hose name and competence are certainly certified to the general public

by the hospitalIs act of listing him and his specialty in its lobby directory, as in the case herein.!he high costs of todayIs medical and health care should at least e6act on the hospital greater, if

not broader, legal responsibility for the conduct of treatment and surgery "ithin its facility by its

accredited physician or surgeon, regardless of "hether he is independent or employed.D++

!he "isdom of the foregoing ratiocination is easy to discern. %orporate entities, li)e 7(', arecapable of acting only through other individuals, such as physicians. 'f these accredited

physicians do their #ob "ell, the hospital succeeds in its mission of offering 5uality medicalservices and thus profits financially. Eogically, "here negligence mars the 5uality of its services,

the hospital should not be allo"ed to escape liability for the acts of its ostensible agents.

:e no" proceed to the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility.

One allegation in the complaint in %ivil %ase *o. H/+++2 for negligence and malpractice isthat 7(' as o"ner, operator and manager of edical %i ty ospital, Ddid not perform the

necessary supervision nor e6ercise diligent efforts in the supervision of rs. Ampil and uentesand its nursing staff, resident doctors, and medical interns "ho assisted rs. Ampil and uentesin the performance of their duties as surgeons.D+7remised on the doctrine of corporate

negligence, the trial court held that 7(' is directly liable for such breach of duty.

:e agree "ith the trial court.

$ecent years have seen the doctrine of corporate negligence as the #udicial ans"er to theproblem of allocating hospitalIs liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absentfacts to support the application of respondeat superior or apparent authority. 'ts formulation

proceeds from the #udiciaryIs ac)no"ledgment that in these modern times, the duty of providing5uality medical service is no longer the sole prerogative and responsibility of the physician. !he

modern hospitals have changed structure. ospitals no" tend to organie a highly professional

medical staff "hose competence and performance need to be monitored by the hospitalscommensurate "ith their inherent responsibility to provide 5uality medical care.+-

!he doctrine has its genesis in arling v. %harleston %ommunity ospital.+?!here, the (upreme%ourt of 'llinois held that Dthe #ury could have found a hospital negligent, inter alia, in failing to

have a sufficient number of trained nurses attending the patient> failing to re5uire a consultation"ith or e6amination by members of the hospital staff> and failing to revie" the treatmentrendered to the patient.D On the basis of arling, other #urisdictions held that a hospitalIscorporate negligence e6tends to permitting a physician )no"n to be incompetent to practice atthe hospital.+:ith the passage of time, more duties "ere e6pected from hospitals, among them@


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(ubse5uent to the 7urcell decision, the Ariona %ourt of Appeals held that a hospital has certaininherent responsibilities regarding the 5uality of medical care furnished to patients "ithin its

"alls and it must meet the standards of responsibility commensurate "ith this underta)ing.Beec) v. !ucson General ospital, 18 Ari. App. 1?-, -00 7. 2d 11-+

2. a)ing permanent the "rit of preliminary in#unction issued by this %ourt on une 21, 1991>


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+. Ordering defendant (o 7ing Bun to pay the aggrieved party, plaintiff !e) ua Cnterprising%orporation, the sum of 7-00,000.00, for attorneys fees>

. ismissing the complaint, insofar as plaintiff anuel %. !iong is concerned, and therespective counterclaims of the defendant>-. Ordering defendant (o 7ing Bun to pay the costs of this la"suit>!his #udgment is "ithout pre#udice to the rights of plaintiff !e) ua Cnterprising %orporationand defendant ee %. %huan Q (ons, 'nc. to negotiate for the rene"al of their lease contracts

over the premises located at *os. 9+0, 9+0/'nt., 92/B and 92/% (oler (treet, Binondo, anila,under such terms and conditions as they agree upon, provided they are not contrary to la",

public policy, public order, and morals.

(O O$C$C.3-47etitioners motion for reconsideration of the above decision "as denied.On appeal by (o 7ing Bun, the %ourt of Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion forreconsideration, the appellate court modified the decision by reducing the a"ard of attorneysfees from five hundred thousand and


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that the a"ard of attorneys fees is reduced from t"o hundred thousand


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. !C (7$CC %O$! AF A&C '*A&C$!C*!EF '($CGA$C !C CM7C$!!C(!'O*F O $. AO$A A* $A. %AEC$O*

C. !C O*O$ABEC (7$CC %O$! AF A&C '*A&C$!C*!EF A:A$CAAGC( !O 7C!'!'O*C$( C(7'!C !C A%! !A! !C$C :A( *O

*CGE'GC*%C O* !C 7A$! O $C(7O*C*! O%!O$.347rivate respondent e Eos (antos edical %enter li)e"ise moves for reconsideration on thefollo"ing grounds@

'!C O*O$ABEC %O$! C$$C '* G'&'*G C %O$(C !O !C '*(!A*!7C!'!'O* A( !C C%'('O* O !C O*O$ABEC %O$! O A77CAE( A

AE$CAF BC%OC '*AE A* CMC%!O$F''!C O*O$ABEC (7$CC %O$! C$$C '* '*'*G !A! A* C7EOFC$/C7EOFCC 3$CEA!'O*('74 CM'(!( BC!:CC* $C(7O*C*! C EO( (A*!O(C'%AE %C*!C$ A* $(. O$E'*O O(AA A* 7C$C%!A G!'C$$CL'''

!C O*O$ABEC (7$CC %O$! C$$C '* '*'*G !A! $C(7O*C*! CEO( (A*!O( C'%AE %C*!C$ '( (OE'A$'EF E'ABEC :'! $C(7O*C*!O%!O$('&

!C O*O$ABEC (7$CC %O$! C$$C '* '*%$CA('*G !C A:A$ OAAGC( '* A&O$ O 7C!'!'O*C$(.3-4'n the $esolution of ebruary 21, 2000, this %ourt denied the motions for reconsideration of

private respondents rs. osa)a and Gutierre. !hey then filed their respective second motions

for reconsideration. !he 7hilippine %ollege of (urgeons filed its 7etition/in/'nterventioncontending in the main that this %ourt erred in holding private respondent r. osa)a liableunder the captain of the ship doctrine. According to the intervenor, said doctrine had long beenabandoned in the nited (tates in recognition of the developments in modern medical andhospital practice.3?4 !he %ourt noted these pleadings in the $esolution of uly 1, 2000.34

On arch 19, 2001, the %ourt heard the oral arguments of the parties, including the intervenor.Also present during the hearing "ere the amicii curiae@ r. elipe A. Cstrella, r., %onsultant ofthe 7hilippine %harity ("eepsta)es, former irector of the 7hilippine General ospital andformer (ecretary of ealth> r. 'luminada !. %amagay, 7resident of the 7hilippine (ociety ofAnesthesiologists, 'nc. and 7rofessor and &ice/%hair for $esearch, epartment of

Anesthesiology, %ollege of edicine/7hilippine General ospital, niversity of the 7hilippines>and r. Eydia . Cgay, 7rofessor and &ice/%hair for Academics, epartment of Anesthesiology,%ollege of edicine/7hilippine General ospital, niversity of the 7hilippines.

!he %ourt enumerated the issues to be resolved in this case as follo"s@1. :C!C$ O$ *O! $. O$E'*O O(AA


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administration of anesthesia to Crlinda. $espondent ra. Gutierre act of seeing her patient forthe first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure "as, therefore, an act of

e6ceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. !he measures cautioning prudence andvigilance in dealing "ith human lives lie at the core of the physicians centuries/old ippocraticOath. er failure to follo" this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.31?4urther, there is no cogent reason for the %ourt to reverse its finding that it "as the faulty

intubation on Crlinda that caused her comatose condition. !here is no 5uestion that Crlindabecame comatose after r. Gutierre performed a medical procedure on her. Cven the counsel ofr. Gutierre admitted to this fact during the oral arguments@

%'C (!'%C@r. %ounsel, you started your argument saying that this involves a comatose patientKA!!F. GA*A@Fes, Four onor.%'C (!'%C@o" do you mean by that, a comatose, a comatose after any other acts "ere done by r.

Gutierre or comatose before any act "as done by herKA!!F. GA*A@

*o, "e meant comatose as a final outcome of the procedure.%'C (!'%C@

eaning to say, the patient became comatose after some intervention, professional acts havebeen done by r. GutierreKA!!F. GA*A@Fes, Four onor.

%'C (!'%C@'n other "ords, the comatose status "as a conse5uence of some acts performed by . GutierreKA!!F. GA*A@'t "as a conse5uence of the "ell,


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H !here "ere t"o attempts. 'n the first attempt "as the tube inserted or "as the laryngoscopeonly inserted, "hich "as insertedK

A All the laryngoscope.H All the laryngoscope. But if ' remember right some"here in the re/direct, a certain la"yer,you "ere as)ed that you did a first attempt and the 5uestion "as did you "ithdra" the tubeK Andyou said you never "ithdre" the tube, is that rightKA Fes.

H Fes. And so if you never "ithdre" the tube then there "as no, there "as no insertion of thetube during that first attempt. *o", the other thing that "e have to settle here is "hen cyanosisoccurred, is it recorded in the anesthesia record "hen the cyanosis, in your recording "hen did

the cyanosis occurKA


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significant because, as found by the trial court, it "as the absence of o6ygen supply for four


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6 6 6 7re/operative medication has three main functions@ One is to alleviate an6iety. (econd is todry up the secretions and !hird is to relieve pain. *o", it is very important to alleviate an6iety

because an6iety is associated "ith the outpouring of certain substances formed in the bodycalled adrenalin. :hen a patient is an6ious there i s an outpouring of adrenalin "hich "ould haveadverse effect on the patient. One of it is high blood pressure, the other is that he opens himselfto disturbances in the heart rhythm, "hich "ould have adverse implications. (o, "e "ould li)eto alleviate patients an6iety mainly because he "ill not be in control of his body there could be

adverse results to surgery and he "ill be opened up> a )nife is going to open up his body. 6 66324r. osa)a cannot no" claim that he "as entirely blameless of "hat happened to Crlinda. is

conduct clearly constituted a breach of his professional duties to Crlinda@%'C (!'%C@!"o other points. !he first, octor, you "ere tal)ing about an6iety, "ould you consider a

patients stay on the operating table for three hours sufficient enough to aggravate or magnify hisor her an6ietyK$. %AAGAF@

Fes.%'C (!'%C@'n other "ords, ' understand that in this particular case that "as the case, three hours "aiting andthe patient "as already on the operating table


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inally, the %ourt also deems it necessary to modify the a"ard of damages to petitioners in vie"of the supervening event of petitioner Crlindas death. 'n the assailed ecision, the %ourt

a"arded actual damages of One illion !hree undred ifty !"o !housand 7esos


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film Ligomar because the rental price "as prohibitive and assured him also that he could not getthe film for about si6 "ee)s. !he last of these letters "as "ritten on the 2?th of April, "hich

sho"ed conclusively that he )ne" they had to get this film from %uddy and from this letter thatthe agent in anila could not get it, but he made %uddy an offer himself and %uddy accepted it

because he "as paying about three times as much as he had contracted "ith Gilchrist for.!herefore, in the opinion of this court, the defendants failed signally to sho" the in#unctionagainst the defendant "as "rongfully procured.

!he appellants duly e6cepted to the order of the court denying their motion for ne" trial on the

ground that the evidence "as insufficient to #ustify the decision rendered. !here is lac)ing from

the record before us the deposition of the defendant %uddy, "hich apparently thro"s light upona contract entered into bet"een him and the plaintiff Gilchrist. !he contents of this depositionare discussed at length in the brief of the appellants and an endeavor is made to sho" that no

such contract "as entered into. !he trial court, "hich had this deposition before it, found thatthere "as a contract bet"een %uddy and Gilchrist. *ot having the deposition in 5uestion beforeus, it is impossible to say ho" strongly it militates against this findings of fact. By a series ofdecisions "e have construed section 1+ and 9 and that %uddy "illfully violate his contract in order that he might

accept the appellants offer of 7+-0 for the film for the same period. id the appellants )no"that they "ere inducing %uddy to violate his contract "ith a third party "hen they induced him

to accept the 7+-0K Cspe#o admitted that he )ne" that %uddy "as the o"ner of the film. ereceived a letter from his agents in anila dated April 2?, assuring him that he could not get the

film for about si6 "ee)s. !he arrangement bet"een %uddy and the appellants for the e6hibitionof the film by the latter on the 2?th of ay "ere perfected after April 2?, so that the si6 "ee)s"ould include and e6tend beyond ay 2?. !he appellants must necessarily have )no"n at thetime they made their offer to %uddy that the latter had boo)ed or contracted the film for si6"ee)s from April 2?. !herefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellants )no"ingly

induced %uddy to violate his contract "ith another person. But there is no specific finding thatthe appellants )ne" the identity of the other party. (o "e must assume that they did not )no"that Gilchrist "as the person "ho had contracted for the film.

!he appellants ta)e the position that if the preliminary in#unction had not been issued againstthem they could have e6hibited the film in their theater for a number of days beginning ay 2?,and could have also subleased it to other theater o"ners in the nearby to"ns and, by so doing,

could have cleared, during the life of their contract "ith %uddy, the amount claimed as damages.!a)ing this vie" of the case, it "il l be unnecessary for us to in5uire "hether the mandatoryin#unction against %uddy "as properly issued or not. *o 5uestion is raised "ith reference to theissuance of that in#unction.

!he right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract "ith %uddy for the lease of the film

must be fully recognied and admitted by all. !hat %uddy "as liable in an action for damages

for the breach of that contract, there can be no doubt. :ere the appellants li)e"ise liable forinterfering "ith the contract bet"een Gilchrist and %uddy, they not )no"ing at the time theidentity of one of the contracting partiesK !he appellants claim that they had a right to do "hatthey did. !he ground upon "hich the appellants base this contention is, that there "as no valid

and binding contract bet"een %uddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, they had a right tocompete "ith Gilchrist for the lease of the film, the right to compete being a #ustification fortheir acts. 'f there had been no contract bet"een %uddy and Gilchrist this defense "ould betenable, but the mere right to compete could not #ustify the appellants in intentionally inducing

%uddy to ta)e a"ay the appellees contractual rights.

%hief ustice :ells in :al)er vs. %ronin


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't is said that the ground on "hich the liability of a third party for interfering "ith a contractbet"een others rests, is that the interference "as malicious. !he contrary vie", ho"ever, is ta)en

by the (upreme %ourt of the nited (tates in the case of Angle vs. $ail"ay %o. but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability forinterfering "ith that contract and causing its breach. 't is, therefore, clear, under the aboveauthorities, that they "ere liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless theyare relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not )no" at the time theidentity of the original lessee

feature film. 't is 5uite apparent that to estimate "ith any decree of accuracy the damages "hichGilchrist "ould li)ely suffer from such an event "ould be 5uite difficult if not impossible. 'f heallo"ed the appellants to e6hibit the film in 'loilo, it "ould be useless for him to e6hibit it again,


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as the desire of the public to "itness the production "ould have been already satisfied. 'n thise6tremity, the appellee applied for and "as granted, as "e have indicated, a mandatory

in#unction against %uddy re5uiring him to deliver the Ligomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminaryin#unction against the appellants restraining them from e6hibiting that film in their theater duringthe "ee)s he

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