Full Version of Bruce Jesson Lecture Presented 27 October - 11.11.10

8/8/2019 Full Version of Bruce Jesson Lecture Presented 27 October - 11.11.10

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KitekorekoeemaupuuanakiotikangametoouManaMotuhake,

Kuangarokoekitepoouriotiraewhaikeeanakoeingaatikangaatetahi

noatu

Whenyoufailtosustainyourbeliefs,sovereignty,freedom

Youbecomelosttoyourselfasyouaresubsumedbythosewhosecustoms

andpracticesyoumustnowserve

In1980 following the furorewhichwas engenderedby the publicationof the

MaoriSovereigntyarticles,BruceJessoncommented:

Essentially,Maorisovereigntyisaboutthecompleteincompatibilityofthe

MaoriandPakehawaysoflife,andabouthoweconomicandpoliticalpower

hasresolvedthisconflictinfavourofthePakeha.1

AtthetimetherewasastridentgroupofMaoriradicalswhoreadilyidentified

with the concept of Maori Sovereignty and with Maori resistance to Pakeha

intrusion into their territories, their values, their mindscapes and their

landscapes.2 The core was drawn from an urban underclass from the

communitiesofSouthAuckland,HastingsandWellington. Theirmessagewas

simple:Pakehahavecolonisedourheartsandourmindsandhavesubstituted

our traditional systems and institutions with ones that Awatere described as

exploitative,oppressive,dehumanisedandspirituallydeficient. 3Itwastimefor

thenationtoturnthepageonaneraofgreed,irresponsibilityandinjusticeand

aneraofchangewasdemanded.

1JessonB,WaitangiaPakehaIssuetoop.108inAndrewSharp(ed) ToBuildaNationCollectedWritings19751999,Penguin,Auckland,2005.2 It is interesting to note that the Oxford Dictionary characterises the term radical as thedeparture from tradition. In these regards, the term Maori Radical would seem to definepeopleoftheilkofDonBrash,i.e.thosewhowouldseektoseverMaorifromtheirtraditions.Ofcourse, inour domesticcontext, the term MaoriRadicalrelatesto thosewhohave struggledthrough the Brash Attacks in their many guises to maintain Maori connections and their

freedomsinthiscountry.TheproofofthisstatementisevidencedmoststarklyinthefactthattheBrashshavefaded,yettheHarawirasstillremain.3JessonB,WaitangiaPakehaIssuetoop.108.


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The Maori World responded over the ensuing decades with a number of

initiativesthatwereinitiallyresistedbytheCrownand,ingeneral,bythePakeha

public. These initiatives included widespread development activity in the

revitalisationofTeReoMaori,autonomousKuraKaupapaeducationinitiatives,controloverMaorihealthandsocialservicesdeliverymechanisms,independent

Maorimedia,anddemandsforredresswithintheTreatySettlementarena.

Thestruggletransformedfromoneofsimpleconfrontationwiththestate toone

that sought the reclamation of Kaupapa Maori theory, practices and

methodologieswiththeassistanceoftheState.WhetherLabourorNational,the

apparatus of the state responded with a variety of quangos like the Maori

Language Commission, the Maori Broadcasting Agency, the Ministry ofMaori

Development, the MaoriEconomic Task Force, the CrownForest Rental Trust

and the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission. The process of

corporatisation had begun, with Maori radicals like me complicit in the

transformation.HoneHarawiraandIwereappointedasfoundingmembersof

TeMangai Paho, theMaoriBroadcasting Agency. Iwas also appointedasthe

DeputyChairpersonofAotearoaFisheriesLtd,asubsidiarycompanycreatedby

theMaoriFisheriesAct1989.

The sameperiod saw the rise ofaMaorielitewithin the process of litigating,

negotiating and then implementing Treaty settlements, many of whom have

become active sycophantsof thebroaderneo liberalagendawhichtransfers a

limitedsubsetofpubliclyownedassetsandresourcesintotheprivateownership

ofcorporationstosettletheinjusticesthathavebeeninflicteduponhapuandiwi

Maori.

AnaurahasbuiltuparoundtheseIwileaderswho,intandemwiththeMaori

Party,arenowtreatedastheauthorisedvoicesofallMaori.ButIamactively

involvedinalltheseissuesandevenIdontknowwhotheyareandwheretheir

mandatecomesfromonparticularissues,letalonewhotheyareaccountableto

andhow.


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In the process, the reality of our people has been lost sight of.As many well

know,the economicmiracle that has allegedly transformedMaori society and

propelledthisforumintowhathasbeendescribedasthemostpowerfullobby

group in Aotearoa is a myth, a carefully constructed illusion. Maori landholdings, even afterTreaty settlementsare taken into account, are small, less

thanthreehectaresperperson,andreturns fromMaorilandareconfinedtoa

smallsectionoftheMaoripopulation,aboutonethird.4Similarlytheassetbase

ofsomeoftheselargecorporations-TeOhuKaimoana,whichisestimatedat

$590 million, only equates to approximately $1,000 per person (if we use

523,000asindicativeofthetotalMaoripopulation).5Thepositionisevenworse

for the most populous iwi like Ngapuhi, whose shareholding per person

diminished to about $500per person upon the terms of the actual allocation

model.6

Statisticscontinuetoreflectthepoorsocio-economicstateofmostMaori.The

Maori unemployment rate is twice as high as non-Maori, and one out of four

Maorireceiveabenefitcomparedtooneoutoftennon-Maori.7Maoriarethree

timesmorelikelytoliveinanovercrowdedhouseholdcomparedtonon-Maori. 8

OnlytwooutoffiveMaoriarecompletingsecondaryeducationwithaLevelTwo

Certificate, compared to two out of threenon-Maori.9 While Maori currently

representaround13%ofthegeneralNewZealandpopulation,wemakeup51%

of the prison population. In 2006, Maori accounted for 43% of all police

apprehensions.10Maorilifeexpectancyis10%lowerthannon-Maori,andMaori

are twice as likely to be obese.11 Our suicide rate is 1.6 times higher than

non-Maori,andouryouthsuiciderateistwicethatofnon-Maori.In2006the

Maoriyouthsuicideratewas31.8per100,000,comparedwiththenon-Maori

4Durie,Mason,NgaKahuiPou:LaunchingMaoriFutures,HuiaPublishers,2003,p.95.5Ibid.6Itshouldbenotedthatthetenlargestiwiinthe2006Censusareasfollows:NgaPuhi122,211;NgatiPorou71,910;NgatiKahungungu59,946;NgaiTahu/KaiTahu49.185;TeArawa42,159;Ngati Tuwharetoa 34,674; NgatiManiapoto33,627;Waikato 33,429; Tuhoe32,670and NgatiAwa15,258.7SocioeconomicIndicatorsathttp://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/8Ibid.9Ibid.

10Dannette,Marie,MaoriandCriminalOffending:ACriticalAppraisal,43(2) TheAustralianAndNewZealandJournalOfCriminology,2010,atp.284.11TheSocialReport2009Healthhttp://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/atpp.21and29


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rateof16.8 per 100,000.12 Almost halfofallMaoriwomensmokecigarettes,

which is twice as high as non-Maori women,13 andwe are significantlymore

likelytohaveapotentiallyhazardousdrinkingpattern.14

The process I amdescribing is not new. Sadly, itmirrors the all-too-familiar

colonial pattern where governments have aimed to maintain control of

indigenous populations through indirect means; that is, in lieu of direct

military-political control, neo-colonialist powers co-opt indigenous elites

through privileged relationships with their government and opportunities to

profitfromtheireconomic,financialandtradepolicies,attheexpenseoftheir

people. Rangatiratanga, as Moana Jackson reminds, has in effect beenredefinedyetagainasaneo-liberalrightofselfmanagementboundbythegood

faithoftheCrownandwhattheCourtofAppealcalledinthe1987Casetheright

togovern.Movingonfromthepastandrecognisingthespecialplaceoftangata

whenuahasbecomeajourneynotofconstitutionalchangebutofdevolutionand

theauthorityoftheStatetodevolveorpermitIwitomanagecertainresources

andprogrammessubjecttogovernmentfundingandrulesofcontract.

TheNationalIwiChairsForum,inparticulartheexecutivewhoisalsoincharge

ofthesecretariatofthisgroup,hassetthemselvesuptobefirstinthequeueto

sit attheMasters tablewiththe cleardesireofexerting economicinfluence in

corporateterms.15

Itistheseobservationsthathaveinspiredmycontributionthisevening,coupled

withthefactthatassomeonebornandraisedintheDPBcapitaloftheworld

Kawerau,Ihavebeenpersonalwitnesstotheimpactoftheeconomicreformson

heartland NewZealand. I have watched a thriving mill-town reduced to a

communitythatisdependentonthegenerosityofthediminishingwelfarestate

toensurethewellbeingofits families. Readingthe insightfulcommentaryon

12Ibid,p.25.13Ibid,p.27.

14Ibid,p.31.15TeTepu,Series6,Episode15.TranscriptfromInterviewwithNICFleaderTukuroirangiMorganbyWaihoroiShortland.


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myhometownbySimonCollinsinaseriesintheNewZealandHeraldrecently

remindedmethatthepooranddispossessedwhoaremyfamilyandmyclosest

friendsarenotbeingtreatedwithrespectorasrelevanttotheseprocessesand

that Maori elites are complicit in perpetuating this poverty without remorse.Thearticlesraisedaseriousmomentofintrospectiononmypart.

IhopethiscontributionwillenabletheMaoriwhoaspiretotheranksoftheIwi

LeadersForumtoreflectonwhethertheyareinfactleadersofourpeopleor

followers of a New Right process that is designed to disenfranchise tangata

whenua and nullify the guarantee of independence of Aotearoa in Te Tiriti o

Waitangi.Byembracingamodernversionofintegrationthathasallthezest,

scale,speedandpoweroftheoldindustrial-eracapitalistimperialism,theyare

leadingasystematiconslaughtontheMaoriwayoflife.

HikinaTeArai

LiftingtheVeil

WhoistheBrownTable?

InarecentsubmissiontotheUNSpecialRapporteur,JamesAnaya,theNational

ChairsIwiForum(NICF)claimsthatitrepresentsmorethan400,000Maori,over

two-thirdsoftheMaoripopulation,andisportrayedasthenewfrontierofIwi

Maori,theglobalentrepreneurs.16

BothMarkSolomonandTukuroirangiMorgan17havesuggestedthattheNational

Iwi Chairs Forum actually numbers approximately 70 people who convene

quarterly to discuss a broadagenda. It isnot clearwho thesepeople areand

uponwhatrightofrepresentationtheyclaimtospeakonissues.

Ironically,mostofthoseMaoritheyrepresenthavetogotothewebsitetofind

outwhotheirleadersare!AsearchofthewebsitesuggeststhattheNationalIwi

16BackgroundPaper,IwiChairsForumtoUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesituationofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedstoProfessorJamesAnayalocatedathttp://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdf

p117QuestionsposedattheHuiaMotuIwiLeadersWorkingGrouponClimateChange10November2009RydgesHotelRotorua.


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ChairsForumisaself-definedgroupofindividualswhomeetregularly,andwho

arechairsoftheirowniwirunanga,tribaltrustboardsorothertribalcorporate

entities,whatiscommonlyreferredtoasIwiAuthorities.

AttendanceattheNICFisrestrictedtoelectedchairsofhapu/iwientitiesofthis

kind who are purportedly mandated to represent their constituents in the

Forum.TheirwebsitenamesMarkSolomon(ChairpersonofTeRunangaoNgai

Tahu), Tuku Morgan (Chairperson of TeArataura), Raniera (Sonny) Tau

(ChairpersonofTeRunangaoNgapuhi),ProfessorMargaretMutu(Chairperson

ofTeRunangaoNgatiKahu),TokoRenata(ChairpersonofHaurakiMaoriTrust

Board),NgahiwiTomoana(ChairpersonofNgatiKahungunguIwiIncorporation)and Api Mahuika (Ngati Porou) as Iwi Chairs who make up the Forum.

Apparently, the further 63 or so individuals have not notified the website

manageroftheirdetails,whichmakesitdifficulttoascertaintheForumsactual

membership.However,thetwoforumsthatIhaveattendedcertainlysuggesta

broadergroupattendsthesemeetings,butthatthebusinessoftheforumisled

bytheiwiChairsprofiledontheirwebsite.

The seven named individuals seem to perform an executive function for the

broaderNICF,supportedbyasecretariat.VariousIwiLeadersWorkingGroups

(ILGs)areformedaroundspecificissues,suchaswater,climatechange,public

privatepartnerships,foreshoreandseabed,whanauoraandgeothermal,where

they consult at the kind of invitation-only hui that I describe below. These

groups operate in similar ways, in that the ILG on a particular issue engages

directlywithgovernment,endeavourstohuiwithIwiandhaprepresentatives

athui they organiseacross the country, and report back toeachNational Iwi

Chairs Forum.What is interesting is that the ILGs seem to rely on mandates

effected at the Forums own quarterly meetings to suggest that have been

confirmedinarepresentativecapacityforiwikatoa.18

18SeediscussionforexampleoftheestablishmentoftheIwiLeadersWorkingGroup(ILG)onForeshoreandSeabedwhichwasformedattheHopuhopuIwiChairsForumon20August2009inBackgroundPaper,IwiChairsForumtoUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesituationof

humanrightsandfundamentalfreedomstoProfessorJamesAnayalocatedathttp://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdfp9.Thisgroupby26August2009wasseekinganumberofcommitmentsfromtheGovernment.


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AcloserexaminationofthegenesisoftheNICFshowsthatitmainlycomprises

menwhoarechairpersonsormembersofthe57MandatedIwiOrganisations

(MIO)thatwereestablishedtosatisfythecriteriatoreceivefisheriessettlementassets following the Sealords Deal. In an interview with Koha reporter Tina

Wickliffe, TukuorangiMorgan noted that approximately 51 of the MIO are or

havebeenrepresentedattheForum.19Mostoftheseorganisationshavebyno

meanssecuredmandatesfromtheconstituentmembersbeyondthesingleissue

offisheriessettlementmanagementormanagementofsettlementfunds.Debate

betweeniwionhowtosharethatsettlementtookyears,asdidsettingupthe

necessary iwi corporate structures to manage the proceeds.20 The Maori

Fisheries Act 2004 led to the first distribution to iwi of fish quota, cash, and

sharesinAotearoaFisheriesLtdinSeptember2005.

According to its website, in the five years since its inception the National Iwi

Chairs Forum has operated in two main areas: hui convened of national Iwi

Chairstoconsiderstrategicissues;andworkinggroupsestablishedatthebehest

oftheNICFtopreparediscussionpapersaroundstrategicmatters.TukuMorgan,

Ngahiwi Tomoana, Mark Solomon, the late Sir Archie Taiaroa, Professor

MargaretMutuandApiMahuikaareallsaidtohavebeenconvenorsatvarious

timesonvariousmattersunderconsiderationbytheForum.TheNICFidentifies

issuesofconcerntoallMaori-oraverybroadrangeofwhanau,hapuandiwi-

andsetsupworkinggroupstoaddressthem.Eachworkinggroupisconvened

byanIwiChair.Theseworkinggroupsmayco-optexpertisefromamongsttheir

bodies. Thesearethebodies thathavebecomeknownasIwiLeaderGroups

because their membership aims to become that of leaders in the respective

issuesasidentified.

19Wickliffe,;T,;LiftingtheVeilofSecrecy,Koha,Issue7,p.5,PublishedbyFOMANACapitalLtdSeptember2010.20AsLordGoffnotedTreatyTribesCoalitionvUrbanMaoriAuthorities[1997]1NZLR513,517(PC)Maorihavefoundthetaskofdividingthefisheriesresourcetobe"anextremelychallengingprocess;SeealsoTeRunangaoWharekauriRekohuIncvAttorney-General[1993]2NZLR301;WaitangiTribunal, TheFisheriesSettlementReportWai307(DepartmentofJustice,Wellington,

1992).;TeRunangaoMuriwhenuav TeRunanganuioTeUpokoo TeIkaAssociationInc[1996]3NZLR 10, 16;TeWakaHio TeArawaand othersv Treaty ofWaitangiFisheries Commission(4August1998)unreported,HighCourt,AucklandRegistry,CP395/93(Wgtn)AndersonJ.


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Inaddition to its website, theNICF claimtohave a communications network,

largelythroughemail,toexchangeinformationwithiwikatoa,andthereare

email streams that develop amongst iwi leadership groups on specific issues.

However,when I askedwhowaspart of theemail stream, Iwasadvised it ismainly the 50 or so representatives that had been invited to the Coronation

meeting in 2007 that had formalised the group, but that it was a very fluid

matter.21 I am still waiting for a copy of the list of individuals who were

purported to have mandated the creation of the forum, which Tukuroirangi

Morganpromisedwouldbemadeavailabletomefollowingameetingwiththe

IwiLeadersWorkingGrouponClimateChangeinRotoruainNovember2009.

One of the strident criticisms is that a self-selected group of iwi authority

chairpersonsandtheiradvisorshavesidelinedtraditionalcommunitiesandtheir

tikangaMaoriprocessesofengagement,suchasregularlyconvenedadvertised

hui thathapuand iwi leadershavemaintainedpriorto fundamentaldecisions

being made that impact on the lives of the community that they purport to

represent. There is no vetting process on those attending this National Iwi

Chairs Forum: the chairswho register as attending claim to do sounder the

manaoftheirelectingbody;butthereisnoclearindicationwhetherinfactthe

electingbodies orthosehapuandwhanau they represent,havemandatedthe

participation of these individuals on the broad range of issues under

consideration.Theirstatusasleaderspurportstoeliminate,oratleastrelegate

from relevance, other figures of authority that their people might look to for

direction, even though there is the often-token attendance of some elders in

thesemeetings.

ANewMaoriHegemony

ItisnocoincidencethattheNationalIwiChairsForum,(NICF)wheretheChairs

and Convenors and Advisor of Iwi Leaders Groups conduct their consultation

witheachotherandasmallextendedcircle,emergedatatimewhenthefirst

21Hui-a-Motu10November2009atRydgesHotelILG(IwiLeadersWorkingGroup)onClimateChange


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distribution of capital into Maori communities was anticipated following

finalisation of the principles of allocation to be applied to the Sealords deal.

ApartfromTainuiandNgaiTahu,andperhapsoneortwootheriwigroups,this

wastobethefirstallocationofcashtoIwicorporatessincetheinceptionoftheTreaty Settlement framework and it was eagerly awaited by the brown

bureaucracythathadgrowninanticipationofthis.

This group of Iwi Authority representatives are joined in the NICF by

chairpersons fromother organisations, likeTribal Trust Boards, andRunanga.

There is also emerging representation from the corporate arms of Post

SettlementGovernanceEntitiesrequiredtobeestablishedbytheOfficeofTreaty

Settlements to receive settlement assets, so that Tukuorangi Morgan, for

example,claimstorepresentTeArataua,ratherthantheTainuiParliament,the

Kauhanganui.

TheculturethatthenewMaorieliteshaveadoptedincreasinglydemandsthat

Maorientitiesberunonbusinesslines,mirroringthemodeloftheTreasuryand

theBusinessRoundtable.

Paepaerangatiraarecategorisedassymbolic,lackingintherequisiteexpertise

to risk allowing them to have even aminimal amount of control of economic

concerns. The strident demands for a separation of governance from

managementhaveaccompaniedeffortstodiminishtheroleofgovernanceand

inflatethatofmanagementinanefforttoreversetheirhierarchicalstatus.Inso

doing they have actually advocated a disconnection of tangata from their

whenua.

This empowerment of corporatised iwi structures has been driven by two

discourses.22Thefirstcentredaroundtherationalethatthecommercial,social

andregulatoryfunctionsofgovernmentdepartmentsshouldbeseparated,which

22 In two consultation documents called Te TirohangaRangapu and Te Urupare Rangapu

approvedIwiauthoritiesweretobecreatedtodelivercertainprogrammes,usuallyinhealthorsocial welfare. Iwi were to be agents and service providers for the Crown operating withappropriatelyindigenizedPakehastructures.


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hadcommencedduringtheRogernomicsera.ThesecondwastheStatesneed

foramechanismtomanagesettlementofMaoriintereststhatwereguaranteed

byTeTiritioWaitangiandwhichhadthreatenedtoactasajudderbartothe

Crown agenda to privatise, and for certainty about who to deal with in thecommercial environment. These discourses informed a market view of

devolutionthroughadecision-makingmodelthatonlyrecognisedtheauthority

of those iwi groupswho had been approved by the state. As Graham Smith

observed: Who names what constitutes leadership of iwi therefore is

determinativeofwhotheexpertsare,23andthereforefromwhomoneshould

seekMaoriopinion.

The economic agenda of the NICF was legitimised by the outcomes of a Hui

TaumatathatwasconvenedinWellingtonfrom1-3March2005,whichbrought

together a wide range of perspectives to look at ways to accelerate Maori

economicgrowth.Itwasthesecondhuiofitskind,thefirstheldinOctober1984

before the onslaught of Rogernomics. The 2005 hui was borne from the

recognition that Maori had been disproportionately affected by the radical

economic reforms of the intervening period and the failed closing the gaps

policy. A Maori Economic Taskforce was established following the Maori

EconomicSummit.ProminentamongstitsmembershipwasRobMcLeodofthe

Business Roundtable, Ngati Kahungungu Runanga Chairperson Ngahiwi

TomoanawhowaslatertoassumetheChairpersonroleoftheTreatyofWaitangi

FisheriesCommissionandNgaiTahuleaderMarkSolomon,whohasbeenaclear

driverbehindtheNationalIwiChairsForumandisaconvenorofoneoftheIwi

Leaders Groups (ILG) relating to Public/Private Partnerships.24 The other

memberswereBenthamOhia,JuneMcCabe,JohnTamihereandDaphneLuke,as

23SmithG,KimihiateMaramatanga,DoctoralThesis,Chapter5,p.103.24TheworkinthisareahasbeenprogressedunderMinisterSharplesTaskforceonMoriEconomicDevelopment.TheTaskforcehasanumberofportfoliosspanning;theprimarysector;accesstocapital,labourforcedevelopmentandtraining,smallandmediumenterprisedevelopmentandsupport;Moribrandingopportunities,infrastructureinvestment,kaupapaMorimodelsofcommercialismandco-investmentamongstIwiandwiththeCrown.MarkSolomonisleadingtheworkstreamonco-investmentamongstIwiandwiththeCrown.SeeBackgroundPaper,IwiChairsForumtoUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesituationof

humanrightsandfundamentalfreedstoProfessorJamesAnayalocatedathttp://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdfp11


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well as Leith Comer, Chief Executive of Te Puni Kokiri and Hon Georgina Te

Heuheu,AssociateMinisterofMaoriAffairs.25

Thepotentialimpactsofsuchseparationseemallthemoresignificantwhenwerememberthattheprocessesofindividualisationallowlandsandothertaongato

beseenastradeablecommodities.Thesemeasuresaresaidtobenecessaryto

achieve the oft-quoted mantra of taking Iwi Maori from grievance to

developmentmode.Thefactthathistoryshowsthemethodtobedangerously

flawed hardly seems to register. Instead, a new type of internecine conflict

erupts,26astheappetiteforpowerofthosewhowouldseektocontroltheasset

base intensifies the covetous desire to obtain more. In the Treaty settlement

litigation that has resulted from the process, a central concern has been the

repeated bureaucratic inadequacies that resulted in a failure to protect the

interests of individuals and groups not (or inadequately) represented at the

negotiatingtable.Whenthecourtshavebeenfacedwiththesechallengesthey

have almost always opted for the view that these are political, as opposed to

legal, matters and are therefore not justiciable and have been reluctant to

intervene. The difficulty is that the iwi authority structures themselves are

without the apparatus to ensure proper democratic and accountability

mechanismsbythosewhoproclaimamandateatthisnationallevel.Theclaims

for Mana Motuhake and Political Independence by hapu are effectively

25TePuniKokiri;TheMaoriEconomicTaskforceKokiriKokiri152009.26TheCrownpolicytonegotiatethesettlementofTreatyclaimswithlargenaturalgroupingswithtribalinterestsatanIwilevelratherthanatahapu,whanauorclaimantlevelhasbeenthesubjectofmuchattentionbythejudiciaryinanumberofcontextsfromchallengestotherobustnessofmandates,concernsaroundthefailuretoaddresstheneedsofoverlappingclaimsandallegationsthatcustomaryrelationshipstolandarebeingtransformedcontrarytoTeTiritioWaitangiandsettledprinciplesofMaoriLawasnegotiatedfollowingtheLandscase.See:TheNgatiAwaCrossClaimsSettlementreportWai9582002TheTeArawaMandateReport:Te

WahangaTuarua;Wai11502005;andtheTamakiMakaurauSettlementProcessReportWai

13622007;HayesvWaitangiTribunalHACWNCP111/0110May2001;WaitahaTaiwhenuaoWaitakiTrustvTeRunangaoNgaiTahuHCWNCP41/9817June1998;MilroyvAttorneyGeneral[2005]NZAR562(CA)andNewZealandMaoriCouncilvAttorneyGeneral[2008]1NZLR318(CA);PouwharevKrugerCIV-2009-485-976HighCourt;AttorneyGeneralvKenehiMair&Ors[2009]NZCA625;HarongavAttorneyGeneral[2010]NZCA201;ForafulldiscussionofthegenesisofthepolicySeealsoAnnieMikaere,"SettlementofTreatyClaims:Full

andFinal,orFatallyFlawed?",(1997)17NZULR425;MalcolmBirdling,"HealingthePastorHarmingtheFuture?'LargeNaturalGroupings'andtheTreatySettlementProcess",(LLB(Hons)ResearchPaper,VictoriaUniversityofWellington,2003),12.


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surrenderedtotheIwiLeadersquestforgreaterparticipationandinfluencein

theNewZealandEconomy.

TheresultisanewMaorihegemonythatsitswithinanationalone.ThisMaori

hegemonyemergesoutofthenew iwi leadershipsassumptionofa highcaste

status, becausemembers of theNICFor theirdelegations are increasingly the

onlyindividualsthattheCrownseesasrelevantonMaoriissues.Yetthestatus

of the NICF exists within a framework of authority that has been created or

redefinedwithinthesettlementprocesstoaccommodatetherequirementsofthe

Office of Treaty Settlements as part of the Crowns Settlement Policy. The

processofCrownapprovalandrecognitionbytheOfficeofTreatySettlements,

prior to the determination of what and how much the Crown will grant in

settlement,reflectstheoldpatternsoftheNativeLandCourtandhighlightsthe

broader and more obvious subordination of traditional Maori processes of

decision-making.Thecompliantacceptanceofthisstateofaffairs,bythefewfor

the many,27 illustrates the continuing subjugation of Maori to a neo liberal

economichegemony toprotect the stability of the construct ofCrownunitary

sovereignty.

ItisunsurprisingthatthecoalescenceoftheIwiChairsleadershipintoanational

bodycalledtheNationalIwiChairsForumhasbroughtwithitadesirebythe

Crowntoentertain nationalsettlementsonkey resources like climate change,

freshwater,geothermal, foreshoreandseabedandpublic privatepartnerships.

Rather than dealingwith these issues inaccordancewithTeTiriti oWaitangi

27ManychairsoftheNationalIwiChairsForum (NICF)likethelateArchieTaiaroa,whowasalsoaformerChairpersonofthenowdefunctNationalMaoriCongress,havealonghistoryoffightingfortherightsofiwiandhaputomaintaintheirmanamotuhakeandpoliticalsovereignty.SirArchieTaiaroawastheCo-Chairpersonwith the lateSirHepiTeHeuheuatoftheHirangiHuiconvenedtoconsideraPan-MaoriresponsetothequestionsofthecontroversialFiscalEnvelopePolicy.Thedifficultyinthepresentregimeisthatthemodelsofsettlementbeingagreedtobymany of the Iwi Chairpersons and their constituents (like the statutory boards created overWaikato River and the Rotorua Lakes in the past) are still models of participation andmanagementofpolicywithintheCrownsrubricofauthoritywhichdeniesthelegitimacyoftinorangatiratanga in the modern context and highlights the fact that the Crown Treaty PolicyFrameworkisstillinthemainunilaterallydevelopedbytheCrown.Furthermorethequestion

mustbeposeddoIwiChairshavethemandatetointerfaceontheseissueswiththeCrownbythepeoplesatthegrassrootswhomtheypurporttorepresentonmatterswhentheirorganisationsfocusisquiteoftenlimitedtoparticularlandmanagementorfisheriesmanagementissues.


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guarantees,theForumseemstobepromotedandacceptedasaMaoriissueone-

stopshop.

ThisupperlayerofMaorisociety,createdtoengagewiththeCrown,providesaconvenient interface thatmakes itunnecessary for the Crownorthe anointed

leaders to communicate directly with those intransigents who refuse to

relinquishtheiridentities.Whenitisseeninthiscontext,thenewlyconstructed

layerofMaorileadershipseemstobeaquangowhichtheCrownthenresources

as part of its specific consultation requirements in the expectation it will

generateanacceptableMaoriview.

Not only is this obstructive of the direct relationship foreshadowed and

guaranteedbyTeTiritioWaitangi,whichisonebetweenNgaRangatiraoNga

HapuandtheCrown;itisindicativeofamorefundamentalfactthatthegroups

accountabilityisnottoourownkaupapa. Itisnotunreasonable toassertthat

the Crown is seeking to engineer a Treaty partner in its own image that is

subordinatetoit.

TheComplicityoftheMaoriParty

These developments require consideration within the context of the Maori

PartyswillingnesstorelinquishitsresponsibilitiestoanelitegroupofIwiChairs

whoseMaoriviewenablesitscoalitionpartnertoachievewhatitneeds,while

claimingithascleanhands.

WhentheMaoriPartystormedintoParliamenton15September2004,securing

four seats and upsetting Labour's safe and complacent hold on the Maori

electorates,itsetintrainarethinkofthewayMaoripoliticalparticipationwith

themainstreampartieswouldbemanaged.Inthehoneymoonperiodfollowing

theMaoriPartys entryintoParliamenttheywerecourtedbya rangeofMaori

interests,nottheleastofwhichweremanywholaterbecameprimemoversin

theNationalIwiChairsForum.HuiwerecalledatvenueslikePukawa,Waitangi

and Ngaruawahia, the Kingitanga stronghold, with Tuku Morgan taking a


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prominent role that builton relationshipswith theMaoriParty leadershiphe

hadnurturedduringitsyearsinopposition.

TherelationshiphasbeencementedovertimewithmeetingsbeingconvenedatthesegatheringsbyIwi leaders,ostensibly tobrief thePrimeMinisterand his

cabinet colleagues about business that the National Iwi Chairs Forum has

discussed, with Maori Party leaders Sharples and Turia invited to attend.

According to Tuku Morgan, it was one such gathering, which happened to

coincidewiththecoronationcommemorationsin2007,atwhichtheNationalIwi

Chairs Forum was formalised to promote Maori-Crown relationships.28 The

relationship has no doubt assumed greater prominence in this latest

Parliamentary term since the Maori Party cut a deal with National, who had

alreadyachievedacoalitionagreementwithACT.

InaParliamentarydebateontheForeshoreandSeabedHoneHarawiraputitthisway:

TeUruroaslinewasbasicallythattheMaoriPartyishappytoallowthis

mattertobesettledbytheIwiLeadersForumasthebestgrouptorepresentMaori

innegotiations,giventhateverymemberisanelectedmemberoftheirowniwi.

Andthereisundoubtedlyconsiderablesupportforthatpointofview,butifIcanbesobold,Isuggestthatthatisnotnecessarilytheviewheldbythetensofthousands

ofpeoplewhohavevotedfortheMaoriPartyoverthepast5years.

Infact,goingbacktowhentheMaoriPartywasstilljustatwinkleinsomebodys

eye,IbetthatifIdaskedthe40,000peoplewhomarchedonparliamentbackin2004whethertheythoughttheForeshoreandSeabeddebateshouldbesettledby

theIwiLeaders,Ireckon39,500ofthemwouldhaveprobablysaidno.29

Thissummarisesthedifficultywhichtheseundemocraticprocessespresentand

howtheMaoriPartyhaspositioneditselfintheprocess.

28Wickliffe;T;LiftingtheVeilofSecrecyKohaIssue7p.5PublishedbyFOMANACapitalLtdSeptember2010;29http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1002/S00209.htm


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LessonsfromHistory

To demonstrate the inappropriateness of such a remedy, let me juxtapose it

againstthepracticesofthecolonialinstitutionthatisperhapsmostconsistentlyseen as one of the major causes of grievance, the Native Land Court. The

WaitangiTribunalhas foundthat theNative LandCourtwas designed to nail

homeBritish ascendency following conflict bypicking apart the communities

thatMaorihadhistorically looked toforprotection. Itwasdesignedopenlyto

destroytribaltitles[and]flattenoutthenetworkofrights.30 Inthisway,the

interests of hapu were transformed into an individualised form of private

ownershiptobeheldbyaselectgrouponbehalfofthecollective.Thecollective

size of the asset conveniently masked the miniscule and paltry fragments of

individualinterest,andwhetherbyreasonofdebt,greed,orunfamiliaritywith

thenewsystem,[theselectelite]startedtoactasindividualsandnotaskaitiaki

onbehalfoftheirpeople.31Asthepeoplewerecutout,sotoowastheirabilityto

enforcetheaccountabilityoftheleadershipinaccordancewithtikanga. 32Itwas

withinthisimposedrealitythataMaorivulnerabilitywascreatedandexploited.

History is repeating itself. The process that isnow beingadopted to remedy

prejudices that flow from injustices inflicted upon Maori is a process of

transferring assets from collectiveMaori ownership to control by an elite - a

process that has been repeatedly criticised for the intergenerational

impoverishmentthatitimposeduponMaoriinthepast.

ThedestructionofMaoricommunitiesandthesubordinationoftheirintereststo

achieveeconomicimperativesappearstobesofundamentallyingrainedintothe

politicalpsychethatitisasmuchapartofNewZealandCultureasBuzzyBees

andPictureTeaTowels.

30WaitangiTribunal,TurangaTangataTurangaWhenua,WAI-814,2004,p.436.31Ibid,p.438.32Ibid.


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RidingtheTideofDiscontent

Toput thesedevelopments inabroadercontext,the FisheriesActwaspassed

whenDonBrashandtheNationalPartyhadwhipped-upanti-Maori,anti-Treatysentiment into a frenzy - the Iwi versus Kiwi dichotomy. One commentator

suggests itwas these events, coupledwith the widespread protests byMaori

following the NgatiApa decision and the Labour Partys entrenchment of the

Foreshore and Seabed Act, that became a call to arms for Ngai Tahu Chief

Executive Mark Solomon to organise corporate opposition.33 It is claimed

becauseofthishewenttoseethelateQueenDameTeAtairangiKaahutogetthe

royal seal of approval for a pan-tribal coalition to drive Maori interests and

concerns.

But there is amajorelementmissing in this explanationof the genesis of the

National Iwi Chairs Forum. What is clear to me was that like the protest

movementsofthe1980s,theForeshoreandSeabeddebacleof2004,whichsaw

the creationof theMaoriParty, hadmobilisedMaoriback onto the streets in

numbersthathadnotbeenseenforadecadeormore.Itisestimatedthatover

60,000 Maori participated in the Hikoi that followed the clamour for direct

action after the Labour Partys leadership, the Prime Minister and

Attorney-General,rejectedtheNgatiApadecision.

Inthethirteendayjourney fromtheFarNorthtoWellington,Maoriorganised

protestsinWhangarei,Auckland,Hamilton,Rotorua,Taupo,Whanganui,Wairoa,

Napier, Waipukurau, Palmerston North and New Plymouth in outrage at the

largest confiscationof lands to have occurred since the early colonial period.

Networks that had long lain dormant since the 1980s were reactivated. The

initial call came from Ngati Kahungungu elders to Hikoi in the spirit of Mana

MotuhakeandKotahitanga.ThentheleadershipandformerorganisersofWAC,

(Waitangi Action Committee),TeKawariki, TeKotahitangaoWaiarikiand the

PeaceMovementAotearoa called for a national co-ordinationofdirect action.

33Wickliffe,;T,;LiftingtheVeilofSecrecy,Koha,Issue7,p.5,PublishedbyFOMANACapitalLtdSeptember2010.


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Oldheadswerejoinedbyanewvanguardofenergeticyoungwomenleadersof

theTinoRangatiratangaMovement.KuraKaupapanetworkswere tapped into

andhapuandmaraecommitteeswereapproachedinthestyleoftheGreatLand

MarchtotakeresponsibilityforvariouslegsofthejourneytoParliamentwhenitbecame clear that the Labour Party was to entrench the ownership of these

remnantsofthecoastlinewhichsitoutsidegeneraltitle(some30percentofthe

total land mass involved) into Crown hands. The huge inequity which still

subsistsintherecentlyintroducedMarkIIversionofthislaw,isthatMaoriwere

to be conferred the opportunity to negotiate limited rights to these lands as

proscribedbystatute,whilevaststretchesofthecoastlinewhicharealreadyin

private ownership, remained untouched and outside the confiscation and

regulatoryregime.

TheNICFhavecapitalisedonthatmomentumforchange.Surfingonthetideof

discontent theyhaveassumed the spacethatgrassrootsactivistscreatedand

promotedneoliberalgoals,suchastherighttoexploitthevastnaturalresources

under the sea, that are more in keeping with capitalism than with the tino

rangatiratangathatwasbeingcalledfor.Significantly,theyhavemovedalsoto

assume the role that had previously been occupied by the earlier Crown

construct,theNewZealandMaoriCouncil,inthisregard.

TeraukawaaRerenoa

PirikitePunui

Hekaioraora

LiketheparasiteofRerenoa

ThatclingstothePunuiDevouringitsessencealive

SeparatingTangatafromWhenua

Ironically,many groupswho had argued that it is for iwi to determinewhat

constitutesaniwiandwhoalsorepresentsiwi,becamelegallyincorporatedto

take advantage of the opportunityoffered byLabours Iwi RunangaAct. It is

apposite toremind ourselves that this Iwi Runanga legislationdid not survive

because the proposalwas considered to be a monoculutral documentwhichundermined the tribal base of Te Ao Maori, misinterpreted cultural values,


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culturesandbeliefsoftheIwiandsoughttoregulatetribalaffairsinamanner

thatwasinconsistentwithcustomarybeliefs.34

One cannot under-estimate the influence of the Fisheries Commissionideologues,ShaneJonesandWhaimutuDewes, inthis reorganisationofMaori

communitiesintoiwicorporateseither.35Bothhadbeenprominentadvocates

inthe IwiCorporatismdebatesgenerated bythe IwiRunangaBill,withShane

Jonesbeingpartofa laterattempt inthe1990stodevelopwhathetermedan

elitepaepae, a taumata to be created as the authoritative voice comprised of

representatives of four organisations - the Maori Womens Welfare League,

MaoriCongress,theMaoriCouncilandtheFederationofMaoriAuthorities.But

thisideafoundered,ashasthevisibilityofmanyoftheseorganisations,withonly

FoMAmaintainingany prominence in the nationalMaoripolitical scenetoday

andtheNewZealandMaoriCouncilunderreview.

Giventhishistory,itisnotsurprisingthatoneofthestrongestcriticismsofthe

NationalIwiChairsForumis thatit isnotdemocraticandismadeupofavery

smallsectoroftheMaoricommunitywhohaslittle,ifany,directaccountability

tothewhanauandhapuitserves.

Thepeopleat thegrassroots,anduntilrecentlyMaoriwomen,werepractically

invisibleinthedelegationsthathavemetwithvariousgovernmentMinistersof

the Crownonthe issuesof the Foreshore and Seabed replacement legislation,

EmissionsTradingSchemeandPublicPrivatePartnerships.Moredisconcerting

is that those most directly affected by these policies, Maori communities

themselves, seem to be irrelevant in the whole process of reporting and

accountability and are forced to rely on media releases and the nightly

state-funded televisionprogrammesTeKaeaandTeKarere for informationon

what the ILGs or theNCIF isup to. It hasnot gone uncommented either that

duringtheWaitangicommemorationstheIwiChairsForumpreferstomeetin

34NZPD,6December1989,14429.

35InCrownProposalsfortheSettlementofTreatyClaimstheCrownalsoclaimsthatitwishestobe sure that the assets and resources transferred toMaori weremanaged and administeredwithinaproperlegalstructure.


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hotelvenuesatHaruruFallsandtheWaitangiCopthorne,awayfromwherethe

publicdebatesareoccurringaroundTeTiritiatTeTiiMarae,againdenyinghapu

and iwi the right to have an understanding and input into thematters under

consideration.Theirstyleofoperationisquitedistinctfromthatwhichoperatedduring the era of the National Maori Congress, which actively encouraged

representationofupto5delegatesfromeachoftheiwiparticipantswithspecific

representationforRangatahiMaori,Womenandothersectorsofthecommunity.

Whatisalsoclear isthatovera relativelyshortperiodtheNCIFExecutivehas

emerged as the key stakeholdergroupwhichappears todetermine theMaori

Partys position on fundamental issues, and the Maori Party has acted as adoormantoallowthemaccesstothekeycabinetstrategycommitteeonTreaty

Issues comprising National Party Members of Parliament Bill English, Gerry

Brownlee, Chris Finlayson, the Prime Minister, John Key and Maori Party

co-leaderPitaSharples.Iusethismetaphordeliberately,becauseinthewordsof

Tuku Morgan in an interview conducted in Te Reo Maori with Waihoroi

ShortlandontheMaoriTelevisioncommissionedprogrammeTeTepu:36

Kotetokoononei-kahokimaiaukitetokoononei,a,kiaahuanei,he

torutoruana,he,ngameaoteAoMaorikataeatetotoroatutepatoto

i runga i te kuaha o te Pirimea, ka tuwheramai, ahakoa he aha te

kaupapa.

Thissix,backtothesix.IthinkthereareveryfewMaoriwhocanknockat

thePMsdooranditwillopen,whatevertheissue.

Hetorutoruanaingameaperaana.

Veryfewpeoplecandothat.

Ka mutu, ahakoa ka whakaturia ko tena ko tena ko te mahi uaua

rawa atu ko te patoto i runga i nga kuaha o nga Minita nei, ka

tuwheramai,katomoatutatoukirotokiteatawherawheraiotatou

kaupapa.

Whilst different people are chosen, whats really difficult is knocking at

theseMinistersdoors,toopenup,toletusin,todiscussourissuesadroitly.

36 Te Tepu, Series 6, Episode 15. Transcript from Interview with NICF leader TukuroirangiMorganbyWaihoroiShortland.


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Na,koiratemahinuikiahuanei.

Ithinkthatsthemaintask.

Nareira,hemamaake,kiatukumatetokoononei,ngakuahaneiepa-epatukiatu,epatotoatu,kiatereteputaatutomatoukiroto,kite

atahamahama ite tepu kimuai te aroaroo te kawanatanga, ki te

meaatu,e,aneietewhakaarooteiwiMaoriputanoaitemotunei.

You see, its easier, tolet thissix beatagainstthesedoors, knockonthese

doors,toenterquicklytohammerthetableinfrontofGovernmentttosay,hey,hereiswhatMaoriaroundthecountrythink.

As even prominent right wing commentator Matthew Hooten has observed:

TheGroups interrelationshipswith iwi, theMaoriPartyand theGovernment

aremurky.TheGroupdoesnotclaimtospeakforallMaori,butbehavesasifit

does.37IwillusethecasestudiesoftheETS,TreeLordsandWhanauOrato

illustratethepoint.

TheHijackoftheMaoriDevelopmentAgendabyILG

TheEmissionsTradingScheme

In2002theLabour-ledgovernmentpassedtheClimateChangeResponseActto

enableNewZealandtomeetitsobligationsundertheKyotoProtocol.Justprior

toXmas2006on18December,theGovernmentreleasedfurtherinformationon

NewZealand's options in responding to the issue of climate change. The

Ministry of Environment planned 11 regional consultation hui with Maori to

occurbetween12February2007and14March2007,withfinalsubmissionsdue

on 30March. The process of consultation was prescriptive. At each hui,

attendees were required to discuss the information and to select a single

representative to a Climate Change Maori Reference Group38 for a twelfth

37 HootonMatthew:Foreshore & Seabed IssueRisksGoing offthe RailsExceltiumCorporate&

PublicAffairsQuarterly;SummerEdition2010;p.10.38 LTukua,S Wilson, AHoukamau,J Ruru, TPaenga, MBlack,S Clair,T Wilson,HRuru andMSkerrettseeFigure:RelationshipswiththeIwiLeadershipGroupMinistryofEnvironment.


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consultative huion29March2007,whichhad beenaddedasanafterthought.

FinalsubmissionsonETSwereduethenextday,on30March2007.39

Atallofthe12consultationhui,theprincipalconcernsoftheparticipantsfellintofourbroadcategories: the focusof theemissions tradingschemewastoo

stronglyoneconomicsattheexpenseoftheenvironment(withenvironmental

benefitsunclear);theneedtoensuretheobligationsofTeTiritiwereprovided

for; the need togiveparamouncy toaMaoriworldviewand abroadTikanga

Maori approach; and that there appeared no obvious way for Maori to have

meaningfulandongoinginputinthescheme.Moreover,thelargestandrichest

industrieswerebeingprotectedfromthecostoftheirpollutingwiththeburdenbeing shared across all other sectors. Major criticisms of the consultation

processincludedthelackofanyanalysisoftheeffectsonMaori.

On24July2007,theMaoriReferenceGroup(MRG)hadmetwithMinistersofthe

Crown David Parker, Michael Cullen and Parekura Horomia to hear the

Governmentresponsetotheirsubmission.40Whatisclearisthatrightuptothis

pointtheCrownrepresentativeshadalsomaintainedstrategicrelationshipswith

the Federation of Maori Authorities (FoMA), who claimed to be acting in a

representativecapacitynotonlyfortheirmembersbutalsoforandonbehalfof

all Maori who own land or were Crown Forest License (CFL) claimants to

pre-1990forestlandsandsubstantialpost-1989forests. 41Therewasnosignof

formal recognition of the NewZealand Maori Council in this process of

engagement, which is highly unusual given their joint role in cementing

obligations via the courts with respect to the proposed sell down of the

NewZealand State Forests and the consequent passing of the Crown Forest

AssetsActsome20yearsearlierandthestatutoryfunctionthatisthepreserve

39NewZealandMinistryfortheEnvironment(2007), ConsultationwithMaorionClimateChange:HuiReport,MinistryfortheEnvironment,Wellington.40 Submission on Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill to theFinance and Expenditure Committee, Iwi Leadership Group and Maori Reference Group

Executive,29February2008.41 Federation of Maori Authorities: Submission to the Emissions Trading Scheme ReviewCommittee.


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of the NewZealand Maori Council to act in a representative capacity for all

Maori.42

The very next day, Ministers Cullen, Horomia and Jim Anderton met with "acollectiveofiwileaders"43tooutlinetheGovernment'spreferredresponsetothe

questionofclimatechange.Fromthiscollective,anIwileadershipgroupwas

then established,which includedApiranaMahuika,Timi TeHeuheu andMark

Solomon for the ILG and Paul Morgan for FOMA. Interestingly the NCIF

background paper confirms that the ILG working party was established in

October 2007 but does not note at whichmeeting of theNCIF that this was

confirmed.Noneoftheseindividualshadbeenselectedfromthe12regionalhui

to represent theMaori opinion on ETS. Their leadership of the processwas

assumed following themeetingwith the CrownMinisters. Theywere initially

calledtheClimateChangeMaoriLeadershipGroup,buthassincebeenchanged

totheClimateChange IwiLeadershipGroup,and isusuallynowreferredtoas

simplytheIwiLeadershipGroup(ILG)speakingonissueslessdirectlyrelatedto

climatechange.

In October 2007, the government conducted a further 12 consultation hui

specificallyontheETSandengagednewtechnocrats,theMaoriReferenceGroup

Executive (MRGE) ofRogerPikia, JamieTuutaand LisaKanawa to facilitate a

processofengagementwithMaoriassistedbyconsultancygroupIwiCorporate

SolutionsleadbyWillieTeAho.44Inaddition,areportwascommissionedonthe

42MaoriCommunityDevelopmentAct1962ss17and18.43 Submission on Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill to theFinance and Expenditure Committee, Iwi Leadership Group and Maori Reference GroupExecutive,29February2008.44 The Ministry of the Environment also supported participation of Maori Reference GroupmembersateachoftheregionalhuiandsupportedadditionalhuifortheMaoriReferenceGroupon25Septemberand25October2007;aMaorileadership-leadNationalMaoriClimateChangeHuion3Septemberand26October2007;aNationalMaoriForestryHuion8November2007;andweeklymeetingsofanexecutiveofMaoriReferenceGroupduringOctoberandNovember.Finally,governmentsupportwasalsoprovidedforthetransportation,accommodationandmeals

formembersoftheClimateChangeIwiLeadershipGroup,MaoriReferenceGroupExecutiveandsecretariattomeetwithMinistersandattendallnationalhuiincludingthemostrecentoneheldon18December2007.


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Maori impacts from theETS InterimHigh Level Findings by Chris Karamea

InsleyandRichardMeade.45

TheMaoriReferenceGrouporganised aNationalMaoriClimateChangeHui inRotoruainOctober2007,withthreesubsequenthuiinNovember,Decemberand

February2008heldinHamiltonandWellington.Astatementinaletterdated

13December2007fromtheIwiLeadershipGrouptoMinistersCullen,Anderton,

Horomia,NanaiaMahuta,TrevorMallardandParkerinresponsetoanOfficials'

Reportistelling:"wehaveadvocatedontwoplatforms.Thefirstplatformis

theTreatyofWaitangiandthesecondistheMaoriEconomy.Duetothetight

timeframes and the economic nature of the ETS, we have focused on the

economicimpacts."46

TheIwiLeadershipGroup(ILG)andMaoriReferenceGroupExecutive(MRGE)

gave a joint submission on the Climate Change (Emissions Trading and

Renewable Preference) Bill to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on

29February2008claimingthattheirpositionhadbeenunanimouslysupported

by Iwi leaders that met at Waitangi on 4February 2008 (and again on

20February2008atPukawa).47

Parallel to this process, the Maori Party had been developing its own policy

approachtothequestion.TheMaoriPartyMinorityreportontheBill,whichwas

eventuallyreleasedearlyin2009,verymuchreflectedthemattersthathadbeen

promoted by Maori during the consultation hui. The report stated that: the

nation needs to grapple with the notion of sustainability and the increasing

challengeposedbyachangingclimatesystemandpendingpeakoiltothinkand

livedifferently,tolivesustainably,48andoptedtoopposetheETSinfavourof

theimpositionofacarbontax.Thegravamenforthispositionwasexpressed

45Dated23October2007.46Mahuika,Apirana(forandonbehalfoftheClimateChangeIwiLeadershipGroup),Letterof13October2007,ClimateChangeIwiLeadershipGroupResponsetoOfficialsReport.47 Submission on Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill to the

Finance and Expenditure Committee, Iwi Leadership Group and Maori Reference GroupExecutive,29February2008.48EmissionsTradingSchemeReviewCommittee:114.


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thisway:anETSallowssectorstopolluteandtradeuptotheKyototarget,but

doesnotincludeincrementalemissionsreductiontargetsinitsdesign.With

theemphasisontrading-establishingandmaintainingtheconditionsforit-the

overarching problem of unsustainable economic growth remainsunaddressed.49

Labourslawwaspassed.Priortothefinalisationoftheschemeinlate2009the

IwiLeadersGroup(ILG)andMaoriReferenceGroup(MRG)convenedafurther6

huioveraperiodof12dayscalledbetween28October2009and10November

2009.50Despitetheshorttimeperiod,theILGclaimover170attendedthehui

withthehighestturnoutbeing92peopleattheNationalHuiinRotoruaandthe

smallest turnout 2 people at the Nelson hui. That is, 170 people out of the

500,000estimatedMaoripopulation. The ILG claimed intheirreport ofthese

meetingsthatthecaliberoftheattendeesateachofthehuimeantthegroup

hadasignificantlevelofsupportfromMaoridomfortheirproposal.

As onewhoattended thehui in Rotorua in this roundof consultationonthis

matter, it needs to be emphasised that thesemeetings are by no meanswell

advertised,openandtransparentintheirpurposeandobjectives.Thereislittle

materialdistributedpriortohuiandthehuithemselvesareconductednotbythe

Iwi Leaders Group, (ILG), but by the technocrat advisers that are in their

travellingroadshows.IntheinstanceoftheETS,theILGsecretariatcompriseda

groupaptlynamedIwiCorporateSolutions,WillieTeAho,hiswife,LindaTeAho

and employeesGina Rangi andMahinarangi Maikawith Mr Te Aho being the

49EmissionsTradingSchemeReviewCommittee:113.SpecificreasonsforopposingtheETSalsoincludeda)anETSwillnotmakeasignificantcontributiontoloweringourdomesticemissions;b) the Maori Partywas unconvinced that the market is the bestmechanism to set pricesoncarbon;c)thecurrentmodeoflivingindevelopedcountriesisnotsustainableintothefutured)the urgency of the climate-change crisisdemands the developmentand implementationofaneffective scheme that is not reliant onwhether or when the price of carbon increases to asufficient level to incentivise change; e) intensity based allocations and subsidies distort themarket model by allowing businesses to increase their emissions without penalty and berewardedforit.

50ClimateChangeLeadershipGroupPositionPaper,13November2009preparedfortheMaoriPartylocatedathttp://cst.org.nz/groups/job_vacancies/files/f/909433-2009-12-14T165354Z/13%20Nov%20ILG%20position%20paper%20for%20Maori%20Party.pdf


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maininterfacebetweenhuiparticipantsandthegroup.51Muchoftheadvicethat

wasprofferedinsupportoftheILGspositionontheETSwasnotavailablefor

distributiononthebasisofthecommercialsensitivityofthematters.Evenmore

worryingwas that the ILGspositionhad byOctober 2009 departed from theMaoriPartyminorityviewthathadopposedthegovernmentsschemebecause

ofitsrelativeineffectivenessandinequalities,includingthesubsidisationofthe

nations largest polluters at the cost of households and small-medium

businesses.52

AlthoughtheMaoriPartywerenotwillingtotalkaboutitsrelationshipwith,or

theeffectoflobbyingby,theIwiLeadershipGrouporthewiderNICFforthat

mattertheirpositionsonanemissionstradingschemebythistimewereclosely

aligned.Newspaperreportsatthetimesuggestedthatindividualsamongstthe

ranks of the Maori Party National Council tried a last ditch effort to seek

commitmenttotheearlierminorityreportpositionon thebasisoftheburden

the scheme would place on low income households.53 The party's co-vice

president,TeOrohiPaul,issuedastatementtomakeitclearthepartywasnot

aboutto"welch"onthedealwiththegovernment,althoughthisspecificmatter

hadnotbeenpartoftheMaoriParty-NationalPartyrelationshipagreement.

TreeLords

These developments cannot be understood in isolation from the commercial

forestryinterestsintheTreelordssettlement.On25September2008thelargest

ever Treaty ofWaitangi deal, since the 1992 Sealords fisheries arrangement,

passedintolaw.TheCentralNorthIslandForestsLandCollectiveSettlementAct

legislatedtheso-calledTreelordsdealwhichinvolved$195.7millionofCrown

forest landcovering176,000hectares, plusabout$223million in land rentals

51Seediagramhttp://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/summary-key-themes-consultation-hui-Feb08/html/figure/page8/html52EmissionsTradingSchemeReviewCommittee,seealsoSustainabilityCouncilofNewZealandMediaRelease12November2009.HouseholdswouldbearhalfthetotalcostsresultingfromtheproposedchangestotheETSduringitsfirstfiveyears(52%),whileaccountingforjustafifthofallemissions(19%).Pastoralfarmerswouldgaina$1.1billionsubsidyandpaytheequivalentof2%of their fair share of the KyotoBill during the first five yearsof the scheme, while large

industrialproducerswouldgaina$488millionsubsidy.53http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/3095679/Maori-Party-revolt-threatens-Emissions-Trading-Scheme


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thathadaccumulatedintheCrownForestRentalTrustsince1989andanannual

incomestreamof$13million.Itwasalsoasignificantnewstepinthatitwasa

treaty settlement across several tribes, rather than a pan-tribal or individual

tribe-Crowndisposition.

CrownForestryRentalTrust(CFRT)annualreportsshow$57millionwaspaid

out in costs to effect the deal since 1990, with $30million of that allocation

directlyattributedtothefiveyearperiodinwhichtheTreelordsAgreementin

Principlewasnegotiatedandthensigned.Almost$20millionwentonexpenses

foriwirepresentativestomeetandnegotiateamongthemselvesregularly.Part

ofthe$57millionwasspentalsoonlawyers(intheprocessesoflitigationand

lobbying over the period), consultants and those paid to implement the deal.

Significantly this expenditure did not include the further allocation from

Treasurythatwasallocatedaspartoftheexpensestoconcludethedealin2008.

What isknownis that individual iwi facilitatorswhowere initially engaged to

facilitateinformationflowbetweentheCrownandthoseiwiengagedbenefitted

significantlyfromthearrangement.GeorgeAsher,wasreportedtohaveearned

$88,000 during May and June 2008 from Crown Forestry Rental Trust alone.

Twootheriwifacilitators,MattTePouandGrahamPryor,earned$67,500each

over the sameperiod. The Treasury increased the spendingonthe deal's iwi

facilitators by $90,000, although it refused to confirm each person's cut.

MrAsher confirmed in an interview with the New Zealand Herald that the

negotiations component of the settlement cost about $5 million, including

administrativesupport.54

ProvidedtheGovernmentwasabletopassitsemissionstradinglegislation,the

CentralNorthIsland(CNI)collectiveofiwicoveredbythesettlementreportedly

stoodtogainitabout$40millionincarboncreditsaspartoftheTreelordsdeal.

NationaloptedtocarryovertheseelementsofLaboursETSscheme.Itisnot

insignificantthattheClimateChangeLeadershipGroupreliedheavilyontheCNI

IwiHoldingsLimitedmeetingof5November2009,heldattheTePuniKokiri

Offices,Rotorua,toprovideevidenceofsupportforitsposition.TheMaoriParty

54TahanaY,NewZealandHerald,4July2009http://www.nzherald.co.nz/forestry/news/article.cfm?c_id=47&objectid=10582485


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abandoned its earlier opposition to the scheme and supported the Bill. In

responsetoaquestionaboutwhatitwantedinreturn,Turiareplied:intheend,

it's not so much particularly what the Maori Party want, it is what the Iwi

Leadershipwant,andtheyaretheoneswhohavebeenleadingthedialogue,theyhavebeenaskingustodefinitelysignupforit.55

WhattheILGandtheMaoriPartydidnotpointoutwasthattheschemewould

entitle Maori to less than half the compensation that is being paid to other

classesofowners.Pre-1990forestlandownerswillreceivecompensationofup

to60 emissions unitsper hectare, if the landwas acquiredbefore 31October

2002. Owners of land sold after 31October 2002 receive only 39 units perhectare.ButsuccessfulclaimantstoCFLlandtransferredafter1January2008,

mostlikelytobeMaoribeneficiariesofTreatysettlements,wouldreceiveonly

18 units per hectare. In return, as highlighted in the Ngai Tahu and FOMA

Submissions to the Select Committee examining the National governments

revisedETSscheme,theETSwouldencumberpropertyrights,andimposereal

andheavycostsonusinganddevelopingassets,withaparticularlyprejudicial

effectonthosetransferredunderTreatysettlements.AttheendofNovember2009,adealwasreachedwithETSwhichprovidedanextra$24millionforthe

home insulation scheme, targetedspecifically at low income homes, a specific

requirement to consult on fisheries, forestry and agricultural allocations; on

futuretargetsandonanycomplementarymeasures.AsidedealwithNgaiTahu

andfourotheriwiinwhichtheygeta70-yearleaseon35,000hectaresofDoC

landsand100percentofanycarboncreditsearnedfortheperiodofthelease

and an all expenses paid junket to Copenhagen for two members of the IwiLeadership group, Roger Pikia of CNI Holdings Ltd and Chris Insley of Ngati

PorouForestsLtd.

TheNewRestructuring

55TuriaT;18October2009inTranscriptofinterviewwithGuyonEspineronQ&ASundayOctober182009p5


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This process has not been an isolated one. Parallel to this process of policy

development, regionalconsultationand then interventionbyanelitegroupof

men in thename of the Iwi LeadersGroup has occurred on anumber of key

issues since the Maori Party/National Party cooperation agreement. PrivatePrisons,Public PrivatePartnerships andmost recently theWaterForumhave

followed the same process of engagement almost exactly. Perhaps most

disconcertingisthattheWhanauOrapolicyinitiativehasnowbeenhi-jackedby

thesameinterventionistapproach,sothattheIwiChairsareactivevoicesinthe

privatisationofsocialservicesanddemandingtherightofvetooverproviders

whohaveexpressedinterestindeliveringwhanauoraprogrammes.

WhanauOra

A report was prepared by the Taskforce on Whanau-Centred Initiatives for

TarianaTuria,Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector. Bill English

joinedMaoriPartyco-leaderandproposedWhanauOraministerTarianaTuria

atTePuniKokiriforthepubliclaunchofthetaskforcereportinApril2010.

TheTaskforcedevelopedaframeworkbasedonareviewofrelevantliterature,

the experiences of health and social service agencies, an analysis of oral

submissions received at 22 hui throughout the country during October and

November 2009 where over 600 people attended, and over 100 written

submissions from individuals and organisations. Common themes emerged,

particularly the need for Whanau Ora to demonstrate a Maori heart, ensure

localrepresentationindecision-making,minimalbureaucracy,sustainabilityand

adequate resourcing, a research and evaluation component and quality

relationshipsbetweenwhanau,providers and iwi. Fundsweretobediverted

fromexistingstateagenciesintoanewWhanauOraTrustwhichwouldcontract

outworktoserviceproviderstodealwiththeproblemsonawhanaubasis.In

otherwords,whereanindividualfamilymemberhadhealth,educationorjustice

systemproblems, the individualwouldbe viewedaspartoftheirwhanau and

thewholewhanauwouldbeengaged in finding solutions. TheTaskforce also

promoted collaboration and shared infrastructure in the wake of the

proliferation of semi-autonomous Maori provider organisations who had


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emergedwithintheframeworkofcommercialcontestabilityofHealthPHOsand

EducationPTEssincethe1980srestructuringofdeliveryoftheseservices.

An Iwi LeadersWorking Groupwas confirmed atWaitangi during the Treatycommemorations in early 2010 to engage with the Crown on the policy. Its

mandate was to achieve the following visions for the contributions of Iwi to

realisingWhanauOra:aJointTreatypartnerapproachtodefiningWhanauOra

outcomesandsupportingtherolloutofWhanauOra;Iwi-ledimplementationof

WhanauOraintheirrespectivetribalareas;andWhanauOrapilots.56

ByMay2010theideaoftheTrusttodevolvetheserviceshaddisappearedand

the budget had been slashed to just 4%of the original proposal. As Nanaia

MahutapointedoutinamediareleaseTarianaTuriamusthavefeltalittleshort

changedafterthegovernmentdecidedtoallocateamere$33.5milliondollarsa

yearfor4yearstofundWhanauora,$800milliondollarsshortofwhatshefirst

expected.InthecaseoftheWhanauOrafundingitlooksasifTarianaisrobbing

PaulatopayPita.57

More significantly, Maori grass roots community workers were starting to

describeWhanauOra asthenew restructuringandopenly askingMaoriParty

Members of Parliament to explain why Whanau Ora, which was once a

overarchingprogrammedesignedtooverhaulthedeliveryofsocialservicesto

Maoriwithfundingof$1billion,hadmorphedintoasmallscaleprogrammefor

allNewZealanders,beingrunoutofTePuniKokirionabudgetlessthanthatof

JohnKeyscycleway.58Questionswerealsoposedaroundhowtoqualitatively

assessthenewprojectandhowmuchoftheallocatedbudgetwillbeutilizedby

TePuniKokiritojustrollouttheproject.

56http://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdfp1157MahutaNanaia,PressRelease:NewZealandLabourParty,6May2010http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1005/S00089.htm58MaoriLegalForum,July2010,QuestionbyTipeneMarrofNgatiRangitihiandDrMarilyn

Brewin,DirectorofResearch,NgPaeoteMramatangatoMemberofParliamentforTaiTongaRahuiKatene.


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Inafamiliarpattern,MinistersoftheCrown(thistimePaulaBennett)metwith

theIwileadershipGroupinAugust2010imploringthemasrespectedleaders

togobacktohapu,iwiandyourwhanauandsay its time to faceup to the

systemic violence in their communities.59

Tariana Turia was defending thecorporateleadersasthosethatwouldbestprovidethesolutionsintheindustry

ofmiserythatWhanauOraisdirectedtoalleviate,despitetheobviouslackof

expertiseoreveninvolvementbymanyofthemoreprominentmembersofthe

ILGinprogrammesfortheeliminationofviolence.Shecomplainedatthesame

meeting:Wereceiveadailydietofmessageswhichexpresssincereconcerns

abouttheroleofiwi.Theyusethetermcorporateiwi'.Itellyouwhat-when

youarepartofaGovernmentthereisnothingmoredishearteningthantohear

suchcriticismfromourown;ofpeoplewhoaretryingtomoveusforward.60

Reflectionsonwheretofromhere?

In his reflections on Maori Sovereignty, Bruce Jesson reminded Pakeha that

TeTiritioWaitangiforeshadowedacommunitythatbothMaoriandPakehaare

part of.61 He understood the Maori Sovereignty movement as a force of

resistancetoacapitalisteconomythatcommodifiednatureandhumanity. Inthedebateonwhoweareasanation,weneedtore-examineourunderstandingof

national identity and our heritage, and to confront the ongoing process of

colonisationthatdispossessesMaoriofresourcesforthebenefitofothers,asif

wehavenopriorrightorrelationshiptothispartoftheplanet.Thechallengeby

itsnaturerequiresPakehatobreakapartfromthehegemonyofStatepracticeto

align with Maori, not just to confront injustice, but to also dispense with a

constitutionalframeworkfromwhichinjusticeisanaturalproduct.

59BennettPaula,PressRelease,23August2010http://www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleID=3372860TuriaTariana,AddresstoIwiLeadersForum19August2010http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1008/S00477/address-to-iwi-leaders-forum.htm

61Jesson,Bruce,WaitangiAPakehaIssueToo, firstpublishedinAucklandMetro,1983,p.109,andsubsequentlyinAndrewSharp(ed) ToBuilda NationCollectedWritings19751999,Penguin,Auckland,2005.


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Toachievethis,Jessonremindedusthatwemustsetseriousgoalsforournation

and ourselves.62 Facing this challenge will involve a reinterpretation of

sustainability and economic development and, in light of the discussion this

evening,whattheIwiLeaderswouldhaveusbelievetinorangatiratanga,MaoriSovereigntytobe.Thereisnomagicbullet;yetthechallengesthatconfrontus

are urgent and require immediate action. That means believing in and

articulating the values of a pathway to real alternatives sourced in Kaupapa

Maori.

While traditional approaches to development focus on achieving growth,

believing that this would trickle down and benefit everyone, I believe thatpeoplemust be at the centre of thedevelopmentprocess. I look to our own

conceptualframeworkaroundthetermtangatawhenuatoconfirmthis.Because

the present economic growth model is premised on the commodification of

taongaforprofitandtheseparationoftangatafromwhenuatoachievethis,itis

problematicinanumberofways.Economicgrowthofthiskindisnotenoughto

achievehumandevelopmentortomaintaintheethicofcommunitywellbeing

which lays at the heartofconstructs likewhanau (family), hapu (community)

and iwi (nation), which are the esteemed institutions of society expressly

stipulated to be protected in TeTiriti. As Jesson reminds us, a community

dependsoncontinuity. Anation and its institutionsdependoncontinuity too.

Weastangatawhenuarequireourtangatatobeconnectedtoourhomelandsin

morethananotionalway.

In their haste to break away from tight control of the state and poor

socio-economic status, the ILG have turned towards forces ofglobalisation for

emancipation,eithernotrecognisingthattheywerebeingmanipulatedtowards

new forms of colonialism and domination or unable to identify any real

alternativetoachievetheirgoals .Theirbehaviour,inpart,mirrorstheinability

ofAotearoaNewZealandasanationto confronttheproblemsofconstructing

62Jesson,Bruce,TherehavealwaysbeenAlternatives:OnlytheirPurposeisMad,DunmorePressLtd,1999,p.216.


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alternativeswhentherehasbeensuchasystemicfailurefromourexperiment

withneoliberalismoverthepast25years.

Notwithstanding this, the Government process has been one of concertedco-option ofMaorielites tomaintain this particular agenda. Consultationhas

beenorganisedbysuccessiveGovernmentsontheirterms.Fromthebeginning,

theGovernmenthasimposedunrealistictimeframesforMaoritounderstandall

theissuesandimplications,todiscusswidelyandformopinionsonthis,andto

communicate these to the Government. At each stage, groups have become

smallerand less representativebyrequiring the consultation huitoelectonly

onerepresentativeeachtoformagroupthatwastorepresentallMaori(without

the time to make this possible), or by reducing that group to an executive

(presumably because of commitments and time constraints), or by the Iwi

LeadershipGroupbecomingtheinterfacewiththeCrown.

Despitethefeedbackfromtheconsultationhuithatthefocuswastooeconomic,

forwhateverreasonateachstageoftheconsultativeinput,thetechnocratsand

advisers have focused more on the economics of ETS and devolution of

contractualrelationshipsand benefitstoIwiCorporates,and lessontheother

concerns, such as impacts on the environment and retention of a Maori

worldviewsafeguardingTreatyrelationships.Thisbehaviourhasculminatedin

theMaoriPartycompletelychangingoradaptingitspolicyandobjectivesinline

withtheIwiLeadershipGroupsedicts.Thereisahugesenseofurgency,created

in part by the media hype, to roll out initiatives with very little analysis or

understandingofthephilosophyofthepolicyorimperativesontheirdelivery.

Inthe current context,Maoriare the losers as it is theirassets and resources

exclusivelythatarecapturedwithinaconfiscatoryregime.Theireofthegeneral

public is inflamedbymis-informationcampaignswhichsuggest that the slight

possibilitythatMaorimightachievesomesmallredressisawindfallthatthey

areundeservingof.TheSeabedandForeshoreisaclassicexample.Politicians

and themediawhipped up a furore about the right of Kiwi to suntan on the

beach. Having nationalised these resources, and denied any traditional


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relationships to the Takutai and Papamoana that Maori may possess, the

government is licensing transnational companies like Petrobras to mine the

petroleumandothermineraldepositswhichsubsistinthecontinentalshelf.

ThishighlightstheoldMarxistnotionofafalseconsciousness:Maoriaredefined

inoppositiontowhatisgoodforthenationandaretoldtoforgive,forgetand

moveon.Wearetoldwemustacceptanidentitythatwearenot.Unfortunately

thedenialofrightsandconfiscationcontinuesandthereisnowheretomoveto,

sothey take to the road. Ostracizing the indigenous intheirown landswhen

theysucceedisnotanewpolicy,atleastnottothiscountry,obviousexamples

being the imprisonment of TeKooti at Wharekauri, TeWhiti and Tohu in

DunedinandRuaKenanaandMokomokoinMountEden.Morerecentexamples

includethelateEvaRickard,thelateSydJacksonandthelateNikoTangaroa.It

is important to note that none of these people were imprisoned for acts of

violence,eventhoughstate-sponsoredviolencewasinflictedonthem.

The employmentofpoliciesofRealpolitikto 'radicalise'Maoriviewsserves to

legitimisetheongoingintentionsofthestatetoproceedwithitsagendaandto

denyMaoriparticipationinthedebate.Issuesofjusticeandpolicyarereflected

insteadas issuesofracialdifference. OnceMaoriareseparatedinsuchaway,

thetaskthenturnstocreatinganeliteclassthatwillsycophanticallyagreetothe

agreedpolicyobjectivesonbehalfofthosewhodidn'telectthemtoundertake

suchroles.

ButPakeha NewZealand are losers too. They have been victims of the same

process of corporatism that distances decision-making and denies effective

participatorydemocracy.

Weneedtohaltthisprocess.Achievingthisrequiresamassmovementthatis

dedicated to a sustained struggle, including education, participation,

engagement, debate, organisation, action and reflection. It needs to be

all-pervasive,withtentaclesreachingtotheheartsandmindsofallofthesectors

ofourcommunitiesandtothepulseofournation.Ihaveactivelycampaigned


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for a Planning Council, democratically elected by Maori responsible for the

designofaprocessofdecolonisationwheretheprocessofformulatingthegoals

for Aotearoa NewZealand are as important as the goals themselves. Jesson

himself saw this kind of strategy as an important step to restore democraticprocessestoAotearoaNewZealand,citingthe1984EconomicSummitandRoyal

Commission onSocialPolicy aspotentiallyhopeful precedents that havebeen

suppressed and by-passed by the Cabal that imposed their agenda of neo

liberalism.63

Challenging economic reform and trade liberalisation also requires a critical

perspectiveondevelopment.Thereisalmostnoonetodayaskingquestionsthat

usedtobeaskedin the1970s thedecadeofindependenceforsomePacific

IslandstatessuchasDevelopment forwhom? and Whodecides? Despite

theproliferationofMaoriDoctoralthesesinthelastdecadethereareveryfew

forums of the kindwhereIwas nurtured in the 1980 Sovereigntymovement,

which looked for solutions fromwithin our communities and consciously set

aboutprovidingthetoolsofanalysistodismantlethebarrierstodebatebetween

andamongstwahineandtane,UrbanMaoriandTraditionalCommunities,Maori

andPakeha.

The future Constitutional arrangements of this nation are the key to social,

economicandecologicalwellbeingofusall.Ironically,asingleoutstandingissue

intherelationshipagreementbetweentheNationalPartyandtheMaoriParty

holdstheopportunitytodevelopthiskindofdebateandfortheMaoriPartyto

redeemitsclaimedcommitmenttothekaupapaofTeTiriti.AttheHirangiHui,

whichwasthelastsignificantattemptbyMaoriasanationtograpplewiththis

issue,therewasagreementthatwhatmattersnowisnotsomuchthedetailsofa

Treaty-based constitution or the flow-on constitutional arrangements, but a

commitment to a constitutional review jointly undertaken by Maori and the

Crownfor thepurposeofdevelopingaNewZealandconstitutionbasedonthe

Treaty of Waitangi and, among other things, fully recognising the position of

63JessonBruce,TherehavealwaysbeenAlternatives:OnlytheirPurposeisMad,DunmorePressLtd,1999,p.221.


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MaoriasTangataWhenua.Huiparticipantsdiscountedthepossibilityofdurable

Treaty settlements without fresh constitutional guarantees and a final break

withcoloniallawsandprocesses.

Anysuchprocessmustbeseenasatrulyindependentdiscussion,distinctfrom

andnotaccountabletoTePuniKokiriortheDepartmentof Justiceor thenew

quango,theIwiLeadersforum.Itmustbeaccountabletothecommunitiesfrom

whom and for whom the programmes of change are being discussed and

evolved,andmustactivelyfacilitatetheirparticipation.Forthismechanismto

be effective, the Iwi Leaders model must be rejected and an independently

resourcedsecretariat established to convenea series of constitutional huiand

forums todiscuss the future ofournation that engagesmeaningfully with all

Maoricommunitiesandreportbacktothem.Themandatemustbegroundedin

theongoingentrenchmentoftheguaranteesoftheDeclarationofIndependence

1835 andTeTiriti oWaitangi, and seek toidentify aconstitutionalframework

whoseprinciplesandprocesses can equipus toconfrontthe ecological,social,

economic and spiritual challenges of the 21st century, and the crises of food,

climate,energyandfinancethatarethelegacyofthefailedglobalmarketmodel.

WhileIamnotaRepublican,thisisanotherpointwheremythinkingforchange

convergestoapointsharedbyJesson.InmodernAotearoawemustmovetoa

modelofgovernmentwhichisnotfocusedonjustsettlingthegrievancesofour

colonialpast,butonbuildingonewherethereistrustandrespectamongstthe

communitiesthatco-exist. TheConstitutionalTaskforceIenvisagethereforeto

assistthisprocessmustalsoincludenonMaoricommunityleadersworkingwith

theircommunitiesdistinctfromstatecontrolaspartofthisprocess.Iamsure

just by posing this solution, a whole lot of other questions immediately are

raised,likewhoarethesepeopleandhowaretheyselectedandtowhomare

theyaccountable?NewZealandasasmallnationcaneasilyanswerthisquestion

forthemselves.Nominationsforcommunityrepresentativesarenotunknownin

thenot forprofit sectorwithprocessesofengagementandreportbackpartof

therangeofaccountabilitiestoanysuccessfulnominee.


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Weasanationneedtoformallyengageinthisprocessoftransformation,which

mustbedesigned, controlledand implementedwith the equalparticipationof

the tangatawhenua and othercitizenswho havemadeAotearoaNewZealand

theirhomelands.Thispleaisnotnew.Whatisnewisthegrowinggroundswellof voices joining those of the late Bruce Jesson and myself for a process to

commenceto takeon the entrenchedpowerand influence of the finance elite

andotherswhohavehijackedournation.Weshouldnotallowthemomentumof

thosepleastodissipate.

Full Version of Bruce Jesson Lecture Presented 27 October - 11.11.10

Documents

Transcript of Full Version of Bruce Jesson Lecture Presented 27 October - 11.11.10