EN BANCG.R. No. 106692 September 1, 1994MILA MANALO,Petitioner,v.RICARDO GLORIA, in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Science and Technology, and PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,Respondents.Irineo B. Orlino for petitioner.DAVIDE, JR.,J.:This is a petition for "certiorariandmandamus" filed on 3 September 1992 urging us to render judgment:(1) Declaring the 1st Indorsement dated 14 December 1990 of the respondent Secretary of Science and Technology, (Annex "E" hereof), and Resolution No. 91-1036 of the respondent Civil Service Commission (Annex "G" hereof) null and void;chanrobles virtual law library(2) Ordering the respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the back wages of the petitioner for the period from April 16, 1988, the date she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the date she was reinstated; andchanrobles virtual law library(3) Ordering the respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the petitioner the salary equivalent to the salary of a Planning Assistant from the time of her reinstatement and thenceforward.1In their comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for the respondents on 2 December 1992, the respondents claim that the petitioner received a copy of respondent Civil Service Commission's (CSC) Resolution No. 91-1036 of 29 August 1991 on 5 September 1991 and pray that the petition be dismissed because, on procedural grounds, it was filed out of time and the petitioner violated paragraph 4 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and CircularNo. 28-91; and, on substantive grounds, the decision in G.R. No. 81495 of4 June 19902cannot apply together since she is not a party therein. Moreover, her position was legally abolished, she did not appeal from the abolition, and instead of joining her other co-employees in assailing the legality of their separation from the service, she requested appointment to a position comparable to her former position. Thus, she was appointed to the position of Clerk II on15 May 1989, which she accepted without reservation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIndeed, the petitioner failed to comply with the aforesaid Circulars. She does not also deny that she received a copy of the challenged ResolutionNo. 91-1036 on 5 September 1991. Pursuant to Section 7, subdivision A (Common Provisions), Article IX of the Constitution,3the petitioner had only thirty days from 5 September 1991 within which to bring the said resolution to this Court via a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.4The instant petition was filed only on 3 September 1992 or eleven months and twenty-eight days after her receipt of a copy of the challenged resolution, indisputably beyond the constitutionally mandated period. On this score alone, the petition must be dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryEven on its merits, the petition must likewise fail. The uncontroverted facts culled from the pleadings of the parties, as well as from our decision of4 June 1990 inMendoza vs.Quisumbing5and companion cases, render this conclusion inevitable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryBefore 16 April 1988, the petitioner held the position of planning Assistant in the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI), an agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), with an annual salary of P26,250.40.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryOn 30 January 1987, the President of the Philippines issued E.O.No. 128 reorganizing the DOST. Section 21 thereof provides for the reorganization of the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the PNRI. Conformably therewith, PNRI was reorganized and a new staffing pattern or position structure, which abolished certain positions, was adopted. A list of employees who would be retained under the new position structure was posted in the PNRI premises. Those excluded were placed in a manpower pool for possible placements in other DOST agencies. Appointments under the new position structure were thereafter issued to the retained employees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryAmong the abolished positions was that of the petitioner. The petitioner, however, "made an appeal with the DOST/RAB to place her to any comparable position to which her qualification would fit,"6which was favorably acted upon by her appointment to the new position of Clerk II with an annual salary of P17,640.00 on 15 May 1989.7She accepted her appointment as Clerk II, a position she presently holds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIn view of our Decision of 4 June 1990 inMendoza vs.Quisumbingand more particularly of the companion case, G.R. No. 81495 (Arizabal vs.Leviste), wherein we held:4) In G.R. No. 81495, the petition is DISMISSED. Except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to be phased out and who have received their separation and retirement benefits, the petitioners are ordered to retain the private respondents-employees in the reorganized department under the new staffing pattern with positions and salaries comparable or equivalent to their former positions but not lower than their former ranks and salaries.the petitioner (who was neither a party in G.R. No. 81495 nor in the case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City subject thereof) sent a letter to the Director of the PNRI, dated 3 September 1990,8requesting the payment of back salaries for the period commencing from the abolition of her office until she was appointed as Clerk II and the payment of salary "comparable or equivalent to her former position as Planning Assistant from the time she was phased out up to the present." The PNRI referred this request to the DOST on 12 November 1990.9chanrobles virtual law libraryIn a 1st Indorsement dated 14 December 1990,10the DOST denied the request because she was not a party in G.R. No. 81495 and because there was no finding under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6656 (Reorganization Law) that the petitioner was illegally terminated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryOn 4 March 1991, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a letter11to the public respondent CSC requesting that in view of the DOST denial of her request, the CSC should "order the PNRI to pay Ms. Manalo back wages during the period she was phased out up to her reinstatement to the lower position of Clerk II, and, in addition that she be paid the difference between the salary of a Planning Assistant and that of a Clerk II."chanrobles virtual law libraryIn its Resolution No. 91-1036 of 29 August 1991,12the CSC denied the request because the petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 81495, and although the position of Clerk II is admittedly lower in rank and salary than her previous position of Planning Assistant, upon her request after she had been phased out, she assumed the duties of Clerk II without reservation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryFrom these facts, it is clear that both the indorsement and the resolution were not issued with abuse, much less grave, of discretion. The petitioner was not compelled to accept the new position. Instead of questioning the new position structure or taking the other alternatives of either accepting separation pay or retiring from the service, she expressed preference for appointment to the new position, voluntarily accepted the appointment thereto, and assumed the new position without reservation. Reluctance or involuntariness in relation thereto is not asserted in her petition and in her letters of 3 September 1990 and 4 March 1991.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThemandamusaspect of this case refers to the payment of the petitioner's (a) "back wages . . . for the period from April 16, 1988, the date she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the date she was reinstated," and(b) "salary equivalent to the salary of a Planning Assistant from the time of her reinstatement and thenceforward."Mandamusunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action available to an aggrieved party when any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes a person from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which that person is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner's claim for "back wages" could be the appropriate subject of an ordinary civil action and there is absolutely no showing that the said remedy is not plain, speedy and adequate. It does not even seem that the petitioner has given some priority to her claim. She did not claim for it in her3 September 1990 letter to the PNRI. The first time she mentioned it was in her 4 March 1991 letter to the CSC. Thereafter, and before she filed this petition, she did nothing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryAs for the payment of salary equivalent to that of a Planning Assistant, it is clear that the petitioner does not seek reinstatement to the position of Planning Assistant. Since she had in fact asked for her retention in the PNRI and for her appointment to a new position and was accordingly appointed as Clerk II, a position which she voluntarily accepted and which she continues to hold until now, estoppel, which is clearly present, bars her obtainment of the desired relief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWe are not persuaded by the suggestion that the petitioner is only seeking execution of the decision inArizabal vs.Leviste. The petitioner is not a party therein and is not, therefore, entitled to its execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryNor do we agree with the plea in the dissenting opinion that we takethis case as one formandamusin the light of our decision inCristobal vs.Melchor.13The factual milieu therein does not obtain in this case. Unlike Cristobal who was never reinstated despite his persistent pleas, the herein petitioner asked for and was appointed to the new position of Clerk II, which she accepted without reservation. InCristobal, this Court considered the viability of an action formandamusand the grant of favorable relief thereunder even if the said action was filed after one year from the accrual of the cause of action, because it was the "act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's . . . complaint for reinstatement."14It appeared therein that Cristobal and the other dismissed employees were assured by Executive Secretary Mutuc that he would work for their reinstatement; however, Mr. Mutuc was replaced by other Executive Secretaries to whom Cristobal "over and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and re-employed at the 'opportune time.'" This "continued promise of government officials concerned led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the President to comply with its commitment."15chanrobles virtual law libraryEven granting that the petitioner can avail herself of the writ ofmandamus, we find no special or cogent reason to justify acceptance of this petition as an exception to this Court's policy concerning the hierarchy of courts in relation to cases where it has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. InPeople vs.Cuaresma,16this Court stated:A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari(as well as prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 129on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That heirarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those maters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard,supra- resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" - was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Courtpro tantoof the burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it." (citations omitted)And inDefensor-Santiago vs.Vasquez,17this Court said:One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryNo pronouncement as to cots.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law librarySO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Mendoza,JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryCruz, Bidin, JJ., are on leave.chanrobles virtual law librarychanrobles virtual law librarySeparate OpinionsBELLOSILLO, J.,concuring:chanrobles virtual law libraryI concur subject to myponenciainAldovino v.Alunan.1I will explain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryI agree with the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan that the declaration of nullity of the assailed reorganizations inArizabal v.Leviste2nullified also in effect the separation of petitioner from the service; hence, theoretically, she could not be deemed to have been terminated. However, her act of signing up for another position, albeit lower, within the same office amounted to an abdication of her right to hold her former position. In other words, despite her separation, petitioner remained, in legal contemplation, as incumbent Planning Assistant of DOST. But the effect of her unqualified assumption as Clerk II is resignation from her former office as she cannot be holding both offices at the same time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law librarySignificantly, it appears from the statement of facts of the majority opinion that after the reorganization, petitioner never questioned her removal until the decision inArizabal. She seemed contended with what fate befell her. Before then, there was no indication whatsoever that she resented her separation. She assumed the position of Clerk II without any condition or qualification; neither did she express interest in her reinstatement as Planning Assistant. Her actuation is indicum that she "opted to be phased out," to use the language ofArizabal. Consequently, she is not entitled to reinstatement to her former position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryHer situation is far different from that of most petitioners and intervenors inAldovinowho, from the start of their separation, unceasingly fought for their positions and demanding reinstatement, although in different fora - some administratively, others judicially and extra-judicially. The ruling inCristobal v.Melchor3cannot save her as it should only be applied sparingly and only in extreme cases of injustice. Her case is not one of them. She does not appear to be a victim of injustice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryI also vote for the denial of the petition.KAPUNAN, J.,dissenting:Arizabal vs.Levisteand the consolidated cases involving the reorganization of various government departments and agencies, emphatically held:We are constrained to set aside the reorganization embodied in these consolidated petitions because the heads of departments and agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own concepts of unlimited discretion and "progressive" ideas on reorganization instead of showing that they have faithfully complied with the clear letter and spirit of the two constitutions and the statutes governing reorganizations.1chanrobles virtual law libraryIn dismissing the petition of the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and the Director and members of the Reorganization Evaluation Committee of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute seeking annulment of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City restraining them from dismissing various employees of the PNRI under Executive Order No. 128, we ordered the petitioners therein to retain the said employees under the new staffing pattern with positionscomparableorequivalent totheirformer ranks and salaries. Specifically, we ruled that:4) In G.R. No. 81495, the petition is DISMISSED. Except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to be phased out and who have received their separation and retirement benefits, the petitioners are ordered to retain the private respondents-employees in the reorganized department under the new staffing pattern with positions and salaries comparable or equivalent to their former positions but not lower than their former ranks and salaries.2chanrobles virtual law libraryThe clear import of our decisions in these consolidated cases was thatwithout exception1)allthe reorganizations embodied in the consolidated cases were set aside, and; 2) in cases where it was plainly impossible and impracticable to comply with our holding inMendoza, we allowed a modification of our holding, provided those affected were restored topositions of similar rank and salary, if said employees did not opt for retirement or separation. Even assuming that petitioner allowed to have her name placed in a manpower pool for purposes of being assigned to another job, consistent with this Court's holding inArizabal vs.Leviste, equity demands that she should have been automatically reassigned to a position both of comparable rank and salary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryA lot has been said about the fact that herein petitioner was not among the original private respondents in G.R. No. 81495. Considering our decision inArizabaland the subsequent case,De Guzman v.CSC, infra, her failure to join the petitioners inArizabalwas not fatal to her petition for reinstatement and back salaries. InCristobal vs.Melchor3where the doctrine of laches was invoked to defeat the petitioner's demand for reinstatement to his former position with the Office of the President, this Court held the statute of limitations (provided for in Section 16, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court) inapplicable because there was no acquiescence or inaction on the part of Cristobal which would amount to an abandonment of his right to reinstatement. Addressing the contention that he was not one of the parties to the civil case and could not benefit from the lower court's decision in the said civil case, we held that:Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action(Emphasis ours). During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryMore importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily spending time and money by going to court - to rely upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein and the identical relief being sought. On this point, we find a statement of Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court in Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and persuasive, and We quote:The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy. Here plaintiffs, of others representing them, protested . . . and ever since they have . . . persisted in the diligent pursuit of a remedy . . . .Where the cause of action is of such a nature that a suit to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only of the plaintiff, but of all persons similarly situated, it is not essential that each such persons should intervened (sic) in the suit brought in order that he be deemed thereafter free from the laches which bars those who sleep on their rights. (250 U.S. 483, 39 S. Ct. 536, 63 L. Ed. 1099, 1106-1107; Emphasis supplied. See also Overfield vs. Pennroad Corporation, et al. 42 Fed. Supp. 586, 613).4Significantly, inCristobal, the plaintiff filed his complaint for reinstatement on August 10, 1971 or more than nine (9) years after his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were terminated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe similarity in the circumstances of the petitioner and the private respondents inArizabaland our ruling inCristobalmilitates against public respondents' assertion that petitioner herein could not benefit from our decision in the former case. Furthermore, we did not limit our holding in theMendozaandArizabalcases only to the petitioners therein.The decision was obviously broad enough to include all of those employees affected by the reorganizations we set aside in those consolidated casessuch that 1) reinstatement should have been automatic, and; 2) it was not essential that petitioner should have intervened inArizabalor joined the other PNRI employees in assailing the legality of their separation, for her to benefit from our holding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryPetitioner's demotion to a mere Clerk II position with a salary of P17,640.00 from that of Planning Assistant II with compensation of P26,250.00 and the respondents' failure to rectify this situation were clearly in blatant contravention of both the letter and spirit of our orders inMendozaandArizabal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWith due respect, I cannot simply reconcile myself with the majority's rationalization that petitioner was not compelled to accept the new position, that instead of questioning the new position structure or taking the alternative of separation or retirement, she expressed preference for the new position and voluntarily accepted appointment thereto. On April 16, 1988 petitioner was removed from her earlier job as a result of the PNRI reorganization. She was unemployed for fourteen months. On June 15, 1989, she accepted a Clerk II position with a salary considerably less than the one which was abolished as result of the new staffing structure. From these circumstances, one can hardly assume that she accepted the unconscionable demotion "voluntarily." She did not have must choice. It was an option between the degradation of having to accept a lowly position with a salary reduced by more than one third and the pangs of hunger out of joblessness, at a time when heads of government departments and agencies were engaged in their orgy of throwing out from office hordes of government workers in the guise of reorganization, running roughshod on their rights of due process and security of tenure. In her unfortunate plight, petitioner, like the dismissed clerk inCristobalwho did not have the luxury, time and money to go to court to protect his rights, must also have relied on the outcome of the case filed by her co-employees, given the similarity of her situation to that of theirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryAs I see it, the majority opinion assumes that this case merely involves the validity of final orders of the Civil Service Commission on the separation, removal or termination of a public officer. I beg to disagree. The issue brought before us affects the extent to which DOST has complied with our decision (inMendoza) setting aside the reorganizations involving these government agencies and our holding (inArizabal) directing petitioners in G.R. No. 81495 to reinstate their employees to positions of similar rank and salary. Such being the case, it would be inappropriate, in my mind, to misdirect our attention to petitioner's failure to comply with procedural steps relating to the CSC's order, rather than on the results of the abolition of the office itself. That would be mistaking the trees for the forest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThere is no disagreement on the proposition that a valid abolition of an office is neither a separation nor a removal. Where, however, the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.5InCruz vs.Primicias6where the validity of the reorganization of provincial departments in the Province of Pangasinan was assailed by government employees terminated as a result of abolition of their offices, the Court, said:No removal or separation of petitioners from service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal question that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known rule also thata valid abolition of offices is neither removal or separation of the incumbents.And of course, if the abolition isvoid the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law libraryAs well settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political and personal reasons, or in order to circumbent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees, it is null and void.7chanrobles virtual law libraryOne of the points raised by the respondents inPrimiciasto defeat the petitioners' challenge against the validity of the abolition of their offices was precisely a procedural point: their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In laying the question to rest, the Court emphasized that the petitioners therein never actually ceased to hold office if the abolition was null and void. Being null and void, their failure to exhaust available administrative remedies was clearly beside the point.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryAs recently as March 11, 1994 inDe Guzman vs.Civil Service Commission8where we clearly reiterated the fact that "we nullified the reorganization of respondents DOST and PNRI,"9inArizabal vs.Leviste, we held, citingArizabal, that:An abolition which is notbona fidebut is merely a device to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of the civil service employees is null and void.10chanrobles virtual law libraryIn the case at bench, therefore, the effect of our decision in the above-cited consolidated cases and inDe Guzmanwas to bring back those employees adversely affected by these reorganizations as far as practicable to thestatus quoon the day their positions were abolished. Consequently, as petitioner is deemed never to have ceased to hold office, it follows that the appealed decisions of the DOST and the Civil Service Commission have no practical force and effect, to begin with. By operation of law, she was entitled to all the rights and privileges which accrued to her by virtue of the office she held. Her failure to appeal the respondent Commission's decision within the thirty-day period required by the Constitution was, therefore, immaterial because in the eyes of the law, her entitlement to the position of Planning Assistant (or to an equivalent one) and to the emoluments and privileges attached to the same had never actually ceased. From a practical point of view, her initial request for reinstatement to the position of Planning Assistant II,was in effect a request for compliance with our earlier orders in the Mendoza and Arizabal cases. The DOST's refusal to comply with the said orders, its failure to restore petitioner to thestatus quo, and the CSC's Resolution of 29 August 1991 were therefore made in excess of respondent's jurisdiction.Compliance with our decision ordering the public officials concerned to restore employees affected by the reorganization of the PNRI to the status quo as far as practicable in Arizabal vs.Leviste was not discretionary, but made obligatory by our orders in theMendozaandArizabal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe majority opinion has made much out of the petitioner's failure to comply with Article IX of the Constitution requiring that such petitions be filed within thirty days from receipt of the assailed resolutions, and Circular I-88 which requires a verified statement of material dates in these petitions. As we had already made a clear and unequivocal pronouncement inArizabalto restore the illegally dismissed employees to positions comparable or equivalent to those they formerly held, "but not lower than their former ranks and salaries" (except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to be phased out and who have received their separation and retirement benefits), the only thing left to do for DOST was to implement or execute the directive. Petitioner's recourse to CSC from the adverse ruling of DOST was a superfluity as petitioner could have come to this Court to execute or implement its final orders. Hence, the prescriptive period mandated by Article IX of the 1987 Constitution could not have run. Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure mandates that, as inMendoza vs.Quisumbingand theDario vs.Mison11cases, we disregard the procedural roadblocks erected by the public respondent in order to defeat what is otherwise a valid claim. A much more equitable result would have followed had we proceeded to treat the case at bench essentially on its own merits, particularly when we consider that the questioned delay in this case was even far less than the assailed delays inDario vs.Misonand in the earlier case ofCristobal vs.Melchor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryInDario, which we cited with favor inMendoza vs.Quisumbing, we stated that:The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure . . . and other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service . . . and because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants.12The Constitution, no less, demands a similar treatment of the procedural roadblocks that stand in the way of petitioner's valid claim.I vote to grant due course to the petition and to enter judgment as follows:1. Declaring Resolution No. 91-1036 of respondent Civil Service Commission as null and void for being issued in grave abuse of discretion;chanrobles virtual law library2. Ordering respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to reinstate the petitioner to the position of Planning Assistant, or if this is not possible, to another position of equivalent rank; andchanrobles virtual law library3. Ordering the Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the backwages of petitioner for the period from April 16, 1988, the date she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the date she was reinstated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law librarySeparate OpinionsBELLOSILLO, J.,concurring:chanrobles virtual law libraryI concur subject to myponenciainAldovino v.Alunan.1I will explain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryI agree with the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan that the declaration of nullity of the assailed reorganizations inArizabal v.Leviste2nullified also in effect the separation of petitioner from the service; hence, theoretically, she could not be deemed to have been terminated. However, her act of signing up for another position, albeit lower, within the same office amounted to an abdication of her right to hold her former position. In other words, despite her separation, petitioner remained, in legal contemplation, as incumbent Planning Assistant of DOST. But the effect of her unqualified assumption as Clerk II is resignation from her former office as she cannot be holding both offices at the same time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law librarySignificantly, it appears from the statement of facts of the majority opinion that after the reorganization, petitioner never questioned her removal until the decision inArizabal. She seemed contended with what fate befell her. Before then, there was no indication whatsoever that she resented her separation. She assumed the position of Clerk II without any condition or qualification; neither did she express interest in her reinstatement as Planning Assistant. Her actuation is indicum that she "opted to be phased out," to use the language ofArizabal. Consequently, she is not entitled to reinstatement to her former position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryHer situation is far different from that of most petitioners and intervenors inAldovinowho, from the start of their separation, unceasingly fought for their positions and demanding reinstatement, although in different fora - some administratively, others judicially and extra-judicially. The ruling inCristobal v.Melchor3cannot save her as it should only be applied sparingly and only in extreme cases of injustice. Her case is not one of them. She does not appear to be a victim of injustice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryI also vote for the denial of the petition.KAPUNAN, J.,dissenting:Arizabal vs.Levisteand the consolidated cases involving the reorganization of various government departments and agencies, emphatically held:We are constrained to set aside the reorganization embodied in these consolidated petitions because the heads of departments and agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own concepts of unlimited discretion and "progressive" ideas on reorganization instead of showing that they have faithfully complied with the clear letter and spirit of the two constitutions and the statutes governing reorganizations.1chanrobles virtual law libraryIn dismissing the petition of the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and the Director and members of the Reorganization Evaluation Committee of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute seeking annulment of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City restraining them from dismissing various employees of the PNRI under Executive Order No. 128, we ordered the petitioners therein to retain the said employees under the new staffing pattern with positionscomparableorequivalent totheirformer ranks and salaries. Specifically, we ruled that:4) In G.R. No. 81495, the petition is DISMISSED. Except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to be phased out and who have received their separation and retirement benefits, the petitioners are ordered to retain the private respondents-employees in the reorganized department under the new staffing pattern with positions and salaries comparable or equivalent to their former positions but not lower than their former ranks and salaries.2chanrobles virtual law libraryThe clear import of our decisions in these consolidated cases was thatwithout exception1)allthe reorganizations embodied in the consolidated cases were set aside, and; 2) in cases where it was plainly impossible and impracticable to comply with our holding inMendoza, we allowed a modification of our holding, provided those affected were restored topositions of similar rank and salary, if said employees did not opt for retirement or separation. Even assuming that petitioner allowed to have her name placed in a manpower pool for purposes of being assigned to another job, consistent with this Court's holding inArizabal vs.Leviste, equity demands that she should have been automatically reassigned to a position both of comparable rank and salary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryA lot has been said about the fact that herein petitioner was not among the original private respondents in G.R. No. 81495. Considering our decision inArizabaland the subsequent case,De Guzman v.CSC, infra, her failure to join the petitioners inArizabalwas not fatal to her petition for reinstatement and back salaries. InCristobal vs.Melchor3where the doctrine of laches was invoked to defeat the petitioner's demand for reinstatement to his former position with the Office of the President, this Court held the statute of limitations (provided for in Section 16, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court) inapplicable because there was no acquiescence or inaction on the part of Cristobal which would amount to an abandonment of his right to reinstatement. Addressing the contention that he was not one of the parties to the civil case and could not benefit from the lower court's decision in the said civil case, we held that:Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action(Emphasis ours). During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryMore importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily spending time and money by going to court - to rely upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein and the identical relief being sought. On this point, we find a statement of Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court in Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and persuasive, and We quote:The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy. Here plaintiffs, of others representing them, protested . . . and ever since they have . . . persisted in the diligent pursuit of a remedy . . . .Where the cause of action is of such a nature that a suit to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only of the plaintiff, but of all persons similarly situated, it is not essential that each such persons should intervened (sic) in the suit brought in order that he be deemed thereafter free from the laches which bars those who sleep on their rights. (250 U.S. 483, 39 S. Ct. 536, 63 L. Ed. 1099, 1106-1107; Emphasis supplied. See also Overfield vs. Pennroad Corporation, et al. 42 Fed. Supp. 586, 613).4Significantly, inCristobal, the plaintiff filed his complaint for reinstatement on August 10, 1971 or more than nine (9) years after his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were terminated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe similarity in the circumstances of the petitioner and the private respondents inArizabaland our ruling inCristobalmilitates against public respondents' assertion that petitioner herein could not benefit from our decision in the former case. Furthermore, we did not limit our holding in theMendozaandArizabalcases only to the petitioners therein.The decision was obviously broad enough to include all of those employees affected by the reorganizations we set aside in those consolidated casessuch that 1) reinstatement should have been automatic, and; 2) it was not essential that petitioner should have intervened inArizabalor joined the other PNRI employees in assailing the legality of their separation, for her to benefit from our holding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryPetitioner's demotion to a mere Clerk II position with a salary of P17,640.00 from that of Planning Assistant II with compensation of P26,250.00 and the respondents' failure to rectify this situation were clearly in blatant contravention of both the letter and spirit of our orders inMendozaandArizabal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWith due respect, I cannot simply reconcile myself with the majority's rationalization that petitioner was not compelled to accept the new position, that instead of questioning the new position structure or taking the alternative of separation or retirement, she expressed preference for the new position and voluntarily accepted appointment thereto. On April 16, 1988 petitioner was removed from her earlier job as a result of the PNRI reorganization. She was unemployed for fourteen months. On June 15, 1989, she accepted a Clerk II position with a salary considerably less than the one which was abolished as result of the new staffing structure. From these circumstances, one can hardly assume that she accepted the unconscionable demotion "voluntarily." She did not have must choice. It was an option between the degradation of having to accept a lowly position with a salary reduced by more than one third and the pangs of hunger out of joblessness, at a time when heads of government departments and agencies were engaged in their orgy of throwing out from office hordes of government workers in the guise of reorganization, running roughshod on their rights of due process and security of tenure. In her unfortunate plight, petitioner, like the dismissed clerk inCristobalwho did not have the luxury, time and money to go to court to protect his rights, must also have relied on the outcome of the case filed by her co-employees, given the similarity of her situation to that of theirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryAs I see it, the majority opinion assumes that this case merely involves the validity of final orders of the Civil Service Commission on the separation, removal or termination of a public officer. I beg to disagree. The issue brought before us affects the extent to which DOST has complied with our decision (inMendoza) setting aside the reorganizations involving these government agencies and our holding (inArizabal) directing petitioners in G.R. No. 81495 to reinstate their employees to positions of similar rank and salary. Such being the case, it would be inappropriate, in my mind, to misdirect our attention to petitioner's failure to comply with procedural steps relating to the CSC's order, rather than on the results of the abolition of the office itself. That would be mistaking the trees for the forest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThere is no disagreement on the proposition that a valid abolition of an office is neither a separation nor a removal. Where, however, the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.5InCruz vs.Primicias6where the validity of the reorganization of provincial departments in the Province of Pangasinan was assailed by government employees terminated as a result of abolition of their offices, the Court, said:No removal or separation of petitioners from service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal question that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known rule also thata valid abolition of offices is neither removal or separation of the incumbents.And of course, if the abolition isvoid the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law libraryAs well settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political and personal reasons, or in order to circumbent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees, it is null and void.7chanrobles virtual law libraryOne of the points raised by the respondents inPrimiciasto defeat the petitioners' challenge against the validity of the abolition of their offices was precisely a procedural point: their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In laying the question to rest, the Court emphasized that the petitioners therein never actually ceased to hold office if the abolition was null and void. Being null and void, their failure to exhaust available administrative remedies was clearly beside the point.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryAs recently as March 11, 1994 inDe Guzman vs.Civil Service Commission8where we clearly reiterated the fact that "we nullified the reorganization of respondents DOST and PNRI,"9inArizabal vs.Leviste, we held, citingArizabal, that:An abolition which is notbona fidebut is merely a device to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of the civil service employees is null and void.10chanrobles virtual law libraryIn the case at bench, therefore, the effect of our decision in the above-cited consolidated cases and inDe Guzmanwas to bring back those employees adversely affected by these reorganizations as far as practicable to thestatus quoon the day their positions were abolished. Consequently, as petitioner is deemed never to have ceased to hold office, it follows that the appealed decisions of the DOST and the Civil Service Commission have no practical force and effect, to begin with. By operation of law, she was entitled to all the rights and privileges which accrued to her by virtue of the office she held. Her failure to appeal the respondent Commission's decision within the thirty-day period required by the Constitution was, therefore, immaterial because in the eyes of the law, her entitlement to the position of Planning Assistant (or to an equivalent one) and to the emoluments and privileges attached to the same had never actually ceased. From a practical point of view, her initial request for reinstatement to the position of Planning Assistant II,was in effect a request for compliance with our earlier orders in the Mendoza and Arizabal cases. The DOST's refusal to comply with the said orders, its failure to restore petitioner to thestatus quo, and the CSC's Resolution of 29 August 1991 were therefore made in excess of respondent's jurisdiction.Compliance with our decision ordering the public officials concerned to restore employees affected by the reorganization of the PNRI to the status quo as far as practicable in Arizabal vs.Leviste was not discretionary, but made obligatory by our orders in theMendozaandArizabal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe majority opinion has made much out of the petitioner's failure to comply with Article IX of the Constitution requiring that such petitions be filed within thirty days from receipt of the assailed resolutions, and Circular I-88 which requires a verified statement of material dates in these petitions. As we had already made a clear and unequivocal pronouncement inArizabalto restore the illegally dismissed employees to positions comparable or equivalent to those they formerly held, "but not lower than their former ranks and salaries" (except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to be phased out and who have received their separation and retirement benefits), the only thing left to do for DOST was to implement or execute the directive. Petitioner's recourse to CSC from the adverse ruling of DOST was a superfluity as petitioner could have come to this Court to execute or implement its final orders. Hence, the prescriptive period mandated by Article IX of the 1987 Constitution could not have run. Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure mandates that, as inMendoza vs.Quisumbingand theDario vs.Mison11cases, we disregard the procedural roadblocks erected by the public respondent in order to defeat what is otherwise a valid claim. A much more equitable result would have followed had we proceeded to treat the case at bench essentially on its own merits, particularly when we consider that the questioned delay in this case was even far less than the assailed delays inDario vs.Misonand in the earlier case ofCristobal vs.Melchor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryInDario, which we cited with favor inMendoza vs.Quisumbing, we stated that:The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure . . . and other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service . . . and because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants.12The Constitution, no less, demands a similar treatment of the procedural roadblocks that stand in the way of petitioner's valid claim.I vote to grant due course to the petition and to enter judgment as follows:1. Declaring Resolution No. 91-1036 of respondent Civil Service Commission as null and void for being issued in grave abuse of discretion;chanrobles virtual law library2. Ordering respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to reinstate the petitioner to the position of Planning Assistant, or if this is not possible, to another position of equivalent rank; andchanrobles virtual law library3. Ordering the Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the backwages of petitioner for the period from April 16, 1988, the date she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the date she was reinstated.

EN BANC[G.R. Nos. 120681-83.October 1, 1999]JEJOMAR C. BINAY,petitioner, vs.HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,respondents.[G.R. No. 128136.October 1, 1999]MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA,petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA,respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan.Since then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,[1]the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2]and 8249.[3]Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019[4]and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code[5]is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay,et al.assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:G.R. Nos. 120681-83On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,[6]and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.[7]The informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations.He contended that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process.Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash.Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan.The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to the motion for reconsideration.In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution.The court ruled that the requisites for suspensionpendente litewere present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019[8]and the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition forcertiorari,[9]to set aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspensionpendente litebefore he could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash.In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash.On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending petitionerpendente lite.Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.[10]On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases.The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioners motion, holding thus:There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade 27 under the compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989.Since, at the time of the commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him.The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27, because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade 27 does not hold water.In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence.From the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989.The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989.Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade 28 under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act.Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of the Compensation & Position classification system prepared by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade 27.[11]On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007.He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside:(1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitionerpendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC.Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner.The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs), praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.G.R. No. 128136Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas.Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality.In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School.This was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan.Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same.The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court.[12]On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City.The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan.In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019.The complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School.The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149.In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan.The information was subsequently amended on May 17, 1996.Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC.The case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds:that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy.The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996.The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition.Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case.On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996.On August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order.On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment.Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.The petition raises the following issues:IHad the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?IIAre the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to respondent court?IIIWhether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on duplicity of information?IVWhether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?VUnder the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of forum shopping?[13]On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.IThe Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases.The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14]as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[15]the pertinent provisions of which state:SEC. 4.Jurisdiction.-The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:(a)Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:(1)Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;(2)Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher thanprision correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceedprision correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.xxx.On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect.At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan.On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysayet al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:Sec. 4.Jurisdiction.--The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:a.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:(1)Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:(a)Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of thesangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;(b)City mayors, vice-mayors, members of thesangguniang panlungsod,city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;(c)Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;(d)Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;(e)PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;(f)City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;(g)Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;(2)Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;(3)Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;(4)Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and(5)All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.b.Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.c.Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.xxx.While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court.This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in theJournalandMalaya, two newspapers of general circulation.As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:SEC. 4.Jurisdiction. - TheSandiganbayanshall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:a.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense:(1)Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:(a)Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of thesangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;(b)City mayors, vice-mayors, members of thesangguniang panlungsod,city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;(c)Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;(d)Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;(e)Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;(f)City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;(g)Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.(2)Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;(3)Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;(4)Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of he Constitution; and(5)All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.b.Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to heir office.d.Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided inBatas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended.Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because:(1)At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27.(2)Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.(3)Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.AIn support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:xxx.The new laws consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay scale.Grades are determined by compensation.The essence of grades is pay scales.Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16]Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification[17]from the City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of onlyP10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988.This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758.Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification[18]from the Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary constraints.This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.The Constitution[19]states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions, thus:The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20]provides in Section 2 thereof thatdifferences in pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In short,the nature of an officials position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary.This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as well.Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the grade defined in Presidential Decree No. 985[21]as includingxxxall classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.[22]The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones position -- the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position.It is the officials Grade that determines his or her salary,not the other way around.It is possible that a local government officials salary may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit.[23]Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials grade.Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions.Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the Index of Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades.Salary level is not determinative.An officials grade is not a matter ofproof, but a matter oflawof which the Court must take judicial notice.[24]As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.Petitioner mayors are local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.More accurately, petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.[25]BPetitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1).They invoke the rule in statutory constructionexpressio unius est expressio alterius.As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction.Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous.[26]The law is clear in this case.As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.The premise of petitioners argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive.It is not.The phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration.The principle ofexpressio unius est exclusio alteriusdoes not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,[27]or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[28]InConrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra,the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and above. The same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1).Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.In the Courts Resolution inRodrigodated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.CPetitioner Binay cites previous bills[29]in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila.The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule ofinclusio unius est expressio alteriusis inappropriate.Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.(Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]).The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation.It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.(Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42).And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).[30]Thus, inRodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan.This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it.Congress has willed that positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will.Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the barangay officials,the municipal officials and employees,postal clerks and letter carriers and the like -- who are involved with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and theft.xxxxxxxxxxxxSenate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayansuch that only those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court.[31]It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant thatallmunicipal officials are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.In any case, courts are not bound by a legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation.It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator.[32]Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]DFrom the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:Sec. 7.Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down inBengzon vs. Inciong:[34]The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal.The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule.The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.[35]There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts of competent jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter.The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to regularcourts, but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court.If the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of proper courts. Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper courts:The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders ofregularcourts whereall the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.[Underscoring supplied.]Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:1.If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.2.If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan hasnotbegun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.(a)If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.(b)If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,