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KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 151, 2010 37

On the Apodictic Proof andValidation of Kants Revolutionary

Hypothesis

BRETT A. FULKERSON-SMITHIllinois Institute of Technology

I.

The second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter,Critique) contains several major and myriad minor emendations.The revision of the mode of presentation is apparent in foursections of the Critique: the Aesthetic; the Doctrine of the Conceptsof the Understanding; the Principles of Pure Understanding; andthe paralogisms advanced against rational psychology (Bxxxviii).

A new refutation of psychological idealism begins at B274. Perhapsmost importantly, a new Preface frames the Critique.

In this new Preface, Kant not only introduces his revolutionaryhypothesis, namely that what can be known a priori about objectsas appearances is only what can be put into them by the knower orthat objects as appearances conform to human cognition, but alsoindicates that the first main part of the Critiquecontains not onlyits apodictic proof, but also its validation.1Though Kant is clearabout this point, he is less clear regarding how the first main part

of the Critiqueaccomplishes both tasks. This raises two importantquestions relating to Kants method therein that, to my knowledge,have been largely neglected in the secondary literature: in what doesthe apodictic proof that a judgement may serve as an hypothesisconsist?; and how is such validated? In this essay, I offer answers toboth of these questions based on an analysis of Kants lectures onlogic.
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38 KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 151, 2010

BRETT A. FULKERSON-SMITH

II.2

In nearly all of his lectures on logic, Kant discusses the possibilityof providing apodictic proof that, on the one hand, a givenhypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is certain and, on the otherhand, a judgement may serve as an hypothesis. In these lectures,an hypothesis is understood as an explanation of something ingeneral, which may arise from reason, or from experience, or fromappearance (24: 220). Since these discussions consider in somedetail the necessary requirements of each kind of apodictic proof, aspart and parcel of their possibility, they shed considerable light on

the apodictic proof that the judgement what can be knowna prioriabout objects as appearances is only what is put into them by theknower or that objects as appearances conform to human cognitionmay serve as an hypothesis in the first main part of the Critique. Itis, therefore, profitable to survey them, emphasizing the similaritiesthey have with each other, and with the Critique.

Necessary Requirements for the Apodictic Proof of an

Hypothesis

Among the earliest of Kants discussions of hypotheses are thosein theBlomberg Logic, a set of lecture notes from the early 1770s.This set of notes focuses on the necessary requirements that agiven hypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is certain. If all ofthe consequences that follow from an assumed hypothesis are trueand agree with what is given, then it is not an opinion anymorebut instead is a certain judgement; as certain as the judgement,for example, that snow is white (24: 220). Nevertheless, it ispractically impossible to demonstrate every consequence for an

hypothesis. Hence, we must say that if all the consequences thatwe have been able to draw from an hypothesis are true, then Ihave great cause to conclude that the hypothesis itself is certainand true as a judgement (24: 220). Kant continues to develop thisline of argument throughout his lectures on logic, namely that it isimpossible to prove apodictically that a given hypothesis, formulatedas a judgement, is certain. Nevertheless, he affirms at least by 1780that it is possible to prove apodictically that a judgement may serveas an hypothesis, and thereby serve at least to explain something in

general, even if the (empirical) truth of the hypothesis cannot beestablished.3


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KANTS REVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS

The Vienna Logic, a collection of notes from Kants lecturesdating from around 1780, records Kant as claiming:

All holding-to-be-true of an hypothesis is grounded on the fact that throughit as a ground other cognitions are to be explained as consequences. Iactually infer, then, from the truth of the consequences to the ground,and thus I infer the truth of the cognition [i.e., the hypothesis] from theconsequences. (24: 887)

As in the Blomberg Logic Kant recognizes in this place that thisinductive mode of inference precludes the possibility of apodicticallyproving the truth of the hypothesis as a certain judgement or

cognition. Through induction it is only possible to cognize thesufficiency of the cognition for some consequences, and only thesufficiency of the cognition for all possible consequences wouldproduce apodictic certainty (24: 887).

Kant illustrates his point with a favourite example. He asks hisauditors to consider the hypothesis that a subterranean fire causesearthquakes or volcanoes. The apodictic proof that this hypothesis,formulated as a judgement, is certain requires demonstrating, forevery possible earthquake or volcano, a subterranean fire as its

cause. While such a demonstration is possible for a few, or evenvery many, earthquakes or volcanoes, it is practically impossible toexhibit for every earthquake or volcano a subterranean fire as itscause. Hence, induction can never apodictically prove the givenhypothesis, namely a subterranean fire causes earthquakes orvolcanoes, is certain.

It is nevertheless possible to prove apodictically that a judgementmay serve as an hypothesis. The Vienna Logic provides two necessaryrequirements for such a proof (24: 888). First, the possibility of the

assumed ground must be fully certain; otherwise, the hypothesisis a pure fabrication, like, for example, any hypothesis for whichthe assumed ground is the commercium pneumaticum, i.e., thepower through which a person can affect other minds. Second, theconsequence must be fully certain, i.e., if I hold something to becertain, then the outcome that I infer from it must be fully certain.

Consider again Kants favourite example. The apodictic proofthat the judgement a subterranean fire causes earthquakes orvolcanoes may serve as an hypothesis requires two things. First, the

proof requires the demonstration that earthquakes or volcanoes arepossible. Empirical observation satisfies this necessary requirement:


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both are possible because both are actual, as empirical observationevidences. Second, the proof requires the demonstration of

subterranean fires. Again, empirical observation satisfies thisrequirement. Although in this example the proof is a posteriori,Kant allows for the possibility of an a priori proof.

The Dohna-Wundlacken Logiccontains a similar, though muchshorter, discussion of the necessary requirements of the apodicticproof that a given hypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is certain.It also identifies the same two necessary conditions for the apodicticproof that a judgement may serve as an hypothesis identified andconsidered in the Vienna Logic. Importantly, however, theDohna-

Wundlacken Logic identifies another necessary condition for thisproof. Accordingly:

| 1. | The ground that I accept per hypothesin, of this the possibilitymust be certain {otherwise one proceeds with just empty fictions}, e.g.,a central fire . . .2. The consequence [Die Folge] from the assumed ground must be given,hence it must be actual the cause need only be possible.3. The implication [Die Konsequenz ] from the cause must be wholly certain as well. Otherwise, how

can one infer from it? (24: 746)4

The condition listed third is of particular interest as it is a newrequirement. According to this requirement, the apodictic proofthat a judgement may serve as an hypothesis requires demonstrationof the necessary connection between the ground whose possibilityis certain and the actual consequence. This requirement is differentfrom the second, which requires, for the apodictic proof that thejudgement a subterranean fire causes earthquakes or volcanoes

may serve as an hypothesis, demonstration that earthquakes orvolcanoes are actual events.

The Introduction to the Jsche Logic presents only in outlineboth the necessary requirements for the apodictic proof that a givenhypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is certain and the necessaryrequirements for the apodictic proof that a judgement may serveas an hypothesis. TheJsche Logicdoes not identify as a necessaryrequirement for the latter, as theDohna-Wundlacken Logic does, thedemonstration of the actuality of the consequence of the possible

ground. Rather, theJsche Logic, with the Vienna Logic, notes only


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the certainty of the possibility of the presupposition itself and theconsequentia (9: 85).

In the Transcendental Doctrine of Method in the Critique,Kant provides what amounts to the necessary requirements forthe apodictic proof that a judgement may serve as an adequateexplanation, not of something in general, as in the BlombergLogic, but of nature.5 In this place, Kant identifies two necessaryrequirements that are very similar to those enumerated in manytranscripts of his lectures on logic. The first of these requirements isgiven at A770/B798.

If the imagination is not simply to enthuse but is, under the strictoversight of reason, to invent, there must first be something that is fullycertain, and not invented as a mere opinion, and that is the possibilityof the object itself. With this it is possible to take refuge in opinionconcerning the actuality of the object, which opinion, however, in ordernot to be groundless, must be connected as a ground of explanation withthat which is actually given and consequently certain, and then the objectas ground of explanation is called an hypothesis.

In addition, a second point . . . is requisite to make an hypothesis

worthy of being assumed, namely its adequacy for determining[bestimmen]a priorithe given consequences (A774/B802).

Although Kant explicitly identifies two necessary requirementsfor the apodictic proof that a judgement may serve as an hypothesisin these pages, Robert Butts claims that the two conditions for anadequate hypothesis that Kant lists are actually only one, since theexplication that he gives for the notion of establishing as a certaintythe possibility of the object itself is indistinguishable from theaccount he gives of accounting a priori for an event. 6 Buttss

argument can be reconstructed from the following passage:

An hypothesis about the course of nature is allowable if (1) we know atleast something by means of which the judgment . . . secures connectionwith truth, and if we can establish something as certain, namely, thepossibility of the object itself. In addition, the hypothesis must accountfor what is given, that is, must explain this given. Furthermore, (2) theexplanation must rest on ana prioribasis, since onlya prioriexplanatoryprinciples are universal and necessary, the distinguishing marks of truthlacking in merely inductive generalizations.7


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Accordingly:

1 According to Kant, an hypothesis must meet two conditions inorder to be worthy of being assumed.

2 The first is that an hypothesis must establish with certainty thepossibility of an object.

3 The second is that an hypothesis must accounta priorifor anevent.

4 Accounting for somethinga prioriis to show that it is determinableby the synthetica prioriprinciples of the understanding.

5 But this is just to establish with certainty that something is a

possible experience.6 Hence, to establish with certainty the possibility of an object is

to account for ita priori.7 Therefore, the two conditions that Kant lists are indistinguishable.

The nerve of this argument is the second premise, namely that anadequate hypothesis establishes with certainty the possibility of anobject. On Buttss view, an adequate hypothesis explains a prioriwhat is given, the explanandum, which is an object of possible

experience, or what is the same, an event.This is not Kants view. Kants view is rather that the object of

possible experience is the explanansof an event, which is, in turn,the explanandum. An adequate hypothesis, then, explains an eventa priori in terms of an object of possible experience. For this, itmust be demonstrated that the connection between the object ofpossible experience that is the ground of explanation and the givenconsequences is certain. While Kant does not here indicate howsuch a demonstration proceeds, perhaps it proceeds by linking the

explanans and explanandum through the dynamical principles ofthe understanding, namely the synthetic a priori principles that areused to regulate the interaction of objects of possible experience (cf.A148/B187A162/B202; A176/B218A226/B274).

In addition, Kant claims that the apodictic proof that a judgementmay serve as an hypothesis must demonstrate that the ground ofexplanation is an object of possible experience. As Kant succinctlyexplains:

It is only possible for our reason to use the conditions of possibleexperience as conditions of the possibility of things; but it is by no means


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possible for reason as it were to create new ones, independent of theseconditions, for concepts of this sort, although free of contradiction,

would nevertheless also be without any object. (A771/B799)

Again, Kant does not here indicate in what this proof consists.Perhaps it proceeds by showing that the ground of explanation isdeterminable by the mathematical principles of the understanding,namely the synthetic a priori principles of the understanding thatare used to constitute objects of possible experience (cf. esp. A162/B202A176/B218).

In the final analysis,paceButts, there are, in fact, two necessary

requirements for the apodictic proof that a judgement may serve asan adequate explanation of nature. Furthermore, these necessaryrequirements are the same as those enumerated in both the ViennaLogicand theJsche Logic. This link between the Critiqueand thesetranscripts makes it possible to determine in what the apodicticproof of Kants revolutionary hypothesis most likely consists.

The Apodictic Proof of Kants Revolutionary Hypothesis

The hypothesis that Kant proposes in his new Preface offers an

explanation of something in general, namely the possibility ofsynthetic a priori cognition. Although he claims that the hypothesisis apodictically proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and theTranscendental Analytic, Kant offers no comment regarding howthe constitution of our representations of space and time and theelementary concepts of the understanding constitute such a proofof the hypothesis that what can be known a priori about objects asappearances is only what is put into them by the knower or thatobjects as appearances conform to human cognition. Given the

framework provided by Kants lectures on logic, the TranscendentalAesthetic and Transcendental Analytic satisfy the necessaryrequirements for the apodictic proof that a judgement may serve asan hypothesis, thereby apodictically proving the hypothesis.

According to the first requirement, what is expressed in thejudgement must bepossible. This requires, on the one hand, proofof the possibility of objects as appearances. The apodictic proof ofthe revolutionary hypothesis must demonstrate, then, the possibilityof objects as appearances. According to Kant, the Transcendental

Aesthetic as a whole proves that objects as appearances are possible:


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the apodictic proof and the validation of an hypothesis, the newPreface follows theBlomberg Logic. Nevertheless, the new Preface

does not indicate in what the validation of an hypothesis consists,noting only that an experiment of pure reason validates thehypothesis (cf. BxviiiBxxi). The Blomberg Logic does indicate inwhat the validation of an hypothesis consists, illuminating the roleof the experiment of pure reason in the Critiquein validating Kantshypothesis.

According to theBlomberg Logic, if an hypothesis, in additionto its adequacy for what follows from it, is strengthened by otherassurances [Versicherungen] about it, then the hypothesis is validated

[Bestttiget] (24: 220). Since an hypothesis is strong just in caseit is adequate for the consequence for which it is assumed, anhypothesis is strengthened just in case it is adequate as a ground forat least one other additional consequence. Hence, demonstratingthat at least one other consequence, beyond the one for which it isinitially assumed, follows from an hypothesis strengthens it; and, ifstrengthened, then validated.

The experiment of pure reason in theCritiquedirectly demonstratesthat only by presupposing the revolutionary hypothesis is it possible

to determine in thought and without contradiction the objects ofcosmology in answer to any of the following questions: (1) Does theworld have a spatial and a temporal boundary? (2) Are things in theworld ultimately made of simple substances? (3) Is there freedom inthe world? (4) Is the world dependent on a necessary being for itsexistence? The experiment of pure reason also implies that only onits presupposition is a unified system of philosophy possible. Sinceit establishes at least one additional certainty about the judgement,objects as appearances conform to human cognition or what is

known a priori about objects as appearances is only what is putinto them by the knower, beyond its adequacy for explaining thepossibility of synthetic a priori cognition, the experiment of purereason strengthens and so validates Kants revolutionary hypothesis.

The experiment of pure reason is discussed in three differentplaces in the new Preface. I contend that, despite their considerablesimilarities, there are subtle though important shifts in emphasisbetween these three discussions. In the first discussion, Kantemphasizes the condition necessary for the possibility of the

experiment of pure reason. When Kant returns to the experimentof pure reason his discussion identifies the necessary facts that the


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experiment of pure reason must establish in order to validate therevolutionary hypothesis. His final discussion of the experiment of

pure reason identifies its ultimate implication.

On the Necessary Condition of the Experiment of Pure

Reason

According to Kant in the new Preface, attempts to think [objectsthrough mere reason] will provide a splendid touchstone[Probierstein] of what we assumed as the altered method of ourway of thinking, namely that we can cognize of things a priorionly what we ourselves have put into them (Bxviii). In classical

metallurgy, the touchstone was used to validate the identity of asample metal: rubbing a sample metal on the touchstone producesa coloured stripe the identity of which is determined by comparingthe coloured stripe of the sample metal to the coloured stripes ofmetals of known identity. Similarly, Kant uses the term to refer tothat upon which an experimental test is conducted to validate thisrevolutionary hypothesis. His footnote to this remark identifies thistouchstone.10

In the first sentence of the footnote, Kant underscores that the

way he will validate his revolutionary hypothesis only imitates theway natural scientists validate hypotheses: it does not follow exactlythe procedure in natural science. The independent clause of thesecond sentence explains why this is the case: now the propositionsof pure reason, in particular when they venture beyond allboundaries of possible experience, admit of no test by experimentwith their objects (as in natural science). The propositions madein natural science are about objects of possible experience; hence,the propositions can be validated with an experiment conducted

on the objects that the propositions are about. As Kant famouslyclaims, the propositions of pure reason are about God, freedomand immortality: objects that cannot be given in any experience (cf.B395). Although a test by experiment can be conducted in order tovalidate these propositions of pure reason, it cannot be conductedwith their objects.

The dependent clause of the second sentence explains how theexperiment of pure reason may be conducted: thus to experimentwill be feasible only with concepts and principles that we adopt

[annehmen] a priori, putting in place [einrichtet] those that allow thesame objects to be considered from two different sides; on the one


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side as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience,and on the other side as objects that are merely thought at most for

an isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience.11Inthe experiment of pure reason, each set of a priori concepts andprinciples is used to consider or determine in thought objects.The use of one set allows an object to be determined only as anobject beyond experience, while the use of the other allows objectsto be determined as both objects of experience and objects beyondexperience. Hence, the possibility of the experiment of pure reasonrequires the establishment of each set of a priori concepts andprinciples.

In other words, thesine qua nonof the experiment of pure reasonis at least the metaphysical exposition or deduction of each set of apriori concepts and principles. According to Kant, a metaphysicalexposition is the distinct (even if not complete) representation ofthat which belongs to a concept . . . as given a priori (A23/B38).More specifically, a metaphysical deduction establishes the origin apriori of concepts and principles (cf. B159).

The requisite metaphysical deductions or expositions occur inthe Critique. As Norman Kemp Smith has persuasively argued, the

metaphysical deduction of the a priori concepts and principlesthat pure reason uses to determine objects from a single standpointoccurs in the First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic (A310/B366A338/B396).12 The metaphysical deduction of the a prioriconcepts and principles that allow objects to be considered asboth objects of experience and objects beyond experience isdivided between two parts of the Transcendental Doctrine of theElements. The metaphysical exposition of the a priori conceptsand principles of sensibility that allow objects to be considered

as both objects of experience and objects beyond experience isgiven in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A19/B33A49/B73); themetaphysical deduction of the a priori concepts and principles ofthe understanding is found in the Second and Third Sections of theFirst Chapter of the Analytic of Concepts (A70/B95A90/B109).

The final sentence of the footnote identifies the necessary factsthat the experiment of pure reason must establish. If we now findthat there is agreement with the principle of pure reason when thingsare considered from this twofold perspective [aus jenem doppelten

Gesichtspunkte], but that an unavoidable conflict of reason withitself arises with a single standpoint [bei einerlei Gesichtspunkte],


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then the experiment decides for the correctness of that distinctionof things into objects of experience and objects beyond experience

(BxviiiBxix). Kant discusses the facts necessary to validate hisrevolutionary hypothesis specifically at Bxx.

The Facts Established by the Experiment of Pure Reason

Because the apodictic proof of Kants hypothesis, in part, explainsthe possibility of synthetic a priori cognition, it promises tometaphysics the secure course of a science in its first part, where itconcerns itself with concepts a priori to which the correspondingobjects appropriate to them can be given in experience (Bxviii

Bxix). But, as Kant continues:

from this deduction of our faculty of cognizing a priori in the first partof metaphysics, there emerges a very strange result, and one that appearsvery disadvantageous to the whole purpose with which the second partof metaphysics concerns itself, namely that with this faculty we can neverget beyond the boundaries of possible experience, which is neverthelessprecisely the most essential occupation of this science. (Bxix)

Important for understanding Kants discussions of the experiment

of pure reason at Bxx and Bxxi is the identification of the parts ofmetaphysics to which Kant refers in this passage with vagueness:it seems that he identifies two different sciences as the first partof metaphysics, thereby rendering problematic the correspondingsecond part of metaphysics. As Giorgio Tonellis exquisitely detailedanalysis of the classification of the sciences in the Architectonic ofPure Reason reveals, the term metaphysics has several differentreferents at various levels of abstraction (cf. A840/B868A857/B879).13

Philosophy is either cognition from pure reason (purephilosophy) or cognition from empirical principles (empiricalphilosophy). Pure philosophy (metaphysics

1) consists of critique

and metaphysics2. Metaphysics

2consists of the metaphysics

3a of

nature (metaphysics3a

in the narrower sense), namely speculativephilosophy, and the metaphysics

3b of morals, namely practical

philosophy. The metaphysics3a

of nature consists of transcendentalphilosophy (ontology) and physiology of pure reason. Physiology ofpure reason consists of immanent physiology (rational physiology)

and transcendent physiology.14Transcendent physiology consists ofrational cosmology and rational theology.15


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According to Kant at Bxix, the first part of pure philosophycontains a deduction of the human faculty of cognition. The Critique

does contain a deduction of the human faculty of cognition in theTranscendental Analytic. Hence, since the Critique is a critique ofpure speculative reason, which investigates the faculty of reasonin regard to all pure a priori cognition, it is the first part of purephilosophy or metaphysics

1. This classification is consistent with

that given in the Architectonic of Pure Reason.On this interpretation, the Critiqueyields a very strange result,

namely that with the faculty of theoretical cognition a priori wecan never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience (Bxix).

Nevertheless, it also contains the experiment of a validation byother means [das Experiment einer Gegenprobe] of the truth of thisstrange result:

For that which necessarily drives us to go beyond the boundaries ofexperience and all appearances is the unconditioned, which reasonnecessarily and with every right demands in things in themselves foreverything that is conditioned, thereby demanding the series of conditionsas something completed. Now if we find that on the assumption that ourcognition from experience conforms to the objects as things in themselves,

the unconditioned cannot be thought at all without conflict, but on thecontrary, if we assume that our representation of things as they are givento us does not conform to these things as they are in themselves but ratherthat these objects as appearances conform to our way of representing,then the conflict disappears; and consequently that the unconditionedmust not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with them(insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things insofar as we are notacquainted with them, as things in themselves: then this would show thatwhat we initially assumed only for a test is well grounded. (BxixBxxi)

This passage, as does the last sentence to the footnote at Bxviii,identifies the facts the experiment of pure reason must providein order to validate the revolutionary hypothesis of the Critique.Importantly, in the latter Kant refers to things [Dinge] as thatwhich pure theoretical reason determines in thought; by contrast, inthe passage under consideration Kant refers to the unconditioned[das Unbedingte] as that which pure theoretical reason determines inthought. Although the unconditioned is a thing, namely the absolutetotality of any serial relation, it is not necessarily an object: all objects

are things, but some things are not objects (cf. A324/B381A332/


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B389; A416/B443A420/B448; A482/B510A484/B512). Indeed,when pure theoretical reason takes it merely as the absolute totality

of any logical serial relation, the unconditioned is determined inthought merely as a cosmological concept; nevertheless, when puretheoretical reason takes it as the absolute totality of any real serialrelation, as happens in dogmatic metaphysics, the unconditioned isdetermined in thought as a cosmological object given in experience.Therefore, the identification of the facts that the experiment of purereason must establish at Bxx is consistent with, though more specificthan, that given at Bxviii.

Accordingly, on the one hand, the experiment of pure reason

must establish that, on the assumption that human cognitionconforms to objects as things in themselves, it is impossible for purereason to determine in thought without conflict the unconditionedas a cosmological object given in experience. On the other hand, theexperiment of pure reason must establish that, on the assumptionthat objects as appearances conform to human cognition, purereason can determine in thought the unconditioned without conflict,though not as a cosmological object of possible experience. Theexperiment of pure reason must establish both results in order to

validate the revolutionary hypothesis, which was initially assumedonly for a test.16

The Ultimate Implication of the Experiment of Pure

Reason

Corresponding to critique as the first part of pure philosophy

is metaphysics2

as the second part. Metaphysics2 consists of the

metaphysics3a

of nature and the metaphysics3b

of morals. Thesuccess of the apodictic proof of Kants hypothesis promises to the

first part of metaphysics2the proper method of a science. This is themetaphysics of nature, consisting of ontology, rational physiology,rational cosmology, and rational theology.

On this view, Kants description of the concern of the first partof metaphysics in the new Preface is congruous with his descriptionof the concern of the metaphysics of nature in the Architectonicof Pure Reason. Kant claims in the new Preface that the first partof metaphysics concerns itself with concepts a priori to whichthe corresponding objects appropriate to them can be given

in experience (Bxix). In describing the concern of theoreticalphilosophy, Kant claims that it considers everything in so far as


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it is (not that which ought to be) on the basis of a priori conceptsand so contains all rational principles from mere concepts . . . for

the theoretical determination of all things (A845/B873 and A841/B869). Both descriptions emphasize that a given object or giventhing is cognized through a priori concepts and principles.

If theoretical philosophy is the first part of metaphysics2that Kant

refers to at Bxix, then practical philosophy is the second part.17TheCritiqueseems, then, to have a disadvantageous result for practicalphilosophy. As Kant explains, however, the fact that in theoreticalphilosophy rational cognition reaches appearances only, leaving thething in itself as something actual for itself but uncognized by us, is

not disadvantageous to practical philosophy at all. In fact, preciselybecause the experiment of pure reason decisively determines thecorrectness of the doctrine of transcendental idealism, effectivelydenying to pure theoretical reason any advance in the field of thesupersensible, pure practical reason is summoned [aufgefordert]to attempt cognition a priori beyond the bounds of sense and inaccordance with the wishes of metaphysics, but from a practicalpoint of view, determining the concept of the unconditionedthrough data from the practical cognition of reason (Bxxi). This is

because, although synthetic a priori cognition of the unconditionedas an object of possible experience is impossible through the useof pure theoretical reason, synthetic a priori cognition of theunconditioned, understood as an object that is not given in sensibleintuition, is possible through the use of pure practical reason.

Kant answers this call in 1797 with the publication of theMetaphysics of Morals. This text presents a system of synthetica priori judgements about the will [Wille] as the unconditionedcondition of action that, it is important to note, is not given in any

sensible intuition. In particular, the first part of the text considersthe metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of right that applyto the will in the determination of right actions; the second part ofthe text considers the metaphysical first principles of the doctrine ofvirtue that applies to the will in the determination of good actions.

In his footnote to Bxxi in the Critique, Kant identifies the ultimateimplication of the experiment of pure reason: the possibility ofa unified system of philosophy. In this place, Kant remarks, thisexperiment of pure reason is similar to what in chemistry is sometimes

called the experiment of reduction, or more usually the syntheticprocedure. This is because the experiment of pure reason brings


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together the two kinds of synthetic a priori cognition: synthetic apriori cognition of appearances within theoretical philosophy and

synthetic a priori cognition of things in themselves within practicalphilosophy. The experiment of pure reason shows, on the one hand,that, in pure theoretical philosophy, synthetic a priori cognition ispossible only of appearances; on the other hand, it shows that, inpure practical philosophy, synthetic a priori cognition is possibleof the unconditioned precisely as a thing in itself. Therefore, theultimate implication of the experiment of pure reason is a unifiedsystem of philosophy.

IV.

In his new Preface Kant asserts but does not explain that the firstmain part of the Critique offers both the apodictic proof andvalidation that his revolutionary hypothesis that what can be knowna priori about objects as appearances is what is put into them by theknower or that objects as appearances conform to human cognitionmay serve as an hypothesis. This essay, exploiting the framework

provided by Kants lectures on logic, offers answers to two questionsnaturally arising from this lacuna.First, in what does the apodictic proof of Kants revolutionary

hypothesis consist? The Transcendental Aesthetic and TranscendentalAnalytic apodictically prove the hypothesis by satisfying thenecessary requirements for such a proof. The TranscendentalAesthetic demonstrates that objects as appearances are possible,while the Transcendental Analytic demonstrates the necessaryconnection between the hypothesis and its consequent. Both

sections demonstrate that what is known a priori about objects asappearances is only what is put into them by the knower.Second, in what does the validation of the revolutionary

hypothesis consist? The validation of the hypothesis consists indemonstrating its adequacy for at least one other consequencebeyond that for which it is assumed. The experiment of pure reasondirectly demonstrates that only by presupposing the revolutionaryhypothesis is it possible to determine in thought without conflictor contradiction the objects of cosmology in answer to any of its

questions. The experiment of pure reason also implies that only onits presupposition is a unified system of philosophy possible.


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Notes

1

Cf. Bxvi and Bxviii. Following A73/B98, the hypothesis may beformulated as follows: if objects as appearances conform to humancognition or what is known about objects as appearances is only whatis put into them by the knower, then synthetic a priori cognition ispossible.

The first main part of the Critique, namely the TranscendentalDoctrine of Elements, contains two parts: the Transcendental Aestheticand the Transcendental Logic. The Transcendental Logic contains theTranscendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. The secondmain part of the Critique, namely the Transcendental Doctrine ofElements, contains four chapters, each with its own subdivisions: The

Discipline of Pure Reason; The Canon of Pure Reason; The Architectonicof Pure Reason; The History of Pure Reason. References to Kants worksother than the first Critiqueare given by volume and page number to theAkademie edition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1902 ).

2 I am especially grateful to Michael Davis, Christopher DiTeresi,Warren Schmaus, John Snapper and the anonymous reviewer forhelpful comments on this section.

3 If this is the correct interpretation of Kants distinction, then it is possiblethat an hypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is true, although suchcan never be proved, let alone apodictically. It is also possible that thesame hypothesis may serve as an explanation of something in general.

As Kant insists, the latter may be proved apodictically.Although he is not explicit on this point, Kant seems to allow that

a judgement may serve as an hypothesis in either natural science, as anexplanation of something given in nature or appearance, or metaphysics,as an explanation of something given in reason. Moreover, it seems tobe Kants position that the use of an hypothesis in either metaphysics ornatural science is for the more general purpose of making progress. In thishe follows Christian Wolffs Commentary on the Institution of the Rulesfor the Study of Mathematics cf. J. E. Hofmannus, ed., GesammelteWerke, vol. 33 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971),165526. Kant would have been familiar with this work, as it is appendedto Wolff sElements of Mechanics, the textbook used for at least one ofthe two courses on mechanics that Kant taught. Cf. Erich Adickes,Kantals Naturforscher, vol. 1 (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1942), p. 11.

Wolff discusses hypotheses as an important means to progress inscience in 309, noting the contribution of Copernicus hypothesis in theprogress of science beyond Ptolemy and through Johannes Kepler, whodiscovered the three fundamental laws of planetary motion that bear hisname, to Newton, who in 1687 described universal gravitation and thethree fundamental laws of motion that bear his name. Kants Preface tothe second edition of the Critiqueis similar, noting explicitly Copernicus

use of an hypothesis to make progress in the science of astronomy (cf.Bxvi and Bxxii); it is therefore plausible that Kant had Wolff s discussionin mind when he penned the new Preface in which he announces his


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imitation of Copernicus in order to make progress in the science ofmetaphysics. The same thrust is also evident in Kants discussion of the

legitimate use of hypotheses in natural science in the Critique(cf. A769/B797A782/B810). A good discussion of the latter is found in GerdBuchdahl,Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science(Cambridge: MITPress, 1969), esp. pp. 51016. See also Robert Butts, Hypothesis andexplanation in Kants philosophy of science, Archiv fr Geschichte derPhilosophie43: 153170 (1961), which is, however, flawed in the wayindicated below. For a more general discussion of Kants philosophy ofscience, see Michael Friedman,Kant and the Exact Sciences(Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); for what is in effect a redaction ofmuch of the latter see Michael Friedman, Philosophy of natural science,in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. P.

Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 30341. 4 The original punctuation has been preserved. 5 In these pages, Kant also identifies a polemical use of an hypothesis as

a weapon of war, not for grounding a right but only for defending it(A777/B805).

6 Robert E. Butts, Kant on hypotheses in the Doctrine of Method andthe Logik, Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie, 44 (1962), p. 189.See also Butts, Hypothesis and explanation, pp. 1648.

7 Butts, Kant on hypotheses, p. 189. 8 Demonstration that the consequence is actual does not make up part

of the apodictic proof in the Critiquebecause such has been already

proved in theProlegomena, and so would be redundant (cf. 4: 26773).In the Introduction to the CritiqueKant adapts this discussion from theProlegomena, proving synthetic a priori judgments are contained asprinciples in all theoretical sciences of reason, including mathematicsand natural science (B14; cf. B15B24).

9 Even in outline, this account of the apodictic proof of Kants hypothesisseems to undermine Robert Hahns account of the same in KantsNewtonian Revolution in Philosophy (Carbondale: Southern IllinoisUniversity Press, 1988), esp. chapter 9. On his view, the apodicticproof of Kants revolutionary hypothesis, which he identifies as thefundamental judgments to which any meaningful claim to knowledge

must refer are synthetic a priori, that occurs in the MetaphysicalDeduction and the Transcendental Deduction of the TranscendentalAnalytic (op. cit., p. 101) is an adaptation of the so-called hypothetico-deductive method that Sir Isaac Newton describes and employs inOpticks: Or a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections &Colours of Light, 2nd Ediction (London: W. and J. Innys, 1718), cf.pp. 35082).

Granted ex hypothesi that he correctly identifies Kants revolutionaryhypothesis, Hahns account is nevertheless flawed in at least oneimportant respect. Hahn incorrectly locates the apodictic proof of Kantshypothesis in the Critique. Kant clearly indicates in his new Preface thatthe proof occurs not only in the Transcendental Analytic, but also inthe Transcendental Aesthetic. Hahn gives no consideration whatsoever


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to the role of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the apodictic proof ofKants hypothesis. For this reason, Hahns account cannot possibly be

correct. Although the account of the roles of both the TranscendentalAesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic in the apodictic proof of Kantshypothesis offered herein may require further development, it is at leastpreferable to Hahns account inasmuch it is sensitive to this interpretativerequirement.

10 In this place Kant notes: Diese dem Naturforscher nachgeahmteMethode besteht also darin: die Elemente der reinen Vernunft in demzu suchen, was sich durch ein Experiment besttigen oder widerlegenlt. Nun lt sich zur Prfung der Stze der reinen Vernunft,vornehmlich wenn sie ber alle Grenze mglicher Erfahrung hinausgewagt werden, kein Experiment mit ihren Objekten machen (wie in der

Naturwissenschaft): also wird es nur mit Begriffen und Grundstzen,die wir a priori annehmen, tunlich sein, indem man sie nmlich soeinrichtet, dadieselben Gegenstnde einerseits als Gegenstnde derSinne und des Verstandes fr die Erfahrung, andererseits aber dochals Gegenstnde, die man bloss denkt, allenfalls fr die isolierteund ber Erfahrungsgrenze hinausstrebende Vernunft, mithin vonzwei verschiedenen Seiten betrachtet werden knnen. Findet es sichnun, da, wenn man die Dinge aus jenem doppelten Gesichtspunktebetrachtet, Einstimmung mit dem Prinzip der reinen Vernunft stattfinde,bei einerlei Gesichtspunkte aber ein unvermeidlicher Widerstreit derVernunft mit sich selbst entspringe, so entscheidet das Experiment fr

die Richtigkeit jener Unterscheidung. 11 On this, I disagree with Hans Seigfried, according to whom the

dependent clause of the second sentence identifies the touchstoneon which the experiment of pure reason is conducted. It is thefollowing proposition of pure reason: we must contrive theconcepts and principles which we adopt a priori such that they beused for viewing objects from two different points of view, namely,as objects of experience and as objects which are thought merely, asappearances and as things in themselves [B XVIIIf.] Hans Seigfried,Transcendental experiments, in G. Funke and T. M. Seebohm, eds,Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress(Washington, DC:

University Press of America, 1989), pp. 3423. On this view, then,Kants claim in the footnote is that in order to validate this propositionan experiment of pure reason is conducted to find out what happensif we try to conceive the possibility of the experience of objects eitherwith it or without it (op. cit., p. 344).

12 Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kants Critique of PureReason (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanity Books, 1999), p. 450.

13 Giorgio Tonelli, Kants Critique of Pure Reason within the Traditionof Modern Logic (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1994), esp. PartTwo, chapter III, which situates the classification of the sciences in theCritiquewithin the evolution of Kants plan for a system of philosophyfrom 1769.


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14 Rational physiology consists of rational physics, whose object iscorporeal nature, and rational psychology, whose object is thinking

nature. 15 Cf. Tonelli,Modern Logic, pp. 3378 (Table XIII). 16 In his Preface to the second edition of the Critique, Kant identifies

the location of the experiment of pure reason as the TranscendentalDialectic. According to the discussion at Bxx, the experiment ofpure reason demonstrates that the unconditioned, understood as thecompletion of the series of conditioned things, can be thought withoutcontradiction only on the assumption that our representation ofthings as they are given to us does not conform to these things as theyare in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conformto our way of representing (Bxx). The unconditioned is the object of

inquiry only of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique(cf. A321/B377A332/B390).

Moreover, a series of manuscripts Kant began six years after thepublication of the second edition of the Critiqueidentifies the location ofthe experiment of pure reason more specifically within the TranscendentalDialectic. These manuscripts were composed by Kant in answer to thequestion of the prize essay competition sponsored by the AcadmieRoyal des Sciences et des Belles-Lettres in Berlin: What real progresshas metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?Friedrich Theodor Rink eventually published this series of manuscripts in1804 and after Kants death.

The manuscript consists, in part, of a discussion of what Kantidentifies as the second stage of metaphysics. This stage of metaphysics isthe result of the transition from the conditioned in the objects of possibleexperience to the unconditioned, and of extending its knowledge to thecompletion of this series [of conditions] by means of reason (20: 287).Distinct from the first stage of metaphysics, namely ontology, the secondstage of metaphysics is transcendental cosmology.

It is in this context that Kant summarizes the main parts of the Critique.In particular, he notes, the Antinomy of Pure Reason leads inevitablyback to that limiting of our knowledge, and what was previously provedin the Analytic, in dogmatica priorifashion, is here likewise incontestably

verified [besttigt] in the Dialectic, by an experiment of reason[Experiment der Vernunft], which [reason] performs on its own powers(20: 291). This passage explicitly establishes that the experiment of purereason occurs only in the Antinomy of Pure Reason of the TranscendentalDialectic.

17 According to Kemp Smith, the two parts of metaphysics areimmanent metaphysics and transcendent metaphysics (Kemp Smith,Commentary, p. 22; see also pp. liv, 33, 56 and 66). Kemp Smithis clearly incorrect in this, as immanent metaphysics is no part ofmetaphysics at all. Nor is transcendent metaphysics a kind ofmetaphysics, as he eventually recognizes: it is never possible (op. cit.,p. 33).

Fulkerson - Prueba de La Hipótesis Kantiana

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