4 November 2015 | Vol. 6, № 41.

From the Institute Director

Articles Published 29 October - 3 November:

Strategic Analysis Paper

The Indus Treaty Revisited – India-Pakistan Water Sharing

The treaty between India and Pakistan needs to be revised so as to consider

increased populations, climatic and environmental pressures. Such revisions are

unlikely to occur in the near future, though, as India-Pakistan relations are too

fragile for meaningful water governance reform to take place.

FDI Feature Interview

Soil Carbon and the Role of Fungi in the Long-term Sequestering of Carbon in Soil:

Associate Professor Peter McGee

In this interview Dr Peter McGee of the School of Biological Sciences, University of

Sydney, firstly describes the significance and importance of soil organic carbon to

soil fertility and secondly, in brief outline, describes exciting recent research that

may lead to an understanding of the role certain fungi play in facilitating the long-

term adding of carbon in soil.

Strategic Weekly Analysis

Jokowi’s Washington Visit: Long Term Aspirations for a US-Indonesia Partnership?

The Sino-Indian Competition Continues - In Africa

Potential “Super” El Niño Presents a Threat to Global Food and Water Security

Students’ Fee Protests Shake South Africa

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Articles to be Published 3 - 11 November:

Strategic Analysis Paper: National Characteristics of South Africa

Strategic Analysis Paper: India’s Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean

Strategic Weekly Analysis:

o Indonesia Looks to Join Trans-Pacific Partnership

o Mayotte Continues Illegal Immigration Battle

o Endgame in Syria or the Beginning of a Regional Re-Ordering?

o Floods in Middle East Unlikely to Alleviate Water Stress

Activities

FDI attended the public lecture delivered by Professor Naoyuki Agawa of Keio University

titled “Japan's Security Policies: Co-operation with Australia, US, and India”, which was

hosted by the Perth USAsia Centre on 4 November 2015.

FDI will attend the lecture by Dr Romit Dasgupta titled ‘Bringing Turkey (Back) into “Asia”’,

which is hosted by The Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western

Australia on 12 November 2015.

I trust that you will enjoy this edition of the Strategic Weekly Analysis.

Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International

*****

Indonesia Looks to Join the Trans-Pacific Partnership

The benefits to Indonesia of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership remain unclear although

it may help to push through much-needed economic reforms.

Background

During his recent visit to Washington, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo

announced that his country will join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade deal.

Following his meeting with US President Barack Obama, Jokowi told reporters, “‘Indonesia is

an open economy, and with a population of 250 million, we are the largest economy in

Southeast Asia… Indonesia intends to join the TPP.’” Jokowi arrived in Washington on 25

October and held a private meeting with Obama the following day, before cutting his trip

short to focus on the on-going haze crisis in Indonesia.

Comment

Jokowi’s decision to enter into the TPP agreement continues his agenda of economic recent

reforms. Jokowi introduced a number of protectionist economic policies in the early stages

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of his presidency but has since backtracked. This appears to be the result of divisions within

the Indonesian government on whether the Jakarta should take a protectionist or liberal

approach towards addressing its slowing economy. Following Jokowi’s statement in

Washington, a number of officials expressed their concerns in relation to the TPP. Speaking

to the Jakarta Post, Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law at the University of

Indonesia, argued that Jokowi’s statement contradicted traditional views held by state

officials, adding that, “‘We were not given any direction or voice in the TPP drafting process

so that if we join the group, we will have acquiesced to set conditions and points that have

already been decided and declared final.’” Riza Noer Arfani, a researcher at the Centre for

World Trade Studies at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, also noted that the

agreement would be difficult to sell in its current form to even the more liberal economists

within the Indonesian government.

Fully implementing the TPP within Indonesia will be a difficult task and will require

significant reforms. Jokowi has acknowledged this, noting that while one of the first steps is

to free up the private sector this will likely take time, adding that, “‘Economic reform is a

process. We may not get it completely correct right away. But we shall continue performing

and improving until we get it right.’” Key reforms that may take place under the TPP include

the restructure of inefficient state-owned enterprises, the reduction of restrictions on

foreign ownership and the improvement of investment protections for foreign investors.

This will require a major policy shift away from a traditionally inward-looking economic

policy towards one of interdependency as enshrined by the TPP. It will also be a major

reversal of Jokowi’s tariff increase on thousands of import items in July. A policy shift of this

magnitude will not only be difficult to implement, but also difficult to get passed in

Indonesia’s fractured parliament.

There is also debate surrounding whether becoming a signatory to the TPP will actually

benefit Indonesia’s economy. Speaking to the Wall Street Journal, Joshua Pardede, an

economist at Indonesia’s Bank Permata cautioned that Indonesia doesn’t produce enough

value-added exports to benefit from increased trade. Instead, its economy is still dominated

by raw commodity exports which typically do not face tariffs in overseas markets. On the

other hand, expanding economic ties through the TPP could open avenues for sourcing

much needed foreign direct investment in the country.

There are, however, other factors at play. As a recent Strategic Weekly Analysis noted,

China’s increasing presence in the Southeast Asian region is playing a role in increasing US

interest in Indonesia. As the region’s largest economy, Indonesia has considerable regional

leverage that could help Washington counter China’s influence there. The TPP, by excluding

China, could balance Beijing’s economic weight and influence in the region. In an interview

with the Wall Street Journal, Obama acknowledged, “‘If we don't write the rules, China will

write the rules out in that region,’” adding that “‘We will be shut out.’” This, however, will

do little to convince the Indonesian parliament to go ahead with the deal. While remaining

cautious, Indonesia is still less concerned than its ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian

Nations) neighbours over China’s increasing presence in the region.

While many hold optimistic opinions about Jokowi’s decision to join the TPP, it remains to be

seen whether the Indonesian parliament will commit to the many reforms that are needed

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and whether Jakarta will actually benefit from the TPP. Indonesian interests do not

necessarily align with those of the US in countering Chinese influence. It could, however,

open avenues to much needed foreign investment in the country.

Jarryd de Haan Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Mayotte Continues Illegal Immigration Battle

As the disparity between Mayotte and the Comoros widens, the flow of migrants will

continue.

Background

Mayotte MP Ibrahim Aboubacar has called upon Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve during

debate in the French Parliament for assistance in tackling the problem of clandestine

immigration that continues to confront France’s 101st départment. Resources such as the 16

additional gendarmes, who were deployed to Mayotte following the visit to the island of

Prime Minister Manuel Valls in June 2015, are already proving insufficient as illegal

immigration from the Comoros continues unabated.

Comment

Anjouan is the closest Comorian island to Mayotte and the two are separated by a distance

of only 70 kilometres. The numbers of immigrants undertaking the short but often fatal

voyage in small boats from Anjouan to Mayotte has continued to swell, putting the island

départment under considerable pressure. The immigrants make the journey in small fishing

vessels known as kwassa-kwassa, which, while sturdy enough, are often overloaded by the

people-smugglers operating them and are thus prone to capsizing in rough seas.

Unfortunately, that happens fairly regularly, most recently on the night of 30 November. In

that incident, a kwassa-kwassa reportedly carrying some 30 people to Mayotte capsized

while still in Comorian waters, killing at least eight people, including a young woman and a

child.1

According to the most recent figures (2013) from the French National Institute for Statistics

and Economic Studies (INSEE), Mayotte is home to some 214,000 official residents. INSEE

figures show that, in 2012, a total of 84,600 foreigners lived in Mayotte, 95 per cent of who

were Comorian.

1 ‘Anjouan endeuillée par un nouveau naufrage de kwassa’ [‘Anjouan bereaved by a new kwassa

shipwreck’], Le Journal de Mayotte, 1 November 2015. <http://lejournaldemayotte.com/fil-info/anjouan-endeuillee-par-un-nouveau-naufrage-de-kwassa/>.

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Many of those making the journey to Mayotte are attempting to join family members

already living there clandestinely. Those already domiciled on Mayotte include adolescents

living on their own and attempting to find work or education while avoiding detection by the

police and gendarmerie. Upon reaching the age of 18, they then have the right to become

French citizens under the principle of jus soli by virtue of being born on French soil.

One particularly vexing issue for Comorians wanting to visit Mayotte is the need to obtain a

visa in advance. Introduced in 1993 by the government of Prime Minister Édouard Balladur –

the so-called “Balladur visa” costs up to 100 euros and proponents of its removal argue that

it has done little to stop the flow of illegal immigrants. At the same time, however, it is hard

to see how simply removing the Balladur visa would change the situation on Mayotte. If

anything, it may actually encourage further immigration while doing little to create addition

employment in a départment that has an unemployment rate of 19.5% in 2013 (the most

recent figures available).

Cazeneuve, who is reportedly very concerned about the situation on Mayotte, announced

on 30 October in response to Aboubacar’s questioning that a mission including personnel

from the Inspectorates-General of Home Affairs, the National Gendarmerie and the National

Police would be dispatched to Mayotte. The issue may also command the attention of

Overseas Territories Minister George Pau-Langevin, when she calls at Mayotte during a two-

day Indian Ocean visit scheduled for 9-11 November.

The large numbers of illegal immigrants is placing a strain on Mayotte. Although the island

has high unemployment, it also has vastly better medical care, educational facilities and

earnings for those who can find work than does Comoros. Given the disparities between

Mayotte and the independent Comoros, there is not likely to be an end any time soon to the

problem of illegal immigration. If a workable solution is to be found, the local and

metropolitan authorities may need to canvas a wider range of options than has previously

been the case.

Leighton G. Luke Research Manager Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Endgame in Syria or the Beginning of a Regional Re-Ordering?

The use of US Special Forces to assist Syrian rebel groups in combatting Islamic State

fighters could herald the break-up of Syria, leading to longer-term problems in the region

and elsewhere.

Background

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US President Barack Obama has announced that an initial batch of ‘fewer than fifty’ Special

Forces troops will be deployed to Northern Syria to ‘help co-ordinate local ground forces and

coalition efforts to counter [Islamic State],’ according to White House Spokesman, Josh

Earnest. The troops will work alongside Kurdish rebel groups who, like Islamic State, control

large areas of northern Syria. It is, however, the overall demands of the Kurds that will pose

the biggest problem to the region, including a state of their own, Kurdistan. This state, if

formed, will comprise territories that currently belong to Turkey, which is a NATO member,

Syria, Iraq and, hardly least of all, Iran. Any collaboration between the US and Kurdish rebels,

therefore, will have regional ramifications.

Comment

It is hardly likely that Russia, Iran, Syria or any other actor in the current events in Syria will

take at face value the US’s comments that its troops will not have a combat role in Syria. If

the US wanted personnel there to train the Kurdish groups in their fight against Islamic

State, why not send the usual military trainers? What is the need for Special Forces troops?

Furthermore, as Russia will recall, the US initially sent “trainers” to Vietnam before

escalating that action to full-blown military operations there. Turkey, which faces a Kurdish

insurrection, is hardly likely to cede territory that includes larger centres such as Mardin,

Batman, Siirt, Van and Igdir. Iraq, in its currently weak condition, will probably have no

choice but to cede territory while protesting its loss.

Washington may claim that it has no

wish to see the territorial contours of

the region change. It may also claim

that its two major goals there are to

see the removal of al Assad from

power in Syria and the defeat of

Islamic State. Notwithstanding this, it

must surely recognise that if al Assad

were to be removed, regional

boundaries will change. History

indicates that even if al Assad

retained control over a stub of Syria,

the diminution of his control over

Syria would cause a power vacuum

like those seen in Iraq and Libya. This

could lead to more strife, this time

around based on sectarian and tribal affiliations, which could cause further emigration.

By training Kurdish fighters, moreover, Washington will be perceived as tacitly working with

them towards the creation of Kurdistan. This cannot but cause much anger in Turkey, which

probably has the most territory to lose to Kurdistan. Neither President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

nor Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is likely to cede any territory, leave alone the vast

swathe the creation of Kurdistan demands. Their antipathy towards the Kurdish rebels, who

they perceive as a threat to Turkish sovereignty and their rule, although not necessarily in

that order, is epitomised by the air strikes they launched against the Kurds in the immediate

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aftermath of their victory in the Turkish general election that was held a few days ago. The

airstrikes can only signal a return to a hard-line stance against the Kurds and indicate that

the two leaders will now commence an all-but-declared war against various Kurdish groups.

From the other side, it is more than likely that, having defeated Islamic State with the help of

the US in the future, Kurdish fighters will work with increased confidence towards the

creation of Kurdistan. This will inevitably lead to increased fighting and bloodshed between

those groups, even if they have not coalesced by that time, and Turkish troops. Erdoğan,

who is no admirer of the US at the best of times, is hardly likely to wish to go down in history

as the president who oversaw the loss of Turkish territory because of Washington’s attempts

to remain relevant in the region by brokering a peace deal. The US could attempt to mollify

Turkish sentiment by pressuring the European Union to accept Turkey as a member state

but this will only cause Erdoğan to weigh membership in the European Union against the

loss of sovereign territory. Given the growing antipathy of ordinary Europeans to the so-

called Islamisation of Europe (see here, here, here and here, for example) and the backlash

that established European parties face in the face of the current refugee crisis (see here,

here and here, among others), any decision European leaders make towards bring Turkey

into the Union would have disastrous consequences for their political parties and

themselves and could, potentially, lead to a loosening of the ties that bind the Union, if not

worse.

Despite the gravity of the foregoing, Iran is, without doubt, the regional state with the most

to lose. Apart from potentially losing territory, albeit to a slightly lesser extent than Turkey,

Tehran could see its plans for regional influence thrown into disarray by the collaboration of

the US with Kurdish groups. While these groups are currently battling Islamic State, they

have no particular liking for the Assad regime, either. It is only a matter of time, in Tehran’s

view, before they turn their attention to toppling him in Damascus. Syria, which has a

majority Sunni population, figures large in Iran’s plans for regional primacy in its competition

against Saudi-led Sunni Islam. It is important for Tehran, therefore, that the Alawite (Shi’a) al

Assad remains in power.

Assad and territory aside, Tehran will fear an alliance between the nominally-Sunni but far

more secular Kurds and the Arab fighters who are arrayed against Islamic State. The Kurdish

Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG or People’s Protection Units) has formed an alliance with

Syrian Arab Groups (“The Syrian Arab Coalition”) to form the Democratic Forces of Syria.

Neither the Syrian Arab Coalition nor the Democratic Forces of Syria are Shi’a or wish to see

an Iran-dominated Syria, making it very likely that they could work towards first defeating

the Islamic State fighters and then working together to overthrow al Assad. They will have

Washington’s support in both endeavours. In fact, Washington has reportedly agreed to

provide this alliance with weapons and training. Tehran undoubtedly fears that any Sunni

government will more likely work with Riyadh than it will with Iran even if it is chary of

becoming a Saudi pawn in that country’s competition with Iran, leading to a further loss of

regional influence. The alleged recent comment by a Saudi prince that, in case of conflict

between Israel and Palestine, he would support Israel and reports that Saudi Arabia has

vowed to match Iran in developing its nuclear capacity will make Iran even more determined

to ensure that it does not lose its influence in Syria or elsewhere in the region. It will likely

use every instrument at its disposal, including its Revolutionary Guards Corp and Hezbollah

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fighters to keep al Assad secure in Damascus and to destroy Islamic State before any other

actor does. This will enable it to reassert its claim to regional primacy and not be seen by

Washington or its own people as having been weakened, thus possibly jeopardising the rule

of the Mullahs. It will probably try to further boost its relationships with Moscow and Beijing

and align itself with them in the global competition for influence.

Washington may have believed it had a moral imperative and a limited goal when it decided

to send its Special Forces to Syria, but by working with the Kurds it has created a longer-term

problem that could have far-reaching repercussions not least of which are a further

diminution of its regional influence and an enhanced regional antipathy towards it.

Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Floods in Middle East Unlikely to Alleviate Water Stress

The arid region has experienced unusually high levels of rainfall in recent days leading to

flooding and potential threats to human health with potentially dire political

consequences.

Background

Flooding occurred in the Iraqi capital

Baghdad after several days of heavy

rainfall. An outbreak of cholera could

grow worse as a result. Days later, a

rare cyclone, the second strongest

on record in the Arabian Sea, also

brought the equivalent of several

years of annual rain to parts of

Yemen, causing considerable

flooding in the usually arid country.

These events could have significant

political ramifications for both

countries.

Comment

The Middle East, a usually arid region, is ill prepared for rare periods of above average

rainfall. After experiencing exceptionally hot conditions over summer, Iraq was subjected to

abnormally high levels of rainfall. In a period of 24 hours, Baghdad was inundated with

24mm of rain. The city’s decrepit drainage system was not able to deal with such a large

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volume of water, leaving many residents without a clean water supply as pollutants washed

into nearby water sources. Sewage systems have also been unable to cope, leaving large

parts of the city at risk of disease.

Health concerns are now a potential concern for the Iraqi Government. An outbreak of

cholera, which is spread by waterborne bacteria, has affected parts of North Africa and the

Middle East. As of late October, conservative estimates suggested that almost 11,000 people

in the region had contracted the disease, with 2,000 cases reported in Iraq. The inundation

of the city with rain and

sewage means it is at

greater risk of the disease

spreading.

The World Health

Organisation launched a

mass vaccination campaign

in the country on 31

October 2015. It is

suspected that the

Euphrates River and

possibly the Tigris River are

contaminated with the

Vibrio cholerae bacterium

that causes cholera. As Islamic State (IS) has maintained control over some of the dams on

these waterways flow has been reduced, contributing to the incubation of the bacteria. The

best way to ensure the eradication of the disease in Iraq is to open the upstream dams of

the two rivers to flush the bacteria out of the waterway. This, however, will involve retaking

the dams from IS.

In the Arabian Peninsula, parts of Yemen have also received rains far above the annual

average in a matter of hours due to an uncommonly powerful cyclone. While it is not

uncommon for cyclones to form in the Arabian Sea, mainly due to its relatively small size and

dry air coming from the peninsula, large, destructive storms are rare. Record high water

temperatures in the region have contributed to the formation of one of the largest cyclones

ever recorded in Arabia. According to NASA, only two tropical cyclones have made landfall

on the Arabian Peninsula since reliable records began in 1979. Other sources suggest that

Yemen experienced similar cyclones in 1959 and 1960.

The storm made landfall near the port of al Mukalla, a city that is under the control of al-

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with expectations it would bring up to 200mm of rain to the

area – over four times the average annual rainfall of 45mm. As it travels inland, the storm

will experience much drier air and mountainous terrain, which will cause it to rapidly

dissipate. The mountains close to the coast are likely to cause the storm to rapidly dump a

large volume of rain in coastal regions and less in the country’s desert interior and more

densely populated regions.

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Due to a lack of rainwater-harvesting infrastructure, the rain will do little for either country’s

water crisis. In Yemen rain is unlikely to reach Sana’a which is likely to become the first

capital city to exhaust its water supply. Even if significant rain fell in the city it would be

unlikely to fill the aquifers upon which it relies. The dry terrain also does not absorb water

well, leading water to either pool or run off.

The governments of both states will find it challenging to deal with these natural disasters as

they grapple with internal political crises. Other non-state actors, such as IS or al-Qaeda,

could capitalise upon the limited capacity of the government to provide relief for those

affected by floods to build social and political capital within the regions most affected by the

natural disasters. In the worst case scenario, such an outcome will further weaken the

legitimacy of state institutions and bolster support for militant organisations.

Mervyn Piesse

Research Manager

Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme

*****

What’s Next?

After two days in China, French President François Hollande and Foreign

Minister Laurent Fabius will spend 4 November in Seoul.

The third ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus continues in Kuala Lumpur

until 5 November.

On 5 November, Admiral Harry B. Harris, commander of the US Pacific Fleet,

finishes a four-day visit to China to discuss China’s artificial islands in the South

China Sea with Chinese military officials.

After two days in the UK, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev continues

his European trip with a reception in his honour at the Élysée Palace in Paris on

5 November.

Tanzanian President-elect John Magufuli will be sworn in on 5 November.

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe will present the budget and the

government’s five-year plan to Parliament on 5 November.

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is visiting the Netherlands until 6

November.

Burma will hold general elections on 8 November.

The Summit of South American-Arab Countries will be hosted by Saudi Arabia in

Riyadh from 8-10 November.

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Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. 80 Birdwood Parade, Dalkeith, WA 6009 Tel: +61 8 9389 9831 Fax: +61 8 9389 8803 E-mail: lluke@futuredirections.org.au Web: www.futuredirections.org.au