From the Editor’s Desk...28 March 2012 | Vol. 3, 11. From the Editor’s Desk Dear FDI supporters,...
Transcript of From the Editor’s Desk...28 March 2012 | Vol. 3, 11. From the Editor’s Desk Dear FDI supporters,...
28 March 2012 | Vol. 3, № 11.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters,
Welcome to this week’s edition of the
Strategic Weekly Analysis. In the SWA this
week, we begin by looking at the interest
of the United States in using Australia’s
Cocos Islands as a base for surveillance
aircraft, together with greater use of the
HMAS Stirling naval base, near Perth.
Still in Australia, we turn our attention to
the lack of food and water knowledge
among Australian school students, before
moving overseas to report on the
worsening food security situation in
Swaziland and the World Water Forum,
held recently in Marseilles.
Next, on the subject of energy security,
FDI Associate Rizwan Zeb reports on the
latest problems confronting the Iran-
Pakistan gas pipeline project, before
looking at the danger posed to the
Nigerian energy sector by the Boko Haram
terrorist group.
Heading south, we investigate the latest
initiative from the South African Navy to
combat the growing threat of piracy along
the southern African coast.
We conclude by analysing the motivation
behind the involvement of two key
regional actors – Saudi Arabia and Qatar –
in the ongoing unrest in Syria.
Last week, FDI’s Global Food and Water
Crises Research Programme held
workshops in Sydney, Melbourne and
Canberra to discuss future potential
conflict points as a result of food and
water insecurity. It was a valuable
exercise in honing our research using the
expertise of our Associates. Keep an eye
out for the findings of this workshop,
which we hope to publish in the coming
weeks. We are grateful to all those who
participated in these workshops. If you
did not participate, but have some papers
that deal with the workshop topic, please
feel free to e-mail
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd)
Institute Director and CEO
Future Directions International
*****
Page 2 of 14
US Interest Confirms Australian Strategic Importance in Indo-
Pacific
Background
According to the Washington Post, the United States is reportedly investigating the
possibility of using the Cocos Islands, in the north-eastern Indian Ocean, as a base for
surveillance aircraft. Also being considered is a greater use of the HMAS Stirling naval base,
located in Perth, and of a possible new facility at Brisbane. In context with the recent
agreement to rotate US Marines through Darwin, the growing interest confirms the
importance of Australia as the US looks to reorient if forces towards the Asia-Western Pacific
region.
Comment
The Cocos Islands comprise two atolls and 27 islands. Located some 2,950 kilometres north-
west of Perth and 1,272 kilometres south-west of Jakarta, Indonesia, the islands serve as a
refuelling stop for the Royal Australian Air Force’s Orion surveillance fleet.
As FDI noted in November 2011, the US interest follows a suggestion made at that time by
Defence Minister Stephen Smith that the Cocos Islands could, at some point in the future,
host joint US-Australian naval and air assets. While Mr Smith points out that any proposal to
use the Cocos Islands is likely to be well into the future, and that the Cocos airstrip in its
current condition is unsuitable for use by Global Hawk drones, it nonetheless highlights the
strategic importance of the archipelago.
For Washington, the ability to operate long-range surveillance drones capable of easily
reaching the South China Sea from the Cocos Islands would be an inestimable asset. The
current US base on the British Indian Ocean Territory atoll of Diego Garcia is much further
afield and is congested. While the American lease on the atoll comes up again in 2016, it
would be remarkable if London were not to renew it. Unlike Diego Garcia, any Cocos facility
would not be a naval base, although it would strengthen the US’ supply chains and logistics
facilities.
The Royal Australian Navy’s largest base, HMAS Stirling is located in the south-western
quadrant of the Indian Ocean. It, too, would complement a reoriented US force posture with
increased ship and submarine visits. It would offer US vessels in the Indian Ocean region a
facility at which to refuel, re-fit and conduct maintenance.
In view of the above – and the Darwin Marines rotation and the joint use of a possible new
naval facility at Brisbane – Australia’s strategic position at the confluence of the Indian and
Pacific Oceans is further validated. The Indo-Pacific nexus that Australia sits astride
represents the westernmost aspect of the US realignment.
While Australia is obviously keen on closer military ties with the US, as are other South-East
Asian states such as Vietnam and the Philippines, both of which have moved closer to
Washington, partly as a result of Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Singapore, a
Page 3 of 14
long-standing US partner, is in negotiations with Washington to base of up to four littoral
combat ships in the city-state.
While any response from Beijing may verge on the predictable, the reaction from Jakarta
may be ambivalent. Indonesia, like Australia, is caught between its links with China, as a
large and growing trading partner, and its security and trade relations with the United
States. Mindful of the South China Sea disputes between China and a number of its fellow
ASEAN members, Indonesia does not wish to see South-East Asia become a theatre of great
power rivalry, or worse. The Darwin Marines deployment was initially greeted with concern
in Jakarta for that reason, although Foreign Marty Natalegawa and Defence Minister
Purnomo Yusgiantoro subsequently stated at the 15 March 2012 “2+2 Dialogue” with their
Australian counterparts that they had no problem with the Darwin initiative.
Although a drone deployment on the Cocos Islands may not make Indonesia’s position
between the US and China any easier, it would certainly contribute to enhancing the security
of key regional waterways and chokepoints and consolidate US influence and power
projection in the region.
Leighton G. Luke Manager Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Food and Water Knowledge Lacking in Australian Schools
Background
A recurrent theme at workshops run by FDI’s Global Food and Water Crises Research
Programme is concern at the lack of knowledge of our food chain systems among Australian
students. Some argue that the lack of appreciation for the importance of food security is one
of the reasons why it is hard to get interest at government level in solving global food and
water crises. These concerns have been somewhat vindicated by a report published recently
by the Australian Council of Educational Research.
Comment
The report, Food Fibre and the Future: Report on Surveys of Students’ and Teachers’
knowledge and understanding of Primary Industries found that knowledge related to food
and fibre production had declined significantly. The report, commissioned by the Primary
Industries Education Foundation, with the support of supermarket chain Woolworths,
revealed that 75 per cent of students surveyed thought cotton socks were an animal product
and 45 per cent of students could not identify everyday lunchbox items that originated from
farms.
Page 4 of 14
PIEF chairman Cameron Archer said the survey was a wake-up call for government, industry
and educators, especially as it comes at a time when the primary industries are being
excluded from the national curriculum.
‘The primary industries sectors face a critical shortage in attracting new entrants at all levels
of the supply chain. This will have serious implications in the next five to ten years as we
begin to understand the implications that an ill‐informed public, climate variability and the
skills shortage will have on Australia’s ability to feed 70 million people here and abroad,’ said
Dr Archer.
‘The people who will need to solve the problems related to food security are either currently
in school, or are yet to be born.’
The survey was conducted from June to October 2011 and involved the participation of 213
Grade Six students, 687 Grade Ten students and 53 teachers from 71 schools.
The report recommends that primary industry-focussed professional development
opportunities may assist teachers in developing knowledge in that area.
The report appears to justify the concerns of farmers and policymakers that food security is
not fully appreciated by students and teachers. If the report’s recommendations are
followed, it could go some way towards making the next generation more aware of future
food and water concerns and also give them the ability to think strategically to overcome or
avert potential food and water problems.
For the full report: http://www.primaryindustrieseducation.com.au/resources/reports/foodfibrefuture.pdf
Gary Kleyn Manager Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Swaziland Food Insecurity Intensified by Financial Crisis
Background
Household surveys in Swaziland indicate the extent to which food security has been affected
by the recent global financial crisis. People in both rural and urban areas are modifying their
food consumption habits, following severe economic shocks. Rising food prices and lower
incomes are inflicting hunger and malnutrition, in a country where the food security
situation was already precarious before the international slowdown.
Page 5 of 14
Comment
A report released last week by the United Nations, reveals that Swaziland’s food security
situation has worsened since the global financial crisis. The report, prepared by the UN’s
Country Team in Swaziland, surveyed a representative sample of urban and rural citizens,
following severe economic shocks in 2010 and 2011. It found that rising food prices and
reduced incomes had forced Swazis to adopt alternative strategies to cope, including
reducing the quality and quantity of food consumed. The results of the survey indicate that
half of rural households, and one-third of urban households, are either reducing the size of
meals or skipping them altogether. Worryingly, over a quarter of rural families are delaying
consumption for periods longer than a day. Considering the already faltering status of food
security in Swaziland prior to the financial crisis, the obvious negative consequences of these
patterns of consumption are alarming.
There are many factors that have an impact on a country’s food security. Economic
performance is an important, though distinct, component of these. Economic markers, such
as unemployment and poverty rates, were high throughout the period leading up to the
financial crisis. In the decade from 2000 to 2010, Swaziland experienced one of the lowest
rates of growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Its economy grew, on average, by 2.7 per cent
annually, compared with 5.7 per cent for the sub-Saharan region. Food insecurity was an
established concern and the country was acutely susceptible to developing future food
crises brought about by external financial shocks. Swaziland found itself towards the lower
end of the UN Human Development Index. Much-needed revenue from the Southern Africa
Customs Union (SACU) decreased substantially amid the fallout from the global downturn,
contributing to the country’s now tentative food situation.
As is usually the case, poorer households have been most vulnerable to the economic
shocks, as well as those infected with, or impacted by, HIV-AIDS. Swaziland has the highest
rate of HIV infection in the world, and a poverty rate of 63 per cent. These households have
little ability to alter their living strategies, and the reduction of real incomes in Swaziland has
the potential to push many of them beyond the threshold of survivability. Outside these
groups, surveys show that households in rural areas have been hardest hit by the crisis. This
has had an impact on all facets of rural living, including education. As food prices rise and
incomes diminish through loss of employment, the ability of carers to pay for education has
weakened. Around one-fifth of families have withdrawn their children from school, an
outcome that further compromises the food security of those children, due to the loss of
access to meals provided by schools. The removal of this vital source of food will worsen
Swaziland’s childhood malnutrition problem.
The negative impact of the financial crisis in Swaziland threatens the progress made in
reaching the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, particularly in food security. The extent
to which household food consumption has deteriorated may even see conditions regress.
Beyond the reduction in food quantity and quality, many households are being forced to sell
their food-producing assets – land, equipment and cows. This unsustainable practice makes
recovery, as well as the attainment of a food-secure status, difficult or even impossible.
Page 6 of 14
Notwithstanding these circumstances, the outlook for 2012 and beyond contains positive
elements for Swaziland. The revenue of SACU is expected to rise 150 per cent in 2012/13,
providing substantially higher financial resources. The country is also projected to achieve
budget surpluses for the next five years, due to the government’s fiscal prudence, further
emboldening the food security situation. Ideally, financial recovery in Swaziland will assist in
restoring adequate levels of consumption to its population.
Jay Vella Research Analyst Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme [email protected]
*****
World Water Forum: A Stepping Stone to Water Security
Background
Every three years since 1997, the World Water Council has hosted the World Water Forum.
This year, the venue was Marseilles, France in mid-March, with the focus on sharing
solutions to water challenges. The forum has developed 12 priorities, which include access
to clean water, harmonising water and energy, and contributing to food security. For the
first time, a universal declaration was signed integrating every theme related to the urgency
of conserving water resources, including human rights obligations.
Comment
Water brings together global questions of food security, health and energy. Universal access
to freshwater is imperative and yet there are growing pressures on this vital resource, from
food production, energy consumption and climate change. As it stands, nearly one billion
people lack access to clean drinking water, therefore good planning and adaptation is
required to reduce the risk that hundreds of millions of people will be affected by disease
and hunger.
The aim of the forum is to tackle the water challenges facing the world and raise the
importance of water on all political agendas. It aims to combine creativity, innovation,
competence and knowledge of water, by gathering all stakeholders with experience of local,
regional and global issues.
Attending this forum were 180 countries, 25,000 participants, 140 ministerial delegates and
over 800 speakers. Among those attending were Bruno Le Maire, the French Minister for
Agriculture; Izabella Teixeira, the Brazilian Minster for the Environment; and South African
Water and Environmental Affairs Minister, Edna Molewa.
The fifth World Water Forum in 2009, with the theme “Bridging Divides for Water”, focussed
on collective progress to ensure water security. The sixth World Water Forum focussed on
Page 7 of 14
the solutions for water crises by advocating a strategic approach, which includes technical,
financial and legal solutions. The forum developed 12 priorities, which include access to
clean water, harmonising water and energy, and contributing to food security.
Many discussions were held, including consideration of the desalination of water as a
solution in the Arab world. The “Water Wealth” programme was launched, drawing on 45
case studies showing new solutions to water challenges applied in Asia and the Pacific. These
ranged from increasing the resilience of river basins, to sustainable management of the
natural environment affecting the storage and regulation of water.
A main outcome of this forum is linked to the United Nations “Rio+20 Summit” on
sustainable development, scheduled for June 2012. Ahead of this summit, 130 countries
have issued declarations urging action that will provide access to clean water and sanitation,
and fix the worsening problems of water scarcity. They believe this can be achieved by
emphasising the linkages between water, energy and food security.
Shona Shah FDI Research Assistant Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme
*****
An Uncertain Future: The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline
Background
The long-proposed Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline continues to stall. Although Pakistan is
facing an imminent energy crisis, for Islamabad, the project is caught up in the complexities
of its relationships with Iran and the United States.
Comment
Islamabad is of the view that securing funds for the construction of the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas
pipeline should not be a problem. According to media reports, addressing a joint press
conference with the visiting Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
stated that there are multiple sources available. ‘This is a fairly viable project and we hope
there will not be any problem in trying to find ways and means of ensuring its funding.’ She
further stated that, in keeping with the severity of the energy crisis in the country, ‘We
cannot afford to be selective in pursuing energy sources and we will continue to do
whatever we consider to be in our national interest.’
The IP gas pipeline is in trouble; once again. The Iran-Pakistan pipeline as it was initially
planned has been around for quite some time now. The discussions for it started in 1994
between Islamabad and Tehran. On the suggestion of Tehran, New Delhi was included in the
proposed pipeline project and it became the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline. In February
1999, an agreement between Tehran and New Delhi was signed. It was then also called the
“Peace Pipeline”, as it was viewed as a joint India-Pakistan venture which would bring peace
Page 8 of 14
and prosperity between the two traditional rivals. The 1999 coup in Pakistan resulted in
some delays, but it soon came back on track. According to various media sources, Tehran
was also keen to involve China in the project. After India abandoned the then-IPI in 2009,
after signing a civilian nuclear deal with the United States, the final destination of the
pipeline remains unclear.
Both Tehran and Islamabad, however, continued working on it. A gas purchase agreement
between Iran and Pakistan was signed in 2009. According to reports, Tehran has already
completed its part of the pipeline while a feasibility study is underway on the Pakistani side.
In recent times, Islamabad showed more inclination towards the IP pipeline than other
options, including the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAPI). This is for various reasons, such as
deteriorating Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, the uncertainty over Turkmenistan’s ability to
supply the agreed amount of gas, and the cost and duration involved in the competition of
the pipeline. The last point being the most important, as Islamabad is in urgent need of new
gas sources as it is increasingly running out of its own gas reserves. A number of experts
have estimated that, even if demand does not increase, reserves would be completely
depleted by 2028-30.
Washington is strongly against the project. According to US policymakers, this would provide
Tehran with capital which it will use to pursue its anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-
Western agenda and to further its nuclear programme. According to media reports, US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, addressing the House Appropriation Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, stated that embarking on the IP pipeline project is in violation of the
Iran Sanctions Act.
Although Islamabad has reiterated that it would go ahead with the IP pipeline, it would be a
bumpy ride. Earlier this year, Pakistan’s own Oil and Gas Development Corporation and the
National Bank of Pakistan reportedly withdrew from the project, stating likely adverse
implications for their foreign partnerships and businesses. But, if Pakistan does decide to
back off from the project, it will have to pay a huge amount in compensation to Iran as per
the 2009 agreement. The only encouraging note so far is that the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China is considering financing the project.
In light of this, the biggest challenge for Islamabad is ensure that it manages its complex
relationship with both Tehran and Washington. While it should go ahead with the IP pipeline
feasibility study and see what shape the current crisis between US and Iran takes, and what
would be the outlook of post-elections Iran, it should also explore other possibilities, such as
TAPI and/or a Qatar-Pakistan pipeline.
Rizwan Zeb FDI Associate
About the Author: Rizwan Zeb is a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies,
Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Western Australia. He is a
former visiting scholar for the India/South Asia Project, Foreign Policy Programme at the Brookings
Institution, Washington DC, USA and a Benjamin Meaker visiting professor of politics, IAS, University
of Bristol, United Kingdom.
Page 9 of 14
This article is a slightly updated and revised version of “Pakistan’s Energy Future: International
Pressures and Regional Compulsions”, published in CACI Analyst, 7 March 2012.
*****
Al Qaida-Inspired Group Threatens Nigerian Energy Sector
Background
The Gulf of Guinea is experiencing an energy boom, as major oil companies seek to capitalise
on the region’s large reserves and relative stability, when compared to the Middle East.
West Africa is not without security challenges, however. Boko Haram, a group with
supposed links to al-Qaida, is challenging the stability of the Nigerian state and, therefore,
threatening hydrocarbon development opportunities. Key to countering the organisation’s
growth will be the development of grassroots strategies by the central government in Abuja,
the nation’s capital. As demonstrated in various theatres, improved social opportunities
often translate to an enhanced security situation.
Comment
Attacks against the Nigerian state by terrorist group Boko Haram continue unabated. The
latest attack, on 12 March, raised questions about the government’s initiative to commence
talks with the organisation. As the oil sector is the main source of the country’s revenue,
Nigerian citizens, the international community and foreign oil companies, are placing
pressure on the government of President Goodluck Jonathan to find a solution and stabilise
the precarious situation.
Nigeria is the largest producer of sweet oil in OPEC. The hydrocarbon sector drives the
national economy, significantly contributing to Nigeria’s position as the second largest
African economy.
The United States is the largest importer of Nigeria’s crude oil; receiving 40 per cent of the
country’s total oil exports. With the unstable global economy and conflict in the Middle East,
the Gulf of Guinea is becoming more attractive for US oil corporations. Projections indicate
that, by 2025, some 60-70 per cent of Nigerian oil imports will go to the US.
According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, despite the country’s
substantial oil wealth, corruption remains a problem and poverty is widespread. Nigerian
human development indicators are among the poorest in the world. This has provided a
recruiting ground for radical organisations, such as Boko Haram.
Founded in 2002 in north-east Nigeria by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram aims to establish a
national sharia law code, eradicate “western teaching”, and unify the Islamic population
against non-Muslims. The group’s main target has been Christians and foreigners, although
moderate Muslims have been increasingly targeted. As the organisation has evolved, its
tactics have become more violent. Originally concentrated in Maiduguri, the capital of the
Page 10 of 14
northern state of Borno, Boko Haram has grown to operate across the north-east quadrant
of the country. These local Boko Haram proxies operate with carte blanche from Maiduguri,
transforming the group from a traditional terrorist organisation to something much more
akin to a guerrilla force.
The group has quickly risen to become one of the greatest challenges to Nigerian stability.
US officials, including the Homeland Security Committee, suspect the group – ideologically
aligned to al-Qaida dogma – may have still deeper connections, including possibly receiving
training from that organisation. Such links, however, are yet to be proven. Importantly, this
connection, whether ideological or tactical, places the country’s hydrocarbon sector at risk.
Targeting of oil infrastructure would be in line with previous al-Qaida statements and
behaviour.
Attacks in the northern city of Kano on 20 January, provide evidence of the violent nature of
Boko Haram. The highly co-ordinated operation saw its members attack police buildings,
free prison inmates and bomb government offices, killing over 170 people. The central
government in Abuja responded swiftly, with the Nigerian State Security Service detaining a
number of suspected militants, particularly focusing on Maiduguri. The long-term success of
the operation remains questionable, and the likelihood of large-scale attacks should not be
discounted.
Importantly, Boko Haram has failed to mobilise large-scale support. Its indiscriminate attacks
have isolated it from the largely moderate Islamic community in Nigeria. Several large
Muslim groups, such as Ansaru, have directly criticised the organisation. This presents key
opportunities for Abuja. The Nigerian Government should seek to replicate the “Anbar
Awakening”, which saw local communities reject, and arguably defeat, al-Qaida’s
incarnation in Iraq. This will involve supporting local Islamic communities, particularly
through grass roots campaigning. A significant part of this outcome will involve improving
the education, health and employment opportunities available in northern Nigeria. In
contrast, failure to resolve disparities could lead to an expansion of the organisation and
stop the emerging energy boom.
Abuja should also look to create security synergies, particularly given the importance of
Nigerian oil to the United States and the European Union, as they seek to diversify their
energy portfolio away from the Middle East. Counter-terrorism training will serve the dual
purpose of weakening Boko Haram, and other extremist groups, while strengthening the
sometimes tenuous rule of the central government.
Denis Leonov FDI Research Assistant Energy Security Research Programme
*****
Page 11 of 14
South African Navy Proactive as Piracy Threatens Southern
Waters
Background
The South African Navy has announced plans to establish two Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) Centres, to combat the growing threat of piracy to shipping along the southern
African coast.
Comment
Chief Maritime Strategy Director Bernhard Teuteberg, who briefed reporters at the State of
the Navy presentation in Cape Town on 8 March, warned that ‘the Somalian piracy threat is
in fact, from week to week, moving into a southerly direction.’1 He also confirmed that the
navy was prepared to deal with the threat. ‘We have proposed,’ he said, ‘a maritime zone
and regional maritime domain zone centres, all working together to exchange information.’2
One of the MDA centres will be based in Cape Town and cover the west coast; the other, in
Durban, will cover the east coast.
‘We already have many sources that provide information generally available,’ Teuteberg
explained, ‘but it needs to be integrated properly within a maritime information system and
that is what we are concluding at the moment.’
This information is expected to be centralised from 1 April. Data will be shared with similar
centres that are already operating between Angola and Namibia, to assist in anti-piracy
measures.
South Africa formalised diplomatic ties with Somalia on 14 March, to better co-ordinate
efforts to curb the country’s piracy problem. Over the past year, South Africa has been
working with Mozambique and Tanzania to secure the channel between the mainland and
Mozambique. South Africa has also been actively involved in joint anti-piracy operations
with France, which has a vested interest in protecting its Indian Ocean départments of La
Réunion and Mayotte.
South Africa has the largest naval presence in Africa, with a force of at least four Valour-class
frigates, two Warrior-class vessels, and 26 Namacurra-class harbour patrol craft, which can
be transported by road. Pretoria’s commitment to safeguarding regional waters against
piracy seems to extend beyond its own self-interest; this would indicate a growing South
African role as a regional power.
Ashley Woermann FDI Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
1 Wingrin, D., DefenceWeb, 19 March 2012, ‘Navy to Establish Maritime Awareness Centres’.
2 Etheridge, J., Neptune Maritime Security, 15 March 2012, ‘Piracy threatens South Africa’.
Page 12 of 14
*****
Syria’s Neighbours Back Opposition, Fuel Ongoing Unrest
Background
Many of Syria’s neighbours are backing opponents of President Bashar al-Assad in the hope
of implementing regime change in the Arab state. While this may benefit opponents of
Assad, this support has fuelled the ongoing unrest within Syria, as pro-Wahhabi elements
within the region intensify their efforts to topple one of the last remaining secular states
within the Middle East.
Comment
Saudi Arabia and Qatar appear keen to see the end of President Assad’s government and the
assistance that has been provided has aided anti-Assad forces, which is fuelling the growing
insurgency within Syria, where an all-out civil war remains a very real possibility. According
to Reuters, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are offering funding and assistance to opposition
groups and are providing weapons to Syrian rebels by way of Sunni tribal allies in Iraq and
Lebanon.
For instance, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, told a “Friends of Syria”
conference in Tunis last month that humanitarian aid to Syria was ‘not enough’ and that
arming the Syrian rebels was an ‘excellent idea’. Days later, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin
Jassim al-Thani said, ‘we should do whatever necessary to help [the Syrian opposition],
including giving them weapons to defend themselves,’ reports the BBC. In addition, the
Iranian media agency PressTV, accused Qatar of airlifting pro-Wahhabi fighters from Iraq,
Turkey and Libya into Syria as reinforcements. There have also been reports that Turkey and
Jordan are also actively fermenting unrest in Syria by arming Sunni opposition groups and
movements, but this remains unsubstantiated.
Saudi Arabia’s rationale to support the insurgency against the Assad Government is
fundamentally aimed at altering the regional balance of power and further isolating Iran. As
the only Shiite-dominated state in the region, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia for
regional supremacy, especially since the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the
escalation of the war in Afghanistan, has intensified. Should Iran lose its most powerful ally
in Syria, where a pro-Wahhabi and Sunni-led government is likely replace Assad, its regional
influence will be significantly reduced as it becomes further isolated in the Middle East.
Qatar, meanwhile, sees itself as a growing player in the region, especially following the Arab
Spring that has swept the Middle East. The removal of President Assad and a growing
alliance with Saudi Arabia would almost certainly see its regional influence expand. Like
Saudi Arabia, Qatar is committed to supporting pro-Wahhabi Sunni-movements through the
Muslim-world and has been actively involved in supporting anti-Gaddafi Libyan rebels and
acting as a mediator in disputes in Yemen and Lebanon. According to some commentators,
Page 13 of 14
Doha has, in the past year, played a larger role in shaping events in the Middle East than
Riyadh has, referring to its role as the “Doha effect” and that “all roads lead to Doha”.
The convergence in the foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia and Qatar is likely to
develop further as both countries look to capitalise on and shape the winds of change in the
Middle East. The previously secular states of Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia and Libya have fallen,
with pro-Wahhabi Islamist groups seeking to replace the former governing apparatus. Syria,
therefore, remains one of last secular states in the Middle East, and both Saudi Arabia and
Qatar are likely to view it as the final piece in an historic battle in the Arab world against
secular nationalists that has been perennial since the end of the Second World War.
So far, however, Assad’s forces have proven resilient, partly because the disparate
opposition groups are splintered and lack heavy weapons. Just how long the conflict will go
on for is impossible to know, but the support provided by Saudi Arabia and Qatar has
certainly given much needed impetus to the insurgents, and has increased the likelihood of a
protracted and bloody civil war.
Andrew Manners FDI Research Assistant South and West Asia Programme
*****
What’s Next?
The Royal New Zealand Air Force is currently hosting an international training
exercise with the Royal Australian Air Force, the United States Air Force, the
Republic of Singapore Air Force and the French Armed Forces of New Caledonia
at the Ohakea Air Base, Palmerston North. The exercise takes place ahead of
the RNZAF’s 75th anniversary air show on 31 March.
New Delhi will host a summit of the leaders of the BRICS countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa), on 28-29 March.
The first “Agriculture & Agribusiness in South-east Europe” Conference will be
held in Bucharest, Romania on 28-29 March. For more details:
http://foruminvest.ro/conferences-and-events/conferences/AGRICULTURE-
AND-AGRIBUSINESS-IN-SOUTH-EASTERN-EUROPE-2012.html
Burma will hold a number of by-elections on 1 April. For the first time,
democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi will be among the candidates.
The National Sustainable Food Summit will take place in Sydney on 2-4 April.
The summit hopes to identify new business models, frameworks and solutions
to create a future sustainable food system. For more details:
http://www.3pillarsnetwork.com.au/media/food_summit_program_prelim.pdf
Page 14 of 14
Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International.
Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. Desborough House, Suite 2, 1161 Hay Street, West Perth WA 6005 Australia. Tel: +61 8 9486 1046 Fax: +61 8 9486 4000 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.futuredirections.org.au