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From Nine-Eleven to Seven-Eleven: The Poverty of Interpretation
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Transcript of From Nine-Eleven to Seven-Eleven: The Poverty of Interpretation
Berghahn Books
From Nine-Eleven to Seven-Eleven: The Poverty of InterpretationAuthor(s): Jonathan FriedmanSource: Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice, Vol. 46, No.1 (Spring 2002), pp. 104-109Published by: Berghahn BooksStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23170135 .
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From Nine-Eleven to Seven-Eleven The Poverty of Interpretation
Jonathan Friedman
Witnessing
Since September 11 2001, there have been a limited number of reactions
beyond the initial shock which some might say was the result of media cov
erage, the actual horror of seeing two planes crash into the Twin Towers.
The fact of witnessing the event must be understood here, and the proof of
its significance is that the attack on the all-important Pentagon which could
not be seen directly, did not provoke the same kind of immediate response. The actual incident is worth consideration since quite a bit has been writ
ten and said about it.
MI watched the scene over and over again! I couldn't stop watching it. It was
horrible and fascinating at the same time, unreal yet real!"
What is the nature of disbelief? This could not happen. It was unreal. It was
more than a shocking experience. There was an enormity of the event that
is difficult to ingest. Is this the nature of the extra-ordinary? Were we not
well prepared for this in a certain sense, the disaster films had certainly rehearsed us for it. Children's questions come to mind. What is it like for a
plane to penetrate a skyscraper and emerge on the other side? Why doesn't
the building just fall over? Imagine a plane coming in through offices, right
through the glass facade. Were people hit and thrown out of the other side?
How fast was the plane travelling? What was the impact like for the pas
sengers? Must we work this out in the imagination to come to terms with
it emotionally? It is important in any case not to confuse this immediate
reaction with that which has been produced by the media, and by intellec
tuals who have sought to interpret the event. The latter consists in linking the event to either motives or intentionalities, to reasons that are not nec
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From Nine-Eleven to Seven-Eleven 105
essarily immanent in the event itself. The immediate response would nat
urally be to know what the immediate intentions were, assuming that this
was not a mere accident. And an immediate next step is why do three
commandeered planes attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (a
fourth plane may have been aimed at the White House). Well, there is some
one out there who does not like something in our country.
Interpreting
Among the major reactions that have occupied the media and intellectual
discussions are the following. One reaction is a combination of fear and anger, driven by a strong
emotion to defend the country from its enemies. It sanctions counter
attacks, and invests itself in eradicating the terrorists who have done this
thing and who would destroy our world. This is perhaps the secondary reaction of people who do not see themselves as living in the "belly of the
beast," who think well of their country and have invested in something
they want to preserve. Another reaction is the strained converse of the latter. It is critical of the
United States as an imperial power, a power that has too often demon
strated the kind of arrogance that might incite this kind of action. Within
this reaction, there are a great majority who condemn the action itself
while finding a reason to engage in something other than retaliation. But
there are also those who think that the US in some sense deserved what it
got. The field of this reaction is complex and partly self-contradictory. A third reaction is the real antithesis of the first one. It understands the
attack as an act of righteousness by a civilization that has been dishonored
by Western hegemony. It speaks in terms oí jihad, in terms of the loss of the
Caliphate at the hands of that Western agent, Mustapha Kemal, in terms of
the necessity of instituting a new world order, one based on sharia. While
not always expressed directly, as in the words and texts of certain extrem
ist or fundamentalist organizations, it exists as a background text that can
be elicited when needed. One should note here the possible importance of
Wahabism, a sect originating in Syria, but which became at the turn of the
century critical in the formation of the Saudite dynasty. Wahabism is based
on an alliance between warriors and priests. I shall not, in this short space, dwell on all these reactions, but shall
limit myself to one that is closest to home, the second response, one char
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106 Jonathan Friedman
acteristic of liberal-left intellectuals and media people. The structure of this
response is interesting in itself. It contains the following propositions:
1. The West is the "bad-guy." The United States in particular is an
arrogant superpower today with no major enemies after the
downing of the Wall. The US exploits the rest of the world, and is
the single most important perpetrator of global inequality and
excessive poverty. 2. This exploitation and inequality is the root cause of the hate that
has grown up against the United States in particular, and against
the wealthy Western World in general. While no citizens of any country deserve to die as a result of
we should understand that it is the long term effect of the
arrogance of power.
Now a number of discourses can be deduced from these basic propo sitions. One, voiced early on by Chomsky and many others is that the
attack on Americans is nothing compared to what Americans have done
elsewhere in the world, the tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of
people that Americans have killed in various military actions and unde
clared wars and campaigns of starvation. And of course there is the crucial
issue of the state of Israel, supported by the United States in its war against the Arabs, and more specifically, its occupation of Palestinian territory. It is
interesting to note here that while for Western supporters of the Palestini
ans, Israel is an outpost or a lackey of American imperialism, for many
Arabs, the United States is itself a Jewish controlled state, thus reversing the
perspective on power. Another is that while it is understandable that peo
ple should react to being attacked, making war on terrorists and on
Afghanistan is no solution. Alternative solutions range from negotiation to
a Marshall Plan for the world's poor. The conditions that are assumed to be
the cause of this attack must be changed.
There are common themes here, and one in particular, that seems to lie
implicit in all that has been written and said. Supposing that the West, and
especially the US represent imperial power, what is asked for is that they be
morally accountable imperial powers. In other words, empire is OK as long as it is moral, and this implies that it is truly engaged in reducing inequal ities within the world, in respecting cultural difference, that it should strug
gle to be a non-empire. This is a moral rather than a political perspective on
the world. The United States has been a shameful and arrogant empire,
supporting all the wrong kinds of people and politics. There is a strange
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From Nine-Eleven to Seven-Eleven 107
paradox in this. Empire is apparently OK perhaps, but it does need to be
reformed. Intellectuals are nervous about the world. In their post-national
ist fervor, they are perhaps more positive to empire, to some form of global
governance, although most of them would prefer a true global government
rather than the Washington consensus. In any case, global power is proper
and necessary but it must serve the Good itself. So the West should be more
understanding of the evil of its ways:
to most people in the Islamic and Arab worlds the official US is synonymous with arrogant power, known for its sanctimoniously munificent support not
only of Israel but of numerous repressive Arab regimes, and its inattentiveness
even to the possibility of dialogue with secular movements and people who
have real grievances (Said, New York Times, 16-7-01).
But there are strange bedfellows around this time, some who have gone
much further in their critique, pinning the blame not only on arrogant
power, but on imperialism and expansionism itself.
How can all our meddling not fail to spark some horrible retribution ... Have
we not suffered enough from Pan Am 103, to the World Trade Center [the first
bombing], to the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salem—not to know
that interventionism is the incubator of terrorism. Or will it take some cata
clysmic atrocity on U.S. soil to awaken our global gamesmen to the going price of empire? (Buchanan 18-9-01, citing an earlier speech.)
And right-winger Buchanan goes to the limit with his argument:
"Either America finds an exit strategy from empire, or we lose our republic"
(Buchanan op. cit.).
Is there a difference here between liberal-left and extreme right? Perhaps,
but in this case it is in the isolationism of the right. And the opposite of iso lationism is the Empire of Good.
There are some who believe that the US is the only source of evil in the world, and that therefore European states represent something closer
to the good with their missionary rhetoric of aid and good deeds. Look out here for the total hypocrisy that is revealed when comparing this to the
complex motives that lie behind it all. The project of empire is alive and well in Europe as well.. It is also alive, but not well, in certain quarters of the Muslim world, in the form of post-Ottoman blues, a kind of subaltern
desire for an empire of sharia. And when I say this I am met often by a
knee-jerk reaction that is molded by the inversion of Western ideology. How can you say such a thing? You must be a reactionary. Nothing bad
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108 Jonathan Friedman
can come from the so-called oppressed of the earth. This is one of the re
actions from the globalization quarters—the liberal-progressive wing of
the new global governance-imperial position. This is the position that is
emerging in the vacuum left by the left—a moral-globalism that would
have the wise rule the world.
And on the Other Voices?
Is this a clash of civilizations? In an ideological sense there is evidence that
the Islamic groups involved in terrorist activity are closer adherents of
Huntington than Western liberals who have lambasted his work as both
reactionary and wrong. Of course the relation cannot be understood in
terms of regional conflict, especially since much of the Islamist discourse is
produced within globally dispersed networks whose main centers are in
Europe and the United States. Dealing with the issue of networks, of
course, does not detract from the ideological production of religious and
regional conflict, for such are the terms of the discourse. It is said that the
relation between the Jews and the United States is crucial since the kingpin in much of the discussion is Israel. Many of the pronouncements from
Islamic extremists adopts the "elders of Zion protocols" and interpret the
US support for Israel as a Jewish conspiracy. The existence of a Jewish State
on Arab soil is a clear denigration of integrity that must be met. And if this
is all linked to a larger scheme of Jewish world dominance, then we have
a logic of violence all ready to go into operation. The structures of the network are clear enough for those interested.
Musa Abu Marzuk, executive officer of Hamas, arrested in 1995 in the
United States, had lived in that country for fifteen years, had connections
to most other major terrorist leaders and was involved in a multimillion
dollar laundering operation. Bashir Nafi who was deported in 1996, had
been working for WISE (World Islamic Studies Enterprise) attached to the
University of South Florida. The head of WISE, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah
was professor at the University of South Florida from 1991 to 1995 when he
surfaced in Damascus as head of Islamic Jihad. Investigation of the organi zation revealed a deep involvement in terrorist organization.
The point for an anthropologist, even assuming that I am wrong, is that
there is a tendency in intellectual reactions to repress the intentionality of
those involved in the events, by translating their actions into a métonymie
expression of world poverty and injustice, or even worse, making them into
the dumb ventriloquists of American arrogance. This is not to deny the fact
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From Nine-Eleven to Seven-Eleven 109
that the US, but Europe as well, of course, have been leading actors in the
past one hundred and fifty years of imperial expansion. There may well be
tendencies in the current global alliances for the emergence of empire, for
the political institutionalization of world order, but this is, historically,
always a late stage in the pulsating history of imperial organization, and it
is usually an expression of a demise of hegemony that is realized subse
quently. Intellectuals who insist that everything following the attack on the
Twin Towers, and perhaps even the attack itself is part of a conspiracy aimed at the establishment of total US power, are living the fantasy of their
own fear, in this new age of uncertainty, a fear that things might really be
much worse in the not so long run, that their own well-being might be in
jeopardy. And in all of it, to commit the atrociously anti-ethnographic act of
reducing the perpetrators to mere mindless puppets is, not so paradoxically, to purify the imperialist mentality which they would see fit to demolish.
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