Abstract ThereisevidenceoftheincreaseinthesecessionclaimsofCataloniaintherecent years.Especiallyafter2012,independencewillamongpoliticalactorshavebeen patent and increasing part of the population supports the regions independence. This studyaimstoprovideaninsightoftheprocessanditspossibledrivers,especially convenient for readers without advanced knowledge on the Catalan issue. It intends to answerthequestionregardingthecausesbehindthisobservedtendencyinthetwo main spheres of public life; the social and the political one. After presenting the facts in achronologicalorderweidentifythemaineventsthatcanbeseenascauses for the mobilization;duetolimitedtimeandwording,thisworkfocusesonthereformofthe CatalanStatuteofAutonomyasthemaineventcausingthemovement.Then,the study analyzes previous general and specific scholarship of the causes for secession, to help us understand the possible perception that individuals hold regarding this event. This study divides the reasons in identity-based and interest-driven but it also suggests therelevanceoftheelementofpossibilityofsecession.Finally,assumingahigh relevanceofcertainintermediaryactorsininfluencingthesocialandpolitical dimensions, it will analyze, in a really small study case, the motivations that led two of themostimportantentitiestoseekindependence.Thiscangiveussomecluesto understand the causes of the whole phenomena. Index 1.Introduction........................................................................................ . 1 1.1. New secessionist movement in Catalonia and main Characteristics ............................................................................... 1 1.2. Importance of understanding the causes............... ..................... 4 2.Facts, Events................................................................................ ...... 6 2.1. History ....................................................................................... 7 2.1.1. Background.................................................. ................. 7 2.1.2. Contemporary history...................................... .............. 12 2.2. Recent Key Events.......................................................... ............ 15 2.2.1. Reform of the Statute of Autonomy .............................. 15 2.2.2. Social mobilization........................................................ . 172.2.3. Political mobilization.................................................. .... 21 3.Theories.............................................................................................. . 25 3.1. General Scholarship.............................................................. ...... 25 3.2. The Catalan case........................................................................ . 29 . 3.2.1. Identity (value-based)................................................... . 293.2.2. Instrumentalism (Interest-driven)............ ...................... 32 3.2.3. Possibility................................. ..................................... 34 4.The (possible) drivers....................... .................................................. 36 4.1. Role of intermediary actors................... ...................................... 36 4.2. Most important intermediary actors in Catalonia..................... ..... 40 4.2.1. Civil Society Groups ..................................................... 40 4.2.2. Political Parties.......................... ................................... 44 4.2.2.1. Change in positions of political parties. ....... 51 5. Conclusions ........................................................................................ 52 Bibliography ............................................................................................ 56 Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood1 1.IntroductionFrom Nationalism to Statehood is a way to call the current political and social process that is going on in Catalonia. Expressions of cultural nationalism have been present in the region for many centuries, demanding further autonomy, but also advocating for the recognitionofNation. Indeed, fortheirspecificculturalcharacteristics, manyCatalans consider that Catalonia is a Nation and should have such a definition even if being in within another State; the Spanish one.Whathasrecentlychangedinthedemandsofthemovementisthat,nowadays,it advocatesforstatehood;moreandmoreCatalansnowdemandtohaveaseparate State,anindependentpoliticalstructurethatwillbespecificfortheNationthatthey claim they are.Thisshiftinthedemandsofthemovementisthefocusofthisstudy;theeventsthat represent it and the possible causes and motivations of it.The introductory part presents the object of analysis in this study: the new secessionist socialandpoliticalmovementinCatalonia.Itfirstpresentsthemainevidencethat showstherelevantincreaseinsupportofsecessionamongtheCatalanpopulation. Then,itanalyzestherelevanceofunderstandingthecausesbehindthismovement. Thesecausesarehereunderstoodasthereasonsthatledtheseentitiesand individuals to seek independence, the argumentation and reasoning that lies under this newclaim.Finally,itwillfurtherdeveloponthestructureandcontentofthenext chapters to come.1.1.New secessionist movement in Catalonia and main characteristics The demand for secession by part of the Catalan population has become a salient topic in the Spanish national arena and internationally after a great demonstration that took placeonthestreetsofBarcelonaon11thSeptember2012:theNationalDayof Catalonia or Diada de Catalunya.Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood2 The 11th of September is commemorated every year as the date inwhichCatalansweredefeatedbythearmyoftheBourbon KingPhilipVofSpainintheendoftheSiegeofBarcelonain 1714.ThatmeantthelossoftheCatalan constitutionsundertheaegisof theNuevaPlanta decrees. Catalans claim that they do not celebrate the loss of their autonomy but rather the fact that, afterthesehundredsofyearsofcultural oppression, the Catalan culture still exists.Thedemonstrationin2012ofmorethanoneand ahalfmillionpeoplewithacleardemandfor independencecaughttheattentionofmanydomesticand internationalactors,becausegiventhetotalCatalanpopulation ofsevenandahalfmillion,thedemonstratorsrepresented almost one fifth of the whole community.This event made patent the change in the Catalan mobilizations thatusedtolimittheirdemandstoself-governanceand recognition as a Nation.In this last aspect, it mightbe useful to clarifythisnationalclaim.TheconceptofNationhasvarious meanings and these have also changed during time, being firstly stronglyrelatedtoethniccommunityandthenmorelinkedto culturalandpoliticalfeatures.Itmaybeusedasasynonymof StateorCountry,butithasamuchambiguousscope,being describedsometimesasimaginedcommunity.(Anderson, 1991) The classic definition of Nation shall be something similar to:ANationisalargebodyofpeopleunitedbycommon descent,history,culture,orlanguage,inhabitinga particular state or territory. (Oxford Dictionaries) Manyaspectsofthisgeneraldefinitionhavebeenusedbythe Catalanmovement;referencestothecommonhistory,culture andlanguagethatareinsomepartdifferentthantheSpanish one.ThelackofaproperStatestructurehasneverbeenan impediment for this culture and language to persist in a more or The protest of 11th September 2012 in the streets of Barcelona is considered a turning point to the importance given to the Catalan Case. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood3 less defined territory.1 Despite a continuous reaffirmation of nation, the movement was mostly regionalist instead of secessionist.Since the great protest with straight forward secession demand of 2012, the presence oftheCatalanissueintheinternationalmediahasgrown.Especiallybetween2012 and 2014, the presence of the issue in media around the world has increased, on many occasionsbeingpresentedtogetherwiththeScottishcaseforindependence.Aswe will see,the Catalan-Spanish relation was alreadyAfter thatDiadaof2012,thesubstantiallyincreasingprominenceof theissuecaused theCatalanpoliticalpartiestorapidlyestablishtheirposition;someofthemclarified their political intentions and others even changed their political discourse in the matter. ManynewpartiesemergedwiththespecificobjectiveofachievingCatalansecession fromSpain.Someofthem,aswewillsee,managedtogetafewseatsinthe Parliamentnotlongafterbeingcreated.Lookingattheelectoralsupportthatpolitical parties had in the Catalan Parliament elections in 2012, we see that between 59.55% and 73.99% of the votes were for a party that supported the calling of a referendum to determine the political future of Catalonia. Thecivilsocietyassociationsthatorganizedthedemonstrationsrapidlygrewin membershipandsawtheirimpactonthesocialandpoliticallife getting stronger. The numberofpeopledirectlyorindirectlyparticipatinginthemultitudeofsocialactsof thosecivilassociationshassubstantiallyincreased.Wecanalsoclearlyseean increase in the secessionist will in general surveys made in the region. The Barmetre dOpiniPblicafromtheCenterofOpinionStudiesoftheGeneralitat(Catalan Government),isa recurringsurveymadeof the Catalanpopulationonmanydifferent aspects of political and social life. In 2011, support for the independence of Catalonia was added to the issues included in the opinion polls with the specific question If there were a referendum tomorrow to decide on Catalonias independence from Spain, what would you do? The possible answers included voting in favor, voting against, and not goingtovote.Thepollmadeonthe27Mayof2012showed,forthefirsttime,a majority vote supporting the independence of Catalonia (51.06% of the total answers). Anotherquestionaskswhichwouldbe,accordingtotheindividual,theideal constitutionalformofCatalonia:aregionwithinSpain,anautonomouscommunity,a state within a federal Spain or, lastly, an independent state. In this case, the available

1 However, the current delimitations of the linguistic, cultural, demographic and political borders are ambiguous and this can lead to the question of Who is Catalan? being difficult to answer. Historically, the different perceptions on its answer also presented evolution. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood4 data starts in June 2005. The answer that saw the strongest change was independent state, which grew from 13.6% in June 2005 to 34% in June 2012. The decrease of 5% registered in only one year time (from June 2011 to June 2012) is the highest increase in the studied period. (Prat i Guilany, 2012) The public support for the calling of an independence referendum has been measured withseveralsurveys.AccordingtosevensurveysmadeinCataloniafromJanuary 2012 to January 2013, approximately three of every four citizens favor or agreed with thecallingofareferendum(being68.9%thelowestresult,fromElPeridico,and 83.9%thehighest,fromLaVanguardia)andtheaveragesupportremainedrelatively constant during this year. (Consell Assessor per a la Transici Nacional, 2013).Indeed, the secessionist movement in Catalonia has evidently grown, and many more voicespayattentiontothisregionnowadays,observingthefactsandtryingtogiveit someexplanation.Thefirstinternationalmediaapproachestotheissuegenerally linked it to the economic crisis that was taking place in Spain. BBC news, for example, presentedtheprotestof2012asdemandsforfiscalindependenceandpolitical autonomy, sharpened by the economic crisis. (BBC, 2012) The study of the coverage intheinternationalmediarevealedthatalthoughthesecessionclaimswereinitially presented as a direct consequence of the economic crisis, the more recent events are being presented with historical and cultural references. Especiallyin 2014, references totheTercentenary(300yearssincethelossofCatalaninstitutions)havebeen increasinglyrecurrent.(RodonE.,2014)However,wecanstillseedisagreement among the informants when pointing at the main causes, reasons or explanatory facts.AlongwiththestrongerinterestoftheinternationalmediaintheCatalancase,many academic studies have taken Catalonias secession as a focus of research. Some have provided further information about the fiscal situation (the so called espoli fiscal2), and somehaveattemptedtoevaluatetheconsequencessecessionwouldhaveforthe

2 Espoli fiscal is the Catalan term to expose the fiscal imbalances of the region within the equalization system of the Spanish State.Figure 1: Evolution of the answer of desired institutional form of Catalonia in time. (CEO. Centre d'Estudis d'Opini, 2014) Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood5 Catalan economy. Others have aimed at the historical rights of secession, the political viability of an independent Catalonia, or at the discrimination that the region has within Spain.However,andsurprisingly,thenumberofstudiesthataimatthespecific reasonsforthisnewriseofsecessionismislower.Indeed,thereasonsthese individuals have for supporting independence now, and not before, are unclear. To get aclearerideaofthegeneralreasonsfortheirrecentclaims(andassumingthatitis impossibletoknowthespecificreasonsanyoneindividualmighthave),Iconsiderit worthwhile to further investigate the causes of the phenomenon in question. 1.2.Importance of understanding the causes Throughout Catalan history political actors have worked for reforms within the Spanish state, rather than demanding secession from it. Nowadays, Catalan cultural nationalism seemstohavemovedfromdemandsofhome-ruleandmoreplurinationality,to extensive demands of secession. This new trend breaks with the historical tradition of the movement.This work assumes that both the social and political mobilizations were initiated due to specificeventshappeningin thecountry,andthatthesetwothen mutuallyinfluenced each other.Theconnectionsbetweenthepoliticalandsocialspheresareundeniable.Politics influence the opinion and the behavior of the society, while the public opinion of a given communitywillalsoberelevantforthepoliticalactions.Sincethechangeoftrend towardssecessionismisobservableinbothspheresalmostsimultaneously,and assuming that the causes both converge and diverge, this work will divide its analysis into these two spheres. AfterpresentingthepolemicreformoftheStatuteofAutonomy,thisstudydescribes theeventshappeninginbothspheres;firstinthecivilsocietysphereandthenthe political sphere, together with their claims and arguments.To determine whether the emergence of nationalist claims is a top-down or a bottom-up process is of high significance when examining its causes. At this point, knowing the relevant events and their causes, it is necessary to examine thetheoryandpreviousscholarshipinordertogetageneralideaofthepossible perceptions that individuals have of the events in question. Such perceptions are part Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood6 ofthethoughtcognitiveprocessthatcompelledasignificantpartofthepopulationto support separation from Spain.

2.Facts, Events Claimsforincreasedself-governanceandforrecognitionofnationalcharacterhave beenpresentinCataloniasincethebeginningoftheregionalistmovement.Ineffect, Catalanregionalismcanbecharacterizedbyitspersistentclaimsoveralongperiod time.Thiscanbecallednationalismduetothefactthattheself-definitionofthe communityasanationhasbeenpresentsincethebeginning,andithasaswell persistedinitsdemandsofbeingrecognizedassuch.Despitethiscontinuityinthe nationalism, the secessionist claims have been historically minor if not residual, even if some specific moments on the Spanish history made the secessionist voices grow.Thisfirstchapterpresentsthefactsandeventsthatarenecessarytounderstandthe caseofstudyanditspreviousanalysis.Wewillfirstlyintroduceanecessary backgroundinthehistoryoftheregion.Itisunavoidableinordertounderstandthe nature of the movement and its current claims, since they are strongly related with the past.The firstpartofbackgroundcontainsthepoliticalhistoryoftheregionsincetheeight centuryuntiltheendofthedictatorshipofGeneralFranco(1975).Itshowsthat Catalonia never agreed to the subordination to Spanish structures in the first place, and whilepersistinginitsdemands,historyshowshowtheconflictbetweenthesetwo entities is nothing new.The second part explains the history from the democratic transition until the beginning of the secession movement, showing how, in democracy, Catalonia continued to claim self-governance and recognition as a nation.Thelastpart,finally,presentsthemaineventscharacterizingthispro-secessionturn (respectivelyinthesocialandinthepoliticalarena)tohelpusestablishanorderof events and a possible cause of them. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood7 2.1. HISTORY 2.1.1. BackgroundAt the beginning of the eight century, when the Arabs were conquering most part of the Spanishpeninsula,CharlemagnereactedbyinvadingarangealongthePyrenees (called back then Gotia and Marca Hispana), which would serve as a barrier to the Arabic force. To some, this marks the birth of Catalonia, while others (Sabat i Curull, 2005) disagree that Catalan identity has such ancient roots.There is wider agreement thatthe Catalan identitydeveloped during the Middle Ages. ThePrincipalityofCatalonia3haddelimitedborders,unifiedlegislativeandjudicial bodies,acommoncultureandacommonlanguage:Catalan.TheCrownofAragon wouldlaterexpandthroughtheMediterranean andbecomeanimportantentityofthe period.

3 The Principality of Catalonia is the territories that were united under the rule of the Court of Barcelona. When the County of Barcelona united dynastically the Kingdom of Aragon they created the Crown of Aragon. Both Aragon and Catalonia retained their own political and legal structures. Figure 2: Map of the Crown of Aragon in 1330. (Historical Atlas of the Mediterranean) "Lo robat s robat per ms segles que passin. Amb quin dret se pot reclamar Gibraltar, si nosaltres no podem reclamar Catalunya?"What has been robbed has been robbed for many centuries. What right do they have to reclaim Gibraltar if we cant reclaim Catalonia? ngel Guimer (1845-1924) Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood8 Itmaybeimportanttoremarkthat,whentheCrownofAragonmadea dynasticunionwiththeCrownofCastile(1469),Catalanswerenot allowed to trade with or to move to the colonies of America, a prohibition that benefitted the Castilians at Catalan expense. This could demonstrate thattheconflictualrelationsbetweenthetwoterritories(evenifbeing dynastically united) have long historical roots.Many battles between the Castilian and Aragon Crown and the Kingdom of France took place during the Thirty Years War (1618 - 1648), and the Guerra dels Segadors (Catalan Revolt)4 was a consequence of the fiscal exploitation.TheendoftherevoltarrivedwithTractatdelsPirineus5 (Pyrenees Agreement) in 1659, putting the Catalan territories against the popularopinionandagainstthelawspromisedbytheKingofCastille whentheunionofcrownstookplace.Itshouldbeacknowledgedthat Catalan territory had already shown rejection to Castilian domination; for example,in1641,CataloniadeclareditselfaRepublicunderFrench protection. It was in 1700, after the death of King Charles II of Castille and Aragon, whentheSpanishSecessionWarbegan6.TheascensionofPhilipVto thethronewasthestartofBourbonreigninSpain7.Alltheterritories conforming to the former Crown of Aragon were united with the Castilian ones after the fall of Barcelona (in 1714) and Mallorca (in 1715). They lost theirinstitutions,lawsandrights,andwerefromthenonruledundera centralistabsolutistregime:theDecreesofNuevaPlantathatinvoked the fair right of conquest (1715-1716).The following years are considered a very dark period of Catalan history. Even historians known to support to Bourbon regime (Rousset de Missy) describedin1719theimpressiverigorwithwhichtheprincePhilipV exactedvengeanceupontherebelsoftheregime.TheSpanish Bourbons emphasized then the Castilian identity as an ethnic core while attempting consolidation of the Spanish nation-state. It was a process characterized by

4 Peasants revolt that took place in the Principality of Catalonia during 1640-1652. 5 This Pact was a modification of the current Spain and France border, and ceded the Country of Roussillon, half of the CountyofCerdanyaandConflenttoFrrance.Thepopulationoftheseterritories,formanyyearsterritoriallyand culturally united, and especially the population living in the border region did not accept the agreement, and it was not effective until it was enforced later in 1720.6 The Castilian Crown supported the French Philip the Borboun while the Aragon Crown allied with the Austrian Habsburg.7 The Bourbon Reign, with three interruptions, has remained until nowadays The Four Red Bars, Coat of arms of the Crown of Aragon. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood9 therejectionofthepluralityandexaltationofCastilianunity.(Mar-Molinero&Smith, 1996) (Muro & Quiroga)Anotherimportantcharacteristicofthisperiodistheconstantmilitaryoccupationof CataloniaunderSpanishforces.8Somescholarssuggestthattheselong-term occupation periods helped the development of the feeling of Spain as a foreign power. (Risques, 1999) Atthispoint,wefoundourselvesintheCatalanRenaixena(1840-1880). Thiswasa cultural movement parallel with the Galician Rexurdimento and the Occitanian Felibrige and had as a main objective the rebirth of Catalan language as a literary and cultural language.At the Spanish level, the great instability of the governments and the polarization of the populationbecameclearintheendofnineteenthcenturyandthebeginningofthe twentieth century. The first Spanish Republic (1873) took place under the presidency of twoCatalans:EstanislauFiguerasandFrancescPiiMaragall,whichweretwoofthe four different presidents of the Executive Power that the Republic saw. OneyearaftertheproclamationoftheRepublic,theBourbonrestorationtookplace withtheuprisingofthegeneralMartnez-Camposin1874.Thisrestorationofthe monarchy was happening simultaneously with the development of Catalonia, thanks to the Industrial Revolution. Catalonia and the Basque Country, in contrast with the rest of Spain,enteraperiodofrapidindustrializationandthissituationcreatedstrong economicdifferencesamongtheseterritories,andaconsequentdivergenceof interests9.Thisdifferenceofeconomicinterestsledalsotoanincreasedreductionof the Catalan representation in the Spanish central government10, a fact that is relevant whenexplainingthegrowthofthefeelingofexclusionthatcharacterizedthisera. (AinaudDeLasarte,1996)Thishappenedtogetherwiththefactthatmanytaxes appliedintheCatalanterritory(backthenthemostdevelopedregioninSpain)could not be found in any other Community of the country. DuetotheeffectsoftheindustrializationandtheCatalanreinaxena,thecommunity sawmanychanges.Firstly,anewIndustrialclass,aneweliteofenrichedleadersof

8 For example, between 1812 and 1874, 45,000 soldiers (one fourth of the total Spanish soldiers) remained in Catalonia and the State of exception in Catalonia was applied during almost 70% of the time of the XVlll century. 9 Catalan elites rapidly demanded protectionist systems but Spanish ruling class was strong supporter of liberal free trade model of economy, which was more interesting for their agricultural products. 10 This low catalan representation can be exemplified by the low number of Catalan politicians serving in Madrid during the XIX and beginning of XX century (Ainaud De Lasarte , 1996) and for the periods in which any of the 200 Ministers appointed were Catalan (from 1902 to 1918). Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood10 thisindustrialsectorthatassociatedwitheachotherforcommoninterestsand, secondly, a new emerging network of groups, associations or ateneu. (Colegio Libre de Emeritos,2015)Oneof themanyassociationsthatwerecreatedinthistimewasthe Centre Catal (Catalan Center) created in Barcelona in 1882 to defend themoral and material interests of Catalonia. This institution gave impulse the Memorial de Greuges11 (GrievancesMemorial)thatwassendtothekingAlfonsoXIIIin1885.Thisdocument was, according to some, seen as the convergence of interest that led to the creation of the Uni Catalanista; the political party that promoted the Bases de Manresa.This party was created through the union of diverse workers organizations and Catalan associationsthatsawacommonobjectiveintheMemorial.Theirmainachievement wastobringtogether,in1982,mostoftheCatalanistentitiestodiscussaboutthe bases of what will be the Regional Constitution of Catalonia. This set of bases that will thenbeknownasLesBasesdeManresawasasetofarticlestowhichCatalonias governancewouldbebased.Itwas,accordingtomany,aconservativeand traditionalistdocumentthatrejectedtheParliamentarysystemandadvocatedfor corporativevoting.(Alarc,2012)RepresentingtheinterestsofmanyCatalan associationsandimportantindustrializedsectorsofthesocietythisdocumentis consideredsincethenthemostrelevantrepresentationoftheaimsandobjectivesof the so-called Catalanism.Some historians argue that the combination of disparity in Catalan social structures and impoverished rural Spain were both determinant causes for the appearance of Catalan regionalismduringthenineteenthcentury.Manyemphasizethatthedifferences betweenSpainstwomaincities,MadridandBarcelona,stimulatedregionalself-identification. (Moreno, Arriba, & Serrano, 1997) ThedictatorshipestablishedbyPrimodeRivera(1923)wasquicklysupportedbythe MonarchAlfonsoXVIIIandimplementedwiththeaimofpoliticalstability.Again,the CatalanMancomunitat12waseliminated;Catalanlanguageandsymbolswereagain forbidden in public life and strongly punished.

11 Memorial de Greuges is the popular name of the document that Uni Catalanista sent to the king Alfonso VIII imitating the procedure in the past Catalan Courts. It consisted on a memorial of the acts that are seen as discriminative by the Catalan side, and consist therefore on Grievances.12MancomunitatdeCatalunyawasthenameoftheCatalaninstitutionalauthorityfrom1914to1923.Eventhoghits nature was supposed to be purely administrative with its four provinces (Catalan provinces of Girona, Tarragona, Lleida andBarcelona)itgainedstrongpoliticalpoweranditrepresentedthefirstrecognitionocCwatalandifferencebythe Spanish State since 1714.Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood11 After the significant deterioration and loss of support from the Regime, the King agreed in 1931 to the proclamation of the Second Republic (1931-39). TheCatalanPresident,FrancescMaci,whohadtoliveinexile duringthedictatorship,quicklyreturnedtoCataloniaand,the sameday,on14thofAprilof1931,afewhoursbeforethe proclamationoftheSpanishRepublicinMadrid,heproclaimed the Catalan Republic. He als encouoraged other regions in Spain todeclaretheirownRepublicinwithinanIbericConfederation. Threedayslater,hecommittedwiththeSpanishauthoritiesto renouncetheCatalanRepublicandtoestablishinsteadtheGeneralitatde Catalunya. TheSecondRepublic,indeed,contributedtosolvingthe ethnoterritorialproblemsbyestablishingaregionalfederal-like model. Many see this as the context of pluralism in which Catalan andotherculturalnationalismswerefinallyinstitutionalized.The Second Republic conceded the so-called Statutes of Autonomy to Catalonia,theBasqueCountryandGalicia.Thisregional autonomy played an important role in the political polarization that led to the Civil War. (Moreno, Arriba, & Serrano, 1997) The Spanish Civil War ended with the triumph of the fascist forces of the General FranciscoFranco,whosedictatorialregimeextendedfrom1939untilthedeath of the dictator in 1975. This was a period of uniformity and centralization without ambiguities and without possible opposition. Together with the prohibition of any democratic freedom, of political parties (except of course from the Falange13), of freepress,ofinstitutionsestablishedbytheStatutesoftheSecondRepublic, etc., the regime systematically persecuted the Catalan language and culture.According to some historians, in the Catalan case, the regime was an attempt of culturalgenocide,aimingtodestroyfromtherootsitscharacteristicnational personality." Josep Maria Sol i Sabat i Joan Vilarroya i Font Two of the main principles of the Franco dictatorship were anti-communism and anti-separatism. Theconceptionofnationalunityandhomogeneityrepresented adogmaintheregimeandsomesuggestthatthelinguisticandcultural

13 Falange Espaola is a fascist political party created in 1933 by Jos-Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera , and became later the only political party allowed in the Franco Regime. Francesc Maci proclaims the Catalan Republic.Official flag of the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1939) Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood12 oppressionofFrancostimulatedtheperipheralregionalism.(Giner,1984).Fromthe 1960s onwards, the regionalist nationalisms intensified and, during the last years of the dictators regime, the opposition already had a program prepared for democratic rights and political decentralization of Spain. In this sense, vindication for democracy and for ethno-territorial autonomy went hand in hand.Thelongdictatorshipisanexampleofhowthesecessionistmovementappearsas resistance to the pressuresof the centralgovernment.(Eltemps d'histria,2005).Thereis evidence to support the argument that,afterlongperiodsof repression,theregionalist movementcameupwithlouder voices.Forinstance,in1977, afterthefalloftheregime,more thanone millionCatalanswentto thestreetstodemandtheir autonomy back. 2.1.2. Contemporary history We proceed now to examine those contemporary events that have direct effect on the newraiseofsecessionism.Thepoliticalandsocialeventstakingplaceduringthe Democratic transition and until 2012 are especially relevant in order to comprehend the nature of the movement.ThebroadpoliticalconsensusthatallowedthewritingoftheConstitutionof1978 duringthedemocratictransitionreflectedtheambiguityoftheterritorialorganization. ThelegaltextincludesboththeideaofanindivisibleSpain,andtheideaofthe protectionofdiversitywithinthecountry.Itwasanopenmodelofasymmetrical federalism (since it explicitly presents some of its Autonomous Communities as having historical rights), which was meant to permit procedures or levels of self-government tobepursuedbyAutonomousCommunities,offeringflexibilityandadaptingtothe differentdesiresofautonomybythedifferentregions.However,thisconstructionof almost-federal state (without federal self-definition) had to follow a top-down process of decentralization, in which the competences were given from the center to the different Protest on 11th September. Barcelona, 1977. (Robert Ramos) Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood13 regions.(Linz,SpanishDemocracyandtheEstadodelasAutonomas,1989)This processhasbeenongoingsincethewritingoftheConstitution,evenifthefull developmentofmultilateraldecision-makingorarealexerciseofthegovernment actioninacommonwayseemsstillfarfrombeingareality.Inaddition,whatwas supposed to be an asymmetric system has actually become decentralization between equal units with the same level of competences, what is known in Spain as caf para todos14.TheprocessisaswellcharacterizedbythebipartitesystemofSpain;sincethe democratic transition, PSC and PP have been alternating in the power. The Socialists seemtohavebiggerrespectfordecentralizationwhilethePopularshaveacentralist approach.ThedemandsandachievementsofautonomybyCataloniaaretherefore, strongly determined by the political party in power in the Spanish Parliament. Thereisastronglinkbetweenthesedemandsforpoliticalself-ruleandtheterritorial identity of the population in the relevant Autonomous Community. As Juan Linz writes already back in the 1975: SpaintodayisastateforallSpaniards,anation-stateforalargepartofthe Spanishpopulation,andonlyastatebutnotanationforimportant minorities. (Linz,PoliticsinaMulti-LingualSocietywithaDominant WorldLanguage:the case of Spain, 1975). In communities where the sub-state identity is more extended than the actual modern stateidentity,theclaimsforpoliticalautonomywillbehigher.(Moreno,Arriba,& Serrano, 1997). However, as we have presented, such claims will not find support in a system of equal competences for all units.Startingin1980,JordiPujol,fromCiU15,governingtheCatalanGeneralitat16were committed to stabilizing the relationship between the region and center. From 1982, the politicalstrategyoftheCatalangovernmentwasthedialecticalapproachtoachieve competencesintheculturalbutalsoeconomicaspects.Thisstrategicapproachalso known as Peix al Cove consisted in the constant demands from the Catalan of further economic rights and governing autonomy. It had apparently some effectiveness, since theSpanishpresidentcommittedtoamodificationoffinancialsystembytheendof

14 Coffe for everyone is a common expression in Spain to support the idea that all the autonomous communities should have the exact same treatement and not the differenciation expressed in the Constitution. 15 Convergncia I Uni, important political party in Catalonia. Presented later in the text. 13. The Generalitat is the institutional system in which Catalonia is organized politically. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood14 1985.Naturally,thereformthatwastobeappliedtotheCatalancasewouldalsobe appliedtotheotherSpanishcommunities,besidestheonesthatalreadyhadan special treatment outside the LOFCA17 (such as Basque Country and Navarra) . In any case,theregionalgovernmentexpectedthereformtobeinsomemeasuremore favorable than the current distribution18.By1990,thenewfinancesystemwasapprovedeventhoughitdidnotfavorthe economic interests of Catalonia. Despite the new systems aim to be a final solution to the financial problem, five different models have since been approved for establishing the definitive level of revenues that the different autonomous communities can have. Ontheotherhand,theCatalansobtainedseveralconcessionsbeforetheendofthe socialistterm.Theseincludelinguisticissues,andissuesinpolicemanagementand judicialadministration.Duringthenexttermofthesocialists(inwhichtheylackeda qualified majority and depended on the CiU for support), the Catalans would agree on themainpoliciesinexchangeofsomeautonomicrightsgivenbythecentral government.Thisisthewayinwhichthe15%oftheIRPFwasawardedtoCatalan management. ThetermofJosMariaAznar,whichstartedin2000withtheabsoluteelectoral majority, marks the start of a change in the approach of the central government to the Catalanissue.TheeducationallawsthatreducetheCatalancompetencesandother examplesshowthedifferentapproachtotheculturaldiversityinthecountry.The negotiate approach was over. ManyauthorsregardsthisAznartermasanimportantcontextinwhichcatalanism19 emergesonceagain.Ineffect,thenextelectionstotheCatalanParliament,in2003, showanincreaseofthesupporttoregionalistpoliticalparties.TheTripartit(the coalitionbetweenthreepoliticalpartiestogovern)marksthestartofthespecific succession of events that are directly related with the growth of secessionist claims. To conclude the part on history, we reiterate that Catalanism has consisted historically ofclaimsforspecialnationalrecognitionandrespectinoneside,andmoreself-governanceinapeacefuldialecticalmannerintheother.Sincetheendofthe

17 Ley Orgnica de Financiacin de las Comunidades Autnomas; Organic Law for the Financiation of the Autonomous Communities.18 The fiscal deficit of that time was estimated to be 9% of the Catalan GDP and the average amount of expenditure that Catalan people received in terms of public services was far below the average in other communities. 19 Catalanism is the name that stands for the Catalan national vindication movement that demands political and cultural recognition for the region Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood15 dictatorialregime,duringthedemocratictransitionanduntilthecurrenttimes,the political relations between the regional Government and the central one can be seen as negotiationsfortransfersofcompetencesandothercommitments.Thisdialectical approachbetweenthetwopoliticalentitieshavebeenmoreorlessintenseduring differenttermsthroughthelastdecades,mainlydependingonthespecificeconomic and social context and the political parties governing in each level.Ineffect,thesecessionistclaimswithintheCatalansocietyhavebeenclassically minorityifnotresidual.Indifference,forexample,tothenationalismintheBasque Countrythathasbeenseparatistsinceitsorigins.Evenifbothregionalismscanbe seenasmanifestationsofamoreprosperousperipherythatresistanddenouncethe centralistattemptsofthestatetowhicharesubordinated,theCatalanregionalismis understoodasprovidinganalternativetothecurrentsituationofSpain,ratherthan rejecting all possibilities besides secession.We will now proceed to develop the most relevant recent events that directly affect the studied phenomena.2.2. RECENT KEY EVENTS The social and political mobilization that came salient between 2010 and 2012 cannot beunderstoodwithoutpresentingitsantecedents.Inthispartofthestudyitwillbe presented the fact happening in the two spheres social and political- , the first signs of the change from main claims of self-governance to main demands of secession. In this sense, it will as well intend to identify the main intermediary actors in each sphere, the main drivers and representatives of the process in the public life.First,itwillpresenttheprocessofthereformoftheStatutestartedin2005,whichis consideredakeyfactorinthesubsequentshiftofdemands.Then,theevents happeninginbothsphereswillbepresentedinachronologicorder,observingtheir main claims and characteristics.2.2.1. Reform of the Statute of Autonomy The reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, initiated in 2005 and concluded in 2010withthesentenceoftheConstitutionalTribunalprovokedbigdemonstrations morethan1millionpeopleonJuly2010andtheappearanceofassociations Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood16 advocatingforCatalanrighttodecide.Theeventsthathappenedsincethenare relevant to understand the strong growth of the secession movement at the social and political level.Asalreadystated,theregionalelectionsof2003inCataloniamarkachangeinthe politicalscenario,giving31.16%ofthevotestotheSocialistParty,ledbyPasqual Maragall,16,44%toEsquerraRepublicanadeCatalunya.Forthefirsttime,the associationbetweenCiU(with30,94%ofthevotes)andPP(with11,89%)doesnot allowCiUtogovernwiththesupportofthePPintheopposition.Itwasknownthat therewasapre-agreementbeyondPSC,ERCandICV-EUiAtogoverntogetherin case among them three they had enough votes for a qualified majority.One of the fundamental parts in the common agenda of the three parties is to approve anewEstatutthatwouldallowCataloniatofitinSpainandsolvetheproblemofthe fiscal deficit.The new Catalan law was approved by 90% of the Catalan Chamber, being only the 15 deputies of thePopular Party and Josep Piqu whovoted against. Before it would be valid though, it still needed to be approved by the Congress and the Senate, and then be submitted to referendum by the Catalan population.TheSpanishGovernmentpresentsanalternativetextthatcontainsmodificationsin half of the text, including the financial management and the definition of Catalonia as a nation.However,in2006theagreementtocontinuethereformoftheStatuteeven withtherelevantreservations-isreachedinLaMoncloabytheSpanishandCatalan mainpoliticalleaders.ERCistheonlypoliticalpartythatgavesupporttotheoriginal reform text in the Catalan Parliament and that strongly opposes this agreement, since it removed the recognition of the region as a nation in the articles of the text and leaves oneofthemainissuesthefinanceunsettled.PPalsorefusestheagreementfor very different reasons.The Deputies Congress finally approves the modified text in March 200620 and in may thetextpassaswellthroughtheSenate21.InJunethetextgoestoreferendumand only49.4%ofthecitizensgotovote,fromwhich73.9%voteyes.Afterfinallybeing

20The text passed the Deputies Congress with 54% of the votes in favor. (ERC, PP and Eusko Alkartasuna voting against and Chunta Aragonesista and Nafarroa Bai abstaining). 21 In the Senate only PP voted against and ERC opted for abstention this time.Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood17 implemented,theStatuteisthenpublishedintheStateLawofficialbulletinand immediately brought in front of the Constitutional Tribunal22. This process coincided with a situation of loss of legitimacy of this Tribunal; four of its members(includingthepresident)hadexpiredtheirmandatesandPPandPSOE couldnotagreeonthecorrectreplacements.ThisandthefactthattheTribunal Constitutional took more time than it was expected in emit a resolution created strong criticism from the Catalan politics and society.InJune2010,afterfouryearsofaverypoliticizedandmediatizeddeliberationand renovation of members, the Constitutional Tribunal declare unconstitutional fourteen of itsarticles,reinterprettwenty-sevenofthemandinvalidatethejuridicaldefinitionof CataloniaasaNation.Thesemodificationsaffectedthecoreaimsofthereform.As FerranRequejoexplainsit,noneofthefourprincipalobjectivesofthereformwere achieved: 1)TheformalandjudicialrecognitionofCataloniaasadifferentnational reality; 2) The protection of self-government under the constant invasions by the centralpowerduringthelastthirtyyears;3)thefixationofthebasesofa financial model that is equitative, rational and with a solidarity that is not based onthecurrentfiscalspoil();and4)theinstitutionalizationofbilateral relationsthatarepoliticallydecisiveforthefutureofthecountry.(Requejo, Despus de las elecciones , 2012) ThisSentence(andthepreviousyearsofdeliberationbytheTribunal)created unprecedentedsignsofcollectivemobilizationinthesocietyandisalsousedasan argument, by the political side, to consider the third way23 as extinct.We shall now examine the apparent reactions to this reform process from both sides, starting with the social mobilization, and then moving the political change of approach.

22 The Statute is taken in front of the Constitutional Tribunal first by the Partido Popular. Other recourses come from the CitizensDefender,thesocialistEnriqueMgica,autonomousgovernmentsofMurcia,Rioja,Aragon,Valenciaand Balear Islands. The reasons among them are really diverse but they all share the idea that Catalonia should not have any competence or self-governing right that could be among other autonomous regions.23 Third way is commonly used in Catalonia to express a federal-like option of increase of autonomy and recognition still within the Spanish State. It is seen as an alternative to the current situation, and to the possible secession of Catalonia from Spain.Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood18 2.2.2. Social mobilization Aswehaveseen,thesecessionistmovementbecamenotablewiththeprotestthat tookplacein2012,whichwasexplicitlydemandingindependencefromSpain. However,protestsandsocialmobilizationinpreviousyearsarealsorelevantsinceit made the nationalist claims a salient topic in within the Spanish reality and especially in the Catalan one-.Massivedemonstrationstookplaceduringtheperiod2006-2010and,havingmore or less participants and media coverage, they were all referring to the Statute.Plataforma pel Dret a Decidir (Proponents for the Right to Decide, from now on in the textasPDD)wascreatedattheendof2005withtheobjectiveofmakinga demonstration to claim that the Statute approved by the Catalan Parliament should be respected in its original form. The group was conformed by 700 entities, 58 municipal governments and more than 4000 individuals.ItwastheentityorganizingthefirstsprotestagainstthemodificationoftheStaturay text;-18th February 2006. Between125.000and700.000(dependingonthesource),slogan:SomunaNaci, tenimeldretadecidir(WeareaNation,wehavetherighttodecide).ThePDD organized itagainst the modification of the original Statute text. However, from all the Parliamentary Parties that gave support to the original Statute, only ERC gave support to the protest. Besides the difficulties that this supposed for the organization in regards of announcing the protest this still took place as planned and the PDD kept its objective of showing social rejection to the modification of the Catalan law.-1st December 2007.Between 200.000 and 700.000. Slogan: Som una naci i diem PROU! Tenim el dret de decidir sobre les nostres infraestructures (We are a Nation and we say enough! We have the right to decide about our infrastructures). Also organized by the PDD claiming the management of the own infrastructures as the original Statute claimed24. Afterthesetwoprotests,andduetointernaldivisionanddisagreementthatstarted regarding the referendum for the Statute, the PDD group lost some power. Still giving

24 The protest demanded the transfer of the transport system management to the autonomic government and requested the publication of the fiscal imbalances between the two levels. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood19 supportandcollaboratingwithnewevents,theboardofthePDDbecamepartofthe SecretaryoftheANC,eveniftheycontinueorganizingandcollaboratinginmany events as a separate entity. -Consultes Sobiranistes Catalan Independence Referendums (2009-2011)The so-called Consultes Sobiranistes are a series of non-binding referendums that took placein554differentlocalitiesofCataloniaaskingaboutthesupporttotheCatalan secession.Thereferendumswereorganizedbythecityhallofthespecifictownor village.The first Referendum took place in Arenys de Munt in an unprecedented decision from theboardofavillagehall,whichdecidedthatwouldmakeapopularconsultationon the issue. The first, therefore, took place the 13th of September 2009, with the specific question:Doyouagreeon Catalonia becomingan independent, democratic and social constitutional state, integrated in the European Union? Thepopularnon-bindingconsultationstookplacebetween2009and2011;atotalof 884,508 people voted in 554 different localities. The results were 91.74% in favor.mnium Cultural, another association that defends the Catalan culture and language, createdclandestinelyin1961andorganizerofagreatnumberofactionssincethen, advocatingforsurvivalandrespecttowardstheculturaldistinctivenessthat characterizesCatalonia.Thisentity,withabout50.000members,calledfora mobilization after the Sentence of the Tribunal. -10 July 2010Between1.1and1.5million.Slogan: SomunaNaci,Nosaltresdecidim. (WeareaNation,wedecide).Withthe supportofallpoliticalpartiesinthe Parliament,besidesPPandCs (Ciutadans).Organizedbymnium CulturalagainsttheSentenceofthe Constitutional Tribunal on the Statute. During the well-attended consultation, that had high attendance, a group of people met withtheintentionof creatinganewCivilSocietygroup thatcouldunite the,untilthen Protest against the Sentence of the Constitutional Tribunal; 10th July 2010.Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood20 divided,independencesupportersaroundthecommunity;theAssembleaNacional Catalana(CatalanNationalAssembly,fromnowonANC).Still,theprocessof construction of the entity took some time, and it was not officially constituted until 2011.InApril2011,1.500peoplemetintheNationalConferencefortheOwnStateto choose the Permanent Council members of what would become the ANC. Conference attendees discussed reasons regarding the need of a Catalan State. Finally, the entity was constituted on May 2011, followed by the Constituent Assembly in March 2012 in which the Statutes of the entity were approved. The Assembly is organized in territorial assemblies in regions and sectors.They called for a protest in Barcelona on the national day; this time, leaving ambiguities behind: the slogan would be Catalonia, next state in Europe -11 September 2012 Between 1.5 and 2 million participants25. Slogan: Cataunya, Nou Estat dEuropa In March 2013 the association had around 27,000 members while, in January 2015 the number of members already exceed the 80,000. Since then, including many members fromothersecessionistassemblies,theyhaveorganizedtheprotestsofthenext nationaldays,neverwithaturnoutlowerthanonemillion(independentlyofthe source).-11 September 2013TheViaCatalana(Catalanwaytowardsindependence)wasa480Kmhumanchain uniting the north and the south of Catalonia, following the ancient Via Augusta from Le Perthus to Alcanar. TheANCorganizedtheeventandtheCataloniasDepartmentofInteriorestimates that there were 1.6 million participants.

25 The Guardia Civil (Spanish State Police) presented after the protest that the number of participants were somewhere around 1.5 million (ANC was claiming they reached the 2 million). After a while, seeing the consequent attention to the Catalan case,the Spanish Government delegation in Catalonia lowered the official number to 600.000. Catalan way towards Independence, on 2013. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood21 -11 September 2014 Demonstrationcreatingahumanmosaic withtheCatalanflagalongtwomain streets of Barcelona. The slogan was Ara s lhora (Now is the time) and according totheSpanishStatePolice,therewere 1.8 million participants.-9 November 2014TheIndependenceReferendumthattookplaceon9Novemberof2014was unconstitutional and non-binding. The number of participants was, officially, 2,305,290 and the support to secession was up to 80%. Human mosaic for Independence, on 2014 Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood22 2.2.3. Political Mobilization AfewmonthsaftertheSentencetotheStatute and the big social demonstration in July 2010 there were,inNovember2010,electionstotheCatalan Parliament.CiUgainedthepowerofthe Parliamentwith62seats.Theachievementofa fiscalpactwasamainobjectiveofitselectoral program.Oneyearlater,inNovember2011there weregeneralelectionsintheSpanishlevel,in whichtheconservativepartyPPgainedthe majorityofdeputiesandofsenators;establishing Mariano Rajoy as the Prime Minister of Spain. The consequences of the centralist ruling in the center-periphery structure of Spain26 are, according to big partoftheCatalansociety,menacetopluralism anddiversity.Thepolemicsdidnottakelong time to arrive; already in 2012, the proposition of a new educationallaw(LOMCE27)impulsebythenew MinisterofEducation,JosIgnacioWert,had strongrepercussionsinboththesocietyand political level. This law, normally referred to as the Ley Wert (Werts Law), establishes Spanish as the driving language of the education system as well in Catalonia, breaking with the system of Catalan education that the democratic transition achieved 30 years ago. The Central Government, according to this law, will now decide on the content and the hours of impartation of all core subjects (between 65% and 75% of all the courses). In Catalonia, the language of Catalan (whichwas until then also a coresubject)ischangedtoaspecializationsubject,atthesamelevelasphysical education. Thislawreceivedsignificantcriticism from thesocialandpoliticalspheres, not only in Catalonia but in the whole Spain.After the social pressure in form of demonstrations and the general negative by the PP central government to further negotiate any fiscal pact (which was a main point for the

26 When referring to the center-periphery issue, this study means the current institutional and politic system in which there is decentralization in form of transfer of consequences, but in which there is as well a marked center with its capital in Madrid.27LOMCE: Ley Orgnica para la Mejora de la Qualidad Educativa (Organic Law for the Improvement of the Quality of Education) Popularsentencecriticizingthe educationlaw.FrancohaWerto referringtothehistoricalsentenceof Francohamuerto(Francohasdied) butwiththenameofthenew minister,makingitsoundlikeFranco ha vuelto (Franco is back). (Pblico.es) Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood23 ArturMasterm)theCatalanpresidentcallforelectionsinordertodeterminefuture directions.Theelectionstookplaceon25ofNovemberof2012andtheysawthe highest voter turnout ever in Catalan regional elections (almost 70%) since the return of the democracy.UnexpectedlyforMas,hispartylost12seats(comparedtothepreviouselectionsin 2010) and was led far away from the qualified majority. The results were: Convergncia iUnio(CiU)won50seats28,followedbytheleft-wingseparatistpartyEsquerra Republicana with 21 seats. It is relevant to remark that ERC (openly secessionist party) jumped11seatsahead,comparedtotheelectionsof2010.Thethirdpowerwasthe Socialist Party, which favors a federal Spain and came in with 20 seats (down from 28). Finally, it is important to remark that a new extreme left and independentist party CUP (which was created not long ago) won three seats.Two main axis determined the results of this elections: first, the center-periphery issue (nationalism and referenda) and secondly, the effects of the economic crisis.Intermsofthecenter-periphery,theindependenceissuedominatedthiselection.In total,theshareinthenewelectedparliamentthatfavorstherighttodecideon secession from Spain (explicitly advocating for a referendum on Catalonias secession in this term) is nearly two-thirds of the Political institution with 87 seats, while the other 48areagainstthepublicconsultation.Thepopulationsupportforareferendum becamecrystalclear;beingthereductionofthesupporttoCiUcontrarestedbythe increase of the support to other even more radically secessionist parties (such as ERC or Cup).In terms of economic crisis, it is normally regarded in political science, according to the economic vote, that governments will be reelected during periods of growth and see their support lowing in times of crisis. In decentralized countries like Spain, in which we can findmultilevelgovernance,itissometimescomplicate forthepopulationtojudge andattributetherightshareofresponsibilitytoeachofthesegoverninglevels. According to the coattail effect, this means that actions on one level affect the results on the other. In this case, individual perceptions of the Spanish Governments actions (the central level) determine the electoral results in Catalonia (the autonomic level).

28 Out of a total of 135 seats in the Catalan Parliament (68 would be the required for a Majority), Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood24 A study from ICPS reveals that, even though the effect of economic voting is seen in theautonomicelectionsof2010,theelectionsof2012donotshowthesame.This, takinginaccounttheimportanceofthecoattaileffectidentifiestwogroupsinthe voters:thosewhoattributeallormostoftheresponsibilityforthecrisistothecentral government (57% of the total) and those who consider the Generalitat as responsible in more or less extent (26%). Within the first group, the grave perception of the economic situation in Spain it rather encouraged the vote to CiU. Indeed, the bad valuation of the economicsituationandtheattributionoftheresponsibilitytothecentralgovernment generatedamajortendencytovoteCiU.Contrary,fromthegroupthatblamesthe CatalanGovernmentfortheeffectsofthecrisiswedocanobserveapatternof economic vote. This group of people indeed reduced their support to CiU (the ruling force) and punished it by increasing the vote of the opposition. (Orriols & Bosch, 2013) Aftertheelectionsof2012,themainParliamentarypartiesstartedimplementing measurestowardsthepossibilityofdoingaReferendum,aspromisedduringthe electoral campaign. In addition, CiU implemented policies to prepare the country for a possible secession.Thisstrategyhasinvolveddifferentactions.Theseincludemobilizationofacademic appointeesinaCommitteecalledConsellAssessorperalaTransiciNacional (Advisory Council for the National Transition), which offers expertise knowledge in the process. It also includes mobilization of many of its commercial and diplomatic offices abroad to implement what is referred to as externalization strategy29. (Bourne, 2014) ThoughthisjourneyinCatalanregionalism,autonomism,andnationalismitis importanttoremarkthatthroughhistoryCatalanpoliticalactorshavedemanded severalreformsinwithintheSpanishstate,ratherthandemandingsecessionfromit. However, most of the intents failed and the claims have persisted over time.Sorenscreatedadatabaseof283nationalminoritiesaroundtheworldandidentified that only approximately 38% of them claim further territorial decentralization. While the other national minorities have a sense of national identity different from that of its state, theydonotpushforfurtherautonomy.Catalansareamongthosenationalminorities who push for decentralization and, in contrast with almost every other sub-state entity,

29 Other acts are also regarded as part of this approach: a letter sent by the Catalan government to all EU heads of state (and to the EU Commission, as well) exposing the domestic support for independence and requesting official support for a peaceful, democratic and transparent referendum, or the allusion to the goal of statehood from the President Mas when visiting EU institutions or foreign states. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood25 arecharacterizedbytheirpersistenceovertime.(Sorens,Secessionism:Identity, Interest, and Strategy, 2012).Spain,likemanyothercountries,haspersistedintheobjectiveofassimilatingits minorities.However,differentlythanintheFrenchcase,forexample,Spanish strategieshavemostlyfailedandthesub-statesnationalitieshavesurviveduntil nowadays.However,weshouldnoticethatSpaindidsucceedinsomecases;the community of Valencia classically belonging to the territories where Catalan language is predominant shows now strong Spanish identification and support to the countrys unity.We see that Catalan regionalism is historical and persistent in its demands. It has been shownhowsocialsupportforthismovementincreasesduringperiodswithcentralist tendencies or in contexts that increase feelings of discrimination. By presenting the recent events in a chronological order, we get a clearer idea of the possible motivations that led each of the separatist representations to exist.Inthesocialaspect,modificationoftheStatutetext(whichwasapprovedbythe CatalanParliamentin2005)causedthemobilization.However,thismovement presenteditselfwithallitsstrengthonlyaftertheSentenceoftheTribunal Constitutionalwiththeprotestofmorethanonemillionpeople.Inaddition,afterthe creation of the ANC this mobilization shows consistency and unity, increasing then the support from the society and the pressure that this movement could have in the political sphere.Regarding the political change, and according to the chronological order of the events, one can say that this one follows the previous social mobilization. It is remarkable how theautonomicgovernment(andspecificallyCiU)didnotgivesupporttothefirst mobilizationsandchangedtheirobjectivesonlyafterthegreatestmobilizations occurred. In addition, one of the consequences of these social representations was the appearanceofnewsocialmovementsandnewpoliticalpartiesthatadvocatedfor independence (some of the political parties getting Parliamentary representation; such as SI in 2010 or CUP in 2012). These new entities were competition for the ruling party; theirlossofsitsin2012electionscametogetherwithanalmostproportional achievementofsitsofotherpartiesthathadbeenalreadyadvocatingforsecession since before them (ERC and CUP).Afterseeingtheorderofeventsandhavingnowanideaoftheircausesand consequencesweshouldnowlookatthetheoriesthatcanhelpusunderstandthe Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood26 cognitiveprocessesthatledtheseoccurrencestocreatesuchanimportant mobilization.Howdidsocietyinterpretthesedifferenteventsand,throughtheir perceptions, which reasons drove big part of this community to claim for independence; thatistoparticipateinthesocialmovementandtogiveelectoralsupportto secessionist parties.3.TheoriesThenextchapterwillfocusonthetheoriesofsecessionistmovements,andwillpay specialattentiontothescholarshipthatcanteachusabouttheircausesand motivations.Thistheoreticalbackgroundwillbethenappliedtotheriseof secessionisminCatalonia,tryingtopresentaninsightonhowthedescribedevents (both the historic and the recent ones) are perceived by individuals. These perceptions are key facts in order to answer the main question of the causes driving to secessionist support.3.1. General Scholarship In general terms, we could divide the classic reasons for secessionism in cultural and politicalidentityreasonsinoneside(orvalue-basedelements),andinterest; instrumentalormaterialreasonsintheotherside(interest-driven).Whilefirst approaches to the secessionist movements placed special attention to identity aspects, somemorerecentonesfocusontheexistenceofinstrumentalintereststhatcanas well determine the support for secession.-Identity (Value-based) Studies that point at national identity as the main determinant of support for sovereignty canbefoundinmanysub-statenationalismssuchasScotland(McCroneiPaterson, 2002),Catalunya(SerranoBalaguer2010),BasqueCountry(Costa-FontiTremosa-Balcells2006)andQuebec.Someofthemarguethatnationalidentityisalong-term politicalattitude,stableandnoteasytochange,andthereforeunabletoexplain detectedshort-termchangesinthelevelofsupportforanationalsecession.(Howe 1998,BlaisiNadeau1992).However,otherscontestthatshortandmiddleterm changed in identity can occur in certain circumstances. (Hierro Hernndez, 2010) The notion of dual-identity societies is crucial to this analysis. Some authors use this term to explain the self-identification systems that can be found in communities, which Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood27 forhistoricalorotherreasons,havetwoormorenon-exclusiveidentities.Thiswould meanthatthedifferentculturalornationalexpressionscohabitinamoreorless definedcommunity,andthatsomeofitsindividualsmayholdmorethanoneself-identification. The recognition of these realities, as well as the relations between them will then depend on the current system prevailing in the society. These structures can find disagreement among the community and then be a possible motivation for a group to claim secession from the community. Inthissense,wecanidentifyacommunityasaminoritynationif thiscommunityhas two main characteristics; first, it has historic, cultural and linguistic peculiarities that differentiate the community living in a more or less defined territory to other communities living next to it. Secondly, it should be a group that had demanded, andwhichisstillisdemanding,itsownpoliticalstatusandsomekindofself-government.(Requejo,Federalisme,DescentralitzaciiPluralismeNacional. TeoraPolticaiAnlisiComparada.,2007).Inthisgeneralconception,the demandsofpoliticalstatusandself-governingcompetences(beingornot secession claims) are related to the first aspect, the cultural characteristics that represent a difference with the state in which this community is found.Keating introduces the concept of Post-sovereignty to give explanation to many current regionalistmovements.Whilenationalismhasbeenclassicallyunderstoodas movementthatdemandssecessionism,wecanseethat,nowadays,mostofthe demandsthatcomefromnationalistmovementareautonomist,andsecessionist claims are rather rare. (Keating, 2012)Thisnewconceptionofsovereigntydoesnotunderstandthesovereignpoweras absolute,but ratherasarelationship.He thereforeexplainsthatnationalities foundin UnitedKingdom,inSpain,oreveninCanadaandBelgiumarenotdeterminedby culture, religion, or by different ways of life. Actually, the social values in these societies donotseemtodivergebutratherconverge,andlanguagemattersarenormally managed in a non-conflictual way (applying bilingual systems, for example). According to his view, the main question regarding these regionalisms is to define the boundaries of a political community, by claiming a normative terrain that is normally already taken bythestate.Thesedecentralizationclaimswouldfindtheirsolutioninconstitutional plurality and respect for asymmetry, even though this system seems to be contrary to theactualideaofsovereigntythatmostnation-statesstillhave.(Keating,2012)By showinghowmanycurrentnationalistmovementsdoproposethirdways Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood28 (Independence-Lite and Devolution Max) Keating explains how the classical concept of self-determination could be nowadays understood as: Therighttonegotiateonespositionwithinthestateandinternationalorder rather than as limited secession. (Keating, 2012, pg. 15) Thispossibleexplanationisinthisstudyunderstoodasvalue-based,sincetheclaim forapoliticalpowerseemstofollowanelementofrecognition.Thedefinitionofthe boundaries of the political community is normally claimed with the basis of a differential identity. -Instrumental (interest-driven) Inregardsoftheinstrumentalelements(interest-basedaspects),theycouldleada segmentofthepopulationtoincreasetheirsupporttowardsindependence,andone canfindmanyliteratureexploringdifferentaspectsofthiseffect.Ingeneral,this scholarship establishes a relation between practical considerations such as the level of developmentofthespecificregioncomparingtothestate,andthelevelof secessionism. (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2011) (Sorens, Globalization secessionism, and autonomy,2004).Thispartofthescholarsuggestthatpopulationwillsupportthe secession of their region if they evaluate it as beneficial to their material interests. ThereareevidenceinsomeresearchesandliteraturefromtheQuebeccaseofthe importanceoftheseinterestsinthepoliticalpreferenceofthepopulation.(Blaisetal. 1995, Howe 1998, Mendelsohn 2003 , Blanger i Perrella 2007, Blais i Nadeau, 1992). In contrast, some researches made in the Basque Country case did not manage to find a clear effect between the economic interests and the support to the independence.These practicalinterestsareofcourseextremelydeterminedbytheperceptionof the current situation and the perception of the hypothetic future situation. In this sense, the secessionismclaimswillincreaseifonehasanegativeperceptionofhowthecentral authorityisaffectingtheownpersonalinterests.Logically,ifthenon-respectofthe individualsinterestsisblamedontheautonomicorregionalgovernmentthenthe centralist demands can increase. Someauthorsclaimthattherecanbeanendogenousrelationbetweenthesetwo elements,sincetheevaluationsdoneintheinstrumentalsidecanberationalized Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood29 accordingtotheself-recognitionpreference.Therefore,somewouldsaythatthe research made on the effects of the economical aspirations may have a limited liability. Otherargumentsforquestioningtheeffectsonpreviousliteratureincludethe uncertaintyoftheeconomicconsequencesofsecession,thecomplexityinthe cognitive processes, and the ambiguity of the influences in the field. Many authors working on the specific case of Quebec call to attention the importance of the role of intermediary agents like political parties, leaders and political discourse in general.Theyarguethatduetotheuncertaintyandlackofinformationofthe consequencesofahypotheticsecession,citizensoptforheuristicmechanismswhen tryingtoarrivetoapersonalchoice.Thispoliticaldiscoursewouldconsistonan importantsourceofinformationtosolvethedifficultiesintheevaluationofpossible costs and benefits of a political separation. (Snideman, Brody, & Philip , 1991) A third elementwe addto these two general ones is thePossibility (or Opportunity). The viability of the independence from the current political entity is, as I consider, a key determinant for the support to the secession. In a system where secession is seen as impossibletheclaimswillbedifferent,pointingatwhatisviable:forexample,more autonomy or more competences. This is especially relevant when it comes to important socialorpoliticalmovements,whichwillmostlikelynotdemandwhatisseenas impossible to get. Rather, they will focus their claims in something seen as achievable. Thiselementcannotbeconsideredacauseforpro-secessionisminitsownbut, combinedwithanyofthetwopresentedcauses;itcanbeakeypointindetermining the creation and growth of a social or political movement. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood30 3.2. The Catalan case 3.2.1. Identity (value-based) In applying the general scholarship to the Catalan case, we see that the region fits the characteristics proposed by Requejo to define a minority nation; the cultural difference exists and the claims for more self-governing have been present for several centuries now. Also,regardingtheconceptofpost-sovereigntyitcomesprettyclearinsightthatthe studied movement has made use normally of the right to self-determination as the right tonegotiateonespositioninwithinthestate,ratherthanpresentingitindemandof secession.(Keating,2012,pg.15)This,ofcourse,canbeappliedtomostof Catalans history, but does not seem to be the case in the current movement. As it has been argued by part of the scholarship, the concept of dual identity is useful tounderstandtheethno-territorialrealityinSpain.Thisdualidentityissupposedto havechangingnaturethatdependsoncontextualaspects.Indeed,anegative perceptionofthepoliticalactsofthecentralgovernmentwouldincreaseafeelingof regional identity and, therefore, decrease the state-level identification. (Moreno, Arriba, &Serrano,1997).Thiswilldefinitelyhavedirectimpactinthelevelofsupportofa referendum.Even if national identity is commonly considered a long-term attitude (which could not explain this short-term increase) there is research that suggests, by exploring surveys intheCatalancase,thattherecanbeshort-ormiddle-runchangesinthenational identity. (Hierro Hernndez, 2010) Specifically, the author observes in surveys how the results on the question if you feel more Spanish than Catalan, or the opposite or both at the same level, saw strong changes in the period 2000-2005. Others scholars agree, "The life of the Catalan is an act of continuous affirmation [...] It is because of this that the defining element of the Catalan psychology is not reason, as for the French; metaphysics, as for the Germans; empiricism, as for the English; intelligence, as for the Italians; or mysticism, as for the Castilians. In Catalonia, the primary feature is the desire to be." Jaume Vicens Vives, Catalan historian Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood31 arguing that during the ruling of the right-centralist Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), withthedecreaseofcompetencesandtheincreaseofcentralizationtoMadrid,the Catalan identity increased among the population30. This strong tendency noticed since 2000stoppedwhenintheelectionsof2004thePartidoSocialistaObreroEspaol (Spanish Workers Socialist Party, PSOE) won and the centralization tendency reduced again.Indeed, we can see evidence in Catalonia suggesting that individual perception of the recognitionoftheircommunitycharacteristicswillradicalizetheirownidentification system,movingthesevalue-basedelementstowardsthewillofmoreautonomyor even total independence. In this sense, as we have seen in the last chapter, the ruling ofthecentralistPPstartedin2011,afterthepolemicsentenceoftheConstitutional Tribunal.Thepoliciesimplementedbytheparty,andespeciallytheeducationWerts law, could have as well a similar effect as the studied by Hierro.Many authors emphasize the historical dimension of the Catalan autonomist claims, as being extremely relevant to explain the new rise of secessionism. Toni Rodon suggests thatCatalansfindthemselvesatacriticaljuncturethatinteractswithantecedent conditions(thesearefailureofnation-statebuilding,economicdifferencesamongthe two regions and the long-periods of military occupation during history) and that makes Catalannationalismemerge.HeexplainsthatCatalandemandsemergedduringthe severalcriticaljuncturesthatCataloniasawduringthehistory.Theseprocesses shapedthehistoricalclaimsofCatalanism:demandingahigherdemocracy(and opennesstoEurope),moreeconomicmodernizationandaplurinationalState.The author therefore claims that the failure in the reform of the Statute had strong effects in thispermanentCatalandemand,sinceitgaveevidencethatthelastdemand(fora plurinationalstatethatrecognizesCataloniasidentity)wasnotgoingtobeachieved. The polemic reform, together with several Spanish governmental acts that marked the period,encouragedtheincreaseofthefeelingthatCatalanaspirationsdonotfitthe Spanish reality. (Rodon T. , 2012) Lndez supports the thesis that the secessionist social movement increases as the part ofthepopulationwhofeelsmoreCatalanthanSpanishgrows.Bycomparingthe tendenciesofthesupporttoindependenceandthelevelofCatalanself-identification she identified a converging tendency that leads to the argument that the increase of the

30 This does not affect only people who turn to feel more Catalan than both the same, but also people who were before feeling predominantly Spanish and then claim to identify with both at a similar level. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood32 secessionistwillisduetoanincreaseofCatalanself-identification.(LndezBorrs, 2013, pg. 108) Theconclusionextractedfromtheconcretestudiesregardingidentityisthatself-identificationwiththesub-staterealityishighlydeterminedbytheperceptionofthe currentsituation.Onesopinionofeachoftheexistinglevelsofgovernancewillhave effectsonpersonalself-recognitionespeciallyinsocietieswithasenseofdual identity. When applying these reflections to the Catalan history we see evidence that seems to be consistent. Referring to the old history, we can see that the Catalan Renaixena started during the centralizedperiodthatwentfromthemonarchrestorationtotheFirstSpanish Republic.Wecanseeaswellhowthemovementdemandingautonomyand recognition came with stronger power after the dictatorial regimes.Regarding contemporary history: Hierro shows how according to the data provided by surveys-theCatalanidentificationincreasedduringthecentralisttermofJosMara Aznar former leader of the PP- and stabilized later with the triumph of the Socialists. (Hierro Hernndez, 2010) Lndezfollowbypresentinghowtheincreaseofthissub-stateidentityseemsto converge with the increase of the social movement in the recent years. (Lndez Borrs, 2013) Therefore, as many voices say,it is plausible thatthe highly polemicized Sentence of theTribunalConstitutional,followedbythestartoftherulingofthePPin2011, followed again by homogenization or centralization policies (like the educational law for Catalonia)madeonceagainthemovementappearwithforce.Theseeventsmight haveincreasedtheperceptionofmenacetotheCatalanidentityfromtheSpanish Stateand,therefore,beinginadual-identitysociety,thishadeffectsontheself-recognition of the individuals on this axis of identity. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood33 3.2.2. Instrumentalism (Interest-driven) According to the general scholarship the studied case could be seen as the developed part of a country that, in periods of crisis, demands secession to see their standard of livingincrease.Thisargumentcould,indeed,fittheCatalancase,sincethestrong effectsofthecrisis(especiallyintermsofunemployment)camejustbeforeitsown secessionmovement.Indeedsomescholarssuggestthatthesenewconjectural nationaliststhatgivenowsupporttosecessionaremotivatedbytheideaofabetter economic situation in an independent Catalonia. Adata-basedreportbytheCentredEstudisdOpinisuggeststhatwecandivide between the share who hold strong preference (who are mostly driven by identity) and those of weak preference (who can be more influenced by instrumental reasons due to their soft identity). (Muoz & Tormos, 2012) Duetotheanalysisofthesurveysdoneuntil2011theseauthorsdeterminethat, besides nationalism, instrumental and specifically economic reasons have strong effect oversecessionistpreferencefromindividuals.Thesurveyscontaintwoquestions regardingindependence:first,howwouldyouvoteincaseofareferendum(Yes/No) and, secondly, which would be the ideal political situation of Catalonia (a region within Spain/anAutonomousCommunity/astatewithinaFederalSpain/anindependent State). The difference between the number of people who vote yes in the first question and independent state in the second is always significant. The study reveals that only 55%ofsupportersofindependencewouldactuallychoosetheindependenceoption when the federal option is also given. This suggests that the sector that claimed to be in favor of independence but yet would prefer a federal state are holders of a malleable preference and are easily influenced by instrumental and economic forces. This would make possible an alteration of support for secession, by influencing their approach for the possible consequences of independence. (Muoz & Tormos, 2012) Evidenceofthistendencycanalsobefoundinthehistoryoftheregion:theGuerra delsSegadors,orCatalanrevoltisgenerallylinkedtothefinancialexploitationthat CataloniawasexperiencingduetothecontinuouswarbetweentheCrownofCastile and the Kingdom of France.Many scholars point out that in recent history, the failure to reach a fiscal pact, together withthestrongeffectsofthecrisisandaperceptionofunjustfiscaltransferswith Spain,arethemaininterest-drivenelementsthatincreasesupporttosecession. Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood34 Therefore,afterthefinalrejectionofthefiscalpurposefromtheCatalanside,which wasincludedintheunconstitutionalpartoftheStatute,thesecessionistmovement experiencedthebiggestincreasebothatthesociallevelandatthepoliticallevel through early elections and change in political objectives. In this case, it cannot be all linkedtothefiscalpact,butrathertotheperceptionoftheeconomicsituationthat comeswithit.Indeed,surveysshowhow38%ofthetotalpeoplesurveyedthinkthat thelivingstandardsofCatalanswouldincreasewithsecession.(Centred'Estudis d'Opini , 2013) However,asKeatingsuggests,citizensinmoredevelopedregionsfavormore autonomyfortheirregionbut,accordingtoopinionpollsofCISinSpain,theyprefer servicestandardsandentitlements tobe thesamethrough thewholestate.(Keating, 2012) Previousscholarshipsuggeststhatbothsetsofcausesaredynamic.Theindividual perceptionofthecontextcanmodifyboththelevelofnationalism(orvalue-based reasons)andtheviewoftheinstrumentalself-interestsofahypotheticalsecession (interest-driven reasons). In the first case, the feeling of belonging to the state or to the sub-statecommunitycanchangedependingontheperceptionthattheindividualhas ofthesetworealities.Thisincludesperceptionsofrespectordisrespectforthe individuals national identity, and perceptions of cultural imposition by that of the state. In the second group, of course, the view of the self-interest of a possible secession is largelydeterminedbytheinformationthattheindividualhasabouttheexpected consequencesofsecession.Thecontentsofthisinformationanditssourcesmay change over time, leading to modification of the material reasons for secession.Itisnecessarytoacknowledgethatthetwosetsofreasonsarenotindependentand exclusive; they can also influence one another. For example, a positive perception of a hypotheticalsecessionmaystimulatethesub-stateidentityandincreasethe nationalistic feelingthatleadto secessionistwill.Intheotherwayaroundaswell;the levelofnationalismmightinfluencetheperceptionthatindividualshaveaboutthe material interests of independence.ItissuggestedbyLndezthattheincreaseofsecessionistdemandsshowsthe disagreementofthepopulationaboutthecurrentpoliticalsituation.Inthissense,the growingsharesecessionismsupportinCataloniaanalyzedhereasasocial movementandnotasapoliticaldiscourseexpresstherejectionofpartofthe Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood35 populationaboutthecenter-peripheryrelationinSpain.andadvocateforasocial changethatinthiscaseisCataloniasindependence.(LndezBorrs,2013)This rejection to the current situation can be led by identity or by interest aspects but, in any case,asecessionistmovementwiththesecharacteristicswouldbedifficulttooccur when most of the population agrees with the system.Thefactsthatareunderstoodascausesforboththeincreaseofthenationalidentity andthegrowingofmaterialinterestsarerelevant,asitistheinformationthat individuals get about them.Indeed,theperceptionthatpeoplehaveonanissuedependsupontheinformation given about it; this information strongly influences the perception of the individual and, thereforehisorherpositionontheissue.Inthissense,analyzingthediscoursethat someofthecitizenssourcesofinformationpresentisofmajorimportance.These intermediaryactorsareimportantentitiesinthetransferofeffectsfromthesocial sphere to the political one, and the other way around.

3.2.3. Possibility Finally,thethirdproposedaspectcomesintoplaywhenanyofthetwopreviously explained reasons emerge. Being as the national identification and the perception of howmuchitisrespected,ortheindividualinterests(andtheperceptionoftheir satisfactionwithinoroutsidethestate)iswhatdrivestosupportsecession movement,thissupportwillonlymaterializeinanimportantsocialorpolitical movementiftheelementofpossibilityorviabilityisaswellpresent.Thismeans,in order to see an important mobilization with a specific objective, thisobjective needs to beseenaspossiblebythepeoplewhoarepartofsuchmobilization.Ifwhatis considered possible is the increase of autonomy, the further negotiation or the adoption ofadifferentfiscalplan,peoplewilladvocateforthatwhenanyofthetwoelements drivethemtodoso.Indeed,ifthepossibilityofindependenceisseenasunrealistic, people will advocate for what they think can be achieved; in the Catalan case, this was, historically, autonomy. Theimportantproteststhattookplaceinthepast(forexample,the1977)demanded freedom,amnestyandStatuteofAutonomy;threespecificobjectivesthatwere eventuallyachieved.Atthesametime,thehistoricaldemonstrationswithgenuine Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood36 secession demands existed as well in the past but with low numbers of participants, in comparison with the autonomists. The reasons that drove these people to protest can besimilartothecurrentonesperceptionofidentityandperceptionofinterests however, the demands seem to be on a much lower level.Lookingatrecenthistory,themobilizationsof2006and2007andaftertheTribunal Sentencein2010hadaclearclaimofrighttodecide.Theydemandedtohavethe finalsayabouttheirowninstitutions, theirownself-definitionand recognition,and the self-managementoftheirownfinancialsources.Thissloganhasbeenpresentthe mostimportantproteststhathappenedduringtheyearsinwhichtheConstitutional Tribunal was about to emit a Sentence and in the massive protest after the Sentence came up in 2010. It can be understood as the right to choose the own institutions and a self-definition for the belonging community and it can also be understood as the right to decide the secession, if desired by the population. Indeed, I consider crucial to remark howthemobilizationshappeningatthebeginningoftheprocessclaimedself-governanceandrecognition.Eveniftheindependencedemandscouldalreadybe heard in the mobilizations, they did not consist in the primary and official claim.Inthepoliticalsphere,revisingtheelectoralprograms,wecanseethatCiU,inthe elections that happened short after the big demonstration of July 2010, stated as well the right to decide. It did not, however, recognize the objective of secession.Finally, in 2012 we can see the final step in the escalation of demands; Independence fromSpain,aStateforCatalonia.Theydidnotdemandanationbecausethe Catalanism has always considered that Catalonia is already a nation and, in any case, it only demanded the recognition of such. In this case, the difference is the demand of apoliticalstructureofNation-State.Therewasnoambiguitywhatsoever; the slogan of the protest was: Catalonia, next state in Europe.In this last case, and linking it to the possibilityelement, it is widely argued by people belonging to the process that demands for independence have become important when thecentralgovernmentmadeplainthefactthatself-governanceandtherightto decidewerenotintheSpanishagenda.Indeed,whatCatalanscalledthethirdway has been considered exhausted after the rejection of the Statute; denial of the status of nation and denial of the fiscal pact.However,itcanalsobearguedthatnotonlythepreviousclaimisseennowas impossible but that the new objective is now seen as more viable. As illogical as it may seemtoask forsecessionfromaStatethatrefusestorecognizeyourcharacteristics Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood37 as a nation, it may be argued that the last protests were not a demand for the central government, but rather a call of attention to the international order. 4.The (possible) drivers Thisstudyaimstoshowthepossiblecausesthatmotivatedthesocialandpolitical movementandacknowledgingthatthesereasonsarestronglydeterminedby perceptionsofthereality(whichisinturnaffectedbyavailableinformationandits source). Therefore, I intend to examine the reasons that these intermediary actors offer in their discourses. Due to the limited scope of time and space of this work, however, theanalysishastobelimitedtofewintermediaryactors.Isforthisreasonthatitwill select what we consider the most important entity in each of the two spheres. To select themostrelevantAssociationinthesocialmobilizationwewillusethecriteriaofthe numberofpeoplewhoismemberoftheentityandthenumberofpeoplewhoare mobilizedandparticipateintheiractions,evenwhennotbeingmember;Assemblea Nacional Catalana.Inthepoliticalsphere,inaneasierway,wewillconsiderthemostrelevantactorthe one that, being separatist from Spain, receives more electoral support; CiU. 4.1.Role of intermediary actors 4.1.1. Framing Framingisakeyconceptintheoriesofcommunication,butitalsohasrelevancein many various fields such as mathematics, economics, political science, psychology and manyothers.Framingisnormallyunderstoodasthecognitiveframeworkthatmedia andotherimportantpublicentitieselaborate regardingaspecifictopic. Thisapproach tothesubjectimpliesthatpublicopinioncreatessomeconceptualbonds,and Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood38 dismissesothers,whenreferringtothespecificinquestion.(Fernndez-i-Marn& Lpez, 2010). Entman gives a clear definition of frames and framing:To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salientinacommunicatingcontext,insuchawayastopromoteaparticular problemdefinition,causalinterpretation,moralevaluation,and/ortreatment recommendation for the item described. (Entman, 1993, pg. 52).Therefore, framing not only determines what the most important problems are, but also definesthem:determinetheactions,thecostsofbenefitsofthem,diagnosesthe causes, make moral judgments and can also suggest remedies. Gamsonpointstwomainelementsinframes,whicharetheirattributeofbuilding significance and meaning in one side, and the orientation towards a social mobilization. (Gamson, 1992) Theframingprocesshasstrongeffectsoverindividualandcollectivechoices.The frame in which a particular gets the information about a specific reality will have strong influences in the perception that this particular will create on that reality and, therefore, will also affect her or his decision on that issue.The Nobel Price Kahneman distinguishes two modes of cognitive function when taking adecision.ThefirstmodeiscalledIntuitive.Itconsistsindecisionsmadealmost automatically due to an impression that would rapidly appear without effort. The second type is known as Rational; it consists in deliberate and slower decision-making. These twodifferentmodeshaveasanoutcomeimpressionsandjudgmentsrespectively (Kahneman, 2002). The first type of cognitive function is difficult to change or to control while the rational choice is more flexible and might differ depending on the information we use to decide logically. (Stanovich & West, 2000) Whencollectinginformationinordertotakearationaldecision,itisclassically understood that most individuals will use as a source one of the most available to them. Taking in account the effects of framing, the accessibility of the sources of information is a relevant element in collective choices. Accessibility can be as well understood as the level of ease in which some particular thoughtscometomind(followingintuition).Salience,selectiveattentionandpriming will determine this. In this sense, highly accessible features will have a bigger impact in the decisions taken by individuals. In this sense, the features that are highly accessible will have a bigger impact in the decisions taken by individuals. In a contrary way, some Ginesta Mir Ezquerra | From Nationalism to Satehood39 featuresthatarenotaccessibleforindividualswillbelargelyignored.Ofcourse,this presentstheproblemthatthemostaccessiblefeaturesarenotalwaysthemost important for making a rational decision. (Kahneman, 2002) Many studies on framing have their focus on the tools that certain public actors have to elaborate a specific frame, and also on the effects of it on society. However, there are fewer studies- even if increasing- that point to the individual psychological mechanisms thatactivateduringthisprocess,theirworkingprocessesandeffects.Forexample, new research has recognized that the previousmental structures of the individual are crucialfortheframingeffects.Withoutthispreviousmentalframework,itwouldbe impossible to achieve the same effects. (Hwang, Gotlieb, & Nah, 2007)Therefore, we concludethat the frame in which the information is presented will have aneffectontheperceptionanddecisionofthoseindividualsmakinguseofthis message.Specially regarding rational choices in contrast with the intuitive ones- the information used in the cognitive process is determinant for the outcome. Indeed, there is evidence that rational choices can be modified by changing the information given to the individual, or even by changing only the frame in which the very same information is presented.31 The accessibility of the information and the frame in which is presented are,therefore,importantfactorstounderstandacollectivechoice,acollective movementor,inthiscase,anincreasingcollectiveclaim.Still,itshouldweaswell consideredthat the framingeffectsdependonthepreviousmentalstructure,andthis onehastobefavorabletotheperceptioninordertoobservehighereffectsonthe decision choice.This,appliedtothe growingpro-secessionsupportinthestudiedcase,wo