Hitotsubashi University Repository

TitleFrom Exclusion to Integration : Asian Americans'

Experiences in World War II

Author(s) Yui, Daizaburo

CitationHitotsubashi journal of social studies, 24(2): 55-

67

Issue Date 1992-12

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

Text Version publisher

URL http://doi.org/10.15057/8389

Right

Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 24 (1992) 55-67. C The Hitotsubashi Academy

FROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION : ASIAN AMERICANS' EXPERIENCES

IN WORLD WAR II

DAIZABURO YUl

I. Introduction

A perception gap can be seen as one of the important causes behind recent trade fric-

tions between Japan and the United States. Generally, such a gap is unavoidable between

peoples whose cultures are so different from each other. During the Cold War era, the

United States forged a political and military alliance with Japan mainly because of ide-

ological reasons.

Now that the Cold War is over, cultural and racial distinctions have become more noticeable than before. But the necessity for both countries to find ways to reconcile their

differences is indispensable, because they are now so interdependent.

Research to find ways on the processes of integration of Asian immigrants into Amer-

ican society will be suggestive. Of course, relationships between the various ethnic groups

in one country is not the same as mutual relations between independent states. But an

experiment in multi-culturalism in postwar United States can offer valuable insights into

cross-cultural relationships in the global community, which is becoming smaller and smaller.

Between the pre and post World War 11 periods, a strikingly great contrast can be seen

in the legal status of Asian Americans. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882

was repealed in 1943. This made Chinese immigrants eligible for naturalization and granted

China an annual immigration quota of 105, however small it might be. This was followed

in 1946 by a law placing India and the Philippines on a similar basis. Moreover the Walter-

McCarran Act of 1952 made all races, including the Japanese and Koreans, eligible for both citizenship and imnxigration.

Why were such drastic legal changes brought about in the 1940's and the early 1950's?

Who endorsed them? How did local communities on the West Coast which had been so antagonistic toward Asian immigrants, react to these changes? These questions should

be analysed not only domestically, but also internationally. In domestic American po-litical terms, the special relationship between the federal government and individual states.

especially those of the West Coast where many Asian immigrants lived in the pre-World

War 11 period, should be investigated. Internationally, the impact on the United States

government of the United Nations' war aims which severely denounced the racist ideolog);

of Nazism should be examined.

56 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [December

Previously, Japanese scholars have paid much attention to Japanese American history.

It might be a natural inclination for Japanese to show a great interest exclusively in their

fellow countrymen who immigrated to foreign countries. But unfortunately, such ethno-centric concerns have often excluded other Asian immigrants from their research interests.

In addition, Japanese studies on American minorities have had a strong tendency to study

one ethnic group separately, such as black studies, Japanese American studies and so on.

But as a historical reality, Japanese Americans have had experiences similar to other

Asian Americans. So comparative studies among them are of great importance. More-over, in order to study the integration process of Asian immigrants into American society,

it is absolutely necessary for us to pay more attention to the question of how ordinary white

Americans react to this process. Therefore, a multi-ethnic approach and comparative studies will be very important for this research.

The process can be divided into three stages of the repeal of the Anti-Asian immigration

laws. The first stage is the wartime era (1941-1945) in which the Chinese Exclusion Laws

were abolished. The second stage is the period immediately after World War 11 (1945-

1946), when immigrants from India and the Philippine became eligible for both citizen-

ship and immigration. The last stage is the early Cold War era (1947-1952) in which the

Walter-McCarran Act was enacted, giving rights to Japanese and Korean immigrants. This paper will focus only on the first stage; the World War 11 era in which the curious

contrast between the Chinese Inclusion of 1943 and the Japanese Exclusion of 1942 can

be found. Why were these two sharply contrasted decisions made? Who promoted these decisions? Comparison of the pressure groups relating to these decisions will be a focal

point in this paper.

II. The Japanese Exclusion of 1942

A. West Coast Initiative For The Evacuation

On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066, author-

izlng the War Department to exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry from military areas

on the West Coast. Accordingly, on March 2, General De Witt, the Western Defense Commander, issued Proclamation No. l, setting up the Military Areas on the West Coast.

Before the issuance of Executive Order No. 9066, it is well known that there had been

fierce campaigns for the mass evacuation on the West Coast. Morton Grodzins, the author of controversial book, American Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation, presented

interesting data on mail to the Attorney-General, Francis Biddle, who was responsible for

protecting measures against alien enemies. From December 8, 1941 through September 1942, Biddle received 1,152 Ietters with respect to the Japanese question including letters

opposing the evacuation.1

Table I and Fig. I show quantitative superiority of pro-evacuation letters (890). 77

l Morton Grodzins, Anlerican Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation, The University of Chicago

Press, 1949, pp. 209-211.

l 992] FROM EXCLUSION

TABLE I .

To INTEGRATION : AslAN AMERICANS' ExpERIENcrs IN WORLD WAR

CHRONOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF LETTERS IN FILES

OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

II 57

Urging or Approving Evacuation Opposing or Criticizing Evacuation

Date Individual

Pressure Manifestation

Total Individual Pressure

Manifestation Total

Dec. 8-14 Dec. 15-21

Dec. 22-28 Dec. 29-Jan. 4

Jan . 5-1 l

Jan. 12-18 Jan. 19-25 Jan. 26-Feb. 1

January undated

Feb. 2-8 Feb. 9-15 Feb. 1 6L22

Feb. 23-Mar. 1 February undated

Mar. 2-8 Mar. 9-15 Mar. 16L22 Mar. 23-29

Mar. 30-Apr. 5

March undated Rest of April

May June July

August September Undated

1 O 2 2 6

13

6

38 O

43

100

176

37

26 14

21 3

10 5 1

10

3 3 3 1 O 2

O O O O 2 8 3

17

24 67

1 62

25

14 8

15

7 3 1 1 2 3 1 O O O O

1 O 2 2 8

21 9

55 1

67 1 67

338

62

40

22 36

10

13

6 2

12

6 4 3 l O 2

2 O O O O 1 O 3 O 6 19

18 7 1 9 3 5 2 1 O

33

22 3 5 1 2 O

O O O O O O 1 7 O

12

14

13

9 2 4 5 9 3 4 2

11

11

8 3 O 1 O

2 O O O O

1

10 O

18

33

31

16

3

13

8

14 5 5 2

44

33

ll

8

3 O

Total 526 364 890 143 119 262

Grodzins, American Betrayed, p. 210.

per cent of the total urged or approved evacuation. Moreover, they were concentrated in the period just before the issuance of Proclamation No. I on March 2, 1942. Interest-

ingly, the starting point in the skyrocketing increase of pro-evacuation letters was not after

the Pearl Harbor Attack, but after January 25, 1942. On that day the Roberts Report, intentionally suggested "subversive activities" of the Japanese residents in Hawaii before

the Pearl Habor Attack, was published.

As the Tolan Committee report suggested, following this publication, "public temper

on the west coast changed norticeably" and "by the end of January a considerable press

demand appeared for the evacuation of all aliens, and especially of the Japanese from the

west coast."2

The same tendency can be found in the fact that 83 per cent of the pro-evacuation letters

' Tolan Committee, Preliminary Report. March 19, 1942.

58 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL or SOCIAL STUDIES [December

FIG. l

340

320

300

,_80

260

240

220

200

ISO

l 60

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

o

/ / /

l //¥¥ ' ,

V

f

, , , ,

/

l f l ll Il ll ,1 __ -Urging or Approving E¥'acuation ll l I -Opposing or Criticizing Evacuation Jl Il fl JI lj ,I 11 ! : i l

I t f I : l l l I l l I f I l I l I l

l f f I

, l

t l

l l l , i

l i f

l I

I / /

l l

l t t ~ l IAL l

v/ ¥ ¥

~ ¥. ./'¥.*

~r-'Hc~~ eoLO

DEC.'41

Oe C¥] l C¥]

C¥l

~r 'H H c;) I

c¥lLr)

JAN.'42

oO Lr) ,H ch~ c¥~ eF) ･H r~

H oo Lr: cJ:)c¥]1-1

c¥9 cr~ FE B .

c¥~-oOLr)c~~(')Lf:o c¥' ~ I'~c¥~c¥9 cr)~~>~!~!l~~ cY~ch~ f I I Ic:) I cOc~] ~~:>cY:'cr)~c)~:~~<~ 'H 'H c~~ MARCH APRIL

Note: change in time interval following March 30-April 5 period. Source: Table 2. Grodzins, op. cit., p. 211.

l 9921 rROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION : ASIAN AMERICANS , EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR u 59

were concentrated in the period between January 26 and March l, 1942. On the contrary,

anti-evacuation letters were only 42 per cent of the total (262) in the same period. Their

peak was shown not in February, but in April 1942.

There were several influential anti-evacuation groups even before February 1 9. For

instance, the Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Alien of Japa-

nese Ancestry was organized mainly by university professors before December 1 941. Various

church groups including the West Coast leaders of Protestant and Catholic and humanitarian

groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union were also active to defend the human

rights ofthe Japanese residents on the West Coast. But according to Grodzins, they showed

"almost a complete lack of awareness with respect to the evacuation issue."3 Their anti-

evacuation movements were activated only after the issuance of the Executive Order No.

9066.

Regional concentration of pro-evacuation letters is also noticeable (Table 2). 80 per

cent came from the West Coast; 71 per cent from California (44 per cent from Los Angeles

County), 5 per cent from Washington and 4 per cent from Oregon. Interestingly, West Coast proportion of anti-evacuation letters is also high; 67 per cent (California 53 per cent,

Washington 1 3 per cent, Oregon I per cent). This means that the evacuation issue had

the same local character as the issue of prewar oriental immigration.

B. Pressure Group Activities

Local initiatives in favor of evacuation were first taken by rival economic groups of

the Japanese residents on the West Coast.

On December 15, 1941, when a state of emergency was declared in California, Governor

Olson asked that tolerance be accorded to American citizens of foreign descent, especially

TABLE 2. PERCENTACE DISTRIBUTION BY AREAS OF MAIL IN

FILES OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Area

Urging or Approving Evacuation

Opposing or Criticizing Evacuation

Number Percentage Number Percentage

California

Oregon Washington Mountain States Central

South Atlantic

Middle Atlantic

New England Alaska No address of sender

631

31

46 26

49 25 64 4 1

13

71 4 5 3 6 3 7 O O l

140 3

35 2

34 5

31

7 O 5

53 1

13

13

2

12 3 O 2

Total 890 100 262 100

Grodzins, op. cit., p. 213.

3 Grodzins, op. cit., p. 181.

60 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDrES [December

to the Japanese.4 In spite ofsuch a tolerant statement, as early as December 22, the Agricul-

tural Comntittee of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce recommended that all Japanese nationals be placed "under absolute federal control."5

A week later, a spokesman of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of California

sent a resolutilon, endorcing the recommendation of the Los Angeles Chamber of Com-merce calling for the mass internment of Japanese American, to a Congressman from Cal-

ifornia. This resolution was also supported by the Salinas chapters of the Chamber of

Commerce, the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. The same line was followed by the Western Growers Protective Association whose membership controlled about 85 per cent of the row-crop vegetables from California. On January 22, they de-

manded that all Japanese be requested to move inland at least 300 miles.6

The Pacific War also presented an unusual opportunity for traditional Anti-Asian groups

and patriotic societies to fulfill their long-term aims. On January 5, the War Council of

California Department of the American Legion urged that "all Japanese who are known to hold dual citizenship also be placed in concentration camps."7 In the case of the nor-

torious anti-Oriental organization, the Native Sons of the Golden West, its Long Beach

parlor demanded the rmmediate removal of "all Japs" from the coastal zone on January 7. After about a month later, the board of grand officers resolved the policy of forced mass evacuation for all resident Japanese, regardless of citizenship status.8

On February 7, the California Joint Immigration Committee, sponsored by the Native Sons of Golden West, the Grange, the State Federation of Labor, and the American Legion,

met for the first time after the outbreak of war. In the presence of the California Attorney-

General, Earl Warren, the Committee resolved that the Japanese, including American citizens

of Japanese ancestry, be removed as quickly as possible from combat zone.9

Influenced by these private pro-evacuation activities, the entire West Coast Congress-

ional delegation met in Washington. D.C. under the chairmanship of Senator Hiram Johnson

on February 2. Eleven days later, the delegation submitted a letter to the President re-

commending "the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage."ro Local top

officials such as Earl Warren and Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles agreed with the evacuation

plan in early February.n

With these combined pressures from private and official groups on the West Coast,

General De Witt submitted a memorandum to the War Department on February 14, in which he recommended mass evacuation of the Japanese.12 In the capital, the Justice De-

partment had been critical to the evacuation program because of its supposed violation of civil rights. But Biddie reluctantly agreed with the War Department which had insisted

the evacuation as a measure of "military necessity."I3

4 Berkeley Gazette, December 1 5. 1941. 5 Grodzins, op, cit., p. 34. 6 Ibid., pp. 22-25, 28. 7 Ibid., p. 39.

8 Ibid., pp. 49-50. o lbid., p. 48. ro arey McWilliams, Prejudice .' Japanese-Americans .

Company, 1944, p. 108. u rodzins, op' cit., pp. 96, 102. 12 bid., p. 363. 13 bid., p. 363.

' Symbol of Racia/ Intolerance, Little, Brown and

1992] FROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION : ASIAN AMERICA~S EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR II 61

C. Exclusionist Coalition and Their Logic

It is worthy to note that the West Coast initiative based on broad coalition of exclu-

sionists gave decisive influence to the evacuation decision of the Federal Government in

February 1942. As Grodzins concluded, there were so many factors involved in the evacuation demand.

"The necessity for protecting coastal areas, the widespread hostility toward resident Japa-

nese, racial animus, economic cupidity, fears of attack and apprehension over the growing

victories of the enemy-these factors became so intertwined that their separation was im-

possible. Yet they all had the common feature of pushing in the direction of evacua-

tion."I4

As for the importance of each factor, Grodzins shows interesting result from his con-

tent analysis of Tolan Committee testimony and the letters to the Justice Department.

Table 3 shows percentage distribution of Tolan Committee testimony in which almost

all witness were leaders of community organizations. Among various factors, "economic"

(25.2~), "sabotage, etc " (19.5~), and "drastic measure" (ll.3~) were the three major

factors. In Table 4 which shows regional distribution, witness from Southern California

shows the highest percentage of 67 ~, because economic competition was so high in this

are a .

In the case of the letters to the Justice Department, written by an undefined group of

persons, the result is a little different from that of Tolan Committee testimony. As Table

5 shows "Sabotage, etc " (49.7~), "drastic measures" (18.8~), "Racral" (10.2~), were

three dominant factors. Very little attention was paid to economic issue.15

TABLE 3 . ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EVACUATION. ToLAN COMMITTEE TESTIMONY, PERCENTAGE DISTRJBUTION

Argument Percent

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

Vll .

Vlll .

IX .

X. XI.

Sabotage, espionage, fifth column

Public morale

Humanitarianism : a) Vigilantism, race riots

b) Humane administration Approval of Japanese militarism

Influence of Japanese government

Migration and distribution

Racial

Cultural

Economic Appeal to patriotism

Necessity for drastic measures

19. 5

O. 3

5. 3 5. 6 6. 5

7. 9 7. 9 6. 9

2. 7

25. 2 O. 9

11.3

Total 100. O

Total units (sentences) : I ,750.

Grodzins, op. cit., p. 413.

14 Ibid., pp.

15 bid., pp. 88-89. 4 1 3 ~'I 6.

62HITOTSUBASHI　JOURNAL　OF　SOCIAL　STUD肥S ［December

TABLE4． ARGuMENTs　IN　FAvoR　oF　EvAcuATloN，ToLAN　CoMMITTEE

TEsTIMoNY，PERCENTAGE　DISTRIBuTloN　BY　AREAs

Argument Oregon　WashlngtonCalifornia　　Northern　（Tota1）　　California串

SouthernCa量ifornia串

　1．

II．

III．

WvW皿H以xM

　　　vW

Sabotage，espionage，盒fth　column

Pubiic　morale

Humanltarianism：a）　Vigilantism，race　riots

b）Humane　administrationApproval　of　Japanese　militarism

InHuence　of　Japanese　govemmentMigration　and　distributionRaciaL

Cultural

EconomicApPeal　to　patrlotism

Necessity　for　drastic　measures

35

Lα4

7．4

2．03．7

581836

α71aα6

　　　2

20．2

13．11．3

3。4

5．4

12．49．7

0。3

26．90．4

6．9

4角∠

飢01

6044160832

18807543。L4

　　　1　　　　

2　　1

17．5

0．15．3

10．03．1

角∠3384

69iαZ

1　

ー　

ヘ乙

8．5

0．2

13．54．7

1．2

3角∠4

乳L3

6

Total 100．0 100．0 100．0 100．0 100．0

Total　units（58躍8ηcε5） 190 469 1，091 304 247

ホState　o伍cials　eliminated，

Grodzins，砂．cπ．，P．414．

TABLE5， ARGuMENTs　IN　FAvoR　oF　EvAcuATloN，JusTlcE　DEPARTMENT　LETTERs，

　　　　　　　　P正RcENTAGE　DIsTRIBuTloN（SENTENcES）

Argument Percent

IH几

　　1

　IV．

　　V．

　VI．

VILVIII，

　IX。

　X．XI．

Sabotage，espionage，fifth　colunm

Public　moraleHumanitarianisml

a）VigilImtism，raceriots

b）Humane　administrationApproval　of　Japanese　militarism

Influence　of　Japanese　govemment

Migration　and　distributionRacial

Cultural

Economic

ApPeal　to　patriotism

N㏄essity　for　drastic　measures

49．72．4

1610125238

2132302よ工8

　　　　　1　　　　　　1

Total 100，0

Total　units（5eπ陀ηc85）；　1，426

Grodzins，oP．（ゴ’．，P．416．

　　　　It　goes　without　saying　that　economic　factor　involved　in　demands　particularly　of　eco－

nomic　rival　groups　such　as　Westem　Growers　Protective　Association．The　racial　factor

was　certainly　promoted　by　traditional　Anti－Oriental　groups　like　the　Nativc　Sons　of　the

Golden　West　and　the　Califomia　Joint　Immigration　Committee．Of　course，these　And－

Oriental即oupsalsosharedthe“intemalsecurity”concemsofsuchpatriotic理oupsasthe　A■nerican　Legion。

l 992] FROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION : ASIAN AMERICANS' EXPERJENCES IN WORLD WAR II 63

But these "internal security" concerns, activated by wartime patriotism, were the main

element combining all other factors, as Louis Fisher pointed out in the Nation of March

7, 1942: "the reactionary press and the politicians are out for blood and wholesale intern-

ment. Jingoes are endeavoring under the cover of wartime flag-waving patriotism, to do what they always wanted to do in peace-time: get rid of the Japanese, harness labor,

and frighten the liberals."

III. The Chinese Inclusion of 1943

A. The East Coast Initiative for Inclusion

The initiative for the Inclusion of Chinese was first taken by the East Coast groups.

On May 13, 1942, an informal meeting to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts was held in

New York. The attendants were Richard J. Walsh, editor of Asia and the Americas. Pearl

Buck, and representatives of church and labor. They decided that the New York group should assume responsibility for publicity and that a committee should be formally organ-

ized after the November election and a popular base for the committee on the West Coast

had been established.

Other core members were Donald Dunham (a former diplomat stayed in Hong Kong),

Roger Baldwin (the American Civil Liberties Union) and Monroe Sweetland (director, the National Committee for American and Allied War Relief of the C.1.0.). Julean Arnold,

China Council of Berkeley, CA., was one of the active leaders on the West Coast, Congress-

man Walter Judd (Republican. Minnesota), who stayed as a medical missionary in China

for about 4 years, was actively involved in the group.

In early 1943, Mme Chiang Kai-shek made a goodwill tour in the United States. The

Wellesley-bred Chinese lady appealed to American popular opinion as a symbol of the U.S.-China Alliance in the Pacific War. At the end of March, Walsh sent a confidential

letter to say "that the time had come for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws and establish-

ment of a quota, and that full advantage should be taken of the presence of Mme Chiang

for strong agitation.'u6

In Congress, Martin Kennedy (Democrat, N.Y.) seized this moment to introduce his repeal bill to make the Chinese eligible for naturalization in the House on February 17.

Nine days later, Congressman Vito Marcantonio (Labor, N.Y.) introduced his bill to provide

the right of naturalization regardless of race. On March 26, Congressman Warren Mag-nuson of Washington proposed his bill to provide for the admission of Chinese immigrants

under a quota system of the Imntigration Act of 1 924.

In the Congress there were heated debates on its objectives (only Chinese or all Asian?)

and its methods (continuation of national quota system of 1924 or not?). Finally the House

Committee on Immigartion and Naturalization decided that the hearings were to be re-

stricted to the Chinese bills and announced the start of the hearings on May 19,

IG Fred W. Riggs, Pressure on Congress : A Study of The Repeal of Chinese Exclusion, King's Crown Press,

1950, p. 53.

64 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [December

After the announcement, on May 7. Walsh sent a letter asking individuals to become

members of a formal committee. Accordingly, on May 25, the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion was formally established. Walsh was elected as its chairman.

The following objectives were adopted: (1) repeal of the Chinese exclusion acts, (2) a quota

basis for Chinese, and (3) eligibility of Chinese for naturalization. Over 250 persons, re-

presenting more than 40 states, joined the committee. Early in the campaign, over 30,000

copies of a booklet. Our Chinese Wall, were distributed. Asia and the Americas, published

its June editorial, "Repeal Exclusion Laws Now," and reprinted l0,000 copies for wide distribution .17

After the House Committee hearings, a compromised bill (H.R. 3070) was introduced

by Congressman Magnuson on June 29. He proposed to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts, to establish a quota for the Chinese (only 105 persons a year), and to make Chinese

immigrants eligible for naturalization. On September 30, the same bill was introduced

by Charles Andrews of Florida in the Senate (S. 1404).

On October 1 1. President Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress to call for pas-

sage of the bill, in which he said that "I regard this legislation as important in the cause of

winning the war and establishing a secure peace. China is our ally. . . . By the repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws, we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted

Japanese propaganda."rs

Ten days later, the House passed the Magnuson bill. On November 26, the Senate gave its approval. The President signed the bill on December 17, 1943. It passed over 60 years after the first enactment of Chinese Exclusion.

B. Inclusionist Coalition and Their Logic

Religious and humanitarian groups emphatically demanded the repeal not only of the Chinese Exclusion laws, but also of discriminatory laws against all Asian immigrants.

From the first, church leaders had been critical of Chinese exclusion. This is because

many American churches had a long history of sending missionary to China. By 1926 the number of missionaries in China reached 8,325. Of the approximately 850 Ietters received by the House Immigration Committee, more than 150 came from religious groups.

None of them opposed the repeal. Of the 42 witnesses for the repeal at the House hear-

ings, 10 were from religious organizations including the YMCA and YWCA,19 On May 19, 1943, the executive committee of the Federal Council of Churches, the

official representative body of some 24 Iarge Protestant communions, adopted a resolution,

asking Congress to revise existing laws so that persons of all friendly nations could enter

under the quota system on the same terms as non-Oriental immigrants.

Many of humanitarian and internationalist groups were especially inclined to demand

repeal of all Anti-Asian laws, not limited to the Chinese. For instance, Oswald G. Villard

urged before the House Committee hearings that "all restrictions should be removed from

17 bid., pp. 56-57.

18 Ibid., pp. 210-211. 19 .S.. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee of Immigration and Naturalization, Hearings

on H,R.1882 and H.R. 2309. Bills to Repea/ The Chinese Exc!usion Acts, To Put The Chinese on a Quota Basis, And To Permit Their Naturalization. Government Printing Office, 1943, p. 119.

1992] FROM EXcLUsloN To INTEGRATION : AslAN AMERICANS' EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR n 65

other peoples of color similarly." He testified as representatives both of the Postwar World

Council and National Peace Conference, the latter was a clearinghouse for 37 organiza-

tions including the League of Nations Association.ao

Thus, how to focus the target, whether to include only Chinese or not, became a hot

issue among the inclusionists. Pro-China groups were mainly concerned with the Chinese.

There were several pro-China organizations, often called "old China-hands," mainly in-

terested in cultural activities, such as American Friends of China, China Club and American

Friends of the Chinese People. Their influence as political pressure groups was limited,

but some members frequently held influential posts, especially in commercial and religious

organizations.

According to Fred Riggs, of the 42 persons testifying for the repeal before the House

Committee, 19 were "old China-hands"; 8 missionaries, 7 businessmen, 2 scholars, I naval

officer, I employee of the Chinese government.

Pro-China groups as well as the Citizens Committee to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion,

worried about the possibility that the argument of "racial equality" would surely arouse

the strong opposition of Southern politicians in Congress. Therefore they wanted to focus

only on the Chinese by emphasizing its importance not as a racial matter, but as a war

measure. The point was clearly shown in the following testimony of Pearl Buck who had

spent most of her life in China in a missionary family, before the House Committee.

"It is the injustice of the total exclusion that hurts the Chinese, the humiliation it puts

upon them as a people, and now as our ally, and this hurt is what is difficult for the American

in China to bear. He is ashamed of being unable, as an American, to meet this accusation

of injustice. It is more than injustice. It is a denial of our democratic ideals, and this

makes the American on Chinese soil ashamed." After saying this, she was asked about the problem of "social equality among the races." She answered : "I do not think that is

very important now, because this is wartime, and this is a war measure. I do not think

social equality has one thing to do, at this moment, with war. I think repeal of these acts

has a lot to do with war measures."21

The theme of "justice for our Chinese allv" could have great popularity. As Grodzins

pointed out, it "not only capitalized the current enthusiasm for China, but also stimulated

the actrve support of Smophiles."22 Humanitarian and religious groups, who had de-manded "racial equalrty " could accept this argument as a step m the directron of racral

equality. As a result, the argument of "justice for our Chinese ally" could make a broad

coalition of the inclusionists and make traditional Anti-Oriental groups isolated even on the

West Coast.

C. Isolation of Traditional Anti-Oriental Groups

Such a wartime appeal as "Justice to our Chinese ally" was very influential with pat-

riotic groups like the American Legion. Like the Veterans of Foreign Wars which main-tained their opposition to the end, national leaders of the American Legion were critical

ao bid., p. 92.

21 Ibid., pp. 7C)-73.

z2 iggs, op. cit., p. 129.

66 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDlrs [December to the repeal at first, in early May. But in early August, its California Department ex-

pressed their support. Then in November, its national executive committee adopted a resolution supporting the repeal,

The argument of economic interest regarding postwar U.S.-China trade was also in-

fluential, particularly among business leaders. President of the U.S. Life Insurance Com-

pany testified that "Trade with China and cooperation with her 400,000,000 people are going to be very important factors in America's postwar prosperity. . . . .Why should we limit those opportunities by keeping on our statute books legislation which no longer is

serving any very usefull purpose, . . . . "z3

This economic concerns were shared not only by representatives of individual com-

panies such as California Texas Oil Co., and American International Underwriters, but

also by the West Coast branches of the Chamber of Commerce. In spite of the silence of

the national Chamber of Commerce, Seattle. Portland. San Francisco branches supported the repeal.

No open opposition from the West Coast branches of the Chamber of Commerce showed

sharp contrast with the case of Japanese evacuation. The reasons can be found in differ-

ences in economic situations. At that time, almost all Chinese on the West Coast were

engaged in such ethnic businesses as hand laundry and Chinese restaurant enclaved in China

Town. This occupational specialization made white business's fear soften.

The same tendency can be found in labor market. In spite of the opposition of the

AFL national leaders, the national convention of the CIO supported the repeal, because

of their anti-racism stands and their judgement that an annual quota of 105 would be neg-

ligible in the American labor market.

In the case of the Japanese evacuation as analysed in Chapter 2, business, Iabor and

patriotic groups were the main forces to advocate for evacuation. But interestingly, many

of them changed their attitudes, supporting the Chinese inclusion. As a result, the main

forces which stubbornly opposed the repeal were limited only to traditional Anti-Oriental

groups such as the California Joint Immigration Committee and the Native Sons of the

Golden West. Their isolation even in the West Coast politics was so obvious that no West

Coast congressmen testified in opposition in the House Committee hearings. And newly elected Governor of California, Earl Warren, influential advocate for the Japanese evacua-

tion one year earlier, said that he had no opposition to repeal for the Chinese on September

6, 1943.24

IV. Conclusron

In considering causes of curious contrast between Japanese Exclusion of 1942 and Chinese Inclusion of 1943, three factors may be stressed.

First, a difference in initiative for the campaigns can be pointed out. The campaign

for Japanese Evacuation was initiated by traditional Anti-Asian groups on the West Coast.

They tried to embrace an opportunity caused by the Pacific War to fulfill their long-term

23 ouse, Hearin~s, op. cir., p. 228. 24 iggs, op. cit., p. 86.

1 992] rROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION : ASIAN AMERICANS' EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR II 67

aims, exclusion of Japanese from the West Coast. On the contrary, the Chinese Inclusion

campaign was started by pro-China and humanitarian groups on the East Coast. They intentionally emphasized the importance of Chinese Inclusion not from racial standpoint,

but as strategy for the wartime alliance between the United States and China.

Second, a difference in coalition politics among pressure groups can be seen. In the

case of Japanese Exclusion, traditional Anti-Asian groups succeeded in making a broad coalition with patriotic, business and labor groups on the West Coast. But interestingly,

they were isolated in the decision on Chinese Inclusion, because pro-China groups success-

fully made an ally of labor, business and patriotic groups, even on the West Coast.

Third, a difference in the underlying logic of the coalition can be stressed. In Japanese

Evacuation, "internal security" concerns were most influential for the decision. Under

their dominance, racist ideology and concerns for local economic competition were closely

combined. So it goes without saying that impact of the Pacific War was the most powerful

factor influencing the evacuation decision. Interestingly, the same situation can be seen

in Chinese Inclusion in which the main slogan for the campaign was not "racial equality,"

but "Justice for our Chinese ally."

In other words, the influence of international affairs enhanced by W. W. 11 gave a strong

impetus for abolition of racial discrimination against Asian residents in the United States.

But that was only the starting point on the long road in the American experiment for racial

equality.

HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY