From: (~~-) 1hurnlay, April 28, 2016 5:12 PM · 1hurnlay, April 28, 2016 5:12 PM Brenner, Eliot...

Boyer, Rachel

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Brenner, Eliot (~~-) 1hurnlay, April 28, 2016 5:12 PM Brenner, Eliot Tomorrow's news tonight~~ read and delete

Internal use only - no distribution outside NRC - no redistribution May contain material proprietary to news agencies

ENERGY TIMES - Ed~or Marty Rosenberg spoke with Chairman Bums today for a piece for the newsletter Energy Times. The questions touched on new reactor construction, small modular reactors, advanced reactors and waste storage as well as the U.S. global position in nuclear. Publication date uncertain.

WCS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE APPLICATION-OPA fielded a number of inquiries (AP, Exchange Monitor, San Antonio Express-News) abcut Waste Control Specialists' application to construct and operate an interim storage application in Texas.

DC COOK - Platts called to follow up on last week's incident involving a plant employee who allegedly killed his wife, a local media personality, and committed suicide. We told the reporter we had no immediate conoems with the plant's Behaviour Observation Program.

PSEG EARLY SITE PERMIT - HQ OPA provided a Law360 reporter a quick summary of the Early Stte Penni! process and potential next steps for PSEG. The Press of Atlantic Ctty and the South Jersey Times also asked about the ASLB ruling.

INOIAN POINT- The Cortlandt, N.Y, Patch and Capital New York had follow-up questions to our blog post regarding degraded baffle-former belts identified at Unit 2. The former wanted to know~ Entergy had objected to performing the evaluations. We said that was not the case.

SEABROOK - There was a three-hour meeting al Headquarters today on concrete degradation issues at the plant. The staff provided additional clarity on its Request tor Additional Information in this area and the company discussed its current and planned adivities. The Daily News of Newburyport, Mass., checked with us on several points of discussion afterwards, but the reporter indicated she may hold off writing another update on the subject for now,

Press releases and speeches posted: NRC Schedules Meeting to Discuss Performance at Hone~ll Metropolis Facility NRC To Issue Southern N.J. Early Site Permit, Following Conclusion of Mandatory Hearing NRC Names New Resident Inspector at Dresden Nuclear Plant

Social Media Today

Blog: WCS Sends NRC Interim Storage Application https"//public-bloa.nrc-aateway.gov/2016104/28/wcs-sendsnrc-inter!m-storaae~application/

Social Media Today

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Brenner. Eliot ~----------/ Monday, April 25, 2016 5:18 PM Brenner, Eliot Tomorrow's news tonight -- read and delete

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CHERNOBYL ANNIVERSARY - The local Fox affiliate in New York City is putting together a piece for tomorrow to mark the 30th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. The reporter asked about the safety of U.S. reactors.

And further south, the Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle contacted OPA and asked for a comment on the 30th anniversary of the accident. We sent a short statement explaining the differences in U.S. plants, including more extensive safe shutdown capabilijies and stronger structures. The reparter planned a short story on the anniversary

INDIAN POINT- The New York City Fox affiliate sought background infomiation on Indian Point and other nuc.lear power plants in the state, as rt followed up on an AP story over the weekend about Gov. Cuomo seeking to incentivize the upstate reactors to stay online. Separately, Platts l'equested an update on the replacement of baffle...former bolts in the Unit 2 l'eactor core barrel.

FITZPATRICK -A reporter for Platts noticed on our Plant Status Summary that the plant was at reduced pawer and asked why, We explained that a control rod had drifted in during testing on Sunday morning. Plant personnel will need to troubleshoot the problem and perform repairs.

Social Media Today: YouTube Video: NRC Public Meeting with OAS/CRCP Directors at https:/tvoutu.be/wVEYhOsHgko

Boyer, Rachel

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Burnell, Scott ~ ~) Friday, April 29, 20iir4:30 PM Burnell, Scott TOMORROW'S NEWS TONIGHT·· READ AND DELETE


NUCLEAR-RELATED LEGISLATION -OPA declined to respond to Bloomberg BNA questions about the policy aspects of House legislation calling for revisions to NRC's approach to licensing advanced reactors.

WCS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE APPLICATION -OPA HQ talked with CQ Roll Call about the NRC's authority to rev""w the Waste Control Specialists' application for spent fuel storage. The conversation touched on authoriling legislation and regulations; other NRC-licensed away-from-reactor storage facilities; and the impact on our review of discussions involving WCS, DOE and Congress over taking title and legal authorit.,s. A radio reporter from Texas doing a three-week stint at a station on Cape Cod (Mass.), WCAl-FM, had some questions for Region I OPA regarding high-level nuclear waste storage after reading about the WCS application.

SALEM - PSEG issued its quarterly financial data press release this morning and there was a mention on page 4 regarding reactor vessel baffle bolt degradation identified at Unit 1. A repcrter from Bloomberg spotted the line and called us for information. We said the company will be conducting ultrasonic testing to determine the extent of any degradation and report what is found to us. We'll also be following up via our inspectors,

INOIAN POINT - Reporters for Bloomberg and Platts checked for any updates on the baffle bolt analyses and replacement wor1< taking place at Unft 2. We said there was little new to report as of today.

TURKEY POINT - Region II is providing a brief overv"w of NRC oversight and inspection at the plant to a Florida Senate committee during a workshop in Homestead. The Miami Herald and Telemundo are attendance and it is expected that other local media outlets may also cover the workshop.

Press reteases and speeches posted: NRC Receives High Mar1<s for Small Business Contracting

Boyer, Rachel

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From: Platts

Library Resource Friday, April 29, 2016 4:38 PM EPUB ~Inside NRC FW; Platts Jnside NRC INRC_20160502.pdf

Sent: Friday, April 29, 2016 4:38:01 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastem nme (US ll. Canada) To: Library Resource subject: (External_Sender) Platts Inside NRC

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S&PGlobat Platts

INSIDE NRC Volume 381 Number 9 /May 2, 2016

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Boyer, Rachel

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Brenner, Eliot C-.__J Tuesday, May 03, 2016 5;07 PM Blenner, Eliot Tomorrow's news tonight · w read and delete

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PART 21: Platts inquired about our Monday press retease on a Part 21 Confirmatory Order on defective battery separators.

Separately, Platts asked about legislation by Reps. Latta and Kinzinger that was discussed on the Hill at a hearing last week. We said we provided House staff with policy~neutral, technical information related to drafting the bills and that we took no position on the policy issues wjthin the legislation.

GLE -A Silex press release on establishing a framewor1< to restructure Global Laser Enrichment triggered an inquiry from a Wilmington, N.C., freelancer who covers fuel cycle facilities for the Wilmington StarNews. We defetTed to the companies involved on most questions, but said ......a would expect GLE to submit a license amendment request for any major changes to its ownership stnJcture and the plans for the Wilmington laser enrtcl1ment facility. We clarified that no cl1ange of ownership hos actually occurred yet.

SALEM - A reporter for Platts sought more information on the degraded baffle.former bolts being identified at Unit 1. We briefly discussed the nature of the problem and said ultrasonic testing to determine the e>Ctent of the condition is continuing.

INDIAN POINT - A free-lance reporter who usually writes about the plant had questions on the replacement of Unit 2 baffle.former bolts. T epics covered included the missing bolt heads and concerns about potential fuel damage from baffle plates becoming dislocated.

SEABROOK-The Portsmouth (N.H.) Herald followed up on a meeting held last week al Headquarters regarding concrete degradation at the plant. The reporter wante<:I more information on ne>Ct Next.Era and NRC steps. The company is expected to submit a license amendment request this summer.

Press releases and speeches posted: NRC Schedules Open House to Discuss 2015 Performance at Harris Nuclear Plant NRC Schedules Open House to Discuss 2015 Performance at Brunswick Nuclear Plant NRC to Hold Open House to Discuss Agency's Assessment of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant NRC Approves Power Uprate for Catawba Nuclear Power Plant

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Blog: Maintaining Radioactive Material Security Through Rules, Not Orders httos://public~blog,nrc~ gateway.gov/2016/05/03/maintalning-radioact1ve-material-security-throuqh-rules-not-orders/

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Boyer, Rachel

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Library Resource Tuesday, May 03, 2016 5;37 PM EPUB - Nuclear News Flashes FW: Platts Nuclear News Flashes NNF_20160503.txt

Sent: Tuesday, May 3, 2016 5:33:03 PM (lifC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & C.nada) To: Library Resource Subje<:t: [External_Sender] Platts Nudear N<ws Flashes

Dear Subscriber,

This email contains your Platts newsletter subscription.

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Boyer, Rachel

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~· ·-) Brenner, Eliot 1~ ,,,,

Wednesday, Aprili.r··ro16 s:o7 PM Brenner, Eliot tomorrow's news tonight -- read and delete


CYBERSECURITY - Inside Cybersecurity checked with us about the upcoming workshop on voluntary mechanisms for cybersecurity that is being coordinated by the FTC and FDA.

BROWNS FERRY - After issuing the news release announcing the annual assessment meeting next week, Region II OPA heard from the Chattanooga Times-Free Press and WHNT·TV m Huntsville. A number of media outlets in north Alabama and southeast Tennesi;ee will likely also use the release.

HATCH - The Region II staff is holding the Hatch assessment meeting this afternoon in Vidalia, and although there has been little media coverage in recent years, a recent special inspection may prompt some interest.

PILGRIM - Our Annual Assessment meeting for the plant will be held tonight, with a sizable crowd expected. As noted in the clips Wednesday morning, Acting Region I Administrator Dave Lew met with reporters Tuesday afternoon to discuss our increased oversight activities. Media out'lets to take part included WATD-FM, Cape Cod Broadcasting, the Cape Cod Times and the Old Colony Memorial.

SUSQUEHANNA -- The zoning board for the plant's host town will be holding a hearing on a dry cask storage facility being planned. We were asked about dry cask and required reviews by the Citizens' Voice (of WilkesBarre, Pa.).

INDIAN POINT·· A reporter for Platts had questions on the baffle bolts s~uation at Unit 2.

INTERNATIONAL ISOTOPES, INC. - Region IV spoke with Exchange Monitor after issuing a news release announcing a prEKiecisional enforcement conference set May 3. The meeting regards four apparent violations related to an incident in which a worker at the company's Idaho Falls, Id., facility received an unplanned radiation exposure. We elq:)laine:d the process used in handlfng a Cobaltw.60 source that led to the overexposure, and described the apparent violations. We said no decision on the significance of the violations would be made at the meeting.

Press releases and speeches posted: NRC Schedules Regulatory Conference to Discuss Apparent Violations at lnternatlonal Isotopes NRC Schedules Open House to Discuss Agency's 2015 Assessment of Browns Feny Nuclear Plant

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Blog: https://public-blog. nrc~g ateway. gov 120 16/04/ 13/ref resh~jeff erson~provinq~ground~the-nrcs-role/ REFRESH - Jefferson Proving Ground - The NRC's Role

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•B•o•y•e•~•Rac--•h•el.._~~~~~~~~~~ .... ~~~~~~~~-i Screnci, Diane ~) Tuesday, April 05, 2016 4:42 PM Screnci, Diane

From: Sent: To: Subject: Tomorrow's News Tonight

internal use only - no distribution outside NRC - no redistribution may contain material proprietary to news agencies

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INDIAN POINT - A Region I PAO did a recorded interview wrth WAMC-FM (Northeast Public Radio) on the Unit 2 baffle bolt situation and also answered questions from Platts on the same topic. Meanwhile, Bloomberg, the Mid~Hudson News and New York Times checked with us regarding the Commission's decision to deny an appeal filed by New Yori< State on the ASLB's rejection of its challenge of a containment leak rate test extension granted for Unit 2.

SEABROOK - We helped the Newburyport (Mass.) Daily News with fact-<:heckin9 on a letter to the editor. The letter suggested there is an underground river that has been at least partially to blame for concrete degradation issues at the plant. We said there has clearty been groundwater intrusion at the site but not due to a river.

PILGRIM - A leader of one of the watchdog groups has written to the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office asking that it not object to the use of decommissioning trust fund money for the transfer of fuej from the spent fuel pool to dry cask storage, We were asked for lnfonnation on what happened along these Jines at Vennont Yankee, as well as general dry cask storage questions.

HATCH - Trade press interest in the special inspection of the safety release valves continued. Region II OPA fielded inquiries from the Energy Daily and Sloomberg's Washington-based energy writer.

SENATE E:PW HEARING-RadWaste Monitor was writing a short on tomorrow's budget hearing.

Press Releases NRC Schedules Open House to Discuss Agency's 2015 Assessment of Surry Nuclear StatiOn NRC Schedul•>S Open House to Discuss Agency's 2015 Assessment of Farley Nuclear Plant NRC to Hold Open House on April 12 in Ontario, N.Y., to Discuss 2015 Performance of R.E. Ginna Nuclear Plant NRC Will Hold an Open House on River Bend Nuclear Plant Performance NRC to Hold Regulatory Performance Public Meeting Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant on April 13 in Plymouth, Mass.

Social Media Blog: NRC Oversight at Pilgrim Plant Entering a New Phase pubhc-b!og.nrcMgateway.gov/2016/04104/nrc~ oversight~at~oilgrim~plant..enterinq-a-new-phase

Diane Screnci Sr. Pub/it; AlfairS Olficer USN/IC 111 6/(J..337-SJJO

Boyer. Rachel

From; Sent To: Subje<t

/> ------' Brenner, Eliot \ /) Wednesday, Mar2~616 5:06 PM Brenner, Eliot Tomorrow's news tonight -- read and delete


SECURITY -OPA provided a recorded-for-radio interview to ""Marketplace.~ covering the basics of NRC's security requirements, for a sidebar item in the outlet's coverage of the nuclear security summit.

ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON NUCLEAR - U.S. News carries a piece on the pressures on the nuclear industry. It contains an assertion that the NRC has routinely weakened its regulations to take pressure off the industry. We'll reach out the writer to suggest the next time he writes about us with an unattributed assertion that he reach out to us to discuss the issue.

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-03-30/nuclear-power-one&-cheap-squeezedMby-mounting--costs

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - Bloomberg asked about the unplanned manual shutdown Monday at the plant and the restart today. We explained thaty e circumstances in which flow to the reactor closedMloop cooling system and other nonMsafety systems was inadvertently cut off. We said the plant responded as expected and our senior resident inspector was reviewing the licensee's response to the event. We also returned a call directed to the resident inspector's office, on the same subjeci from a member of Physicians for Social responsibility, a local activist group

SMALL MODULAR REACTORS - OPA clarified TVA's pre-application status for an Early Site Permit at the Clinch River Site for a reporter with Energy Wire.

INOIAN POINT - Bloomberg News and a free-lance reporter had questions for us on defective baffle bolts identified in the Unit 2 reactor vessel. Entergy issued a press release regarding the development on Tuesday afternoon, followed by a statement from N.Y. Gov. Cuomo expressing concerns about the issue. The company intends to replace the faulty bolts. Meanwhile. NPR's 'Here & Now" aired a repa~ this afternoon on the ongoing debate over the plant's future, as well as recent issues that have surfaced at the facility: http://ber~~.r1dnow.w_Qyr,ora/2016/03/30/ny-nuclear-ptant-debate

MILLSTONE - The Day (of New London, Conn,) had a reporter at our Annual Assessment meeting for the plant last night and she had questions prompted by part of the discussion. We responded to questions regarding a shutdown of the Unit 3 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwa1:er pump during testing last month.

PILGRIM -The Cape Cod (Mass) Times sought information on our Phase ~a~ inspection set to begin next Monday at the plant. The inspection is part of our increased oversight initiated last year.

SEABROOK - Region I staffers involved with concrete degradation issues at the plant brought the Newburyport (Mass.) Daily News up to speed on our reviews in that area. Among the topics discussed were ASR-related testing to be performed at NIST for the NRC and NextEra's plans for additional mon~oring of the condition.

Press releases and speeches posted: NRC to Hold Open House on April 6 in Delta, Pa., to Discuss 2015 Petfonnance of Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Plant

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Boyer, Rachel

From: Krsek, Robert Sent To:

Tuesday, April 19, 2016 9;34 AM

Cc: Clark, Theresa; Valliere, Nanette; Bowen, Jeremy Castleman, Patrick; Cubbage, Amy

Subject: ~E; IP2 Containment Building Leaks

Thank you

In case no one else has seen it, NUREG/CR-7111 (link below) has a good synopsis of the Indian Point 2 Refueling Cavity and lists the licensee's planned corrective actions for future outages (wtien it was published in 2012) in Section A.3.4. Jt provides a good history and you may find the information useful The link is below:

http:l/pbaduows.nrc.gov/docs/ML 1204/ML 12047A184.pdf .~) ,_ /

Robert G. Krsek T('(hnical Assi5tJnt !or Rl.!<lttnrs

Office of Commissionl;'r B.:ir;in

U.S. Nuclt.•J.r R1.'gul<ik)I) ClHTI1nissi11n

301.415.1766

From: Clark, Theresa Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2016 9:02 AM

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To: Gilles, Nanette <[email protected]>; Bowen, Jeremy <Jeremy.0owen@nrc,gov> C.C! Castleman, Patrick <[email protected]>; Cubbage, Amy <[email protected]>; krsek, Robert <[email protected]> Subject: Re: IP2 Containment Buildins Leaks

Thanks. rm asking Jeremy to follow up with the region, and we'll get back to you as soon as possible.

On: 19 April 2016 08:48, "Gilles, Nanette" <Nanette.(Jillcs,,ii'·nrc,g()V> wrote: Theresa,

Can you please get some background information on this issue from today's clips to the TAs today so the principals can have it before tomorrow's hearing?

Entergy Unable To Halt Contaminated Water Leak In Indian Poinfo Unit 2 Containment Building. The Huffington Post (4/18, Witherspoon, 518K) reports that for the "past 23 years, Entergy engineer5 have tried unsuccessfully to ignore, live with, and then stop a radioactive rain from the Indian Polnt 2 reactor cavity from falling onto workers inside the massive containment building.• Entergy pledged in 2010 to ~try different methods in each of the next three refueling outages to see ff' they could stop the flow of water through the massive concrete and steel tub surrounding the reactor.b That "six~year plan was deemed acceptable by the NRG." But the first two efforts during refueling outages "failed." The plant is ·currently in the midst of the third refueling outage and NR:C spokesman Neil Sheehan said in an email exchange that the company has been unable to find or halt the leaks."

Thanks,

Nan

Nanette Valliere Techn!cal Assistant for Reactors Office of Chairman Burns U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-1830

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Boyer, Rachel

From: -- ---Pickett, Douglas (--·~' Se11t: Wednesday. April 06, 2016 2:32 PM To: Tate, Travis; McHale, John; Cheruvenki, Ganesh; Paehler, Jeffrey; Jenkins, Joel; Clark,

Theresa; Rihm, Roger; Tifft, Doug; McNamara, Nancy; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil; Turk, Sherwin

SUbjec:t: FW: Battle Bolt issues from 2000 - FYI Atta<hmonts: Baffle Bolts OD 00·011.pdt,IR 05000247-2000-003.pdf; RE: Baffle Bolt issues from 2000

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From: Haagensen, Brian sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 2:05 PM To: Dentel, Glenn <[email protected]>; Lally, Christopher <[email protected]>; Pinson, Brandon <[email protected]>; Schussler, Jason <[email protected]> Cc: Cataldo, Paul <[email protected]>; Newman, Garrett <[email protected]>; Rich, Sarah <[email protected]>; Pickett, Douglas <[email protected]> SUbJect: Baffle Bolt issues from 2000 • FYI

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Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office)

j(b)!B) I

2

Doc. ID.

®:co -6//

Rev. No. I seq. No.

UHrTEO STATl;S

NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION ~EGIOPlll

Mr. A. Alan Bind Vice President • Nuclear Power Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

Indian Point 2 Station Broadway end Bleakley Avenue Buchanan, NY 10511

475 AU..ENOALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406·1415

May 16, 2000

SUBJECT: NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2000-003

Dear Mr. Blind:

Thia letter transmit. the resutts of safety inapedions conducted by NRC in$pl!CtorS at your Indian Point 2 roactor feoltlty from February 29, 2000 tl1rough April 1, 2000. The untt was in c<>ld shutdorwn throughout the Inspection period as steam generator examinations continued and the re•ctor was disaa:aembled ror refuellng.

Bated on the re&ulls of this inspection, •n apparent violation was k:lentified th~ is under evaluation in conjunction with other find'mgs from the Augmented T earn lne:pedion described in Roport 0500024712000002. The apparent violation Involves the fallore to maintain the isolation valve....,, water (IVSW) system operable per Technical Specification 3.3.C and as deaclibed In tho Updated Final Safety Analysts Report (UFSAR) Section• 6.5 and 14.3.e. 1. The isolation valve ....,, water system became Inoperable on February 15, 2000 during lhe ataam generator tube failure event shorUy after It actuated In response to • phne A containment iaotatlon aignel. There ...,"' prior OIJl>Orl\lnltieo to have corrected detioiencie8 in tVSN syotem operotion. we undenrtand that modtfications to ccf'TeCt eystem response to a containment ilolation signal wffl be completed pnor to plant mtart from the present steam generator outage. Should you have a dlffemnt understanding regarding plans to correct tl1e IV&N system problem before 1'81tart. please c<>ntact Mr. Peter Eselgroth at 61 0-337 ·5234.

Also, based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has detennined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violatiOflt. are bei"U tfeated n Non-Cited Violations (NCVs), consimnl with Sectlon Vll.B.1.a of the Enforcement Polley (November 9, 1999, 64 FR 61142). The NCVs lnvolvo the lellum to maintain the react0t coolant pump oli collection syatam per regulatory requinlmen1$, the failure to follow nmlts in ""'lduat heat removal operating procedures for reactor differential temperat...-a, and the fa/hJre to provide adequat<> maintenance instructions for fire dampers in the cable spreading room. If you choose to contest these violations or the oeverity level of these NCVs, you should provide a roaponse within 30 days of the date of this Inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commlaolon, ATTN: Document Control 0..1<. Washington, O.C. 20555-0001: with copies to the Regional Adminialrator, Region t: the Dlr<>ctor, Office of Enforcement, Untted States Nuclear Regulatory Commtaaion, Washington, O.C. 20555-0001; and Iha NRC Resident Inspector at the Indian Point 2 facility.

--.. -······ ~--·-----

A. Alan Blind 2

Jn aCCOldance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you h"'e any question$ regarding this report, please oontacl Mr. Peter Eoelgroth at 610.337-5234.

Sincerely,

c~% A. ;and~ph ~h. ;,.,clor

Dookat No. 050002•7 License No. DPR-26

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. o5ooo247/2000-003

cc wlend: J. Groth, Senior Vice Pre$ident - Nuclear Operations J. Baumstark, Viee President, Nuclear Power Engineering J. McCann, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Ucenllng B. Brandenbufg, Assistant General Counsel C. Faioon, DilllCtor, Nuclear ucenalng. NYPA J. Ferrick, Operations Manager C. Donaldson, Eaqoim, Alsi11»nt Attorney General, Naw Ym Department of Law P. Eddy, Elecllic Division, Deportmon1 of Public Service, St..to of New YOl1< T. Rose, NFSC Secretaiy F. Willam Valentino, Pre&ldent, New YOl1< St..te Energy Resear<h

and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Dineot«, New YOO< State Ene<gy Resear<h

and DeveJopment AUthority Courity Cieri<, West C-r Coun1y Legislature Wntoheoter Coun1y ExO<Ut!ve Putnam County Executive Rockland County Executive Orange Co1>'11y EXecutJVe T. Judson, Central NY Citizens Awareness NetwOf'k M. Elie, Clt.b::ent Awareness Network

Dookel No. License No.

ReponNo.

Facility:

Location:

Oates:

Inspectors:

Approved by:

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

05000247 DPR-26

0500024712000-003

REGION I

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

Indian Point 2 Nudear Power Plant

Buchanan. New York

FebnJary 29, 2000 th"1ugh April 1, 2QOO

William Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector Pater H1bighorst. Resident Inspector Jenrtifer England, Resident fn1pector Gregory Cranston, Reactor Engineer

Pater W. Eeelgroth, Chief Projeeto Bninch 2 DiVit ton of Reactor ?rofects

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant NRC lnspeecion Report No. 0500024712000.(1()3

This integrated in$pection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a fNe-week period of inspection by resident and regional inspectors.

Operatjons

Con Edison had adequate controls for placing two reactor caolant pumps on the backseat, and adequate plans for containment closure in the event of a loss of reactor coo4ing. Att operating proeedure locked guidance to assure a safe shutdown Instrument was prope~y vented. (01.1)

The operators failed to control RCS differential temperature Within limits during RHR system operation. The failure to foUow SOP 4.2.1 was a non-<:ited violation of NRC noquirements. Lk:ensee actions continued at the end of the inapection period to evaluate the impact on the baffle-.former and baffle..barrel bolts in the reactor ve&tel mtetn•ls, and to resowe this maher prior lo plant re&tllrt. (01.2)

The operators promptly re$p()Oded to the k:J$s. of power to the steam generator noz:zte dams. The nozzle dam normal air s~ly was k>st; however, no loss of reactor coolant system inventory occurred, and no monitoring existed for the nozzle dam• for approximately one hour. Con Edison failed to control and integrate several temporary facility change& for the nozzle dam tUPPort systems. Inadequate coordination betwe.n operators and workers resulted in -11 near mls•foraslgnlflcaminjury. (02.1)

Plant management presentations lo the Nuclear Fadlltiea Safety Commi!IM werw incomplete. However, the committee members appeared wotl pnlpared ond provided good ditooHion• on the Febn.14iry 15 tie am generator tube letlk event. (07. 1)

Con Edison completed the investigation of the P'•nt response to the February 15, 2000 item generator tube leak. Corrective actions to lddresa lhe eeulOS of we•"""*- In the plant reoponso to the event """' in progress at the end of the inspection period and NRC review will be the $Llbject of an AIT follow-up team Inspection. The reautts of the root ceuse kweatigatlon for the steam generator tube fallure went not revleWed and are being provided by Con Edison to the NRC Ollice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for review. (07.2)

Maintenance

Maintenance activities were satisfactorily completed. The conduct of Surveillance teats during the period was acceptable. Maintenance and test activities were not conai'stentJy performed in accordance with expectations and adminl$trative controls. The initial evaluations in preparation for a turbine load test dkt not compkrtely consider shutdown ristt (M1 .3)

ii

ExOC!Jtive Summary (confd)

The containment liner boeame comx::led due to prolonged contact with borated water in areas where moisture barriers were degraded. Con Edison actions continued to inveStigate and repair liner degradation, and to auure that margins to design limits were maintained. (M2.1)

Engineerioo

The failure to coled leakage from the vent pipe and the lower oil resetVOir drain connections on three RCP motonl is considered a violation of 10 CFR SO Appendix R, Section Ill. This Severity Level IV viOlalion jg being treated as a N~ited Violation. A long·stan<ling deficiency in th<! oil conection system had gone ~ncorrected. (E2.1)

Con Edison did not recognize a !Ong-standing difference between the design and licensing basis for the isolation vatve seal water sy&tem. Despite several past events and a design basis verffication program which highlighted IVSWS performance issues, Con EdiSon failed to cof'RK:t a basic design deficiency and assure that the licensing basis was met. Operability evaluations were less than adequate and corrective actions were narrow and untimely, The failure to assure tegulatory requirements were COi rectly translated into specifications, drawWlgs and procedures wu an apparent violation. (E2.2)

Steam generator eddy current testing and anatysia was conducted, The eddy current test resuhs revealed defects which re.suited in a Classificatk)n of c.3 per Technical Specification 4.13. (E2.3) More detailed tevieW of steam generator inspection results is under the purview of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

A lack of maintenance instaltatiOn instructions contributed to the failure of cable apreading room fire damper11 to fully close. Tho faulty damper11 caused the suppreaalon system to be degraded for approximately J months. The laUure to maintain provisions of the NRC.approved flre protection plan as de8"'ibed In the UFSAR and approved NRC Safety Evalualion Ropart jg a Non.Cited Violation. (E2.4)

Plant Suooort

Con Edison staff appropriately responded lo the discovery of trace amount• af contamination in tho Unit 1 stonn drains and tOQk proper actions to resotve the condition and to investigate the cause. The material was not assodated with the Unit 2 steam genenator event or any recent plant IQtivities, and there was no radiological dose consequence due to the contamination. (Rl.1)

iii

~--~"~------------------"""'"' ...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECllTIVE SUMMARY ... . ............ , ............ II

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... . ................. . iv

I. OPERATIONS .. . . .. . . . .. . .. ................... 1 O 1 Concluc:t of Oporationll .. . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . , , .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. 1

01.1 Operational Safety Veritic:alion .. .. .. . , . .. . .. .. .. 1 01.2 Excessive Core Oiflerential Temperature (NCV 200!Hl03-01) ...... , . 2

07 Quality Assurance in Operations . ... , ....... , ........ , .... , . , ...... 5 07.1 Nuclear Fadllties Ssfety Committee .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .... 5 07.2 Steam Generator Tube Leak Ract Cause (Sl-1) Evaluation , . S

08 Mi&cell...-Ou1 Operations Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 08.1 Reporting of Events . . . . . . 6

11. MAINTENANCE .. . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . 7 M 1 Conduct of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

M1 .1 Maintenance Observations ..... , . . . .... 7 M1 .2 Surveillonco Oboervatlons .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .... 6 Mi .3 Condulions for Maintenance and Surveillance . . . . ............. 8

M2 Malnteoance and Matertal Can<!ltlon of Facilities and Equipment ........... 9 M2. 1 Containment Liner Degradation . . .................... 9

Ill. ENGINEERING. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . . 10 E2 Enginoenng Support of Faoilltiel ond Equipment . . . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . .. .. . . 1 O

E2. 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Colledion System (NCV 2000-003-02) . 1 O E2.2 Inoperable laolation Valve Seal Water System (EEi 2000.003-03) ... 12 E2 3 Steam Generator Examinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 14 E2.4 C..bie Spreading Room Fire Dampers (NCV 2000003--04) .. , . 16

IV. PLANT SUPPORT ........... , . . . . .. . . . ................. 16 R1 Radiologicol Proto<:lion and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls ''' '''' '''''' ''.' 16

R1.1 Conlarnlnatlon in Storm Orslns ........ , ...................... 18 X1 Exit Meeting Summary., .......................................... 19

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1 • Inspection Procedures Used ~ Items Opened and Closi!td • Wl1 of Acrooym• U&od

i•

Report Details

I. OPERATIONS

01 Conduct of Operations

The plant was in COid Shutdown during the Inspection periOd to Inspect steam generators tonowtng a tube failure while operating at"°""' on February 15, 1999. On Marcll 27, Con Edison announced its decision to enter the refueling outage. Reactor vessel diu&umbly was in progress at the end of th• Inspection period.

01.1 Operational Safety Verification

a. /nsoection Scope (71707}

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the lnspeet0111 conducled frequent raviews of ongoing plant operations. Specific observations are described below.

b. Obsftrvations •nd Findings

The lnopeetor performed regular tours In the control room, $Whchgear mom, auxlllary building, diosel generator building, turbine building, primary ouxtllary building, containment building, spent fuel building, and areas within Indian Point Unit 1. Plant parameters Important to safety Wete ObServed within allowable limits during control board and plant status reviews..

Reactor ('mJant PYmP* on the Bae.beat

Con Edison placed Ill<> 21 and 23 reactor GOO!anl pumpe (RCPs) on the boekseat to fadUtate maintenance on the seal packages. A reactor eoolant pump that Is disoonnected from the motor with the pump 1h1ft lowlr joumal bearing resting on the upper thermal banier Is on the backseat. llMI bac:kaeat mlnlmlz:tis reactor coolant system leakage during maintenance on the reactor coolant pump seal package.

The pre-evolution brief was consistent with procedural guidance In SA0-202, •infrequently Performed Tetts or Evoll.lliOns.R Lessons teamed from NRC lnfonnation Nolice 96-58, "RCP Seal Replacement with Pump on Backseat,' were com!Clly incorporated into temporary operating pro<edure (TOI) 235, "RCP Backoeat Operations with Fuel in the Reaotor or During Fuel Transfer".

The in$pe(:f.or observed nucfear plant operators edeq1.1•tety monit~ leakage from th" two reactor coolant pumps and control room personnel were adequately aware of contingency actions If reactor coolant system leakage increaHd significantly. The leakage ftom the 23 RCP was greater than 2 gallons per minute (gpm) on March 24, 2000, which was greater thin the expected leakage of less than 1 gpm. Operators isolated lhe leal<Oge by securing the seol inject;on line veol valve. Procedure TOI 235 only provided guidance lo lncnoase leakage monitoring tt leakage was greater than 2 gpm. After discussions with the inspector, Con Edison processed temporary procedure change 200Q..0071 to add a atep to close the seal injection vent valve. No eonseqouenee

2

occurred from the leakage. The seals were successfully replaced and the RCPs wore taken off the ba<kseat

coma1nmont Closure

Nuclear plant operators in\lolved with containment closure were knowtedgeable of their responslbllllles. The contingency plana for dosure were established in the event of a loss of residua! heat rem0\181. OC)erators had instructions on which containment penetration• needed to be iaoloted and a number of oonneotlons penetrating Ill rough the containment eqllpment hateh. Containment evacuation alarms were trited daily during lflis period.

On March 16, 2000, Con edlson incteased Ille number of lines penetrating the equipment hatch in support of steam generator sludge lancing. This complicated the actions needed to close the eontairvnent The inspector noted a la<:<k of consistency betWeen operating Cl8WI in contingency planning, such as specific roles and mponslbilities on do&Ure aetkrities and timely evacuation. These tssues were disaJssed with Con Edison management Wl10 ael<nowledged Ille Inspector's eoncem. At the end of the Inspection, plant condition changes NISUlted in leu urgency for containment closure,

Alternate Safe Shutdown Pressurizer Leyel Instrument <LJ .. 3101 >

During a containment tour, the Inspector ob&et'Ved that the alternate safe shutdown pressurizer lewl Instrument (Ll-3101) Indicated fivfJ percent Reactor COOiant system water level at the time was 6 Inches below the pressurizer. The remaining pressurizer level instruments Indicated zero percent. U~3101 was indicating inaccurately. This tevel Instrument would be used dLJ'ing a reactor shutdown~ the eonlrol room was lnacce1slble. The pressurizer WU preuurized with nitrogen at the time. A nitrogen bubble in the reference leg of the level lnstrumet1t would cause the Indicator to read high. Procedure SOP 1. 1 did not provide guidance to vent this transmitter. COndition Report 200001596 was for this deficiency. Con Edison Initiated Gc:tion$ to auure the instrument was made operable when required.

c. Conclusions

Con Edison had adequate control$ for placing two reactor coolant pumps on the backseat, and .Oequate ptans for containment closure in the event of a lou of reactor cooling. An operating procech.n lacked guidance to anure a safe shutdown Instrument was properiy vented.

01.2 Excessive Core Differential Temperature (NCV 2000-003--01)

a. Inspection SCQPB CT1707l

The purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee control of the reactor temperatures during shi,rtdown operations.

3

b. Oburyation and findings

NRC Inspection 0500024712000002 noted that the .. actor dlfferenlial """""'11lu"' (delta-1) "'ached 91 deg.,... F during plant cooldown actiYities lollowing tile February 15, 2000 Steam Generator Tube Failure. The reactor delta~ T is defined to be the dtfference between the averoge "'let°' C'lOlant system (RCS) wide range hot leg and cold leg temperatures. ProceCIUlll SOP 4.2.1 (limlation 2. 7 end atep 4.1.2) directs the OPO'lllor lo limtt -T to 72 de9,.,. F. Tho delta·T exceeded and then nitumed below the limtt as the aperators realigned the RHR eyatem by removing cne residual heat removal (RHR) he.at exchanger from 1arvi<». Tho maximum core delta·T occumod at 2:45 a.m. on FebNary 17 when the four cold leg temperatu"'8 we"' 105, 105, 102 and 116 degrees F, respectlvely, and the tour hot leg tampe'llturos we"' 192, 192, 191 and 216 degre .. F, respecijVely. The failure to follow SOP 4.2.1 during RHR 1ystem operation Is considered a non-Qted Violation of NRC requirements. this Issue I• in the corrective action prog..m as condition report (CR) 200001681. (NCV 0500024712000..003-01)

The maximum core deft.a. T was established for the re.ctor vNSel lntem•ls (reference 1988 safety evaluation SECL 88-6128) to limtt lateral deflection of the boftk>.fotmer and baffte..barrel bOtta to 0.02 tn(heS. con EdiSon contaeced the reactor vendor to perfonn an evaluation of the consequences of exceeding the delta· T limtt. Con Edill<ln required that the evaluations be resotved prior to plant operation aboVe 200 degrees F. Licensee sciion on this item continued .rt the end of tho inti,,ection petiOd.

c. Conclusjons

The operators faited to control RCS differential temperature wlttlln •mtts durtng RHR •ystern operation. The faUure to ro11ow SOP 4.2.1 was a non--eited Yiolatlon of NRC requirements. Ucenaee action• continued at the end of the Inspection per1od to evaluate the Impact on the baflle.lormer and bal!le-barrel bolts in the ...actor v.- int<lmalo, •nd 10 resolve t~i• matter prior to plant rntart.

a. !nMQCtjon Seopt

The inSpector --the lic:enaee retponse to • lou of power and air supply to the steam generator nozzie d•ms.

b. Qbservatjona and Findings

On March 2, 2000 with the unit in cold shutdown and reactor coolant system level slx inet'IH above the reactor vel&el flange, operators were alerted by control room annundators that electrical power lilnd compressed air supply wa$ k>st to the steam generator noz:de dams. The inspector revlewed the cause af the momentary loss of support systems to the nczzte dams, the impact on reactor C'lOlant oyotem Inventory, and the performance Issues associated with the recovery of the support systems. The nozzle dam air supply was loat wtien a worl<ef tripped on and Inadvertently dlsconne<:ted a temporary 480 volt power supply.

-------------· --· ......... .

4

The operator appropriately followed annunciator rasponse proooduras to confirm there was no lo$C of reac:tor cool3"t system inventory, and initiated actions to troubleshoot the losa of -r" The power - was invMtigated by nucleat plant--'""'· the watch engineer, and memboro of the woll< contml center. Troubleshooting-· originating fn>m the WOf1< c;ontrol center were accomptlshed without communleatlng witll the control room. The control room personnel were not initially notified of the cause for the loss of power and ~ized the temporary 480 volt -r supply, Poor ooordlnatlon bet\"'en the containment and the control room resulted in a Potential personnel saf<lty issue. Maintenance pergonnel were repairing the 480 vott cable when the operator energiud the 1..,_.ry 480 volt supply. No personnel injuries occurred" Con Edison documented lhese dill<::nlpandn in condition reports 200001433 and 200001441. Plant worl<er.s failed to foUow the requirements In SA.0..105, -Work Pennits·, intended to assure penionnel ufety while WOtking oo ptant equipment. This .,.,cffle pmblem i• eonlktered to be a minor violation and is not subfect to fonnal e11foleement action

No 8dverse consequenc9$ oCCUITed wh&n the atr au~y and electrical power to the nozne dam monitOring panel& were lost tor approidmately one hour and ten minutes. Con Edison confirmed no reactor coolant system '8aklge into the generator plenum& and backup nitrogen oupplied the nozzle dam oeols" The ateom genorator noxzle dams provide a barrier betw.!en the reactor coolant system and the steam generator ptenum to allOW' for inatanauon of equipment to lnapect steam generator tubes.

TM operalions regponae to the toss of power and air was compticated by inadequate doscriplions lo• ooveral temporary fooHity ch•nges (TFCs)" Six TFCs provided temporaoy electriClll power and ait supply to the containment: l\oweVer, none of the TFC• were evaluated to minimize ttie consequence on 1 loa of eledrical power. The TFC associated with electrical power were from a Unit 113"8 kllovott suppty b<eakOr. Further, oleclrical prote<:ti"8 featu,.. (i"e" ground fouM) only existed at the one supply braaker.

The inapecto< -rved that operation of the redundant eloctrlcal and dine! llr compreaaars was not l.n:teratood tr/ control room peraonnet The buHding -.d grounds penionnel were -$lblt for maintenance and open1tion of the cornprwuors, Con Edison documented this failure In condition report (CR) 200001•35. The CR was prioritized as a signllloanoe level 2 out of a four tier pnority oystom (wi1h level 1 moat significant). The inspector eont\nned that corredlw adions adequately addressed the above deficiencies. Con Edieon establi1hed 1 special team to review the cau&e1 for industrial safety events.

c. Conclusion"

The operators promptly retponded to the loas of power to the steam generalor n.,.Je dams. The nozzle dam normal air supPy was lo&t:; however, no k>ls of reactor coolant syatem inventory oc:curred, and no rnonttoring existed fOf the nozz:te dame for approximately one hour. Con EdiSOn failed to control and integrate several temPQt8ry facility changea for the nozzle dam support syatama. Inadequate coordination between opel(lte>f'5 end ~ers resulted in a near miss for a algntficant Injury.

07 Quality Auuranc:e In Oporatlons

07.1 Nuclear Facilities Sefety Committee

e. Inspection Scope

5

The inspeetot obSe,..,d activitio• of the Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee (NFSC) on Marc/115, 2000.

b. Observations and Findings

the commlttMI fulfllled its reeponslbilities in aocorc:hmce with the techniceJ specificatiOns. The primary agenda topic inoluded performance obseMltiooo during the February 15, 2000 11eam generator tube leak. The """1ffic agenda ~ems included event chronology, equipment response, and emergency plan execution. Plant management ptMentations lo the N-•r Facillll .. Sal'ely Committee""'"' Incomplete. For eqmple, dlllClJSSionS on lhe use 1 o CFR S0.!>4 (X) lmplemen1ation of emergency oi>etlrtlng procedure changes, and delayo on establishment ot normal Pf""Surlhr spray ""''" nol lnitlally presented to the NFSC by operations management.

The NFSC raised appropriate qt.M!tStiona and appeared to be adequately briefed on the e"ent and performance in&igtits. The NFSC questiOned the adequacy of the Opellllor work around process. the long~standing degradation of the steam auppty valve to the air ejectors, and questioned whether recurrent problems occurred in emorgeney planning given ~nt perfonnanc:e observations.

c. Condysjoos

Pl•nt management presentations to the Nud9ar FacNities Safety Committee were lnCQmplete, However, the committee members appeared Mii prwpared and provided good diaeu1aion1 on the February 15 steam generator tube Ink event.

07.2 Steam Generalor Tube Leak Rool Cau .. (SL-1) Evaluation

a. ln1poclion SMC' 193703)

The inspector reviewed the ncenaee actions to evaluate the February 15, 2000, steam generator tube leak event response and develOp correctiVe eetions.

b Observatiqu1 and Findings

con Edison comploteo lhe plant lrlp analysiS and investigation for the February 15, 2000 sleam generalor tube leak ovenl --· The Significanoe Levol 1 (SL·1) report was issued during thiS inspection period and described the correettve actiorus to addta8ti the direct and contributing causes of weaknesses: in the plant rellf)Onse to the event. The CQttectrve meas1.1res included actions to revise prccedure., train operatol"S, perlonn extent of condition revtews, enhance log keeping, repair equipment, modify plant

6

equipment, and addre&s weaknes.ses in the emergency plan and emergency plan imi:*M11entation. Licensee actions continued at the encl of the inspection period to complole the •hort and long term conedlve adlon In the SL-1 report. NRC ntView of the Con Edison corrective actions continued to verify the oorredive measures were timely and appropriate, and to detemllne whether the weaknesses addreeaed In NRC Report 05000247/2000002 wefl! adaq<Jately addressed. Furthe< NRC review will be the subject of an AIT follow..up team inspection.

c. Cooctusioos

Con Edison completed the ilweatigation of the plant response to the February 15, 2000 steam generator tube teak. COrredive actions to addresa the cause& of weaknesses in the plant response to the event ~ in progress at the end of the Inspection period and NRC review wli be the oubject of an AIT follow-up team inlP"cliOO. The reoulta of the root cause Investigation for the steam generator tube failure were not ,.VieWed and are being provided by con Edison to the NRC Office of Nuctur Reactor Regulatlon for review.

08 Mltcolt.neoua Openatton• 111ue1

08. 1 Reponing of Events

•- !mO'(;fjon soooe (92703)

The inapecior reviewed ltcensee actions to submit reports per 10CFR 50.72.

b. Observations and Flndjoos

On March 3, 2000. Con Editan retracted an e11ent previously reported as a design deficiency that ~ in plant operation outside the design basis for the auxiliary - •)'lllem (noMnce Event No. 3e660). con Edison reviewed the deoign basis caiaJlatlon for the ayatem, FIX-00030-02, and found that ~ com.Ir.ad ex-. conaetvatllm for nitrogen u-noqunmonts for the ""8Ulned number of valve operations end lealutges. Ak revising the cak::ulation to include more realistic aasumptiOn•. Con Ediaon determined that the auxiliary feectwatet ayt;tem met the design basis requirements With adoquate margins. The inspector reviewed the reviled ealCUletlon and tctentifted no disctepandes. The licensee had an adequate basis to retract the event.

c. Congtusjons

The reporting of events per 1 O CFR 50. 72 was appropriate.

7

II. MAINTENANCE

M1 Conduct of Mllntanance

M1.1 Maintenanoe Observations

a. lnspectjon &9oe (62707)

ihe in!J.pectors reviewed selected maintenance work activities and $Uppotting work doa..imentation. ActMtieS were selected for systems, structures, or components in the scope of the malmenanoe rule.

b. Obseryatigns and Fjncfings

23 Reactor Coolant pump Motor Ljft

on Marcil 7, 2000, the Inspector ob&erved the lifting of the 23 Reactor Coolant Pump motor. This motor wu removed to perform lower bearing and pump seal inspections. The lift followed System Operating Procedu111 (SOP) 29.8. 1 "Polar Crane Operation." The heavy lift was performed in accon:tance with this prooedUf'8, however. the procedure was not referenced during the actual lift. Station Admini1trative Order (SAO) 133 •Procedure, Technical SpecificatiOn• and Licensee Adherence and Use Policy• requires each step of a continuous use procedure to be read prior to performance. SOP 29.8.1 Is a continuous use procedure; however it was not observed to be in visibk! use. This concern was discussed With an outage manager, who assured the inspector lhat procedures were used. This specific faill,.lf"8 to follow procedures on procedure use tia.d minor 1lgnlficance. Thls issue is being treated as a non-died vlolaUon oonalstent with sec:tloti IV of the N~C enforcement polley.

The adminl&tnltlvo cormo for heavy load& wore followed during the lift. H.,.,..,.,r, the inspector detennined through lntetvlewo that not •II persomel 1110dated with the activity went familiar with the odml-ivo oontrols for haavy iolldo. Thia was diocuuecf with the M-outage managem. The li<:enlff conducted briefings to aseure work c::rew. were famili•r with the controls for heevy loeds.

NP-O!:e14381 22 Steam Generator Hillside Port Remoyal and Restoration

On March 6, 2000, the inspector observed t.he attempt to remove the 22 steam generator hilside pon to allow an inspection of the upper support plate. The removal was not successful because one bolt could not be removed. The bolt was later cut and drilled out to allow for the inspection, On March 8, 2000, the inspector observed the restoration of the hillsfde port The ltPPl~iate portion o1 the procedure was present In the field. The procedure called for a specific torque sequence, however, that torque eequence was not followed. The opposlle torque sequence was followed. This did not impact the effectiveness of the system restoration.

8

NP:90:14380 23 Steam Gene!jttor Hillside port Re!Tk)Yal 511\d Bc!f9ration

On M•roll 6. ZOOO, the inspector obaefved the -al Of the 23 11..,,, generator hilslde port. The hlll&ide port was removed consistent with the pmcedure. On March 8, 2000, the inspector obeetved the restoration of the 23 steam generator hiQslde port. The: hHltide pott wa1 removed and l"Htored property.

M1.2 SuNeillanc:e Ob&ervatiOns

8, Inspection Scooe (61726)

The inspec:tor reviewed selected surveillance activities and supporting doeumemetlon. Actlvltle$ wero selected for systems, atructures, or components In the aeope of the maintenance rule

b. Qbservatjon1 and Eir'KJinas

WO @:12391 Tyrbioe Building Crane Load Test

The inspector .reviewed lk:ensee preparations to load teat the t~ne buMdlng crane by lifting 66,000 ganons oJwater In water bags. The in1pector naiHd • quesdon on the consequence• of e failure and the impact on shutdown risk and of lntem.I ftoodl.ng of tke ul'etywfelated 480 volt switehgeat t'Ol)r'li. Con Ediaon stopped Iced te.t piepaiatlone end initiated condition report 200001553. TM loed teet wat conducted following a major overhaul on the main and auxiliary hoist gearboxes, brakes •nd hook bloda!i.

Con Edison's corrective actions induded., evaluation to determine Whether an unre"1eWe<I safety questlOn elCilted (snty evaluation SE.00.188-PR). The ulety evaluation 1dequatoly documented a bolls that an unre- salety question did not exist Con Edison periormed two engineering ealculllllons. The first c:ok:utation (FMX· 001""4) conduded lhat the use ternponuy dams would be llUftk:lent to PAIW'nt Impact on the "80 voR bu..,., oervtce wster punp - cabling, ond 8.9 kilovott load cont.... 111• .. cond cak:utatlon (FMX.001•5) oetarmlne<t tha maximum water height 81 lhe tempoOlry d1ma. The inopeaor Wll'lfted that the tempomy damo instalod to pR1t11ct aafety....i.ted equipment In the event that the-·• b8Qa railed """" conslsten1 with the engineering calculations. The turbine load test was peri'onned ailer contingency actions were taken to preclude Impact on safety.related equ11>ment.

tnoomplete planning occurred for the load test since the potential faffure of the load and tmpaet: on ••fe shutdown equipment was not evaluated. Col'T'8d.ive 1dion1 were apprapriate and the load test was perlomied sueeeufully.

M 1.3 Conctustons for Maintenance and Surveillanoe

Maintenance activtt:ies were satisfactorily completed. The conduct of surveiltance tests during the period was acceptable. Maintenance and test activities were not consistently performed In accordance with expectations and administrative centrers. rhe initial

9

evaluations In preparation for a turbine loa<1 tett did not completely conaider ahutdown risk.

M2 Maintenance and M1t<tliol Condition of Facllltlea and Equipment

M2.1 Containment Liner Degradation

a. ln&eect!on scooe (62707)

The inspector reviewed licensee actions to investigate and evaluate degradaUon in the containment iiner.

b. ObffNations and Findings

Con EdlaOn completed inapoctlOna or the containment liner during the oulage to meet the requirementa of ASME S..cllon XI, Sublectlon IWE. The lnspectiona identified degtadatiQn in • c;:a1,flk seel installed in the joint between the insulated Wner wall and the containment ttoor 11 lhe 46 foot elevlllon. Tho degtaded aeal aH""'9d water to """P behind the 1naulat1on and contact the carllon steel liner. Fu~her Investigations In areas behind tho degraded .. al Identified com>sion and wall loss In the liner at and belOW the floor leveL The zinc-based paint and epoxy was mi.sslng In some locattons wtth exten•ive wall Joss, Th• licensee expanded the in&f)edions 11nd conducted ultrasonic (UT) measurement• to Identify the flCOpe of the OOl'TOlion and the extent of the degradation. The results were summari:ted on Drawing OMO 322097-M, Revision O, dated March 27, 2000.

The corrosion occulTed becaua.e moisture bamer seats were mining or deteriorated, whlcll allowed extended wetting of the liner with bonlted wller. A possible "°"""' was water leakage onto the "8 ft elevation noor from souron tueh es the aocumulator tanks. Another aoun::a of t;ner wetting waa from past events in which Zooe 10 of lhe weld channel and penetnolion _...rization oyetem (WCPPS) beceme ttoodod. Zone 1 O was in-.ntty ftQoded early in 1>4ont life while filing lhe reoctor cavity. Zone 10 woo also h)'droatatlcally teated in 1995 In an attempt to ldtntify end repair leakage within the zone. Zone 10 has olnoe been A1tired tn pleoo 11 aloMd by Todinlool Specific:ation 3.3.0.2.c boceUIC of 5eakege that was deemed not repelreble. The moat 1lgniftcant liner degradation wn f0t.tnd to exiat •t Inspection port #9, located behind accumullltora 21 and 22, and just above a wekf c:hannllll located abOut 6 lnc:heS betoW the ftoor.

The Hc:ensee evaluated the llner concfftiQO$ and determined that U\e nner remained acceptable to function as a barrier to leakage. The UT measurements showed the depth of the Oefects; the minimum waU thh:l<nes• in the nominal CJO!t.ohaJf {~)inch liner was 0.360 Inches. Engineering evalulllono (Raytheon Report 91450.044.S-001) ahowod that the minimum wall thiel<ness was 0.34 lnchel for buckling loads (applicable for initial construction only). and that a wall lhiolmesses 81 low as 0.25 Inches may be allowable for alrain in local areas. uoen ... evaluations continued at the end of the lnspe<:tlon period to analyze the minimum allowable wall thickness.

--------------------------~-

10

The licensee entered this Issue in the corrective :actions system (reference CRs 200001209, 200001731, 200001652 and 200002024). Corrective action• continued at Ille end of Ille Inspection period to restore damaged moisture aeals and repair conorvte, re&tore liner protection in the area of greatest corrosion, and plan for future in1pections to monttOt the rate of oorroslon. Nf:{C review of the licen.ee corrective actions continued at Ille end Of Ole Inspection period.

c. CQnolusfOns

The containment lioer became COtToded due to p«>looged contact with borated w;ter In areas where motstllRI barriers Mre degraded. Con Ediaon action& continued to investtgete and repair liner degradation, and to assure that margins to design Nmits were maintained.

Ill. ENGINEERING

E2 Engineering Support of F•cllllles and Equipment

E2.1 Reactor Coolant Pump OH Collection System (NCV 2000-003-02)

a. loseect;on &epe (92903)

The inspection reviewed Con Edison's action$ in response to IDW' oM level alarms on the upper and loY.ier oil reservoirs for the 23 teactor coolant pump motor and acceptability of tho o~ collection oystem .. n.qulnld by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R section 111. O

b. Observation and Findings

On February 15, 2000 at approximately 10:40 p.m., tho operators secured Ille 23 reactor coolant pump (RCP), •• part of the activities in response to the steam generator tube failure. Two and one hair houts leter latN oil level •i.tms were ennunt;iated in the control room for both the upper and lower oil reservoir. The oporalions watch engineer inspocled the 23 RCP motor and found oil on the entire motor frame, and burnt oU residue on the pump main ftange, •Nd• and mirror lnsUlation. Condition report (CR) 200001152 dooumenled these oboervaliona. The watch engineer Hlimated based upon IOcol level lndk:otions that opproximately 4% (8 gallon>) of Ole oil inveotoiy had 1.,.ked out of the motor. Con Edison concluded that the oil al1nns occurred when oil leaked from the motor on shutdown end doe to oil C011traction on motor cool down. No smoke or smoldering was observed due to the leaking oil.

The inspector walked down the RCP motor oil collection system using applicable Con Edison design drewinga. The oil coflect.ion system was de•lgned •• depk::ted on the drawings. The inspector verified that no oil addition and no change In the oil colledion tank Inventory was identif.ad during the last four months of pump operation.

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Duling the outage, Con Edloon performed pnwentativo maintenance on the 23 RCP motor, initiated work orders to remove and or inspect reactor coolant system Insulation on both 1he 21 and 24 cold legs, and lniliotod o plant modlfleation 10 lldd"""' po!ential extemal on lea"8go not oollecled by 1he oil coHection syo1em kif an RCPs. Con Eclison believes the ptimaty soun:e or oH leakage Is from the motor cooling air vent$. Specifically, oil mist goes past the fl)'Wh""' oil seal into the vent pipe. The misted oil travels down the exterior side or the motor and is picked up by the motor coormg air vents and sprayed into surrounding areas. Plant modification FPX.()().123344' was being developed to C011plure the oil leaks from under the motor flywheel cover and nsdirect It Into the existing oil collectlon system. The inapector walked down the proposed modification with cognizant design engineering personnel.

During review of this condition, the inspector leamed that i1nother long-atanding vulnerability existed on the oil collection system. CR 199801646 documented that three of four RCP motor lower reservoir drain lines with flanged connections ware not enclosed by the oil c:oltedlon system. Further, a Quality Alaurance Fire Protmctlon Audit In 1998 (~7-A) documented that Con Edison lnapproplialely diSpositioned this observation. Con Edison concluded that this flanged connedlon did not need to be endosed. E:ndosure of the lower oil reservoir drain c::omections for the ACP motors ta now planned as part of modification FPX.00-12334-F.

10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section 111.0., requires, in part, that the oil coUectlon system shalt be capable of collecting lube on from all pot•ntial pressuri:z:ed end unprouurized leakage sites in the reac:tor coolant pump lube oil tyAtems. Leakage PQintS to be protected shall include, in part, flanged conneotions on oil lines and lube oil reservoir& where such features exist on the "'actor cooiant pumps. NRC safety evaluation dated October 16, I 984, mstated NRC'• approval of the reactor coolant oil colectlon 1ystem and approval of an exemption that the hoiding tanks woukl not hold the entn lube oil system inventory from the four RCP9. The faiture to COlteet leakage from the vent pipe and the lower oil reservoir dtaln connedions on three RCP motor& 11 considered a violation of 10 CFR 50 ~ R, Section ill. This Severity Level IV violation Is being treated as a Non-Cited Vlolotion, consistent with Section Vll.B.1.a of the NRC enforcement Polley (84 FR 81142, November 9, 1999), lll1d this violation proposed corrective actions are ctoeumented in thl!l lioensee eotteetive action program as CR 200001152 and CR 199801846. (NCV OISOD02A712000.00S.02).

e. Conc!usiOn

The failu~ to collect leakage from the vent pipe and the iow&r on reservoir drain connections on three RCP motors is considered a \riOlation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. Section ill. This Severity Level IV violation Is being treated es a Non-cited Violation A long~atanding deficiency in the oil collection system had gone uneorTeded.

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E2.2 Inoperable Isolation Valve Seal Water Sy•tom (EEi 2000.003-03)

a. Inspection f!mpe

The inspection involved a review of the deficiencies documented in NRC ref'Ort 500247/200002 nogarding the isolation valve ... 1 water oystem OVSWS).

b. ObM!rvationa and Findinea

Con Edison failed to reoognize a lang-a18nding differeni;:e between the plant deaign and IVSWS licensing basis. This failure ,.....lted in less than lldequale "°"""'ive actions for defideneios in WSWS performanoe.

Ltcensjng Posis

Technical iplldflcatlOn (TS) 3.3.c. requi""' the JVSWS to be -rable above cold lhutdown with the tank maintained greater than 52 p$ig and a minimum of 144 gallons of seal water. The IVSWS a~ aeaJ water to the containment Isolation valves to minimize contalnment leaka!le following lou of coolant oooidents. The aystem injects Seal water at a pressure higher than the eont111lnmel'tt design pressure of 47 pslg, so that leakage wffl be from the Mii water system into the containment. The aystem operates automatically fot lines communicating with containment atmosphere. IVS\NS is an engineered safeguards system and Is Initialed on 1 phase A containment itolation signal.

The Updated Final Solely Anolyslo Repon (UFSAR) Section 6.5. 1 statOI that the design balit lor the JVSWS is to ensure the -· of the con1alnmont Isolation Wives during ony condition which requires c:ontoinment isolation. The UFSAR ltat<ls that no single flllure In the JVSW system would prevent It lrom po!formlng th• dealgn function. The rvsw tank inventory ii auffldent to ensure a ~ hour auppty of aeal water to al containment ito,atiori vatvw, wtth an ••umed wonst c.-e i$oldon valve ... t INkage. The IVSWS tank volume is IUl!icient for approximately 2.5 d•ys of operation It dealgn aeal water flow rates before mekeup ie required.

IYSWS PosiM and pmtqananee

As designed, the JVSWS would operate 1110001sfully to llOist containment isolation only after a lerge break LOCA in wtlich a phase B i10lati0n folloW\I Jmme<lleteiY allet' th• phaH A i*Olatiofl. The prennt dasign doe• not as.sure IVSVVS operability under all licensing baslo conditions for which tt could be called upon to function, opeolficalty for the broader apectrum of postulated breaks in the plant licensing basis, and In particular, for those break sizes where the phase B isolation is delayed after the start of the ewent.

The IVSWS response during past e11ent1 involving a phase A isolation was to drain the IVSWS tank into the component cooling water system and decrease system pre&&Ure below that nHded to seal the isolation valves serviced by the seal water. A Phase A isolation signal does not dose all containment penetrations, and results In a loss of seal water to open penetrations and the in8bility to !'e$tQre the seal water. Pending the

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completion of manual actions to refill the IVSWS tank and represaurizo the system, JVSWS was not capa~ of performing its de$91 function.

On Feb<uory 15, 2000, tonowing • pha .. A containment loolallon elgnal, operators found that the lVSWS tank was empty and ooukl not refill the tank. The IVSVVS tank cirained through open containm<11nt loolatlon volveo In penelrllllons that remain open by design untll a phase S signal occurs (e.g., reactor coolant pump themlal barrier return line). The operators declared the t)l!ltem inoperable and entered TS 3.0.1.

On November 24, 1998, Con Edison idenlirled discrepancies betWeen the IVSWS design as described In UFSAR Se<:tlon 6.5.2.1 and design documents (CR 199810169). Calculation PGl--00333-00 was prepared to demonstrate per UFSAR 6.5.2. 1 that the IVSWS water Inventory waa sufficient to oupply eoal water tor 24 hours following a de$ign basis aecidetlt CR 199810169 documented that several UFSAR nsumptions used in the cafc:ulation were unverified1 and that differences existed between the ealevlation .,,d a suvelllaince procedure O&Od to assure system leakage was Wittlin limits. An o~rability determination on November 24, 1998 concluded that IVSWS was opeMblo. On January 26, 2000, -lgn engineering c:onctUded that ll'le IVSWS tank would empty In -ut 65 mlnut .. lhrough valves that remain open folowing a phase A isolation signal, and questioned whether the operator coutd llCld water to the IV&NS tank prior to tt being emptied. However, no further operability review was perfomled after lhls erigineering itsue was raised.

On Ju"" 2, 19117, the IVSWS did not perfonn os detcribed in the UFSAR following a phase A containm""t isolation slgnal at power (LER 05000247/1997-010). The IVSWS tank lost both level and P"""'""' beca""e of leakage through a containment isolation valve. The valve leakage was not Identified previoutly dve to insufficient testing. The c:orreetive actions were to novlse the IVSWS teat and for the operators to verify system peoformanoe Within the em01gOncy operating procedures (E-0, step 44). These actions were overly narrow and failed to addt'MI the basic dMlgn problem that allows the seal water to be depleted prior to the 24 hourt assumed In the design basis calculation.

Safety and Regylatorv Significance

1 O CFR 50, Appendtx B, Criterion Ill, "Design Control,• in part, require• that musures shall be established to •:ssure trnlt appicab&e regulatory requirements as specified in the license application (UFSAR) are conectly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions (i.e., the p4ant desfgn). The NSWS design basis as documented in UFSAR -n• 6.5, 14.3.6.1, and Table 14.3"1811 to minimize leel<oge following any event requiring containment Isolation. However, the planl de.&ign as specified Jn drawings and procedures did not ir\COlpoiate the r8gvlatory ~uirem•nts in the UFSAR to assure IVSWS functions following both a phase A and phaae B isolation.

Following the safely injection and phase A Isolation on February 15, 2000. the operator declared the IVSWS inoperable When the tank level and pressure c:ould not be ll!Storod per emergency operating procedure (EOP) E-0, Reactor Trip/Safely Injection, step 44, to the TS limits. The operator action was required much sooner than tne 24 hours

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aaaumed in UFSAR Section 6.5. On February 15 and during previous occasions, the IVSWS loot functional capability after a ""'"'"A ~ under ooncitiono ~ was aaaumed to remain operable: as delcribed In the Wcen&lng basis. The lVSWS has not been Oj)Ol'Obie as - In UFSAR Section 6.5 or TS 3.3.C &Ince lnfflal plant startup. The failure to ensure the licensing basis of the IVSW system was maintained during conditions for which it waS required to perf(M111 its intended aafety f\.l'W:tlM j;s 8 violation (EEi 050002'7/2000-G3-G3).

The technical specification bases and the UFSAR state that no ""9dit is taken for IVSWS operation In the calculation to show post-accident offsfte doses are well below the limits In 10 CFR Part 100. The original NRC safety evaiwltion (November 20. 1970) ooneluded !Mt IVSWS l'fll\lid<I• an addtlonal means of nKludng leakage following a IOSt-of-c:oolant •celdent. UFSAA Table 14.3-48 p<OVldea a summary of offslte exposu"' calculation& for Jou of coolant acck:lents wtth leakage terminated in one minute by itoletioo valve M•I weter. The UFSAR thowa a reduction in publie dose With successful IVSWS operation.

c. Conctusion!i

Con Edi$on dfd not recognize a k>ng-Nnding difference between the do9ign and licensing bnia for lhe isolation valve: &etll W8tef' 1-ystem. DeGplte Mvorul past events and a design basi1 verification program which hi9hligh'9d IVSWS ptrlormence iHi.in, Con Edison failed to correct a basic design deficiency and auure that the licensing basis waG met. Operability evaluations were less than adequate and corrective atetions were narrow aod untimely. The failure to assure regulatory requirements wore c::omKitty translated Into specifications, drawings and procedures was an apparent violation.

E2.3 Steam Generator Examinations

a. ln•DIC!!on Scope (61 n5J

The purpose of the: il'lllpec:Uon wet to review the lndi•n Point Unit 2 Steam Generator eddy current testing program and the tea1 1•>11ull•. In ouppo11 of an ongoing - by the NRC Of!lce of Nuolear Reactor Regulation of steam genenotor tube Integrity et Unit 2. The sum""'ry provided herein rofteots lhe prog111m ttatU$ .. of March 27, 2COO.

b. Observations and F!ndjngs

Swnmarv of Steam Generator Actiytt!es

Can Edison initiated examinations of the 1tructural integrity of the ln..eervice tubes In all four steam genet'Btora and conducted additional activities lo evaluate the steam generatora. The tevaluationa on the seoondary sk:te tncluded p111ssunt tests, flow slot examinations, hillside port inspections, end aludge lancing. The evaluations and repairs on the primary side incluektd eddy current examinations using bobbin and rotating pancake (RPC) probes, special Interest plus point examinations, high frequency plus point examinations, tube re-roll, tube plug replacement and repair, measurement of

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denting, ultrasonic testing, and in""8itu testing. Con Edison modified steam generators #21 ond #24 per FMX-00-12~ to add a 2 inch Inspection port In the tromiltion cone ond • 1-112 Inch """"""8tl port In the tube bundle wra-. The modlftcation was supported by safety ovaluallon SECL-e9-1131A, Revision 1. with the cleUtnnlnatioo that no unrevlewed safety question was created. The modification allowed ~ of the tubee and aupJ)Ortll above tho #6 tube supJ)Ort plate. Con Edison planned to replace the lnconel eoo mechanical tube plugs on the COid leg $Ide of the #21 and #24 steam generators.

Con Edison identified an axial crack in the U~bend region of the tube at Rew 2 Column S In the #24 stoam generator, which was tho dlro<:t cauoe of the FebNary 15 event. The root cause of tho tube faiture lo being detennlned by Con Edison arl(t WiR be submitted to lhe NRC Office of Nudoar Reactor Regulation. Three additional Row 2 tubes In the #24 Steam Generetor (SG) were also found to have Indications: row 2, column 4; row 2, column 71; and row 2, column 74. Con Edison planned to conduct in-aftu hydrostatic testing of theM tube in accordance with industly guld-. The rMUK& of tho eddy current prog"'m •• of Ma!Oh 23, 2000 Indicated there wse d-In geater than 1 peroent of the tubM inspected In the #21 and #24 steam generatora. The majority of the defects were at the tube eupport pklte intensoetiona and in Row 2 u..f>ends. In accordance with Technical Speeiflcation 4.13, the defect& l'BSulled in a Classification of C-3 for twc eteam genenotora. Con Edison reported this to the NRC per 10 CFR 50. 72(bX2)(1) as the plant being In a degraded condition. Con Edison also reported this event as licensee event reJ)Ort t..eR 2000-003. In accordance with Tecllnlcal Specification Table 4.13-1, Con Edison must obtain NRC approval prior to plant restart. Con Edison actiona were in progress to complete a root cause evahJation of the tube failure, and to comp{ete a Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment. The review of the steam generator examination program and results by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation continued at the end of the Inspection period.

Steam Generator Inspection Ruutts

The lnspec;tor observed SG tube testing and date analyoio from the eddy c;u""nt ..,.t program. Con Edison ldentlfled three lube leako during 1 hydmstlltic test of SG 22. Tho leaks were diacQvered in Row 44, Column 42; Row 45, ~umn 39: and Row 45, Column 44. The teaks were very slow: abou11 drop per 30 min~& for two tubes and 1 drop per 60 minutes for the third. The potential aiginifieenoo of the findings was that the eddy current testing (ECT) examinations dl.flng this current outage had not Identified defects in thee tubn and followup inspectiono were planned. The ECT data for one ar the tubes had one finding categorized as a non quailfled Indication (NQI) whic:ll ho.I not yet been profiled with a RPC probe. Further licensee review of the ECT data for theae t1,1be1, as well at an engine«ing evaluation of the hydro result$, continued at the end of the inspection. The k)catton of the leak was the same on .an three tubes and was at the tube to tube sheet file! weld. llli• i• the same issue described In NRC lnfomiallon Notice 98-27. The leak$ were located using the mid-range, +Point probe at 300 KHz. This was Identified using th• RPC probe and was not oeen With the C<IOCO probe.

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The licensee planned to nM1xamlne al Row 2 and 3 tubes with high frequency probes. Addltl<>nal areas planned for investigation included i..., Indications In the u.bend area of the #24 SG that were l<heduled for lnsltu tesllng. Con Edison deWlloped a Pluggable Tube Summary to Identify the minimum nl<l1bet of additional tubes that wiW be plugged for each SG. The plugging list Included all Row 2 tubes and al tubea that had lndleettons at the support plat... Not Identified are those tubes that had lndleations In the u-bend area, sludge area and lube sheet area that will be retested using the high lrequency probes. For tul>K with Indications In the tube sheet area. including the thrN tubes in the #22 SG that leaked (see C.1 above), a decision will be made as to whether to plug those tube& or re-toll th& tubet.

Con edison obtained and qualified additionat high frequency probes to augment ~ Ce= and plus point examinations. The advan1- of the high frequency probe Is that the aignal does n01 penetrate as far. Consequently, if there is crud on the outside of the tube, it will not appear as a ridge on the data analyafs presentation, whk:h makec it easier to see crack indk::ations on the Inside of tho tube wall. Twetve (12) hot leg tubes in the #24 SG will b$ re-rolled M to ind~• observed in the b.lbct to tube·~ erea. The length of the ,.,.roll votles for eaoh tube. The original roll length is about 2.25". The tube sheet Is about 22" thiok. The -Is win vary m.n about 2" to r In length, done in abOut 2" increments with some ovet1ap. The inspector reviewed the tubes being re .. rolled, along with the number of tests to be cond\JOOld and the test stlltus as of March 27, 2000.

This is an intenm report on the status of the steam generator tube inspections and test results. The tubes to be plugged wore not yet completely established.

c. Conclusions

The steam generator eddy current testing and analysis was in progress. The eddy current test result9 revealed - which resulted In a ctasalflcation of C-3 per Technical Specffication 4.13. More detailed review of steam generator inspection results I• under IM putView of the NRC Ofllce of Nuclear Reaotor Rogvlation.

E2A Cable Spreading Room Fire Dampens (NCV 2000003-04)

a. tospoction Scgpe

Th6 inspection invotved wliflcation of Con Edison's analysis and corrective actions following a surwiSance in which 1<>me cable spreading room fire dampers failed to perform their intended safety function.

b. Observation$ and Ejndjng&

During the performance of PT-R36A. -Main Tranoformer #21 Water Deluge System," operators were not anticipating fire damper actuation because a test switeh used during the surveillance should have blocked the actuation signal to the dampers. The dampers operated during the test due to an intermittent test SWitch failure. Con Edison could not

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duplicate the swi1eh failure, however there has boon industry experience with this type of swi1eh failure. At the end of the period, the switch was being sent out for failure anolyolo.

'v'Vhen ac:tuated during th• t0$t, four of ten fire d•mpers did not function property, Three dampers faHed to operate due to mechanical interference between the fusibkt links and the conduit fittinge. The mechanical interference wat pruent line. Oooember, 1999. Another damper failed to fully clOse because the Closing latch was bent.

The fire dampers failed to dOae because of Inadequate!! maintenance instructions and vendor information on proper installation of GOndult fittings and methods to property unlatch <losed flre <lampe111. Malntenan"' Instructions in a WOii< Olep list did not provide instru<tions on methods to preclude mechanical Interference between c:ond<I~ fittings and the fusible links. coo Edison had prevloullly c:onsldensd the method to unlatch a closed fire damper as •5kitl of the craft", however this method resutted in mechantcal defonnation of the latching medtanism causing the damper not to fully close. Con Edison's corrective actions wert!l to remove the mechanical Interference with the fusible link& and to correct the latehing meehanism defonnauon. Extent of condlt!On revle\Vs were adequate to k:lentify any other fire damper vulnerabilities. None were k:lentified.

The fire dampers provide a fire banier to protect equipmeot in the cable sl)(eading room and batt•ry rooms in the event of a trantformer fire. The dampers also serve as a battier to ensure that the halon fire suppression system 111 not compromiHd. The failure of four of the ten dampers constituted a degradation In the fire suppreulon system between December 1999 through March 2000. Con Edison appropriately implemented fire watch tours per station administrative order (SAO}-703, "Fire Protection lmpainnent Criteria and Su111eillanoe: during inoperobility of the fire dampors and the assoeiated halon system for the cable spreading room.

License Condition 2.K of License OPR~26 requires Con Edison to implement and maintain all provisions of the NRC..pproved flre protection program as descnbed in the UFSAR for tho facility and 11 approved in SERs. Tl1e SER dated Oclober 31, 1980 documents operability requlnml*\tl for the cable a~adlng room halon system. Those requirements are in SA0-703 addendum II. Poor maintenance in1tructlona resufted in the faulty installation of fire dampers in December, 1999, and caused the halon suppression system to be inoperable. The failure t.o provide adequate maintenance instructions that resulted in an inoperable cable tpreadin~ room halon system was a violation of OPR·26 l.icenae condition 2.K. This Severity Level IV viol'ation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B. 1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (64 FR 6114Z, November 9, 1999). The violation was propor1y eo~cted and documented In the licensee's eorrective action program as CR 200001825. (NCV 0$000247/2000003-04). '

NRC inspoction fllport 05000247/1999011 described other deficiencies with the design, testing and oporatlon of the cable spreading room halon fire suppression eyetem. There was no causal relationship between the two eventa.

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c. Cond!Jsions

A tack of maintenance installation instructions contributed to the failure of cable llj)l'eading room fire dampers to futty olooe. The faulty dampers cauHd the oupprMflion system to be degraded for approximately 3 months. The failure to maintain pr'OVilions of ttie NRC...pproved fire protedion plan 8$ desaibed In the UFSAR and approved NRC Safety Evalua1ion Report is a Non-Cited Violetion.

IV. PLANT SUPPORT

R1 Rodlologlcal Protection and Chemletry (RP&CI Control•

R1 .1 Contamination in Storm Drains

a. lnspec:t100 ScoO@ (71750)

The tnspector reviewed licensee actions to investigate the discovery on March 30 of low level contamination in the stonn drains (refe<ence Condition Repon 20002197). This matter was reviewed with the 11shstance of NRC Region I Health Physics PeraoMel.

b Obfervationc and find!nas

Trace concentratiOns of Cs-137 and Co-60 (in the rilflSle of E-5 to E..S uCilgram) were found in the storm drain sift and debris in the vicinity of the Unit I Chemical Service Building. All wmer sample• >Mtte Clean; only tilt and debtia had n11di04letivity above background'. No lh«t·llved •c:tlVation or fission products were identified, such u Cs· 134, which indicated that the radioactivity was not rocenlly produced within the reactor, and thus was not assoc:::iated with the Unit 2 steam generator tube leak event.

The storm drains are normally sampled annuaf.ly by taking small sample volumes. VVhi1e deaning out all dirt and debris to foellltate drain ftow, Con Edison took much larger samples and counted iong.r (about 8 hours). Conooquently, the 1""'98Md Mnsllivlty resulted In the polilive ldentlflcahon of activity. Con Edison confirmed that obout half of the 13 drains had detoc::table activity when umpled and analyzed In this manner. The stonn drains COlltnect to the untt 3 system before diacharge to the river. No activity was Identified In any drain that flowed Into Unit 3, indicating that no ae1ivtty left ttie Unit 1 site throu~h this pathway.

Licensee actions continued at the end of the inspection period to dean debris from the storm dtlllin sy•tem. Contaminated debris will be handled as nltdioective material and disposed of accordingly. Further, Con Edison will investigate ff there is an on..site source. or ifthi& material Originated from previous spills or leakage events on.-site. There was no radiological dose eonaequence associated with this event. Con Edison took proper actions to resolve the immediate concerns and Investigate tM cause. The issue was entered Into the corrective action system as Condition Report 20002197.

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c. Conclusjons

con Edison appropriately responded to the discovery of trace amounts of contamination in the Unit 1 stonn drains and took proper actions to resolve the condition and tc lnvntigate the causa, The material was not associated with the Unit 2 steam generator event or any recent plant activities, and there was no radiological dose c:onseqwnce from the contamination.

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The resident inspector presented the inspection results to Con Edison's management at an extt meeting on April 6, 2000. The inspectors were not informed by Con Edison that any of the issues discussed at the exit or materials examined during the inspection shouk:t be considered l)roplietary

····-···-·---------------

ATTACHMENT 1

INSPCCTION PROCEDURES USED

37551 Oils~• Engineering 40500 £ffectjyeness of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, and Prevent Problems 81728 Surveillance ObseNation 62707 Maintenance Observation 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant SUpport 92902 Followup.Mainlenance 92~ Followup.Engineering 61725 SurveMlance Testing and Callb<allon Control Program 92901 F Ollowup-Operations 92904 Followup.Plant Support

~

2000-03-01 NCV 2000-03--02 NCV 2000-03--03 EEi 2000.03.(J.4 NCV

~

2000-03--01 NCV 20CJ0.03-02 NCV 2()00.03.(J.4 NCV

ITEMS OPENED and CLOSED

Failure to follow Procedures on Core Differential Temperature Failure to Meet Appendix R for Oil Collection System Failure to Meet IVSWS Ueensing Basis Inadequate Maintenance ln1truction1 for Fire Dampers

Faiture to Follow Procedures on Core Ottlerential Temperature Failure to Meet Appendix R for Oil Collectlon System Inadequate Maintenance lnstructiont for Fire Dampel'1

Attachment 1 (cont'd) 2

cc ConEd CR ECT EOP gpm IVSWS LLD NCV NFSC NQI OTSG RCP RCS REMP RP&C SAO SE SC SOP SPI TFC TOI TS UFSAR UT WC PPS

cubic centimeters Con Edisoo condltioo report eddy curnint testing

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

emergency operating procedure gallons per minute isolation valve steam water system low level dose Non cited violation Nuc.lear Facilities Safety Committee non-qualified indication once~thru steam generator reac:tor coolant pump reactor coolant system radiological environmental monitoring program r.Kliologk;:el prQte<:tion ;1nd chemistry coritrors station administrative order safety evaluation steam generator system operating proeedure support plates temporary facility change temporary operating procedure technical specification Updated Final Safety Anaty1ts Report ultrasonic wekl channel and penetration pressurization system

From: (~~-) 1hurnlay, April 28, 2016 5:12 PM · 1hurnlay, April 28, 2016 5:12 PM Brenner, Eliot...

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