fride

7/21/2019 fride

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/fride 1/28

Alliance of Civilizations

International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy

Seminar Conclusions

Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada

October 2005

ICEI WP 03/05 - FRIDE Working Paper # 13

WORKING PAPER

7/21/2019 fride


7/21/2019 fride


Abstract

The initiative to form an “Alliance of Civilizations” as a means to overcome cultural and politicalgaps originated in a proposal made by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to the Secretary-General of the

United Nations during a speech at the 59th UN General Assembly on September 21, 2004.Kofi Annan officially took over the initiative, co-sponsored by the UN, the Spanish and the Turkishgovernments, on July 14, 2005. The Secretary-General also put in place a process to form a HighLevel Panel, which is expected to hold its first meeting in late November, in order to convert thisfirst impulse into a feasible and operative concept by the end of 2006.

On June 6-7, 2005, the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) and the Funda-ción para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) organized an internationalseminar in Madrid, bringing together experts, academics and practitioners to analyse contemporarychallenges, reflect critically on their implications for the present initiative, and enhance and enrichit.

The present paper summarizes the main ideas for an Alliance of Civilizations, the major criticalpoints, and the suggestions made, during the seminar, in order to tackle them.

Resumen

La propuesta de formar una “Alianza de Civilizaciones” para superar las divergencias políticas yculturales tuvo su origen en la propuesta de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero al Secretario General en

un discurso ante la 59ª Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 21 de septiembre de 2004.

El 14 de julio de 2005, Kofi Annan oficialmente adoptó la iniciativa, co-auspiciada por NacionesUnidas y los gobiernos de España y Turquía, y puso en marcha un proceso para formar un Grupode Alto Nivel, cuya primera reunión se espera para finales de noviembre, con el objetivo deconvertir este primer impulso en un concepto viable y operativo hasta finales de 2006.

Los días 6 y 7 de junio de 2005, el Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) y laFundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) organizaron unseminario internacional en Madrid, con el objetivo de analizar retos contemporáneos y susimplicaciones para el futuro concepto de una Alianza de Civilizaciones. El presente documento detrabajo resume las principales ideas, puntos críticos y sugerencias surgidas en el seminario.

7/21/2019 fride


Contents

1.

The Alliance of Civilizations Initiative ……………………………………….. 1

2. The Need for an Alliance of Civilizations: Global Challenges………………… 22.1. Growing Gaps ………………………………………………………….. 22.2. The Self and the Other: Identities and Perceptions …………………... 42.3. Global Governance, Multilateralism and Cosmopolitan Democracy … 11

3. Implications and Ideas for a Tangible Alliance of Civilizations ………………. 16

7/21/2019 fride


Alliance of Civilizations.International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy

Seminar Conclusions

1

1. The Alliance of

Civilizations Initiative

1. The Alliance of Civilizations initiative

originated in a proposal made by the Spa-nish President of Government, José LuisRodríguez Zapatero, to the Secretary-Ge-neral of the United Nations, during aspeech at the 59th UN General Assembly onSeptember 21, 2004. Zapatero presentedhis idea to form an “Alliance of Civiliza-tions” as a means to overcome cultural andpolitical gaps, and called on the Secretary-General to adopt the initiative.

2. The proposal was taken up by the Spa-nish Minister of Foreign Affairs, MiguelÁngel Moratinos, in his address before theArab League the following December, aswell as in an intervention held togetherwith UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan onMarch 9, 2005, in Madrid. The Secretary-General officially took over the initiativeon July 14, and put in place a process toform a High Level Panel in order to con-vert this first impulse into a feasible and

operative concept.3. A working group, composed of repre-sentatives from the UN and the Spanishgovernment, was formed to bring forwardthat process. For this purpose, Kofi Annanappointed Iqbal Riza and GiandomenicoPicco as Special Advisers. On behalf of theSpanish government, which was asked bythe Secretary-General to take a leading rolein bringing forward the initiative, Ambas-sadors Máximo Cajal and Juan Antonio Yá-ñez were appointed. This working grouphas elaborated an initial concept paper forthe Alliance of Civilizations to serve as abasis for the work of a High Level Panelwhich was nominated by the Secretary-General on September 5, 2005, and whichis expected to hold its first meeting in lateNovember.

4. The composition of the Panel countswith a wide regional and civilizational re-

presentation, and comprises politicians outof office, academics with a religious-

cultural background, media representati-ves and other representatives of the diffe-rent civilizational entities. A list of the 18-member Panel and its terms of reference

will be made available shortly. The HighLevel Panel will be supported by a secreta-riat in its task to elaborate a set of recom-mendations to the UN Secretary-Generalby the end of 2006, and to issue an actionplan with concrete, practical measures.

5. The Turkish government, representedby Prime Minister Erdogan, agreed to co-sponsor the initiative alongside with theSpanish government and the UN. ThisTurkish co-sponsorship is symbolically ex-

tremely valuable and constitutes a strongpolitical signal.

6. Beyond the question of co-sponsorship,an informal group of 19 states and two or-ganizations already expressed their sup-port for the Alliance of Civilizations initia-tive. These are: Argentina, Costa Rica, E-gypt, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Malay-sia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, Phi-lippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden,

Tanzania, Thailand, and Tunisia, as well asthe Arab League and the Islamic Con-ference.

7. Parting from a general unease due to thewidening gaps between certain parts of theworld, the Instituto Complutense de Estu-dios Internacionales (ICEI) and the Fun-dación para las Relaciones Internacionalesy el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), two institu-tions dedicated to the studies of Interna-

tional Relations, were both convinced thatthis was an initiative that was put forwardat the right time and which was worth sup-porting through assistance to its furtherdevelopment. On June 6-7, 2005, FRIDEand ICEI, in collaboration with Univer-sidad Complutense, Caja Madrid and theSpanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs andCooperation, organized an internationalseminar in Madrid, bringing together ex-perts, academics and practitioners to ana-lyse contemporary challenges and reflectcritically on their implications for the pre-

7/21/2019 fride



2

sent initiative, enhance and enrich it andthink of ways of making a real impact.

8. The seminar was attended by a widerange of academic scholars, experts, diplo-

mats, journalists, as well as representativesof the United Nations, the Spanish govern-ment and civil society. Particularly welco-med was the presence of the representa-tives of the Spanish government for theAlliance of Civilizations, Máximo Cajaland Juan Antonio Yáñez, and the SpecialAdviser on behalf of the UN, Iqbal Riza.The debates were organised around foursessions where the following issues werediscussed: possible contents of an Allianceof Civilizations; which is or could be Eu-rope’s role in the relation between the

West and the Islamic world; how does theAlliance of Civilizations fit into the multi-lateral framework of global society, espe-cially in terms of international law; and fi-nally, which could be the role of civil so-ciety within the framework of this Allian-ce?

9. The present conclusions summarize themain ideas for an Alliance of Civilizations,

major critical points, challenges, and thesuggestions made in order to tackle them.

2. The Need for an Alliance of

Civilizations: Global

Challenges

10. The first set of issues was related to thepresent intercultural and intercivilizationalrelations, the nature of existing tensionsand their possible root causes.

2.1. GROWING GAPS

11. An immediate criticism of the Allianceof Civilizations which had arisen after itsproposal by the Spanish Head of Govern-

ment before the UN claimed that the pro-posal took for granted the existence of the

entity “civilization” as a compact and moreor less closed reality, thereby indirectly, orpartially, confirming Samuel Huntington’stheory of a “clash of civilizations” . The de-bate on a possible “clash”, as predicted by

Huntington in 1993, is indeed closely lin-ked to some of the core issues of theAlliance of Civilizations. However, therewas agreement among the participants ofthe seminar that Huntington’s theory hashad a highly unconstructive effect on pu-blic discourse, poisoning public debateand people’s minds for over a decade withideas that have been feeding hostile at-titudes.

12. Up until the 18th century, the term “ci-vilization” described the opposite of barba-rism. Today it has gained a new meaningas a virtual synonym for culture and socie-ty. Huntington’s definition of a civilizationis similar: “A civilization is a cultural en-tity [...] the highest cultural grouping ofpeople and the broadest level of culturalidentity people have [...].”1 According toHuntington, “[t]he great divisions of man-kind and the dominating source of conflictwill be cultural.”2, and a clash of civiliza-

tions will occur between nations and mem-bers of different civilizations, with the faultlines between civilizations as the battle li-nes of the future. After the Cold War, hesays, the two blocks of capitalism andcommunism will be replaced by “the Westversus the rest” as the main line of con-flict. But the creation of fault lines betweencultures, civilizations and societies, so his-tory has shown, can only happen over ti-me. And which are the borders of civili-

zations? According to Huntington, a civili-zation is the broadest level of identificationan individual can participate in, and thisidentification lays the foundation for theclash that is to come, with the main sourceof conflict being the antagonistic relation-ship between the “West” and the “Islamic

World”.

13. According to some participants, Hun-tington’s theory had been granted too

1 Huntington, Samuel P.: “The Clash of Civilizations?”, ForeignAffairs, nº 3/1993.2 Ibid.

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

3

much scientific significance, and was bestopposed by ignoring it. However, in prac-tice, the theory has attracted vast attention,and no matter to what degree one mightconsider the “clash of civilizations” to re-

flect current realities, there is no doubtthat it has been successfully used in Western political discourse for agitationagainst Islam. Similar discourses – cons-piracy theories, demonization of the Wes-tern culture - exist in Islamic countries. Soeven though Huntington’s general picturemight be simplistic, cut and dried - all jus-tified critique of his ideas cannot distractfrom the fact that we do face an authenticthreat: the enormous intensification of hostile perceptions between the “Islamic

World” and “the West”. As we have had towitness in the past, the manifestation ofthese hostile perceptions through violencecan do terrible harm. The confrontationbetween the Islamic World and the Westhas reached a civilizational dimension.This is why we need an Alliance of Civi-lizations.

14. There was consensus among the work-shop participants that the current confron-

tation and the whole discourse on conflictand dialogue between civilizations are atits heart about the relationship betweenthe “Arab-Islamic World“ and the “West” .Consequently, the improvement of this re-lationship was considered a key issue offuture action of an Alliance of Civiliza-tions. Moreover, it was expressed that theterm “civilization” was used only for rea-sons of political correctness or politeness.Nevertheless, it was clear to most people

that from the Western point of view, theterm was mainly aimed at religion in gene-ral and Islam in particular. This impres-sion seemed indirectly confirmed in thecontext of the seminar by the regional re-presentation of the speakers, who exclu-sively originated from Western and Islamiccountries.

15. In an attempt to explain the narrow fo-cus of a debate which should actually be ofglobal scale, it was expressed that the ini-tiative to form an Alliance of Civilizationswas a merely reactive framework: on the

one hand, responding to Huntington’s ar-gument, trying to soften it and reduce thedamage by providing a human, anti-racistconcept using the same terms, and on theother hand, reacting to the fact that the

USA and Spain were, for the first time, themain targets of large-scale terrorist attacks,which eventually led to the powerful agen-da-setters calling for a global remedy. O-thers considered that, given the increa-singly hostile perceptions among some ci-vilizations, Zapatero’s proposal was simplya pro-active initiative at the right time.

16. However, there was no doubt that thegrowing tension between the West and theIslamic World constituted a true threat tointernational peace and security, whichcould not be ignored and must be coun-teracted by adequate measures. Hostileperceptions do not only exist in extremeright-wing circles, but are spreading acrossthe minds of intellectuals, youth, ordinarypeople in all parts of society, leaving peo-ple in both worlds more and more convin-ced of the bad faith of the other. Stereo-types such as the imaginary army of radicalbomb-throwing Bin Ladens, or the deca-

dent non-believers trying to colonize theIslamic World for oil and imperial domina-tion, are subject to instrumentalization byreligious and political extremists , whothemselves firmly believe in their own ste-reotypes and the rejection of the other.The question was raised whether the Al-liance of Civilizations should be a politicalinitiative only, or include also a religiousdimension. As desirable as it may be lea-ving religion aside, it was concluded to be

impossible because religion had de factoturned into a political instrument.

17. For some Muslim extremists, the“clash of civilizations” provides a mostwelcome support, feeding their belief ofbeing warriors of Jihad against the newcrusades, and facilitating the recruitmentof followers. Some participants consideredthat the dominance of a globalized neoli-beral economy was crucial in this respectbecause in many parts of the world it re-moved the “safety net” provided by stateswhich used to give ordinary people shelter

7/21/2019 fride



4

by providing basic health, education, ele-mentary and economic rights. Once remo-ved that shelter, people find relief in thecharity and welfare institutions of religiousorganizations, some of them extremist.

The social and welfare work is preciselyone of the strongest assets of Islamist orga-nizations and a way to ensure support andrecruitment. In some occasions, a similarphenomenon has been observed in Chris-tian extremism. As long as secular forcesdo not take a stand and religious groupsare the only societal forces which addressthe needs of people, be they social andeconomic needs, or fear and anger vis-à-visimperial foreign occupation, the field isleft to non-secular forces. It was stressedthat the question of how to stop the flowsof recruitment by bringing forward poli-cies should be at the centre of reflection,and that the issue of foreign occupation,most particularly in Iraq and Palestine,played a major role in this regard.

18. When talking about the need for analliance between civilizations, the notionof terrorism as one of the fiercest expres-sions of the existing confrontation is una-

voidable. Some raised the question whe-ther the fight against terrorism by the do-minant Western powers was not the newmask of a modern colonialism. Accordingto another critical argument, the fact thatterrorism, as a threat which causes not afraction of the fatalities caused by war, di-sease and starvation, had been put on topof the global agenda gave evidence thatthis agenda was not being set according tothe objective scale and dimension of the

threat, but rather according to its targetgroup, and according to who had the po-wer to determine when there is or not anurgent need for concerted global action.

19. The phenomenon of terrorism is socomplex that, for decades, the internatio-nal community was unable to define itproperly, and the term keeps on being mi-sused for other kinds of violence.3 Terro-

3

In his report In larger freedom: towards development, securityand human rights for all, published on 21 March 2005, the UNSecretary-General fully endorsed the High-level Panel onThreats, Challenges and Change´s call for “a definition of terro-

rism, even though by no means an exclu-sively modern phenomenon, has today de-veloped into a large-scale lethal threatwhich at the same time constitutes, illus-trates and reinforces the confrontation be-

tween Western and Islamic societies. The-re is nothing by which terrorism can be justified. However, in order to be able totackle the problem, the underlying reasonsbehind it must be well understood. Dea-ling with the root causes and motivationsof terrorism means trying to resolve theGordian knot, and still it is a much moresustainable and therefore promising ap-proach than trying to tackle the problemmerely through security measures. Despe-ration and anger of a long-term sufferingand injustice from the hands of a powerfulopponent often provide the fertile groundon which extremism and terrorism cangrow. With regard to the Alliance of Civili-zations, it was strongly believed that anyinitiative which contributed to successfullycountering hostile perceptions betweenmembers of different civilizations wouldalso help to stop the violence.

2.2. THE SELF AND THE OTHER: IDENTITIES

AND PERCEPTIONS

20. A clear image of the other, as well as ofone’s own identity, are preconditions forrecognizing and respecting each other’sdifferences. When talking about an Allian-ce of Civilizations, who are we talking of?

What constitutes “the West”? Is there an“Arab-Islamic Civilization”, and if so, how

is it characterized? In accordance with thementioned perceptions, the answers tothese questions are very different, depen-ding on which side of the Mediterraneanone enquires.

21. There was general agreement that a cutand dried characterization of either “the

West” or “the Islamic / Arab World” did

rism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions al-ready proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes

terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harmto civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidatinga population or compelling a Government or an internationalorganization to do or abstain from doing any act.”

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

5

not do justice to the complexity of eitherof them. Moreover, even if one allowed theexistence of such civilizations as relativelyhomogeneous entities, by using theseterms one encounters the practical diffi-

culty of not knowing whom to include.Does Israel belong to the West? Does Ja-pan? Does the “Islamic World” includeonly Arab states or also Far Eastern Islam?And where to place Turkey?

22. Historically, the terms “East” and“West” arose from the split of the Chris-tian Church in the Roman Empires of the

West and East, thus out of a break withinChristianity, not as a distinction betweenChristians and Muslims. Speaking of an“Arab-Muslim World”

is per se not accep-table, because the term is mixing up reli-gion with ethnicity by equating the re-ligion of Islam with the Arab ethnic group.Such a blend of categories reinforces ste-reotypes (“All Arabs are Muslims”, “AllMuslims are Arabs”) and must therefore becarefully avoided. The term “Arab World”remains extremely limited, while the term“Muslim World” appears rather too exten-sive, especially if one includes not only

those states where the majority of the po-pulation is of Muslim confession, but alsothose with a considerable Muslim minori-ty, which would again include almost all of

Western Europe. And even if a suitableterm could be found, given the variety ofthe different forms of Islam as a religion,the range of political systems in Arabcountries, and the many inner-Arab con-flicts throughout history, it would remaindaring to speak of this entity as a homoge-

neous block without further differentia-tion.

23. The quest for an entity called “theWest” in order to find a term one can ac-tually operate with, does not prove mucheasier. Participants especially expressedtheir difficulties in mingling together Eu-rope and the United States, given the subs-tantial differences between them. And evenif one accepted to define the “West” ascomprising the European Union and theUnited States, and maybe Israel, whatabout Japan, and many other countries? So

apparently, failing to make up a precise de-finition, the debate sticks to the West asonly including the US and the EU only toreduce complexity. Despite the general re-

jection of the whole “East-West” termino-

logy for being all too cut and dried and ac-tually out-dated, the terms kept on beingused due to the lack of more suitable alter-natives.

24. In the reflection on what constitutesthe identity of the West from a Westernpoint of view, the current European identity crisis , illustrated by the paralyzation ofthe Constitutional ratification process, gai-ned special attention. In fact, one of thereasons for the present crisis was seen inEurope’s unwillingness to cut the umbili-cal cord to the United States. The questionof to what extent the negative referenda inFrance and the Netherlands constitutedany reliable evidence of the European po-pulation’s general unhappiness with thedevelopment of the European Union, oreven meant the failure of the Europeanproject, was controversially discussed.

25. The issue of a possible future Turkish

EU membership was agreed to be greatlyrelevant for the inquiry after the Europeanidentity. With regard to the present semi-nar, one participant noted that the fact thatTurkey was singled out as the only countryto be assigned a special notion in the pro-gram of a seminar on the Alliance of Civi-lizations suggested that “Turkey was trou-ble”, an attitude which greatly reflected thegeneral European posture towards thecountry. At the same time it was admitted

that as a matter of fact, there were manyreasonable objections to Turkey’s EUmembership. Officially, it is a candidaturelike any other, with criteria such as humanrights and democracy, social-economic de-velopment, etcetera. However, participantslargely agreed that in spite of all well-intended attempts to claim the opposite,the main reason why Turkey, unlike Eas-tern European countries, was not beingimmediately accepted as a future EU mem-ber state was not its economic or humanrights situation, but its Muslim identity.

7/21/2019 fride



6

26. Since the country’s possible accessionhas come closer and has thus become a fre-quent issue of debate, Islam has increa-singly been seen as an obstacle to EU ac-cession on both sides. Turkey is a country

hard to classify; depending on the criteriaapplied, it could be included both in Wes-tern and in Islamic civilizations. Euro-peans fear that the presence of millions ofMuslims might challenge European cul-tural integrity – a fear that neglects the factthat a broad Muslim presence in Europehas been a reality for decades. But eventhough such fears are present, there is nototal majority opposition against Turkey’saccession within the EU population. Ne-vertheless, according to the Turkish per-ception of the inner-European debate, theissue of their country’s accession is seenthrough the “prism of the Christian club”.Even though Turkey’s “bridge role” hasbeen often exaggerated, it was noted thatparadoxically, Turkey was probably one ofthe non-European states which most re-sembled the pattern of a Western Euro-pean nation-state. But again, by labellingTurkey with the emblem of Islam, religionand state are mixed up. Participants stres-

sed that, if Europe really understood thepractical meaning of laïcité , it would notbe discussing Turkey’s EU accession interms of Islam.

27. The case of Turkey reveals a lot of theEuropean identity debate, because thecentral question, whether or not the EUcan integrate millions of Muslims in theirmidst, ignores the detail that there are al-ready millions of Muslims living in the

heart of Europe. Islam in Europe, or Euro- pean Islam , is not an option but a reality.All too often, it was bewailed, Islam is trea-ted as if it were a problem in itself. In thedebate on how Islam fits into European so-cieties, again, the issue of how Europe de-fines itself is crucial. So far the EuropeanUnion has been stating negatively attribu-tes which did not form part of the allegedEuropean identity, but failed to clearly de-fine itself positively, and in this sense, Is-lam has always been a factor of distinction.The perception of Islam being an easternreligion is so deeply rooted that even after

four generations, Muslims in Europe aredenominated as foreigners. The idea thatIslam might be European, too – and Chris-tianity Middle Eastern – does not enterinto people’s heads, in spite of the obvious

realities. Muslims in Europe are eternallyimmigrants, and Islam is considered thereligion of immigrants, thus non-Euro-pean. How many generations will it takeEuropean Muslims to be recognized as fullcitizens? There has to be a moment whenpeople are granted the label “integrated”,meaning European citizens. Multicultura-lists, who only want to build bridges, andonly bridges, pave the way for the cons-truction of walls.

28. The issue of the separation of state andreligion, laïcité , is of considerable impor-tance in the immigration debate, but alsoin the interplay of perceptions between

Western and Muslim countries. The Westis all too ready to criticise Muslim coun-tries for their lack of secularism in the pu-blic sphere. In the Middle East, many peo-ple found their identity on Islam. A lot ofpolitical parties have been founded in or-der to conform politics with Islamic prin-

ciples. Most of these are respectable, butsome are immeasurably orthodox, and so-me of them want the religious law (Shari’a)to be also a political one. But also in the

West, even though Christian political par-ties are essentially secular, protestant mo-vements – namely in the US – are having agreat political impact. In this sense, par-ticipants argued that the West was not en-titled to praise its own superiority in termsof secularity of public space.4

29. We live in an era of a “re-enchantmentof the world” (Morris Berman), a parallelspreading of technology and religionthrough globalisation, through which reli-gion seems to live a comeback. But the re-vert to religion is not a return. What re-turns is not religion, but religious practi-ces. Globally speaking, there is an increa-

4 In the United States, American nationalism is formally secular

but in fact functioning according to a Biblical archetype, sinceits defenders see themselves as a people with a mission to bringsalvation to humanity, even if it were by force.

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

7

sing social pressure to exercise religiouspractices, mostly transmitted by the mediaand boosted by the process of globalisa-tion, resulting in a “merchandization” ofreligion. American neoliberalism supports

the revival of religion in the US, but in factit is not a real religious comeback but apolitical recourse to the religious as ameans to secure imperial dominance. InEurope, too, laïcité has not been real. Inspite of all secularisation throughout his-tory, the formally secular nationalism hasmaintained a strong underlying sense ofthe religious, which has been often instru-mentalized to gain and secure power. No-wadays, discourse in many Europeancountries is double-faced: people easilyclaim superiority in terms of laïcité and

judge Islam, but on the other hand, in con-venient occasions, it does not bother themthat religion enters the political sphere.

30. But is there a problem with EuropeanIslam after all? Today’s difficulties with Is-lam in Europe are not of a legal or reli-gious nature. Muslims do not have per seany problems with European legislation.However, secularisation and laïcité have in

the Muslim World often been perceived asbeing anti-Islamic. This perception beco-mes more understandable when looking atthe different models of imposed seculari-sation, which left in many countries thefootprint of secularisation as being anti-religious, and which has above all servedas a means to impose autocratic regimes.Fortunately, in Western immigrant socie-ties this perception is today changing.Muslims who migrate to the West should

have a very clear understanding of themeaning of secularism, citizenship, etc.Europe, on its part, must be very clear andcoherent as to what are the non-negotiableprinciples of public space.

31. So instead of a true understanding oflaïcité , there is a great confusion betweennationality and religion. Frequently, theterm “Islam” is being used as if it were anethnic group or nationality, while as a mat-ter of fact it is a religion with a universalvocation, not limited to any ethnic, geo-graphical or linguistic group. Some parti-

cipants noted some kind of hysteria aboutIslam in Western public discourse, with alittle bit of Islam being mingled in every-where. At the same time, cultural relati-vism, which tries to explain terrorism with

a lack of true understanding of Islam in Western societies, thereby establishing adirect connection between Islam and terro-rism, was considered unacceptable. A cleardistinction of religion, ethnicity and natio-nality, a real understanding of laïcité , mustbe the basis of any discourse on Europeanidentity.

32. Even though Islam does not per seclash with democratic principles, the Euro-pean capacity to integrate Muslims in theirsocieties is rather decreasing. In Europeancollective memory, three chapters of cru-cial importance for the relationship bet-ween Europe and the Muslim World arepractically absent: the memory of the Mus-lim philosophical heritage (which is cur-rently reduced to name-dropping), thememory of colonialism, and an awarenessof the contribution of Muslim exile wor-kers in the context of European recons-truction. In order to solve the problems of

the present, public memory must be com-plete and vivid. For example, unlike in thecase of Christian philosophy, the establish-ment of a link between religion and ratio-nalist philosophy is being categoricallydenied to Islam. This imposed separationconstitutes an intolerable limitation, andignores the long rational Islamic tradition.By denying Muslims the ability to rationalthinking, they are implicitly denied theability to participate in public debate. Peo-

ple who build the present today have tounderstand that rationality belongs to eve-ryone and not, as selective memory sug-gests, to the West only.

33. With regard to the view on Islam in

Western discourse, a major criticism wasthat the religion of Islam was being treatedas a monolith, with an image of unvariedand inflexible backwardness, while in factit is a religion with many different expres-sions and with a long tradition of rationa-list philosophic thinking. The Western dis-course is characterized by a strong essen-

7/21/2019 fride



8

tialization of Islam , in the sense that allMuslims are being lumped together, in or-der to facilitate the terms of reference forthe West. This essentialization constitutesa powerful weapon of domination, because

essentializing the other, presupposing itbeing a monolith immovably caught in thestatus quo, is a violent simplification andthereby inferiorization of the other.

34. An example for the essentialization ofIslam is provided by the current debate ondemocracy and terrorism, and in securitypolicy in general, where Islam and terro-rism are frequently equated with eachother. In a debate on terrorism, Muslimsare supposed to talk. In a debate about de-mocracy, Muslims are supposed to listen.The fact that nobody considers the possi-bility that a European citizen, democratand of Islamic confession, might have so-mething to contribute to the debate on thefuture of European democracy is very tel-ling. Terrorism indeed requires a politicalresponse, but this response cannot consistin security policies which institutionalisediscrimination, racism and a supply of evi-dence based on a general suspicion.

35. In line with its selective memory, Eu-rope fails to remember that the Greek-La-tin heritage has led to a break in the Me-diterranean, and to an expulsion of the Je-wish-Arab heritage, the Arab origins of Eu-ropean culture, our “forgotten heritage”(Alain de Libera). It was repeatedly stres-sed that, in the context of the Alliance ofCivilizations, Spain would be perfectly sui-ted to move the northern Mediterranean

towards a re-appropriation of its

Jewish- Arab heritage . This heritage is of particularsignificance for the civilizational dialogue,because it proves, once more, that neithercivilization can be seen as a stereotypedsingle block, since there has been a longhistory of mutual influence and exchange.Moreover, it was emphasized that “al-An-dalus” as a symbol of tolerance and tri-cul-tural and religious coexistence very wellreflected the idea of the Alliance of Civi-lizations.

36. Some Spanish participants expressedtheir view that, despite the positive chapterof al-Andalus, taking into account most ofthe rest of Spanish history up to the pre-sent, Spain could not possibly serve as a

good example as the “country of dialogue”between cultures and civilizations. In addi-tion, they stressed the general importanceof avoiding mystification, and to rather fo-cus on finding solutions for the presentand the future rather than dwell too muchon the past in the sense of historical revi-sionism. Al-Andalus and the Jewish-Arabheritage must not be neglected, but neithermystified.

37. The crisis of identity is by no means anexclusive matter of the West. The issue ofidentity in the Arab-Muslim World is apressing question in many ways, especiallyin relation to the development of Islamand its traumatic clash with modernity.There are problems in today’s Umma , butthese religious issues are not to be discus-sed by Christian or Jewish interlocutors,but must be discussed between Muslims,in the Muslim World.

38. During the colonial era, a sensationhad emerged in the progressive parts of Is-lamic societies that, compared to the West,they had somewhat stayed behind. Inde-pendence movements were founded whoseaim was to lead their societies into the mo-dern era and enable them to compete withthe West on an equal foot. They appealedto religion in order to gather support, butwere opposed by the traditionalist clerics,who rather thought Islamic societies were

behind for not having pursued religiousprinciples strictly enough. Thus the key tosalvation was believed to be found in thefundamental principles of Islam. Amongthe militant subgroups there was by thattime a sensation that they had reached ahistorical moment in which their religionsuffered an attack by the West, whose se-cularism had turned their societies profaneand decadent, and was thus the one to bla-me for the loss of the Golden Age of the Is-lamic Empires.

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

9

39. However, during the same period, the-re was also a strong exchange of knowled-ge and ideas between the two civilizations,through scholars, embassies, and travel-lers. In fact, contrary to a frequent Wes-

tern belief, the Muslim World has neverbeen sealed-off, not to the Enlightenment,not to the World Wars, and nor is it today.The Muslim youth, participants argued,knows perfectly well what is going on inthe West; so rather, one should be worriedabout the lack of knowledge in the domi-nant Western countries.

40. Today it is an acknowledged fact thatthe achievements of medieval Muslimscholars built the bridge that connectedHellenism with Renaissance. To the degreethat Europe and the New World progres-sed, the era of science in the Islamic Worlddeclined. Four schools of Islamic jurispru-dence represented by that time differentinterpretations of Islamic Law. The moreliberal Ulema favoured independent reaso-ning and the effort to reach consensus,whilst the orthodox condemned these libe-ral interpretations. The latter won thestruggle, and in the 14th century, the clerics

declared the doors of Ijtihad (independentinterpretation of Islamic Law by Muslimscholars) closed − a decisive moment inwhich a big paving stone closed up the de-velopment of Muslim rationalism and con-troversy.

41. As a consequence of this development,as well as of the colonial domination, ma-ny Islamic societies remain in relative stag-nation up until today. They are drowned

in a decidedly unequal relation of powerespecially with the West. Domestically,they are often incapable of providing theiryouth the education and opportunities toempower them, and in many cases, theycannot even provide employment and themost basic social services their peopleneed.

42. But all these frustrations in Islamic so-cieties alone cannot explain the authentic

lethal threat that has undeniably emerged.As mentioned above, the rise of terrorismis often rooted in desperation and anger of

a long-term suffering and injustice fromthe hands of a powerful opponent, espe-cially under foreign occupation. Crucial inthis respect is the issue of Palestine . Thedaily suffering and humiliation of the Pa-

lestine people are transmitted on TV andinflame the hearts and minds of Muslimsworldwide. The same is true for Israelisand Palestinian suicide bombers. Someparticipants argued that, the atrocities onboth sides are the result of an occupationprotracted for almost forty years, and willnot stop before there is an agreement toguarantee security in Israel and a viableindependent Palestinian state. Besides, oneshould not forget that the Palestinians res-ponsible for the attacks also considerthemselves as a legitimate armed resistancegroup, although they are labelled “terro-rists” by others.

43. The presence of Western troops in Af- ghanistan is another factor fostering re-sentment in the Islamic World. The 9/11attacks were so severe that they did notleave the US any other choice than to over-throw the Taliban regime. For Talibansupporters and al-Qaeda, the presence of

Western troops equals a continuation ofthe 80´s Soviet occupation. Likewise, thepresence of Western troops in Saudi-Ara-bia was another source of anti-Westernresentment, especially with the countrybeing the guardian of Islam’s two holiestshrines.

44. Finally and perhaps most importantly

the invasion and occupation of Iraq hasleft in Muslim societies the conviction of

Islam being an objective of Western ag-gression. In addition, people all around theworld are extremely angry about the sanc-tions imposed on Iraq that let half a mil-lion children under five years old die. Ho-wever, Saddam’s dictatorship and his inva-sions of Muslim countries (Iran, Kuwait),are hardly being taken into account. Ins-tead, the foreign occupation of Iraq isbeing compared to the occupation of Pa-lestine. The Iraq issue is clearly becomingpart of the confrontation between Islamand the West, and provides a great sourceof inspiration for al-Qaeda and other mili-

7/21/2019 fride



10

tant groups, who see in Iraq another hotspot for their Jihad .

45. On top of all this, the revealed tortureof prisoners by Western guards such as in

Abu Ghraib undermines the credibility andtrustworthiness of the West which prea-ches democracy and human rights while atthe same time spurning them. The impactof these terrifying acts on the symbolic le-vel is substantial, since it plainly confirmsthe Muslim perception of the West, and es-pecially of the demon USA, nourishing aparticular hostility against Islam.

46. In order to stop violence in the MiddleEast, it was considered that the most ur-gent things for the West to do was to endthe American occupation of Iraq, and toput massive pressure on Israel to grant Pa-lestinians their rights. With regard to thelatter, scepticism was expressed that thepolitical weight American Protestantismhad under the Bush administration, rathershowed an America that would most likelysupport Israel unconditionally in its conti-nued colonialism. Civilizations can closeup intellectually as an act of resistance.

The longer these situations continue wit-hout a viable political solution, the morethe mutual hostilities among the civiliza-tions will grow, and the more recruits al-Qaeda and other extremist organizationswill get.

47. One participant expressed astonish-ment on the relative absence of two as-pects in the present debate: on the onehand, why only so few mentioned Guan-

tánamo and the embarrassment before thisaction of an allegedly free and democraticcountry such as the US which on top clai-med moral superiority. And on the otherhand, in more general terms, why nobodymentioned that the Muslim World shouldalso make an effort to earn itself the trustof those members of other civilizationswith good faith?

48. Looking at how negative perceptionsin both civilizations are created and nou-rished, the role of public political debateand especially the mass media was strongly

emphasized. In the seminar there was ge-neral agreement that in both civilizations,people live in an atmosphere which wasdenominated “ideology of fear ”: a wantedstrategy to make people fear the other and

maintain conflictive perceptions. In Euro-pe, fear is mostly directed towards immi-gration and terrorism, and creates a localsuspicion which itself nourishes those po-litical problems that seem to confirm Islambeing a threat in itself. This fear is createdin part by the emotionality that dominatesthe debate. Political forces try to keep thisemotionality as negative as possible withregard to Islam, in order to keep up thefear, which they deliberately instrumenta-lize for political ends. Most surprisingly,this very questionable kind of political agi-tation is not even necessarily being ques-tioned as a legitimate political tool; oneparticipant noted that even the renownedsociologist Anthony Giddens had recentlystated at the UK House of Lords that atcertain times in history, it was necessary tocreate cultural fear.

49. The strategic use of such an ideologyof fear has been a very important tool of

the Bush administration, both domesticallyand internationally. Most importantly, thisfear has successfully been used to boasteracquiescence and support for the so-called“war on terror”. However, it was expressedthat the Western fear had a very strong ra-cist element. The fact that, in the Euro-pean context, nobody feared white BosnianMuslims but only ethnic non-Europeans,gave evidence that actually it was not afear of Islam in European societies, but

fear of Arabs, an expression of the old fearof the different and the unknown which al-ways constitutes a key component of ra-cism. Paradoxically, the uninformed peo-ple in the US and Europe probably knowmore about Islam than about Confucia-nism or Buddhism, which shows again thatthe fear used to foster the present religiousantagonism has its roots not only in cultu-re or religion but also in racism.

50. Similar patterns of fear of the unknownin the population, with political forcescreating and deliberately nourishing fear

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

11

for political ends, can be observed in Isla-mic and Arab societies. It was expressedthat in both civilizations, the ideology offear was fostered by extremists, Islamic aswell as Christian, so that one of the main

threats consisted not in Islam or Christia-nity, but in the dangers inherent to reli-gious fundamentalism in general, whichcountering must be the main aim of anAlliance of Civilizations.

51. Within Western societies, the descri-bed ideology of fear leads to several conse-quences. Firstly, ideas that until recentlyhad been stigmatised as belonging to extre-me right-wing discourse, are now adoptedand advocated by classical conservativediscourse and thereby made acceptable, adevelopment which is very dangerous.Secondly, it reinforces the fear of a loss ofcultural uniformity/ integrity in Europe. Inmany European countries, Muslims werefirst told to integrate, and once they havedone so, they are explicitly being distin-guished, since their integration might putin danger the cultural uniformity of thecountry. This is a very subtle and dange-rous discourse, bordering racism.

52. Finally, the ideology of fear has an im-pact in the field of citizenship . As mentio-ned above, Muslims must do much morethan others to prove they are genuine citi-zens. This leads to the emergence of a rela-tionship between state and citizen which isnot based on trust, but on control. Citizensof Muslim confession may be tolerated, butare not valued as equal, because peoplecannot imagine that a Muslim citizen can

be completely and fully part of their socie-ty. Instead, control is exercised over whatthey do. But citizenship is per definitionemnot attached to religion or ethnicity, but isa personal choice, an exercise of personalfreedom to adopt the rights and duties of asociety.

53. In a general view on identities and per-ceptions in Arab and Islamic societies andthe West, the most central issue was con-sidered to be the lack of genuine informa-tion and knowledge of each other, whichform the basis for all distorted perceptions.

Both civilizations were asserted to havestereotyped images of the other, and thatreligion, as well as imperial dominance inthe past and present, played importantroles in this regard. It was emphasized that

those stereotypes must be cleaned upthrough massive means, and that the cul-ture of confrontation arising from it mustbe counteracted. An Alliance of Civiliza-tions which managed some impact in thisregard would be a very valuable contribu-tion.

2.3. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE,

MULTILATERALISM AND COSMOPOLITAN

DEMOCRACY

54. Beyond the idea of what constitutes theself and the other, resentment and hosti-lities between nations and civilizationsmight also be created by some more tan-gible disagreements regarding the way thecurrent international system is designedand operated. Particularly in the weakercountries, resentment is increasing to thedegree that the powerful take advantage of

their superiority to dominate the way theinternational economy, peace and securityand other global issues are being dealtwith, according to their national or regio-nal interests, thereby contradicting the ve-ry idea of the United Nations. Controver-sial issues in this regard which were dis-cussed during the present seminar includethe call for multilateralist solutions (espe-cially in the context of UN Reform), thedevelopment and enforcement of Interna-tional Law, and the promotion of demo-cratic values, including human rights.

55. The current system of global gover-nance, institutionally represented by theUnited Nations, starts from the principlethat any threat to global security must bedealt with on the grounds of multilateraldecision-making . However, with the USleft as the only superpower, politically,economically and militarily highly supe-rior to any other, the multilateral system

faces the difficulty of enforcement of Inter-national Law vis-à-vis an invincible power,

7/21/2019 fride



12

which is naturally tempted to submit itssovereignty under the rule of the UN onlywhere it matches its interests.

56. The United States today takes advan-

tage of its unique position in a selectiveapplication of values, in particular relatedto what is declared the universal value ofdemocracy. The United States, it was ex-pressed, imposed on the world their rules,challenging International Law and the Uni-ted Nations, down-playing the role andsignificance of the UN. Nevertheless, insixty years of its existence, the UN had ne-ver been more relevant than when it stoodup against Washington and said “No” towar.

57. To the extent the US applies unilateralad hoc solutions, instead of leaving thetask of managing global governance andparticularly peace and security to the UN,anger is generated in the rest of the world.Particularly those who are target of USunilateral action and lack the strength tocounteract, are filled with indignation be-fore the absence of effective mechanismsto implement multilateral solutions and

the impotence of the global communityand especially the UN, which is supposedto be safeguarding the rights of the wea-kest. The most significant case in point isthe unilateral US invasion of Iraq, whichwas not backed up by the UN SecurityCouncil and thus illegal under Interna-tional Law.

58. The invasion of Iraq provoked the mo-bilization of civil society around the globe,

of people on the streets saying “No” towar, disgusted at the US’ single-handedaction. Even though this was not the firsttime anti-war demonstrations were held,governments around the world were for-ced to listen in a collective and collabora-tive manner. Due to the global scope ofprotests, powerful governments could pro-vide a kind of political backing for thesmaller ones, a group called the “Uncom-mitted Six”5, six countries each of themtoo weak to oppose the US on its own. To-

5 Cameroon, Guinea, Angola, Pakistan, Mexico and Chile.

gether, backed by larger, more powerfulcountries, they were able to provide thecore of a governmental challenge to Was-hington’s drive towards unilateral war.How was that possible? Because people in

the streets massively demanded it, so at so-me point the price governments would ha-ve had to pay for giving in to Washingtonturned higher than the price for saying noand standing up against the US as a part ofthe global resistance movement. Eventhough this opposition of the masses thistime was not enough to prevent unilateralmilitary action, it illustrated the power ofthe people and showed that, where there isunion, an opposition against a single su-perpower’s unilateralism can have an im-pact.

59. The distribution of power and effectivemultilateralism are central issues withinthe ongoing process of UN Reform . Howcan the United Nations be consolidated asa reference point for effectively safeguar-ding global peace and security, based onmultilateral decision-making? Again, onefaces the dilemma of how such a reformcan possibly be adopted with the consent

of the only superpower if it aims to forcethat very superpower under the rule oflaw. Some participants emphatically un-derlined the need that the world reclaimedwhat the UN charter stands for, that theglobal community’s interests must not bedriven by the powerful, but by all. In thissense, the unique opportunity of the pro-cess of UN Reform must be taken advan-tage of to make multilateralism accounta-ble to stand up even to superpowers.

60. Is this a feasible aim? A talk about re-form is a talk about power, is a talk aboutthe Security Council, which up to today isso often the representative of the strongest,as well as of the least democratic agents ofthe UN. Participants considered that intheory, a reasonable reform of the SecurityCouncil would have to abolish the vetoand expand the Council in order to makeit a truly representative organ. In practice,a more realistic proposal to make the Se-curity Council accountable was seen in thecreation of an oversight panel, composed

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

13

not of country representatives but of indi-viduals, influential jurists foremost in In-ternational Law, to ensure that SecurityCouncil decisions did not themselves vio-late International Law.

61. Moreover, there must be a shift of po-wer from the Security Council to the Ge-neral Assembly. Legally, according to theUniting for Peace Resolution, when the Se-curity Council is paralysed for any reason– which could be a veto, or threat of it –the General Assembly is authorized to takeup issues that ordinarily would only beallowed to be taken up in the Council.6 There are ways the General Assembly canreclaim power to reflect the interests of thenon-powerful. The run-up to the Iraq war,even though it did not stop the war in theend, already gave an idea of how thatcould work.

62. Some wondered whether the very callfor an Alliance of Civilizations was not aproof that the project of the United Na-tions, founded in 1949 as a true Union ofNations, had failed, for not being able toconduct a global policy that safeguarded

national politics by placing itself above it.In response, it was admitted that in someways, the UN had failed to fulfil its object-tives, and thus the Alliance of Civilizationsshould contribute to its renewal. On theother hand, people argued that the hugeefforts and achievements made by the UNin some fields, e.g. in the Palestine issue,had been too often neglected. Moreover, itwas not a failure inherent to the UN if itsmembers lacked the common sense to ap-

ply laws and agreements. The UN, it wasargued, had its strengths and weaknesses,and among its strengths, UN action in thefield of humanitarian intervention and thedevelopment of the rule of law were men-tioned. The necessary UN Reform, partici-pants added, must not be reduced to “sla-shing budget and firing staff”, but insteadbe a reform aimed at openness, democrati-sation, transparency, and broadening to in-clude civil society.

6 UN General Assembly Resolution 377(V): Uniting for peace ,03.11.1950.

63. Some participants argued that even if itwas viable to establish a true multilatera-lism, it would not suffice to satisfy con-temporary requirements. Multilateralism,it was argued, included only governments

in the decision-making process, so whatwas needed for a democratic global gover-nance was a system based on a new kind ofmulti-levelled “internationalism” , invol-ing the UN as both actor and venue, na-tional governments, as well as the mostimportant non-state actors of civil society,in order to challenge the whole range ofissues relevant to global governance.

64. The hard end of multilateralism is theenforcement of International Law. Multila-teralism can only be effective if Interna-tional Law is applied universally. However,due to the current distribution of power,there are in practice different measures forthe US and for the rest of the world. UNResolutions are being applied or not de-pending on whose interests are affected bythe envisaged actions. This insufferable hy-pocrisy, participants criticized, was under-mining the credibility of the UN as an im-partial global intermediary. As a matter of

fact, International Law is currently in a ve-ry precarious situation. The system opensno space for an opposition of the weakestto the most powerful, in case the latter de-cide not to stick to the rules.

65. Why is this so? Since the Middle Ages,the world has been organized in politicalcommunities around the principle of sovereignty , first monarchs, then nation states.

With the development of military techno-

logy, wars between sovereign Europeanstates reached a level of violence which, af-ter two World Wars, led to the founding ofthe UN as a system of global harmoniza-tion on the basis of a common law. Parallelto that, sovereignty, which had been thesymbol of the majesty of power and theindependence of people, became the objectof desire of the people in the colonizedterritories, and their elites imitated the po-litical form of the sovereign state in the20th century process of decolonisation in auniversal extension. Sovereignty therebybecame the basic principle of International

7/21/2019 fride



14

Law, guaranteed by the UN charter (art. 2par. 1).

66. The principle of sovereignty of the sta-te still forms the basis of contemporary In-

ternational Law. Sovereignty means the ex-clusiveness of competences on a specificterritory, itself or by delegation. It is by de-finition unlimited, which must naturallylead to a clash of different national sove-reignties. The principle of sovereignty ischaracterized by a strong inherent ambi-guity: on the one hand, the sovereign isentitled to administer the national law,which constitutes a guarantee of the rightsof its citizens. On the other hand, the in-conditionality of sovereignty is susceptibleto instrumentalization. This leads to anerosion of International Law, turning sove-reignty from an instrument for the pro-tection of the weak into a tool of the mostpowerful.

67. On this ground, International Justicemust remain weak. The ICC and the ICJdo not have the power to summon anyonewithout the consent of the home state, andtheir judgements often stay without prac-

tical consequences. Moreover, the incondi-tionality of sovereignty implies the riskthat the rule of law, human rights andother democratic principles may be under-mined any moment by a return to the stateof emergency as the very last resort of thesovereign. An example is the US “PatriotAct”, which constitutes a considerable res-triction of human rights and civil libertiesin the name of protection.

68. The inconditionality of power inherentto the principle of sovereignty makes thelimitation of the stronger sovereignties, bylaw or legal procedures, impossible. Buttransnational relations need a legal frame,of which the source cannot be the statesthemselves. It is true that sovereignty is aconstitutive element in the definition ofdemocracy. But the difficulty to maintainmultilateralism in a world with an imba-lanced distribution of power shows that ona global level, it is in fact the limitation of(national) sovereignty that guarantees de-mocracy.

69. Contemporary International Law is avoluntary law, in essence a contradiction,meaning that those who choose to subs-cribe to it voluntarily submit their sove-reignty under its rule. In legal terms, laws

are an expression of general will and/orvalues, and obligatory for all. “Internatio-nal Law”, however, is based on contracts, atool of interindividual relations on the le-vel of the signatories. Consequently, Inter-national Law is relative, not absolute, andno binding rule can be imposed on the so-vereign state to which the very has notsubscribed (except, indirectly, through po-litical pressure). Hence, on the global le-vel, there is actually no “law” in the abovementioned sense.

70. The big international conventions,which were meant to provide a frameworkfor international society, are ratified onlyby those states which are in favour of itsrequirements, without any legal obligation.There is no reference law, and no judgeautomatically competent, so there is agreat space in which the contract partnerscan fully exercise their interplay of forces,to the disadvantage of the weak. Moreover,

what we call today external constraints na-turally weigh heavier on the weak than onthe strong states. This leads in practice to ahierarchy between the states, a system ru-led by the survival of the fittest. At the sa-me time, there are no universal norms tobalance these inequalities, and to fight allthe pressing problems which fall under theduty of global governance. This situationnaturally fosters the anger of the weakest.

71. So what is to be done? The erosion ofInternational Law must be faced throughthe corresponding improvement in synthe-sis, but above all in application. The con-text of UN Reform, and especially the Se-curity Council, provides a unique opportu-nity to clean up these disparities and esta-blish rules and procedures to guaranteedemocracy and the rule of law also on aglobal level, without depending solely onthe good will of sovereign states. Given theweakening effect the concept of sovereign-ty has on the regime of multilateralism, itssignificance as a basis of contemporary In-

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

15

ternational Law should at least be revie-wed, and eventually adjusted. In generalterms, a redefinition of values on an inter-national level is needed, plus the corres-ponding mechanisms to ensure its applica-

tion. However, as long as there is no suchset of genuine, complete rules for demo-cratic global governance, the existing onesmust be applied.

72. The call for a redefinition of globallyapplicable principles leads to the questionof the universality of democratic values. Asmentioned above, the credibility of a coun-try’s efforts to promote democracy, humanrights and the rule of law throughout theworld depends on the integrity and cohe-rence that a nation demonstrates itself inthe application of the corresponding va-lues. Since such efforts are based on thebelief of democracy as a universal value, itis paradox that apparently, to the degreenational sovereignty is being touched, thisclaimed universality seems not to apply tothe only level where a truly universal dis-persion of these principles can be promo-ted: globally.

73. The dominant nations, participants ar-gued, must therefore not be surprised iftheir noble quest to bring the good to theworld is not being met with the expectedenthusiasm, since they foil their own cre-dibility in this field by not applying uni-versally themselves what they claim to be auniversal value when it fits their interest.The only conclusion that can be drawnfrom this double-faced discourse, it wasexpressed, is that not a serious commit-

ment with democracy, human rights andthe rule of law stands behind the powerfulcountries’ democratisation efforts, but theattempt to bring about conditions favoura-ble to their own political, economical andgeostrategic interests, under the disguise ofnobility.

74. Democratisation efforts entail a certain“democratic paradox” (Huntington): per-mitting genuine democracy throughout theworld includes a risk to get regimes hostileto one’s own interests. In this sense, mostparticipants did not believe the West and

especially the US to be seriously commit-ted to democracy. Some participants fromArab countries argued that people in theArab World wanted indeed democracy, butwhile the West did not take its commit-

ment to democratic values seriously, neit-her could they.

75. Good governance is rule-based deci-sion-making through transparent institu-tions which are representative of the peo-ple at large. Anything else leads to a con-centration of power and a marginalizationof the masses. In this sense, the currentglobal multilateral system is exercising badgovernance. The concept of “cosmopolitandemocracy”

7 describes democracy as a tru-ly universal regime, not only applicablewithin states but also on the regional andglobal spheres, between states and interna-tional organizations. This implies that de-mocracy needs to be understood with cer-tain flexibility, that there is not only onemodel of democracy that can be applied atall levels. And above all, it implies that theold notion of sovereignty needs to be re-placed by some “constitutionalism”, mea-ning that all actors of political life have to

be integrated into some constitutional sys-tem, so democratic principles are obligato-ry not only within states, but also betweenstates and within international organiza-tions.

76. The current US administration, it wasargued, referred only to democracy on aninner state level. It permitted itself to de-termine how other states have to designtheir democracies, and showed no inclina-

tion to follow the rules of democracy on atransnational level. This was considered ananti-ethical program, based on a schizo-phrenic understanding of democracy: in-ternal democracy, external free style. Butdemocracy as a universal value cannot beapplied selectively.

77. In the promotion of democracy, theremust be a consistency between means andends. Democracy means also the rule of

7 See Daniele Archibugi and David Held (Eds.): CosmopolitanDemocracy. An Agenda for a New World Order , CambridgePolity Press, 1995.

7/21/2019 fride



16

law, and consequently, democracy cannotbe imported by breaking the law. Neithercan democracy be imported where it is notwanted and there are no societal forces topreserve it. For example, the fundamental

difference between the liberation of Italy in1945 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 wasthat in Italy, the Americans stopped thewar started by the fascist government, whi-le in Iraq, it was the Americans who star-ted the war. Whilst the former was a trueand welcome liberation, the latter was anaggression. But aggression is no politicaloption to promote democracy.

78. In terms of human rights, it was be-moaned that the effective protection of hu-man rights still depended on the good willof the states. An Alliance of Civilizationscommitted to human rights was seen con-fronted with two choices: either provide arather limp reference point for humanrights without explicit effort in this area,or fundamentally claim the primacy of human rights and International Humanita-rian Law. Given the already mentioned in-coherence in the application of humanrights, democratic principles and Interna-

tional Law in general, an explicit notion ofthe primacy of International Human RightsLaw was considered necessary in order tosecure the basic human rights of every-body and defend their universal validityagainst cultural relativism. In the contextof the Alliance of Civilizations, as well asof UN Reform, it was demanded to treatcivil and political, economical, social, andcultural rights as a non-negotiable socketof law – be it called international republi-

can law, common patrimony of human-kind, or other – as a whole, single blockwhich enjoys explicit primacy. A simplereference to those rights, it was repeatedlyemphasized, is not enough if the universalapplication of human rights is to be se-cured.

79. Against the background of all thesechallenges, how must such an Alliance ofCivilizations be designed in order to makea valuable contribution to tackling them?

3. Implications and Ideas for a

Tangible Alliance of

Civilizations

80. One of the immediate reactions to theidea to form an Alliance of Civilizationswas a certain doubt on whether and inwhich way this Alliance would provide anadded value to the field of already existinginitiatives aimed at building bridges andestablishing ties between different coun-tries, peoples and cultures (e.g. IranianPresident Khatami’s Dialogue of Civiliza-tions). Especially in the Mediterranean, gi-ven that several similar activities have al-ready been implemented in that region(Forum for the Future, EuroMed Part-nership, European Neighbourhood Policy,etc.), there might be a certain danger ofduplication, further adding to what is al-ready a rather confusing array of initia-tives.

81. In response, it was stressed that themain virtue of the Alliance of Civilizationsin comparison to other, similar initiativeswas that it did not remain in getting to

know each other in order to overcome ste-reotypes and mutual hostility, but that itaimed at urging concrete measures of com-mon action beyond simple exchange. Thisdifference, it was stated, was also perceivedat the UN Headquarters, and had evenbeen recognized by initiators of other ini-tiatives, like the aforementioned Dialogueof Civilizations. The Alliance of Civiliza-tions will be a long-term initiative whichaims to go beyond any other initiative

which has advanced, but maybe not mana-ged to mobilize universal conscience. TheDialogue of Civilizations has opened adoor but has been practically exhausted, sonow it is time to start a new impulse with adifferent strategy. Moreover, the Dialogueof Civilizations is limited to the frameworkof the UNESCO, while the envisaged fra-mework for the Alliance of Civilizations isthe whole UN.

82. A major criticism regarding the pro-posal to form an Alliance of Civilizationsconsisted in it being still too vague and

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

17

lacking substance in terms of concreteideas. In the present seminar, a broad de-bate lead by the explicit desire to generatesuch tangible ideas and give substance tothe Alliance of Civilizations, treated se-

mantic questions, actors involved, scope ofaction, and possible fields of activity.

83. First of all, the very term “Alliance ofCivilizations” was being challenged as a ti-tle for the present proposal. Among theimmediate criticisms to the Alliance of Ci-vilizations initiative was the argument thatthe term “alliance”, unlike “dialogue” or“cooperation”, had a conflictive connota-tion, implying there was a confrontationwith an enemy against whom allies mustbe sought. Some participants found theterm “Alliance among Civilizations” moresuitable for the envisaged undertakingthan “Alliance of Civilizations” becausethe former described better the element ofcross-fertilization, cosmopolitanism, andthe idea of a shared process in which noneof the partners must sacrifice its culturalintegrity. Others argued that the term“Alliance among Civilizations” turned thatalliance into a self-fulfilling prophecy by

conveying the message that the alliancewas urgently needed due to existing con-flicts, a message which might provoke aboomerang-effect. Again, others took theposture that the term “Alliance of Civili-zations” should not be dwelt on too aca-demically, since they considered the ideabehind it perfectly comprehensible wit-hout a need for semantic adjustments.

84. One participant defined the term

“alliance” as different components findingeach other on a certain subject and wor-king together in order to achieve a com-mon goal. In this sense, it was argued thatthe formula “Alliance of Civilizations”missed a definition of its common ground,the very goal towards which that alliancehad been formed. It was therefore sug-gested to call the initiative after its goalsrather than after its participants, concre-tising which values the Alliance stands for(e.g. “Alliance for Democracy, Peace andSustainable Development”, “Alliance a-gainst the recruitment of extremism”). The

term “alliance” itself was mostly seen asvery suitable to name the envisaged initia-tive, since it described the political notionof a partnership with common goals, inte-rests, and challenges.

85. No consensus could be reached as towhat might be a suitable definition of theterm “civilization” , despite its being exces-sively used. Hence, several participantswere in favour of dropping the term, sinceit allowed for too many interpretations. Ci-vilizations, it was argued, are a constructwith no body, no address and no represen-tatives; a blurred character which pavedthe way for an instrumentalization of theterm. The term “culture” , which describeda different concept, did not provide a sui-table alternative either, and the frequent,misleading use of both terms as synonymsespecially after 9/11 was bewailed. One ar-gument against the use of both terms in aUN context was founded in a certain fearthat these terms, with their unclear, blur-red meaning, might infiltrate InternationalLaw, an option which was seen out ofquestion since countries were not to begrouped by culture or religion.

86. Moreover, it was expressed that theterm “civilization” recalled the Biblical ar-chetype of good and bad, and the 19 th-century nationalist fanatism transposed bycolonialism. The question was raised whet-her the aforementioned, old-fashioned no-tion of civilization as the opposite of bar-barism was no longer valid in the sensethat in every civilization today, there re-mained a seed to go back to barbarism in a

new form (as illustrated by the many warsand conflicts), and whether in this sense,the Alliance of Civilizations must not sym-bolize our conviction that the very “valueof civilization” must be conserved as adefence against the threat of the resurgen-ce of barbarism in our societies, in order tobuild and defend a humanistic global so-ciety, capable of integration, instead ofmarginalizing any of its social elements.

87. As mentioned above, civilizations wereseen as rather blurred entities with noofficial representatives. So who can be the

7/21/2019 fride



18

agents of this Alliance of Civilizations?The debate about who should be the main

actors involved in the corresponding acti-vities mainly circled around the issue ofhow to involve systematically not only

governments and the United Nations, butalso civil society. It was argued that on thegovernmental level, there was already asort of alliance of civilizations in place, inthe sense of the US and EU being in allian-ces with the leaders of the Arab World.

Where there was no alliance so far was interms of the population, so what we nee-ded was an “alliance from below”. Thisalliance would not replace or run againstthe existing alliance between governments,but provide a democratic counterbalanceto it at a global level. While some parts ofthe plenary strongly supported this idea,others sceptically added that a generalconsensus from below would imply theexistence of a universal morality, whichwould still remain to be defined, and bywhom? The question whether the UNcould provide a suitable framework forsuch an alliance from below, taking intoaccount that this idea went beyond whathad so far been the main nature of that

organization, remained unanswered.

88. In the debate on the actors to be in-volved, there was broad consensus thatboth governments and civil society mustplay an important role in the initiative.

Without the firm will and power of go-vernments to apply present initiatives, pro-posals and demands of civil society, nochange will be possible. Of course, an ade-quate civil society representation is crucial,

otherwise governments would remain theprincipal agents and there would be nochange compared to the status quo. Therewas general agreement that a powerfulalliance among civil society could not beformed without involving the powerful,that is, the elites, and that an Alliance ofCivilizations as a voluntary exercise by ci-vil society only would not lead to greatthings, so governments must be involved.

89. In principle there was consensus thatthe Alliance of Civilizations must be aninitiative in which governments, the Uni-

ted Nations and civil society worked to-gether hand in hand. However, a majorchallenge was seen in how this idea couldbe translated in practical terms so it ac-tually reached the people at the local level.

For this aim it was considered crucial thatthe Alliance be provided with an institu-tional structure which went beyond cur-rent government-based models and allo-wed the systematic involvement of civil so-ciety on an equal foot. It was underlinedthat in the present seminar, a special ses-sion had explicitly been dedicated to civilsociety because one of the singularities ofthe Alliance of Civilizations proposal,compared to other initiatives, was precise-ly to mobilize the people, and to ensurethe participation of the organized civilsociety.

90. The idea of the creation of a forum si-milar to a “World Parliament” was raised,which was in theory considered a usefulinstrument for an Alliance of Civilizationsto get to know the interests, needs andopinions, as well as the disagreements,among the forces of society. At the sametime it was, in this form, admitted to be an

utopian idea, but still the hope was ex-pressed that some similar, less far-reachingmeasures could be taken, such as strength-hening the Interparlamentarian Union, the

World Social Forum and the UN GeneralAssembly, and establishing the MillenniumAssembly of civil society as a permanentinstitution. Generally, the need for an ins-titutionalised and powerful role of civilsociety in the Alliance of Civilizations gai-ned special emphasis. At the same time,

scepticism was expressed that govern-ments and the UN would grant civil so-ciety such a powerful role.

91. With regard to the geographical scopeof action of an Alliance of Civilizations,the debate concentrated on two alternati-ves: on the one hand, starting with theEuro-Mediterranean region as proving-ground, and eventually amplifying it to therest of the world, and on the other hand,designing the Alliance of Civilizations as aglobal scale initiative right from the start.

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

19

92. As mentioned before, on the Euro- Mediterranean level, there is already abroad range of initiatives in place to fosterdialogue and exchange. The idea of totallyreducing the present initiative to the Medi-

terranean region was mostly rejected.However, the Mediterranean, being a rela-tively small area where the West and theArab-Muslim World are almost withinsight of each other, was considered a verysuitable proving-ground for this new ini-tiative for a systematic cross-fertilization ofcultures. In this regard, the Barcelona Pro-cess could serve both as a source of syner-gies as of lessons learned.

93. The geostrategic dimensions of theBarcelona Process and the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy are of highest im-portance, beyond their being regionalpartnerships. The Alliance of Civilizationsmust be independent of the BarcelonaProcess, but take it into account. A seriesof key lessons can be drawn from ten yearsof the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,which could be applied to the Alliance ofCivilizations. First, approaches so far havebeen elitist, involving a small elite who is

already well travelled and socialized. Se-cond, educational exchange has been one-way, south to north. Third, the focus hasbeen on history heritage, going backwardsrather than searching common ground forthe present. Fourth, governments havebeen firmly maintaining control over theprocess, excluding oppositional civil socie-ty. Fifth, there is a danger that these initia-tives have become exercises just to showup autocratic regimes in the south and are

being supported simply as a means of di-verting tensions away from the real chal-lenge, which is the lack of political rights,as they are wanted by citizens in all partsof the world, and about which there isnothing civilizational.

94. Those in favour of a global scalelaunch of the initiative right from the startargued that the duty the Alliance neededto fulfil implied per se the need to operateon a much broader scale, not just regio-nally, but globally. Since the initiative wasbased on the political will to foster multi-

lateralism, it must be a project of universaloutreach, which to limit regionally, and beit only temporarily, would contradict itsvery raison d´être . The Alliance of Civiliza-tions as a global initiative could contribute

to foster a systematic worldwide process ofcross-fertilization of civilizations, culturesand religions. Some participants expresseddoubts that, within the framework of theUnited Nations, the initiative would beable to resist American and Western domi-nance respectively, and might thus be de-signed along the wishes and stereotypes ofthe powerful Western countries. In this ca-se, it was argued, the continuation of hos-tilities towards the West in the Arab-Mus-lim civilization would be guaranteed andthe initiative would be a failure right fromthe start.

95. In terms of possible contents of theAlliance of Civilizations, the fields of ac-tion it should operate in, a wide range ofgeneral and concrete suggestions was ma-de, coming down to five broadly overlap-ping fields: general information and know-ledge, mass media, translations, streng-thening civil society participation, and fos-

tering the regime of multilateralism withinthe context of UN Reform.

96. It was repeatedly noted that the Allian-ce of Civilizations initiative should ratheraim at a more modest approach that wor-ked than at a grandiose one that failed andwas soon forgotten. Instead of trying tobuild a new world order, it was argued, thecurrent dynamics to form this Allianceshould be taken advantage of to make up

something which might be small but at thesame time so deeply rooted and stronglyinstitutionalised that it outlasted govern-ments and UN Secretary-Generals. Howe-ver, it was added that even though propo-sals should be tangible and realistic, rea-lism must not dictate the goals. While re-maining down-to-earth, utopias are worthpreserving.

97. An alliance on the general information level was considered a precondition forcountering hostilities. It is commonplacethat stereotypes, prejudices and antagonis-

7/21/2019 fride



20

tic thinking can best flourish on thegrounds of a lack of knowledge. Ignoranceleads to a lack of recognition and mutualrespect, and without recognition and mu-tual respect, neither true dialogue nor an

alliance is possible. Hence, enhancingknowledge of the other beyond stereotypesand name-dropping must form the elemen-tary basis of an Alliance of Civilizations.

While the lack of knowledge can be a greatdanger, where this deficit is efficiently tac-kled, the “weapons of knowledge” can al-so be effectively used for the right cause.The creation of more cultural spaces in US,Europe and the Arab World was suggestedas one possibility to enhance information.However, in order to reach not only theelites but all people, the pulse of such aknowledge and information alliance mustobviously not be political security spee-ches, UN reports, or similarly intangiblechannels, but the mass media .

98. It was expressed that an alliance on theinformation level, however, cannot meanimposing one means of information on theother, as so far effectively exercised byCNN and BBC World. Al-Jazeera, today

watched in 40 million households throug-hout the Arab World, was created in res-ponse to these basically “Western propa-ganda networks”, in order to provide peo-ple in the Arab World with a more balan-ced information. At the same time, thepropaganda machine underlying such bia-sed reporting also works very efficiently inthe West itself. The dominance of certainmedia, which substantially reduce criticaland balanced debate especially in the US,

but also in Europe, is decisive for the cur-rent antagonist thinking. This indirect“thought police”, it was bewailed, deli-berately spreads stereotypes, in order tokeep up the “ideology of fear” with regardto the “foe image” of Islam. A concreteproposal in order to provide some counter-balance to this unhealthy propaganda wasto set up – in the Euro-Mediterranean con-text – a two-sided TV channel which ai-med at providing genuine, balanced infor-mation of either side of the Sea, and whichwas designed to reach a broad publicthrough a varied and attractive array of

programmes. A similar idea might be deve-loped with a global outreach.

99. A related proposal aimed at enhancinginformation was to found a Mediterranean

“Open University” on television (followingthe British 1970´s example), throughwhich anyone interested could learn andget to know other realities. The cost ofsuch a project was estimated to be consi-derable, but not out of reach. An OpenUniversity, either of the Mediterranean oron a global scale, a TV channel with cul-ture, history etc. with a mainly educationalfunction, was considered to be a lastingway of bringing people of different back-grounds and cultures together, and wasbelieved to be something that would lastmuch longer than conferences. Both pro-posals, the independent TV channel aswell as the Open University, were conside-red proposals able to effectively reach outto the people, and were thus received withgreat enthusiasm and broad approval.

100. The same was said to be true about aproposal made to bring underway massivetranslations in order to enhance know-

ledge and understanding between the Arab World and the West. Given the poorknowledge especially of Arab-Muslim phi-losophy and literature in the West, therewas a broad consensus that spending asubstantial amount of money to bringabout translations of philosophy, contem-porary literature and poetry, and also ofschool manuals, news and other hard factsources on a massive scale, was considereda highly worthwhile investment.

101. In order to strengthen civil society and involve the people on the national andlocal levels, first of all, an Alliance of Civi-lizations should ensure that in all parti-cipating countries there actually exists acivil society worth the term. Civil societyis, generally speaking, all organized societybetween public institutions and the mar-ket. Civil society is the society organizedwith the objective of defending some inte-rests, be they economic, social or cultural.Civil society groups must be autonomous,meaning above all not party- or govern-

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

21

ment-related, and internally democratic,implying above all representation by elec-tion. The framework for civil society ac-tion is provided by institutionalised plu-ralism, which again is manifested by free-

dom of expression and freedom of asso-ciation, both not only de iure but also defacto . However, deficits in practical imple-mentation do not imply that one shouldnot collaborate with civil society unless itenjoys perfect liberties. On the contrary,alliances with local civil societies supportthem in attaining these liberties to a fullscale. One of the most essential elementsin a pluralist civil society is the capacity ofsocietal groups to represent their interestsand demands, and to be able to negotiatetowards a resolution of conflict of inte-rests. Here again, we cannot wait for de-mocracy to enforce civil society. Civil so-ciety is a condition to facilitate the pro-gress of democracy and, once it has arri-ved, to socially assimilate democratic prin-ciples in order to maintain democracy.

102. Strengthening civil society and en-hancing their participation could be anenormous field of action for the Alliance of

Civilizations. At a governmental level, theAlliance could facilitate the adoption ofnorms in favour of freedom and recogni-tion of civil society organizations. Moreo-ver, it could form alliances between thedifferent civil society organizations in thedifferent countries through exchange andcollaboration programs.

103. In terms of global governance, theAlliance of Civilizations initiative could

contribute to a government reform on theglobal level, that is, to UN Reform . We arein a special moment of the history of in-ternational organizations where there is ameeting of minds and a will to reform glo-bal governance in order to prevent a con-centration of power, which must be seized.Doubt was expressed on whether it wasfeasible to change global government priorto national ones, thereby giving more po-wer to undemocratic regimes. In response,it was argued that the first step in a globalgovernance reform must be to deconcen-trate power in the United Nations Organi-

zation itself. In particular, the need to putan end to the monopoly of power in theSecurity Council was emphasized, as wellas the need to give a larger role to the Ge-neral Assembly, especially in the decision-

making process regarding peace and secu-rity issues. Political pressure, it was ar-gued, is possible even under the presentbalance of power, and should be built on.

104. Participants were reminded that afterall, the Alliance of Civilizations was plan-ned as a UN-based initiative, and thusmust take into account how the UN couldbe involved. While there was generalagreement that the Alliance of Civiliza-tions should influence the process of UNReform, no concrete proposals were madeas to how and through which measuressuch influence could be established.

Outlook

105. Towards the closing of the seminar,the plenary agreed that some importantand very tangible ideas had emerged, suchas a focus on the role of the media, a Me-diterranean or global Open University,translations on a massive scale, etc., whichwould all provide a wonderful start. Now,beyond the analysis of contemporary pro-blems and the brainstorming for concretemeasures, the principles and ideas on thetable need to be reframed more concretely.As the UN representative pointed out, thecontents of the Alliance of Civilizationswill now be laid down in a political con-

cept, which will eventually provide thefoundation for an action plan of concretemeasures. This political concept, as well asthe plan of action containing concrete, tan-gible measures, will be awaited benevo-lently by all participants and speakers ofthis seminar.

106. One participant declared that he hadarrived at Madrid with a rather critical atti-tude towards the Alliance of Civilizations,

but had learned throughout the debates ofthe past two days to grow more positive

7/21/2019 fride



22

about the initiative. Beyond all semanticadjustments, he said, the symbolic value of

the initiative must be underlined, and inpolitics, symbols were of great importance.

7/21/2019 fride



Seminar Conclusions

23

Últimos títulos publicados ICEI

Working Papers

WP 03/05 Kausch, Kristina; Barreñada, Isaías: Alliance of Civilizations; International Securityand Cosmopolitan Democracy.

WP 02/05 Sastre, Luis: An alternative model for the trade balance of countries with openeconomies: the Spanish case.

WP 01/05 Díaz de la Guardia, Carlos; Molero, José; Valadez, Patricia: International competi- tiveness in services in some European countries: Basic facts and a preliminaryattempt of interpretation.

WP 03/04 Angulo, Gloria: La opinión pública española y la ayuda al desarrollo.

WP 02/04 Freres, Christian; Mold, Andrew: European Union trade policy and the poor. To-

wards improving the poverty impact of the GSP in Latin America.

WP 01/04 Álvarez, Isabel; Molero, José: Technology and the generation of internationalknowledge spillovers. An application to Spanish manufacturing firms.

Policy Papers

PP 02/05 Alonso, José Antonio; Garcimartín, Carlos: Apertura comercial y estrategia dedesarrollo.

PP 01/05 Lorente, Maite: Diálogos entre culturas: una reflexión sobre feminismo, género,desarrollo y mujeres indígenas kichwuas.

PP 02/04 Álvarez, Isabel: La política europea de I+D: Situación actual y perspectivas.

PP 01/04 Alonso, José Antonio; Lozano, Liliana; Prialé, María Ángela: La cooperación cultural española: Más allá de la promoción exterior.

Serie Previa

DT8/2004 Legrain, Milli: La crisis argentina de diciembre de 2001. Debilidad institucional yfalta de legitimidad del Estado.

DT7/2004 González, Mariano; Larrú, José María: ¿A quién benefician los créditos FAD? Losefectos de la ayuda ligada sobre la economía española.

DT6/2004 Díaz de la Guardia Carlos; Molero, José; Valádez, Patricia: International Competi- tiveness in Services in Some European Countries: Basic Facts and a PreliminaryAttempt of Interpretation.

DT5/2004 Donoso, Vicente; Martín, Víctor: Exportaciones y crecimiento económico: el casode España .

DT4/2004 Vilariño, Ángel: Sobre las dificultades de medición del contagio financiero .

DT3/2004 Palazuelos, Enrique: La incidencia de las transferencias del Gobierno en la distri- bución de la renta en Estados Unidos: 1981-2000 .

DT2/2004 Álvarez, Isabel; Molero, José: Technology and the generation of internationalknowledge spillovers. An application to Spanish Manufacturing Firms .

DT1/2004 Alonso, José Antonio: Emigración y desarrollo. Implicaciones económicas .

7/21/2019 fride


FRIDE Publications

Policy Papers

1 Europe in Iraq: from standoff to engagement? , Richard Youngs, November 2004

2 Hacia una nueva cooperación española Silvia Hidalgo y Fernando Espada, December 2004

3 Uso de la fuerza y responsabilidad de proteger. El debate sobre la reforma de la ONU , CarlosEspósito, June 2005

4 A Peacebuilding Commission for the United Nations , Jessica Almqvist, June 2005

Working Papers

1 A proposal for governance of the Gaza strip in the context of the announced Israeli withdrawal ,

TICPax, at the initiative of Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami, November 2004

2 Ten years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting Arab Reform? , Richard Youngs, January2005

3 Political Islam: Ready for Engagement? , Emad El-Din Shahin, February 2005

4 Reflexiones sobre la reforma del Servicio Exterior de España, Carlos Espósito, February 2005

5 Which Justice for Perpetrators of Acts of Terrorism? The Need for Guidelines , Jessica Almqvist,March 2005

6 Spain and Morocco: Towards a Reform Agenda? , Richard Gillespie, April 2005

7 Contribución española a la construcción de la paz. Razones y propuestas para la elaboración de unPlan de Acción, Luis Peral, April 2005

8 EU instruments for conflict prevention , Javier Niño Pérez, April 2005

9 España y el Magreb durante el segundo mandato del Partido Popular. Un período excepcional ,Laura Feliú, May 2005

10 Agresión, crimen de agresión, crimen sin castigo, Antonio Remiro Brotóns, June 2005

11 Political Reform and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in the Gulf , Jill Crystal, July 2005

12 Building a New Role for the United Nations: the Responsibility to Protect , Carlos Espósito and

Jessica Almqvist, September 2005

13 Alliance of Civilizations: International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy , Kristina Kausch andIsaías Barreñada, October 2005

Pedidos de publicaciones a:

Felipe IV, 9 1º Dcha. 28014 Madrid - SPAINTel.: +34 915 22 25 12 – Fax: +34 915 22 73 01

Correo electrónico: [email protected] Todas las publicaciones de FRIDE están en el sitio web de FRIDE: www.fride.org

fride

Documents

Transcript of fride