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Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 1
Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality
Robin GregoryDecision Research, University of Victoria and UBC
Office address: Galiano Island, B.C. CanadaTel: 250-539-5701
E-mail: [email protected]
Presentation to Risk & Rationality ConferenceQueen’s College, Cambridge
March 29-31, 2007
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 2
Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality
Introduction: Rationality vs. reasonableness
Public engagement : Structured decision making
Example 1: Treating interface fires
Example 2: Facing taboo trade-offs
Example 3: Recognizing invisible values
Discussion: What should be done?
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 3
Management of risks is a central concern of society Highly skilled people – risk managers, scientists, elected
officials – view their job as helping citizens to make / support more rational choices across competing risk-reduction & mitigation possibilities.
In 1970’s, work of Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, & Baruch Fishchhoff – my Decision Research colleagues -- instrumental in initiating a dialogue about the standard of rationality that guides people’s perceptions of risk.
Expanded set of factors considered as contributors to risk: voluntariness of exposure, familiarity, dread.
Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality: Introduction
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 4
How might rational risk choices be defined? Ignoring philosophical debates, I suggest three criteria:
Concern for risk management is higher among those experiencing adverse consequences
People think carefully about consequential risk topics and seek out information to become better informed
The factual base for estimating risk impacts is repeatable and reflects observations based in “good science”
In my experience, these minimum criteria are repeatedly violated. What does this mean?
People are irrational - no There are other standards besides rationality - yes Risk managers and policies need to reflect more than just
rational / cognitive responses to risk - yes
Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality: Introduction
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 5
Risk and rationality: Introduction
In this talk, I will focus on public engagement as input to risk managers and decision makers
Context: Risk problems involving multiple dimensions: economic,
social, environmental, cultural, health & safety
Participants: Diverse stakeholders (public, government, industry,
academics, interest groups, indigenous populations)
Management dilemma: Increases on one dimension (protection of biodiversity,
fewer illnesses ) mean decreases on another (fewer jobs, higher costs)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 6
Risk and rationality: Introduction to Structured Decision Making
One useful approach for public engagement in risk management: Structured decision making
Based in insights from decision analysis and behavioral decision theory
Widely used in stakeholder deliberations when problems are complex and involve tough choices across multiple dimensions of value
Goal is insight for decision makers: show pros and cons of risk management alternatives
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 7
Define Issues, Objectives & Measures
Develop Alternatives
Estimate Consequences
Make Trade-Offs and SelectImplement and Monitor
Define Problem1
2
3
4
5
6
Steps in a structured decision making approach
Iterate as required
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 8
Terminology
Objectives The things that matter in the decision
Performance Measures (or attributes) The specific information used to report the consequences of the
alternatives on the objectives
Alternatives (or options) The means of achieving the objectives
Trade-offs (or balancing across objectives) Differences in performance among objectives; the key to
understanding tough choices that decision makers have to make
Constructed preferences The recognition that for many policy options, we don’t really know
what the components are or how we feel. So we construct our situation-dependent preferences in relation to cues.
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 9
Example: Use of SDM to help address management of Cultus Lake sockeye
(with G. Long, Compass Resource Mgt)
Worked with multi-stakeholder committee (approx. 20 people) over 1 month period (April, 2006) – but issues contentious for over a decade!
Key risk tradeoff: Environmental protection (of endangered stocks) vs. Economic
(commercial fishing revenues)
Multiple interests: High visibility species, High importance to Conservation
(COSEWIC listed) Commercial fishers, and First Nations
Data quality variable (and controversial)
Multiple management options (exploitation rate, captive breeding, predator removal) but uncertainty about consequences of actions
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 10
SDM Cultus Sub-committeeObjectives & Performance Measures
Sockeye conservation Probability of meeting Recovery Plan objectives 1
and 2 Returns in years 2010 and average of 2016-19 Probability of extirpation by 2036 % Enhanced in 2010 and average of 2016-19
Costs Total costs over 12 years, levelized No cost allocation attempted
Catch Traditional commercial catch Commercial TAC available upstream of Vedder Total First Nations FSC
Jobs Employment opportunities directly related to
enhancement and freshwater projects
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 11
SDM Cultus Sub-committeeAlternatives
Alternatives created by assembling ‘blocks’ of options:
Cultus Exploitation Rate % Lates (Upstream) Exploitation Rate % Enhancement options Freshwater projects options(Note: these included those factors considered
to be most important; fine tuning to occur at a later time)
Make use of strategy tables to encourage creative thinking. Two examples:
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 12
Building Alternatives – A Strategy Table
Cultus Exp Rate Lates Harvest Differential Location Enhancement FW Projects
5 0, As Cultus SQ – Downstream Only None None
10-12 (2005) 10 Mixed Current: Captive Brood Current Milfoil
20 20 UpRiver (Vedder) Current Ongoing Moderate Milfoil
30 30 Double Current Smolt Full Milfoil
40 Unconstrained Max Enhancement Current Pikeminnow (<5%)
Ongoing dbl current capModerate Pikeminnow (5-
20%)
Full Pikeminnow (+20%)
Hire Stewardship Co-ordinator
Alternative 1: “Status Quo 2005”
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 13
Building Alternatives – A Strategy Table
Alternative 6: “Spread the Pain 2”
Cultus Exp Rate Lates Harvest Differential Location Enhancement FW Projects
5 0, As Cultus SQ – Downstream Only None None
10-12 (2005) 10 Mixed Current: Captive Brood Current Milfoil
20 20 UpRiver (Vedder) Current Ongoing Moderate Milfoil
30 30 Double Current Smolt Full Milfoil
40 Unconstrained Max Enhancement Current Pikeminnow (<5%)
Ongoing dbl current capModerate Pikeminnow (5-
20%)
Full Pikeminnow (+20%)
Hire Stewardship Co-ordinator
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 14
SDM Cultus Sub-committeeAlternatives
Exploration of alternatives through iterative SDM process: creation, analysis, elimination
Step 1 created 6 alternatives
Step 2 Reviewed these 6 and created 3 more
Step 3 reviewed all 9, eliminated 6 because they were
dominated (others the same or better on objs) agreed on several key components for all altsf Focused on one, favoured alternative and created 6
new simpler variations
Use of VISTA (G. Long): Displays objectives & alternatives in consequence matrices, highlighting tradeoffs (pros and cons)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 16
Cultus Lake: SDM trade-off analysis
Participants examined how well different alternatives “satisfied” the objectives
Recognition that some objectives are easily & cheaply met – common sense to retain these “low-hanging fruit” in all alternatives
Recognition of need to simplify the decision problem through elimination of relevant objectives and alternatives. Do this via exploration of
Redundancy: where performance measures do not vary across alternatives
Dominance: where one alternative is better than or equal to all (or, by collective agreement, nearly all) aspects of another
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 17
SDM Cultus Sub-committeeTrade-Off Analysis
Three alternatives remained at the end of this process:
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 18
Establish/communicate areas of agreement and disagreement
One alternative favoured by group (8)
Agreement on common features: Full predator-removal program Full habitat-improvement program Employ habitat stewardship coordinator
Bound & deliberate on remaining issues: Degree of enhancement (100-150k) Exploitation rate (20% - 40%)
Provide information on areas of agreement and disagreement to decision makers, also provide process recommendations
Current status: discussions continuing !!!
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 19
Risk and rationality: SDM and insights
SDM / risk engagement assumes there is a problem to be addressed, that it can be characterized in terms of values and measurable attributes, and that people’s preferences for management options will reflect their values.
New research in behavioral decision making suggests otherwise:
The role of emotions (pre-cognitive) (Damasio & Loewenstein & Hsee)
The importance of affect (judgements of good and bad) (Slovic & Peters)
The role of judgemental heuristics (Kahenman & Tversky, Thaler & Knetsch)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 20
Risk v. reasonableness: Role of affect
Four roles of affect (Peters, 2006) As Information: feelings act as information to
guide the judgment or decision process As a spotlight: focusing us on different
information (e.g., numerical cues) As motivator: we can take action or devote
more attention to aspects of tasks As common currency: facilitates the
comparison of unlike options
Affect is thus an active component in the construction of preferences:
conditions more delayed cognitive responses
works in parallel with cognition
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 21
Rationality v. reasonableness: Examples
This tension between affect and cognition is a challenge for decision aiding approaches that seek to assist in the development of risk policies through public engagement (prescriptive)
Three examples: Interface fires (public engagement) - Canada Facing taboo choices (experimental) – US Recognizing invisible values (NSF, science
and local / aboriginal knowledge) – Canada, US, Thailand, New Zealand
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 22
Example 1: Interface forest fires -- the role of emotions (with Joe Arvai)
Context: public groups and surveys in aftermath of severe forest
fires in western Canada
Goal: aid risk managers in making fire management
decisions (fuels, “speed bumps,” evacuation plans, replanting, harvest timing, equipment)
Analysis: starting point was structured dialogue with
stakeholders, asking: What do you think are key sources of risk? What might be done to reduce risks?
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 23
Risk and rationality: Interface fires
Factual result: Most high risk areas remain so, even after burning. In some cases,
risks increase.
Expected finding: Wake-up call people in high-risk fire areas, having already experienced losses, will
seek added protection & risk reduction (e.g., US after 9/11)
Actual result: Letdown people in high-risk areas feel safer – the low-probability event already
has happened, and “lightning doesn’t strike twice in the same place.”
Source: Arvai, Gregory et al. 2006. Letdowns, wake-up calls, and constructed preferences: People’s responses to wildfire risks. Journal of Forestry 104: 173-181.
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 24
Risk and rationality: Interface fires
Post exposure wake-up call vs. post-exposure letdown
Homeowners’ self-ratings of affect (items 1-5; midpoint = “neutral” in all cases), and levels of concern and motivation in an
exposed (Kelowna) and unexposed community (Vernon). Responses were provided on seven-point Likert scales.Comparisons between the two samples were made using a 2-sample t-test.
SURVEY ITEMKelowna Vernon
P
X SE X SE
1. Calm vs. Upset (1=very upset, 7=very calm) 2.80 0.16 2.62 0.26 ns
2. Safe vs. At Risk (1=very much at risk, 7=very safe) 3.58 0.25 2.62 0.30 0.05
3. Confident vs., Unconfident (1=not at all confident, 7=very confident) 3.51 0.22 2.86 0.27 0.05
4. Optimistic vs. Pessimistic (1=very pessimistic, 7=very optimistic) 5.67 0.21 4.08 0.32 <0.0001
5. At Ease vs. Worried (1=very worried, 7=very at ease) 3.80 0.24 2.68 0.22 0.001
6. Level of Concern about Future Fires (1=low, 7=extreme) 5.51 0.19 6.16 0.19 0.05
7. Level of Motivation (1=low, 7=high) 4.89 0.21 6.11 0.20 <0.0001
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 25
Risk and Rationality: Interface Fires
Practical implications of affective response Little demand for risk mitigation in many
high-risk communities – people feel more safe than they really are
Homeowners in high-risk areas not willing to undertake risk mitigation – not at threshold of risk identification
High level of trust (unfounded) in protection efforts
Emphasis on context & history-specific construction of preferences for management actions: what? and who?
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 26
Example 2: Facing taboo choices (with J. Irwin and S. Lichtenstein)
Context: some decision situations are so difficult or repugnant
that people dislike or refuse to make a choice.
Literature refers to these as “taboo” choices (Tetlock), “protected values” (Baron), or “protest votes”’ (CVM)
From standpoint of SDM / DA, it’s important to distinguish choices that are difficult or confusing – provide help? -- from those that truly are taboo – respect (and leave alone?).
Source: S. Lichtenstein, R. Gregory, J. Irwin. What’s Bad is Easy: Taboo Values, Affect, and Cognition. Ms. under editorial review.
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 27
Risk and rationality: facing taboo choices as part of public engagement
Examples: Do not eat foods containing modified genes Do not make choices that will increase risks to
one’s own children Do not jail citizens on basis of DNA profiling
Characteristics of such values: Quantity insensitivity: 10 deaths = 20 Agent relativity: it matters who makes the TO Moral obligation: a social, as well as personal,
reference (effects beyond the individual)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 28
Risk and rationality: Taboo choices
Study goals: distinguish mere disapproval from protest and from
taboo values understand reasons for disapproval develop rules for public engagement: when to probe
or educate vs. when to leave alone
Study design: 22 brief scenarios, covering range of issues. Ex:
Cut old-growth trees to assist in development of new drugs
Transplant organs from patients in deep coma to help otherwise terminal patients.
16 reasons, both affective (this plan disgusts me) and cognitive (this plan is complex)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 29
Risk and rationality: Taboo choices
Note U-shape of figure: scenarios judged most difficult to think about are intermediate in affect, whereas scenarios judged lowest and highest in affect are judged easy to think about.
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 30
Risk and rationality: Taboo choices
The worst and the bestscenarios are theeasiest to think about.Thus it may be difficultto get people to acceptassistance in thinkingthrough tough decisions:What’s bad is easy! Leads to polarization as
part of engagement.
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 31
Example 3: Recognizing invisible values (with L. Failing, M. Harstone, N Turner, T. Satterfield)
Risk management choices should reflect the “best available knowledge” – few would disagree
But in the context of public deliberations about risks, What does this mean?
Typically, three sources of knowledge: Science (technical) Community (local) Aboriginal (indigenous – First Nations / First
Peoples)Source: L. Failing, R. Gregory, M. Harstone. Integrating Science and
Local Knowledge in Environmental Risk Management: A Decision-Focused Approach. Ecological Economics. (In press)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 32
Recognizing invisible values – the limitations of science
Typical link is from knowledge to facts: a “rational” approach to identifying risk consequences leads to the examination of factual evidence.
But this assumption may be too limiting: Knowledge of local communities includes
concerns such as pride, integrity, lifestyle Knowledge of Aboriginal communities
includes spiritual and ceremonial concerns, also impacts on ancestors
Access to knowledge and values remains closed until basic level of trust is established
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 33
Recognizing invisible values-- the limitations of science
Effective risk management thus must also look to values as a source of knowledge. In some cases, key impacts may be unobservable by “neutral” participants. Examples:
In Alaska: impacts of oil/gas exploration on visible walrus populations vs. “Great” walrus
In British Columbia, impacts of development on grizzly bear populations vs. “Spirit” bears
In New Zealand, impacts of GMO foods on Maori culture (T. Satterfield)
In Thailand, impacts of development on “spirits” of forest and on “ghosts” of historical inhabitants
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 34
Invisible values: the limitations of science
Practical implications for risk engagement Requires expansion of measures of value in
assessing risks. Food contamination (GMOs) – health impacts, also spiritual, ceremonial, social relations impacts
Brings focus to affective and emotional considerations: worry, shame, fear, reverence
Brings focus to constructed preferences / TOs Leads to questions about tradeoffs: cultural
survival, transmission of knowledge across generations
Leads to questions about elicitation: how to conduct “public” engagement with Elders
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 35
Rationality v. Reasonableness in Risk Management: What should be done?
Issues of fact are typically resolvable: new studies, more deliberation, better models
Issues of value are usually not resolvable: no reason to expect that values will align
Usual tools – rational, decompositional, analytical – may not work well in contexts where emotions and culture underlie risk exposure and risk management choices
This leaves those of us working on public engagement in risk management with several (wonderful & perplexing) challenges
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 36
Challenge 1: Developing useful performance measures / attributes
Best measures of risk are natural, easily understood: e.g. lives, dollars, kilometers. But often need to use case-specific “constructed” measures:
ecological health Inter-generational knowledge transmission degree of cultural or lifestyle change worry or shame or fear
How can different measures best be used to capture dimensions of value without overstepping limitations of analysis (compartmentalization)?
What are criteria for distinguishing successful from inappropriate measures / attributes?
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 37
Challenge 2: Public engagement in highly affective situations
“Rational” risk management may make sense to experts but not to stakeholders:
don’t want too little risk reduction: initiatives overturned by post-exposure letdown
don’t want too much risk reduction: initiatives inflated by affective worry or fear
Reasonable suggestions: Employ affect in risk communication (markers) Use non-traditional measures of risk Use risk language of local participants Address affective issues as prelude to risk
reduction Recognize influence of affect on other judgements
(e.g., assessment of probabilities & consequences)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 38
Challenge 3: Applying RA or SDM techniques in other cultures
Engagement need to reflect culturally “reasonable” tools of analysis – stories, qualitative analyses, narrative
Engagement needs to be flexible Where cultural worldviews are more holistic Where spiritual values are more important Where trust in “outside” experts is missing Where key tradeoffs include invisible beings Where stakeholder expression of values is
unusual (taboo to speak to outsiders) Where key populations are marginalized or
unapproachable (thus speaking out is unsafe)
Friday, March 30, 2007 UK Cambridge presentation 39
Risk, Rationality and Reasonableness: Conclusions
Reasonable risk tradeoffs are informed by both rationality and emotion / affect
Preferences for risk management options will be informed by culture and values as well as by factual knowledge – science plus community/local knowledge
Structured engagement methods need to work with expanded set of concerns and make use of constructed attributes / measures to incorporate diverse values
Successful public engagement needs to recognize constructed nature of preferences
Successful facilitators need to adapt tools (probability assessments with Elders?) and learn new ways to probe or question (stories? narrative? walks?)
Establishment of trust may be precursor to actions