98

150 Leftet to Hussei, 21.5.1891

With a concept word it takes one more step to reach the obiecr

than with a proper trame, and the last step may be missing - i.€ ,th€ concept may be empty - wifiout the concept word's ceasing to

be scientifically usefirl. I have dra\lal the last step from concept toobrect horizontally in order to indicate that it takes place on the

same level, that obiects and concepts have the same obiectivity (see

my Foundations, S4?).5 In liteHry use it is sumcient if ever''thinghas a sense; in scientific use there must also be Bedeutungen lnt\cFoltndaions 1 did I'ot yet draw fte distinctio$ between sense andBedeutuns. l^ S97 I should now prefer to speak of 'having a

Bedeutung' l'bede tu tgsL)o 'l inst€ad of'havirg a sense' ['sinnvol]'1,Elsewhere, too, e.g. in SSl00, l0r, r02, I would now often replacc

'sense'lry'Bedeutung'.6 WIat I used to cal judgeabl€ content is

now divided into thought and tuth-value.? Judgement in the nar_

rower sense could be characterized as a transition ftom a thoughtto a rruth-value. I

Now it seems to me that for you the schema would look like this:

concept woldJ

sense of the concept word(sense)

Jobiect falling under the concept

so that for you it would take the same numbe! of steps to get ftomproper names to obiects as ftom concept words The only difrer-enc€ between proper names and conc€pt words would then b€ thatthe former could refer tos only one object and the latt€r to more

t}lan one. A concept word whose concept was empry would thenhave to be excluded ftom science ,ust like a proper name withouta conesponding object.

Yours sincerely,Dr G. Frese

' See pp. 99 100 tbove-i It is ronh norirs rhar in these secrions Frese is critictins formalisn (.t pp r24 tabove), vhere n misbt seem especialy jmponant to d.aw somc kind or disrinction bd'

rweeD Sinn' and 'Bedeurung'.I See nS, S2 (pp. 52 I .bovet for thc cdy notion of judscrblc contenCj lnd ct COI

I. 1136 below, on fte larer biaurcxtion or !h$ notion

"'lhc Gcrmln con{ruction ncr is srh bcTicncn trl'

li

On Sinn andBedeutungr

I l lris paper was tust published in 1892 in the Zens.hnft Jih Phrlosophbntd philosophische Kndk,100, pp. 25 50. It is Frege's most influentialrr{l best known work, containing his tuIest account of his distinctionltt\\eer] Sirl and Bedeutune.l

liturtiryA gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogetherersy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation betweetr objects, or betweeirr rDes or signs of objects? ln my Begrifrsschdltl assumed the latter.2 The

'rrsons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a ar,d a = b

i.c obviously statements of difiering cognitive value lErkenntnisuenl;,r d holds d pnbn and, according to Kant, is to be labelled anabtic,$hilc statements of the folm a = , often contain very valuable exten-lxDs of our knowledge and cannot always be established d rn;r,- The,liscovery thar the rising sun is not new every moming, but always therrmc, was one of the most fertile asbonomical discoveries. Even todayrl'. rcidentification of a small planet or a comet is not always a mat-r.r of coufse. Now if we were to r€gard equality as a r€lation betweenrh:r which the names 'a' and 'r' designate [6ed"rarr], it would seem thatr l] could not ditr€r ftom a = a, i.e. provided a =, is rrue. A relation\!,,uld rher€by be exprcssed ofa rling to irself, and ind€ed one in which,,r(h thing stands to itself but to no other thing. What we apparently\ri'rt to state by a = 6 is that rhe signs and 'r' design3te

lralanted nrc same dring, so rhat rhose signs rhemselves would be,rrrlcr discussioq a relation between t}lem would be assened. But this

' I '^r dris srrd in thc scnsc of idcmity Ud,"dtd ,nd undcrsand 'd = 6' ro have thc,, r dl ,r is ih. crm. ,s ,' .r 'd and 6 ..in.id.'

rr,trtrlrrcd by Md Black (rPtY, pp. 56 lAtQP, pp. 157 77). l'!gr nunb€6 il lhe

' , f':i', r.c aron ihe ..isinJ ioumrl. 'lhe tdnd3ted r€xt herd is liom the rhi.d editionI / /'ll?, with minor rcvnions made in ,cco.dmcc wil\ thc policy adoptcd in tne presem

, ,1,!ie in padicular, 'Bedeutuns' (and cqlatcs such as 'bedcutmsslos') bcins lcli' r,.trrllr.d, and 'bedeuten' bei ns rendered as'st.nd for' (or occas ionauy as'desisndc')

' ,'L rhc sccond edition (but with the Oerman .lways in square bnckes following it),,tr'ls\ othcnvisc indicntcd. For discussior of tbis policy, and thc problems involved in

" trrJrtrns Bcdeubng dd its co*mrrs, sue lhe lrtrodudion, {4 rbove.\, r e\p. ?rJ, $8 (np. a'4 5 rhovc).

27

t52 On Sinn a'?d Bedeurung

relarion would hold between the names or signs only in so far as dleynamed or designated something. It would be mediated by $e connec-tion of each of rle two signs with $e same designared thing. But thisis arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidd€n ro use any arbitradly producibleevent or object as a sign for something. In that case tle sentence d =,would no longer be concerned wifi the subiect matter, bur only withits mode of designation; we would exprcss no proper howledge by irgmeans. But in many cases this is jusr what we want to do. If rhe sign'd' is distinguished ftom fie sign 'r' only as an object (here, by meangofits shape), not as a sign (i.e. not by the manner in which ir designat€ssomething)j the cognitive value of d = d becomes essenrially equal rothat of d = ,, provided a = , is true. A difference can arise only if rhcdifference between the signs corresponds ro a difference in the mode ofpresentation [Art dcs Gegebenseins] of the rhing designated. I-et d, ,, .be the lines €onnectins the vertices of a triangle wid de midpoinrs ofthe opposite sides. The point ofintersecrion of d and, is then the samcas the point ofintersection of, and c. So we have different designationsfor the same point, and ihes€ names ('poinr of intersection ofd and,','point of int€rsecrion of , and c') likewise indicate the mode of pres-ertationj and hence the starem€nr conrains actual knowledge.r

h is natural, now, to think of dere being connected wirh a sign (name,combination ofwords, written mark), besid€s thar which rhe sign desig-nates, which may be called thc Bdde&r,/rA of the sign, also what I shouldlike to call rhe rerse of lhe sign, wherein the mode of prcsentarion iscontained. ln our elample, accodingly, the Brde rfi?g ofde expres-sions'th€ point ofinlersection of d and ,'and'the point ofintersectionof , and .' would be the same, but nor rheir sense. The Bedeurrns oi'Evening Star'would be the sam€ as r-har of 'Moming Srar', but not thc

1 A diasran is added he.e to illurlate Fiesc's csampl.. Comprd this (rarh.. snnpl.rcrxmplc) wnh r. g.onct;lrl exlmple liese gave in A.S in moriv.rinsh( dr.lior disrnrc-tion b.twecn contcnf hd frodc ordct..minatior ofco.tcnC (scc pp. 64 5 !b.v!) o|.hc rclntnnNhif irct$ccn r.r.g.s.fli.r rnd l]rtr vievs, \c! dt I'nr uctior, pt 2l J

Or? Sirn d'd Bedeutung

Ir is clea! ftom the context that by sign and name I have here under-srood any desigoation figuring as a proper name, which thus has .s irsItede tung a d.ef]lrite obiect (rhis word taken in the widest range), but notr concept or a relatroB which shall be discussed furrher in another aft-rcle.lThe desienation ofa single ob,ect can also consist ofseveralwordsor olher signs. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper

The sense ofa proper name is elasped by everybody who is sufficiendyl.miliar with the language or lotality of designations to which it belongs;B

hut tlis senes to illuminate only a singJe aspect of the Bedeutung, s\tp-

t,osing it to have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the B€darflr?g wouldrLquire us to be able to say immediately whedrer any given sense attaches

ro it. To such knowledge we never atain.The rcsular connection betw€en a sign, its sense

^nd its BedeutwS ls

,,1 such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and torh.rr in turn a definire Bedertrlr& while to a given Bedeutung (aL obiect)rhcre does not belong only a single stgn. The same sense has different.xpressions in different languages or even in the same language To berrrej exceptions to this regular behaviour occur. To every €xpression

l)cbnging to a complete totality of signs, there shodd ceftainly corre-,tx)nd a definire sensej but natural languages I often do nor satis& this, ()ndition, and one must be €ontent if the same word has the same

',cDsc in the same context. It may perhaps be ganted that every $am-rrrrtically well-formed expression {iguring as a proper name always has

l scnse. But rhis is not to say tlat to the sense theic also conespondsrr /irdearaag. The words 'the celestial body most distant from the Earth'llivc a sense, but it is very doubttul if they also ha'|€ a Bedeutung.'fherxfrcssion'the least rapidly convcrgent series'has a senser but demon-rrbly rherc i. no tstJeutuns, sincc for every given convergent teries.

,r!)ther convergent, but less rapidly converg€nt, series can be found lnlrrsping a sense, one is not thereby assured of a Bdd€rt,/aa.

ll words ale used in the ordinsry way, what one intends to speak ofr. ll\cir Bealeutung. h can also happen, however, that one wishcs to talk.Ll!,ur rhe words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance,\!hcn rhe words of another are quoted. One's own words then first

l" rlrc casc ofan actual pioper nmc such as 'A.ntode' otinions as to the sense nay.!Ll .'. h

'nisht, lor instlnc.' bc takcr to bc rhe fouoeins: th. pupil ol Plito and tcdcht.

,i ,\l!\rtrd.r thc C;.crt. Anybody $ho do.s rhn wil xtr.h anotier scns. to the senren.e

\'rr.rle *!s boft in Stagira rhan wiu $nc.ne Nho takcs.s the sense olthe mne: drc

ih.rofAlcxxn.l.r rc Grcat who \'!s b{rn in SbAna So long as rhe a.r'r",,!rcn.insLtr \rmr, \urn v.riitions of sense may bs toldatcd, althoush they a.r t, b. avoidcd inLi rh$fuli.! {ructurc of a dcnonnrlrilt scicncc xrd ousht D.t to occur in a perlect

\( (tr (l(,nLqit xnd ()bjc.f, np l8l 93 bllow

153

154 O'? Sinn drd Bedeutune

designate lredrdrr] words ofrhe other speaker, and only the lattertheir usu l Bedeutuns.We then have signs ofsigns. In wriring, rheare in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a wording between quotation marks musr nor be taken as having irsBedeutu g.

In order to speak of the sense of an expression I' one may siuse the pb.rase '$e sense of the expression '7"'. In indirect speechtalks about the senseJ e.g.r of anothe! pefson's remarks. It is quite clcfiat irr this way of speaking q,ords do not have rheir customarybut designare [rede,ref] what is usually rheir sense. In order to havc Isholt expression, we will say: in indlecr speech, words are used td,reci! ot have $ei i direct Bedcutung. We distinguish accordingly thacusromary fto'Jn t\e indiect Bedeutung of

^ \nord,; and irs .r/srrma4,, s€n||

from its ,r/rrrr sense. The rlrd]-le.r Bedeutung of a word is accordinglyits customary sense. Such exceptions must always be bome in mind ltthe mode of connection between sign, sense and Bedeutung in patli.\tlttcases is to be correctly undersrood.

29 Tl\e Bedeutung and sense of a sign are to be distinguished ftom rhtassociated idea [VorstuAuis].7f the Bedzutu s of a sien is an objc.tperceivable by r}le senses, my idea of it is an intemal image, arisinffrom memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, bothintemal and €xtemal, which I have perform€d.c Such an idea is ofrcnimbued with feeling the clarity of its separate parrs varies and oscll.lates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same mnnlwith the same idea. The idea is subiective: one man's idea is nor thttof another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differenc€ain the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a horsemanland a zoologist will probably connect diff€rent ideas wirl dre namt'Bucephalus'. This constitutes an essential distindion between rhe id6tand the sigl's sense, which may be fie common property of manypeople, and so is not a pan or a mode of the individual mind. For onacan hardly deny that mankind has a common storc of rhoughts whichis transmifted ftom one generation ro another.D

In the light of this, one need have no scruples in speaking simplyoft e sense, whereas in the case ofan idea one must, srricdy speakinS,add whom it belongs to and at what time. It might pefiaps be said: iuutas one man connecrs this idea, and another that idea, with the sama

c \ye ndy include with idcas intunions F&rdn,s,r: h€re, sense idp.essions aDd rdlthcmselver rake tne phce of rhe ta.es wbich rhey have left in rhc mind. I he dndrcLnrlis uninl)ondnt for our purposc, cspecillly since m.mo.ics ofscnsc inr.$sions od rdralways co alons with such nnprcsions and acts themselves to coDplcrc ihr nerccntuNlinzE V :.hauu,s:bild). Olc my on rhr orhcr hand unde$tr intrilnln !$ incl ilr.ny objccr in sJ h. rs it is scnsibly pd.cpiiblc or splrid.! Itencc it is inrdvn$L t) u\c dre {ord 'nicr' nr dcsiA re sor,d hnrs {, hnsicrlly niticdn

O" Sinn ard Bedeutuns 155

\v,'rd, so also one man can associate rhis sense and another that sense.

I lll r rher€ still rcmains a difference in the mode of connection. They are

r|r pf€vented from graspi[g the same sense; but th€y cannot have thetnc idea. Si dlto idcn laciunt, non est idem.lf r\xo persons picture the

{IDc thing, each srill has his own idea. It is indeed sometimes possibler,, cstablish diferences in the ideas, or even in the seNarionsj ofd fer-{rr nenj bur an exact comparison is not possible, because we cannot|,.'vr bo$ ideas rogether in the same consciousness.

II]e Bedeutuns of ^

proper name is &e object itself which we desig-

'rrc by using it; the idea which we have in that case is wholly subject-rvri in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subiective lilerllr idea, but is yet not the object itself. Th€ following analogy willt(rhrps clariiy these rclationships. Somebody observes rhe Moon t][ough

'r r.lcscope. I compare the Moon itself to the Brdedrrg; it is the obiect

,'l rhc obseflarion, mediated by the ftal image proiected by the objectultr\s in fie inredor of the telescope, and by the r€tinal image of the,,lrcrver. The formff I compare to the sense, the latt€r is like the idea

"t rttninon lAnscha ung). The optical image in the telescope is indeed

'tr(, sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it isirrll otrjective, inasmuch as it can be used by several obsewers. At anyr rc it could be arranged for seveml to use it simultaneously. But each

'ir would have his oirn retinal image. On account of the diverse shapes,,1 rl)r observers' eyes, even a geometrical congruence could hardly be

, lricvcd, and an actual coincidence would be out of th€ question. Thisrrlogy might b€ developed still further, by assuming A's retinal image

llrfilc visible to B; or A might also see his oivn rerinal image in a minor.lr rhis way we miSht pefiaps show how an idea can irself be taken as

.' object, but as such is not for the obserlr'er what it directly is for the

Itr'n,n having the idea. But to pursue this would take us too far afield.wc can now recognize three levels of differ€nce betwe€n words, ex-

I'rr\sions, or whole sentences. The drfferenc€ may concem at most ther,l' rs, or the sense but not the Bedzutung, or, fn lly, t17e Bedeuturlg

^s(' ll. with respecr to I the first level, it is to be noted that, on account,'l rl,( uncenain connection of ideas with words' a diference may holdl,'r ('rc personr which anoder does not find. The drfference betweeni r.x'rslation and fte odginal text should propetly not overstep the lir:stl, \ .1. fo the possible diferences here belong also the colouring and shad-I rrl lvhich poetic eloquenc€ seel.s to give to the sense. Such colouring and

'|,rlurg are not objective, and must be evoked by each hearer or readerr, ( ( ding to the hints of the poet or the speaker. Without some afrnityr, l,uDran ideas an would cenainly be impossible; but it can never be, \,( rly determin€d how far the intentions of rhe poet are realized.

I', whar follows there will be no fifther discussion of ideas and in-rrrrrrns; they have bccn mentioned here only to ensure that the idea

il

i2

156 O,? Sinn ard Bedeuimg

aroused in th€ hearer by a woid shall not be contused with its sense orits BedzutunE.

To make shon and exact expressions possible, let the following phraseo-logy be established:

A proper nme (word, si8n, combinaiion of signs, expression) er?Erres irssense, stak^ lor lbedeubrl ot daisaax' [bezenhnetl i$ B..|eatu,s. By enptoy-ing a siSn we er?ress its sense and designate its Bede!l!,r'.

Idealists or sceprics will perhaps long since have objected: 'You tallswithout further ado, of the Moon as an obiectj but ho\rr do you knowthat the name "the Moon" has any Bedeutuns? How do you know thatanlthing wharsoev has a Bedeunng?' I reply that when we say 'rheMoon', we do not inend to speak of our idea of rhe Moon, nor arewe saiisfied with the sense alone, but we presuppose

^ BedN tung. To

assume that in the sentenc€ 'The Moon is small$ than the Eanh' theidea of r}le Moon is in question, would be flarly ro misundersrand thesense. If this is what the speak€r wanted, he would use the phrase 'myidea of the Moon'. Now we can of course be mistaken in the pr€supposi-tion, and such mistakes have indeed occuned. But &e question whetherthe presupposition is pefiaps always mistaken need I not be answer€dhere; in order to iusrify speaktng of the Bedeuung of a sign, it is enough,at firsr, to point our our inteniion in speaking or thinking. (We must rhenadd rhe rcservarion: provided such

^ Bedeutuns exists.)

So far we have considered the sense and Bedcutung only of suchexpressions, words, or signs as we have called proper names. W€ nowinquire conceming the sense

^nd Be.leutu s oI an entire assedoric sen-

tence. Such a sentence contains a thought.r Is .his thoughr, now, to beregarded as its sense or its Beder&nA? Let us assume for the rime beingthat the sentence has a Bedeutung.lf we no' replace one word of rhesentence by another haviaq the same Bedeutung, but a differem sensejthis can have no effect upo'r the Bed.urung of the s€mence. Yet we cansee that in such a case th€ thought changes; since, e.g., the thought inthe sentence 'The Moming Srar is a body illuminated by the Sun'differs ftom that in the sentence 'The Evening Star is a body ilumin-ated by the Sun'. Anybody who did not know that rhe Evening Star isthe Moming Star mighr hold rhe one thought to be true, the other false.The thought, accordingly, cannot be the Brdrxt"ug of the sentence, butmust rather be considered as its sense. \I.rhat is the position Dow withrcgard to the Bedeatung? Have we a right even to inquire about it? Isit possible rhat a sentence .s a whole has or y a s ense, b$ no Bedeutungl

' Ry r rhousht I undc.{.nd not thc subjcctivc pcrlomm.c ol ihinking but irs objccrivc.ontent, rvh,ch is crl3blc ofbcing drc commor propc(y of scvcrrl rhink{rs.

r57

At any rate, one might expect thar such sentences occurJ just as thereare pans of sentences having sense bt no Bedeutung. And senrenceswhich contain proper names wirhout Bed?rrMs wilt be of *lis kind. Thesentence 'Odysseus was set ashore at fthaca while sound asleep' obvi_ously has a sense. Bur since ir is doubtful whether rhe name ,Odysseus,,

occurring therein, has a Be.Jelrrr,& ir is also doubrful wherher rhe wholesentence does. Yer it is certainr neverrhelessJ rhar anyone who seriousivrook rhe senlence ro be (rue or faLe woutd ascribe ro rhe name .Odvseuq.J Brd"rrrrA. nor merelv a

"ensei for ir is ol rhe Aedeutuhg o15.," , nu ,

that the predicate is affimed or denied. ',t0hoevcr does not admit r}l€name has a Bedeutung can neither apply nor wirbhold the predicare. Butin that case it would be superfluous to advance to tIrc Bedeutune ol r\enamej one could be sarisqed wirl rhe sense, if one wanted ro go noturther than the rhought. If it were a question only of the sense of thesentence, rhe thoughrr it would be needless to bolher wirtr rhe Bede,orl,gof a pan of the senrence; only the sense, not r}l e Bedeutung, of it:le pattis relevanr ro th€ sense of the whole senrence. The thought remains thesrme wherhe! 'Odysseus' has a Bed€|rlza or not. The facr rhat we con_cem ourselves ar all abo the Bed.uane of a pan of the sertence indic_xtcs that we generally recogniz€ and expecr a B€drlrrlr!, for the senrencertself. The thoughr los€s value for us as soon as we rccognize that theBcde t"ry of one of its parts is missing. W€ are th€refore jus.ified in notbcing satisfied with the sense of a sentence, and in inquiring also as toits Bdderrrlrg. But now why do we wanr every proper name to have noronly a sense, but also a Bederrrrg? lghy is the thought not enough fortrs? Because, and to rhe extenr tharr we are concemed with irs truth_value. This is not always the case.In hearing an epic poem, for instance..rpr trom rhe cuphony ot rhe lansuage $e are inreresled only in Lhescnse of rhe sentences and the images and feelings thereby arc,rsed. Thequestion of rruth would cause us to abandon aesrhetic delighr for anrLlitude of scientific investigarion. Hence it is a matter of no concemro us wherher the name 'Odysseus,, for insrance, has a Bedeutung, soIong as we accept rhe poem as a work ofart.Ii h is rhe strivins for trurh,l,lll drives us alwats ro advance from lne sense rc the Bediutung.

We have seen rhat rhe Eedertu f, of a sentence may always be soughr,whenever rhe Eederrrrg of its components is involved; and &at this isthc case wh€n and only when we are inquidng after the nuth-value. I

\ve are therefore ddven into accepting the rrurr-?dl e of a senrencers consriruting irs Bededrr?g. By the uuth-value of a senrence I under_srrnd the circumsEnce rhar ir is rrue or false. Th€re are rlo funher

' It Nould he dcsirabl! ro hrvc . spccill term r'o. sisns im.dded to havc only sensc. Itr. nrnrc drcdr sJy, rc|rcscntriioD\ [lJ,ard, rhc words otihc rcrn ou thc *Au wouldlic r.rr$lntxri(rri n\lc.(l rhc rlrr hnnsrll would be ! reprcscnotron.

O'l Sinn ar?d Bedeutung

158 Oa Sinn aad Bedeutune

35

uuth-values. For brevity I call the one the True, th€ other rhe False.Every assenoric sentence concerned with the B?derrrrA of its words istherefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its Bedeutune, 1f ir hasone, is either the True or the False. These two objects are recognized,if only implicitly, by everybody who judges somethirg to be tme - andso even by a sceptic. The designation of the rurh-values as obtects mayappear to be an arbitmry fancy or perhaps a mere play upon words, ftomwhich no profound consequences could be drawn. W}tat I am calling anobject can be more exacdy discussed only in cormection with conceptand relation. I will resefte dis for anoth€r article.5 But so much shouldalready b€ clear, that in every iudgement,G no matter how irivial, thesr€p fiom the level of thoughts to the level of B€dd"rrrg (the obiecrive)has aheady been taken.

One might be t€mpted to regard the relation of the thought to t}leTrue not as that of sense ro Bederflr?g, bur rather as tlat of subject topredicate. One can, indeed, say: 'The thouglt that 5 is a prime numberis true'. But closer examination shows that norling morc has been saidtlan in the simple sentence !5 is a prime number'. The truth claimarises in each case from dre form ofthe assertoric sentence, and whenthe latter lacks its usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an acror upon rhestage, even the sentence'The drought that 5 is a prime number is tlu€'contains only a thought, and indeed the same thoughr as rhe simple'5is a pime number'. It follows that the relarion of the rhoughr ro rhe Truemay not be compared with that of subject to predicate. Subj€ct andpredicate (understood in dre logical sense) are jusr elemenrs of rhoughrjthey stand on t}le same level for knowledge. By combining subject andpredicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes ftom a sense to irsBedeutung, ne'rer frcm a thoughr to its truth-value. One moves at lhesame level but never advanc€s from one level to the next. A tmd-valuecannot be a part of a thought, any morc rhan, say, the Sun canJ for itis not a sense but an object.

If our supposition that rhe Bede tung of ^

sentence is its truth-valueis correc{, the latter must r€main unchaneed when a pan of the sen-tence is replaced by an er,Tression with the same Bedeuruns. And. t\isis in fact the case. Leibniz gives tle defini.ion: 'Eadem sunt, quae sibinutuo substitui possunt, sab,a oeitate'.6 ll we arc dealing with sentencesfor which rhe 8?deltszg of their component parts is at all relevant, thenwhat feature except &e tmth-value can be found thar belongs to such(;A

iudgenent for me is not rhc m$c sraspins of a ihonshr, but thc rdmisson1.,1,{&d,,,rsl ol n5 tmth.I Sc. 'On Co.ccpt r Objccf, pp. l8t 93 bclNr.' '-lhosc rhinss .rc th. s.'nc which .id bc sub\titurrd tu. ont lnothcr wnhout lo\s olrurh lhn i\ j!{ tlc srnrc Lcibnizirn pnncipl. firL tncAe krJk r\ his dclinitn,n olnllnlLv ,n \1r5 ot thc /i,,rJ!ti,,\ (rhc difcrcnce nr li) nnhrnrr n drirl)i scc r. I12 rbovr

O, Sinn dd Bedeutung 159

sent€nces quite seneralty and.emairc unchanged by substirutions ofthekind just men ioned?

If now the trurh-value of a sentence is its Ber]errr?gr then on rhc onehand all rue senrences have rhe same Brdrr&rrrg ana so, on the otherhand, do all false senrences. From rhis we see th

^t jn the Bedeutuno nf

dre senrence aU drar i( specific r\ oblirerrred. \ve can never be concernedonly,\\tith the Bedeurung of a sentence; bur again rhe merc thoughr alonevields no knowledCe. buL ont' rhe rlouglr logerher wirh iL, ATae ung,r.e. irs rrurh.value. Judsemenrs can be regarded a" advances from;thoughr to a rruth-vatue. Naturally this cannot be a definirion. Judgcment is somethins quite peclrliar and incomparable. One might alo iayrhar judgcmenrs are di.Linfiions otparF $iLlin rrurl,_\alue.. Such di.l,ncuon ocLurs by a rerum ro dre Lhoughr. To cvery sen.e arrachrng roa truth-value would corespond its own manner of analvsis. However-I hive here u,ed rhe word.pdn inaspccial sen.e. IhavemIacrrranyferred the rctarion between rhe parrs and rhe whole of rhe sentence ro)ts Bedeutxns, by catlijng $e Bedeutu s of a wo:nl patt of t\e Bedcutuns.frhe senren(e.

'trhe $ord ir.ett s a pan otthi,entence. rhis wal

of 'peaking can cerrdintr be arracked, becruse $e uhole Acdeut arg andone pan of ir do not sufdce to determine the remainder. and belauserhe wod 'pan' is already used of bodies in another sense. A speciaiterm ivould need ro be invented.

The supposition rhar rhe trurh-value of a sentence is its Bedeutu p.hall now be pur ro turLher re\r. NVe ha\e tound r}at rne rmr} value oi-.cntence remains unchrnged when an expre"sron in i( i. replaced by.rnorher wirh rhe same Bed.,r,'rs: bur $e have nor yer ton.iiered rtrecrse in which rhe expression to be replaced is irself a sentence. Now if,'ur view is correct, the 0uth-value ofa senrence conraining anorher aspa must remain uncha.nged when rhe pan is replaced by another sen_tence_having the same trurh-value. Exceptions are ro be expected whenrhe whole sentence or irs parr is direct or indirect quoratio;; for in suchceses, as we have seen, the words do not have rheir clstomary Bedeutung.lr drrc(r quotalon. a senlence designare\ laezfer.,rerl ano*rer renrcnci,,rnd in indirecr specch a rhoughr.

\ve are rhus led to consider subodinare sentences or clauses. These,'ccur as pafts of a sentence complex, which is, from the logical srand_tr)int, Iikewise a sentence - a main sentence. But here we meit the ques_r ()n lvheder it is also tme of rhe subordinate sentence rhat its Be&arazf,r! r tmth-value. Of indirccr speech we already know the opposite. Gramir"rrians vicw subordinate clauses as repr€sentatives ofpans ofsentences,,rct dividc rhem accordinsly into noun clauses, adjective clauses, adver,Inxl cl:ruscs. 'Ihis might generrte r}lc supposition rhat ttl. Bedeurung ol

'trdrr \n (hri'r.'n.l A'A(l,L(t rtu,tt, rrn.n !t.khhudcurrndrn r,*r,(r,

V-160 O, Sinn /d Bedcurung

a subordinatc clause \ras not a rmtl-value bul rarher ofthe same kindas lhe Bsd.,.,,e ofa noun or adjectivc or adverb in shof, ofa pan ofa s€ntence, whose sense was nor a thoughr bur only a paft of a thoughr.Only a more thorough invesrigation can clad{y tnc issue. In so doing,we shall not follow the grammatical car€gories sricdy, bur rather grouptogether wha! is logicslly ofthe sa,ne kind. Ler us first search for casesin which the sense oftlc subordinare clause, as we have jusr supposcd,is not an independent rhousht.

The case of an abstracr noun clause,! introduced by 'rhal, includesIhe case of indirect speechj in which ire have seen rhe words to havethei. indirect Bcdd,rr rsJ coincidenr with what is cusromarily tlcir sense.In Ihis case, then, the subordinale ctause has for irs Bed.,r,'rf,a thoughr,nor a truth-value, and for its sense not a rhoughlJ bur the s€nse of thewords 'thc thoughr fiar . . .', which is only a paft of the thoughr in rheentire complex senlence. Tlis happens afrer 'say', 'hcar', 'be ofrhe opin-ion', 'be convinced', 'conclude', and simiiar words.IrThcre is a differenr,and indecd som€what complicarcd, siruarion rfrer wolds like,recognte,,'kttow', 'fancy'," which rrc to be considered iater.

That in .he cases of the first kind the Bed€xrrra of rhe subordinatcclaurc is in fact de thoughr can also be rccosnizcd by seeing thar it isindiffcrent Io rhe truth of the rvhole whethcr thc subordinare ciausc istrue or false. ht us compare, forinsrrnce, the two senrences'Copcrnicusbeljeved that thc planetary orbits arc circlcs' and 'Copernicus beiievedthar lhe apprrent morion of rhe Sun is produced by the rcal motjonof rhe Errih'. Onc subordinare clause can be subsiirured for rhc orherwithout harm to tirc trurh. 'I he main clause and rhe subordinare clausetogether have as thcir sense only a single rhoughr, and thc truth of rhewhole includcs neither rhe trudr nor the unrruth of the subordinareclause. In such cases ir is not permissible ro replac€ onc expression inthe subordinate clause by anorher having the same cusromary Bc./crrrrg,but only by onc having rhe srme indir€ct Brd.|aors, i.c. the same cus-tomary sensc. Somebody might conclud€: rie Bed,,r,ra of a senrenceis not its truth value, for in rhat case ir could always be replaced byanothe. sentcncc of rhe srme trudr-valu€. Bur this provcs roo muchjone mjght just as well cl^im &at the Bedeutu s of 'Moming Stsr' is nor

rL In A,ied thrt n. h.d se.n R, !!c suboftlinar. chu\. dc{gn{$ [,r&,/rl r rh]ur:ht,ol whicl) tr is bei.g s.id. n.{1!) rhrt A .ssen.d it rs rru.) &d sccoDdly, tllt A lvrseodeirnl .l ir\ til\ity.' |rcge frub.bly mcds .lru\es grum.rically rcplj..rbL b), trn nb$r.ct n.ur-phrarej. s. Smrh d.nrcs r/r!r /,4o':r.\nf = Smnh dcni.s

'/z d^rrtr. ./ d/dr.,J i .r rslin, n

drn..nroxr rftcr'd.nics'. LhiL Br.\n is \ri\. is rctlr.ubt. b! rh.lvNlom.tll.o\n.(.tj.)

-1ic (;!rnrn w.id\ hcr rtu .rk( nrn. ti\\.n u1 ,wiihnrn lhe I.u nrcrn\ \oinrxLi,ic. hut \snh d,o nnfh.xtnin oI n.nrq n) n',,Jr

O,l Sirn ard Bedeutung 161

Venus, since one may not always say'Venus'in place of 'Morning Sta/.one hns the right to conclude only rhrt the Bdd€erd,a of a sentence isnot al&dts its tludr-vaiue, and that'Morning Star'does not ahvays

stard for [redcrret] thc planq Venus, viz. whcn the word has its indirectBrderrlrg. An exception ofsuch a kind occurs in the subordinate clausejust considercd, which has a thousht as its Adde,rr,s.

If one says 'It seems that . . .' one means [ncirr] 'It seems to mc that. . .' or 'I rhink rhat. . .'. \Ve therefore have rhe same case again. Thesituation is simiiar in the case ofexpressions such as'ro be pleased', 'tore$eC, 'ro approve', 10 blame', 10 hope', 'to fear'. If, torvad rhe endoflhe baule of \(/arerloo, "' \J(/ellingron was giad that the Irrussians rverecomins, Ihe basis lor his joy was a convicdon. Had he been deceived,he lvould have been no less pleased so long as his illusion lastedj andbefore he bccamc so convinced hc could not havc been pleased that thePrussians wcrc coming . even $ough in fact dlcy might have beenrheady approaching.

Just as a conviction or a bciief is the sround of a fcclins, it can, as

in infcrcncc, also bc thc sround of a conviction. ln the sentcnce 'Columbus inferred from the roundness of the Eafth thal he could reachlndia by travelling rowards the ivest', we have as the Bedcutungc of thepans rlvo thoughis, thai lhe Earrh is round, and thar Columbus bytravelling to the west could reach India. All that is relevan. here is thatColumbus was convinced of born, and rhrt the one conviction was a

gound for the orher. Y&ether the Earfi is reaily round and Columbuscould really reach India by traveiling wesr, as he lhought, is immaterial10 the truth oloul sentencej bui it is not immaterial whether we replace'the Eanh'by'the planer rvhich is accompanied by a moon whose dia-mcter is greater than the founi part ofits own'. Here rlso we have theindircct Bddcu rrzl' of the words.

Adverbial {inai ciauses beginnins 'in order thaf also belong herej forobviously dre pu4osc is a tholrght; therefore: indirect Bedeutung for rll,cwords, subjunctive mood.

A subordinare clausc with'tnat' aftcr'command','ask','forbid',rvould appear in direct speech as an impcrativc. Such a sentence hasno Brdcut.r,a but only a sensc. A command, a rcquest, arc indccd norrhoughts, but thcy stand on thc same level as thoughts. Hcnce in subo.dinate clauses dcpendins upon 'command', 'ask', etc., ivords haverheir indirect Bldert r& The Eedrrt,?g of such a clause;s therefore nolr truth value but a command, a requesr, and so forth.

'Ihe case is similar for the dep€ndeni question in phrases such as'(ioubt rvhedrer', 'not to know whar'. h is easy to see that here also dle\', ords are to be taken io hav€ their indirect Brdcrrorg. Depend€nr clauses

l.'.q. usr\ 11,. llr$irr nr r( li,r ihr br(|. llrlt Allirn... (?i.)

Jll

i7

i

G-

162 O, Sinn drd Bedeutuns 163

'-fhere wds someo,le who discoveied rhe elliptic fom of rhe plancra.y

rvherher the suhordinate clause

O', Sinn ard Bedeutuns

er"ressing questions beginning wirh 'who', 'ivhar', '!vhere'! '!vhen', 'how','by what means', etc., seem at times to approximate verycloseiy to adver-bial clalses in which words have rheir cusromary Bcdrrr,?s. These cases

are distinglished linguistically [in Gennanl by the mood of rhe verb.With the subjunctivc, wc have a dcpendent question and t}le words havetheir indirect Bedeutung, so that a proper name cannot in general bercplaced by anothcr name of the same obiect.

In .he cas€s so far considered drc ivords of thc subordinatc clauses

had their indirect Bedertrr& and rhis madc it clear that thc Brdertd,aof rhe subordinate clause ilself was indirect, i.e. not a truth-valuc buta rhoughr, a command, a reques., a question. The subordinate clausecould be resarded as a noun, indeed one could say: as a propcr llameof that thought, rlat cornmand, etc., rvhich i. represented in the con-te)(t of the sentence structure.

',x/e now cofle to other subordinate clauses, in which the words dohave their customa{, Bedertrrg without however a thought occuning as

sense and a truth-valuc as Bede,r,,s'. How this is possible is best mad€clear bv examples.

''Whoever discovered &e eiiiplic fom oft\e pianerlry orbns dled iD miscry.'

If thc sensc of the subordinate clause were here a t1lought, it wouldhave to be possible to cxprcss it also in a separate sentence. But it doesnot work, bccausc the srammatical subject 'whoever' has no independ-cnt scnsc and only mcdiates d1e lelarioD with the consequent clause'dicd in miscry'. For dis rcason the sense of the subordinatc cl.ruse isnot a completc thought, and its Bcddrlrrng is Keplcr, not a tluth-v ue.

One might object that the sense of the wholc docs contain a thoughtas part, viz. that there was somebody who first discovered the ellipticfolm of the planetary orbits; for whoevc. takcs drc whole to be true I

cannor deny this pan. This is undoub.edly so; but only bccausc othcr-wise the dep€ndent clause 'whoever discovered rhe ciliptic form of thcplanetary orbirs' rvould hsve no Eedrrrrr?a. If anlthing is asserred thercis ahvays an obvious presupposition fiar Lhe simple or compound proper names used hav€ a Ardrrtrlrla. Iftherefore one assens 'Kepler diedin misery', there is a presupposition lhat the name 'Kepler' designatessomethingj but it does not follow that the sense ofrhe s€ntence'Keplerdied in misery' contains rle Gougii that the n3me 'Kepi€r' d€signatessomething. If this were the case the negation would have to run not

'Kcplcr did nor dic in miscry',

but

'Kerlcr did no! die in nriseryJ or thc nue Keplcr" is ,r/Lrtu,,fr1dl.

That the name 'Kepler' designates somerhing is jusr as much a presup-position for the assenion

'Kepler died in misery'

as for the conrary assetion. Now langlages have the fault ofcontain-ing expressions which fail to designate an object (although their gram-matical form seems to qualify them for thal purpose) because .he truthofsome sentence is a prerequisire. 1'hus it depends on the truth of the

40

.llhoever discolered the ellipdc form of rtle planeiary orbirJ

realty designates an object, or only seems .o do so while in fact isbcdeerrrgtos. And thus i. may appear as ifou. subordinatc clausc con-t.rined rs a pan of its sense the thought that there was somebody whodhcovered &e elliptic form of the plan€rary o$its. If rhis were risht,thc negation would run:

'Either whoever discovered rhc eilipic form offte plancrary orbits did notdle in misery oi dere was nobody wLo discovcrcd thc eltiptic form oftheplanetary orbiti- l

ll fhis arises from an impedection of ianguage, fiom which even thesymbolic ianguage of madematical analysis is not alrogether free; evenrhere combinations of symbols can occur that seem to stand for []ed"rtcrlsomething but (at leasi so far) are bedcuulngshs, c.g. diversent infinite\cdes. This can be avoided, e.s., by mcans of the spccial stipulationLhat divergent inlinite series shall stand for lbedeutcnl the number 0."A logically pefect lansuage (Besnlkrcln ) should satisfu the conditions,ll t ever'' expression gnmmalically rvell constructed as s proper name(ut of sigrs already introduced shall in facr desigrale an objecr, and thatno new sign shrll be introduced as a prop€r name without being secured. llcdeutu'ts. The logic looks contain wamings againsr logical mistakesrrisins from thc ambislity of expressions. I regard as no less peninenr:r varning against apprrcnt proper names that have no BedrrturI'. 'I'he

(ll. (;(;. L rjllr ... Af r.ndir I boliN

I

r61 O/, Sinn aad Bedeutung

hislory of mafiematics supplies erroE which have arisen in rhis way. Thislends itself to demagosic abuse as casily as ambieuity pcrhaps morceasily. 'The will of the people' an examplej for it is easyIo establish tllar there is ar any rate no generally accepted Bedeuhnp forrhi. cxpre\\,on. lr i\ rhereforc bv no mrans unimponanr ro etm;arcthe source of rhese misrakes, at least in science, once and for all. Thensuch obiections as the one discussed above would become impossibtc,because ii could never depcnd upon dre rrurh of a thoughr whether a

Proper name had ^

Bedeutxne.With thc considcratnrn of rhese noun clauses may be couptcd rhat ot'

t!"es of adjective and adverbtul clauses which are logicalty in close

Adiective clauses also serve to consrrucr compound proper narnesjthough, unlike noun clauses, ftey are not sufficienr by tncmselves for thispurpose. These adjecrive clauscs are ro be resarded as equivalent toadjecdv€s. Instead of'rhe squarc roor of4 ivhich is smaller rhan 0,, onccan also say'the negarive square roor of4'. We have here rhe case ofacompound propcr name consrrucred from the exprcssion for a conceprivith Ihe hetp ofthe singular definire :rrticle. l'his is at any ljtc permis-sible ifthe concepr applies ro one i and only one single object.rExpr€s-sions for concepts can be so consrructed thar marks'r of a concepr arcsiven by adjecrive clauses as, in our example, by rhe clause ,ivhich issmaller than 0'. lr is cvident $at such an adjccrive clausc cannor havca thought as sense or a rruth-valuc as Be.1rmrrA, any more rhan fte nounclause could. Irs sensc, which can also in many cases be cxpressed bya single adjecrive, is only a part ofa thoughr. Hcre, as in thc case ofthcnoun clause, rhere is no independenr subject and thereforc no possibil-ity of reproducine rhe sense of thc subordinare clause in an independ,

Placcs, insrants, streiches of rime, logically considered, are objects;hence the linguistic designarion ofa definire place, a.tefinire instant, ora stretch of timc is ro be rcgarded as a proper namc. Now adverbialclauses ofplace and rime can be used to consrruct such a pmper namein much the saoc way as rve have se€n noun and adjcctive clauses can.In the same way, expressions for concepas thar apply ro places, etc., canbe consrructed. It is ro be noted herc also thar the sense of thesc sub-o.dinate clauses cannot be reproduced in an independent sentence, since

I In 3cco.darcc $nb rvhd iv.L srid ibole, an rxnres\ion olrhc tind nr qurjn,n mu{r.rurlly alwa's bc is\ur.d ola lr'&dx,r{, b,\' ncr\ ola spccirt niputaiion, . !. by th!convonton drat 0 slull count rs its lr.&!!,a when tht conccpr apnt'es to no .tri.ci orto morc rhm onc ls.o tn lt .bov..lI lir dru norio. .rr ''nuk ( Merkrn,rt), :.r G1_, \51 (pr. 102 I rrr.vc)i a;r). Fp l|)

rn essential componentj viz. the determination ofplace or time, is missnrg and is just indicated by a relative pronoun or a conjunction.J

ll In conditional clauses, also, .here most often I recognizably occursrD indefinite indicalor, wirh a correlarive indicator in the dependent.lause. (We have already seen this occur in nolm, adjective, and adverbial.huses.) In so far as each indicaror r€lates to the o$er, boih ctaus€sroscther folm a connected whole, lvhich as a rule erlTresses oniy a singlerhousht. In the sentence

'If a nlmber is less thdn I and greater than 0, ns square is less rhan I andq.errer lh.n 0'

rhe component in question is'a number' in the antecedenr clause and'rts' in the consequent clause. lt is by means of rhis very indefinitenessrhrt the sense acquires rhe generality expecred of a law. h is rhis which,\ responsible ior the fact that the ant€ced€nt clause alone has no com-t)lete thought as iis sense and in combinaiion rvirh the consequent clause.\presses one and only one thoughr, whose pafts afe no longer thoughts.Ir is, in acneral, incorect to say thai in the hlpothetical iudgement twotudgcments are put in reciprocal relationship. If dris or something sim-llrr is said, the word 'judgement' is used in the same sense as I havcronnected wirh the word'thou8hi, so that I would use d1e formulation:1\ hyporhe.ical rhousht establishes a reciprocal rclationship bctwcen tworhoughts'. 'Ihis could be true only if an indefinite indicator is absent;(but in such a case there would aiso be no generality.

If rn insiant of rime is ro be indefinitely indicatcd in both the ant€-.cdent and the consequen. clause, this is often achieved merely byusing

In lh..rsc orthcrc scntcn.ei. v.rious ntrcipr.r.tions arc c.siiy po$iblc. Thc scnsc oli ,r sonldce Ah.r Schlc$visl lokrcin {as s.par.tcd fron Dc.mnrk,I'ru$i. rDd Ausix,tfr.r.l[d .rn also bc rcnd.r.d in thc form 'Aft.r the seprrdion of Schle\wis Hohiein,!r! DcrmarL, Pru$ir and Aunri. quarclled. Jn rhis veBionj n is \urely suricicndy,lr.r dr.t drc scnse n not to be t.ken as h.ying as a plr the though! thlt SchlesFigll,ilncnr wrs once separated hom l)eqDark, bur that ftir is thd nt.rs!.ry preruppositio!,tr.'der tor rhc expressn)n rlier thc s.rrrliJn of S.hlcswis-l lohr.in fron D.nmxik'toli n. ! .l}/.rr,,( ri all. li 6c s!re, our scntcn.c c.n aho bc intcercrcd as siltng rhats,hl.ivis-Il(n{ein wrs oncc s.p&ated lion Dcnmark. !{c tben h.ve a cxsc Nhich n ro1,. .onsidt.ed lrter. ln ordff to undcrsand thc rlifcrcncc more.leirly, ler us pioicct,iLtrs.lr$ ntu drc nind of a Chin.se $ho, having little knosledge ol Fuopcan hnbry,l)rh.\.s ir to bc ftlsc tlut Schlcs$ig H.l$cin {.s.ver scnrrated r..nr Denmark IIc will

lic our s.Dtence, in the iir* ve$ion, b be nenher true nu trlJ€ but will d.ny it to hlve.ri! llrnrr,re on rhe sround that ns subordinrtc.laus. lac(s a rrJc,r,rr. lhi\ cliuse\dnld .!!y ltprrcnrly determi.e a nmc. Il lrc idt.rr'ret.d ou sentcncc jn tlt sdon,lr.'y, Lo\cvcr, he $ould li.d r thousht.aprus.d i. it which hc ivould takc b t'c llhe.. .1. ,I.r.{1.hr.-l'll'.d,Lr" / n{ L.' r.

AL tme" rltr. a r.lirsuiiicaltv cxrli.it indicrtor.nd oD. nru* ir. r.rd ot! lrcm rhc

O'l Sinn and Bedeutung 165

12

I

r66 Or Sinn aud Bedeutung O, S;nn ard Bedeutung 167

the present tense of the verb, which in such a case horvever does notindicate the r€mporal present. This grrmmatical form is rhen the inde-6nite indicator in rhe main and subordinate clauses. An €xample ofthisisr '\{4len t}te Sun is in the trcpic of Cancer, the longesr &y in thenorthern hemispherc occurs'. Herej also, it is impossible to express thescnsc of the subordinare clause in a full scllence' because this sense is

not a complcte thoug'hi. Ifwe say'The Sun is in the tropic of Cancer',this would refer ro our present timerr and thereby change the sense.

Neither is the sense of the main clause a thought; only the whole, com-posed of main and subordinatc clauses, has such a sense. Ir may be addedthat several common components may be indefrnirely indicated in theantecedent and consequent clauscs.

It is ctear that noun clauses with 'who' or 'whaC ,nd adverbial clauses

with 'wherei 'when', 'wh€rever', 'whenever' are often to be interpreted as

havirg drc scnse ofrntecedent clauses, e-s. 'who touches pitch, defileshimself'.

Adjcctivc clauses can also rake the place ofconditional clauses.'fhusthe sense ofthe scntence previously used can be siven in the lorm "lh€square of a number which is less than I and grearer than 0 is lcss tlanI and greater than 0'.

The situarion is quite differenr if rlle common component of the twoclaus€s is d€signated by a proper name. Ill the sentence:

'Napoleon, who rccognized the danser to his right flank, himself led his

sud.ds ag,insr Lhe enemy posirion'

two thoughts are exprcssed:

(1) Napoleon re.ognized &e danse! Io hn isht flankj(2) Napoleon hlmself led his slrards lsainsr the enemy posido!-

\vllen and wherc this happened is to be fi,xed only by thc context, butis nevenheless to bc taken as definitely determined thereby. Ifthe entiresentence is ultered as an asscftion, we thereby simuhaneously asseftbothcomponent senrences. Ifone of the parts is false, rhe whole is false. Herewe have rhe case that thc subordinate clause by i.self has a completethougl. as sens€ (if we complcte it by indicalion of place and time).The Bedeurung of the subordinaic clause is accordingly a truth-valu€.wc can therelore expect thal it may be replaced, rvithout harm to thetruth-value ofthe rvhole, by a scntence having the I same tiuth-value.This is indeed the case; bur ir is to be noted that for purely grammalicalreasons, its subiect musr be 'Napoleon', for only then can it be broushtinto fic form of ltn rdjeclive clause attaching to 'Napoleon'. But ifthe

r' rul un\rr. (;.qrrqrn bc/ichur'

demand that it be express€d in this form is waivcd, and rhc connectionshorvn by 'and', rhis restriction disappears.

Subsidiary clauses beginning widr 'althoush' also cxpress complctethoughts. This contunction actually has no sense and does not changethe scnse ofthc clausc but only illuminates it in a p€culiar fashion.t Wecould indeed rcplace the concessive clause ivithout harm to rhe rruth ofllie whole by another ofthe same truth-valuej bur the lighr in $'hich theclause is placed by rhe conjuncrion might then easillr appear unsuirable,rs if a song with a sad subject were Io be sung in a lively fashion.

In the iast cas€s fie truth ofthe whole included dle truth of the com-ponent claus€s. The case is differcnt if an antecedcnt clausc expressesr complete though. by containing, in piace of an indefinite indicator,r proper name or something which is to bc regarded as equivalent. In

'If rhc Sun has rlrcady riscn, rhe sky is very cloudy'

the time is the presenr, ftat is to sayJ defrnite. And the place is also tobe thought ofas dcfrnitc. I{crc it can be said that a relation benveen rhelrurh vslucs ofartecedem and consequent clauses has be€n ass€fted) viz.tirat the case does not occul in which the anrec€dent srands for [6edrdr]drc True and thc consequent for Ihe Fa1se. Accordingly, our semenceis rruc if the Sun has not yet ris€n, whether the sky is very cloudy orr1oi, and also ifthe Sun has risen ard lhe sky is very cloudy. Since onlytruth-valucs are here in queslion, each compon€fl clause can be rcplrcedby another ofthe same truih-value lvithour changiry fie trudr-value ofthe whole. To be sure, Ile light in which the subject then appears worJdusully be unsuirable; fie rhouglt might easily seen distollcdj butrhis has norhing to do \rilh its truth-vaiue. Onc must always observcrhar there are overrones of subsidiary ihougits, which are howcvcr notexplicirly expressed and tlerefore shouid not bc nckoned iD thc scnsc.llence, also, no account need be tlken of thcir rmth-values.M

'lhe simplesr cases have :row been discussed. I-.t us rcview what we

'la€ subodinate clause usually has for its scnse not a rhoughtJ butonty a part of one, and consequently no truth-valuc as Be.leutuns. Thererson for dis is either that thc words in rhe subordinare clause havethcir indirect Bederrbrgr so that the tcdrrr ,& not Ihe sense, of L\e subordinrte clause is a thoughtj or else that, on account ofrhe presence ofxn indefinite indicator, thc subordinatc clause is incomplere and expresses

L Snnilrr)v m iht c!\r .l buf. vea'I lho rlxluchL ofour \cntc.cc m,ql[ Jl\o b. cxtr.scd thus: l]ith.r dr. Sun hrs noi,nrn y.l or tlr. sltr i\ !.'y .l(rdr" shilh \lxNs h.w rli\ kn ol \0nrrncc c.nncctnn,

lr'

F168 O, Sinn drd Bedeutung

a thought only when combined with r}le main clausc. Ir may happen,however, that the sense ofthe subsidiary ciause is a compieie rhoughrr inwhich case it can be replaced by anorher of rhe same trurh-value wirh-out harm to the truth of the whole provided dere are no grammatical

An examination ofall thc subodinare clauses which one may encoun-ter ivill soon providc some which do nor frt lvell into rhese caregories.The reason, so far as I can seeJ is thar rhese subordinate clauses haveno such simple s€nse. Almosr always, it seems, we conncct ivith themain thoughts exprcssed by us subsidiary rhoughrs which, alrhoush norexpressed, arc associared lviii our words, in accordance with psycho-iogic.l laws, by the hearer. And since the subsidiary rhought appears robe connected wirh our words on irs own accounr, almost like the mainthought its€lf, we want it also ro be e$resscd. The sense of rle sen-tence is lhereby enrichcd, and it may rvell happ rhar we have morcsimplc though$ rhan clauses. In many cases rhe scntence must be under-stood in lhis way, in othe$ ir may be doubttul whether the subsidiarythought belongs to the sense oflhe senrencc or only accompanies it.NOne mjght perhaps find rhar the scntcnc€

'^_apoleon, who recognizcd rhc dalser to his righr flank, himself ied hissuards asajnst ihe enemy posidon'

€xpresses not only rhe rwo *roughts sho$ryr above, but also the rhoughtthat the knowledse ofrhe d.nger was the reason why he led lhc suardsagainst thc encmy posirion. One may in fact doubr whethcr rhis rhoughtis tust slishtly suggesred or really exprcssed. Ler rhe question be con-sidered whether our sentence is false ifNapol€on's decision had alreadybeen nade before he recoelizcd the danger. If our sentence could betme in spite of rhisJ rhe subsidiary rhoughr should not be undersroodas pan of the sense. One lvould probably decide in favour of this. Thealtemative would make for a quite complicared situation: we should havemole simple thoughts than ciauses. If the senrcnce

'Napoieon recognizcd $e dangei to h; risht flaDk'

werc norv ro be replaced by another hving the same rrurh-value, e.g.

'Napoleon was dlr.ady nroie rhar 45 yea6 old',

not only would our first thought be changed, bul also our rhird one.Hencc the trulh-value of thc latter mighr change - viz. ifhis age was nor

\'ll$ n,rv be i,nt.drnt ntr d,o qut{i{n whdhf rn rs.nn)n n I li.. or rr..rh r

dre reason for dle decision to lead the guards against the enemy. Thisshows why clauses of equal firth-value cannot always be substituted forone another in such cases. The clausc exp4sscs morc through its connection with another than it does in isolation.

kt us now consider cases where rhis rcgllarly happens. In the se ence

'Bebel fancies [@r/dt[ rhat the rctum of Alsace-Lonaine lvould lppeasctrance's desire for revetse'

two thoughts are expressed, which are not however shown by means ofantecedert and consequent clauses, viz.

(l) Bebel believes thlt dE retld of Alsace Lomine would .ppeaseFrance\ desire for revengei

(2) the retun ofAisace bnalne wouid not appease France's desire for

In the expression of the first thought, the words of lhe subordinateclaus€ have their indirect Bedeuung, .J'hile fi€ same words have fieircustomary Brdrrr#a in the expression of rhe second rhought. 'l-lxis showsfiat r}le subordinare clause in our original complex sentence is to beLaken twice over, wirh different Be.le tunsen, of which one is a thought,lhe other a rmth-value. Since the truth-value is not the whole Bedsrr{r,aoftie subordinate clause, we cannot simply replace the latter by anotherof equal rruth-value. Similar consideraiions apply to expressions suchrs 'know', 'recognize', 'it is wetl known'.r5

By means of a subordinrte causal clause and the associated mainclause rve express seveml thoughts, which however do not corrcspondseparately to the original clauses. In the sentencc 'Because ice is lcssdcnse than water, it floats on rvater' we have

(l) Ice is less dense than water;(2) If anythlng js le$ dense than warer, it floats on wrter;(l) lce fioars on warcr.

l hc third thousht, ho*'ever, necd not be cxplicitly introduced, since itrs contained in lhe remaining two. On rhe o.her hand, neiiher the lirst,rnd rhird nor the second and Ihid combined would furnish the senseol our sentence. It can now be seen that our subordinate clause

'ireclusc icc is lc$ densc than watc.'

\\A\(t, rrl(rfn(D, .(\ N h!1tr)nr'.

O, Siin dd Bedeulung 169

lrr

47

I

110 O, Sinn ard Bedeurung

exprcsses our tust thought, as well as a pan of our second. This is how

it comes to pass that our subsidiary clause cannot be simply replaced

by anoths of equal trufi-value; for this would alt€r our second dloughtand ftereby might wel altet its sudl-value.

The situation is similar in dle sentence

'If hon were less dense than *€ter, it would float on water'. I

49 Here we have the two thoughts that iron is rot less dense than water,

and that something floats on water if it is less dense than water. Thesubsidiary clause again e:lTresses one thought and a part of the other.

If we interpret rhe sentence already considered,

'After Schleswig-Holst€in was sep.mted from Demark, Prussia and Aus-rria quarelled',

in such a way that it expresses the thought that Schleswig-Holstein was

once separared ftom Denrna*, we have fust ftis thought, and secondly

the rhought tlat, at a time more closely determined bv fie subordinate

clause, Prussia and Austria quanelled. Here also the subordinate clause

erTresses not only one thought but also a part of another' Therefore itmay not in general be rcplaced by another of the same truih-value.

It is hard to exhaust all the possibilities siven by languagej bur I hope

to have brought to light at least the essertial reasons why a subordin-ate clause may not alwa)s be replaced by another of equal truth-valuewithout halm to the truth of the whole sentence siructure. These rea-

(D

(2)

when the subordinate cl.use does not stand for lradd,t?,1 a lruth-value, inasmuch as it expresses only a pan of a thoughtiwhen rhe subordinate clause does stand for trde,trl a rruth-value'but ls not resficled to so doing, inasmuch as its sense includes one

thought and pan of eother.

The first case arisesl

(a) for words having indi,t .t Be,leutxnE,

ab) if a parl of the sentence is only an indeinite indicator instead of a

Proper name.

In the second case, the subsidiary clause may have to be taken twice

ov€r, viz. once in its customary Brdrxr'ngr and the other time in irs

indirect a.dd,tr,6 or thc sense of a part ofthe subordinate clausc n1av

likewisc bc r component ofrnolher thouglt, which, taken togethcr with

O', Sinn drd Bedeurune t7t

the thought directly expressed by the subordinat€ clause, mak€s up rhesense of the whole senrence.

It follows with sufficient probability ftom rhe foregoing that the caseswhere a subordinate clause is nor replaceable by anorher of the samevalue cannot be brought in disproof of our view I that a ruth-value isthe Bed€&rrra of a sentence thar has a rhought as irs sense.

Irt us retum to our starting-poinr.Ifwe found'd = a' and'd = r'to have different cogritive values, rhe

explanation is that for the purpose ofacquiring knowledge, the s€nse ofthe sentence, viz., the thought e\<pressed by itr is no less relevant rhanits BedeuanE, i.e. its tudr-valu€. ffrow d = 4 then ]\deed 6e Bedeutunsof 'r' is the same as that of 'ai and hence the truth-value of 'a = ,' isthe same as that of 'a = a'. In spite of this, the sense of'r' may ditrerfrom the sense of'a', and thereby the thought expressed by rd

= ,' willdiffer ftom that expressed by 'd = a'. In that case the two sentences donot have the same cognitive value. Ifwe rmderstand by 'iudgement' theadvance ftom fie thought to its trurh-valueJ as in the present paper, wecan also say thar the judgements are different.