FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017 2017... · 2020-03-04 · Internet penetration in Ukraine continues to grow...

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FREEDOM ON THE NET2017

Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017

• SeveralpopularRussianplatformswereblockedonnationalsecuritygrounds,includingsocialnetworksVKontakeandOdnoklassniki(seeBlocking and Filtering).

• Ukrainianauthoritiesimprisonedsocialmediausersforuptofiv yearsforexpressingviewsdeemedthreateningtoUkraine’sterritorialintegrity,whileRussian-backedseparatistauthoritiesinLuhansksentencedabloggertofourteenyearsinprison(seeProsecutions and Detentions for Online Activities).

• RenownedindependentjournalistPavelSheremetoftheUkrayinska PravdawebsitewasmurderedinacarbombattackinKyiv,likelyinretaliationforhisreporting(seeIntimidation and Violence).

Ukraine2016 2017

Internet Freedom Status Partly Free

Partly Free

ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 8 9

LimitsonContent(0-35) 11 16

ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 19 20

TOTAL* (0-100) 38 45

* 0=mostfree,100=leastfree

Population: 45 million

Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 52.5 percent

Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes

Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes

Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes

Press Freedom 2017 Status: Not Free

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FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017


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Editor’s NoteOn March 16, 2014, Russian military forces presided over an illegal referendum in Crimea to justify Russia’s annexation of the territory from Ukraine. On March 27, 2014, the General Assembly of the United Nations issued a non-binding resolution calling the referendum invalid and urging member states and international organizations not to recognize any such change in Crimea’s status. As of this report, Ukraine and a vast majority of countries recognize neither the Russian-organized referendum nor Crimea as part of the Russian Federation.

Freedom on the Net focuses on internet freedom developments as they pertain to internet users within each of the 65 countries under study. This report focuses primarily on the overall status of internet freedom in Ukraine from June 2016 through May 2017. Due to the ongoing crises in the region, events in Crimea during this time are generally excluded from this report and do not directly affect the analysis, assessment, or score of internet freedom in Ukraine published here. To the extent that Crimea is mentioned in the report, it is to acknowledge and describe the connection between internet freedom developments in Crimea and those elsewhere in Ukraine. Events in parts of the Donbas that are outside of government control are included in the report and do affect the analysis, assessment, and score of internet freedom in Ukraine.

IntroductionInternetfreedomdeclinedinUkrainefollowingunprecedentedcensorshipofRussianonlineplatformsandthemurderofleadingindependentonlinejournalistPavelSheremet.

DespiteaperiodofoptimismfollowingtheRevolutionofDignityin2014thatoustedformerPresidentViktorYanukovych,internetfreedominUkrainesteadilydeterioratedintheensuingperiodofconflict Russian-backedarmedseparatiststookcontroloftheeasternregionsofDonetskandLuhanskin2014,andrebel-ledadministrationsintheoccupiedareascontinuedtoengageUkrainianforcesin2017,despiteinternationalattemptstobrokeraceasefire 1

Contentmanipulationbytrollsfavoringbothsidesofthedisputeflourishe onsocialmedia,andtheUkrainianauthoritiesusedtheongoingconflic tojustifyincreasingincursionsoninternetfreedom.Inanunprecedentedactofcensorship,PresidentPetroPoroshenkoblockedseveralpopularonlineplatformsentirely,includingsocialnetworkVKontakte,ongroundsthattheyposedathreattonationalsecurity.Ukrainianauthoritiesalsocontinuedblockingwebsitesdeemedanti-Ukrainian,whileseparatistforcesintheoccupiedregionsrestrictedcontentdeemedsupportiveoftheUkrainiangovernmentorUkrainianculturalidentity.

Socialmediauserswerepunishedforexpressingseparatistideas,withseveralusersimprisonedbyUkrainianauthoritiesforuptofiv years.Separately,a14-yearsentencewashandedtoabloggerintheso-calledLuhanskPeople’sRepublic.Onlinejournalistsandbloggerscontinuedtofacedigitalandphysicalsecuritythreats.Inthegravestattackfromtheperiodofcoverage,veteranjournalistPavelSheremetwasmurderedincarbombattackinthecapital,Kyiv,likelyinretaliationforhisworkasanindependentonlinejournalist.Journalistsreportingfromtheconflic zonewerealsosubjecttodoxingattacks,withtheirpersonaldetailsleakedonline.

1 UkrainianInternetAssociation,“ResearchoftheInternetaudience”,(inUkrainian)accessedonApril4,2017,http://inau.ua/sites/default/files/file/1701/iv_kvartal_2016.pp

Introduction

Obstacles to Access

Availability and Ease of Access

Restrictions on Connectivity

ICT Market

Regulatory Bodies

Limits on Content

Blocking and Filtering

Content Removal

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Digital Activism

Violations of User Rights

Legal Environment

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

Intimidation and Violence

Technical Attacks

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Thoughtheongoingconflic andinformationwarwithRussiaposesignifican challenges,Ukrainiancivilsocietycontinuestohaveanimportantpresenceonline.Activistsusedsocialmediatocoordinatevolunteersupportforthemilitary,assistinternallydisplacedpopulations,encourageoversightofofficia andinstitutions,andexposebiasedormanipulativeinformation.

Obstacles to AccessInternet penetration continued to grow in 2017. Access to the internet remains affordable for most of the population. The market is diverse, and state-owned providers no longer dominate the market. Inevitably, Ukraine’s telecommunications market has suffered due to economic hardships in the country and the crisis following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and later, the upheaval in eastern Ukraine.


Key Access Indicators

Internet penetration (ITU)a 2016 52.5%2015 49.3%2011 28.7%

Mobile penetration (ITU)b 2016 133%2015 144%2011 121%

Average connection speeds (Akamai)c 2017(Q1) 12.8 Mbps2016(Q1) 12.3 Mbps

aInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.bInternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,2000-2016,”http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.cAkamai,“StateoftheInternet-ConnectivityReport,Q12017,”https://goo.gl/TQH7L7.

InternetpenetrationinUkrainecontinuestogrowsteadily,dueinparttodiminishingcostsandincreasingeaseofaccess,particularlyformobileinternet.Localstatisticssaidthatinternetpenetrationhadreached63percentin2016,slightlyhigherthanfigure publishedforthesameperiodbytheITU(seeAvailabilityandEaseofAccess:KeyIndicators).2

Infrastructureismoredevelopedinurbanareas,thoughtheurban-ruraldividehasnarrowedslightlyovertime.Internetpenetrationinruralareasrosefrom45percentin2015to54percentin2016,accordingtooneestimate.3Mostpeopleaccesstheinternetfromhomeorwork,thoughmanycafesandrestaurantsprovidefreeWi-Fi.Accessisalsocommoninpubliclibraries,schools,shoppingmalls,andairports.Internetcafesstillexist,buttheirpopularityhaswaned.Monthlysubscriptionsarefairlyaffordabl formostofthepopulation,withmonthlyfixed-lin broadbandcostingaslowasUAH80-130(US$4-5),andmonthlymobilebroadbandcostingaslowasUAH40-70(US$1.50-$2.50)in2017.

Mobileinternetusecontinuedtogrow,with6.1millionUkrainiansaccessingtheinternetusinga

2 UkrainianInternetAssociation,“ResearchoftheInternetaudience”,(inUkrainian)accessedonApril4,2017,http://inau.ua/sites/default/files/file/1701/iv_kvartal_2016.ppt 3 KievInternationalInstituteofSociology,“DynamicsoftheInternetUsageinUkraine:February-March,2016”,accessedonApril4,2017,http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=621http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=621

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smartphonein2016.4Anestimated35percentofthepopulationownedasmartphone.5Mobileoperatorsweregranted3Glicensesin2015,greatlyfacilitatingmobileinternetuse.Whilespeedandcoverageremainsrelativelypoorcomparedtomobiledataservicesinothercountries,6the3Gnetworkcontinuedtoexpandtomoretownsandcitiesin2017.7


Inlatespringandsummerof2014,Russianandpro-RussianforcesoccupiedtheCrimeanpeninsula,andlatertookcontrolofpartsoftheDonetskandLuhanskregions.Alongwithgainingpoliticalcontrol,separatistforcesalsoattemptedtodisruptorregulateaccesstotelecommunications.Whilesomedisruptionsininternetandmobileconnectivitywerecausedbymilitaryactivity,especiallyineasternUkraine(forexample,celltowersorinternetcablesdamagesbyexplosions),8insomecasestherewasdirectpressureoninternetserviceproviders(ISPs)fromrebelmilitiasandRussian-supportedauthorities,causingthemtotakedownorblockparticularservices,suchasUkrainiannewswebsitesinDonetsk,9Luhansk,10andCrimea11(seeBlockingandFiltering).

Defactoauthoritiesoftheself-proclaimedDonetskPeople’sRepublic(DPR)andLuhanskPeople’sRepublic(LPR)rampeduppressureagainstUkrainianISPsstilloperatingintheregion.12InOctober2016,thedefactoauthoritiesinLuhanskissuedadecreemandatingthatinternetservicebesuppliedonlybylocal“state-owned”providers.Usersacrosstheregionexperiencedatemporaryinternetoutageonthedayfollowingtheannouncement,thecauseandextentofwhichremainsunclear.13Ukraine’slargestISP,UkrTelecom,wasforcedoutofDonetskinMarch2017afterdefactoauthoritiesthereseizedthecompany’sDonetskoffic Thesuddendepartureleftaround200,000userswithoutalandlinephoneconnectionandmobileinternet,forcingthemtochooseanotherprovider.14FollowingtheexitofUkrTelecom,internettrafficintheoccupiedterritoriesisnowlargely

4 Gemius,“Онлайн-аудиторияисамыепопулярныесайтывУкраинезаиюль,”(OnlineaudienceandthemostpopularwebsitesinUkraine,Julydata),August18,2016,http://www.gemius.com.ua/vse-stati-dlja-chtenija/onlajn-auditorija-i-samye-populjarnye-sajty-v-ukraine-za-ijul.html5 “Користувачісмартфонівє35%українців-дослідження,”(35percentofUkrainiansownsmartphones-study)RBC Ukraine,September12,2016,accessedonApril4,2017,https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/lnews/polzovatelyami-smartfonov-vlyayutsya-35-ukraintsev-1473682956.html6 “ВУкраїнімобільнийінтернетодинізнайгіршихусвіті-OpenSignal”(InUkraine,mobileinternetoneoftheworstintheworld-OpenSignal)Hromadske,August17,2016,accessedonApril4,2017,https://hromadske.ua/posts/v-ukraini-mobilnyi-internet-odyn-iz-naihirshykh-u-sviti-opensignal.7 PavelKrasnomovets,“Lifecell,“Киевстар”иVodafoneзапустили3GвЧеркассах-одномизпоследнихобластныхцентровбезновогостандарта”,(Lifecell,KyivstarandVodafonelaunched3GinCherkasy-oneofthelastoblastcenterswithoutanewstandard)AIN,March16,2017,https://ain.ua/2017/03/16/3g-v-cherkassax.8 “Війназазв’язок:щовідбуваєтьсянасходіУкраїни,”[Warforconnectivity:whatishappeningineasternUkraine]TechToday,MTSProductions,September19,2014,http://bit.ly/1RiaEeO.9 “В«ДНР»ввелицензурувинтернете,”[“DNR”IntroducesInternetCensorship]ZN.ua,May30,2015,http://bit.ly/1PQ7yO310 TetyanaLokot,“UkrainianSeparatistsBlock100+NewsWebsitesin‘LuganskPeople’sRepublic’,”Global Voices,January14,2016.https://globalvoices.org/2016/01/14/ukrainian-separatists-block-100-news-websites-in-lugansk-peoples-republic/.11 “ВКрымуотключаютукраинскиеновостныесайты,”[UkrainiannewswebsitesblockedinCrimea]Hromadske Radio,August12,2014,http://bit.ly/1L6Ym8j.12 “Привет”от“ДНР”?Уклиентовахметовской“Vega”воккупированномДонецкепропалдоступкИнтернету,”(“Hello”from“DPR”?ClientsofAkhmetov-ownedVegadisconnectedfromInternetintheoccupiedDonetsk)Ostrov,August2,2016,http://www.ostro.org/donetsk/society/news/505346/.13 “Інтернет-провайдерVegaзаявляєпрозахопленняофісувокупованомуДонецьку,”(InternetproviderVegaclaimsitsoffi wasseizedintheoccupiedDonetsk)Detector Media,January24,2017,http://detector.media/infospace/article/122513/2017-01-24-internet-provaider-vega-zayavlyae-pro-zakhoplennya-ofisu-v-okupovanomu-donetsku 14 «Укртелеком»АхметовавОРЛДОприпиняєроботучереззахоплення”,(Akhmetov’sUkrtelekomstopsoperatingintheoccupiedterritoriesofLuhanskandDonetskregions)EkonomichnaPravda,March1,2017,https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2017/03/1/622149/.

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routedthroughRussia.15

ThesedisruptionsremainedlocalinpartbecauseUkraine’sdiverseinternetinfrastructuremakesitresilienttodisconnection.ThebackboneconnectiontotheinternationalinternetinUkraineisnotcentralized,andmajorISPseachmanagetheirownchannelsindependently,thoughtheformerlystate-ownedUkrTelecomremainsdominant(seeICTMarket).Ukraine’sbackboneinternetexchange,UA-IX,allowsUkrainianISPstoexchangetrafficandconnecttothewiderinternet.Thecountryhasawell-developedsetofatleasteightregionalinternetexchanges,aswellasdirectconnectionsoverdiversephysicalpathstothemajorwesternEuropeanexchanges.16

ICT Market

TheUkrainiantelecommunicationsmarketisfairlyliberalandundergoinggradualdevelopment.Overall,approximately6,000providersandoperatorsoftelecommunicationsoperateinUkraine,accordingtotheNationalCommissionfortheStateRegulationofCommunicationsandInformatization(NCCIR).17

Thestatepreviouslyowned93percentofthelargesttelecomcompanyandtop-tierISP,UkrTelecom,butthecompanywasprivatizedinMarch2011.18Authoritieswereinvestigatingallegedirregularitiesintheprivatizationagreementduringthereportingperiod,thoughthecompanydeniedinvolvementandsaidtheprobewouldnotaffec service.19

UkrTelecomisstillthelargestISPinthecountry.Othertelecommunicationsprovidersaredependentonleasedlines,sinceUkrTelecomownsthemajorityoftheinfrastructure,andmanyalternativeproviderslackresourcestobuildtheirownnetworks.However,UkrTelecomdoesnotexertanypressureorregulatorycontroloverotherISPs.

OthermajorISPsinUkraineincludeVolia,Triolan,Datagroup,andVega.20Kyivstar(ownedbyDutchVimpelComLtd)isthesecondlargestISP,21andoneofthreemajorplayersinthemobilecommunicationsmarket,alongwithVodafoneUkraine,and“lifecell”(formerly“life”),ownedbyAstelit,whosemainshareholdersaretheTurkishcompanyTurkcellandUkrainianSystemCapitalManagement.Together,thesecompanieshold94.6percentofthemobilecommunicationsmarket.22

15 “В“ДНР”полностьюперешлинароссийскийинтернет-трафик,”(“DNR”completelyswitchedtoRussianinternettraffi Strana.ua,March7,2017,http://bit.ly/2qM200A.16 JimCowie,“Syria,Venezuela,Ukraine:InternetUnderFire,”DynResearch,February26,2014,http://www.renesys.com/2014/02/internetunderfire .17 NationalCommissionfortheStateRegulationofCommunicationsandInformatization,http://nkrzi.gov.ua/index.php?r=site/index&pg=55&language=uk18 92.8percentofsharessoldtoESU,aUkrainiansubsidiaryoftheAustriancompanyEPIC.See“Укртелекомпродан,”[UkrtelecomSold]Dengi.Ua,March11,2011,http://bit.ly/1Vq9ALT.ESUwasacquiredbyUkrainianfir SystemCapitalManagementin2013.http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/404675.html19 “SCMconfirm readinesstodefenditspropertyrightstoUkrtelecom,3Mobincourt,”Kyiv Post,May23,2017,https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/scm-confirms-readiness-defend-property-rights-ukrtelecom-3mob-court.html 20 IlliaKabachynsky,“Рейтингуспішностіінтернет-провайдерів-2015,”(Rankingofsuccessfulnessofinternetproviders-2015)Forbes Ukraine,April30,2015,accessedonApril4,2017,http://bit.ly/2oAFVVJ21 Ibid.22 OlgaKarpenko,“ВУкраинепочти55млнабонентовмобильнойсвязи,”[Ukrainehasalmost55millionmobilesubscribers]AIN,July31,2012,http://bit.ly/1FKMuIE.

Introduction

Obstacles to Access



ICT Market

Regulatory Bodies

Limits on Content


Content Removal


Digital Activism

Violations of User Rights

Legal Environment




Technical Attacks

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Ukrchastotnagliad,theUkrainianfrequenciessupervisorycenter,reportsthat86operatorshavelicensestoprovidesatellitecommunicationservicesinUkraine.CompaniesprovidinginternetaccessusingsatellitetechnologiesinUkraineincludeUkrsat,Infocom-SK,Spacegate,Adamant,LuckyNet,Ukrnet,andItelsat.WiththeexceptionofInfocom-SK,23allofthesecompaniesareprivatelyowned.24

TherearenodirectbarrierstoentryintotheICTmarket,butanynewbusinessventurefacesobstaclesincludingbureaucracyandcorruption,aswellasthelegalandtaxhurdlescommontotheUkrainianbusinessenvironment.Inparticular,theUkrainianICTmarkethasbeencriticizedforitsdifficu licensingproceduresforoperators—underthe2003LawonCommunications,operatorsarerequiredtohavealicensebeforebeginningtheiractivities.RegionalISPsareusuallysmallerlocalbusinesses,andregionaldominancelargelydependsonbusinessandotherconnectionsinaspecifi region,makingthemarketpronetocorruption.

Regulatory Bodies

TheICTsectorisregulatedbytheNationalCommissionfortheStateRegulationofCommunicationsandInformatization(NCCIR).MembersoftheNCCIRareappointedbythepresidentofUkraine.25The2003LawonCommunicationsdoesnotguaranteethecommission’sindependence,andthelackoftransparencysurroundingappointmentshasraisedconcerninlightofwidespreadcorruptioninthepoliticalsystemandthelucrativenatureofbusinessintheICTsector.CriticssayNCCIRdecisionsandoperationsalsolacktransparency.AnewlyappointedNCCIRheadvowedtoreformtheregulatorin2015.26

Limits on ContentThe conflict with Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine has driven authorities to censor online content perceived to undermine Ukraine’s standing in the conflict. Several Russian online platforms were blocked in this coverage period, and dozens of Ukrainian websites have been censored in the rebel controlled Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Despite the restrictions, the internet remains relatively diverse. Though pro-Russian trolls are active online, locals actively track and expose online manipulation attempts.


Inthepast,Ukrainianauthoritiesrarelyblockedonlinecontent.However,astheconflic betweenUkrainianforcesandRussian-backedseparatistsineasternUkrainecontinuedintoitsfourthyear,PresidentPetroPoroshenkodeclaredinMay2017thatseveralRussian-ownedplatformshadbeenaddedtoasanctionslistandweretobeblockedonnationalsecuritygrounds.27UkrainianISPswereorderedtoblocksocialmediaplatformsVKontakteandOdnoklassniki,whichwerepreviouslywidelyusedinUkraine.AlsoblockedwasYandex,theRussian-speakingworld’smostpopular

23 Infocom-SKwasfoundedin1991jointlybystate-ownedUkrtelecomandControlware,aGermantelecommunicationscompany.Infocom,“History,”accessedonJune15,2012,http://bit.ly/1FIrp1N.24 OpenNetInitiative,“Ukraine,”https://opennet.net/research/profiles/ukrain .25 NationalCommissiononRegulationofCommunicationsandInformatization,accessedonApril5,2017,http://bit.ly/1OaChbb.26 “НКРСИдолжнастатьнезависимой—глававедомства,”[NCCIRmustbecomeindependent—headofregulator]Delo,May26,2015,http://bit.ly/1Lmv5Iy.27 “Innewsanctionslist,UkraineblocksRussiansocialmediasites,”Washington Post,May16,2017,http://wapo.st/2htxHN4.

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searchengine,andmail.ru,apopularemailservice.Theseplatformsremainedblockedinlate2017.PresidentPoroshenkoclaimedthemeasureswerenecessarytoprotectagainstcyberattacksanddatacollectionbyRussianauthorities.28OtherinternationalplatformssuchasFacebookandTwitterremainfreelyavailableandgainedsignificantl moreusersfollowingtheRevolutionofDignityin2014(seeDigitalActivism).29

TheblockingofRussianplatformsfollowstheintroductionofacybersecuritydecreeandaninformationsecuritydecreeinFebruary2017,bothofwhichenvisionbroaderstatepowerstoblockcontentonline.Thedecreescallforthedevelopmentoflegalmechanismstoblock,monitor,andremovecontentdeemedthreateningtothestate.30InJune2017,theMinistryforInformationPolicyreleasedablacklistof20illegalwebsitesdeemedtoinciteinterethnicenmity.MostwebsitesonthelistarenewsoutletspublishingcontentsympathetictodefactoauthoritiesintheoccupiedDonbasregion.31

UkrainianauthoritiescontinuedblockingwebsitesthatweredeemedtocontainRussianpropaganda.InJuly2017,theSecurityServiceofUkraine(SBU)announcedthatitblocked10websitessupposedlycreatedbyRussianagentsforthepurposeofspreadinganti-Ukrainianpropaganda,thoughthespecifi websiteswerenotidentifie inthestatement.32TheSBUdescribedthewebsitesasbeingpartofRussia’shybridwaragainstUkraine.33

DefactoauthoritiesinoccupiedeasternUkraineseparatelyblockUkrainianresources,particularlyUkrainiannewswebsites.34InMay2015,theself-proclaimedDonetskPeople’sRepublic(DPR)institutedanoffici blacklistofwebsitesbannedonitsterritory,thoughthelistisnotpublicanditisuncleartowhatextentDPRofficia havebeenabletoenforceit.35InJanuary2016,separatistauthoritiesinneighboringLuhanskblockedaccesstoover100mediawebsitesbypressuringlocalISPstoimplementcensorshiporders.36

Copyright-infringingmaterialissometimesblocked.Acyberpoliceunitestablishedin2015orderedblocksonpiratedmaterialduringthecoverageperiod,includingapopularfil exchangeservice.

Content Removal

TheUkrainiangovernmentsometimesforcesthirdpartiestoremovepoliticallysensitivecontent.TheSBUtargetedweb-hostingcompanyNICafterthecompanyfailedtocomplywitharequestto

28 “Innewsanctionslist,UkraineblocksRussiansocialmediasites,”Washington Post,May16,2017,http://wapo.st/2htxHN4.29 MinistryforInformationPolicy,Ukraine,“Listofprohibitedwebsites,”accessedNovember1,2017,http://mip.gov.ua/filespdf/perelik-saitiv.pdf.30 YuliyaZabelina,“БоротьбазнеугоднимиабозРосією:щостоїтьзадоктриноюінформаційноїбезпеки,”(FightwithunwelcomeorRussia:whatisbehindtheinformationsecuritydoctrine)DetectorMedia,March1,2017,http://bit.ly/2nYm9AB.31 MinistryforInformationPolicy,Ukraine,“Listofprohibitedwebsites,”accessedNovember1,2017,http://mip.gov.ua/filespdf/perelik-saitiv.pdf.32 SecurityServiceofUkraine,https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/3685#.2veayF96.dpbs;NetFreedom,“SBUblocks10sitesforanti-Ukrainianpropaganda”July12,2017,http://netfreedom.org.ua/sbu-zablokovano-10-sajtiv-z-antyukrainskoju-propagandoju/.33 TetyanaLokot,“UkrainianSeparatistsBlock100+NewsWebsitesin‘LuganskPeople’sRepublic’,”GlobalVoices,January14,2016.https://globalvoices.org/2016/01/14/ukrainian-separatists-block-100-news-websites-in-lugansk-peoples-republic/.34 “Боевики«ДНР»блокируютинтернет-сайты,выступающиепротивтерроризмаисепаратизма,”[“DNR”fighter blockinternetwebsitesspeakingagainstterrorismandseparatism]CRiME,September30,2014,http://crime.in.ua/node/6462.35 “В«ДНР»ввелицензурувинтернете,”[“DNR”IntroducesInternetCensorship]ZN.ua,May30,2015,http://bit.ly/1PQ7yO3.36 TetyanaLokot,“UkrainianSeparatistsBlock100+NewsWebsitesin‘LuganskPeople’sRepublic’,”GlobalVoices,January14,2016.https://globalvoices.org/2016/01/14/ukrainian-separatists-block-100-news-websites-in-lugansk-peoples-republic/.

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removefiv allegedlyanti-UkrainianwebsitesinApril2015.SBUoffice subsequentlyseizedhostingserversatfourNICdatacentersinKyiv,causing30,000unrelatedUkrainianwebsitestogooffli temporarily.37Nosimilarincidentswerepubliclyreportedduringtheperiodofcoverage.

InApril2017,theUkrainianparliamentpassedalawthatwillrequirehostingserviceproviderstolimitaccesstowebpagescontainingunauthorizedreproductionsofcertaincategoriesofcopyrightedmaterialontherequestofthecopyrightowner,ifthewebpagehasbeennotifie oftheinfringingcontentandfailedtoremoveit.Thehostingprovidercanhidethepagewithoutacourtorder,butcourtapprovalisrequiredwithintendays.Providersriskliabilityfornoncompliance.38ThelawwasintendedtosupporttheUkrainiancinemaindustry.39

Ukraine’scriminalcodecurrentlymandatespunishmentsfor“unsanctionedactionswithinformationstoredoncomputerdevicesornetworks.”40ISPscouldbeobligatedtoremoveorblocktheoffensiv orillegalcontentwithin24hours.


OnlinemediainUkraineisgenerallylessconstrainedbyeconomicpressureandownerintereststhanthemainstreammedia.Theubiquitoususeofsocialnetworks,particularlyFacebook,byjournalists,politicians,andactivistsfacilitatesdiversityandpluralismonline.However,onlinejournalists,commentators,andinternetusershavebeenpressuredtoself-censor,especiallyontopicsdirectlyrelatedtotheRussian-backedinsurgencyintheeast,andonthethemesofseparatism,terrorism,andpatriotism.Self-censorshiphasbeenmorepronouncedinthepartsofeasternUkraineoccupiedbypro-RussianforcesandinCrimea,whereinternetusersandjournalistshavefacedattacks,41abuse,andintimidationforexpressingpro-Ukrainianpositions.

TheUkrainianauthoritiessometimesintimidateonlineoutletsperceivedtobepro-Russian.InJuneandJuly2017,lawenforcementoffice andtheSBUraidedtheoffic ofStrana andVesti,twoUkrainianonlinenewsoutletswithapro-Russianstance.TheSBUstatedthatthesearcheswerepartofaninvestigationintotheallegeddisclosureofstatesecrets,thoughStranadeniedbeinginvolvedinsuchactivity.Observershavespeculatedthattheraidswereanattempttopressureandintimidatetheoutlets.Bothwebsitesremainaccessible.42

MediaprofessionalsperceiveprogovernmentmanipulationofonlinediscussionsasthemostpervasiveinternetfreedomissueinUkraine,accordingtoarecentsurvey.43JournalistsandICTusersingovernment-controlledareasincreasinglyfacedbacklashforcriticizingthegovernmentor

37 AnnaPoludenko-Young,“Ukraine’sSecurityServiceTakesDown30,000WebsitestoFight‘Pro-RussianPropaganda’,”GlobalVoices,April28,2015,http://bit.ly/1M47yqs.38 BakerMcKenzie,IntermediariesNowLiableforThirdPartyOnlineCopyrightInfringementsinUkraine,http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/05/intermediaries-online-copyright-infringements/.39 “Міжзахистоміцензурою.ВУкраїнірегулюютьінтернет-піратстводосудовимметодом,”(Betweenprotectionandcensorship.Internetpiracyistoberegulatedbypre-courtprocedureinUkraine)InternetFreedom,April3,2017,http://netfreedom.org.ua/mizh-zakhystom-i-cenzuroju-v-ukrajini/.40 Articles361,362,363ofUkraine’sCriminalCode,http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2341-14/page11.41 “УЛуганськусепаратистивикралижурналістаіпограбувалиофісінтернет-сайту,”[InLuhansk,separatistskidnapjournalist,robinternetwebsiteoffi ]RadioSvoboda,July16,2014,http://bit.ly/1MKcSSA.42 NetFreedom,“NewsearchesofStrana.uaandVesti,”Augst11,2017,http://netfreedom.org.ua/novi-obshuky-strana-ua-ta-lypnevi-obshuky-vestej-chomu-sylovyky-neefektyvni/.43 InternewsUkraine,“РезультатиопитуваннящодоризиківІнтернет-свободивУкраїні,”(ResultsofthesurveyontherisksofinternetfreedominUkraine),http://internews.ua/2017/01/netfreedom-survey/

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military.ProgovernmentactorsharassedHromadske,anindependentUkrainianonlineTVoutlet,inretaliationfortheoutlet’scoverageoftheconflic ineasternUkraine.AFacebookpostbythejointstaffofUkraine’smilitaryclaimingthatHromadskehadexposedthepositionofUkrainiantroopswassharedhundredsoftimesinthespanoffiv minutesbyaccountsthatabusedHromadskejournalists.Suchahighlevelofengagementwasunusualforthejointstaff’ Facebookpage,andaninvestigationintotheactivityrevealedthatgroupsofprogovernmenttrollsandabotfarm,whichcanautomatefakeaccountstofeigngrassrootsengagement,werereportedlyinvolved.44HromadskejournalistssaidtheyweretargetedbecausetheyexposedpoorconditionsfacedbyUkrainiantroopsinthecombatzone.

TheUkrainianonlineinformationlandscapeisalsosubjecttomanipulationbyactorsappearingtorepresentRussianinterests.FabricatedorintentionallymisleadinginformationpresentingKremlin-friendlynarrativesisregularlycirculatedinonlinenewsarticlestargetingRussian-speakingaudiences,includingUkrainians.StopFake,alocalplatformcreatedtodebunkfakenewsandpropagandaonline,regularlyidentifie examplesofRussianlanguagefakenewsontopicsconcerningUkraine.Thearticlesfollowasimilarpattern,presentingfalseinformationpurportingtohighlightvariousfailuresattributedtotheUkrainiangovernment,45Ukraine’sfailingrelationshipwiththeEuropeanUnion,46aswellasfalseinformationpurportingtohighlightUkrainians’andCrimeans’acceptanceofRussia’sannexationofCrimea.47Thearticlesoftenfirs appearonRussianoutlets,includingstatemediaoutlets,andsometimesreappearonUkrainianonlinenewswebsites.48

Kremlin-alignedtrollsactivelytargetUkrainianaudiencesonsocialmedia.Inanewtactic,trollswereobservedposingasenthusiasticUkrainianpatriotsinthepastyear,attemptingtosowdistrustwithinUkrainiansociety.Observersnotedthatthetrollaccountsoperateinintricatenetworks,andareoftenhighlyactiveinUkrainianpatriotgroupsonsocialmedia,sometimesevenactingaspageadministrators.ThetrollsusedsymbolicUkrainianimagesinprofil pictures,andtypicallysoughttodepicttheUkrainiangovernmentasfailingtheircitizens,oftencallingforthemtobeviolentlyoverthrown.ObservershavenotedthattheirtargetaudienceappearstobepatrioticUkrainiansengagedwithpoliticalaffairs 49

Moretraditionalformsofpro-Russianmanipulationwerealsoongoing,includingmasscommentingandpaidpostsonsocialmediaandfakewebsites.50TheUkrainianMinistryofInformationhasattemptedtorespondinkindtotheorganizedRussianinformationmanipulationeffort bycreatingitsown“internetarmy,”butitsactionshavenotreceivedmuchpraisefromUkrainianinternetusers.51

Digital Activism

TheUkrainiansocialmediasphere,whichexpandeddramaticallyfollowingtheRevolutionofDignity,continuedtothrivein2017.FacebookandTwitterhavebecomecrucialplatformsfordebateabout

44 Gorchinskaya,K.“TheriseofKremlin-styletrollinginUkrainemustend,”Guardian,July27,2016,http://bit.ly/2at6nYA.45 Forexample:http://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-ukraine-to-introduce-food-ration-cards/46 Forexample:http://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-most-ukrainians-not-interested-in-visa-free-travel-to-eu/.47 Forexample:http://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-crimea-benefits-economically-from-reunification-with-russia48 Forexample:http://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-most-ukrainians-not-interested-in-visa-free-travel-to-eu/.49 “Thetrollnetwork,”Texty,October4,2016,http://texty.org.ua/d/fb-trolls/index_eng.html.50 AricToler,“InsidetheKremlinTrollArmyMachine:Templates,Guidelines,andPaidPosts,”GlobalVoices,March14,2015,http://bit.ly/1j3kMNw.;AricToler,“Fake‘Ukrainian’NewsWebsitesRunbyRussian‘TrollArmy’Offshoots”GlobalVoices,November19,2014,http://bit.ly/1P7EkfB.51 TetyanaLokot,“MinistryofTruth’RecruitsUkrainiansfor‘InternetArmy,”GlobalVoices,Feb25,2015,http://bit.ly/1OJEyua.

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Ukrainianpolitics,reforms,andcivilsociety.Bytheendof2016,theFacebookaudienceinUkrainereached7.2millionusers.52However,RussiansocialnetworksVKontakteandOdnoklassnikiwereblockedinMay2017,inhibitingthepotentialformobilizationusingthesepopularplatforms(seeBlockingandFiltering).

Activistsandvolunteersmobilizedduringthe2014RevolutionofDignityandfoundnewusesforonlineplatforms,53suchasfundraisingformilitaryandvolunteerbattalions,providinginformationandassistancetorefugees,andcrowdfundingUkrainianbooktranslations.54Citizenjournalistsusedopen-sourcetoolsanddatatotrackthepresenceofRussiantroopsandmilitaryequipmentinUkrainein2015.55Oneonlineplatform,LetMyPeopleGo,regularlyupdatesalistofUkrainiancitizensheldcaptivebyRussianforcesandcampaignsfortheirrelease.56AseparatesocialmediacampaigninMarch2017advocatedforthereleaseofUkrainianuniversityprofessorIgorKozlovsky,whowasimprisonedinDonetskonchargesofspyingandweaponsmanufacture.57

Activistshavelaunchedseveralonlineinitiativesadvocatingforpeoplewithdisabilities,58andwomen’srights.Povaha,anonlineplatformlaunchedin2016,seekstoelevateprofessionalwomenthroughonlineadvocacycampaignsandthecreationofanonlinedatabaseofUkrainianwomenexperts.Thedatabaseisavailabletolocalandinternationalmediaoutletsseekingexpertinputformediasegments.59Anotheronlinecampaign,#яНебоюсьСказати(#IAmNotAfraidToSayIt),wasmadepopularinJuly2016byactivistAnastasiyaMelnychenkoaftershesharedpersonalstoriesofsexualharassmentandabuse.ThousandsofwomenfromUkraineandRussiamobilizedtosharesimilarstoriesusingthehashtag,withtheaimofshiftingculturalattitudesincountrieswhichoftendismissorblamewomenforinvitingsexualviolence.60

Manyofficia intheUkrainiangovernmentuseFacebookandTwitterheavilytoreportontheiractionsandreforms.Officia regularlyengagewithcommentsinattempttotakeintoaccountpublicopinion,helpingtoincreaseaccountability.61

52 OlegDmytrenko,“УкраїнськааудиторіяFacebookдемонструєфантастичнітемпиросту–збільшиласьнатретинувсьогоза7місяців,”(UkrainianFacebookaudiencedemonstratesfantasticspeedofgrowth-itgotbiggerbythirdinjust7months)Watcher,November25,2016,http://bit.ly/2kwFycn53 TetyanaBohdanova,“How#EuroMaidanandWarwithRussiaHaveChangedUkraine’sInternet,”Global Voices,January9,2015,http://bit.ly/1M49gI8;TymurVorona,“Украина—родинаволонтеров,иликакIT-добровольцыпомогалистранев2014году,”[Ukraine—thelandofvolunteers,orhowIT-volunteershelpedthecountryin2014]AIN,Jaunary8,2015,http://ain.ua/2015/01/08/556357.54 http://komubook.com.ua/55 TetyanaBohdanova,“OutingtheRussianMilitaryinEasternUkraine,”GlobalVoices,March19,2015,http://bit.ly/1O5Tp0r;AricToler,“FactCheckingtheConflic inEasternUkraine,”GlobalVoices,March3,2015,http://bit.ly/1YRnKVo.56 LetMyPeopleGo,https://www.facebook.com/LetMyPeopleGoUkraine.en/.AccessedonAugust1,2016.57 “#FreeKozlovskyу.Усоцмережіфлешмобіззакликомвизволитивченогозполону“ДНР”,”(#FreeKozlovskyy.Aflashmo insocialmediatocallforreleaseofscholarfromthecaptivityin“DPR”)Ukrayinska Pravda. Zhyttia,March15,2017,http://bit.ly/2nrKmlC.;https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/21/they-do-exist58 Dostupno.UA,https://www.facebook.com/ДоступноUA-1617803701799770/.AccessedonAugust1,2016;“КористувачісоцмережурізнихшкарпеткахпідтримуютьлюдейізсиндромомДауна,”(UsersofsocialnetworkssupportpeoplewithDownsyndromebywearingdifferen socks)Ukrayinska Pravda. Zhyttia,March21,2017,http://bit.ly/2nrILfL.59 “WomenanddigitaladvocacyinpostEuromaidanUkraine,”Global Voices,January1,2016,https://rising.globalvoices.org/exchange/2016/01/27/women-and-digital-advocacy-in-post-euromaidan-ukraine/.60 AnastasiyaMelnychenko,“Thewomanwhowasn’tafraidtosayit,”Meduza,July8,2016,https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/07/08/the-woman-who-wasn-t-afraid-to-say-it.61 “КакихукраинскихминистровможночитатьвFacebook,”[WhichUkrainianMinistersYouCanFollowonFacebook]AIN,March17,2014,http://bit.ly/1OaG20h.

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Violations of User RightsAuthorities have cracked down on social media users in an attempt to curb anti-Ukrainian rhetoric online, imprisoning users for so-called “separatist” or “extremist” expression. Physical violence remains a concern, with the murder of renowned journalist Pavel Sheremet in Kyiv. Cyberattacks, predominantly initiated by foreign agents, have targeted various state agencies, infrastructure, and state registries.

Legal Environment

TherighttofreespeechisgrantedtoallcitizensofUkraineunderArticle34oftheconstitution,althoughthestatemayrestrictthisrightintheinterestofnationalsecurityorpublicorder,andinpracticeitisfrequentlyviolated.Part3ofArticle15oftheconstitutionforbidsstatecensorship.

Thereisnospecifi lawmandatingcriminalpenaltiesorcivilliabilityforICTactivities,butotherlaws,suchasthosepenalizingextremistactivity,terrorism,orcallstoseparatism,applytoonlineactivity.Article109(2)-(3)oftheUkraineCriminalCodeoutlinesjailtermsofthreetofiv yearsforthreatstotheterritorialintegrityandsovereigntyofUkraine.62Article110oftheCriminalCodecriminalizespublicappealsfortheinfringementofUkraine’sterritorialintegrity,includinganymadeonline,withmaximumpenaltiesofuptofiv yearsinprison.

Ukraine’slawonStateofEmergencycontainsbroadprovisionsthatallowfortheintroductionof“specialrules”concerningtheconnectionandtransmissionofinformationthroughcomputernetworksduringastateofemergency.63Itisunclearwhatthisprovisioncouldmeaninpractice,thoughitislikelytoallowforsomelimitationinaccesstotheinternet

AcyberpoliceunitwithintheMinistryofInteriorwascreatedin2015aspartofabroaderpolicereformthatwaslargelywelcomed.64Theunitwastaskedwithbattlinginternetcrime,includinginternationalmoneylaunderingschemesanddigitalpiracy(seeBlockingandFiltering).


MultipleinternetusersinUkrainewerefined detained,orsentencedtoprisonforuptofiv yearsin2016and2017.65Separately,separatistadministrationscontrollingterritoriesintheeastsentencedabloggerto14yearsinprison,inpartforhisallegedcooperationwithUkrainiansecurityforces.

TheUkrainianauthoritiespunishedactivityonsocialmediapagesandaccountstheyconsideredtocontain“callstoextremismorseparatism”orotherwisethreatentheterritorialintegrityofUkraine.ThesecurityservicesstatedinFebruary2017thatcriminalproceedingshadbeeninitiatedagainst30administratorsofsocialmediagroupsthat“disseminatedcallsfortheoverthrowofUkraine’sconstitutionalorder,massupheavals,andotherillegalactions.”66

62 CriminalCodeofUkraine(2001,Amended2016),http://bit.ly/2fzpeqb.63 LegislationofUkraine,StateofEmergencyhttp://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1550-14.64 TetyanaLokot,“WatchOut,Internet!UkraineIsGettingItsOwnCyberpolice,”GlobalVoices,October12,2015.https://globalvoices.org/2015/10/12/watch-out-internet-ukraine-is-getting-its-own-cyberpolice/.65 IsaacWebb,“UkrainianSocialMediaUsersGetFiveYearsinPrisonFor‘SupportingSeparatism’,”GlobalVoices,February7,2017,http://bit.ly/2oNREAt.66 SecurityServiceofUkraine,“СБУефективнопротидієантиукраїнськійпропагандівІнтернеті(відео),”(SecurityServiceofUkraineiseffectivel counteractinganti-Ukrainianpropagandaoninternet(video)February13,2007,http://bit.ly/2oQHG0M.

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• InNovember2016,aresidentofVinnytsiainwesternUkrainewassentencedtothreeyearsinprisonunderPart1ofArticle110ofUkraine’sPenalCode,whichcriminalizespublicappealsfortheinfringementoftheterritorialintegrityofUkraine.Themanallegedlypostedcallsonsocialmediaforareferendumtocreateanindependent

“VinnytsiaPeople’sRepublic.”67

• InaseparateNovembercase,acourtinLvivsentencedamantothreeyearsinprisonunderArticle110ofthePenalCodeforpostingcallsonVKontakteforcitizenstoseizepowerinKyivandalterUkraine’sborders.Themanreportedlyhadonly22followers.68

• AresidentofKharkivinUkraine’seastwassentencedinJanuary2017tothree-and-a-halfyearsinprisonforpublishingsocialmediapostsinsupportofpro-RussianseparatistsineasternUkraine.TheSBUreportedthatthemanhadviolatedArticle110ofthePenalCodebywritingpostsdesignedtothreatenUkraine’sstatehoodandadvocatingforthecreationofanewstatecalledNovorossiyawithinUkraine’sborders.69

• AVolynresidentwassentencedtofiv yearsinprisoninFebruary2017forpostingpropagandainsupportofdefactoauthoritiesinDonetskandLuhanskonsocialmedia.70

• Zhytomyr-basedfreelancejournalistVasilyMuravitskywasarrestedinAugust2017onchargesofhightreason,threateningUkraine’sterritorialintegrity,supportingactsofterroristorganizations,andincitinghatred.TheSBUsaidthatMuravitskyhadpublished

“anti-Ukrainianmaterials”onsixRussiannewswebsitesandthathewasan“informationmercenary”workingforRussianauthorities.Muravitsky,whofacesamaximumsentencesof15yearsinprison,wasapparentlysingledoutonthebasisofacontracthehadwiththeRussianstatenewsagencyRossiyaSegodnya.71

AuthoritiesintheseparatistcontrolledterritoriesofDonetskandLuhanskalsopunishedonlinejournalistsandbloggers.UkrainianbloggerEduardNedelyaev,whowroteaboutdailylifeinLuhansk,wassentencedto14yearsinprisoninNovember2016.Nedelyaevwasaccusedofdefamingresidentsoftheregion,incitinghatredofRussia,andendangeringnationalsecuritybycooperatingwithUkrainiansecurityservices.72TherebeladministrationinLuhanskdetainedanotherblogger,GennadiyBenitsky,fromNovember2016toMarch2017onchargesofusingsocialmediatospreadextremistmaterialthatdishonoredlocalresidents,anddisseminatingoffensiv materialaboutLuhansk’sdefactoauthorities.73

67 “Вінничанинаув’язненонатрирокизаантиукраїнськізакликивінтернеті,”(ResidentofVinnytsiasentencedtothreeyearsforanti-Ukrainiancallsonline)Detector Media,November24,2016,http://bit.ly/2pi92tC.68 “ЖителяЛьвоваосудилина3годазасепаратистскиепосты«ВКонтакте»”(ResidentofLvivconvictedforthreeyearsinprisonforseparatistpostsinVKontakte)AIN,November9,2016,http://bit.ly/2pOTHE1.69 “InKharkiv,adistributorofseparatistmaterialssentencedto3.5years,”Detector Media,January11,2017,http://detector.media/infospace/article/122118/2017-01-11-na-kharkivshchini-rozpovsyudzhuvacha-separatistskikh-materialiv-zasudzheno-na-35-roki-sbu/.70 “AresidentofVolinconvictedofspreadingpropagandaforDNR&LNR,”Detector Media, February3,2017,http://detector.media/infospace/article/122819/2017-02-03-volinyanina-zasudzheno-umovno-za-propagandu-dnrlnr-u-sotsmerezhakh/.71 https://cpj.org/2017/08/ukrainian-journalist-in-custody-on-anti-state-char.php;https://rsf.org/en/news/two-more-victims-information-war-ukraine72 RSF“TwomorevictimsinUkraine’sinformationwar,”https://rsf.org/en/news/two-more-victims-information-war-ukraine;

“ВокупованомуЛуганськузатрималиблогера,якийвідкритопідтримувавУкраїну,”(BloggerwhoopenlysupportedUkrainewasdetainedinoccupiedLuhansk)112,November30,2016,http://bit.ly/2pfenld.73 “В«ЛНР»взяливполонщеодногоблогера,”(Anotherbloggercapturedin“LPR)Hromadske Radio,December27,2016,http://bit.ly/2okcuXb;http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1482873596.

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Thereislittleinformationpubliclyavailableaboutsurveillanceorcommunicationinterception.Generally,thereisalackofcomprehensivelegislativeregulationtoprotectprivacyandpreventabuse.Thesecurityservicescaninitiatecriminalinvestigationsandusewiretappingdevicesoncommunicationstechnology,butexistinglegislation,suchastheLawonOperativeInvestigativeActivity,74doesnotspecifythecircumstancesthatjustifythesemeasuresorthetimeframeorscopeoftheirimplementation.

InDecember2013theNCCIRreleasedaneweditionof“RulesforActivitiesintheSphereofTelecommunications,”whichincludedaproblematicparagraphaboutISPsandtelecomprovidershavingto“installattheirowncostintheirtelecommunicationsnetworksalltechnicalmeansnecessaryforperformingoperativeandinvestigativeactivitiesbyinstitutionswithpowerstodoso.”75Thereisnoinformationavailableontheextenttowhichtheseprovisionshavebeenimplemented.76

From2002to2006,mechanismsforinternetmonitoringwereinplaceundertheStateCommitteeonCommunications’OrderNo.122,whichrequiredISPstoinstallso-called“black-box”monitoringsystems.Thiswasostensiblydonetomonitortheunsanctionedtransmissionofstatesecrets.CavingtopressurefrompublicprotestsandcomplaintsraisedbytheInternetAssociationofUkraineandtheUkrainianHelsinkiHumanRightsUnion,theMinistryofJusticeabolishedthisorderinAugust2006.

Thereiscurrentlynoobligatoryregistrationforeitherinternetusersorprepaidmobilephonesubscribers,anduserscanpurchaseprepaidSIM-cardsanonymously,aswellascommentanonymouslyonwebsiteswherethewebsiteownerdoesnotrequireregistration.


Theongoingconflic ineasternUkrainecontinuestoexposeonlineactivistsandjournaliststothreats,andahighprofil murderwasreportedduringthecoverageperiodofthisreport.

OnJuly20,2016,PavelSheremet,aveteranBelarusianjournalistworkingforUkraine’sUkrayinska Pravdawebsite,waskilledinacarbombexplosioninKyiv.77Sheremetcoveredstatecorruptionandtheconflic intheeastforthewebsite,amongothertopics;hehadenduredstatepressureandjailtimeduringacareerthatspannedBelarus,Russia,andUkraine.Sheremet’scolleaguesatUkrayinska Pravdabelievehewasmurderedinretributionforhisprofessionalactivity.78Thecaseremainedunsolvedinmid-2017.

Otherjournalistsfacedviolenceforreportingoncorruptiononline.InMarch2017,securityguardsoutsidethemansionoftheheadoftheZaporizhzhyaregionalgovernmentattackedjournalistswhowerefilmin fortheonlineanti-corruptionplatformNashi Groshi(OurMoney),damagingtheir

74 LawofUkraineonOperativeInvestigativeActivity,http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2135-12.AccessedAug1,2016.75 NCCI,RulesforActivitiesintheSphereofTelecommunications.76 OlegShynkarenko,Зашморгнаінтернет[ANooseontheInternet],INSIDER,January8,2014,http://www.theinsider.ua/business/52bac42dd8f4d/.77 ChristopherMiller,“ProminentBelarusian-BornJournalistPavelSheremetKilledInKyivCarBlast,”Radio Liberty,July20,2016,http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-journalist-pavel-sheremet-killed-car-bomb/27868777.html.78 AlecLuhn,“CarbombkillspioneeringjournalistPavelSheremetinKiev,”TheGuardian,July20,2016,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/20/ukraine-journalist-pavel-sheremet-killed-kiev-car-bombing.

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equipment.79

Journalistsreportingontheconflic faceretaliationfrombothUkrainiannationalistpartisanforcesandRussian-backedseparatists.Bothsidesusedthetacticknownasdoxing,deliberatelypublishingthetarget’spersonalinformationtoencourageharassment.

InAugust2016,agroupofUkrainiannationalistactivistscallingthemselvesMyrotvorets(Peacemaker)updatedapubliclistcontainingtheleakedcontactdetailsofthousandsofjournalistswhowereaccreditedtoreportintheself-proclaimedDonetskPeople’sRepublic,80labellingthemas“accomplicesofterrorists.”81Journalistsonthelistsaidtheexposureobstructedtheireffort toreportobjectivelyontheconflict andseveralreceivedthreats.82Thedoxingcausedwidespreadconsternationamongtheinternationalmediacommunity,83butmetwithlittlecriticismfromUkrainianofficial Some,includingMinisterofInternalAffair ArsenAvakov,applaudedthemove.ProsecutorsinKyivinvestigatedtheleaks,thoughnoprogresswasreported,andthelistremainedavailableonlineinmid-2017.

Russian-backedseparatistsalsopublishedalistofjournalistsdeemed“UkrainianPropagandists”ontheseparatistnewswebsiteTribunalinDecember2016,includingleakedcopiesofthejournalists’photosandpresscards.84

Foreigncorrespondentswerealsoharassedinthepastyear.InFebruary2017,auser-generatedsectionoftheonlineUkrainiannewsoutletKorrespondentpublishedpersonaldetailsaboutforeignjournalists,includingtheirlicenseplatesandtransportationroutesintheconflic zone.TheinformationwassubsequentlyrepostedonUkrayinskyy Vybir(UkrainainChoice),apro-RussianonlineplatformheadedbyViktorMedvedchuk,afriendofRussianpresidentVladimirPutin.85TheinformationwasremovedfrombothplatformsaftermediaNGOscomplained.

Othervulnerablegroupshavebeensubjecttoonlineabuse,sometimesbecausetheirownonlinebehaviororconnectionshelpedassailantstoidentifythemasatarget.LGBTI(lesbian,gay,bisexual,transgender,orintersex)peoplehavebeenbaitedonsocialmediaandluredtoin-personmeetingswheretheywerebeaten.Theattackershavebeenknowntopostvideofootageoftheincidentsonline,forcingvictimstostatetheirname,address,andotherpersonaldetails.EntiregroupsonsocialmediaplatformVKontaktearedevotedto“exposing”LGBTIpeople.Participantsinthegroupstendtoconflat LGBTIpeopleandpedophiles,justifyingtheharmtheyinflict 86

79 “ОхоронаголовиЗапорізькоїОДАнапаланажурналістів«Нашихгрошей”,”(SecurityguardsoftheheadofZaporizhzhyaoblaststateadministrationattackedjournalistsfrom“Ourgroshi”),InstituteofMassInformation,March21,2017,http://bit.ly/2oVYWid.80 Миротворец”оприлюднивновийсписокжурналістів,”(“Myrotvorets”publishedanewlistofjournalists),Detector Media,August20,2016,http://bit.ly/2phJ7lF.81 AricToler,TetyanaLokot,“UkrainianActivistsLeakPersonalInformationofThousandsofWarReportersintheDonbas,”Global Voices,May11,2016,https://globalvoices.org/2016/05/11/ukrainian-activists-leak-personal-information-of-thousands-of-war-reporters-in-the-donbas/.82 HalyaCoynash,“UkrainianjournalistwhotwiceconfrontedPutintargetedbyMyrotvoretsCentrevigilantes,”HumanRightsinUkraine,May25,2016,http://www.khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1464127138.83 “Journalistsfigh backagainstUkrainianactivistswhodoxedthousandsofwarcorrespondentsintheDonbas,”Meduza,May11,2016,https://meduza.io/en/news/2016/05/11/open-letter-demands-ukrainian-action-over-publication-of-undercover-journalists-information.84 “СайтдонецькихсепаратистівпродовжуєпублікуватиперсональніданіжурналістівукраїнськихЗМІ,”(ThewebsiteofDonetskseparatistscontinuespublishingpersonaldataofUkrainianjournalists),Detector Media,December27,2016,http://bit.ly/2ofoM2q.85 GalaSkliarevskaya,“КтоизачемопубликовалмаршрутыпередвиженияжурналистоввзонеАТО?,”(Whoandwhypublishedroutesofjournalists’transportationintheATOarea?),Detector Media,March11,2017,http://bit.ly/2nYhL3u.86 https://globalvoices.org/2017/05/12/diversity-interrupted-anti-gay-crusades-mar-ukraines-tolerant-facade/

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Technical Attacks

Ukrainianbusiness,governmentwebsites,andnationalinfrastructurearefrequentlysubjecttocyberattack.ObserversnotethatmostoftheattacksappeartooriginateinRussia.Hackercollectiveslikethepro-RussianCyberBerkutandthenationalistUkrainianCyberForcesdefacedwebsitesandleakedinformationtodiscredittheirperceivedfoesduringthereportingperiod.InMarch2017,theUkrainianCyberForcesclaimedthatithadtaken173separatistwebsitesoffli inthreeyears,thoughitremainsunclearwhatmethodsthegroupused.87

Ukrainewassignificantl disruptedbyaransomwareattackinJune2017.Themalicioussoftware,dubbedPetya,encryptedentireharddrivesandrequestedpaymentinordertorestoreaccess.88ThevirusspreadacrossthecountryonJune27,theeveoftheanniversaryoftheadoptionofUkraine’sconstitution,destabilizingtelecommunicationscompanies,governmentministries,banks,andothervitalinfrastructure.Radiation-measuringsystemsatthesiteoftheChernobylnucleardisasterwerealsotemporarilyinhibitedbeforetheattackwascontainedonJune28.89Observersspeculatedthattheintentionoftheattackmayhavebeenpoliticalratherthanfinancial Ukrainiansecurityservicessaidthatthesoftwarelackedaneffectiv mechanismforsecuringransomfunds,indicatingthattherealpurposewastodestroydataanddisruptinstitutionsacrossUkraine,agoaltheyattributedtoRussia.90

PresidentPoroshenkohadpreviouslyaccusedRussiaofrunningacovertcyberwaragainstUkraine.InDecember2016,PoroshenkoclaimedthatRussiahadlaunchedatleastsixthousandcyberattacksagainstUkrainianstatewebsitesinthespanoftwomonths.91ThewebsitesoftheMinistryofFinanceandthestateTreasurywerereportedlyamongthoseaffected Ukrainianinfrastructurehasbeenconsistentlytargetedbycyberattacksinthepast,includingtherailwayservice,92thestateaviationservice,93andstateregistries.94PoroshenkoestablishedaNationalCybersecurityCoordinationCentrewithintheNationalSecurityandDefenseCounciltocounterexternalthreatsinearly2016.95

87 “Українськікібервійська”затрирокизаблокували173сайтитерористів,”(Ukrainiancyberforcesblocked173websitesofterroristsoverthecourseofthreeyears),Detector Media,March10,2017,http://bit.ly/2ofBooQ.88 “CyberattackhitsUkrainethenspreadsinternationally,”June27,20167,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/ransomware-hackers.html?mcubz=1&_r=0.89 “CyberattacksonUkrainiangovernmentandcorporatenetworkshalter,”Ukrinform,June28,2017,https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2255698-cyber-attack-on-ukrainian-government-and-corporate-networks-halted.html.90 “Ukrainepointsfinge atRussiansecurityservicesinrecentcyberattack,”Reuters,July1,2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-ukraine/ukraine-points-finge -at-russian-security-services-in-recent-cyber-attack-idUSKBN19M39P91 “Росіярозв’язалакібервійнупротиУкраїни-Порошенко,”(RussialaunchedacyberwaragainstUkraine-Poroshenko),TSN,December29,2016,http://bit.ly/2oW7UMJ.92 RomanHankevych,“Мінінфраструктуриназвалоорганізаторівхакерськоїатакинаінформаційнумережу

“Укрзалізниці”,”(MinistryofInfrastructurenamedorganizersofhackingattackoninformationnetworkof“Ukrzaliznytsia”),Zaxid.net,December15,2016,http://bit.ly/2ofS5lA.93 YuliyaPolikovska,“СайтиміністерстваінфраструктуриУкраїниіДержавіаслужбинепрацюють,”(WebsitesoftheMinistryofInfrastructureandStateAviationServicedonotwork), Zaxid.net,December16,2016,http://bit.ly/2nvi4GI.94 “ЖоднаDDoS-атаканадержреєстринебулауспішноюінепризвеладозміниданих,”(NoneoftheDDoS-attacksonstateregistrieswassuccessfulanddidn’taffec thedata), Interfax Ukraine,February13,2017,http://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/402947.html.95 MayaYarovaya,“ПорошенкоутвердилстратегиюкибербезопасностиУкраиныисозданиекоординационногоцентракибербезопасностиприСНБО”[Poroshenkofinalize Ukraine’scybersecuritystrategyandcreationofcoordinationcenterforcybersecuritywithinNSDC],AIN,March17,2016,http://ain.ua/2016/03/17/638654.

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