[G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937.]GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

SYLLABUS1.PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION. — While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial function (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to ". . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)2.ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS. — The term "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenge act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction."3.ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS. — The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or the prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)4.CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. — What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.5.ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052. — The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provision of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."6.ID.; ID.; ID. — Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when

the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase ""advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.7.ID.; ID.; ID. — The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people." The stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.8.ID.; ID.; ID. — While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

D E C I S I O NLAUREL, J p:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing as follows:

"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36, and 50 centavos." the said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to ". . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions," (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance

of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino People. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

 Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. this Act is as follows:

No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:"SECTION 1.The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the cost of plates, and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto."SECTION 2.The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."SECTION 3.This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury."SECTION 4.This act shall take effect on its approval."Approved, February 21, 1933."It will be seen that the Act appropriate the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's

complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications in the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act. No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. "Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.]ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO,

Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of said council, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day as per Resolution No. 6 which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused to return custody of the image to the council until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. The parish priest and his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state. freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church. The lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution.

On petition for review, the Supreme Court held, that the absence of the Kabataang Barangay chairman, despite due notice from the sessions of the barangay council, did not render the resolutions then adopted void since there was a quorum; and that the questioned resolutions did not contravene any constitutional provision since the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money, and in connection with a socio-religious affair, the celebration of which is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.Judgment of the lower court affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; LOCAL AUTONOMY; BARANGAY; BARANGAY COUNCIL; COMPOSITION THEREOF. — The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall be ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and functions as a barangay councilman.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE IN SESSION OF DULY NOTIFIED MEMBER DOES NOT RENDER RESOLUTION ADOPTED DURING SAID SESSION VOID IF THERE WAS A QUORUM. — In the case at bar, the absence of the barangay youth chairman from the sessions of the barangay council when the questioned resolutions were adopted, did not render said resolutions void, because there was a quorum and he was duly notified of said sessions.

3.ID.; SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; BARANGAY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR PURCHASE OF SAINT'S IMAGE WITH PRIVATE FUNDS IN CONNECTION WITH BARANGAY FIESTA, CONSTITUTIONAL. — Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

4.ID.; ID.; BARANGAY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION DESIGNATING CUSTODIAN OF SAINT'S IMAGE WHICH WAS BOUGHT WITH COUNCIL'S PRIVATE FUNDS IN CONNECTION WITH BARRIO FIESTA, VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL. — Resolution No. 6 of the Barangay Council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, adopted in connection with Resolution No. 5 (providing for the purchase of an image of San Vicente Ferrer with funds from solicitations and cash donations) and which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, the chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next fiesta, and that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day, does not involve at all, even remotely or indirectly, the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church, contrary to the contradictory positions of the petitioners — petitioner Garces swearing that the said

resolutions favored the Catholic Church, and petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swearing that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could sec the image in the church only once a year during the fiesta. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña's claim that it belongs to the church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas. If the council chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.

5. ID.; ID.; BARANGAY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE HIRING OF A LAWYER TO FILE REPLEVIN CASE AND APPOINTING REPRESENTATIVE IN SAID CASE; VALID.— The barangay council of Valencia has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image of San Vicente Ferrer, which is its private property, from the parish priest of Valenzuela by enacting Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image, as well as Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case.

6.ID.; ID.; NOT ALL GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY HAVING RELIGIOUS TINT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTION. — Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. (Sec Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201)

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J p:

This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. Cdpr

On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia."

That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. It provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente

Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations" (Exh. A or 6).

On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.

It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day

Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangay general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).

 Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos (Exh. F-1, 3 and 4).

On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. cdphil

A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition.

Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.

Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.

Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmeña did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to

have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9).

The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). In his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).

Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).

The lower court dismissed the complaint. It upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners appealed under Republic Act No. 5440.

The petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because Isidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions. LibLex

Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.

Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).

The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).

The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and functions as a barangay councilman.

In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d], Exh. 1).

Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed.

The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium" (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution). prcd

That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners' argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church.

The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmeña, the parish priest.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).

We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. It is not a microcosmic test case on those issues.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. It would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña's claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. cdrep

If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs.

Under that law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.

The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.

 Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps.

It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed. llcd

The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil. 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held as trustee.

Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs.

[G.R. No. L-9637. April 30, 1957.]AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee.City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Juan Nabong for appellant.Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa for appellee.

SYLLABUS1.STATUTES; SIMULTANEOUS REPEAL AND RE-

ENACTMENT; EFFECT OF REPEAL UPON RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES WHICH ACCRUED UNDER THE ORIGINAL STATUTE. — Where the old statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enacts all or certain portions of the pre-existing law, the majority view holds that the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption. (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 322). In the case at bar, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 of the City of Manila were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, Subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 13, 1949, by section 13, Subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The only essential difference between these two provisions is that while Subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under Subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding Section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of authorities aforementioned, City ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 are still in force and effect.

2.MUNICIPAL TAX; RETAIL DEALERS IN GENERAL MERCHANDISE; ORDINANCE PRESCRIBING TAX NEED NOT BE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT TO BE EFFECTIVE. — The business of "retail dealers in general merchandise" is expressly enumerated in subsection (o), section 18 of Republic Act No. 409: hence, an ordinance prescribing a municipal tax on said business does not have to be approved by the President to be effective, as it is not among those businesses referred to in subsection (ii) Section 18 of the same Act subject to the approval of the President.

3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; DISSEMINATION OF RELIGIOUS INFORMATION, WHEN MAY BE RESTRAINED; PAYMENT OF LICENSE FEE, IMPAIRS FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION. — The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar, plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and

sales of bibles and religious articles. The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, and required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license. Plaintiff protested against this requirement and claimed that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. Held: It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot be applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. Upon the other hand, City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff society involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

D E C I S I O N

FELIX, J p:

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. The defendant-appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together

with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same (Annex B). To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the premises, on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which the said fees were being collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action. In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 paid under protest, together with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just and equitable.

Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often- repeated ordinances.

Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersigned attorneys and respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:1.That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral, Manila, Bibles, New Testaments, bible portions and bible concordance in English and other foreign languages imported by it from the United States as well as Bibles, New Testaments and bible portions in the local dialects imported and/or purchased locally; that from the fourth quarter of 1945 to the first quarter of 1953 inclusive the sales made by the plaintiff were as follows:2.That the parties hereby reserve the right to present evidence of other facts not herein stipulated.WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearing so that the parties may present further evidence on their behalf (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-16)".When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other

things, that it has been in existence in the Philippines since 1899, and that its parent society is in New York, United States of America; that its contiguous real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that it

was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does the American Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work. Regarding plaintiff's contention of lack of profit in the sale of bibles, defendant retorts that the admissions of plaintiff-appellant's lone witness who testified on cross-examination that bibles bearing the price of 70 cents each from plaintiff-appellant's New York office are sold here by plaintiff- appellant at P1.30 each; those bearing the price of $4.50 each are sold here at P10 each; those bearing the price of $7 each are sold here at P15 each; and those bearing the price of $11 each are sold here at P22 each, clearly show that plaintiff's contention that it never makes any profit from the sale of its bible, is evidently untenable.

 After hearing the Court rendered judgment, the last part of which is as follows:

"As may be seen from the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that this case should be dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merits, with costs against the plaintiff."Not satisfied with this verdict plaintiff took up the matter to the Court

of Appeals which certified the case to Us for the reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involved only questions of law.

Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:1.In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not unconstitutional;2.In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic Act No. 409;3.In not holding that an ordinance providing for percentage taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines; and

4.In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.The issues. — As may be seen from the preceding statement of the

case, the issues involved in the present controversy may be reduced to the following: (1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar.

Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides that:

"(7)No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends

that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.

Before entering into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, We shall first consider the provisions of the questioned ordinances in relation to their application to the sale of bibles, etc. by appellant. The records show that by letter of May 29, 1953 (Annex A), the City Treasurer required plaintiff to secure a Mayor's permit in connection with the society's alleged business of distributing and selling bibles, etc. and to pay permit dues in the sum of P35 for the period covered in this litigation, plus the sum of P35 for compromise on account of plaintiff's failure to secure the permit required by Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila, as amended. This Ordinance is of general application and not particularly directed against institutions like the plaintiff, and it does not contain any provisions whatsoever prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3000 reads as follows:

"SEC. 1.PERMITS NECESSARY. — It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to conduct or engage in any of the businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this Ordinance or other businesses, trades, or occupations for which a permit is required for the proper supervision and enforcement of existing laws and ordinances governing the sanitation, security, and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in the business specified in said section 3 hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A PERMIT

THEREFOR FROM THE MAYOR AND THE NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THE CITY TREASURER."The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is

not particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit is required therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in the business of the plaintiff. However, section 3 of Ordinance 3000 contains item No. 79, which reads as follows:

"79.All other businesses, trades or occupations not mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax . . . P5.00".Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the

power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila required

the society to pay from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 1st quarter of 1953 in the sum of P5,821.45, including the sum of P50 as compromise, Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028 prescribes the following:

"SEC. 1.FEES. — Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as amended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of the businesses or occupations below enumerated, quarterly, license fees based on gross sales or receipts realized during the preceding quarter in accordance with the rates herein prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any business or occupation for the first time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for the first quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the business as indicated herein for the corresponding business or occupation.

xxx xxx xxxGROUP 2. — Retail dealers in new (not yet used)

merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax, such as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise; (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of . . . books, including stationery.

xxx xxx xxxAs may be seen, the license fees required to be paid quarterly- in

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, are not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers in general merchandise" which, it is alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles, books, etc.

Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code which includes section 2444, subsection (m-2) of said legal body, as amended by Act No. 3659,

approved on December 8, 1929, empowers the Municipal Board of the City of Manila:

"(M-2)To tax and fix the license fee on (a) dealers in new automobiles or accessories or both, and (b) retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax.

"For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall be classified as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise, and (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of (a) textiles . . . (e) books, including stationery paper and office supplies . . . PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the combined total tax of any debtor or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under these subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned herein, SHALL NOT BE IN EXCESS OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS PER ANNUM."

and appellee's counsel maintains that City Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, were enacted in virtue of the power that said Act No. 3669 conferred upon the City of Manila. Appellant, however, contends that said ordinances are no longer in force and effect as the law under which they were promulgated has been expressly repealed by Section 102 of Republic Act No. 409 passed on June 18, 1949, known as the Revised Manila Charter.

Passing upon this point the lower Court categorically stated that Republic Act No. 409 expressly repealed the provisions of Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code but in the opinion of the trial Judge, although Section 244 (m-2) of the former Manila Charter and section 18 (o) of the new seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent was expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in both legal provisions and, consequently, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, are to be considered as still in full force and effect uninterruptedly up to the present.

"Often the legislature, instead of simply amending the preexisting statute, will repeal the old statute in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enact all or certain portions of the preexisting law. Of course, the problem created by this sort of legislative action involves mainly the effect of the repeal upon rights and liabilities which accrued under the original statute. Are those rights and liabilities destroyed or preserved? The authorities are divided as to the effect of simultaneous repeals and re- enactments. Some adhere to the view that the rights and liabilities accrued under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes from which they sprang are actually terminated, even though for only a very short period of time. Others, and they seem to be in the majority, refuse to accept this view of the situation, and consequently maintain that all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-enactment

neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption". (Crawford-Statutory Construction, Sec. 322).

 Appellant's counsel states that section 18 (o) of Republic Act No. 409

introduces a new and wider concept of taxation and is so different from the provisions of Section 2444(m-2) that the former cannot be considered as a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the latter. We have quoted above the provisions of section 2444 (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and We shall now copy hereunder the provisions of Section 18, subdivision (o) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as follows:

"(o)To tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax under the provisions of this section.

Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance.

For purposes of this section, the term 'General merchandise' shall include poultry and livestock, agricultural products, fish and other allied products."The only essential difference that We find between these two

provisions that may have any bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.

Plaintiff, however, argues that the questioned ordinances, to be valid, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines as per section 18, subsection (ii) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as follows:

"(ii) To tax, license and regulate any business, trade or occupation being conducted within the City of Manila, not otherwise enumerated in the preceding subsections, including percentage taxes based on gross sales or receipts, subject to the approval of the PRESIDENT, except amusement taxes."

but this requirement of the President's approval was not contained in section 2444 of the former Charter of the City of Manila under which Ordinance No. 2529 was promulgated. Anyway, as stated by appellee's counsel, the business of "retail dealers in general merchandise" is expressly enumerated in subsection (o), section 18 of Republic Act No. 409; hence, an ordinance prescribing a municipal tax on said business does not have to be approved by the President to be effective, as it is not among those referred to in said subsection (ii). Moreover, the questioned ordinances are still in force, having been promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under the authority granted to it by law.

The question that now remains to be determined is whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society, plaintiff herein.

With regard to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028, appellant contends that it is unconstitutional and illegal because it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant.

Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as 'a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator' (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201). It has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature.

"In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring that a license be obtained before a person could canvass or solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or merchandise cannot be made to apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about from door to door distributing literature and soliciting people to 'purchase' certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The 'price' of the books was

twenty-five cents each, the 'price' of the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that in making the solicitations there was a request for additional 'contribution' of twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each for the pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books were even donated in case interested persons were without funds.On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were engaged in commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court continued:'We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean vs. American Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . .It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.'

Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an official or manager even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S. 501) or by the United States itself as held in the case of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and religion occupies a preferred position as against the constitutional right of property owners.'When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of property here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute.'" (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 304-306).Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the

National Internal Revenue Code, provides: 

"SEC. 27.EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. — The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such —

"(e)Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . Provided however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code;"Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has

exempted the plaintiff from this tax and says that such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not fall under the above legal provisions.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free

exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. In the case of Coleman vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was elucidated as follows:

"An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed a nuisance and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin, does not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system."It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered

unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing defendant to return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Reyes, A., J., concurs in the result.

[G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996.]IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ, respondents.

SYLLABUS1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; ACCORDED A PREFERRED STATUS. — Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN BE REGULATED BY THE STATE. — We reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today.

3.ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH; PRIOR RESTRAINTS, ENJOINED. — Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down.

4.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION; T.V. SERIES CONTAINING CRITICISM OF SOME OF DEEPLY HELD DOGMAS AND TENETS OF OTHER RELIGION, NOT INDECENT, CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS. — The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking" other religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B," "C," "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under sections 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and

interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

5.ID.; ID.; T.V. SERIES CONTAINING "ATTACKS AGAINST ANOTHER RELIGION," NOT A GROUND PROHIBITING BROADCAST." — The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.

6.CRIMINAL LAW; IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS; SHOWS WHICH OFFEND ANY RACE OR RELIGION; WORD "OFFEND" NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH "ATTACK." — It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any religion" as a ground allegedly ". . . because section 3(c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity material which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word "offend."

7.ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE UTILIZED TO JUSTIFY PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF SPEECH. — Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.

8.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; GROUND FOR RESTRAINTS. — In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

9.ID.; ID.; ID.; HYPOTHETICAL FEARS OF SUBSTANTIVE AND IMMINENT EVIL, NOT VALID GROUND. — The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

10.ID.; ID.; ID.; CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER; RULE APPLY TO SPEECHES AND ATTACKS AGAINST OTHER RELIGIONS. — It is suggested we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear and present danger test undergone permutations. Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.

11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE APPLIES TO VIDEO TAPES THAT ARE PRE-TAPED. — It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotape that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.

12.ID.; CONGRESS; MAY GRANT ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER TO PREVIEW AND CLASSIFY T.V. PROGRAMS. — We are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our court.

D E C I S I O NPUNO, J p:This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board for Motion Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.

Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."

Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast.

On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC, NCR, Quezon City. 1 Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.

On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties orally argued and then marked their documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as its exhibits, viz.:

(1)Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows: 2

REMARKS:

There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very surprising for this program to show series of Catholic ceremonies and also some religious sects and using it in their discussion about the bible. There are remarks which are direct criticism which affect other religions.

Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more opinions.

(2)Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows: 3

REMARKS:

This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible.

We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faith.

(3)Exhibit "B," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 119, as follows: 4

REMARKS:

The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so.

This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship and decision.

(4)Exhibit "C," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 121 as follows: 5

REMARKS:

I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion.

I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong, which they clearly present in this episode.

(5)Exhibit "D," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 128 as follows: 6

REMARKS:

The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the Catholic and Protestant's beliefs.

We suggest a second review.

(6)Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner's block time contract with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated September 1, 1992. 7

(7)Exhibit "F," petitioner's Airtime Contract with Island Broadcasting Corporation. 8

(8)Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed to Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the showing of petitioner's Series No. 129. The letter reads in part:

"xxx xxx xxx

The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression under Article III, section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.

We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well as studied the passages found by MTRCB to be objectionable and we find no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee."

(9)Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V. Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board x-rating petitioner's Series No. 128.

On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:

(1)Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992 allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under parental guidance.

(2)Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.

(3)Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era Broadcasting Service which reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

In the matter of your television show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" Series No. 119, please be informed that the Board was constrained to deny your show a permit to exhibit. The material involved constitute an attack against another religion which is expressly prohibited by law. Please be guided in the submission of future shows.

After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on petitioner's bond of P10,000.00.

The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. 9 The pre-trial briefs show that the parties' evidence is basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several times as the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a Judgment, 10 on December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of 'Ang Iglesia ni Cristo' program.

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing 'Ang Iglesia ni Cristo' program.

SO ORDERED."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration 11 praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed the motion. 12 On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered: 13

 

"xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second portion of the Court's Order dated December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing 'Ang Iglesia ni Cristo' program is hereby deleted and set aside. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program 'Ang Iglesia ni Cristo'."

Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied. 14

On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs."

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises the following issues:

IWHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 'ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO' PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE 'ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO' PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.

IIIWHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.

IVWHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 'ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO,' A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.

The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under PD No. 1986. Its section 3 pertinently provides:

"Sec. 3Powers and Functions. — The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

b)To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export.

c)To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs

and publicity materials, subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:

i)Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the economic and/or political stability of the State;

ii)Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people, their government and/or duly constituted authorities.

iii)Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;

iv)Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or pornography;

v)Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;

vi)Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;

vii)Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are sub-judice in nature (emphasis ours).

The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime."

Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed."

We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 16 We have also laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist: 17

Religious Profession and Worship

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

(1)Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul — in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. 'Men may believe what they cannot prove.' Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.

(2)Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: 'The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.

Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The police power can be validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband.

We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence

of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

 It is also petitioner's submission that the respondent appellate court gravely erred when it affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for ". . . criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible." They suggested that the program should only explain petitioner's ". . . own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths." Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance . . ." Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated ". . . for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. . . . (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong . . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably recommended because it ". . . outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs." On second review, it was x-rated because of its "unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the bible." 18 In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.

First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV series for "attacking" other religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the

evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B, "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, 20 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are prominent in church or state or even to false statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history that inspite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a side-glance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order

prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. 21 This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.

It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any religion" as a ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the Executive Department espouses this view. Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:

"xxx xxx xxx

"However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television program of INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the standards of censorship, to wit: 'immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people or with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or of a wrong' as determined by the Board, 'applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard.' As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INC's television program to 'previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious program' makes mention of beliefs and practices of other religion.' On the face of the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said program by the Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to be within the contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law." (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 22 this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 23 we further ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger."

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US, 24 as follows: ". . . the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive speech. 25 Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing. 26 The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950's when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States involving communist conspiracy. 27 In Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation that ". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 28 when the High Court restored in the test the imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished. 29 Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. 30 Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to

the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.

 It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.

Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that . . . the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies." The same submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.

This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in our jurisdiction. Its seedbed was laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in the 1962 case of Manual Enterprise v. Day. 31 By 1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland 32 was ready to hold that "the teaching of cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." 33

While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this set-up in Sotto vs. Ruiz, 34 viz.:

"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons posses no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character.

On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications from the mails, in the exercise of executive power, is extremely delicate in nature and can only be justified where the statute is unequivocably applicable to the supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any publication for the

mails, the object should be not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other FUNDAMENTAL right of the people. This is the more true with reference to articles supposedly libelous than to other particulars of the law, since whether an article is or is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the courts in case he had abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex parte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing Co. vs. Murray [1916], 23-Fed., 773)

As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases coming from the United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States Postmaster-General), that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates & Guilid Co. vs. Payne [1904], 194 U.S., 106; Smith vs. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S., 63; Masses Pub. Co. vs. Patten [1917], 246 Fed., 24. But see David vs. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909, announcing a somewhat different doctrine and relied upon by the Attorney-General).

To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the proposition whether or not courts alone are competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected. 35 The issue involves highly arguable policy considerations and can be better addressed by our legislators.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 95770. March 1, 1993.]EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU

SYLLABUS1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP; FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ENTITLED TO HIGHEST PRIORITY AND AMPLEST PROTECTION: TWO-FOLD ASPECT THEREOF. — Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531). "The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SOLE JUSTIFICATION FOR PRIOR RESTRAINT OR LIMITATION ON EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; CASE AT BAR. — "The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. . . . After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barneta, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): ". . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." "Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . — assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at

the expense of religious liberty. A desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.).

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEES' EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE OF CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENT ON ACCOUNT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS VALID SIMILAR EXEMPTION ACCORDED JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES WITH REGARD TO OBSERVANCE OF FLAG CEREMONY VALID. — In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group. ". . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some 'compelling state interests' intervenes." (Sherbert vs. Berner 374 U.S. Ct. 1790.) We hold that a similar exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non. vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).

4.ID.; RIGHT TO FREE PUBLIC EDUCATION; EXPULSION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES FROM SCHOOL FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF FLAG CEREMONY A VIOLATION THEREOF. — The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

D E C I S I O N

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

These two special civil actions for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were consolidated because they raise essentially the same issue: whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled

from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

In G.R. No. 95770, "Rose Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers," in the Philippines.

In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:

"SECTION 1.All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National anthem."SECTION 2.The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided.SECTION 3.Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation."In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution responsible for such failure."

The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:

"RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

"1.The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public VFand private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flagstaff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a commanding position in front of the building or within the compound."

"2.Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner:

"a.Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.

"b.The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing the hat over the heart. Those without hat may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.

"c.Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison the following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular

version), which may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which are intended for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.

"English Version"

I love the Philippines.It is the land of my birth;It is the home of my people.It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;I will obey the rules of my school;I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.

xxx xxx xxx."

Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control (p. 10, Rollo).

 This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.

The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960). This Court in the Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students, thus:

"The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no

more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar."

"In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship."

"The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirements still disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority."

"The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority." (pp. 2-3.)

Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna, as follows:

"The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not being a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion." (Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.).

Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on September 21, 1988 (one year after its publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83, No. 38 of September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative cachet to the ruling in Gerona, thus:

"5.Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation."

However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above provision of the new Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1255 and the implementing orders of the DECS.

In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr./Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision in Gerona, issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770) directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational Institutions as follows:

"1.Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers, pupils, students, and school employees in public schools who refuse to salute the Philippine flag or participate in the daily flag ceremony because of some religious belief."

2.Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and Regulations) but also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained effort to inculcate patriotism and nationalism."

3.Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in any manner whatever a justification for not saluting the Philippine flag or not participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Philippine says:

"'The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.' (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 105 Phil. 11.)

"4.As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance, the Supreme Court asserts:

"'But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter.' (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.).

"5.Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the daily flag ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be considered removed from the service after due process."

6.In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme Court has this to say:

"'If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it! Having elected not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools.' (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 15.)

"7.School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those who choose not to participate in flag ceremony or salute the Philippine flag." (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770; Emphasis supplied.).

Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887), but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770).

In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which reveal the following:

"After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses, parents on October 2, 1990 and yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philippines during Flag Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic Act No. 1265, this Office hereby orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah's Witness pupils from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.

"xxx xxx xxx.

"This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated November 17, 1989 by virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955 dated July 21, 1955 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265 and Supreme Court Decision of a case 'Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and Appellants vs. The Honorable Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against their favor." (p. 149, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)

In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public schools." (p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.).

"1st Indorsement

DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II

Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.

"Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo Elementary School with the information that this office is sad to order the dropping of Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades III and IV pupils respectively from the roll since they opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law (R.A. 1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Philippines 15). However, should they change their mind to respect and follow the Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted."

"(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG

District Supervisor"

(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)

The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School, Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan Primary School and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu, upon order of then Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education Isidro Cariño but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21, Rollo.)

 

The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.

On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these Special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The petitioners pray that:

"c.Judgment be rendered:

"i.declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners from their respective schools;

"ii.prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their classes or otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and

"iii.compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their respective schools." (p. 41, Rollo.)

and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit them to their respective classes.

On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately readmit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this Court (p. 57, Rollo).

The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to be impleaded as respondents in these cases.

On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98, Rollo) defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:

1.Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social school children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.2.There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that the DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion and worship.3.The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of country, for which the flag stands.4.The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.5.The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.6.State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having scriptural basis.7.The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).

Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year-old decision of this Court in Gerona upholding the flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.

It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to reexamine it. The idea that one may be compelled

to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).

Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).

"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).

Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

"The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.

The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:

"[T]he flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism — a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school

population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption." (Gerona, p. 24.)

has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.

As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barneta, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):

". . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."

"Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . — assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.).

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and

promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group.

". . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some 'compelling state interests' intervenes." (Sherbert vs. Berner 374 U.S. Ct. 1790.)

We hold that a similar exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).

Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained freedom and sovereignty of our nation.

Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not

be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ ., concur.

[G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.]ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein

represented by PROF. ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the

Philippines, herein represented by HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS, herein represented by its

Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; ACCORDED PREFERRED STATUS BY THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. — Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLASSIFYING A FOOD PRODUCT AS HALAL IS A RELIGIOUS FUNCTION; CASE AT BAR. — Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INFRINGEMENT THEREOF IS JUSTIFIED ONLY BY THE PREVENTION OF AN IMMEDIATE AND GRAVE DANGER TO SECURITY AND WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY. — Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that

food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. CIScaA

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J p:

Before us is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.

Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) 1 and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal 2 certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.

Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an 3 and the Sunnah 4 for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.

On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. 6 As a

result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.

Hence, this petition for prohibition.

Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. 7 It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.

Petitioner also maintains that the respondents violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "(n)o law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be passed." After the subject EO was implemented, food manufacturers with existing contracts with petitioner ceased to obtain certifications from the latter.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the subject EO violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution which respectively provide:

 ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS

Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.

People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.

Sec. 16. The rights of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate, the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and without even consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before it became effective.

We grant the petition.

OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." 8 OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. 9

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 10

Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. By delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks to protect and promote the muslim Filipinos' right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them.

We disagree. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. 11 If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human

consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims.

Section 48(4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) the power to inspect slaughtered animals intended for human consumption to ensure the safety of the meat released in the market. Another law, RA 7394, otherwise known as "The Consumer Act of 1992," gives to certain government departments the duty to protect the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for business and industry. 12 To this end, a food product, before its distribution to the market, is required to secure the Philippine Standard Certification Mark after the concerned department inspects and certifies its compliance with quality and safety standards. 13

One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFD) of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article 22 of said law, BFD has the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations fixing and establishing a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a standard of quality and a standard of fill of containers for food. The BFD also ensures that food products released in the market are not adulterated. 14

Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales acts or practices as defined in Article 50. 15 DTI also enforces compulsory labeling and fair packaging to enable the consumer to obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality and quantity of the contents of consumer products and to facilitate his comparison of the value of such products. 16

With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of muslim and non-muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. Of great help are the provisions on labeling of food products (Articles 74 to 85) 17 of RA 7394. In fact, through these labeling provisions, the State ably informs the consuming public of the contents of food products released in the market. Stiff sanctions are imposed on violators of said labeling requirements.

Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids muslim consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile, BFD ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality standards. Then, through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, Muslim consumers are adequately apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according to their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place by the State to ensure that the muslim consumers' right to health is protected. The halal certifications issued

by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for muslim consumption.

We do not share respondents' apprehension that the absence of a central administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact that muslim consumers can actually verify through the labels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the concerned certifying organization.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2001, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same. SO ORDERED.