Freedom of Expression and Trademark Law: Assessing the ...

1 Center for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI),

Strasbourg University

Freedom of Expression and Trademark Law:

Assessing the Impact of External Boundaries

Leonardo Machado Pontes

PhD candidate

[email protected]

Prof. Dr. C. Geiger

Prof. Dr. D. Barbosa

Ninth WIPO Advanced Intellectual

Property Research Forum: Towards a

Flexible Application of Intellectual

Property Law – A Closer Look at

Internal and External Balancing Tools

26-28 May 2015

2 Center for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI),

Strasbourg University

I– THE SUPREME COURT’S FULL AND

INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY CASE LAW

II– THE COMMERCIAL/NONCOMMERCIAL

SPEECH DICHOTOMY TO TRADEMARK CASE

LAW

III– THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’

MARGIN OF APPRECIATION SCRUTINY TO

POLITICAL, ARTISTIC AND COMMERCIAL

EXPRESSION

IV– THE DECISION OF THE CJEU IN JOHAN

DECKMYN V. HELENA VANDERSTEEN

V– THE COMMERCIAL/NONCOMMERCIAL

EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND FRENCH

TRADEMARK CASE LAW

Center for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI),

Strasbourg University 3



“[T]hus the ‘[m]isleading commercial speech’

regulated by the Lanham Act ‘is beyond the

protective reach of the First Amendment’...

Moreover, the content-neutral prohibitions of

the Lanham Act against false and misleading

advertising ‘do not arouse First Amendment

concerns that justify alteration of the normal

standard for ... relief.’... First Amendment

concerns for commercial speech do not justify

altering standards or burdens of proof in

Lanham Act cases.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. New

Regina Corp. 664 F.Supp. 753,767-

68(S.D.N.Y.,1987).



Case C-201/13, Johan Deckmyn v. Helena Vandersteen [2014] OJ 2015 C16/3.

Paras. 21 and 24 “[r]easonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work itself.” “[d]oes therefore not lead to the scope of that provision being restricted by conditions, such as those set out in paragraph 21.”



“Core” commercial

speech

“[n]othing more than proposing an economic transaction”

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,

Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)

“[e]xpression related solely to the economic

interests of the speaker and its audience.”

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public

Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)

“Peripheral”

Commercial

Speech

(1) an advertising format;

(2) reference to a specific product;

(3) an underlying economic motive of the

speaker.

Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp., 463

U.S. 60, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2888 (1983)

Pure

Artistic/Political

Speech

Speech

spectrum

“inextricably intertwined test”

Riley v. National Federation of

the Blind of North Carolina,

487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667

(1988)

full constitutional scrutiny

intermediate scrutiny

Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct.

2618, 2639 U.S (2014)



[C]ommercial/noncommercial distinction is

potentially dispositive. If the ad is properly

classified as commercial speech, then it may be

regulated, normal liability rules apply (statutory

and common law), and the battle moves to the

merits of Jordan’s claims. If, on the other hand,

the ad is fully protected expression, then Jordan

agrees with Jewel that the First Amendment

provides a complete defense and his claims

cannot proceed.

Michael Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. 743

F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2014)



Intermediate scrutiny

“Enhanced” Central Hudson test

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service

Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)

(1) if an act of speech is lawful and not misleading it receives

First Amendment protection;

(2) the Government can then regulate it only if the regulation

serves a substantial interest of the governed;

(3) if the regulation directly promotes this substantial interest,

either through direct and material advancement, the burden

to show that the harm is “real” and that restriction will

alleviate the harm to a “material degree”;

(4) only if the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to

serve this particular interest, the Government is required to

take numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to

the restriction, in other to achieve the “reasonable fit”

between the government’s end and its means.

Eldenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.

761, 770-71 (1993)

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. 514

U.S. 476, 487 (1995)

City of Cincinnati v.

Discovery Network, Inc. 507

U.S. 410, 418, n. 13 (1993)

Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as

Commercial Speech Regulation, 58

SCL REV. 737 (2006).

Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive

Trademarks and the First Amendment,

70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2002).

“Content/neutral-based”

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.

Ct. 2653, 2666 (2011)



[…] courts apply one of several tests,

referred to in the legal discourse as

“balancing tests,” that are unique to

intellectual property-related cases, to

determine whether the First

Amendment limits a right of publicity

claim in that context. Courts do not

tend to apply strict or intermediate

scrutiny tests when addressing a First

Amendment defense to intellectual

property-related claims, such as the

right of publicity.

Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 808

F.Supp.2d 757, 769 (D.N.J. 2011).

Even content-based commercial speech restrictions to

intellectual property may receive less First Amendment

protection – an exception to Sorrell.



Bolger factors

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights

Com'n., 165 F.3d 692, 709-10 (9th

Cir. 1999)

“no more than propose a commercial transaction”

test as the true and unique test to separate

commercial from noncommercial

Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v.

Activision Blizzard, Inc., 2014

WL 6655844 (N.D.Cal., 2014)

classical definition + Rogers v. Grimaldi

CPC Intern., Inc. v. Skippy Inc.,

214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000)

Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 93

Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 860-61 (Cal.

App. 1 Dist. 2000)

commercial speech supplemented by comments

related to the marketed product comments

on the trademarked or plaintiff’s actions or

image as a corporation

Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. v.

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. CV–

89–5463–RSWL(JRX), Not

Reported in F. Supp., 1991 WL

352619, at *5 (C.D.Cal.,1991)

Riley factors

merit attention, but…



Trademark parody

adequate alternative

avenues of

communication test

Rogers v. Grimaldi

“No satires”

Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini

Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183

(E.D.N.Y. 1972)

Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders

v. Pussycat Cinema 604 F. 2d

200 (2d Cir. 1979)

General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa

Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036

(D. Mass. 1979)

Harley Davidson, Inc. v.

Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813

(2d Cir.1999)

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A v.

Hyundai Motor America, No.

10 Civ. 1611(PKC),Not

Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012

WL 1022247, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.

2012)

(1) it has no artistic relevance

to the underlying work or,

(2) if there is artistic relevance,

the title explicitly misleads

as to the source or the

content of the work

“No direct

competition”

Starbucks

Corporation v.

Wolfe's Borough

Coffee, Inc. 588

F.3d 97, 113 (2d

Cir. 2009)

Volkswagen AG v.

Dorling Kindersley

Pub., Inc.,614 F.Supp.2d

793,810(E.D.Mich.,2009

“[…] VW has not

identified any case law

which precludes the use

of the Rogers test where

the First Amendment

use of the mark is in

direct competition with

the use of the trademark

holder.”

But...



Rogers Mutation

First prong

Rebellion Developments Ltd. v. Stardock

Entertainment, Inc.,Not Reported in F.Supp.2d,

2013 WL 1944888, at*3(E.D.Mich.,2013)

no need of any referential use to plaintiff’s mark

Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts Inc. Not

Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 2457678,

at*6 (S.D.Ind.,2011)

“superficial and attenuated” link

E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star

Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)

“…[t]he level of relevance merely must be

above zero.”

Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g

Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1989)

“a colorable claim”

But...

Masters Software, Inc. v. Discovery

Communications, Inc., 725 F.Supp.2d 1294,

1306 (W.D.Wash.,2010) (“Cake Boss”)

must allude

Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732

F.Supp.2d 883, 888-89(N.D.Cal.,2010)

“cultural significance”; iconic;

association

it “[w]ould allow any person to

ascribe their own meaning to a

mark and thereafter argue that their

artistic work bears relevance to this

opportunistically-defined meaning.

Indeed, it would allow defendants

to co-opt the most fanciful marks—

marks afforded great protection

under trademark law—as those

marks are the most susceptible to

differing interpretations.”



Rogers Mutation Second prong

Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.,

947 F.Supp.2d 922, 932 (N.D.Ind.,2013)

affirmative statement

Rebellion Developments Ltd. v. Stardock

Entertainment, Inc.,Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013

WL 1944888, at*4-6(E.D.Mich.,2013)

“overt misrepresentation”

Volkswagen AG v. Dorling Kindersley Pub., Inc.,614

F.Supp.2d 793,810(E.D.Mich.,2009)

“[a] slight risk of customer confusion will not

necessarily defeat a First Amendment defense”

Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,

Inc.,214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir.2000)

Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v.

Publications Intern., Ltd.,996 F.2d

1366,1379(2 Cir.1993)

No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930

F.Supp. 1381, 1383(C.D.Cal.,1995)

traditional likelihood of confusion factors

+ particularly compelling to outweigh the

First Amendment

But...



Rogers

Mutation

Expansion

Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc. 542 F.3d 1007,

1015-16 (3d Cir. 2008)

no commercial speech + beyond titles

Dryer v. National Football League, NO. CIV. 09-

2182 PAM/FL, 2014 WL 5106738 at 20*(n.8)

(D.Minn.,2014)

Pure artistic works, no commercial speech

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 814

F.Supp. 791, 795-96 (E.D.Mo.,1993)

traditional likelihood of confusion test +special

sensitivity

Warner Bros. Entertainment v. Global Asylum, Inc.,

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, No. CV 12–9547 PSG

(CWx), 2012 WL 6951315, at 2 (n.2)*

(C.D.Cal.,2012)

No dilution claims

Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain

Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 808 (n.14) (9th

Cir.2003)

no trademarks or trade dress

New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Perlmutter

Pub., Inc., 959 F.Supp. 578, 82

(N.D.N.Y.,1997)

No difference between canvas or cotton

t-shirts

Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.808

F.Supp.2d 757, 793 (D.N.J. 2011)

“In” the video game

Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th

Cir. 2013)

all artistic works, but might draw the line on

later cases between expressive and non-

expressive video games

In re NCAA Student-Athlete

Name & Likeness Licensing

Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268,

1280-81 (9th Cir.2013)

no wholesale to publicity

rights

University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New

Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th

Cir. 2012)

paintings, prints and calendars, but…

mugs and ordinary products

Cummings v. Soul Train Holdings LLC, No. 14

Civ. 36(LGS), 2014 WL 7008952, at *6

(S.D.N.Y.,2014)

plaintiff’s likeness “in” and “on” DVD sets

+ promotional materials



no referential use + even direct

competition + above slight risk of

confusion + affirmative statement +

all artistic works + commercial

speech + source of origin uses

Original Rogers

Enhanced

Rogers

non-misleading competitive titles

+ minimal artistic relevance +

explicitly misleading

“[I]t is clear that the commercial nature of artistic works does not diminish their protections under the First Amendment, and

the fact that a title attempts to attract public attention with stylized components is irrelevant.”

Rebellion Developments Ltd. v. Stardock Entertainment, Inc.,Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 1944888,

at*3(E.D.Mich.,2013)

Altered Rogers

Minimal artistic relevance + all

artistic works + traditional

likelihood of confusion factors, but

particularly compelling

Mummified Rogers

Only iconic marks + direct

comment + traditional likelihood

of confusion



Back to ….

Johan Deckmyn v. Helena Vandersteen

What does it mean not to “[r]easonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work

itself”?

Satirical use allowed: The real purpose of trademark law...

A slight risk of confusion allowed?

The need of different factors of likelihood

of consumer confusion?

How protective of expression?

“Hulk” or “Power Ranger”?

Mummified version

excluded



Daniel Jacob Wright, Explicitly explicit: the Rogers test and the Ninth Circuit, 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 193 (2013)

•an extensive discovery period due to the fact-intensive nature of the likelihood of confusion inquiry is

harmful to speech interests;

•many of the factors commonly included in likelihood of confusion tests are simply irrelevant in the context

of expressive works;

•while a consumer may be led to wrongly believe that the markholder approved or sponsored the use of a

mark in an expressive work, it is not clear in all cases that such a belief results in any real harm to the

consumer;

•the degree of any increased evidentiary burden with the “Power Ranger” version would be subject to

judicial discretion;

•considerable difficulty in determining whether an unauthorized use of a trademark in an artistic work will

be protected creates a strong incentive for risk-averse content creators not to engage with trademark parody;

•expensive litigation only helps trademark owners, as opposed to the possibility of quick summary

judgment;

•trademark is not a property right in gross; it does not create incremental incentives or innovation directly, as

patent and copyright supposedly do;

•trademark protection last forever and there is no “public domain,” which blocks free expression uses and

affects negatively such balance;

•trademark is a tool to reduce search costs of information, allowing for the consistence of product’s quality,

not a monopoly to shield companies from criticism in the corporate arena;

We should go for “Hulk”!



ECtHR’s margin of appreciation pro-IP case law

1) be proscribed by law;

2) pursue a legitimate; end

3) be necessary in a democratic society

Margin of appreciation doctrine

Article 10 of the

ECHR Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher and Robert Rockenbauer v. Austria (17200/90), 2 December 1991 – trademark “reputation”

Nijs, Jansen and the Onderlinge

Waarborgmaatschappij Algemeen

Ziekenfonds Delft-Schiedam-

Westland U.A. v. the

Netherlands (15497/89), 9

September 1992

Maximalist protective approach

to trademarks

"proportionate to the legitimate aim

pursued”: conforming strictly to

trademark exceptions under national

law

ad hoc diverseness

unemphasized

deceptiveness

overemphasized

commerciality

heavily fact-

finder

dependant

different protective interests

under the ECHR problem

Ashby Donald v France (36769/08), 10

January 2013

preponderancy of the

competitive element



“[W]e find the reasoning set out therein

with regard to the “margin of

appreciation” of States a cause for

serious concern. As is shown by the

result to which it leads in this case, it has

the effect in practice of considerably

restricting the freedom of expression in

commercial matters.”

Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus

Beermann, (A/165) (1990) 12

E.H.R.R.161 (dissenting opinion)

Justices Walsh, MacDonald and Wildhaber

argue that relaying too much on the

preponderancy of the competitive element

to frame the margin of appreciation

doctrine would permanently shield unfair

competition cases from the Court’s

scrutiny

Jacubowski [1995] 19 E.H.R.R. 64 at para

56



“[s]tatements made ‘for purposes

of competition’ fell outside the

basic nucleus protected by the

freedom of expression and

received a lower level of

protection than other ‘ideas’ or

‘information,’”

Markt intern Verlag GmbH and

Klaus Beermann, (A/165) (1990)

12 E.H.R.R.161 at para. 32.

a TV commercial

“[i]ndubitably fell outside the

regular commercial context

inciting the public to

purchase a particular

product.”

Vtg Verein gegen

Tierfabriken, 34 E.H.R.R. 4 at

para. 57

“[i]n the particular circumstances

this [advertising] effect proved to

be altogether secondary having

regard to the principal content of

the article and to the nature of the

issue being put to the public at

large.”

Barthold, 7 E.H.R.R. 383 at para.

58. See also:

Stambuck v. Germany [2003] 37

E.H.R.R. 49

Mixed expressions Secondary

effect doctrine

it is “[n]ecessary to reduce the

extent of the margin of

appreciation when what is at

stake is not a given

individual’s purely

‘commercial’ statements, but

his participation in a debate

affecting the general interest,

for example, over public

health.”

Hertel, 28 E.H.R.R. 534 at

para. 47

commerciality broadly

constructed as ‘subject matter’

and ‘type’ of discourse

Ashby Donald v France

(36769/08), 10 January 2013, at

para. 39

Subject matter doctrine?

Go back to Casado

Coca, 18 E.H.R.R. 1



Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für

Nichtraucher and Robert Rockenbauer v. Austria

(17200/90), 2 December 1991 But see...

"ONLY A CAMEL WALKS MILES FOR A

CIGARETTE" ("NUR EIN KAMEL GEHT

MEILENWEIT FÜR EINE ZIGARETTE")

JT International GmbH v. Comité National Contre les

Maladies Respiratoires et la Tuberculose (CNMRT), CA

Paris, 4th Chamber, Section B, 14 January 2005, JurisData &

cours suprêmes 2005.260197

Cour de Cassation

Freedom of Expression and Trademark Law: Assessing the ...

Documents

Transcript of Freedom of Expression and Trademark Law: Assessing the ...