Fraser Institute: Post Stimulus Spending Trends in Canada

8/13/2019 Fraser Institute: Post Stimulus Spending Trends in Canada

1/13fraserinstitute.org FRASER RESEARCH

BULLETIN

by Sean Speer and Joel Emes

F R A S E RRESEARCHBULLETINFROM THE CENTRE FOR TAX AND BUDGETARY POLICY February

Post-Stimulus Spending Trends in Canada

Canadian governments enacted Keynesian-inspired scal stimulus plans in 2009. Theseplans were to be a temporary response tothe global economic recession. The stimulusspending was to be withdrawn after two yearsand program spending was then to be brought

under control and returned to pre-stimulustrends.

However, Canadian governments did notwithdraw their stimulus spending as quickly aspromised and as a result have run budgetaryde cits for longer and accumulated more pub -lic debt than they would otherwise have.

This research, which focuses on the post-stimulus spending trends for the federal gov -ernment, Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontar -io, nds that these governments have delayedwithdrawing their stimulus spending andpushed back initial projections for eliminating

their budgetary de cits by at least two years. These four governments have run larger and

more protracted budgetary de cits than theywould have if they withdrew stimulus spendingand returned to pre-stimulus spending trends.The result is $63.5 billion in higher cumula -tive de cits and $2.9 billion in additional annualdebt service costs that could have been avoided.

QUICK SUMMARY


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fraserinstitute.org FRASER RESEARCH BULLETIN

IntroductionThe global economy began to decline in 2007and took a sharp downward turn in Septem -

ber 2008. Canada was not immune from thisworldwide slowdown. Output in Canada start -ed to decline in the third quarter of 2008 andreached a low point in the second quarter of2009. Overall the economy contracted by 3.3percent. Employment declined by 431,000, or2.5 percent, from October 2008 to July 2009(Uppal and Larochelle-Ct, 2013).

In response, Canadian governments enactedscal stimulus plans to help boost economicactivity. The federal governments two-yearstimulus package was $45.4 billion and com -prised a mixture of tax relief, expanded bene tsand training for unemployed workers, and in -frastructure spending. The provinces followedsuit with matching funding for infrastructureand new programs in their own priority areas. 1 The Ontario government, for instance, provideddirect subsidies to pulp and paper mills, farm -ers, and the auto sector. The Alberta govern -ment provided subsidies for carbon captureand storage and other environment-relatedprojects. Each Canadian government imple -mented some level of scal stimulus and overallthe composition was heavily weighted towardsspending rather than tax reductions.

This paper will not assess the economic impactof the stimulus packages put in place by Cana -dian governments. Past research published bythe Fraser Institute has estimated that stimu -lus spending had a negligible effect on Canadaseconomic recovery (Karabegovic, Lammam,and Veldhuis, 2010). A subsequent commentary

1 According to federal estimates, provincial andterritorial stimulus spending totaled $18.4 billionbetween 2009-10 and 2011-12 (Canada, Departmentof Finance, 2012: 290).

published by the Institute found that this expe -rience is consistent with empirical research onthe general ef cacy of scal stimulus (Veldhuis

and Lammam, 2010).Instead, this paper focuses on governmentspending trends post-stimulus, and the ex -tent to which temporary increases have be -come permanent and the base from which fu -ture program spending will grow. In particular,the analysis focuses on the federal government,Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia.

At the time the stimulus plans were enacted,

these governments touted them as tempo -rary measures to protect and create jobs inthe short-term (Canada, Department of Fi -nance, 2009). The stimulus spending was sup -posed to be timely, temporary, and targeted(Canada, Department of Finance, 2009: 10; On -tario, Ministry of Finance, 2009: 7). The govern -ments were clear that the scal stimulus wouldbe withdrawn and program spending would bebrought under control and returned to pre-stimulus trends.

As this paper will show, these governments didnot withdraw their stimulus spending as quick -ly as promised and as a result have run bud -getary de cits longer and accumulated morepublic debt than they otherwise would have. All four governments have delayed their initialprojections for eliminating their budgetary def -icits by at least two years and in some cases thereturn to a balanced budget remains precari -

ous. Many of these governments have attrib -uted revenue shortfalls as the source of ongo -ing de cit spending. But the real cause of theircurrent de cits and debt accumulation is highspending.

The concept of short-term scal stimulus ndsits intellectual basis in the work of John May -nard Keynes. Writing in the 1930s, Keynes pos -


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tulated that during periods of economic down -turn governments should (i) not try to balancetheir budgets in the face of falling revenues

and (ii) borrow to fund temporary tax cuts ortemporary increases in government spending(transfers or purchases) to increase aggregatedemand. His work was premised on the as -sumption that de cit- nanced spending wouldhave a multiplier effect represented by the ratioof the increase in real output to the increase ingovernment spending or tax cut that generatesit. Put differently: government spending couldhelp to stimulate investment and employment,and in turn have a net positive effect on eco -nomic output. This thinking underpinned thescal policies of Canadian governments in re -sponse to the global economic recession.

The empirical foundation of Keyness multipli -er effect remains a point of contention amongeconomists and in any case is outside the scopeof this paper. What is important, however, is thecorollary of Keyness prescription, which is thatscal stimulus should be temporary and gov -

ernments should retrench once the recessionis over in order to pay down debt accumulateddue to lower revenues and higher spending. Asone commentator has put it: Real Keynesian -ism swims against the economic current all thetimeborrowing and spending when times arebad, running surpluses and paying down debtwhen times are good (Crowley, 2013, March 2).

This often overlooked aspect of Keyness think -ing is relevant to our analysis. Canadian gov -ernments that engaged in stimulus spendingcommitted at the time to adhere to his theoryby withdrawing the stimulus after two years.The record of the four governments covered inthis paper, however, shows that there were de -lays in fully withdrawing so-called temporaryspending, which has led to protracted de citsand a greater accumulation of debt than would

have otherwise happened had they followedKeyness prescription more closely.

The purpose of this analysis, then, is to evaluatethe extent to which scal stimulus was tem -porary by showing the difference between ac -tual (and projected) program spending and theamount these governments would have spent ifthey had grown expenditures according to thepre-recessionary trend. The pre-recessionarytrend level of spending is estimated by takingthe level of spending prior to stimulus and in -creasing it by the rate of population growth andthe rate of in ation to maintain constant real

per capita program spending.We show this pre-recessionary trend as a redline in the gures. Thus, our calculations forthe amount of the de cit that could have beenavoided are based on the amount by which theblue exceed the red lines in the post-stimulusperiod. The green line shows revenue less debtservicing costs to illustrate when these govern -ments would return to budgetary balance.

This is important because if temporary spend -ing increases become permanent, they will en -tail a higher debt and greater future tax bur -den and possibly affect the scal sustainabilityof government programs. It is important tonote that total government spending also in -cludes debt servicing costs, and debt servicecosts with larger de cits means more overallspending than when those de cits are smaller.For the Canadian governments examined here,

these higher short-term de cits have led, andwill continue to lead, to higher governmentspending over the long-term.

The federal governmentThe federal government launched its stimulusplanpolitically branded as Canadas Economic Action Plan inBudget 2009 . The two-year plan


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covering scal years 2009-10 and 2010-11 2 con-tained $45.4 billion in new spending and tax re -lief initiatives.3

As a result of its plan, federal government pro -gram spending spiked in 2009-10, increasing by$36.2 billion in year one and remaining elevatedin year two. This 17.1 percent increase in pro -gram spending was supposed to be temporaryand withdrawn at the end of the second year ofthe stimulus plan.

2 A small portion of federal stimulus spending oninfrastructure projects (a total of $1.3 billion) was ex -pensed in 2011-12 (Canada, Department of Finance,2012: 290).

3 Of the total federal stimulus, the governmentestimates that $6.2 billion (14 percent) was deliveredin the form of tax relief (Canada, Department ofFinance, 2012: 290).

Indeed, the governments 2009 budget wasclear that the stimulus measures were focusedin these two years in order to allow for an earlyreturn to balanced budgets. As it stated:

The Government has designed its Economic Action Plan to concentrate new spendingin 2009-10 and 2010-11, when the economyis expected to be weak. Starting in 2011-12,the scal position of the Government isprojected to improve rapidly, as the time-limited stimulus measures expire and theeconomy recovers. By 2013-14, the budget is

projected to be in a small surplus (Canada,Department of Finance, 2009, 28).

However, the government deviated from thisplan in subsequent years and has since pushedback its timeline for eliminating the de cit bytwo more years. The key to understanding thecurrent de cit lies in spending trends following2010-11.

Figure : FederalProgram Spending vs. Constant Real per Capita Program Spending

Sources: Canada, Department of Finance (2013a); Canada, Department of Finance (2013b); Statistics Canada (2013a); Statis-tics Canada (2013b); Statistics Canada (2013c).

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Constraining post-stimulus spending growth toalign with population growth and increases inprices based on a 2008-09, pre-stimulus base -

line would have been consistent with Keynessprescription for scal stimulus and the govern -ments communications in the 2009 budget.

Yet instead of withdrawing stimulus spend -ing and adopting a low-growth expendituretrend, the government pursued a less ambitiouscourse that has led to larger and more pro -tracted budgetary de cits, and in turn higherpublic debt than it initially projected.

The government now estimates that it will haveaccumulated $68.5 billion in de cits from 2011-12the rst post-stimulus yearto 2015-16theyear in which it currently expects to eliminatethe de cit.

Had it lowered spending growth beginning in2011-12, it would have been in a position to bal -ance the budget a year earlierin 2014-15andwould have accumulated $29.2 billion in de citsduring this period.

If the current plan holds, the government willhave ran de cits longer and accumulated $39.4billion more in debt than it needed to because itdid not return program spending to a pre-stim -ulus trend. The annual increase in debt servicecost from these additional accumulated de citsis $1.9 billion.4

Ontario

The Ontario government also launched a scalstimulus plan as part of its 2009 budget. It wasdesigned to match temporary federal spend -ing on infrastructure and subsidize student jobs

4 Based on 2012-13 public debt charges and ac -cumulated de cit in the 2013 Fiscal Reference Tables (Canada, Department of Finance, 2013a).

and support sectors affected by the economicdownturn such as agriculture, mining, and for -estry.

The two-year plan covering scal years 2009-10 and 2010-11 contained signi cant newspending and tax relief measures, including$32.5 billion in infrastructure spending.

As a result of its plan, program spending spikedin 2009-10, increasing by $11.5 billion in yearone and by another $4.9 billion in year two, orby 17.1 billion for the two years.

The governments stimulus-induced increasesin program spending were supposed to be tem -porary and withdrawn from the governmentsspending trajectory allowing for a balancedbudget by 2015-16.

As the Ontario budget stated:

The governments plan consists largelyof short-term strategic investments thatwill preserve and create jobs today, whilepreserving future scal exibility Theshort-term nature of a large majority ofthe governments new capital investmentsallows for a prudent, realistic plan to returnto balance by 2015-16 (Ontario, Ministry ofFinance, 2009: 7).

However, the government has revised down -ward its scal projections in the interveningyears and is now planning to remain in de -cit for two more years. Its latest economic

and scal update showing lower-than-expect -ed economic growth and a renewed focus onshort-term spending, what the nance minis -ter described in his speech to the legislature asa new direction, suggests that even this de -layed target may be at risk (Sousa, 2013). Budget2014 will provide Ontarians with a better senseof whether the current timeline is credible orif the government will remain in de cit even


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longer, leading to higher debt levels for theprovince.

The source of these revisions to Ontarios scalplan stem from its post-stimulus spending trajec -tory. The government has put off any signi cantspending reductions, which means Ontario willnot return to trend until 2015-16, resulting in larg -er and more protracted budgetary de cits andgreater public debt than it projected in 2009.

Current projections show that Ontario will haveaccumulated $47.8 billion in de cits from 2011-12 (the rst post-stimulus year) and 2017-18

(the year in which it currently projects to elimi -nate the de cit). Had it constrained programspending growth to population plus in ation,beginning in 2011-12 it would have run smallerannual de cits during this period and accumu -lated $27.1 billion rather than $47.8 billion in to -tal de cits. This $20.7 billion difference will addroughly $850 million to Ontarios annual debtservice costs.

Alternatively, had it fully withdrawn its stimulusspending and frozen program spending for oneyear in 2011-12 and maintained spending growth

equal to population plus in ation thereafter,its projected de cit for 2011-12 through 2016-17would be only $1.3 billion.

However, the governments current plan toachieve budget balance is for a slight spend -ing decline over 2015-16 through 2017-18. Thiswould represent a signi cant departure fromrecent trends and the governments overall re -cord on program spending. To put this in per -spective, the Ontario government grew pro -

gram spending, on average, by 7.4 percent peryear between 2002-03 and 2007-08 and 3.6percent between 2008-09 and 2012-13.

Of course it would represent signi cant prog -ress were the government to be able to holdspending growth to its projected levels for thenext four years. Still, had the Ontario govern -ment better controlled spending following its

Figure : OntarioProgram Spending vs. Constant Real per Capita Program Spending

Sources: Ontario, Ministry of Finance (2013); Canada, Department of Finance (2013a); TD Economics (2013); StatisticsCanada (2013a); Statistics Canada (2013b); Statistics Canada (2013c).

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stimulus plan, the province would have avoidedtens of billions of dollars in de cits.

Alberta

The Alberta government also engaged in stimu -lus spending in response to the global reces -sion. Its 2009 budget relaxed the provincesbalanced budget legislation in order to permitde cit spending and outlined $23.2 billion in in -

frastructure spending (over three years) alongwith other measures to stimulate economic ac -tivity.

Our analysis for Alberta differs from that forthe other provinces because it had been re -cording multi-billion dollar surpluses and hadmore than $30 billion in net nancial assetsin the years prior to the economic downturn.

In other words, Alberta entered the recessionwith no net provincial debt.

Because Albertas revenue dropped from anaverage growth of nearly 12 percent a year toclose to zero, we take our trend line from 2007-08 rather than 2008-09. We also highlight theaccelerated asset drawdown that started withthe stimulus plan. Although the other jurisdic -tions covered in this analysis increased capitalspending, their non-de cit debt accumulations

were largely unchanged before and during thestimulus period. Alberta, by contrast, saw itsdebt excluding de cits grow signi cantly in thestimulus years.

The governments original plan was to run bud -getary de cits for four years before returningto balance in 2012-13. Changes to its balancedbudget legislation authorized the government

Figure : OntarioProgram Spending vs. -year Spending Freeze and Constant Realper Capita Program Spending

Sources: Ontario, Ministry of Finance (2013); Canada, Department of Finance (2013a); TD Economics (2013); StatisticsCanada (2013a); Statistics Canada (2013b); Statistics Canada (2013c).

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to offset these de cits from its net nancial as -

sets held in the Alberta Sustainability Fund. As the budget document explained:

Albertas forecast 2008-09 nancial results,as reported in the 2008-09 Third QuarterFiscal Update and presented in Budget 2009 documents, re ect a $1.4 billion de cit. Thisis the rst de cit in 15 years.

Budget 2009 also projects a de cit for

2009-10, of $4.7 billion, and de cits for thefollowing two years. By 2012-13 a returnto surpluses is forecast. The de cits willbe offset by transfers from the expanded Alberta Sustainability Fund, as permittedunder the new Fiscal Responsibility Act. Thenew Act changes the scal framework for2009-10 and future years. (Alberta, Ministryof Finance, 2009: 10).

Albertas Keynes-inspired stimulus plan was

not so much an increase in program spendingas it was a lack of program spending reductionin response to a signi cant decline in revenue.Its program spending contracted by 0.4 percentin 2009-10, but this was not enough to bring itdown to trend or to match its revenue decline.Spending growth then resumed to 4.5 percentin 2010-11 and has remained above 4 percent,on average, up to the current year. This hascontributed to a delay in the governments planto eliminate the de cit.

Current projections anticipate that Alberta willhave accumulated $4.4 billion in de cits be -tween 2011-12 and 2014-15 when it now expectsto record a small budgetary surplus.

Had the Alberta government taken more ag -gressive steps beginning in 2011-12, includingbringing its program spending to a pre-stimu -

Figure : AlbertaProgram Spending vs. Constant Real per Capita Program Spending

Sources: Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance (2013a); Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance (2013b); Canada, Department ofFinance (2013a); TD Economics (2014); Statistics Canada (2013a); Statistics Canada (2013b); Statistics Canada (2013c).

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lus trend, it would have run smaller de cits andaccumulated $1.2 billion less in de cits duringthis period.

In addition to this de cit spending, projec -tions show Alberta adding $7 billion in debtand continuing to reduce its net nancial as -sets. Changes in net assets show Alberta spentroughly $600 million per year between 2002-03 and 2006-07 outside of program spendingand interest costs. When its large surplusesceased, this spending not only continued, butincreasedto $3.5 billion in 2007-08 and $2.6billion per year for the three years of capital

spending in the stimulus plan.While the government has identi ed volatilerevenue growth as the primary driver of itsongoing de cits, the real problem in Albertais high program spending. If the Alberta gov -ernment had exercised greater spending re -straint following its stimulus plan, it would haverun smaller de cits and would not have drawndown its nancial assets as much as it has.

British ColumbiaBritish Columbias government introducedstimulus spending in its 2009 budget. In partic -ular, its stimulus plan included $2 billion in newcapital spending (over three years) to matchfederal spending on infrastructure, increasesfor post-secondary and training, and new pro -grams for communities affected by the eco -nomic downturn.

As a result of declining revenues and its increasein program spending, the government antici -pated de cits in 2009-10 and 2010-11 and pro - jected a return to a balanced budget in 2011-12.

As the provinces then- nance minister said inhis budget speech:

the budget includes a temporary de cit.Weighed against the risks to our economy,our communities and our futureit is,

quite simply, the right thing to do. I wantto be clear that this is not the same kindof de cit we saw seven years agothe kindthat persists, year over year, even in timesof strong economic growth. What we willhave for the next two years is a short-termde cit, one that results from a downturn inprojected revenues (Hansen, 2009).

The governments 2009 plan to eliminate thede cit in two years has not come to fruition.

In fact, it has since delayed the return to a bal -anced budget by two years to 2013-14. Budget2014 will give British Columbians an opportu -nity to see whether the government deliverson this new target or if de cit spending will beprolonged further.

This two-year delay can be mostly attributedto a large spending increase after a single yearof strong revenue growth in 2010-11. In fact,program spending grew by 6.7 percent in 2011-12the year in which the government initiallyplanned to return to balance. The governmentscurrent plan has spending growing slower thanpopulation plus in ation, but it will not returnto trend until 2013-14.

Current projections anticipate that BC will haveaccumulated $3 billion in de cits between 2011-12 and 2013-14 when it expects to record a smallbudgetary surplus.

Had the BC government taken more aggressivesteps beginning in 2011-12by returning spend -ing to a pre-stimulus baseline trendit wouldhave run smaller de cits and accumulated $2.3billion less in de cits during this period. This$2.3 billion difference adds roughly $140 millionto BCs annual debt service costs.


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Figure : BCProgram Spending vs. Constant Real per Capita Program Spending

Sources: British Columbia, Ministry of Finance (2013); Canada, Department of Finance (2013a); Statistics Canada (2013a);Statistics Canada (2013b); Statistics Canada (2013c).

BCs current plan now envisions a greater de -gree of spending restraint going forward. Pro - jections for 2013-14 to 2015-16 anticipate thatprogram spending will grow below that forpopulation plus in ation. The provinces aver -age annual spending growth for these threeyears is projected to be 1.2 percent. This wouldrepresent a departure from recent trends andthe governments overall record on programspending. To put this in perspective, the BCgovernment grew program spending, on aver -

age, by 4.0 percent per year between 2002-03and 2007-08 and 3.3 percent between 2008-09and 2012-13.

ConclusionCanadian governments adopted scal stimulusplans in response to the global economic reces -sion as part of their 2009 budgets.

Inspired by Keyness theory of de cit- nancedscal stimulus, governments were prepared torun short-term budgetary de cits and incurdebt increases in order to fund infrastructureprograms and other initiatives to encourage in -vestment and job creation.

But the governments were also clear that theyintended to withdraw the temporary stimulusspending after two to three years, and to elimi -nate their de cits over the short- and medium-

term.This analysis has examined the experiences offour Canadian governmentsthe federal gov -ernment, Ontario, Alberta, and British Colum -biain order to measure their post-stimulusspending patterns and their records on with -drawing stimulus spending and eliminatingtheir budgetary de cits.

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These governments did not withdraw theirstimulus spending as quickly as promised andinstead maintained program spending at el -evated levels. This decision has contributed toongoing budgetary de cits and more publicdebt (or, in Albertas case, lower nancial as -sets). All four governments have delayed theirinitial projections for eliminating their budget -ary de cits by at least two years.

Figure 6 shows the projected de cits from2011-12the- rst post-stimulus yearto the -nal year in which these governments are cur -

rently projecting that they will record budget -ary de cits. The gure also shows what thede cits would have been if these governmentshad withdrawn their stimulus spending and re -turned to pre-stimulus trends. As illustrated,the consequence is that these governmentshave run larger de cits and accumulated moredebt in the years following the scheduled expi -ration of their stimulus plans than they and tax -

payers had been led to believe they would. Theresult is $63.5 billion in higher cumulative de -cits that could have been avoided if these fourgovernments had taken action to return spend -ing to regular, pre-stimulus levels.

These avoidable accumulated de cits will con -tribute to higher debt servicing costs andtherefore higher overall government spend -ing in future. We estimate that these de citswill lead to $2.9 billion in additional annual debtservicing costs distributed among the four gov -ernments. This represents the yearly nancialcost of their failure to end temporary stimulusspending and return to pre-stimulus trends.

References Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance (2009).

Budget 2009: Building on our Strength . Gov-ernment of Canada.

Figure : DecitsProgram Spending vs. Constant Real per Capita Program Spending

Sources: Figures 1 to 5.

68.5

47.8

4.4 3.0

29.2 27.1

3.20.7

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Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance (2013a).Budget 2013: Overview . Government of Alber -ta.

Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance (2013b).Budget 2013: Fiscal Plan Tables . Governmentof Alberta.

British Columbia, Ministry of Finance (2013). June Update: Budget and Fiscal Plan 2013/14-2015/16 . Government of British Columbia.

Canada, Department of Finance (2009). Budget2009: Canadas Economic Action Plan . Gov-ernment of Canada.

Canada, Department of Finance (2013a). FiscalReference Tables . Government of Canada.

Canada, Department of Finance (2013b). Updateof Economic and Fiscal Projections . Govern-ment of Canada.

Crowley, Brian Lee (March 2, 2013). Even KeynesOpposed Permanent Stimulus. Ottawa Citi-zen .

Hansen, Colin (2009). Budget 2009: Bud-get Speech . Government of British Colum -bia. , as of January 28, 2014.

Karabegovic, Amela, Charles Lammam, andNiels Veldhuis (2010). Did Government Stim-ulus Fuel Economic Growth in Canada? An Analysis of Statistics Canada Data . Fraser Alert. Fraser Institute.

Ontario, Ministry of Finance (2009). 2009 Bud-get: Confronting the Challenge: Building ourEconomic Future . Government of Ontario.

Ontario, Ministry of Finance (2013). 2013 Budget: A Prosperous & Fair Ontario . Government ofOntario.

Statistics Canada (2013a). Table 051-0001Es-timates of population, by age group and sex

for July 1, Canada, provinces and territo-ries, annual (persons unless otherwise noted) ., as of November 18, 2013.

Statistics Canada (2013b). Table 326-0021Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2009 basket,annual (2002=100 unless otherwise noted) ., as of November 18, 2013.

Statistics Canada (2013c). Table 384-0037Gross domestic product, income-based, pro-vincial and territorial, annual (dollars) ., as of November 19, 2013.TD Economics (2013).2013 Ontario Fiscal Up-

date . TD Bank Group. , as of January10, 2014.

Veldhuis, Niels, and Charles Lammam (2010).Research or Rhetoric? Fraser Forum (May)., as of January 28, 2014.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors wish to thank the anonymous re-

viewers for their comments, suggestions, andinsights. Any remaining errors or oversightsare the sole responsibility of the authors. Asthe researchers have worked independently,the views and conclusions expressed in this

paper do not necessarily re ect those of theBoard of Trustees of the Fraser Institute, thestaff, or supporters.


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Sean Speer is Associate Director ofthe Fraser Institutes Centre for Fis-cal Studies. He previously served indifferent roles for the federal gov-

ernment including senior economicadvisor to the Prime Minister anddirector of policy to the Minister ofFinance. He has been cited by TheHill Times as one of the most in-

fuential people in government andby Embassy Magazine as one of thetop 80 people infuencing Canadian

foreign policy. Sean holds an MA inHistory from Carleton Universityand has studied economic historyas a Ph.D. candidate at QueensUniversity.

Joel Emes is a former senior advi-sor to British Columbias provincialgovernment. He previously servedas a senior analyst, then as execu-tive director (2009 to 2011), at theBC Progress Board. Prior to that,

Joel was a senior research econo-mist at the Fraser Institute, wherehe initiated and led several fagshipprojects in the areas of tax free-dom and government performance,spending, debt, and unfunded li-abilities. Joel holds a B.A. and anM.A. in economics from Simon Fra-ser University.

Copyright 2014 by the Fraser Institute. All rights re -served. Without written permission, only brief passag -es may be quoted in critical articles and reviews.

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Fraser Institute: Post Stimulus Spending Trends in Canada

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