Fraser 2010, Recurring Ethnic Violence in Kenya Without Civil War

Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen

Sommersemester 2008

Seminar: Analyse von Bürgerkriegen

Recurring Ethnic Violence without Civil War:

The captivating case of Kenya. An historical analysis of the role of ethnicity in the violence

around the Kenyan elections of 1992, 1997 and 2007.

Iain Fraser

M.A Friedensforschung und Internationale Politik

Term Paper for Analyses of Civil Wars Seminar, University of Tübingen Iain Fraser 2010

Contents 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1

2. Historical Background……………………………….…………………………………..2

2.1 Kenya in the Wider African Context ……………………………………………..2 2.2 Independence ……………………………………………………………………..4 2.3 Kenyatta and Kikuyu Dominance ……………………………………….…….....5 2.4 Moi and the One-Party State….…….…………………………………………….7

3. Theoretical Considerations of Ethnicity……...…….…………………………………..9

3.1 Macro-Level Approaches……………………………………………………..…..9 3.2 Specific Questions for Case Study of Ethnicity………………………………......9 3.3 Micro-Level Approaches……………………...……………………..……..……14

4. Ethnic Violence in Kenya (1992, 1997 and 2007/08)…………………………….……19

4.1 Cultural Demographic Indicators in Kenya……………………………………..19 4.2 Description of the Ethnic Violence in 1992, 1997 and 2007/8………………….20

5. Explanations for the Recent Conflicts in Kenya……………………………….…..…26 5.1 Macro Level of Analysis; Quantitative Explanation………...……………….….….26 5.2 An Historical, Qualitative Explanation of the Ethnic Violence…………...……….27

5.2.1 Historical context and discourse of ethnicity in Kenya 28 5.2.2 Ethnicity’s place within political structures and boundaries 29 5.2.3 Is the State Ethnically Based or Defined? 29 5.2.4 Influence of Democratic State Structures and Legitimacy Upon Ethnic Pluralism 30 5.2.5 Ethnicity and Class 31 5.2.6 Role of emotions in ethnic violence 32

5.3 Intergenerational Effects upon Ethnicity……………………………………………33 6. Conclusions……………………….…..………………………………….…..………….35 7. References……………………………………………………………………………….36


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1.Introduction

The Republic of Kenya is a fascinating subject for a political case study for

numerous reasons. For many years Kenya was one of a few exceptional African states

that was broadly considered an outpost of stability and progress. This perception was

and is reinforced and perhaps embodied in the city of Nairobi, a city that not only is a

very influential centre in the politics of East Africa, but furthermore the home to many

international organisations (including various United Nations bodies and programmes).

Not only has Kenya’s stability been of importance to its own internal processes and

developments; Kenya has also always been the point of contact between central- and

eastern Africa and the rest of the world. This stability is more so remarkable when one

considers the neighbourhood in which Kenya finds itself. Bordering on Somalia,

Ethiopia and Sudan, all countries well known for their share of conflicts, and

geographically close to Rwanda and the Congo, it is indeed remarkable that Kenya has

been able to maintain the stability, for which it has a reputation. However, in the years

1992, 1997 and 2007, around the time of each of the respective elections, significant

outbreaks of ethnic violence and conflict occurred. This violence occurred, in the

overwhelming majority of cases, along ethnic cleavages.

This paper has two primary focuses. First, a macro level analysis will be

conducted to explain why the recurring conflicts did not develop in to a civil war.

Secondly, the role ethnicity played, as a salient identity, in the aforementioned outbreaks

of violence. This paper begins with a thorough analysis of historic ethnic developments

in Kenya. This is necessary in order to highlight the fundamental effect of colonialism

on current ethnic relations, and the intertwining of politics, economics and ethnicity in

Kenya. This is followed by an introduction of ethnicity as the main subject (in the

Kenyan context) of this enquiry. Ethnicity is then defined and a review of the literature

on the salience of ethnicity as an explanatory variable is provided, with a further

distinction between macro and micro-levels. This theoretical section is followed by a

brief portrayal of the ethnic violence under examination. Subsequently I will explain the

importance of ethnicity as a highly salient identity for Kenyans that was first

strengthened, exacerbated and instrumentalised by the colonial authorities, and has

since been manipulated by political elites, resulting in the ethnic violence of the

stipulated periods. Despite the deep inter-ethnic and historical grievances, it will be

argued that due to its high level of fractionalisation, Kenya has not experienced a civil

war. It is further argued, that the corrupt, centralist, nepotistic and ethnically favoured


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policies of Kenya’s post-independence politicians, contributed to the hardening of

ethnic identities and the increased willingness of Kenyans’ frustration and grievances,

which manifested in the violence of the 1990s and late 2000s.

2.HistoricalBackground

2.1SettingtheScene:ThebirthofKenyaintheAfricancontext.

It is important to begin with a brief overview of historical developments in

(today's) Kenya, dating back to the mid eighteenth century, but mostly concentrating on

the independence/post-colonial period. After gaining independence in 1963, and

becoming a Republic in December 1964, much had occurred throughout the British

colonial period in Kenya, that were to have effects on ethnic developments after

independence. Meredith (2006) mentions numerous cases where missionaries and

administrative colonial functionaries all across Africa were on occasion active in

creating new ethnicities or ethnic categories, at other times grouping non-associated

peoples into existing ethnic groups. This took place at a time when the African continent

was being arbitrarily divided up among the European powers, with absolutely no

consideration for the existing political or ethnic realities on the ground. This is most

obviously evidenced by the disturbing number of geometric lines to be found on the

political map of modern Africa. The result of this arbitrary division was that “the new

boundaries [of African territories] cut through some 190 culture groups. In other cases

Europe’s new colonial territories enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups,

with no common history, culture language or religion” (Meredith 2006, pp.1-2). This

disconnect with the reality of life for the peoples of the African continent continued

until independence. As Meredith (2006, p.2) estimates, “by the time the Scramble for

Africa was over, some 10,000 African polities had been amalgamated into forty

European colonies and protectorates.” With varying accounts as to the large number of

ethnicities residing in Kenya today (Osamba 2001, p.42, places this number at over 40),

it is useful to remember that there was nothing obvious leading to the formation of

Kenya’s borders, and the inhabitants that reside within them – who had to become

Kenyans.

A number of tribes can be identified in historical accounts that are still connected

with the territory of present-day Kenya. The two most powerful were the Maasai and

the Kikuyu. The Maasai had been carrying out raids of expansion throughout the 18th


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and 19th centuries, and the Kikuyu, who were established pastoralists by that time, had

cleared forests and established a stronghold from which they expanded in to present-day

central province (Britannica, 2008). World War I brought significant hardships to the

area, because of the southern border with (present day) Tanzania, a German territory.

Most able-bodied men were conscripted, leaving their traditional regions and farms

behind them. This of course caused problems when returning soldiers were promised

new lands as part of reintegration schemes. In 1920, after the War’s end, the East Africa

protectorate was turned into the new colony of Kenya, its name based on the territory’s

highest mountain (Britannica Online, 2008). In the 1920s the Young Kikuyu Association

was founded, which did not receive support from Chiefs and older, more traditional

Kenyans, but marked the beginning of more active participation in the political process.

However, the organisation’s “attempts to win the support of other ethnic groups failed

because of their unwillingness to accept Kikuyu leadership” (Britannica Online 2008).

Increasing white settlement, and the corresponding disenfranchisement of

thousands of Kenyans, led to increased hostility, which was combined with the problem

of the many white farmers in the Rift Valley creating demand for farm-labourers (who

were mostly Kikuyu). The Rift Valley had traditionally been Maasai territory, whose

pastoralists had been cleared for occupation and development by white farmers. “By the

mid-1940s, the populations of Kikuyu squatters and their families had risen to about

250,000, one-quarter of the Kikuyu people” (Meredith, p.82). Firstly, this caused

animosity between the people who had traditionally inhabited the valley, and the new

Kikuyu population. Furthermore, as the white farmers expanded their landholdings and

operations, Kikuyu, some of whom had been in the valley for a generation or two, were

thrown off the land, forced to migrate to the slums in the cities – principally Nairobi.

Although Kenya was the first of the eastern African territories to get a ‘native’

representative in the national legislature in 1944 (this number increased to 8 by 1951),

these political concessions came far too late, and were not enough to quell the growing

demands for political equality (Kenya, 2008).

Whilst movements for independence were underway by the start of the 1940s, it

was not until after the Second World War, that the nationalist cause really gained

momentum. The Kenya African Union (KAU) was founded in 1944, and as Jomo

Kenyatta returned from Europe, he took over the leadership of this organisation. While

the goal of the organisation was to work towards a nationalist movement, the

overwhelming majority of its membership and its leadership came from the Kikuyu

tribe (Meredith 2006). Indeed it was among the Kikuyu that anti-colonial sentiment was


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at its peak. In the years following the War, the pace of change in Kenya had increased.

The African population of the capital, Nairobi doubled throughout this period, and now

Kikuyu constituted over half of the inhabitants of Nairobi (Meredith 2006, p. 84).

Concurrently, and particularly after the return of Kenyans who had fought in the

Second World War, there was a rising tide of militancy in opposition to the status quo in

Kenya. Meredith (2006, pp.80-86) argues that whilst the British considered Mau Mau to

be a secret society, it is better considered an insipient Kikuyu revolt. Associated with

Mau Mau membership were intimidating rituals and oaths of allegiance to the Kikuyu

people. By 1952 most of the Kikuyu (whether they supported it or not) were caught up

in an armed rebellion. In the fighting that ensued however, only relatively few whites

were killed. Indeed over 2,000 moderate Kikuyu were killed throughout the period.

Other accounts hold that although Kenyatta had publicly denounced Mau Mau, the

British arrested him and declared a state of emergency. The violence and brutality had

shocked both Whites and Kikuyu alike and was seen as an imperative to pursue more

democratic means for working towards independence.

In 1957 eight Africans were elected to the legislative council during the first

African elections in Kenya, including a young minority Kalenjin leader, Daniel arap

Moi. Parity with the white representatives was achieved shortly thereafter, when in

1958, the number of African representatives was doubled. Throughout this time, and

now coming from within the establishment, pressure was increased for the release of

Kenyatta. Whilst still in prison, Kenyatta was elected to the post of president of the

Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 1960. African political organisations had not

been allowed throughout the last decade due to the Mau Mau rebellion. KANU had

been formed around the personality of Kenyatta and promoted the idea of strong

centralised government. However, in June of the same year two of the founding

members, Ronald Ngala and Daniel arap Moi, left KANU to found another new African

organisation, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU favoured

decentralisation as the best way to address the needs of the Kenyan state; and were also

concerned about Kikukyu domination in KANU (and in general). Despite their

differences, after the 1961 election both parties maintained their pressure for the release

of Kenyatta, who was released in August that year. In 1962 a coalition government

between the KADU and KANU was formed, and in 1963 Kenyatta became Prime

Minister, under a constitution, in which Kenya achieved self-government (Kenya 2008).


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2.2IndependentKenya:Birthofthemodern,stablebutone‐partystate.Kenya gained its independence on December 12, 1963, amid a swell of African

colonies, in the 1960s. Kenyatta became the president of the new Republic one year

later, with Oginga Odinga as his vice president. Already in 1964 Kenyatta had

persuaded opposition politicians from KADU to cross the floor and take up prominent

posts in the government (Meredith 2006, p.165), which resulted in most KADU

members transferring their allegiance to KANU.

“We are determined to have independence in peace, and we shall not allow

hooligans to rule Kenya” (Kenyatta 1962 cited in: Meredith 2006, p.90)

While a thorough description of early post-colonial developments or in-depth

analysis thereof are unfortunately beyond the scope of the present paper, it is worth

mentioning a number of historical events and trends, particularly through the lens of

ethnicity, that were to have an impact on the election violence that is the focus of this

paper. Before arriving at the events surrounding the violent 1992 election, there are two

politicians that demand closer attention, for these two men dominated Kenyan politics

for over 30 years: Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi.

2.3Kenyatta,KANUandtheKikuyuDominatedNewRepublic

Arguably, the Kikuyu felt the brunt of colonialism more than any other tribe in Kenya

due to their historical geographic base around Nairobi and the large number of Kikuyu

who had migrated to the Rift Valley, but then had to leave it, due to the presence of

white settlers. This exposure to the urbanisation of Nairobi and heightened interactions

with the British and with new forms of political action, organisation and participation

were to differentiate the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu further gained recognition through the

rather extraordinary personality of Jomo Kenyatta. In summing up Kenyatta’s record

after his death Meredith (2006, p.264) notes:

In the fifteen years that he presided over Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta enjoyed massive authority. Even critics of his government accorded him due respect. In his old age he ruled not so much by exercising direct control over the government as by holding court with a circle of loyal ministers and officials, predominantly Kikuyu from home district of Kiamb, whom he entrusted with the administration of country.

It was also relatively early during Kenyatta’s reign that Kenya’s tradition of one

party rule and excessive centralist power was established. In 1964 Kenyatta was able to


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persuade the leader of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) to disband and to

join the KANU party, thereby forming a single chambered national assembly. Added to

this consolidation of power, by this time most white settlers, who were opposed to

African rule had left, allowing Kenyatta to focus on internal integration (Jomo

Kenyatta, 2004). In addition, through a number of successive constitutional

amendments, Kenyatta significantly strengthened central power, and thereby his

authority. In this manner he was able to arrest and hold political opponents as soon as

they were considered to constitute a threat to public order. Although definitely

benefiting the Kikuyu, Kenyatta occasionally selected individuals from differing ethnic

backgrounds in order to hinder strong tribal-based opposition (Rowe, 2009). In general,

and particularly in foreign diplomatic circles of the time Kenyatta was attributed with

having achieved a remarkable level of stability. In the year 1969, Kenyatta made a

choice to align himself with the West, which was in contradiction to his previous vice-

president, Jaramogi Odinga, who had looked to Russia and China. Odinga was a strong

representative of Luo interests, and was arrested in the same year. This split followed

the controversy surrounding the assassination of the popular Luo poltician Tom Mboya,

whose death many suspected was arranged by powerful Kikuyu wanting to reduce the

Luo influence in power. Riots in Kisumu (in the Luo Nyanza Province) resulted, which

were so severe that Kenyatta’s motorcade was forced to flee, and the president shunned

the region for the next ten years. This region, Odginga’s homeland, would continue to

be marginalised throughout Moi’s entire presidency (Kimani, 2008).

Having decided to become a western allied foothold in Africa, Kenyatta’s general

economic record was regarded as impressive. Gross domestic product rose on average

by 6 and 6.5 per cent throughout the 1960s and 70s respectively. This period of

prosperity, which is one of the foundations of the Kenyan exception stereotype, was

particularly reflected in the development of the city of Nairobi, which became a hub for

international economic and political conferences. However, these figures must be

considered in the sobering light of Kenya’s population growth at the time. Just before

independence, Kenya’s population was at 8 million; by the year of Kenyatta’s death,

1978, it had all but doubled to 15 million, representing one the fastest rates of growth in

the world (Meredith 2006, pp.265-266). Despite his early communist beginnings and

early contacts with Moscow, once in power Kenyatta rejected the trend towards

socialism among the new African Republics. The term ‘Herambee’ (in English: ‘pulling

together’) which is still the motto of the Republic of Kenya, was used by Kenyatta as a

slogan. Kenyatta favoured individual enterprise and entrepreneurship to the national-


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isation programmes that were particularly popular throughout the continent at the time

(Rowe, 2009).

Kenyatta’s capitalist politic aroused dissent, even within the constraints of the one

party system and was accordingly seriously challenged a number of times throughout

his career. First by Bildad Kaggia (a former Mau Mau leader), followed by Oginga

Odinga his vice-president, and finally by a young Kikuyu politician, and then J.M.

Kariuki in the 1970s. As mentioned above, Odinga, a prominent Luo politician (and a

surname that features once again in Kenyan politics), had criticised Kenyatta’s

government for siding with the West. Odinga advocated nationalisation programmes and

a new alignment with the Eastern Bloc. Odinga founded a new party, but this fledgling

party was harassed and repressed at every turn, Finally, Kenyatta had Odinga arrested

and the Party was officially banned (Meredith 2006 ; Rowe 2009). Kariuki, also a

Kikuyu (the same ethnic background as Kenyatta) did not use ethnicity, but rather relied

upon the growing discontent with the corruption and increasingly extreme inequality

under Kenyatta’s rule, as his political base. Kariuki aimed to replace Kenyatta after his

death and became the champion of the landless and the poor. Whilst Kenyatta remained

widely popular until his death, his direct family members and associates had blatantly

profited through corruption. Kenyatta’s daughter and wife had business connections and

investments in almost every major industry in Kenya, and were often referred to as ‘the

royal family’ (Meredith, 2006). By the time of his death, Kenyatta had mostly retreated

from politics, leaving government to family and trusted ministers. Coupled with an

appreciation of the stability that had been achieved in Kenya, Kenyatta had maintained

a West-friendly policy course, which Moi, Kenyatta’s successor, was to try and continue

(Rowe, 2009).

2.4Moi:OnePartyRuleforKenyaandthepoliticalemergenceofKalenjin“I would like ministers, assistant ministers and others to sing like a parrot after me. That is how we can progress.” Moi, 1984 (Mr. Moi’s Parrots, 1987).

Daniel Arap Moi was able to secure power after Kenyatta’s death in 1978. Moi

had long been involved in central politics in Kenya: he travelled to London to discuss

the options for independence, but it was only after Kenyatta that he decided to make a

mark for himself. While Moi continued in Kenyatta’s tradition of a one-party KANU-

state, and carried on many of the prevailing policies, Moi could also be described as a

‘tribalist’ (Meredith, 2006; Wrong, 2009). He intended to undermine the long-

established power base of the Kikuyu in Kenya, and instead sought to benefit members


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of his own Kalenjin tribe. Although Moi ruled with an iron grip in Nairobi, he had

originally been in favour of a transfer of power from the centre to the periphery, referred

to as Majimboism in Kenya, which would thereby lessen Kikuyu influence.

The term Kalenjin is one telling example of the lingering colonial impacts upon

ethnic identity in Kenya. A short description of the Kalenjin also shows how the

political history of Kenya continues to play a role in current ethnic politics. The

Kalenjin people are estimated to constitute around 13 percent of the population of

Kenya. However, the term Kalenjin did not come into existence until the 1950s. Until

this point, the Kalenjin were referred to as ‘Nanji-speaking peoples.’ Kalenjin are

actually an ethnic grouping of eight culturally and linguistically related but distinct

tribes: the Kipsigis, Nandi, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Pokot, Sabaot, and the Terik.

Their present-day homeland is Kenya's western highlands and the Rift Valley (Kalenjin,

2009). As mentioned above, the KADU party (led by Masinde Muliro, Daniel arap Moi,

and Ronald Ngala) represented smaller and less advantaged ethnic groups of the Great

Rift Valley and coastal areas, including the Kalenjin tribes. KADU was an advocate of

‘Majimboism’ (translated as ‘regionalism’ in Swahili), which would create ethnic-

based, semi-autonomous political regions in Kenya (Chronology for Kalenjin in Kenya,

2007). However, Kenyatta’s centralism prevailed over this position. Whilst Moi was

then able to enjoy the almost-royal powers of the presidency that Kenyatta had

established, the problem was that his own tribal constituency supported regionalist

policies. The huge excesses of corruption and repression employed by Moi, in order to

‘maintain order’ in Kenya cannot be overstated. Moi managed to stay in power for

twenty-four years, and, as Kenyatta before, ensured that his family and close associated

massively profited from their time in office. Moi’s term is often compared, in ethnic

terms, to those of Kenyatta; whereas under Moi it was the ‘Kalenjin’s turn to eat’

(Wrong, 2009).

In 1992, the 14th year of Moi’s presidency, and ten years after Moi officially

declared Kenya to be a one-party state, multi-party elections were held after a year of

significant violence occurring in various parts of the country. Before analysing the three

electoral years of 1992, 1997, and 2007/8, I will next discuss the theoretical approaches

to understanding civil wars, and their applicability in the case of Kenya1.

1 This paper is part of Seminar on Analyses of Civil Wars in Africa. Two colleagues also worked with me on the case of Kenya. Thus, in this essay I continually restrict myself to a focus on ethnicity as a factor, because my two colleagues each dealt with political and economical explanations respectively.


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3.TheoreticalFoundations

3.1CulturalExplanationsofCivilWars:theroleofethnicity

Cultural explanations are one of three major approaches to understanding civil wars,

with the main focus being on religion and ethnicity. Whilst there are some small

religious fault-lines in Kenya, these played no significant role in the violence between

1992 and 2008; thus the focus of this essay is primarily on ethnicity. Important to

mention at this juncture is that all across the globe, complex constellations of varying

ethnicities mostly have managed to, and continue to, live in relative harmony and

certainly in peace with each other. In this regard it must be questioned: what causes

some ethnic groupings to occasionally exercise violence against certain other ethnic

groups? Furthermore, to what extent can ethnicity be considered the main, or most

important, causal factor or main attributive element in explaining the outbreak and

occurrence of civil wars and conflict?

Ethnicity is a loaded term in everyday use and can serve as a quick label to

distinguish people or groups from one another. This term also invokes associations of

homogeneity, historical and customary allegiances. Another mental connection that is

often made with ethnicity is that it something ‘essential’ or primordial; something we

are born with (Cramer, 2008). This simple understanding of group identity is often

supported by the news media that, when reporting on a complex conflict, seeks to

simplify the situation by describing many conflicts as being ethnic conflicts. In order to

better understand the theoretical complexities associated with the concept and reality of

ethnicity, this paper distinguishes between macro- and micro-level approaches and

analyses, whilst noting that these two levels can have an affect on one another.

3.2Macro‐LevelApproachestoEthnicity:GroupswithinStateApproaches to ethnicity as a subject matter vary within the social sciences and can be

broadly divided into three categories: primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist.

Samuel Huntington’s over-cited (but also often over-simplified) Clash of Civilisations is

a classic example of the primordial approach to ethnicity and religion. This perspective

sees ethnicity and religion as natural categories, which can be taken at face value and

analysed as such. Cultural differences thus lead to the formation of alliances and

groupings and conflicts occur along ‘cultural frontlines’. Political leaders are then seen

as representing the dogmatic differences between the groups and are able to channel the


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mistrust of the ‘other’ whilst building upon a sense of solidarity within the ‘natural’

groupings. Mistrust of the other can then quickly lead to a willingness among members

of the same group to set about pursuing their political goals by military/violent means.

Huntington’s thesis particularly, and the ‘primordial’ position in general have been

seriously and widely questioned and criticised by numerous authors2 and will

accordingly not be employed in the analysis that follows.

I prefer a more constructivist definition of ethnicity offered by Kasfir (1976: 77)

that accounts for the constructed elements of identity, whilst noting concrete factors that

enable classification and analysis:

Ethnicity contains objective characteristics associated with common ancestry, such as language, territory, cultural practices and the like. These are perceived by both insiders and outsiders as important indicators of identity so that they become the bases mobilizing social solidarity and which in certain situations result in political activity (emphasis added).

Whilst noting elements such as language and common heritage (ancestry), this

definition also recognises the importance of the perception of such factors. An example

of the changing perceptions of the importance of culture and ethnicity can be seen when

contrasting the nationalist Europe of the early 1900s, which then experienced two

catastrophic world wars, and the increasingly transnational, regional EU at the

beginning of the twenty first century.

More convincing than primordial arguments are the instrumentalist and

constructivist approaches to understanding ethnicity in the context of conflict. Simply

stated, primordial approaches attribute causality to ethnicity (and/or religion); whereas

these other approaches perceive ethnicity to be a constructed identity and a factor that

can be exploited in order to further political, social or economic aims. As the Carnegie

Commission (1997: 30) stated:

Mass violence results when leaders see it as the only way to achieve their political objectives, and they are able to mobilize groups to carry out their strategy. Without determined leaders, groups may riot but they do not start systematic, sustained campaigns of violence to achieve their goals; and without mobilized groups, leaders are unable to organize a fight.

Instrumentalists see socio-economic factors as being the main underlying causes of

conflicts that at first appear to be ethnic.

This does not, however, mean that ethnicity is of no importance, but rather that

2 See for example Amartya Sen’s recent publication: Identity and Violence: the illusion of destiny in German: die Identitätsfalle: warum es keinen Krieg der Kulturen gibt. Horowitz also shows the limits of a primordialist understanding of ethnicity when examining inter-ethnic violence (1985; 2003).


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ethnicity can be employed as a mobilising factor. Without such identities it is possible

that conflicts would not take place in the form that they do, and most probably, those

who serve to gain from such mobilisations would have a much harder time garnering

support for their military designs. Cramer (2006: 102) argues that “various forms of

collective identity play important organisational roles in the production of violent

conflict. By calling on historical memory (mythical or otherwise) and on cultural

markers of loyalty and values they lend depth to political experience.” This collective

identity, ethnicity, can then be useful in abstracting individuals from their personal

biographies; making them a part of something bigger, more important or heroic.

Accordingly, emphasising, politicising and mobilising this identity can be a useful

method for leaders, elites or ‘entrepreneurs.’ Kreuzer (2005) and Posner (2004) both

demonstrate that elites can play an important role in the construction and spreading of

ethnic and religious identities, and more disturbingly, that in some cases these identities

first begin to gain salience for the parties involved only once violence and/or escalation

takes place.

Some authors also point to the existence of status hierarchies between ethnic

groups within a state (Horowitz, 1985 & 2003; Petersen, 2002). Depending on the

perceived legitimacy of this ‘ranking’ and the relevant status position a group occupies

within the hierarchy, this can lead to inter-group discrimination that attempts to degrade

the other competing groups relative status3. Once again, it is the perception, the extent

to which the actors concerned (in this case the members of the groups, and the groups as

agents as a whole) perceive the relative imbalance or inequality among groups and

determine this to be unjust, that is important. In turn, this perception is not a wholly

organic process; it too, is open to myth making and can be affected by the designs of

influential individuals and be instrumentalised. In this regard a socially constructed

approach to understanding the formation, retention, development and salience of ethnic

groups is important, whilst at the same time recognising the plasticity of ethnicity, and

the extent to which ethnic groups can be instrumentalised.

When analysing ethnicity from a quantitative perspective, there are a number of

possible ethnic political constellations, which can explain the chances of, and have

differing effects on, the outbreak of civil war. An ethnically fractionalised (or

pluralistic) society is where there are many smaller ethnic groups and no one ethnicity

3 This line of reasoning follows from Tajfel and Turners Social Identity Theory (1979; 1986) which is discussed in much further detail, along with the application of this theory by Horowitz and Petersen, in the following section 3.2.


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makes up a significant enough proportion of the population. A polarised society (as

discussed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005) entails a society comprised of two

major ethnic groups of relatively equal size. In a dominant or majority constellation

there is one ethnic group that makes up between 45 and 90 percent of the population. A

further schema has been put forward by Cederman and Girardin (2007), where the

presence of a smaller ethnic minority in power is proposed to increase the chances of a

civil war. However, this finding has been severely and empirically called into question

by Fearon, Kasara and Laitin (2007). These various approaches attempt to construe a

causal correlation in which the numbers of people of a certain ethnicity, and the number

of differing ethnicities within a given state have an effect on the likelihood of conflict

breaking out.

However, as Posner notes, “by not capturing the depth of the divisions between

ethnic communities, indices of ethnic fractionalization leave out a potentially important

part of the explanation for the variation we observe in economic performance in cases

of ‘ethnic’ fractionalization for 190 countries” (Posner, 2004: 852). Thus the interaction

between ethnicity and economy is left out. Furthermore, it is very problematic and

difficult to summarize the ethnic landscape of a country with a single measure as

countries contain multiple dimensions of ethnic cleavage. Thus the ethnic fraction-

alisation of a country has been analysed in concurrency with variables like the influence

of horizontal social inequality along ethnic cleavages (Østby, 2008). Accordingly,

neither inequality, nor ethnic heterogeneity as a variable is significant in explaining the

outbreak of civil war by itself. Whilst numerous studies demonstrate empirical progress

made on the role of ethnicity in civil war, the difficulties in operationalising this

complex variable are considerable.

As constructivists will point out, ethnicity is not the only identity that an

individual possesses. Societies are complex constellations of individuals with

overlapping constructed identities. These simultaneous identities wax and wane in terms

of relevance and salience. It is often the case that only once a situation or process has

begun to escalate that polarising structures begin to develop (Chandra/Wilkinson 2008;

Posner 2004, cited in Hasenclever 2009: 8) As Østby (2008) argues, this ethnic identity

may only first gain salience when combined with common economic grievances that

afflict other members of the same delineable group. In this regard, the identity of

repressed, cheated, exploited is combined with that of a certain ‘cultural’ (be it

language, custom, ethnicity, religion) identity, which then serves as a source of people

ripe for mobilisation. These identities can sometimes conflict with other identities such


13

as class or national belonging. In summing up the complexity of determining the cause

(or better, causes) of civil war, Malone and Nitzschke (2005:5) abridge the findings of

numerous case studies by stating that

the onset of violent conflict was triggered by the interaction of economic motives with long-standing grievances over the mismanagement or inequitable distribution of resource wealth, exclusionary and repressive political systems, inter-group disputes, and security dilemmas exacerbated by unaccountable and ineffective states. (cited in Gottwald 2009: 78)

Thus, one can note that the degree of ethnic homogeneity is not the only factor affecting

the likelihood of civil war and violence. The political institutions of the state, and the

extent to which they accommodate the ethnic make-up of the populations living and

participating in the state, can also determine the propensity for ethnicity to feature as a

factor in mobilising violence (Wolff, 2007). The specific historical circumstances

affecting the state and ethno-political relations within it also have a large effect. For

example, the United States of America has a history spanning multiple centuries of

liberal-democratic institutions that (theoretically) had to accommodate waves upon

waves of settlers and immigrants with hugely varying ethnic backgrounds. The majority

of ex-colony states have had, in contrast, only half a century to consolidate mechanisms

and state institutions that redistribute wealth and services among the various ethnic

communities (see for example Esman, 2004).

Recently the interaction between variables such as cultural cleavages, political or

economic discrimination against particular ethnic (or religious) groups, and the

necessary perception of such discrimination have been identified as increasing the

likelihood of the outbreak of civil war (see for example Gottwald 2009). More critically,

the capacity of elites (if they are present) to be able to manipulate, instrumentalise and

thus utilize ethnic belonging and/or identity to achieve their goals through violence

must also be analysed, in order to understand the role ethnicity plays in the outbreak of

civil war.

Reiterating Gottwald’s (2009) sentiment that quantitative studies, dealing with the

influence of (the factor) grievance(s) on the occurrence and outbreak of civil wars, have

suffered due to the inadequacy and limitedness of the indicators employed, I wish to

now discuss qualitative approaches to the question of identity.


14

3.2QualitativeQuestionsforaSpecificCaseStudyAnalysisofEthnicity

As mentioned at various junctures above, the complexity of ethnicity as a variable

demands serious analytical attention. Some particular considerations concerning this

are: 1) the specific historical context and discourse of a particular ethnicity, 2) the

political structures that a particular ethnicity moves within (or transcends) – for example

is the ethnicity in question confined within a set of national boundaries, 3) whether the

state has an ethno-cultural base like Saudi Arabia, Northern Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, or

if it is multi-ethnic/pluralist like the United States of America or the Republic of Kenya,

4) how well established the state structures are, and to what extent pluralism (ethnic

heterogeneity) has been incorporated into the political process, 5) the interaction

between ethnicity and class and 6) whether there are specific ethnically-based dominant

emotions, such as grievances/greed/fear. Finally the intergenerational effect of the

reproduction of ethnicity must be considered.

Whilst noting the importance of understanding how ethnicity as an element

factors into the phenomenon of civil wars, macro-level focussed analyses tell us very

little about what ethnicity means for an individual and his/her behaviour that

corresponds to this identity. For at the end of the day, civil wars fought between ethnic

groups are composed of individuals that are in violent conflict with one another, despite

being ‘citizens’ in the same country. What separates those many individuals who belong

to different ethnicities that live non-violently together around the world from those who

become involved in the conduct of mass organised violence against members of other

ethnicities? In furthering the qualitative analysis of ethnicity, the next section examines

micro-level processes that describe an individual’s behaviour, with particular reference

to ethnicity.

3.3Micro‐LevelApproachestoEthnicity:theIndividualandtheGroup

An analysis of the individual and their relation to, and interaction with, a group must

begin with and acknowledge the work of Tajfel and Turner (1979) who expanded upon

the body of work of Sherif (inter alia 1961 and 1969) in social psychology. Tajfel and

Turner particularly analysed and refined Sherif’s realistic conflict theory (RCT). In

summarising this theory they write:

The R.C.T states that opposing claims to scarce resources, such as power, prestige, or wealth, generate ethnocentricism and antagonism between


15

groups. Therefore, low status should intensify out-group hostility in groups that are politically economically, or socially subordinate.

Tajfel and Turner discussed the interaction between the group and the individual, not

only in terms of the differences between how groups and individuals behave, interact

and react, but in terms of how ‘belonging to the group’, in of itself, has a social-

psychological effect on the individual. They also questioned the objective nature of ‘in-

compatible group interests’ (implicit in the RCT) and argued that not only were such

incompatibilities not always sufficient to generate conflict; they were not even always

necessary (Tajfel & Turner 1979: 38). Their arguments are based upon a body of

experiments they conducted throughout the 1970s, which demonstrated the readiness of

individuals allotted into groups to discriminate positively towards their ‘group-mates’

and negatively against those not belonging to the group. They argue that this polarised

perception towards the ‘in-group’ and against the ‘out-group’ contributes to the

individual’s sense of self-worth (page 40). Thus, negative evaluation of the out-group

also contributes to a positive sense of self-identity, which is then reinforced through

membership in the group. Due to the close connection of self-identity and self-esteem, it

follows that the individual attempts to feel good about themselves. However, Tajfel and

Turner also point out that such intergroup comparisons are not always positive in terms

of relative self-evaluations. If the comparison with the out-group leads to a negative

evaluation on the in-group, then the individual, as well as the group will attempt to

redress this. How this is done and whether discrimination occurs depends on a number

of factors: 1) whether the status of the group within the larger hierarchy is perceived as

legitimate or not; 2) the permeability of the group and how demarcated the group is; and

3) the instability of the general society/system (Tajfel and Turner, cited in Gottwald

2009: 79).

The direct ramifications of this in-group out-group dynamic for civil conflict are

noted Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 44) in reference to social competition, in which

the group members may seek positive distinctiveness through direct competition with the out-group [and] may try to reverse the relative positions of the in-group and the out-group on salient dimensions. … We can hypothesise, … that this strategy will generate conflict and antagonism between subordinate and dominant groups insofar as it focuses on the distribution of scarce resources.

Tajfel and Turner went on to refine these arguments in the formulation of their

Social Identity Theory (SIT), based on the psychological advances made in the 1970s.


16

In later works they also mention conditions and specifications that impinge upon the

likelihood of the group identity leading to conflict.

In the field of social psychology the phenomenon of in-group, out-group

dynamics has since been heavily researched and documented. Indeed the social element

present in each of us means that even when it comes to the most mundane indicators,

subjects will generate in-group feelings, and react to a perceived out-group

accordingly.4 The debate on the exact nature of the individual, if indeed there exists

such a thing, is far and beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, it is no wonder

that cultural indicators and cultural identities, which are often cultivated and developed

and retained over hundreds or thousands of years, can serve as deep points of difference

by which a group defines itself. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, the majority of

groups across the world, despite clearly defining themselves relative to other groups,

live in peace5 with one another.

Around the same time of the articulation of the SIT, Donald Horowitz (1985)

produced an impressive analysis of how ethnic groups operate in conflict. Horowitz

worked with Tajfel and Turner’s analysis of intergroup interactions and transferred this

to the realm of inter-ethnic group relations. As Gottwald notes, while ethnicities can be

differentiated on the base of race, skin colour, language, religion or other criteria;

Horowitz denotes permanence as the most important indicator of ethnic identity. This

permanence ensures that individuals will not come and go from this ethnic group

(Horowitz, 1985, cited in Gottwald, 2009: 79).

Horowitz begins his examination of ethnicity by looking at the contributions of

social psychology to understandings of group belonging. By examining vast amounts of

data stemming from the decolonisation period of the 1960s Horowitz demonstrates how

colonial administrations, time and again, deliberately selected out and differentiated

ethnicities, often favouring a specific group in the running of the administration of the

colony. Recalling the effect this is likely to have according to Tajfel and Turner, it

follows that this led to negative feelings amongst the out-group(s) and begins to explain

4 During my undergraduate degree in social psychology, I was involved in experiments that demonstrated that in-group out-group distinctions can be made by individuals, randomly selected, who define themselves as preferring a certain type of art (e.g “Us Kadinsky Fans” vs. “those Picasso admirers”). More extensive testing was carried out in camp scenarios where people were simply divided into two teams, who then demonstrated alarming levels of cultivated hostility based solely upon this first arbitrary distinction. 5 As any student of Peace and Conflict studies knows, defining the word peace is an important process. Whilst I subscribe to a more Galtungesque understanding of peace, for the purposes of this paper, peace here can be understood as referring to the absence of war and violent conflict.


17

the serious grievances that these ethnicities have. This in turn led to the use of violence

as an instrument with which to redress the perceived injustice. Horowitz reminds us of

the mobilising strength of a group upon an individual when he writes: “The

improvement of the groups condition… may be a more powerful motivation for

participation in collective action than is improvement of the participating individual’s

condition.” Furthermore, just like members of any group, members of an ethnic group

exhibit typical characteristics of in-group out-group bias. Additionally, however, “they

appear frequently to engender more loyalty from their members than competing group-

types do and to engage in severe conflict with other ethnic groups” (Horowitz, 2003:

47).

Thus, the ethnic group can be considered like any other social group, but often

entails very powerful feelings of affiliation, which are particularly strengthened by the

intergenerational nature of ethnic identity. Ethnicity is reproduced and reinforced

through a mixture of socialisation and genetic similarity (Horowitz, 2003: 47-50).

Whilst noting the significant role the family plays in the reproduction and socialisation

of ethnicity, Horowitz does not rule out the space for the social construction of ethnicity.

Just as Tajfel and Turner were able to construct and/or redraw the identity boundaries of

arbitrary research groups, so too can the boundaries of groups in real life be changed.

This also holds for Ethnic groups.

At this juncture the primordialist approach can be recalled. An oversimplified

primordialist approach to ethnicity at the level of analysis of the individual would see

ethnicity as something that an individual is born with and that remains a (highly

significant, if not defining) factor in the individual’s life. At the other side of the debate

is a pure constructivist position, that sees ethnicity as a very malleable attribute, that is

not only instrumentalised but even sometimes conjured, defined and made salient by

elites and other individuals that can profit from this constructed identity. Here I agree

with Horowitz in attempting to find a golden middle between the two positions. One

must not belittle the deep attachments to ethnicity as one of the cultural cornerstones of

a person’s identity. Nonetheless, ethnicities change over time, die out, are born, expand,

merge with other ethnicities, and are ultimately just one of a number of identities that an

individual possesses. Thus it is fair to say that elites are limited in their scope as to what

they can achieve when invoking ethnic allegiances. Whilst “those with interests [can]

seek to harness [these] passions, … constraints of the field in which group interactions

occur limit what elites can do and what interests they can pursue.” Ultimately, “the

freedom of elites to foment conflict and violence is limited by their followers’ definition


18

of the situation and by what they would be willing to fight over” (Horowitz, 2003: 50).

In other words, elites neither conjure up ethnic identities nor do they coerce individuals

into displaying in-group bias towards other ethnic in-group members, whilst

discriminating against ethnically ‘different’ out-group members. The ‘objective’ ethnic

difference is however not the point, if in fact one can point to such a measure, but rather

the perception thereof. Alone the dynamics of inter-group relations determine that

differences will be inflated, and different attributes apportioned as part of the self-

identity building process. But how should one account for the (often seemingly

unexpected) changes in an individual that allow this person to exact violence upon his

neighbour or fellow citizen of a different ethnicity. Leaving aside for now the

multifarious (and previously mentioned) macro-factors, one must consider the process

and motivations that enable individuals to take part in ethnic violence.

Roger Petersen concerned himself with exactly this question in his work,

Understanding Ethnic Violence, in which he examines emotion as a mechanism that ex-

plains shifts in motivation and in turn mediates between cognition and desire (2003:

20). Whereas Horowitz focussed on the historical groundings of ethnicity (i.e

colonisation) and particularly stressed the severity of cases involving disputes over the

original occupants of territory; Petersen maintains that ethnic conflict simply results

from discrimination against one ethnic group, chiefly when through structural changes

they become aware of the discrimination. With a particular focus on the three emotions

Fear, Hatred and Resentment, Petersen demonstrates what effects (in terms of ethnic

conflict) these mechanisms can have on an individual’s actions. These emotional

processes/mechanisms help explain why individuals (in a certain discriminated ethnic

group) seemingly suddenly become disposed towards violence in times of structural

change (Petersen, 2003: 21). Petersen agrees with Horowitz’s position that both

discrimination and the degree of justification play a decisive role in determining the

chance of ethnic conflict occurring, but adds that a certain mobilising potential must be

present, as well.

In concluding this section covering theoretical approaches to the factor ethnicity, I

would like to draw attention to Cramer (2006: 104-108) who urges caution in handling

the ‘effect’ of ethnicity. Whilst there is no doubt that there ethnicity can be of

significance in violent conflict; there is nothing automatic about it (p.104). Ethnicity is

often treated as an independent variable that has an effect upon the dependent variable

outbreak or occurrence of conflict/civil war. Many analytical approaches attempt to

attribute a degree of causality to ethnicity. “However, ethnicity is not a discrete social


19

category with internal consistency and predictable, mechanistic functions and imp-

lications. It is not independent as a political variable” (Cramer, 2006: 106). It is often

treated as a factor that can be treated across time and space in varying contexts. I am

sceptical of this simplification, and thus wish to demonstrate the importance of

understanding the specifics of the historic context, in which ethnicity is both a

constructed subject and object, influenced by key political economic developments. In

the following section the ethnic violence as it occurred in Kenya in the stipulated time

period will be described. This will be followed by explanations for the occurrence of the

violence, and its very visible ethnic qualities.

4.EthnicViolenceinKenya(1992,1997and2007/08)

Before describing the major tendencies of violence that occurred around each of

the three aforementioned elections, it is important to examine the demographic make-up

of Kenyan society.

4.1CulturalDemographicIndicatorsinKenya

Even the question of statistics raises questions about the importance of ethnicity to

understanding politics in Kenya. In 1999, the results on the ethnic composition of

Kenya were deemed too sensitive and were thus not released (BBC, “Contentious

Census,” 2009). Kenya has 42 recognised tribes, which can be categorised into three

ethn0-linguistic groups, namely: the Bantus, the Cushites and the Nilotes (Cf. Oucho,

2002). The Bantu ethnic group comprises approximately 70 percent of the country's

population, whilst occupying less than 30 percent of the land. Kenya’s Bantu people

mostly occupy the coastal, central, western and eastern provinces of the country. Tribes

belonging to the Bantu ethnicity include: the Kikuyu (Kenya's largest single ethnic

group; the Embu and Meru tribes (closely related to the Kikuyu); the Luhya, who live in

Western Kenya; the Kamba people of Eastern Kenya; the Kisii tribe from the Rift Valley

region, and the Swahili, Taita and Mijikenda people from Kenya's coastal regions (Dee,

2008).

The Cushites are the smallest of these three groups and are live in the north-

eastern and eastern parts of Kenya and include the Somali, Rendile, Borana and Oromo

tribes. After the 2009 Census, the publishing of the results has been suspended

indefinitely, because of alleged inconsistencies. The Somali population, according to the


20

results, is reported to have grown 140 percent, a finding that is heavily questioned, and

has been declared to represent manipulation by local leaders (Teyie, 2010).

The third group, the Nilotes (derived from the upper Nile River Valley) primarily

reside in Rift Valley and Lake Victoria regions of Kenya. Kenyan Nilotes include the

Luo (River Lake Nilotes); the Maasai, Samburu and Turkana (Plain Nilotes); and the

Kalenjin (Highland Nilotes), who traditionally inhabit the Western Highlands. The

Nilotes, whilst sharing some common linguistic traits, traditionally exhibited very

varied forms of societal organisation, ranging from nomadic pastoralists, fisher folk, to

well established agriculturalists (Dee, 2008).

The largest ethnic groups in Kenya (as a percentage of the total population) are as

follows: Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii

(6%) and Meru (6%), Mijikenda (5%) and Maasai (2%)6. Although dated, Nellis’ (1974,

cited in Elischer, 2008: 11) account of the concentration of ethnicities in Kenya’s

provinces is revealing. For example, whilst Kalenjin only constituted 51 percent of the

population in the Rift Valley Province; this represented 95 percent of all Kalenjins.

Furthermore, 97 percent of the Maasai lived in the Rift Valley. 87 percent of all Luo

resided in Nyanza province, where they made up 63 percent of the total population of

the province. However, 95 percent of all Kisii live in Nyanza, whilst only constituting

31 percent of the population of the province. The Eastern Province is dominated by the

Kamba and Meru/Embu tribes, where 87 percent and 97 percent of the their respective

tribes resided. Due to continued population growth (Kenya’s population has doubled

since 1985) and urbanisation, in part caused by the poor economic conditions in the

latter Moi years, many Kenyans were forced to leave their ‘tribal homelands’ in search

of work in the cities. The growth of Kenya’s increasingly infamous slums in recent

years visibly points to this trend. Current estimates put the Kenyan population at around

the 40 million mark. According to UNICEF statistics, 54 percent of Kenyas were under

the age of 20 in 2008. Moreover, around 8 and half million Kenyans were aged between

10 to 20 years old. This is the generation that was born into the Kenya of hundreds of

thousands of IDPs, and significant numbers of this generation were either born in slums

or temporary camps. These generational considerations will be built upon in the next

section that looks to explain the role ethnicity played in the violence of the 1990s and

2007/8. But first the main trends of ethnic violence that occurred around the three

elections following the introduction of multi-party politics will be described. 6 The other/smaller tribes and communities make up approximately 10% of Kenya’s population. Cf: CIA World Factbook, 2010; Elischer


21

4.2DescriptionoftheEthnicViolencein1992,1997and2007/8.

In 1992, directly after the exposure of the Goldenberg scandal, aptly described as “the

Moi presidency’s crowning disgrace,” in which the extent of the ‘feeding7’ that had

taken place under Moi’s regime was revealed; Kenya had its first multiparty elections.

Nonetheless, it was to take another ten years before the ‘big man’ Moi and the KANU

party would truly suffer defeat in the 2002 election. Moi had come under increasing

pressure to reform governance and because of the ailing state of the Kenyan economy,

international capital was a necessity. Moi continued to justify upholding the one-party

system and warned that the introduction of multi-party politics would lead to instability

and chaos. In 1992, despite the fact that Moi did not even achieve 50 per cent of the

vote, due to the (mostly) ethnic fragmentation among the opposition he was able to stay

in power. As Wrong (2009: 140) observed: “the clashes [in 1992] seemed desgined to

prove [Moi’s] thesis correct. Osamba (2001: 38) notes that throughout the 1990s there

was an “upsurge in cases of conflict and violence in Kenya since the re-introduction of

political pluralism.” What started off as more ‘sporadic outbreaks of violence’ led to the

massive movement of peoples and the creation of hundreds of thousand of internally

displaced persons (IDPss), an entrenchment of the tit-for-tat resentment between

ethnicities, and culminated in severe violence, small-scale ethnic cleansing and

widespread atrocities that by the end of 2007 had shocked the world. Finally the long-

held view of Kenya as an ‘African Exception, a stable place where one could do

business, was laid bare and buried.

Whilst incidences of violence carried on throughout the period, particularly in

rural areas, three noticeable peaks in conflict occur around the elections of 1992, 1997,

and 2007. Going into explicit detail of all the cases of violence in each year is beyond

the scope of this paper. In the sections that follow, I will briefly outline the violence

around the election, the main perpetrators, who the victims were, and where and under

what circumstances the violence took place. Given the length of the period being

considered (fifteen years), the amount of deaths hardly amount to a sustained civil war.8

7 Feeding is a typical Kenyan reference to eating up the state’s resources. This theme for corruption led Wrong (2009) to accordingly title her book on corruption in Kenya: “It’s our turn to eat.” It is alleged that at least 600 million dollars was involved in this single case, equivalent to more than 10 per cent of Kenya’s GDP (see Meredith, 2006 and Wrong, 2009). 8 Kenya certainly does not meet the quantitative requirements of the 1,000 deaths per year of conflict definition. Nonetheless, in the three months following the 2007 election debacle, over 1,000


22

However, the repetitive nature (in terms of geographic hot-spots), the obvious ethnic

cleavages, and the increasing brutality are certainly cause for alarm. For more detailed

and categorical accounts of the violence see Kmenyi and Ndung’u (2005: 128-138) for

violence in the 1990s and International Crisis Group (2008) for a thorough description

of the more recent violence.

Beginning in September 1991, bands of Kalenjin ‘warriors’ conducted attacks

and arson primarily against Luo, Kikuyu, Luhyia and Kisii throughout the Rift Valley.

Whilst these attacks began as small-scale skirmishes, the scale increased in the year

1992, covering areas in which over fifty per cent of Kenya’s population was affected by

the violence. (Osamba, 2001: Kimenyi & Ndung’u, 2005). Resulting from this violence

approximately 1,000 Kenyans lost their lives, mostly Kikuyus, and over 100,000 were

forced to flee the region. As mentioned in the historical section of this paper, the Rift

Valley was ‘settled’ by many Kenyans from other regions as a result of the ‘White

Highlands’ land policy under colonial rule. These were predominantly Kikuyus (but

also Luo) who were seen as non-indigenous ‘immigrants’, and were thus terrorised in

order to force them to leave the province/region. In this time, led by Kalenjin ministers

prominent in the region, the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (sometimes this

tribal alliance is shortened to “Kamatusa9” in the literature) tribes were told that they

should consider the entire rift valley ‘their’ exclusive zone (Meredith, 2006).

Whilst Moi had initially responded to the founding of the FORD group (Forum

for the Restoration of Democracy) by declaring it an ‘illegal organisation’ whose

supporters would be ‘crushed liked rats’ (cited in Meredith, 2006: 402), he was forced

to change his tune due to international pressure. Even so, Moi’ regime was able to tip

the scales in its favour, by manipulating the voting boundaries and adjusting the

weightings of the electorates – making it more than twice as difficult to win a seat in a

non-KANU electorate. Added to this, there is ample evidence of financial and logistical

assistance to those carrying out violence aimed at clearing non-sympathetic ethnicities

out of crucial electorates. Furthermore, the police, who were mostly supporters of

KANU and Moi, repeatedly demonstrated absolute partisanship by not stopping

violence; even in cases joining in!

Many commentators on the 1992 elections note that irrespective of the degree to

deaths (according to International Crisis Group, 2009) have resulted from the violence. 9 Together these four ethnic groups represent 15 percent of the population, whereas the Kalenjin alone, only rank as the fourth largest ethnic group in Kenya.


23

which Moi was involved10, the violence helped skew electorate numbers ethnically in

his favour and helped instil doubt in the mind of people considering the plausibility of

multi-party elections. Meredith (2006:403) states that Moi “made full use of his control

of government machinery to obtain funds, harass the opposition and manipulate the

results.” Furthermore, this violence, which in fact could be considered confined ethnic

cleansing was to have a very detrimental polemic effect on many otherwise non-tribal

Kenyans, and their approach to Kenyan politics. These events sparked calls to revitalize

the Gikuyu11-Embu-Meru Association (GEMA)and led to the establishment of defence

militias (Wrong, 2009). John Githongo, a Kenyan journalist, later to become one of the

most renowned whistleblowers in Kenya, commented in 1992: “Kenyans are now

keenly aware of their ethnicity in a negative, destrucitive sense… we voted largely

along tribal lines [in 1992]. We sowed the wind; I earnestly hope we shall not soon be

reaping the whirlwind” (cited in Wrong, 2009: 140). Meanwhile, the Ford opposition

had split into two factions: a Kikuyu-based faction, ‘Ford Asili’ and a Luo faction,

‘Ford Kenya,’ led by Oginga Odinga (Raila’s father).

Two years after the election in 1992, approximately 500 kilometres to the west of

Nairobi, Rwanda experienced a terrible genocide, where the vicious dangers of

corruption and ethnic tension were plain for all to see. Kenyans were reportedly

‘baffled’ by these horrific events, but did not often see the ramifications and parallels to

what was occurring in the Rift Valley (Wrong, 2009). Many authors noted that from

1992 onward, conflict lingered and continued in the rift valley. Three years later, Kenya

was to experience violence that, unfortunately once again, occurred along ethnic lines.

This time the theatre of focus expanded and included violence in the coastal region, and

many more cases of blatant police repression against political opponents of Moi’s

regime. Unfortunately, the KANU leadership were once again to exploit ethnic violence

to remain in power in the 1997 elections. Klopp and Kamungi (2008: 14) note that

gerrymandering had become commonplace policy, and was often violent, as a means to

‘cleanse’ key constituencies of unwanted Kikuyu and Luo voters. In this context the

KANU policy of Majimboism, not only referred to constitutional reforms toward a

stronger federated state, but rather more to the forced removal of ethnicities to their

original ‘homelands.’

In 1997 ethnic violence reared its head in the coastal region in the districts of

10 Prunier (2008) describes the two elections in the 1990s as “occasions for carefully state-managed ethnic violence.” 11 Kikuyu is sometimes alternatively spelt Gikuyu; thus the acronym GEMA.


24

Mombasa and Kwale. In this case, the Digo (one of the Mijikenda tribes) targeted

ethnicities that had migrated from outside the coastal region, which were mostly

Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo (kimenyi & Ndung’u, 2005). On 13 August 1997, violence

erupted in Likoni, as houses of potential supporters of the opposition were targeted and

destroyed or burnt. Armed groups of bandits terrorised in a very targeted manner,

specific ethnic minorities so as to drive them from the region. Many businesses were

burnt, plundered or destroyed; making the economic survival of the other ethnicities

impossible. In interviews with perpetrators involved in the violence in 1997, Human

Rights Watch (2002) found that KANU politicians had been involved in the preparation

of such plans since 1992. Once again, those who had become internally displaced

persons were not able to vote, which helped Moi ensure continued political dominance

in the Coastal province. Furthermore, cases of police complacency and complicity were

even more pronounced in the lead-up to the 1997 elections12. Osamba estimates, that by

1999, the violence had claimed over 2,500 lives and had led to the displacement of

around 400,00 people (2001: 47-48). Although two electoral commissions correctly

recognised the orchestrated nature of much of the ongoing and spreading violence,

along with damning reports by international and national human rights groups, in which

the guilty parties were clearly identified; those who sponsored the violence evaded

prosecution (Klopp and Kamungi, 2008). In general, whilst the violence around the

1992 election was confined to the provinces of Western, Rift Valley, and Nyanza; by the

election of 1997 most provinces were experiencing some form of violence, along mostly

ethnic lines.

As numerous authors point out, pockets of ethnic violence did occur in 2001 and

2002, including the disturbing emergence of gangs (so-called “private armies”) in the

slums of Kenya’s capital city. (see for example: Kimenyi and Ndung’u, 2005:126).

Nonetheless, having learnt from the electoral losses in 1992 and 1997, the opposition

finally managed to form an alliance that led to a resounding defeat of Moi’s KANU.

Also, following the election, and the high hopes among the wider population for reform,

ethnic violence lulled. Kibaki and the NARC coalition had promised to tackle the

endemic and debilitating problem of corruption, that had been a hallmark of Kenyan

governance since independence. Particularly in Nairobi, there was a tangible

12 It is, however, not so simple, because the police forces also consist of various ethnic fractions. Whilst Moi had seen to it that the army and police were weighed in his favour; in many localities, the police often demonstrated their ethnic belonging when it came to dealing with both perpetrators and victims.


25

atmosphere of excitement among Kenyans and in broader international circles alike (cf.

Wrong, 2006). Nonetheless, by 2005, Kibaki had reneged on almost all of his pre-

election promises, and most importantly failed to bring about a power sharing

agreement stipulated in a memorandum of understanding with Odinga (Wrong, 2009).

This would have significantly increased the executive power of the office of the prime

minister (Odinga). In the same year the government had sponsored a draft-constitution,

which was then put to a referendum. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was

thus thrust into the forefront amid the organisation of the ‘no vote’ against the draft

consititution.

In 2007, in contrast to previous years, most violence occurred after the election.

This represented the disappointment of the electorate at the obviously rigged election

results. Although Luo and Kikuyu had often been common victims of Kalenjin/

KAMATUSA violence in the previous decade, in 2007/2008 they were the main

opponents. The Luo had mostly supported Odinga for President, whereas many Kikuyu

had voted for Kibaki, both of these presidential candidates belonged to the two

respective ethnic groups. Adding to the usual land claim-based traditional conflicts in

the Rift Valley, were brutal violent clashes in the slums of Kenya’s major cities, in

Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret and Mombasa. As the International Crisis Group (2008:1)

reported:

Protests and confrontations with the police rapidly turned into revenge killings targeting representatives of the political opponent’s ethniv base. Kikuyu, Embu and Meru [GEMA] were violently evicted from Luo and Luhya dominated areas, while Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin were chased from Kikuyu-dominated settlements or sought refuge at police stations.

By early February of 2008, over 1,000 Kenyans had died13 in the clashes and over

300,000 people had become IDPs. Whilst this conflict often mirrored or repeated

previous violent outbreaks (in terms of geography and ethnicities involved), revenge

killings were far more frequent in prominence. Once again, numerous cases of violence

did appear to be well organised, funded and intentionally planned. However, there were

also an alarmingly high number of seemingly spontaneous outbreaks of violence. This

violence was carried out by groups of young Kenyans, that often clashed with one

another. 2007/2008 saw the re-emergence of the notorious Mungiki, a Kikuyu based

politico-religious criminal syndicate. There were other slum-based ethnic gangs; the

Taliban (a Luo gang) also playing a significant role in the violence of 2007/8.

13 Various BBC reports on Kenya since 2008 have put the death toll at over 1,300


26

The violence tailed off almost as quickly as it had begun, as political leaders

began to reign in their ethnic support bases; particularly in light of the international

pressure to restore order. Already in February 2008, Kibaki and Odinga had agreed to

enter negotiations during a Kofi Annan led African Union mediation attempt

(International Crisis Group).


27

5.ExplanationoftheRecentConflictinKenya

As obvious as it sounds, the violent conflicts that arose in Kenya’s recent electoral

history are the tragic results of combination of numerous factors that expressed

themselves through violence along ethnic lines of differentiation. This section will first

analyse the factor ethnicity at the macro/quantitative level, before moving onto the

historical, qualitative, and social-psychological level of analysis,

5.1MacroLevelofAnalysis;QuantitativeExplanations

Kenya clearly represents a highly ethnically fractionalised society, with over 42

tribes coexisting in the same state. The largest single ethnic group, the Kikuyu, still only

constitute a fifth of the population, which requires them to seek alliances in multi-party

politics. Not only is Kenya highly ethnically fractionalised, but the tribes are also

geographically fractionalised across the state’s territory. Tribes compete with each other

for access to the states resources, but also over scarce land (the country’s major

resource), and attempt to use state control to generate benefits for members of the tribe.

Thus, fractionalisation can be seen to result in changing patterns of ethnically delineated

conflict, with changing fronts, due to the shifting of power and repositioning of ethnic

interests. However, because the ethnicities are so fractionalised, the chance of civil war

braking out, despite the recurrence of violent clashes and conflict is low, because no one

ethnicity is able to dominate. The state is always viewed as the vehicle for advancing

the interests of the ethnic group, which is why each ethnicity favours government posts

(preferably a favourable president, and/or high cabinet positions) rather than opting for

civil war. The fact that ethnicities that were previously common victims of violence

carried out by a certain ethnicity (e.g Luo and Kikuyu during the Kalenjin instigated

violence of the 1990s) became the main enemies within the space of 10 years,

demonstrates the propensity for leaders to realign themselves and rechannel ethnic

support in new attempts to get into power.

However, whilst these macro-level factors go some way to explain the bi-polar

effect of a highly ethnically heterogeneous/fractionalised state, insofar as it increases the

occurrence of ethnic clashes but reduces the likelihood of civil war, it does not tell us

why ethnicity should be a significant factor. Thus, in the following, a historical,


28

qualitative analysis will be applied to the case of Kenya to better understand why

ethnicity should be a salient identity, that time and again proves to be a mobilising point

for intergroup violence.

5.2AnHistorical,QualitativeExplanationoftheEthnicViolence

The following analysis draws upon the six qualitative questions that I previously

posed in section 3.2 of this paper. Numerous authors writing about the ethnic violence

in Kenya noted that people were shocked and even surprised at the violence.

Unfortunately, neither the violence, nor the ethnic lines of division, along which the

violence occurred are surprising. A closer appraisal of the historical context of ethnicity

in the politics of Kenya reads like a tragedy; in fact, the reader should be expecting the

whole system to erupt into violence more often than it has.

5.2.1 The specific historical context and discourse of ethnicity in Kenya.

Understanding the complexity of ethnic difference, and why different ethnic groups in

Kenya repeatedly carry out violence against one another must begin with an analysis of

the construction of ethnic categories under colonialism. Wrong (2009) argues, that

whilst the peoples living in the territories that were to be declared ‘Kenya’ were no

doubt aware of their ethnic differences, and had on occasion clashed over cattle, land

and women, on the whole there was significant coordination and interaction among

tribes, due to intermarriage, trade and economic interdependence. This was because of

the division of economic structure that commonly existed, with some tribes remaining

on the land and becoming agriculturalist (e.g Kikuyu), and others living more nomadic,

mobile, pastoralist lifestyles (i.e Maasai) (Wrong, 2009). There is no simple way in

which to qualify or quantify the incredibly destructive and fundamental impact of

colonialism. One must caution against using colonialism as a catch-all explanation in

place of a more exact observation of the historical reality; nonetheless, the severity of its

impact and the recurring negative after-affects upon the African Continent must not be

overlooked.

The traditional systems of inter-ethnic interaction in Kenya were violently and

irrevocably changed under colonialism. The British, pre-empting president Moi by half

a century, perfected the art of divide et impera, by reinforcing, and more-often creating,

ethnic categories and exacerbating differences (Meredith, 2006). This was certainly the

case in Kenya. Already in the 1920s, the British had begun to divide up Kenya into 24

ethnic-based administrative districts, native reserves, that would then form the basis of


29

the present province system. These reserves were, however, overcrowded because the

British had confiscated large tracts (almost all) of the fertile farmland in the Rift Valley,

i.e the “White Highlands,” where Africans could not own land. African Kenyans were

only allowed to leave their administrative reserve if they wore the highly unpopular

ethnic identity card. The British, as in other colonial and imperial forms throughout

history were set on not allowing anything like a national sentiment to grow that would

challenge their hegemony.

Thus, tribes responded to the set structures that were placed on them, and had to

learn to ‘play the game.’ The ethnicity Luhya14, first coined as an overarching term, was

born in the 1930s, combining over 20 different sub-groups. Similarly the ethnic

grouping ‘Kalenjin15’ was born out of the Second World War, where a radio broadcast,

aimed at 8 Nandi speaking sub-groups, was used to recruit them for the British war

effort. More frighteningly, because competition among the reserves for scarce resources

was so high, those from other reserves came to be referred to as ‘foreigners.’ The

missionaries also played a role in the concretisation of ethnic groups by solidifying

languages and ascribing names to certain sub-groupings (Wrong, 2009: 48-51). On top

of this, the British tended to enlist certain tribes for certain jobs16. Thus, the Maasai

would be used as mercenaries or rangers, Kambas as porters and kitchen staff, Kikuyus

worked on the land, while Luos work around the household (Wrong, 2009: 49).

Astonishingly, many of the stereotypes that Kenyans associate with one another’s ethnic

group can only be traced back as far as the late colonial period, where ethnic

differentiation was engrained. Hence, one can speak of a proactive, ascribed, and multi-

faceted identity building process under Colonialism in Kenya. The emotion Resentment,

that Petersen describes, can in part be attributed to the fact that political organisation

could only take place at the local, ethnic level, which stunted the development of

nationalist sentiment. In this regard, as the strains of empire began to show after the

Second World War, Kenyan political leaders’ agency had been determined by the

historical political developments imposed upon them. Ethnicity in Kenya had become

an ingrained and salient feature of political organisation.

14 Luhya means: ‘those of the same hearth’ 15 Kalenjin was the name of the broadcast, literally meaning: ‘I say to you.’ 16 As Meredith (2006) makes very clear, this was by no mean a specifically British tactic. Other European colonial powers also specifically employed certain ethnicities in certain jobs, reinforcing the divisions between them.


30

5.2.2 Ethnicity’s place within political structures and boundaries.

The end of colonialism in Kenya coincided with the ascendance of a new generation of

young Kenyans who recognised the historic moment as it occurred, and worked to

inherit the state, not to overthrow it. In the lead-up to independence the dominant

discourse was one of Kenyans versus their colonial oppressors. This discourse (mostly)

overlooked the inherently divisive ethnic structures that the British had implemented,

cultivated, and maintained, and rather sought to gain independence and take over the

state and it mechanisms, which the British had created. With the exception of cross

border raids from Somalia, the ethnic violence in Kenya and Ethnic difference is viewed

wholly in national terms. This is interesting because many of the cultural-linguistic

ethnicities present in Kenya extend across the arbitrary national colonial borders. This

tells us that the colonial process of nation building should be a starting point for an

analysis of ethnicity and ethnic violence in Kenya.

Not only did colonialism have lasting negative effects upon Kenyans in terms of

entrenched ethnic divisiveness and inter-ethnic competition; Kenya also inherited a

system of often unjustly apportioned land and unequal social and infrastructural

investment. Whereas in pre-colonial times the relation of varying tribes to the land had

been at times the source of conflict, it appears to have mostly been fairly symbiotic. An

interesting balance between agriculturalist and pastoralist peoples. Horowitz’s (1985,

2001) arguments about the importance of disputes over land, and question of who were

the original inhabitants of the land, are particularly enlightening in the case of Kenya.

Thus the longest standing ‘ethnic’ conflicts continually occur in the Rift Valley Province

due to the internal migration of ethnicities to this province under colonialism. This led

to a sense of injustice among tribes that had traditionally occupied much of the land in

this area. Accordingly in-group identification (for example amongst the Kalenjin, and

Maasai), then led to more negative appraisals of the out-groups, the foreigners, and

because the ‘original inhabitants’ perceived this to be unjust, there is continual

willingness to redress this imbalance through violence (as Peterson, 2002 and Horowitz,

2001 argue).

5.2.3 Is the State Ethnically Based or Defined?

The legal and automatic response to this question in the case of Kenya is a resounding

‘no.’ When compared to Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Japan17, or other states that attempt to

17 Esman, 2004 cites these among other examples of cultural/ethnically dominated states, compared


31

preserve a sense of a single culture, Kenya is much closer to the USA, in so far as the

constitution makes no reference to ethnicity, and that every ethnic individual is free by

law to live where they please, and practise whatever customs they wish. Nonetheless,

as Meredith reminds us: “Africa’s post-colonial states [were] successors to profoundly

anti-democratic colonial forms of governing” (Meredith, 2006: 4). This was particularly

the case in Kenya, where, after independence, the ruling KANU party made little

attempt to redress specific ethnic historical grievances or institute inclusive measure that

would grant more democratic participation to all ethnicities. Moreover, the British had

conditioned a generation of young Kenyans to ‘play their cards right’ in order to gain

access to (and thus rewards from) the resources of the central state. After Independence

the land from the departing British settlers (in the Rift Valley) was sold on the basis of

willing seller and buyer. This naturally benefitted the ethnicities with more economic

resources at their disposal – in this case the Kikuyu. Although Kenyatta originally

included leaders of almost all major ethnic groups in his Government, the Kikuyu

steadily began to establish themselves as the dominant ethnicity in Kenyan politics.

Having denied the concept of federalism/majimboism, many Kikuyu elites were able to

exploit the strong centralist structure of post-independence Kenya. Furthermore, the

Kikuyu benefitted from the fact that government spending (in the form of physical and

social infrastructure) was invested into the central province and Nairobi, where the

majority of Kikuyu live. It was at this time, that the term ‘Mt. Kenya Mafia’ came into

existence. This is a clear example of group identity building that would be used by other

ethnicities in Kenya to explain injustice and inequality by referring to Kikuyu

hegemony. Thus, the theoretically neutral, liberal, pluralist state was infiltrated and

repeatedly understood as a tool through which ethnic interests could be advanced, rather

than an instrument for developing the nation as a whole. This continued under Moi, for

the Kalenjin, and is generally expressed by references in Kenya to ‘eating,’ meaning

exploiting the centralised state resources to benefit the ethnic group.

5.2.4 Influence of Democratic State Structures and Legitimacy Upon Ethnic Pluralism.

One of the largest tragedies in Kenya that has not often been related to the outbreak of

violence is the persistence and existence of graft and corruption. Bribery had become an

everyday fact of life for most Kenyans by the end of Moi’s presidency. As one

commentator noted, “why pay for a lawyer when you buy yourself a judge?” (cited in

to pluralist/liberal states.


32

Meredith, 2006). In the 1990s scandal after scandal came to the fore, prompting donors

to freeze aid and investment. Often the sums involved amounted to more money than

the aid for that year, representing daunting percentages of GDP (cf. Meredith, 2006;

Wrong, 2009). Under one-party rule, legitimacy was not a question, because KANU

was unstoppable; all opposition was crushed or assimilated. If one sought favours with

the Government, one needed a contact on the inside. Once the cold war was over, there

was little reason for western governments to blindly support the thoroughly

undemocratic position of the Kenyan government. Thus in the 1990s many internal

activists and a number of key external stakeholders began to pressure for the

liberalisation of Kenyan politics.

At this moment opposition politicians had the opportunity to rise above the

ethnocentrist approach to politics by building a genuine democratic reform based

opposition. However, as discussed above, this was not to be the case. Instead Ford split

into competing ethnic fractions, and neither in 1992, nor in 1997, could Moi’s KANU

party be defeated. This served as yet another incentive for Kenyans to revert to

tribal/ethnic political structures in terms of obtaining resources. Furthermore, as

Elischer (2008) argues, Moi and his party were able to win these elections because they

understood the logic of ethnic arithmetic. When politics is reduced to this, and

opposition simply entails fragile, temporary alliances of convenience (as Horowitz

described them), the state and democracy both lose their sense of national legitimacy.

5.2.5 Ethnicity and Class

Although there were eventually trade union movements and strikes in the 1950s,

Kenyatta effectively stalled the development of socio-economic class politics, through

his Harambee18 approach of Kenyans against the colonists, and then the pretence of

liberal equality in spite of the growing economic inequality. A lack of perceived

legitimacy will often result in the search for alternatives. In the case of Kenya, where

the state and its politicians constantly failed Kenyans as whole, it is conceivable that

citizens were compelled to take ethnicity seriously. A just and democratic distribution of

resources after colonialism may well have contributed to a stronger common identity, or

at least the development of socio-economic based parties rather than ethnic coalitions.

Furthermore, the fact that Kenya’s growing slum populations were consistently

overlooked, and that no (ethnic) party sought to address this trans-ethnic problem meant

18 “Let’s all pull/work together” in Swahili.


33

that the frustration and disillusionment in the system grew particularly.

5.2.6 Role of emotions in ethnic violence

Whilst Kenyans repeatedly demonstrated their desire for democracy, and many

individuals risked their lives to reform the corrupt and undemocratic state, the violence

can be seen as representing some very legitimate negative long-held emotions.

Petersen’s (2002) four emotions; fear, hatred, resentment and rage, were certainly

observable in the violence of the last two decades. Fear as a motivating factor

exacerbated animosity among the many IDPs as well as those perceived to be on the

defensive, such as the resort to armed Kikuyu, Embu, and Mera defense squads.

Violence was incited and carried out by Kalenjin throughout the 1990s in the fear that

they would stand to lose the most if Moi lost the elections. In accordance with Petersen

(2002), the Kikuyu have repeatedly been considered a political threat, which helps

explain why other ethnic leaders are able to mobilise violence against them. Hatred (or

‘ancient hatred’ explains the opportunistic violence that occurred during the ‘chaos’

around each of the elections. Old rivalries or disputes are opened up in the face of a lack

of enforcement. Ethnic groups thus exact violence upon groups that they have

traditionally clashed with throughout history. This certainly contributes to an

understanding of the recurring clashes in the Rift Valley in the face of limited

constraints at times of change (such as at election time).

Of the three instrumental emotions postulated by Petersen (2002), resentment is

the most pertinent to the violence in Kenya. Here the group hierarchy is challenged,

changed, or stressed through systemic changes, i.e achievement of Independence, the

death of Kenyatta, the introduction of multi-party politics and contested elections. This

emotion also contributes to an understanding of the violence specifically enacted against

Kikuyu ‘settlers’ in the Rift Valley and other provinces, as well as violence carried out

against successful minorities in regions such as Nyanza, Western and Coast provinces

by the majority ethnic group. Thus ethnicities that were larger and had expanded out of

their traditional ‘heartlands’ were punished, in the absence of central authority, by other

ethnicities that sought to subordinate the ethnicities perceived to be in a higher position

in the ethnic hierarchy. Whilst the violence was a measure used to force ethnicities to

leave provinces and destroy their economic base, this mostly occurred in the context of

elections. In this regard, the violence can be regarded as subordinate to the democratic

process. Nonetheless, it is a sign of mistrust, disappointment and disillusionment in the


34

ability of democracy to bring about results that satisfy ethnic voters.

Finally, Petersen (2002) identifies a non-instrumental emotion, namely rage.

Rather than pursuing political, economic or rational goals, and working as part of a

larger instrumental, planned process; individuals experiencing rage seek an outlet for

their frustration and are looking to take it out on someone, or perhaps anyone (Petersen,

2002: 30). This finding is helpful when attempting to understand the terrifying violence

that broke out in numerous slums. Whilst there is some evidence that some politicians/

organisers had connections to some gangs involved in the violence; much of the

violence continued after the politicians began openly talking about a compromise. In

fact both leaders of the 2007/8 divide began imploring the populace to stop the violence.

As Wrong (2008) reports, although many poor Kikuyu (and people from the other PNU

aligned ethnicities) actually voted for Odinga’s ODM, they were simply killed or

attacked by their fellow slum-dwellers. Although these communities were the repetitive

‘losers’ of corrupt politics that had done nothing to redress the growing inequality, they

got caught up in the ethnically charged atmosphere of violence. Thus, those that had

voted across so-called ethnic lines were reminded of the dangerous salience of ethnicity.

5.3IntergenerationalEffectsuponEthnicity.

One final qualitative consideration, to better understand how it came to such widespread

(and repeating) ethnically divided violence, is to look at intergenerational developments.

As established above, ethnicity is neither fixed, wholly biologically determined, and

static, nor wholly fictional, fluid, and unimportant. An historical constructivist approach

to ethnicity enables an understanding of the importance of politics, power and

economics on the retention, expansion and redefinition of the salience of ethnicity.

Consider the following: the vast majority of those carrying out the violence in

question were born after independence. In contrast, many of those in power (certainly in

the 1990s) were alive at the time of independence. Those who have been in office, or

working throughout the majority of Kenya’s independence had a thoroughly different

understanding of exploiting a central authority. Indeed, they appear to have learnt well

from their old colonial masters, by continuing the tradition of divide and rule. No doubt,

the euphoria that followed the attainment of independence must have certainly

contributed to a culture of not wanting to rock the boat in the decade that followed.

Unfortunately, rather than recognising the incredibly diverse ethnic landscape that now

occupied the Republic of Kenya, the new leaders centralised constitutional power and

authority, repressed genuine opposition and critique; effectively taking the wind out of


35

the belief that Kenyan democracy had the answer to ethnic conflict.

Fast forward to the end of 2007. Over 50 per cent of the Kenyan population was

born in or after 198919. Kenya’s population growth, described in the history background

section above, is not to be overseen when searching for explanations of the chaotic

developments in recent years. Ethnicity must be passed on from generation to

generation. It follows, that depending on how the state has accommodated ethnicity,

parents will comprehensibly pass on this sentiment. As many Kenyans realised

throughout the 1970s and onwards, the way to become wealthy and do good business

normally entailed knowing someone in government, and failing that, to rely upon on

ethnic contacts and extended relatives to achieve upward mobility. Nonetheless, as the

research of Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) into voting preferences shows, “Kenyans resist

defining themselves in ethnic terms.” Investment in education, a sense of pride in their

country’s stability, the leading role played in achieving freedom from colonialism, the

internationalisation in Nairobi through the presence of International Organisations,

NGOs and the UN, among many other factors have contributed to a sense of Kenyan-

ness. A quick survey of many Kenyan blogs reveals, there are certainly a significant

number of Kenyans that reject the regression to purely ethnic identities. Neither must a

strong identification with one’s ethnic group lead to violence.

Even so, it does not take much imagination, to realise what affect the massive

displacement of Kenyans (along ethnic cleavages), beginning in the 1990s, must have

had on younger generations’ perceptions of ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations. Added

to this was the disappointing continuation of ethnic arithmetic and inter-tribal disputes

among the opposition once multi-party elections became possible. After a close reading

of Wrong’s (2009) painstaking detailing of the incredible excesses of pervasive and

crippling corruption in Kenya (both under Moi and afterwards), it is understandable that

disaffected Kenyans no longer respected the state or it’s projected national identity. In

conclusion, generations of Kenyan leaders had failed to address the divisive and

competitive effect that colonialism had had on its various ethnic communities. Latent

ethnic animosity gained momentum, which was reproduced across generations that were

confronted with disinterested, self-serving and increasingly authoritarian, nepotistic

“presidents” and administrations. The children of Kenyans who first saw dispersed

ethnic violence in 1992, were at least 15 years old by the time of the 2007 election. The

largest generation in Kenya has only known a period of confined ethnic 19 My own calculation, based on UNICEF (2007) data, where in 2007, 19,633,520 Kenyans were aged 0-20 years old.


36

cleansing/displacement and politicised ethnic alliances that have legitimised controlled

violence as a means to electoral victory. Michela Wrong remembers the question, with

regard to ever increasing population of youngsters, of what would happen to all the

“jobless, prospectless youngsters” (2009: 303). In 2007/8 this questioned was partly

answered. Whilst “mobs don’t do nuance” (Wrong: 307), they do clearly represent

systematic and wide-spread frustration and grievances.

6.Conclusions

This paper went back into the historical narrative of Kenya to trace the contextual

developments in which ethnic identities developed. By demonstrating the politically

motivated, divisive colonial policies and approaches towards keeping Kenyans from

uniting in opposition, the British were to have lasting affects upon the ensuing inter-

ethnic competing for political power and the corresponding state’s resources. A

quantitative analysis, which recognised the demographic ethnic fractionalisation in

Kenya, was employed to explain why no civil war has broken out in Kenya. It was then

however argued that a further, historically qualitative analysis was necessary to

understand why it came to recurring, and increasingly widespread instances of violence

around the elections of 1992, 1997, and 2007.

The qualitative analysis drew upon numerous theoretical approaches grounded in

social psychology and a constructivist approach to ethnicity. The paper looked at the

interaction between ethnicity and political and economic developments, arguing that

ethnicity as a salient identity responded to such developments. Under the one-party

state, the government in power managed to repress, dissuade or incorporate ethnic

leaders. The Kenyan state, and thus Kenyan democracy, increasing lost legitimacy,

which decreased a sense of national identity, whilst leading to disadvantaged groups

seeking ethnic solutions to their problems. Corruption and a population boom then

contributed to the already growing economic disparities in the country. Once Moi was

forced to allow multi-party elections in 1992, political and ethnic elites reneged their

opportunity to redress ethnic cleavages, and instead sought to better their own positions.

Finally the inter-generational effects and causes of the latent conflict in Kenya

was considered. Indeed, if further outbreaks of even more serious ethnic violence are to

be hindered, then serious and immediate measures must be undertaken that redress the

historic causes of ethnic grievances, and that restore faith in the governments ability to

distribute state resources in a just and neutral manner. Furthermore, the constitutional


37

question of federalism (majimboism) should be handled in an intellectual manner, that

doesn’t simply attempt to create mono-ethnic provinces.


38

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Fraser 2010, Recurring Ethnic Violence in Kenya Without Civil War

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